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The Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People, and Policies
iMltiliftiicr
hfrimtim amiable aiaffO2 hoi been ilea4 in the preparation of ikh report
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
Thii repot Iprepared bi
iWflttf olrwlyro. -inhconinoulioni Irom
CemiMlUnuerie* arcand myirected loiheChiel Olf.ee of SoviciAnilri.
Thc Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People, and Policies
Keyand death among the agios; Soviel leadership have propelled
succession to the lop of Moscow's political agenda. Following party secretary Suslov'j death in January, President Brezhnev moved quickly to bolster ihc status of his protege, Konstantin Chernenko. at ihe expense of Andrcy Kirilenko. the man who prcviourly had been besl placed to become ihe nexl pany chief. Behind-the-scenes opposition to Cherncnko'shas developed and has made Brezhnev's own position moreThiswith the reported illnesses of bothandthat succession maneuvering is intensifying and increasingly preoccupying Soviet loaders
In Ihe three past successions. Ihe key to victory in ihc power struggle has been control of the party Secretarial and its powerful staff. This, in turn, has ledontrol of the provincial party apparatus and to some influence over ihc economic ministries, the security apparatus, and the military command. Only Stalin succeeded in winning complete control over the regime's entire machinery. Short of this,licing and reasonably stable leadership has been possible when the General Secrcuty. basing himself in the Secretariat, has had sufficient strength to dominate the Poliibuio. the party's chief policymaking institution
Precedent would suggest that Brezhnev's successor will be chosen from ihc senior secretaries who hold membership in the Politburo. This had formerly led us to believe thai Ihc succession would come in two siagcs. with an Older interim successor, such as) or) being replacedew years by one of the younger members of ihe leadership. Severaldeath of king-maker Suslov, ihe possibleof Kirilenko. the apparent lack of Politburo support for Cherncnko, and the weakened condition ofmade it equally likely, however,ore dramatic change could occur,ounger member of the leadership quickly to the top without an interim phase. Any such change would require ihe strong support of the military andnd probably would be promptedhared belief thatspecially in ihc economicvigorous action and leadership sooner lailier than later
Wltoevei ultimately comes out on top. ihc succession pioccss is politicizing policy differences within the leadership. The post-Brezhnev leadership will have lo grapple with complex and increasingly urgent political and
economic iuues/oone of which lend themselves to easy volutions. Some notable polk/ differences already have emerged between senior secretaries Kirilcako tnd Chernenko that probably represent vkwpoinis slured by oiliru in thcleadcrihipand within the bureaucracy:
foreign policy issues. Kirilenko has been equivocal in his support of
. iEiirri to the United Slates, less optimistic than Brezhnev about !lhc^prospecti for resolving Sirso-Sovict differences, and less tolerant ihan'nsoit leaders about Fast European deviations fromguidance and direction. Although Cliernenko has airack record than Kirilenko on foreign policy issues, he hat been far more enthusiastic in his support of improved rda lions with the United States and of arms limitation, and well ahead of his colleagues in warnings about the'coriscqucocei of nuclear war.
domestic issues, Kirilenko has been fairly consistent in his advocacytrong defense posture, strict cultural and ideological discipline, and the preferential development of heavy industry, while Chernenko has slrctsed the need to improve the If of the Soviet consumer and called for greater mi nearly "democracy."
Conflict over these issues could lead to some important policy shifts:
The most immediate changes arc likely to be made in economic policy, wilh some reallocation of resouiccs away from agriculture likely after Brezhnev leaves. Even ihe defense budget, virtually sacrosanct since "he, probably will come under some attack. Given theof current weapon programs and the needew leader to obtain the support of ihc military and security services, however, reductions in the growth of military spending seem unlikely in the near term.
Concern over declining growth rates also will intensify efforts to improve efficiency and could bring changes in the economic managementalthough changes that seem politically feasible probably would not significantly improve the economic situation
Departures in the foreign policy arena seem less imminent. Soviet strategy already has shifted toore pessimistic consensus about the prospect* for improved relation' with the United States, and tbis new direction appears unlikely to change, baiting major US initiatives in ihc
immediaterezhnev period. As the pessimism about Soviet-US relations becomeself-fulfilling. Soviet leaders may become even more inclined to pursue policies in tbe Third World that the United States would find disturbing and perhaps threatening to its interests.
Despite the likelihood of some policy channe. no leader who succeedsselected from his contemporariesounger group of Politburowill have the power to pushomryre^yensivc package of domestic and foreign policy programs. Wc know less "about the policy preferences of the younger group than those of the seniors, however, and are less able to predict what Soviet policy might beounger leader has had time to consolidate his position ss party chief. As Politburo members, these younecr leaders have been participants in the policymaking process for someactor that may lessen the likelihood of radical policy shifts when they assume more responsible posts, but their future policy preferences undoubtedly will be strongly influenced by ihe environment at the time
We arc even less able lo gauge Ihc policy inclinations of the generation of Soviet leaders who will come lo the fore in the. Although these leaders could respondncreased domestic and international pressures by iltempting to liberalize the Soviet system, weore likely response wouldeturn to some form of neo-Stalinisi orthodoxy. This would be more consistent with the Russian and Leninist tradition than significant, liberalizing reforms
BLANK PACK
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Coa Cents!
Inniiuli.ini and Their Roic in .Soviet Succession "
Succession Process ' "
1
Central .Committee and Ibe PoUtbura HMeauOtCoatOa
Military
J
Presidium of the Council of Miniiteis The Secretariat and the General Secretary
5 6
('layers
Current Political Scene
Position
An Heir Presumptuous? , erncnVo Broadens His Base
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WillBecome Politiciicd
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Heavy Industry Versus Cortsumer Goods
Tie Spendcri-xiaT
and Productivity
16
Policy Issues
Relations
Curopean ReUtions Triangular PolitkaT
19
Impfiealions
Policy
Policy
on the Successor
Range Uncertainties
BLANK PAGE
The leadership of ihe Soviel Communis! Party his chanced only three times inears, and each time under dramatically different domestic and international conditions. This is the first lime in Soviet history that an entire generation of leaden is departing history's state more or less together. Accordingly, precedents are fragile and the uncertainties great. The Politburo does not yet know who nest will wear Lenin's mantle, nor do we. But this paper win help the reader better understand the process, the people, the political dynamics, and the possible outcomes CJ* ihe struggle for power in Ihethe implications for the United Slates.
The first section discusses the institutional and historical setting in which Ihe political struggle takes place. We then analyze currcnl indications of succession maneuvering anr* speculate about Brezhnev's role in trying to prearrange the succession. The policy issues that will play an important role in Kremlin politicking and the policyof ihe leading contenders, Konstantin Chernenko and Andrey Kirilenko. are ciptorcd ML (Although Kirilenko is now reported to be in poor health and could eventually be eliminated from contention, his views have such strong iiuiilutsonal backing that other leaders undoubtedly will pick up the banner if heinally! the paper looks at likely areas for policy change in Ihe post-Brezhnev era and some of the institutional fac;ors lhal could affect new policies.
