special analysis ussr-poland"
oo ems tic.
international repercussions of the oraakdown, in.,,
vty degree ofoncmy for the union movements
tbe soviets are aware that worker morale endcannot be created by military decree, but they have given little indication of how they believe the poles should proceed tourable economic: and political order even over the long term. eamV
> moscow so far appears to be hoping thator other solidarity leaders can be persuaded to workregime. the soviets realize, however, thattlon of bargaining between labor leaders andcould threaten the USSR'* main policyof eliminating any challenge to centralizedcontrol. the soviets will not tolerateto the confrontations between solidarity andthat prevailed before martial law. teens" 'on ,
severe financial and .economic constraints haveeady forced the ussr to reduce its energy snd other raw'- material exports to its bast european allies, and moscow can-continue to support the polish economy only at the cose of .painful adjustments for itself and its other allies. the soviets will want to enforce discipline, but to allow the polish economy to run down would pose
approved for release
risk* that could necessitate Soviet Intervention, ^rr, mcly COn0mictherefore appear
If future developments lead the Soviets toor harsher measures within Poland, the costs of martial law will become greater for the DSSR. Additional Western credits would be jeopardized and this would Increase the burden on the DSSR'a domestic economy,
The Soviets' caution In dealing with theselikely to lead them to show some tolerance forregime's attempts to convince the population ofgood Intentions.-, They probably will accept
concessions as the release of some prisoners and the emergenceocile Solidarity. Moscow, however, also realizes that easing of restrictions on Solidarity and the freeing of detained individuals could give thehance to reestablish itself in factories, emamV
For the moment, the Soviets are supporting Premieronly to use himocus for foreign criticismmartial law. Over the longer term, there is potential for.friction between the Soviets and Jaruzelskiariety of issues, including!
adequacy of Soviet economic assistance.
acceptable limits of conciliation and compromise with Solidarity.
military and security requirements In Poland. -
pace and scope of the restoration of civilian party, rule.
traditionally independent role of the Church. ameer -
Although th* issues dividing th* Soviets and Polish authorities are serious, they should not be overestimated. In the short tern, the factors bringing the two sides ogether will predominate. Both give priority to the strengthening of internal control in Poland. US economic measures against the Soviets and the Poles could belski as-justification for oloeer cooperation.
If, however, Jaruzelski'or othsra on the Supreme Military Council try to work with some elementsolidarity, Moscow will use Its leverage to limit any concessions. esses1
" Over the longer term, Jaruzelski's militaryand his nationalism may lead Moscow to seek other leaders in whom it can place more reliance. The Soviets are likely to move in this direction if friction becomes serious over ths acceptable bounds of reform and political compromise, over economic aid, or over their efforts to strengthen their military presence. At some point, the Soviets will want to demonstrate the re-creationarty political leadership, and they will work toa collective leadership that can be exploited by Moscow, emmma.Original document.