Soviet Short-Term Options in South Asia
CIA HISTORICAL REV
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rhi*fot rel* ^HISTORICAJ, RTJir-contr*l
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SOVIET SHORT-TERM, OPTIONS-IN SOUTH ASIA"
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF INTEUIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTEUIGENCE BOARDPvrtepottd in ,h- prepora.ion oflhe
Ay^y. ooditgniiolo Porlkipatng;
of SMI Ic(,
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CONTENTS
THE CURRENT STRATECIC ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH
SOVIET POLICIES IN SOUTH ASIA
-1
Pakistan
India
SOVIET OPTIONS
ii
Inc.eascd Pressure on Pakistan via Afghanistan
Attempts To Manipulate Indian Policies
CONCLUSIONS
KEY JUDGMENTS
Over the nexl six toonths, the situation in Afghanistan willthe Soviel Union's most pressing problem in South Asia.
The Soviet military intervention has demonstrated Moscow'sto use force in support ofragileKarmallias improved the Soviets' military potential in the region. On the other hand, the Soviets continue toolitical price for this intervention, including Pakistan's pursuit of closer ties with the United States and China and China's campaign to improve relations wiih India.
Moscow's military presence has preserved the Kabul regime artel" enabled it to keep tenuous control of maior cities. However, thcase of that regime is narrower than it was infghan Army capabilities have declined, and the securily situation is worse.
In September, the Sovietsigh-level mission to Kabul to take slock of the situation and, in November, they began sending in additional forces, now numbering. Mosl. if not all. of these men probably will perform security functions, thus freeing maneuver elements already in the country for combat operations. Thc Soviets simultaneously have improved their 3ir defense and communications capabilities in eastern Afghanistan.
Wc are noi certain if lhe Soviets have completed theirbut we do not believe that it will00 men-bunging the total Soviet force level in Afghanistan lo. If thoy combine this augmenlation wiih incieases in Soviet cornha_tcould include some increased use of chemicajmay improve lhc security of their own supply lines and somewhal reduce insurgent capabilities near thc cities.
Moscow will accompany these military efforts wiih atlcmpts loore effective Afghan leadership, bul no Soviet-backed alterations are likely to improve lhe regime's standing with thc people. The Soviets will also continue lo feign inleresl in internationallargelyactic to obtain rrcognilion of the Karmal government, bul will remain unwilling loenuinely autonomousor withdraw their forces.
c
Thc Soviets continue lo consider Pakistan's support for the Afghanaior factor in sustaining tbe irsistance. They are likely to intensify pressure on Pakistan during the neat year, stepping up cross-border operations and, possibly, increasing assistance to internalgroups opposed to President Zia. They simultaneously will hold out Inducements to Islamabad to demonstrate the advantages -of accommodation.
Thc Soviets will continue their attempts Io manipulate India's historical enmity toward Pakistan and its concern about Pakistan's improving military capabilities. They mighl urge India to strengthen further its forces along thc Indc-Pakistan frontier and Initiateborder incidents to distract Pakistan and prevent it fromits forces along the Afghan-Pakistani border Sovietwill have lilllc impact, however, unless the Indians, for their own reasons, decide lo move against Pakistan.
We believe lhat none of the USSR's probable actions, either alone or in combination, will significantly improve its overall position in Afghanistan. Therefore, within thc year, wc eipcct the Soviets again to face the difficult choice of further augmenting their forces inTheir decision then, as now. will bc determined not only by thewithin Afghanistan, but also by Soviet domestic developments and the internationalthc situation in Poland
I. Thb paper eaimines possible Soviet ocXkmuAsia ovet the not sit io If months. It focusespolicy toward Alehjnislin. Pakistan, andsituations tha! might prompt new Sovietthem; Soviel options; and Soviel
THI! CURRENT STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH ASIA
The Sosiet military- Intervention in Afghanistan hasew stralegic situation lhat affects llie entire region and other poweis hiving inlereiti in the region Aside from Afghanistan, the most obvious impact Ins been on lalislan. which now faces Soviel military power on ill western border as well as its traditional enemy. India, on lhe east
The Pakistanis, believing themselves vulnerable both to subversion and eiternal miliiary pressures, have responded by supporting (be Afghan inturgentt tn order to hamper consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan. They also haveloser security relationship with the United Stales and strencthencd lies to China and their Islamic World allies The Soviets, who have Hied to pressuie and entice Pakistan into acceptance of their presence, must be particularly distressed by lhe enhanced US position in Islamabad and ihe potential for closet US-Chinese cooperation in suppotl ot Pakistan
The Indians remain ambivalent about the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan:
They aie concerned by the removal of tbeAfghan buffer between lhc USSR and Soulh Asia Thc Soviet intervention abo has piovidcd an incentive for the United Slates to svpot* arms to Pakistan and. in ibeir view, heightens the risk ofconfrontation in
' ForilitrusMon ol Inn ind So-iei pollerit, vx HI IMmlwr
lhe region. In addition they believe lhal Iheir own credibility in Ihehas suffered because of their identificttton with the
USSR.