The Soviet Political Succession; Institutions, People, and Policies
Their Role USoricl Sueceulon
ThieePolitburo, the party Secretir-in. and Ihc Council olill play key roles in Ihe coming succession struggle. Although Ihcol power often ihifis among theseand their respociive members during aofficials based In the party Secretariat, and especially its nominal head, ihe General Secretary, have historically had the upper hand in this contest.
The
The death or ousier of ihe parly leader in the USSR in all three previous.) ledrolonged power struggle. While the initial appointmentuccessor is made quickly, the new General Secretary needs several yean to consolidate his position. His colleagues in Ibe Politburo dn no)ule readily submit to1 eruptsssume the power and aulhonty of bis predecessor.onstitutional basis for his claims,orced to build support gradually- and sinceI means. Stalin overcame these obstacles in the, as did Khrushchev in thendnd in more l'. in'int took several years (in average of about five! to resolve each of the Ihtcc succession crises. I
While the nev- General Secretary maneuvers to con-soltdate rower, ihc leadership oftenouble mak-in; decisions on comolicy miners. Policy lines tend lo become fouled with political ones,eadershipr-Cise increased influence On policy. If Ihe parly boss fadsonsolidate power Quickly, the Secretariat may becomeem of acute conflict, at ineriod, or there may be in increase in the strength and issertiveness of the government in relation lo Ihe tuny apoaratus. such as occurred in the early post-Sulin years The political arena is widened even
further by the enhanced activity of institutional "in-icresi groups- in the military, ihe economicthe scientific establishment, and ihe creative intelligentsia.
The Central Committee ind Ihe Politburo: Arenas of Conflict
By statute. Ibe supreme organ of the Communist Party of ihe Soviet Union (CKSUj is the party congress, held at least every five years. Between congresses, that role is assigned to ihc parly Central Committee, which theoretically is responsible forthe General Secretary In practice, however, the Central Committee hat been used sincerimarilyegitimize the regime's decisions and ctions, lis membership has become much too large andnow hasullembers andandidate (nonvoting)serve as in effective decisionmakingant) it rarely meets more itiinear.
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The Politburo, in fict. prondes ttic re.il forum for the
KJsion making
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hought st nby xen plenumi uliiOiily ilk speak in the jltibsiro.ion;
Bureaucratic as well as political considerations dictate the siae and composition of the "'ling group Since Stalin, membership generally has ranged froml toull IvoiingJ members and from su to ninrInons-onnglosi of these slots have been allocated on almost an ct officio biS'S to men (only one -amanerved on i'ic i'ohlbuio)
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who hold top positions in me party .secretarial, the Council of Ministers, and key regional party and siaie ergonirations For someSecretary. Premier, andthe other hand. Politburo membershiprerequisite Considerable room for political maneuvering, noneiheiess. ciuit concerning Ihe statui of the slots (full orbe number of parly isc (curies on the Politburo, and the re.-fe-scataitoa of the military, police and Foreign
Ihe power and influence of individual Politburo mem* bcri varyespite the formal appearance of equality, and personal clout depends ririmaiily on eiecuiivr position in Ihe ruling institution TheSecretary, the Premier, and Ihe President, as head of theirrgani rat ions, have more influence, for rismple. lhaa lower ranking officials in ifcciti/almas, that is. other scetctaries or depuis premiers Siace Khrushchev's triumphartynet have mm IK beentronger pusii-oa wiihm the Polilbuio than government oflicials with comparableMoscow .based leaders, as rrguljr participants in Politburo proceedings, have more influence on national polic) lhan iheir col-leaguo who work ouiiidc of Moscow and do not
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Under Urcrhncv. Politburo meetings hive apparently become loutinc decisionmaking sessions, not thefreefor-alts thai occurred under KhiusKcKcv The) normally hit been heldel. usually on Thuriday. ltd lynealtv consider only tbiee or lout major quuiionsour-hour session, leaving lesser Issues lo phone Of buck slip coordinalion, Iitucs ate usually placet1 on ihe agenda in advance, wiih the necessary documefU properly coordinated and givenhe membcisto the meeting. The discussion notmally focuses on whether lo like Ibe action pro pence) in Ihe documentside-ranging debate ol many different optiam. If new information or issues ariseesult of thit discussion, final resolution will often be deferred until the new point can be properly staffed out Conicnaasappears to be ihe rale, with formal votes rarely taken
Despite ils vast authority, IheH lis own administrative apparatus. It has to rely on ihe party Secretariatseeuie commands to the parly. To carry cat slate policy, the Politburo depends on the Council of Minister* for econoauc affairs on tit Presidium, and for security allairs on its specialised miniitiiei (Foreign Affairs. Defense, and the KOBl
C'V'etKIIJt';
ihc struggle for po-rr in Ihc Politburo hi) in ihc panailie foi influence -nhin and amonf ihe institutions lhal implement Politburo >rSiatin wed hn p ihe party becretar-hi to achieve political preeanoenee. but in tbc IIWi be relied on Ihe tecum* Mjim locr<onaI dictatorship over ibe Politburo and all other Sonet institutions Stalin's rule so weakened the purty't bureaucratic machinery thai ihe institutional pecking order wM not self-evident in Ihe early pott-Stalinulers in three different invtiiulioru- Ihe partythe governmcoi (Mulcnkovl and the policeto gain pritnicy. ssilhhiuilichcv and the party winning out afier foot vein.oo. used the parti at his institution' al bate, ililuuth he hadharei- 'spscligtit with Premier Kosyginime
Inuilutinnal Inttrni Croats Theliraggtcs described abec hive (one through >uriout luges -frueneader shipriumviritei to individual political preeminence to personal dtciaiorthi[i. Several in-til ulionilased
an active role in ihit proecss, among ihcm ihcthe security organs, the government economic bureaucracy, and.por*"Hly, the Central Committee Secretariat
t Illy. While pro-iding the bichbone for the nation's and the party's security, nihil ryhave been indoctrinated from ihc regime'sto siand aside from higher politics andhave not been ssell positioned to become major players in the posver snuggle. Only twice, in fact,rofessional officer been elected to the PolitburoMarsh'17 and Mitshil Grcehko
Like lkit of Other keynfloence his varied directly with itscohesion and in-ers'l) with theof the political leadership. Succession iirugglesiven the high command more Ircway for engaging in high politics-While the military has not initiated importantchanges, in support is essential: foi ciample. the
miliiaiy threw ill luppcst to Khrushchev durini bis fijhf wuh the antipariy (roup7bsbJy acquiesced in the eoup ifiiati fcim4
Marshalxperience, however, probably still serves as an object lessonilitary professional who eels heavily involved in Politburo politick ma. He supported Khrushchev7 and ordered mihlaiy literal!rinisupporters in theCommitteeoscow. Khrushchev paid of (hb poll licit debt by elcvaiinj Zhukov io full membership on the Politburo Such dependenceilitary leader, nevertheless, made the leadership aervoat. aad Khrushchev nutted him ihree months later, ostensibly foro reduce political contiots overilitat}
' The Tarty, moreover, has ne>er bcea entirely comfort -able with ibe presence of this lirie. disciplined, hierarchical orraniiation in us midst Various checks and controls have been developed to deal with it. The KGU and the Minmry of Internal Affairs iMVDfc for dimple.hei' own miliisry forces Morehe piny has peaetraied the military by ire*nne ;wobodies^-ihe Coital Commit' ice'i Adminisiiaiivr Organs Deparimcnt. which mutt
approve all military promotions, and the Defense Ministryolitical Directorate, which hasia the aimed forces and provides lor troop indoctrination The parly also uses ihe KGB'shief Directorate lo survcil military aciiviticv
