National Foreign Assessment Center1
General Dozier's Kidnapping: An update
Two weeks after the kidnapping, the Red Brigades have issued two communiques but as yet have made no demands on the VS or Italian governments for Dozier's safe return. The communiques suggest that the Brigades have expanded their political objectives to include European security issues as well as "classgainst the Italian establishment. Italian security forces have ;aade some arrests in the case, but to date have no firm loads as to Dozier's whereabouts. The pace of the incident continues to suggest that the kidnapping willrotracteddesigned to achieve maximum publicity for the Brigades.
This memorandum was prepared for the Office for Combatting
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Some Italian terrorist experts believe that the language of the communiques suggest they vera prepared by nembers of the Venetian column of the Brigades. The vituperative tone and the references to General Dozier as aresemble the Venetian column's communiques during tha kidnapping and eventual riurder of Italian businessmanthis spring.
The communiquesway from focus on the class struggle within Italy and towards more international topics. rigades' propaganda pamphlet earlier this fall critiqued such issues as TNF and neutron bomb production and went into some detail as to how the Brigades perceived Italy's NATO role. While the most recent communique is more polemical than the earlier document, the basic anti-NATO ttirust of the Brigades* current operating strategy is clear.
Like the RAF in West Germany, the Brigades have obviously boen impressed by the size and intensity of the "peace movement'* in Western Europe and are seeking to capitalize on it. By publicly identifying itself withass movement, the Brigades are attempting toeadership position within the movement. Like the RAF, the Brigades believe that terrorist acts against NATO targets will gain them new followers and are acceptable acts to elements of the peace movement.
Both Brigades communiques call for uniting all revolutionary groups into one movement, and the first communique specifically calls on the Provisional IRA and the Basque ETA to join with the Brigades and the Red Army Faction in fighting imperialism. Thiseparture from previous Brigades' propaganda and the statements of imprisoned Brigades members, which categorized ETA ard PIRA as fighting wars of national liberation rather than engaging in class warfare. The Brigades have evidently decidedan-European front should be established to fight imperialism and are calling on ETA and PIRA to add their considerable resources to the struggle. It seems unlikely, however, that either ETA or the Provos would find much to gain in such an alliance. While it is known that the Brigades and the other three groups have at least passing contacts with one another, it is doubtful thatcoordinated action by all these groups is feasible. H
While it is dangerousTOo much into what isropaganda broadside, the second communique implies that the Brigades have decided to suspend operations against domestic Italian targets and move against US and other NATO targets. The communique suggests some structural changes to the
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Brigades' table of organization, but it. is unclear how the renaming of the group and any change in organization will affech future operations.
Despite some speculation that General Dozier might have been movedeighboring country, Italian authorities believe that the Caneral is in Italy, perhaps in the Milan-Verona-Venice
experts believe that Moro was never far from Rome, and raay have been kept within Rome itself.
.Tnehave made several arrests in the case, incluT^P
one key member of the Milan column. -The massive ando. the search makes it likely that the authoritiesmore Brigades members and sympathizers. Thus, thehave the side-effect of seriously disruptingand its support apparats. Although rone ofto date appears to have first-hand knowledge ofcase, offers of rewards for information and anby police andsecurity authorities may finallyfirm leads.
earlier allegations by SISMI chief Lugaresi and some Italian political leaders that the Dozier kidnaoping had a
g that While no
roreign hand" including possible Libyan, Soviet, or Palestinian involvement, they have been unable to produce any evidence to back chese statements. There are soma fragmentary reports which
was one gades 3ome West
played an operational role in that case.
evidence was ever produced to sustain that theory, there report earlier this fall stating that the raf and the Bri. had operational contacts and that the Brigades had provided assistance to the RAF during their attacks on US targets in
Germany this past summer.
Near Term Prognosis
The Brigades are likely to continue to prolong the case in order to milk the case of its maximum publicity value. Future
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communiques will probably become more focused on specific demands" on the US and Italian government, including termination of agreements to station cruise missies in Italy, reduction of the US military presence in Italy, an end to the stationing of the Sixth Fleet in Naples,emand that Italy not involve itself in theater nuclear force modernization,H
Brigades' references to "prisons- in^^fl communiques may foreshadow demands for blanket amnesty for imprisoned members oc the release of key group leaders. The group may also demand that the Italian media publish Brigades' propaganda. I
We believe there are several factors now miJ^^Bgsafe 3
Venetian column, which apparently provided most of the operational assets for the kidnapping, murdered its last kidnap victim.
Brigades may decide that Dozier's murder wouldajor blow, destabilizing the Italian government and resulting in massive governmental overreaction, including suspension of civil liberties. Incenario, terrorist theoreticiansassive spontaneous "peoples' uprising."
Brigades may calculate that the public would regard the release of Dozier unharmedefeat in light of the firm, no-concessions stand by the government.
accidental discovery of the "peoples' prison" and an immediate assault by security forces. In such an unstructured incident, the Brigades are likely to resist, and Dozier's chances for survival would be minimal,
Factors favoring Dozier's safe return include the follffil^
members of the Brigades may balieve that killing the General would create public revulsioncale as large or larger than the murder of Moro. Most senior Brigades members believe that Horo's murderistake, and that favorable publicity gained during the operation was lost when Moro was murdered.
Italian government might make concessions short of giving in to Brigades' demands on NATO issues, in the cases of Judge D'Urso and Cirillo, the Italian government quietly acceded to some demands for the safe release despite public pronouncementsno concessions.
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Brigades nay believe that the murder of General Dozier wouldrack-down oncale and with such
intensity that the group could not survive. The Brigades, like other terrorist groups, are aware of the demise of the Uruguayan Tupamoros after they murdered US AID official Daniel Hitcrione.
Given the probable long duration of this case, other factors may arise that wouldearing on the chances for General Dozier's safe return. At the moment the initiative is with the Brigades, and they will continue to control the pace of the incident unless the Italian government is able to modify the scenario. One way might be to implement plans to cut off communicatins between imprisoned Brigades' leaders and their at-large members. Other options would include warnings of draconian reprisals should the General be murdered, solicitation of tho help of illegal entities such as the Mafia, and an expanded "internationalization" of the search effort. These efforts might hslp the government regain the initiative and put the Brigades on the defensive. Incenario, the Brigades would have to alter their plans; once they have diverted from their carefully thought out qame^lan, the chancesrigades* mistake
Theretrong possibility that the Brigades will try to kidnap another US official orATO installation in the near term to increase the pressure on the Italian government. Recent information from SISDI warns of an attackS target by the Naples column of the Brigades, an attack that could occur in the next few days. The Brigades also may have decided to attack senior Italian politicians. Communique numberingles out Socialist Party Secretary craxi severs! times. ^HHIOriginal document.