Despite these concerns, tbc Indiansi pressed only muted opposition lo Ihe Soviet presence, primarily because they prefer il lo some of thc possible alternatives, for example, the emergenceilamic slate in Afghanistanro-US Afjhin Pakistani Alliance The Indians also warsMo preserve their close lies to lhe USSR, particularly their acceu lo sophisticated miliiary hardware" and weapons production technology- provided by lhc Soviets
Moscow's military presence in Afgfianbtan has become another major Irritant In Si no-Soviet relations thus reinforcing Bcipnc't inclination to strengthen lies to lhe United Slates and weakening Moscow's position in the USSino-Soviel triangle. China has also em-bailedampaign lo improve relations with India, hoping tode-Soviet relations
Renewed US aid lo Pakistan and support of thc Muslim Afghan insurgents have received Ihc general approval of the Arab "fluid. At llie same lime ihu US policy hasenchmark against which to judge US reliability as an ally in lhc longparticularly if Pakistan shouldineal to ils soveieignty and integrity Western Europe and Jiparvhilethc Soviel invasion, have fcmainecLlcery of getting loo diiertly involved in the struggle.
SOV1EI POLICIES IN SOUTH ASIA
Afghoniilan
Soviets in,lull* believed thai their mihliry intervention inlo Alghinutau in9 and lhe accession of the Babrak Karmit regime would QuKlly bctvlcr the Afghan Aimy. countet lhe lews! ance. and lead to the consolidation of lhe Marint,
iwo-Soviet regime. Theyeipected Quicker P* ogres* la cssunlcr insurgency ooeist.oni Theyhave hoped lhal Ihe coruolidation en* their conirol In Afghanistan -ould (educe Western and Chinese inlluervcc in South Alia and promote Soviet goab in (he area stretching Irom India to Egypt.
hc intensity ol International opposition lo the Soviet military Intervention in Afghanistan haiover Ume. but the Soviets still suffer some political liabilities Another UN resolution calling fo< the withdrawal of (oieign Iroops from Afghanistan was adapted overwhelmingly innd the Isiue continues to impede Soviet efforts to Identify broadly wiih Third World, particularly Muslim state, positions
9 Thc Soviets underestimated the problems they would encounter in Afghanislan Although they hive managed loro-Soviet regime in Kabul, the popular base of (hat regime it narrower (ban it was in9 and ihc security situation is worse Thc insurgents have taken many more casualties than the Soviets, but (hey appear at numerous as ever and lhcir morale is high Allhough the Soviel military presence is not threatened, (he insuigenls aiebetter limed and more effective militarily thin (heyear ago Recent Afghan Ministry of Defense statistics indicate that insurgent eontiol oi the countryside has been growing nther than diminishing.
brunt of the war against tlse insuigenU. Thedecline In Afghan Army capabilities has meant lhal the Soviets have had to become more involved in the fighting, but many of their operations bare been Ineffective. Kabul's Inability last summer to recall aneservistslow to Soviet hopes of rebuilding (he Afghan Army.