More recently, the party leader Jap has placed athe head of theestablishment Although he has fxenclosely involved with the Soviei military industrial cornptci for overears and obtained fcncnl officer rank during the war. he has notine officci, and his appointment may have been opposed by theofficer corps. He appears to be hifhly retarded by his Politburo col leagues and almost certainly is influential in Politburo discussions on security policy. Uilinov's position provides the leadership with an effective meant of controlliniE ihe miliiny. On ihe other hand, askey "ciWun" mem her of the Po.it bu ro. he isavorable position tccnsuie thai military inicrc.sis are promoted. Ustinov also can luihorita-lively use his position is civilian bead of the military io vote its stock oa sensitive perinealraitinc some of the fears such actions byofficer like Zhukov would prompt
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AVeurir/eTrgunt. Ihe KGB has own entangled hipolitic* a' critical junctures Ii became an active participant inooscnricy to remove Khrushchev, and without its help ihc coup alroosi certainly would hire failed StatinIhc police to ehminau his ri>d decimate the professional officer Corps in ihe tnduary
The KGB's potential clout in hither leadershipstems largely from its role in providing leadership security and its control of leadership communications. Il isood position to know about the political maneuvering or compliant! undertrong leader can use It at an insnumeni of blackmail by exploiting privileged information ihe KGB acquires through performance of in duties. Realiriisg itsfor barm. Brezhnev placed three political cromct in key securityuse of thisagainst hm- difficult and perhaps giving him tome ability lo keep .at* on his colleagues. It was used in ihit manner bvin Ihe immediate post-Stalin years
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. has titer theearefining ihe security threat to Ihe USSR and ia determining the progiamt required to deal with this thecal Thii deference ic fleets the party's need for the military's eipcrtitc. its confidence in the highand the considerable congruence of views bei-cenr gam rat ions on national security rwbo Ihe military,esult, has been rather u inrincipal political interest .outlining the resourcesarry out its itohmmi
The political leadership, nevertheless, has beensuccessful in pieventing heads of Ihc KGB from using it for then persona! advantage. Hcriya atlempieil to do so in) in the advent of Sti death but failed and -at ciecatcd. Subte-qucnt chie'i until Andropo-'s ippoiiM 'dewed Politburo Status while they held ibis posit tonoreorer.olitical appointee,areer polxe official. If he hat anr hopes of becomingcontender for Brerhnev't mantle. Andio-pov would piobaWy have lo assume an interimthat has Utile to do with Ihe KGD't Slock in trade
Ihe Fteiiiiam ai ihe Council of Miniimi The Council of Ministers Presidium is primarily reiponii-Mc for managing Ihe Sonet economy ll Oversees the activity of more thanesponsible lor particular sectors ol the economy. ThisiJd mike the Presidiumome of its attendant minntnti influential in ibe Kremlin pc*er snuggle, (or ibis potential to be realized, hosvevcr. its leader* must be strongly represented in the Politburo while the central parly apparatus is weak
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leaden of this vail economic bureaucracy have fur the most pari been unsuecessful in translatingtrnu.it iniu real and enduring power. Only iwiee in the post-Stalin era has this group of 'ciders had considerable clout in the leadership. After Stalin's death the) initially appeared to be more powerful than party officials in themuch so that Malcukos-ave chosen to like the Premiership over the lop parts pos( as his base of power.neverihcle*s. overcame this early weakness andevere dcfea( on the government buicauc-ue>'abolishing moss of their economic niiniMtio 'spelling iis senior members from the
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The economic burcaucracs regained some of its status andhe aftermath of the Khrushchev coup a* actpc participants in ihe conspiracy, in leideis -ere able to get agiecment on recstablishmcni of the central uuni>lrie> in MiincO* and on an economie
rcform package. More imporianily, its leader,Pre-mier Kosygin. received equal billing with Brezhnev, and two ol hit deputies joined him in (he Politburo. This powei. nonetheless, proved fleeting, as Brezhnev used his base in (he Secretariat to gain preeminence over Kr-vgin. and (he reform was eventually under* mined
I he Stereiaiiai and ihe Cwat Stneiary, The real keyictory in the power struggle until now has been Control of (he pany Secretariat and its powerful naff. The Secretariat, consistingeneraland usually fiom seven toecretaries,in (he elaboration of policy alternative, oversees the implementation of Politburo directives and party lility generally, and maintains control of personnel appointment* (thein ihe party and all oihet institutions. Ii is assisted in lis work by several thousand parti officials organired into some twodepariments. each of which is supervised b> a
- secretary. These departments monilorctivity of government minisiries. (he military, ihe securityand other institutions. One of them, (he General Department, pro-ides staff support foe Politburo
In pasi successions, control of (he Secretarial has been convened into control of (he provincial parly appjrj. tus and varying deerees oT influence over (heinistries, the security apparatus, and ihe military command. Only Stalin,ucceeded in "inning complete control over the tejlme's entire machinery Shoit ofirons and reasonably liable leadership has been possible when ihe General Secretary, bating himself in theufficient strengthominate the Poliiburc
The General Scerciars'j power and authority are neither conitiiinion.il> defined nor definitivelyby historical piccedcni. They vary according to hi* capacities and ambitions and the strength of the fortes supporting him on the one hand, and th-influ.nce of those iipposing him on ihe other
While he mutt maneuser politically to cipand his authority, hit position gives him some advamages in Ihe contest with his colleagocs. He is (he nominal head of ihe party Secretarial and. ihtough it. ihe pany apparatus. This gives him an extra measure of SUlus in party mce.ings.ery likely places him in ibe chair ai meetings of the Secretariatim more influence in determining the agenda andof thai body (ban other secretaries have
This penition in the Secretarial is likely lo give himclow in ihe Politburo as well. Despite its crdlective character, ihe Politburohairman to direct its activities, arrange ill agenda, and preside over itshe General Secretary, as ihe leading administrative officer in the Secretariat, is the most logical choice for this role- No one else is as cenirally placed or has ihef responsibility in parly work to perform this funclior
Brezhnev capiialiicd on (hit position at an early stage in hit tenure as party boss. He sets the time of Politburo meetings and determines (he agenda, baled on recommendations from other members andHe controls ihe flow of documents lo his colleagues concerning issues lo be discussed. He has Ihe authority to invite non-Poliiburo members lo its sessions. Most imponani. he sumi up ihe results of Polilburo meetings and -laiet the consensus on Ihe issue under discussior
The Players
The position of General Secreiary. ihiia. is ihe highly coveted prize in the succession struggle. While It will be filledolitburo member, oone of Brezhnev's colleagues hsve as ye(ery strong claimhe post. Precedent, toure, suggesit ihaiuccessor will be chosen from the senior secretaries who hold membeiship in thecrilcxia met only by Andrey Kirilenko.n Chernenko. and ihe mosi recent addition, agriculture secreiary Mikhailage, health, and caperience in various ways make each of these less tbao an ideal candidate Kirilenko isnd reportedly very ill; he hat been absent from leadership fonetiont during the last month. Chernenko isnd
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The lack ofandidaici for ihr rns^could lead ihr Pohiburo If lain te* eahri leaders, such as KGB Chairman Vain Aadiopov oi Defend Minister Dm
triy Ustinov, who iindef other circumstances probably would not be considered Doth Andropov and Uninov aie handicapped by poor hollo and by the rest of the leadership's desire to keep the initilutioni they head firmly under cont'dield of poorly qualified candidaics however, both have the advantage of past eipertence in the Srcreiariii and eiprrtise in key
m foreign affairs in! iceurity mil' ' ten ind Ustinov in economic management andIf enhet should relinquish his present posi and move back to ihe Secretarial, he wouldrime candidate for ihe top party post.
