SPECIAL ANALYSIS
POLAND: arty in Disarray
The long-delayed session of the party's Central Committee that begins today appears primarily intended to demonstrate that the party isital force. The party has made ocant prog-reos, however, toward resolving internal differences andits leading role. The session may provide indications of the strengths of the moderate and hardline factions in thebut the primacy of party chief Jaruxelskl and the military will not be seriously affected, in any event, the party stillengthy rebuilding process.
The need to impose martial law and to erect the first military government in communist historyevere indictment of the Polish leadership and testimony to the bankruptcy of the party. During the party's decay over the IB months before martial law,embers turned in their cardsimilarwere expelled or suspended; this has reducedby about one-sixth. ^ ^
The disintegration of the party created sharpbetween moderates and conservatives, even though there was general agreement that martial law wasthat tho party would have to be reestablished as the leading political force, and thata strong state apparatus would have to be created. bbbbI
Conservative Strength
Martial law vindicated the conservatives, who had consistently advocated firm measures, and they are now seeking to reshape the party in their image. When the military steps'aside, they want to take over and to reject any significant reforms.
Although the hardliners are few in number, they are disproportionately strong in tho party apparatus and the security services. Consequently, they,are able to exert Influence through intimidation.
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inability to rule by itself ensure that the martial law regime will remainear or more-while tho party is rebuilt. The hostility of manyofficers toward civilians increases the chances of a thorough housecleaning.
The Military Council istrong position to perpetuate its authority to make decisions and to determine the shape of the reborn party. Ineneral heads the Central Committee's cadre department, and reserve officers reportedly are being placed in local party positions. ^
The Soviet View
Moscow frequently has used hardliners in theput pressure on Polish leaders for firmerof this tactic has been limited, however, byto avoid weakening the party further by
Although the Soviets are urging purges and other measures to restore party cohesiveness, they realize that the process will be long and that the time is not ripe to return to civilian rule or to place aat the helm. So long as Jaruzelski appears able to maintain order and pursues policies generally in line with Soviet wishes, Moscow probably will continue to accept him as the best choico over the near term. It will not hesitate, however, to use its conservative assets to influence him toard line.
Outlook
If the conservatives ultimately prevail, the party will become even more Isolated from society. It willmaller organization that will rely solely on fear and coercion to maintain control. This inherently unstable situation wouldew round of resistance,attacks against party and police personnel.
The only hope for the party to move eventually toward an accommodation with the Polish people may be for an outsider such es Jaruzelski to retain the party Jaruzelski, however, has neither shown serious interest in remolding the party, nor demonstrated the required political skills.
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The conservative side is led by former Politburo memberlast year after leading an attack against former party chiefibin Siwak, an outspoken Politburo member opposed to Solidarity. member Olszowski, who wants to become party leader, may havehurt his cause by appearing to stay on the
A recent document suggests that at the meeting the conservatives will renounce the policy ofurge of those who supported reforms, and call for reduced ties with the West. They alsomaller, tighter party structure that can exert unchallengedover the party and the country.
The hardliners almost certainly regard Jaruzelskiemporary leader. They need the Army but will seek to subordinate it to their control. Although they cannot attack jaruzelski directly, they may try tohim from such moderate advisers as Deputy Premier Rakowski and Politburo member Barcikowski.
The moderates, in contrast, are weak and on the defensive. Even before martial law they were ambivalent about the reforms demanded by Solidarity and the party rank and file. Rakowski probably represents them when he argues that the new party must not restore theunresponsive style thatajor cause of the country's numerous crises. J
At the local level, the moderates seem to be the main victims of purges. Their position probably would erodeny new unrest that leads to greater repression.
In the meantime, the pragmatic Jaruzelski offers the moderates their beat hope for continued influence because he appears committedourse of some eventual political accommodation. His support for reform of the bureaucracy, wibh emphasis on technical competence^outs him on the side of the moderatesey issue.
Military Retains Control
The continued party infighting solidifies's position and encourages the military's appetite for power. The need to maintain control and the party's
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