n (he last few months. Soviete USSR
faces mux problems Innd, for the first lime, (he Soviet press has begun to acknowledge the eilent of the resistance efiort and indicate that there hive been Soviet fatalities Tbis bellied candorwith the return to Kabul of Soviel First Depult Defense Minister Sokolov and other senior Soviet military off-.ciili Their almost continuous presence in Afghanistan since September suggesij_conside(ition ofshift in Soviet tactics
n November, (he Soviets began sendingfoices to Afghanistan. These numbeien ind include eight independent securily biiiiUoru, two independent motonicd rifle baitilions. and anegiment Evidence suggests that most, tl not all. of the newly arrived battalions are intended to perform instillation and route security, thus freeing mincuver eljrnents ilrcady in lhe country for combat opera) ions|
The Soviet commitment in
Afghanistan is irlafi'eh small, however, and tbe Soviets can continue to ibsoil) the political, economic, and military costs of iheir occupation
II. Thc Soviets hive eipetimenledariety of (aeticsontrol the Alghin situation. On (he political side, (heyriedkeptical populace ihit the government respects (slim and to peisuadc il lo iotn mass popular orginiulsons Such Soviet elloets to broaden ihe popular base of (he regime have failed The Kabul leadeiship remains ffeClionaliand and Ins been iceiive
n llie miliiary side, lhe Soviets hive madeconcerted elloil lo have the Afghan miliiary bear lh"
^hot-range air defense missile systembrought into wealcrn Afghinislan shortly ific. lhe mv.rion. Thenit recently deployed lo cistern Afghanistan replacesitingnft unil and suggests Soviet conce.njbout an increased air Ihrcat. possibly from Pikotarp
Poliilon
toscow his longloiled li.do-Pakistan,vchicle for forging close, lies to Newhe So-ieis hive generally backed Indus on the issue of Kashmir, and they gave strong biekine
(
lo India during,1 Irtdo-Pakistani wai that led to the secession of Eut Pakistan and Its liansforoutton Into Dangladesh Alter the war,drift away Irom the West increased as did iu efforts to strengthen already good relations with China.
n the immediate aftermath of the Intervention, the Soviets sought to reassure Pakistan that its security was not threatened They honed to draw Pakistan into direct dialogue with Kabul and recognition of tbe Babtak regime. Soviet policy hardened, however, .when Islamabad condemned the Invasion and sought Islamic and Third World support for its position. Thc Soviets have been particularly eonceined bv Pakistan's tuppori and sheltering of the Afghan insurgents, which theyajor factor sustaining the resistance.
hroughout 1PM snd mosthe Soviets combined threats and biandishments In an effort to move Islamabad toward acceptance of the status quoalt in ils support lor lhe insurgents. Soviet threats ranged fiomilitary pressure lo stepoed-up support for Pakistani dissident groups-Foreign Minister Crc-myko wen' so far as to warn in0 (hat continued Pakistani support for tbe resistance threatened to jeopardize Pakistan's existence.
hreats of internal subveision were givenbv Moscow's decision ino allowregimeive sanctuaryase ofto Al /nilIkar,headed bvformer Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's sonsto (he over(hrow of Zia. The Sovietscontactaluchi and Push tunand" have suggested to Islamabad that lhcsupport separatist movemenis Soviet threatspressure were reinforced by incidentsborder, some ofppear to have
oscow simultaneously offered Pakistanincluding economic aunlance and possibly eventual miliiary aidetter lo Zia. (he Kremlin suggested in1 that Pakistaniof ibe Itabrak icglme mighl lead to settlement of the disputed l'akisUn-Afghanistin border which no Kabul government hu ever lecogntied. These over-lures met wiih no success
tl. Moscow's frustration over Pakistani arms deal with the United States as wdl ai Increued pressure from the Insurgents may be behind thc recent Increase In KUcks en Pakistani border posts and refugee camps. Zla. In turn, has used (Kes-rstticks tohis position domestically, to secure an anti-Soviet Afghan resolution at the UN this year, and to lobby for (he salefis by the US Congress.
Ineks
The Soviets consider India their main ally in efforts to contain China snd block US advancement In Soulh Asti. India's stralegic location, regionalpowerful armed forces, and leadership stilus in Ihe nonaligned world are also (jelors motivating (he USSBursue close bilateral lies, as symbolized by1 Friendship and Cooperation Trealy. To maintain close tiesndia, the USSR hu been generous in etiending miliiary assistance and has allowed the Indians to pieduee Soviet weaponry.
Events in Afghanislan have intensified Mos-cow'i interest in close tiesndia. The Soviet Union has lookedhe Indians lo dampen International criticism of Soviet behavior and restore the credibility of Moscow's claims lo be thc "natural ally" of the nonaligned nations. The Soviets also want Indian help in preventing Pakistani support of the Afghanand in undermining cooperation among China, Pakistan, snd the United Stales.
The Soviets were pleased by Gandhi's return to power in0 Candhi hu not forgotten lhe USSR's shabby treatment of her when she was out of power, however, and remains arTrToyed lhat Moscow has not forced India's pro-Soviet Communists toher domeslic programs. Bul she wants Soviet cooperation and support and will continue lo seek the best possible terms for economic and military assistance.