Among iheecond-rank leaders, three regional partyGrisiunri-fOtiy Romanovd Vladimir Shelter-bitskiypossibilities. Of the three. Shehcr bitecently has been the most visible and may be anglingosition in theourth regional leader. Kaiakh party chief Dinmuk-hameds disqualified by his ethnic origin
The remaining PolitburoNikola) Tikhonov. foreign Minister Andre; Gromyko. and Parly Control Committee Chairman Arvidappeare completely out of the running Tikhonoi and Gtomtko ate handicappedotal lack of experience in the parti apparaics and Pelshe bj his agciX'tand Latvian nitidnaltls
The Current Political Scene
Jockeying with in the Politburo hai inienuficdsince ihe.death of ideology vecreiary Mikhailin January Sudos wat nol an asmrani lot the lop party postc> tiabdiring force in leadership politics, working to mainUtn the existing balsncc Cdandole for himselfpower broker in the post-Brerhae> sucecuioneaih triggered an immediate shakcup w> leadership rankings that -beneficial toptotege. Chernenko and damaging to Ktnknko. the party secretary who had been best placed toi. --
The impact of Suite*cftccicd in the announcenseni of Ihe funeral eommisnonwh-ch titled Icirilenaa out of vrouenee and last among the full members of ihe Polilbuio on Hie commission When Smlo- was lying inie/hne* and ahead of Premier Tikhonov and Kiritrnku. bnthof whom previously had outranked him Al the funeral andappeatances likhuno* was back in his usual
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[Kmunn not to Brerhnev. but Chernenko continued lo outrank Kirilenko, standing in thei Stxluvhai make* hint the"second
tj for Chernenkofollowed by loene indirect imping al Brerhnev ihat oould seemcuuirc high-loci suttpori, possibly from.ekmrrii in ihc leadetship who believe hepositioningto become hii successor Numcroui lumoo linking people close io Brezhnev ssith larious ttnn scandals have been plantedWestern corir-sjwndcnis in
According io one let of run>nvon.
Yiiny. maaose hit yob as First Dcpui)
Mtmiici of Foreign Trade because of unsprcilud f corruption. Another set of rumori had
Urrrhncv't slaughter. Galina. being questioned by '* anlhoritirc la connectionjewel scandals invoh-ing - Iki ,tiid lover and the head of the stile ewe**
When Brerhne- fjiled to sign the obit nan of KGB lirw Deputy Chairman Tivigna in January, villi
other rumors surfaced, suggesting thai Tt'igun had
cuenmilted suicide becaute he and Brcrhnctat * orruption case.
tl't'Knri't Position
Tinsrobably tioubksonnc and eniaarrats-ing to BrcrhocT. but ii is not particularly threatening Suchn fact, are lisay and may reflect the desperation of those who oppose Brezhnevs recent rnovea
Brerhnev hat clearly demonstrated thai be stillhas strengthenedacked Kiriknkos. and made some key personchanges. For caairipk, he haso first deputy chairmen of the KGB,indicate he has not lost control of thatMe also removed the trade union chief, whohad the support of Suskw (he bad servediuslo'sold bailiwick) and Kirilenko (wover his LosultauooX and replaced hamofficial Kirilenko had indirectly crit kited.
Ahhough there are no signs lhal Brerhneverious dctcrioraiioo in has health could convince ho Podiburo colleagues that sorne form o* retirement was neceiiary and make his leadership >ubycct to challenge ll may have been Brezhnevs perception of this vulnerability that led him to blockote into Ssis.'o-'s former position as unofficial secondthat would have increased Kirilenko'i ability tog: to hisy giving ihe pen-on torusted protege ss-ho is dependent on Brerhnev.
An Hen Presumptuous?