Moscow has iried to cement relations with Candhi by scheduling high-level exchanges andincreased assistance. In0 (henations signed an arms pact estimatedS billion; the sophisticated miliiary equipmente supplied India will further strengthen its undisputed militaryin Soulh Asia
'opj-W'el
Inreihnev madesecond stale visit to India, lhc onlyorld nation he has visited sincehe visit resuh-cdoviet plcdc' of MOO million In new economic aid, offers of additional arms, andlarger guaranteed supply of Soviet oilime when most Soviet aid recipietiG were facing smaller future Soviet deliveries.
The SovieU clearly see benefit accruing from continuing, tensions between India snd Pakistan. These tensions. Including those stemming from Islamabad's rvoclear weapons program and the US Pakistan arms rcUt(pnsbip. have giveneans of Increasing IU ties lo New Dellti
everal high-level military eichanges1 reflected Soviet efforts lo strengthen thc military relationship as well as to head off India's armiefforts with the West, these include anlo purchase West Cerman submarines andI for purchases of French lighter aircraft. The Chief of tbc Soviet Cencral Staff. Ogarkov, visited India In April, and Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Corshkov visited in November and December. Numerous other military missions have negotiated dctaib of0 arms accord, they have offered more naval equipment andircraft, which the Soviets have advanced as (heir answer to6 The Indians consistently have resected Soviel requests for access lo Indian military facilities, although ihey have allowed naval ship visits
POSSIBLE SOVIET OPTIONS
A variety of circumstances could cause further changes in Soviet liehavior in Soulh Asia.
Should tbe Sovieu perceive lhat the current augmentation, appaiently modest, is inadequate and lhat thev Still are losing ground in Afghanistan, ihey mighladical change tnasic change also could be prompted by jockeying within lhc Soviet leadership orignificant increase in insurgent effectiveness Soviet decisions in Afghanistan will alto be affected by worldwide developments.
-.particularly in Poland, and pouibly in Korea, the Middle Easi. and Onlral America
SovieU arc already ciptostlng Indianabout Pakistan's improved military capabilities
Whale India's overall military superiority will not be cbartcnged by Pakistan for lhe foreseeable future, Ihc
ill give Pakistan improved capability to launch deep penetration raids Into India. Thb concern as well as Pakistan's nuclear program could spark Indian military action, which could work lo Soviel advantage in Afghanistan.
Afghonbton
Theoretically, Ihe Sovietsange ofin Afghanistan. These Include unlikely policies, such as unilateral or even negotiated withdrawal on lhe one hand and massive escalation on the other. More likely prospecU Include reliance on the modest augmentation and shift in tactics currently in train or. should ibisore significant buljdup
The withdiawal of Soviel forces fjoen Afghani, slan would lead lo the fall of the Afghan regime Clvcn lhe high price already paid, trie likely tepercui-tions wilhin lhe Soviet leadership, lbc severe damageove would inflict on foviel credibility, ind concernew Afghan regime might beIslamic or possibly pro-US or pro-Chinese In oiientalion, il is highly unlikely thai any Sovielwould scrioudy contemplate such action in the near futuie Similar considerations would also argueegotiated withdrawal wilhin lbc neatonths
AIteinatively, the SovieU also have lhe military capability to massively augment their forces in Afghanistan Such an augmentation would be designed primarily lo crush lhe insurgency, but il would also enable them to put more military pressure on Pakistan snd Iran and thus rnore effectively Jianil insurgenl movements across (he borders But lo accomplish lhat, the SovieU probably would need aldditional men Escalation on ibis scale would be enormously costly, engender internationaland cause ettreme logistics problems, ll Is highly unlikely, theiefore, during lhe neat year
t is clear, however, that the Soviets arewith atimited adjustment in the numbers and composition of iheir forces in Afghani-slan Even if the current reinforcement00 men. bringing the lotsl Soviet force level to., unlikely that it will be sufficient lo
meaningful change in thc military situation. Possible Increases In So-let combatI tornreater use of chemical weapons, designed to compensate foe the conlinuing ineffectiveness of mote conventional tactics, will ttill hive only limiied Impact- Tbey nuy. however, enable tbe Soviets to improve the security of their own supply lines and lomcwhal reduce insurgent capabilities in and near the eilies.
the Soviets have decided on aaugmentation,00 men.would implement it gradually toproblems and minim ire internationalIn addition to improving security, thuthem to citcnd the Afghan regimes
Soviets will continue lo linker withpolitics in the hope of obtaining aleadership They have been particularlywith continued disputes between theand Khalqi fictions of the AfghanParty. Rumors of imminentare frequent enough to suggest lhal (heactivelyewevelopment might reducefighting at thc top. it is unlikely to improvestanding with lhe people or increasecontrol.
Soviets abo will continue to eipressinternational negotiations but will seek toon alleged US. Pakistani, and Chineseof the insurgency Actual negotiationsnever start because tbe Soviets are unlikelyto Western demands to broaden lhe baseregime and withdraw their own forces.fostering an image of reasonableness andlo talk, tlie Soviets hope to deflect some ofdirected at their uncompromisinga development would be especially valuablelimutlancously chose to inciease ilsIbe Afghan resistance as well as Pakistan
Increased Pressure on Pakistan via Afghani si on
Soviets, frustrated by Ihe failure ofto persuade Pakistan lo accept ihein Afghanistan, are takingmore aggressive
Islamabad Tbey still may hope lo shakexJiCses of support for Ihe Afghanand close security lies lo lhe United Stales. The options avalUble to ihern include greater aupport for Pakistani diuaoenti, support for tribal minorities, and cross-border
he Soviets might well Increase aid lovariety of political and ethnic groups in oppositionhey abeady maintain contact with the Pakistan People'i Party and Al Zulfikar. Pakistani Pushlun and Baluchi separatistnd pro-Soviet Pakistanione of these groups has demonstrated lhe capability lo mount significant domesticlo /ii. and ihere might be little rapid payoff for Ibe Soviets; such support could even push Pakistan closer to (he Uniled Stiles and China. The Soviets probably calculate,that" putting internal pressure on Zu serve* lo restrain his active opposilion lo iheli policies in Afghanistan and is therefore worthwhile
he Soviets alsoariety of miliury options for pressuring Pakistan, which are currently within the eapabililies of their forces in Afghanistan These Include
Artillery bariage*
Air atucks against refugee camps and Pakistani bolder pott*
Crosj-botder raids by imall, air-assault teams supported by helicopters and fighter bombers
Air or ground attacks agiinsl Pakistani military installations
Regimental site operations lo srite and occupy small segments of Pakblani territory '
Most of these options could be eiecuted by Afghan foices to blunt lhe international reaction
he air and ground allacks undertaken by lhe Afghans and SovieU in leccnt month* may be only lhe first phaseore assertive militaiy approach lo Pakistan Such raids disrupt insurgent activity only temporarily, howeser. and they serve some Pakistani
' Foi adrtiiWd dimifiHnofMlnny ocTUm
Piliataas. fr SMEt1SSSI. TV iovUi Tl<ia< la
Tooa^.e,
Interests byem*!iorulcusrd OO
Soviel ikieat.
continuation... on scveaal factors. Includingwell (hi Soviet* anAfgfartislan. and tke esScni of Pakistaniitaciion to the leeenl ipaie ofhaitraaVie mlowtlk iotrwiuw. aircrafl etoae* to
enttonal attacks on regular PaluiirHopposed lo itnics on border pasta) mightIn intimidating Paktitan and couldof an iMeniibed Soviet campaign aiilnilTheir iigood chance thai Pakistanbr strengthening Hi defenses on ihrand seeking rioter lica io ike Unitednd China Thrie abo would beloourse Major aiiscli ihricforcrd unlikely in lhc neit rear
ccupation ofnvill part of Pakistan would be difficult logistiraUv and would involve sub-ft ant ill risks for the Soviets Tiooos would have to be resuppliedountainous fronlk'ugged and comfitrled In addition, lhc international costs would be hick, greater Sioo-US cooperation would probablyasd there might be increasedupport lor US military preseaee io tke regionmight Invoke9 Executive Agrorment with the Uniled Stales, calling for tke latter. In accordance witk constitutional procedures, to come to Pakistan's aid in Ike event ol Communis aggression Thui. suckn occupation would involve ihc mk ol confrontation with lhe United States Given tkese negativeand ike uncertaini unlikely that lheould consider suck aciion in ike neal year
a iaige-seale invuion ol Pakistan in Ihe butave no evidence of actual preparation) lor luch an operation In fact, tke Soviets have insufficient lexers Us At|haM*tan lo OiiY it outdoes ruck action secan an eftectrv* way for the USSRolve alt Afghanke military el Fort required would hegreater tkin thai ot tignlfi canlly eapanding Soviet operalkiru in Afghanistan. And the Inln nil tonalncluding ikr mi of
wiak tke United St.tes. make.ption lor tke Soviets loontks
Aitcmpu MeWpuiaU vvton Pofccwi
acedaruinulng unsatisfactoryA'chanislan. tke Soviets may further Intensifykialocical enmity toward
Pakistan. Tke* araagk asrac tarsia la totreaae proanalilaryPakistan,Ikal tins would help undermineluppari for ihr Afghan Intwt geney; lead lo Ziai ouater. cresira US-Patblaai rctaltoM by crealiag doubl la Washington about lhe appropriate resraonse; and derail ant pauibilivlno-lndianoviet tocowiagemcnt -ill have Lttle impact, kowevcr. unless the Indiana have decked to late
I
IS Tke Sovieu also couldoordinaled Ind*Sonet cflort lo sUengikea lhe PitbUa People'sn opposition pails headed br Bhutto's widow Tlieoreasons, may ahead? be chaisn*tnig suppocl lo ih* PrT.