Kirilenko. indeed, could well havehallenge to Bre/hnev if lefl unchecked Certainly no other
in
contender could much hit credentials foi Breihnev's pott, which even include on-the-job eiperienee is Acting General Secretary daring Brrrhnev*,Kirilcnko hat primary responsibility for ibe i ion ofheavy industry, ranks see-ond onlyrcrhner at ibe parly ipoktsman on general economic mailers, and hat considerable ct pcTtcnce in international Communisi party affnr<
In recent year-hnev _
Seemed to findlalut.eader uniquely qualified and positionedecome the neat party chief, increasinglyn an apparent effor! to counter him. heeries of rapid nmmotiont for his longtime associate and General Department6andidate member of the Politburoad to fall memberisefollowederies of slights and political
setbacks for Kirilenko. beginninghen his protege. Yako* Ryabov. was derooted from party secretary so first depaly caairanaa ofther moves thai seemed designed lo damage his imagee likely successor included the deletion of his pictureewspaper photo of9 Maylineup and, more recently, ihetreatment givenh birthday. Following ibe furtherto hit prestige afier**disatmeaird from pub-Ik view.t
Cbernfnko Broadens His Base
Despite Brezhnev's support. Chernenko's duties until recently had been confined primarily to running the Centraleneralost he has held5 Although the position isoveriees the Politburoecision ma king ma-
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coiners, serving inat liteculiveresponsibilities never have beenwiih those of other seniortinlike Kirilenko. hatnuctlyin economic management, having jervedpositions tinder Brerhnev for more ihao ISuntil relent ly he had only limnedffair*
In an effort lo bolster Cherncnko't credentialscnux secretary. Brerhnev hat been trying for tome lime io eipand hit res ponsibibyhim more in foreign iff jut Sincelection io Ihe 'Secretarialrerhnev bat involved him in hii annual summer mcciingi in ihc Crimea with Hast European leaden and Included him on ihe delegation lo ihe Soviet-US tummil in Viennaespite thete efforts. Chernenko seldom appeared In any capacity lhal luggested independent authority in the area of Soviet-Bait Furopennand report ally playedupponing role at ibe Soviet-US summit,ack (catother Politburo membert on Ihc delegation
Recently, however. Chernenko) involverncni inaffair, hu been on the increase. Late tail year Brezhnev reportedly went to far as to loan vootc of his own foreign policy adviscribrain trust'*as assembling, and P'.vda identified apolicy aide to Chernenko. making him the only party secretary other then Bieihnev toublicly identified assistant. Chernenko received the Yugoslav Ambassador inas the ranking leader at mcclings with visiting Nicaraguan officials in October andnd met sviiha Greek Communist Party delegation inn ibe short period since Suslov's death. Chernenko already hasrominent role in interparty icUtioru. heading the Soviet delegation to the Congress of the French Communitt Party In Februaryith Polish leader Jirurelski last month
More ussportani. in terms ol hit succession prospceu. there arc signs that Chernenko may now have some -direct involvement in personnelarea previously thought to be dominated by Brezhnev. Suslov. and Kinlcnko. Reports of Cherncnko'swiih cadre mailers began to surface with his promotion io full member of the Politburooviet source datrned thatwas taking overunction ofties bet-een Ibe Central Committee and regional piny lenders While there never was any evidence to support lhal ctaitn, Cherncnko didajor effort to get party and government officials at the middle and lower levels lo carry nut kadeifcipassignment that implied dissatisfaction with ihc *ay Kirilenko wai supervoing economic management. The firs! tangible evidence ofiirvolvetnent in personnel appointments came last month, "hen he and Ivan Kapltonov. Ihe junior cadres secretary, presided over Ihc replacement of trade unions chief Shibayev.hen Shibaycv was iiWallcti, the Dtesiding lecrcuries were Kirilenko and Kapitonov.l
Infighting Will Intensify
Cherncnko. despite his recent success, by no meansock on the luccession. While he will attempt to improve his position further. It is unlikely that Brers ncv will name him a*en rent Brerhnev may believe that Chernenko should protect his historical legacy, but he isre that conferring suchaendanger bit own posit ior
With Brethnev gone.ivals coulddefeat him unless he obtains adailionalihose who will make theminus Brerhnev Cherncnko appears tostrong supporters and reportedly commandsfrom such leaden as Ustinov andcurrent behind-the-scenes sniping almoreover, thai by lipping his hand infavor. Brerhnev may hare crystalliiedto Cherncnko'i candidacy. If.e the case.pparentham from contention, other Politburoarc bkciy to contest
This political lofighiiBg is not likely to lead tochanges while Brerhnev remains on the scene. The debate over poticv. nr-tethelcss. willbecome more heated
Issac* Become Polit iciicd
-
Whoever nilir.:KItwl onhe ivaaiice piutci will significantly poliiicire foliey difference; within lite leadership. Virions contenders will iak 10
CXploil issue* facing Ihe Politburo focp" fSOIllI jr.,!
(actional advantage. (Cherisenko. in curikular. has kinvl oil of step wild otheromber oT issues and mayo shifi his position to tainiven the scnousacss and complexity of tlxew leadership will hive to deal with, moreover,'debate and connict over policy Ii likelye paiiicularlysiUrp and intense
oes
Alone wiih Bicjhnev't title, the new Gcotralwillifficultorca singly complei economic situation. Economic growth hit fillcn in Ice*ear for (he past three yeais. leading io (eductions in thellocated to consumption ind iavestase.it. Although paitly the retoli ofailures, (hit decline in growiS has been largely ittiibutablehe deereaiini avail-ability of low-ecul resources (chieflyeries of harvestfactors in (he regime'i recent decision to invest heavily in energy aad if ricalturire rail hi est meat Sachdccj. sidns. if coupled with the usual iocrcracnti lo defense, leave little room for incicites critically needed in ferrous metallurgy, machine buildint.ihei sectors. Wcuither dcteiioialion in the Soviet energy, labor, aad hard currency peeitioas that will eiaccrbate the cconoaue sooccic.rsah. ia theew years it will be increasingly apparent toSoviet leaders slut Ihct will havcioehoosehe conflicting goals of loot-term Orowlh. eontumer taiisfaction. and military power<
HtmfVrumi CaiHun Gearfi. Ihe slowing economic growth rate will iharpen ibeboth the level of capital imrstment and sedoial insesinicnt pii.itii.es. The decision, announced last November, to cut ihe capital investment goal for the Current five-year plan meant that sectors such as machine buildiag. which tome leaders believe are impurtani for kotijc teem growth, will saffrr at Iheof near-tetm prior ilies. As ihe full dimension
of (he economic predicament become clear, the de-maisds of Hnl cliimants for shrinking resources win intensify and reinforce the tendency of centenden to dike out independent positions designed to appeal lo one or another inlercsl represented in ihe leadership. Differences in investment priorities already hive emerged bet-ee/rone group (representod bySbcberbitikiy. and others] (hit his advocated ihe priority development of heavy Ind miry, and(repieseoted by Cheroeako) that has catted foe increasing the availability erf consumer goods, and boih will be marshaling support for their vicwi
Kirilcnko's commitment to the prcfercniialc/heavy industry is long standing and probably
Stents, from hit experience at party leader inof heavy industry and his currentHe his continued lo favor (bisat times when ibe consumer sector hasgreater public attention and rhetoricalfrom Ihe leadership. Recently, for example,said little ibool Ihe derision, so heavilyBrrahnev and Chernenko. lo assignrite to ihe production of consumer goodinew five-year plan. Kirilcnko alio his beenBreihaev'i asssch-rrabtiea-ed calls for aprogram" and in (he pan hai resiiled
oi eutringfront ihr-sector to agriculture
Kirilcnko's lovestmem prrlccnces, moreover, seemshared by Shelter bitskiy and may haveamong other leaden, such at Tikhonov,have indicated similar priorities. Inthere hasorking alliancey. the defense industries, and proponentsmdusiry such as Kirilcnko. This suggeststhis (action. High level differ-
ences over ihe euricnt inveiimem siriiegy werein? by inardacritized the five-year plan justfari'idecfuiie resoareiihehas championed in Ihe
Mir. .