oscowndian prnaiui on Pikolan to keep lhe bller'i forces concentrated near India and thus prevent lilamahad liom tliengtheniiui1troopt aksng Ike Pakmiau-Afgkan border. To caaore tho. tke Sovietsndia to Urcnctkrn further K)long Ihe Indo- Pakistani Ironlkr ai weD aslo initiate inlermillenl border incidents Such incidents nsicht occur inaoelaao witk Soviet-backed Afghan raids aerau lhe Alghan Pakntini border Pakiatani officials already belkvc lhal recent simuhineous inridrnii along Pakulani borders witk Alfhanistaa and India rnd^ate Indo Sonet coHuuoe lo presWe PakBtaas mititanb'-
hccould calculate thatet-cen India and PlkbtaaPakinan from supporting ihr AlghanThey might hopeakistani defeatoioie pliable iraime in Islamabad and besetback lor tke Uniled Stales and Chinathat thr Uniled Stales would not
become involved if tke lighting Involved only lhe Indians and lhcn tke olher kand. lhc Sonets might be concerned thaibntc-scsV dashhinese preMot on
etter climate lor the US presence in iKe legion, arid an Increase in Superpower (cruions.
venoscow wanted to encouragelarge-scale Indian attack on Pakistan, the Indians would not be responsive unless Candhi perceived an intolerable Pakistani threat to India's security, inucleaionventional military contest.
ndia mightarge-scale attack against Pakistan without forewarning Moscow Nonetheless, it would eapect Moscow to give political and diplomatic support and to rapidly replace lost or damaged equtp-jnent. New Delhi would risk alienating Chins, bul, given China's current military capability in the llims-lavas, wouldwo-front war lo develop
The Soviets mighl not encourage such Indian action, but their desire to maintain close iclilions with India probably would keep them Irom trying to prevent it. They probably would leel compelled" to support India rhetorically and through resupply.
II there ii no maior conflict in the region, the SovieU will remain concerned about and continue lo try to stall Sino-lndian norma li tat ion in order to keep India more amenable to Soviet loreign policy obiec-lives. Soviet efforts have had little success because both China snd India see advantages in normiliulion. however, little progress has been made and any noi mali ration is likely to bc slow. Even if normalisation were lo accelerate. Moscow's policy toward India would not change because India remains live most significant Soviet ally in Asia and an important coun terweight to China
CONCIUSIONS
mid November, the Soviets haveiheir total forces in Afghanistan to about
usted the composition of those forces They abo have upgraded and Improved their air defense and communications capabilityare not certain that aU of the adjustments hav* been complfl. ed. bulo not believe thai (he adjustment current-Iv in train will lead to force leveb lhal greatlyen.
these increases, in the neat sit towe cipect the Soviets to:
Increase their combat activity in Afghanistan; promote changes jn the Afghan leadership to mike it more cohesive snd effective; ind mike some pro forma diplomatic gestures.
Increase pressure on Pakistan Ihrouch border actions; support Zia's optmiscaU to create politi-eal problems inside Pakistan, ind hold outinducements for FaTiitani
Encourage India to apply military pressure on Pakistan lo dampen Zia's support lor the Afghan
insurgents
believe lhat these moves maythe security of Soviet supply lines sndregime's control neir Ihe cities, bul thatnot significantly aflect the USSR's overallin Alghanislin Therefore, we eipcetthe next year, tbc Soviets again will faceoption of reinforcing even furtheris with the preseni chinges. will benot only by the situation withinalso by Sovietevelopments indnational enslronncntthe siiuatmn
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