Cherncnko his emerged as ihc icadcnhlp's leading advocate of investment ia coctsunstl goods la hit Lenin Day tpeech inn fan. he argued, pel haps nth Polish devcscevjscnls in mind, that ihcrowthassigned lo consumer gcoda in Ibe preseni five-year plan should be consideredeiinninf. In what appeared toirect retort to warnings fromhe uccsscse said that if popular needs were ignored for Ihe sake of production, aoi-ffv the people, but production loo, would suffer;
ii . attitude toward investment prioriiiei is consisicni wiih hit effort to cultivate the imageeader ailnned to popular asriraixen through calls fo commissions lo study public opinion, more inttapari)and greater attention to ktiert from ihe rank and file. Kirilenke. ahhongh noto popular needs, hat shown Utile appreciation forpproach and reportedly blocked hit recent effort lo setew intlitulc for sociological research, arguing that the parlyhad adequate means for divining public cjinior
Although consumer advocates (such as Milcokov. Khruthchev't exponent in the pott-Slilia lucccation) traditionally have not fared well politically,could find (ommwi cause with such leaders as agricullurc secretary Gorbachev and party leaders from republics not dornioaied by heavy industry, such as Kazakh party chief Kunavcv. His "populist" ap-prcaach also has drawn strong support from Georgian party leader Shevardnadze, who began prorrtotiag theof public opinion studies long before Chernenko. t
Dt/enu Snea/ing. Concern about the domesticalso could impel one or another leader toome reduci'm in the rate of growth of military spending, if not an absolute cut as Khrushchev did in Ihe. The aigurocot could reasonably be made that the military budget of theecades has improved the Soviet positionu the Wcstera alliance lo the point that the country can afford some redirection of resources to argent intergnl iyedijoopnrdiring detente rcctui.cmcnt r
i
lodging from their previous public statement!.would seem more inclined to push for aof military growth than Kirilenko or mostMe has stressed, for eaaroplc, theto be derived from arms limiution.more continently used rhetoric lhal suggestsan undi minis bed defense effort. Th it, ofevoke military support for Kirilenko orwith likeil '- irnenko wereKiriknko's support for investment inheavy industry, however, cornei-ablyhtm to favor some rrxlisiribuiion offrom defense-oceosionno new leader, unless he perceivesikely to advocate cuts in therh't would antagonize Ihe military
Regional Cnnneririsva. Into these sectoral dashes, ihe battle for resources is likely to heighten cor.ructrsons regions of the country andrepresentatives ia the Politburo. Succession polU tics Las typically given regional Leaden moreon national policy, and contending factions wiU esptoit this situation The difficult political decisions regarding resource distribution will be crjmrn,icaterj.
niocco-icr.bj an oixfcrlyioj economic dilemma: ihe Furopean. part Wlhe Seniel Unioncll-dcvcl-oped infrasiruciure" biii-ii short on labor and natural reworccs; pari* of Siberia, where ihe naturalare totaled.are low on labor resources and lacking in infrastructure and ihe Ceniral Asian area
^ha( ample labor resourcesimited leehnical
'base
In the debate over regional im-esimeni priwiiics, some leaders will urge more attentionhe economic interests of the Russian Republicalready taken by Susie and an assistant lo Kirilcnko. While there are "objective" reasons for followingourse (Soviet oil and gas reserves, for example, are concentratedhese arguments also could be advanced as partarger appeal to Russiantraditional refuge of Soviei leaders in difficult times. The new emphasis some leaders recently have placed on RSFSR economic projects, such as the program to develop central Russia's non-Mack -earth lone, could be viewed in this context. Several regime spokesmen also havea solution to ihe country's manpower problem ihai involve- migration of workers (rem the labor-rkh Muslim republics to underpopulated areas of Ihe Russian Republic, Such proposals "odd be strongly supported by local ofTiciab in Ihe RSFSR, who arc now heavily represented on the Central Committee.
Leaders of oibcr republics, several of whom hold candidate or full membership on the Politburo, can be expectedrgue for more investment in Iheir own areas, where consumer and ethnic disconteni seem most likely to converge and cause problems for ihe regime. Already the Central Asians are pressing bard for ihe construction of new industrial facilities and for (he costly diversion of Siberianwovide irrigation for ihe soulhern republics
Although party cadres in the non-Russian republics have less political influence than (hose in the RSFIR. their represenution on the Politburo has grown inyears, and they couMignificant role in the sikceision. Chernenko. "ho (hut farussian bus. ahead, seem.-oh: drawing support from some of Ihcse leader
ll would be difficult to devise an economic program thai would appeal lo all non-Russian cadrc-rhowever. since the interests of the various national republics arc diverse and not entirely compatible. In any event, the strategy of wooing the non-Russians would be risky. Anyone attempting il would have* erase care lo avoid charges of such faults as "bourgeoisincurred by former KGB chief Beriya when be made overtures lo the minorities aftereath.
Efficiency mad ProJuciriiy. The economic dilemma thai Brezhnev's successor will inherit has been heighi-ened by the regime's failure to deal effectively with such underlying problems as labor produesrrity.and chronic inefficiencies in economk management.over declining growth rates will prompt some debate in (he post-Brezhnev Politburo over newio these problemf
Kirilcnko has ekmrmsfraled more Openness loan Chernenko io new ideas in Ihe area of economic management. He was one of ihe few Soviet leadersssociate himself wiih Ihe eslablishmenl of (he Sovietirei Wcjiern-siyle business management school and was ihe first Politburo member to endorse the concept ofrnodiKlionmode of rationaliring industrial management Ihai aroused some rcsisiaoce from the ministerial bureaucracy. He also has gone further than other Sovietndooing ibe Hungarian economic reform'
Chernenko. on ihe Oiher hand, has lended lo stress nonsystemic solutions io Soviei econocnic problems, calling for improvements in ihe duality of leadership at all echelons of the party and stale bureaucracies. He also has attacked excessive pany interference in economic"iiicism of Kir.nterventionist approach.
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On Ibe issue ol labor productivity, Kinlenko see mi ioombination of exhortation, ai etemplified by ibe annual "sociallit competition" campaigns, and wage bonuses. Chernenko, on the other hand, bas rarely addressed the issue, hinting only thai anin the availability of consumerould make wage incentives more mcaningfu1
1 Foreign Policy Issues Foreign policy issues alto couldone of contention In the post-Brezhnev Politburo. Although these issues will be determined largely by the interna-lional situation al (heuccessor regime today wouldumber of serious forhallenges, including ihe US effort lo bolster its military ea pat-improved relations between China andituatidn in Afghanistan ihai is proving more uoublesome than the leadership expected;risis inivotal jouniry in the Soviei empire. Political trends in such areas as Central America, ihe Mtddk East, and Europe, nonetheless, win continue to give the Soviet keadenhip ajMuiS lies io pursue policies hostile to US inieresU.
Sofin-VS Ktltuitnt. Breihne* has madeornerstone ol his foreign policy, even against the opposition of some powerful members of liteand his departure undoubtedly will bring further
review of us relative merits. Indeed, enthusiasm about ihe pursuit of improved Soviet-US reu lions has been on the wane in ihe Politburohen the US Congrcsi passed the Jicksoa-Vamk Amendmenttrade lo an increase in Jewish emigration, and US policy has been actively debated in Moscow imce Washington's unexpectedly sevr" reaction io the Soviei invasion of Afghanistan
Unlike Chernenko. Kirilenko always has been equiv-oca! in bis support of Brcihacv's overtures lo the United Stales, coupling even bis most positive siaie-meati on detente with warnings about ibe uoesuoginf nature of USrom Kiiitcako'tIbe chief justification for pursuing detente probably has been its potential economic benciit. The Soviet-US relationship almost ccniinly hasisappointn thai icgard, however, and hisliaiementt suggest he believes Moscow should be shifting its focus to Western Europe.0 speech be said thai detente Still had some supportober politicians" in Ihe'atcs andin Europe, where by no means everyone Is disposedtake ihe path of Washing ion-imposed adveniure
-St caul i
Chernenko ha* been lar more enthusiastic than Ki'ri-lenko and moil olher leaden in bit support ofrelaiiom wilh ihe Wcit. partkulaily Ihe Unit cdnd of arm* limitation. In his Supreme Soviei election speechor example, he weni further than any leader other lhan Brezhnev in sHcuing Ihe importance of what would have been the neat slep in strategic arms limitation talks fSALT llll Kirilcnko. by contrast,coupled hisendorjemcnl of ihe SALT II wealy wilh calls for "vigilance and more vigilance" against Western intrigues. In another round of leadership speecheshernenko seemed to be (he leader most concerned about Ihe freeze in relations with the Wesl following the inva-won of Afghanislan. He also has been well aheadolitburo colleagues in warnings about Ihe consc quences of nuclear war. noting In hit1 Lenin Day tpcech thai ithreat tovi hra lion."
Although various shades of opinion are still discern-iblc among Soviet leaden, many, judging by their statements, seem to believe the prospeeis for unproved Soviet-US relations areassessment thai could lead ihemndorse effortiounter, distract,mbroil US policv C
3.claims Hie KGB fill concluded mat the United Slates willohcy of confrontation for (he foreseeable future, and Marshal Nikolay Og.irr.ov. chief of th- Soviet Gener-al Siaff. openly said as muchook published last month. Brezhnev alsoessimistic tonerieeeh to (he Pany Congress Ian year
Smn-Ellelation. Economic consider, alions will be increasingly important in leadership debate over policy toward Eastern Europe as well. The leadership remains commllled to maintaining control over its East European empire. The Poliibu-o. however,ilemma. Subsidization of Eastern Europe may now be too costly for theut allowing Easiern Europe lo become economically dependent on Ihein (he case of Poland-is polilically dangerous. Continued economic shortages in Easiern Europe, however, could increase popular cusconteni there to perilously high levels. Thetherefore, is likely to vacillate between courses designed to counter whichever danger seems more pressmgi.en lime, lis basic inclination, howev-er. will beequire the East Europeans io place more emphasis on discipline and control to fill ihe void left by declining Sovin and Wesicrn economic support
Triangular Polities' Those leaders who believes virtually no prospect for US-Soviel cooperation, especially on arms control bsues. migfal ravor pfayinr. Ihe China card ard normalizing relations with Beijing Thai option appears to have been left open, ai least by receni leadership statements. Afler Premier Tikhonovapanese newipapet in February thai he saw no favorable signs in US-So-iel relations and
alluded io possible "concrete steps" lhat might be taken io improve Sioo-Soviet relations. Brezhnev
opened the dew even wider lasi mo.ih. offering to
resume border talks and establish new economic.
sc:enufk. and cultural tic
Chernenkot viewirms Ii mi It lion andh ihe United Stales thus seem outside the em/en. nu nsucamol Polilbuio opinion and may require some modification if he is to gain the support he need, once flrerhnevjoe, As economic growih declines and resources become increasingly scarce, other member, of .be leadership, possibly even Kirilcnko. may be. come0 US prorotal* foi armswC.er.may of avoiding the cosi of arms (hey may perceive as necessary to counter ihe emergence of ne- US weaponi
Full nornuli/alion of relations would be difficult io achieve, however, because (hose Soviei leaders whr> have been mos( tuspicious of US motive! appear io be oaoaily suspicious of ihe Chinese.ar-(rcolar. has shown hit pique toward (he Chinese on sc-eral occasions fcsasperaied by what he considered Cttmese intransigence in ihe Sino-Sovicl bordei neco-nations, he rcporiedly once (old aof foreign Commiinisis that the talks were likely to continue for ten thousand yeais.*^
sensitive lo Ibe eiTtelctions could hive on relations wilh ibe West. Even those who have been least suppoelive of Brezhnev's overtures lo ihe United Suits must be aware of ihe need for Westernand credit arrangements and probably would be -'uctani io pui relations with Western Europe at risk.
Policy Implications
Oikti OpiioKt. Soviet leaders have other options, however, (or keeping the Uniied Slates engaged whileespite daring which they could realign their policies Some of these already are being implemented and seem unlikely to be affected by Ihe luccestion:
They are giving more aitcnticehe Caribbean and Ceniral America as sensitive areas for US policy and asdistrict ion from their own actions in Poland and Afghanistan Soviei support forhas expanded ia recent months, aad arms and additional MIG-IJs have been scat to Cuba.
They could focus more effort on Sudan. Pakistan, Zaire, and Greece, with ihe aim of gcncraiiag regional pressures on ihem and causing discontent with US aid and security commitments.
They ate seeking to promote unreal ia southern Africa by casposirig Westernolution io Ihe Nimibian proWei"
Increased domestic problemsesire to impose greater discipline al borne could reinforce argument! of leaders who mightore aggressive suacc ir these areas. Other leaders, however, might be more
If Brezhnev leaves the scene soon, conflict over these issues, heightened by political jockeying in Ihe post-Brezhnev period and the complexity of the country's problems, could lead to significant policy shifts. The most immediile changes arc likely to be made ia economic policy, where the current investmentalready seems ro have aroused opposition within the leadership
fenoomic Policy
Some rullocaiion of resources almost certainly win be fter Brezhnev goes, withIhe absence of its principalikelyersuasive case can be nude ihai agriculture hai not predudivery ascd the massive infusions of capital that Brezhnev insisted upon and thai oihct sectors, such as heavy industry, canreater return on each ruble invested. These other sectors also will be affected by ihe fortunes of their sponsors, however, making Ihe bene-IVcuries largely unpredictable- Nooaulilary heavy industry, (or example, probably would fare belterirflenko or tierbilsk i. regime than it would under Chernenk.
Under ihe Current economic constraints, eveabudget, virtually sacrosanct since theprobably will come under some attach.o( factors make it unlikely however ihainear term any new leadership will makereductions in ihe growth of theThese
The poor state of US-Soviet red lions.
The political commitment of most Soviet leaders to
a strong defense.
Tlic'ullcnge of planned US defense pcojrimi.
The Increased Influence of ibeuccession environment.
- The momentum of weapon development andixoz raws thai ate under way.
Indeed, the military could come awayower struggle with an even higher rale of growth of defense spending
Over the long lertrt, as the post-Brezhnev leadership Struggle* to prepareh five-Year. there may be greater pressure to reduce Ibe growth in military spending in order to free up the labor and capita! resources urgently needed In key civilian sectors. In this connection, the cost-ivoidance benefits of arms control agreements could assume greater importance Even in the, however, we consider absolute ted actions in theelTort to be unlikely.
Concern over declining, growth rates will mfensify efforts to improve efficiency and could be sufficient to overcome bureaucratic opposition to changes in the ccorromic matiagcmcnl structure. Although no new idear can be espocted from the governmentwhich has been even less innovative than the party in dealing with eeooomte problems, changes may be enacted along lines previously proposed by Brczlmcv and other party leaders. At the center, ihe multitude of functionally related and cnertappihg ministries might be placed under more centra Ii ted management and direction. This effort could also be accompanied by some decentralization of operational ii.specially in the agricultural sector, where the importance of local conditions'itn this'area .that the Hungarian model is being most clearly studied and emulated on an cipcrimcntal basts
Foreign
Although foreign policy issues also wilt come under review, iniernational eorsditions make departures in this area seem less irnrainent than in ihe domestic arena. Soviet foreign policy strategy already has shifted toessimistic consensus about ihc prospects for improved relations with the United
States, and this new direction appears unlikely to change, barring major US initiatives, in thepost-Breghncv period
Soviet leaders probably will wish io continue the arms limitation talks with the United Stales while at-the same lime focusing most of their attention onwith Westernew arms control agreement would enable ihe Soviets to regulate or shyw US weapons pros]rams, thereby facilitatingplanning, redudag weapons costs, and. ia signifi-cant areas, minimizing ihe possibility of tccfancrogical surprise. In an effort to ienprove economic relations wiili Western Europe and further split the Western alUance, ihey probably winarder position against the United States on nutters of less concern to the Europeans, whilearrot-and-siick attitude on European questions. The need for trade with Western Europe and Moscow's own economic stringencies also will continue to be the primary constraints on Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. Although full normaluation of Sirso-Soviet relations does not seem at hand, the Sonets are already trying to exploit US-Chinese difficaJliics and will leave the door open io improved relations with Beijing. It still seems doubtful, however,ew Soviet leadership wnnld nfer terms the Chinese would find attractive.
At the pessimism aboutons becomes increasingly self-fulfil ling. Soviet leaders may become even mote inclined lo pursue pdicics in the Third World that the United Stales would find disturbing and perhaps threatening to its interests. They could increase' the level of their* political and militarywithin the limits of their own txooornic constraints, to dirntt such as Angola. Ethiopia, and Vietnam and demonstrate greater willingness tothemsdvei directly in areas lhal risk confronix-lioo with the United Stales. They might, for example, abandon ihcir Current counseling of caution to their Syrian and Palestinian dicnts and support greater risk-taking by the Palestinians inmove that could provoke an Israeli military attack, threaten Syria's position, and bring in Soviet forces. The Soviets cwldore direct role in Central Amcric
i. .ii om thehe dimensions of Soviet eoooomk problems {Increase ibe.probability of shifts in thatrca,eader' likely to succeed Brezhnev will initially have Mho powerath Uuoughomestic ind ttxriin policy programs. Theeneral Secretary's colleagues, acting in their owa perineal interests, win aueaipt lo restrict bb power and probably prevent him from becoming Chief ofpottnly aflcr I] years as party leader. As in ibe early days of ihe Biezbnev era. (he General Secretary Is likelye sharing ihe spotlight, particularly in foreign affairs, with (he Prcsidcni and Premier. His naiional socuHiy role ilso could be diminished, with Ihe chairmanship of ihe Defensemilitary planning group of lop political, mililary. and defense industry officiipossibly goingnother leader-.
In Ihe past, it usually hasew General Secretary about five years to consolidate his power. Brezhnev's reluctanceive broad national authority to any other pany secretary, however, may mean that hit successor will need more time to accompliih ihit than pieviout party chiefs. Both Chernenko andmoreover, are in theirolder than former leaders have been at the lime they assumed office (Stalinhrushchevnd Brcrhncv inc<ea the perceptionarty chiefs tenure could be shortmake the consolidation of power more dilTicv/n
Lougre Range Uatrrtalntlcs
The conventional wisdom has been thai ihe min who rcplicn Breihncv is likely to be only in interim successor and lhi( by (hee and other (op officii It probably will be replaced bysomewhat younger group already in (hearly leaden GrithinL Shcherbiiskiy (Ml. and Romanovhe other hand, with former power-broker Sutlov dead. Kiritenko possibly incapacitated, and Brcihac* physically weakened,cenario could be dramineally foreshortened. The rest of theleadership, led by Ustinov. Andropov.nd others,ware of Ihe costs of continued drill- especially for iheagreelevate one of its own or one of the younger generation directlynterim phisc "to get the country moving again
Under cither scenario, the policy preferences of ihe younger Politburo members ire more difficult to predict. The more patrchul concerns of these younger leadeneir peooou accusesat eionsrsiic issues as wefl as their foreign polky statements, which of leu contain tougher language, more issertrveness. and greater hostility lo-ird the West ihm those of ihei; mocc senior coHeigur.
iders have not been members of iheinner circle. They bive not been heavilyin developing national security options (they are not, for example, members of ihe Defenseor. for Ihai mailer. In formulating five-year plans. As Politburo members, tbey hive been participaBis In the policymaking protest for someactor thatlessen the likelihood of radical policy shifts when they assume more responsible posts, but (heir future policy preferences uadoubiedly will be sirby 'he ami ont the time of their peorno-liot
We are even less ableauge the likely policy.
inclinations of the generation of Soviet leaden who wiQ comehe fore ia the. Their current pes:tins io the Central Committee apparatus and regional pany cirganiraiioni provide for lilile involve, meat in foreign policy. While they have lorneauthority in implementing theomestic policies in iKarireas. their influence onpolicy is minima
Although ihese younger leaders are better educated and less tainted wjih the Stalinist pisl, they are not likely to hold views much different from their elders. The selection process ihai his pliced them on the fringe of the Politburo it controlled by Ihe current leadership and diseouriges the development ofor deviant political opinions While it ii possible that some officials might, nonet te less, come lo power who favor moderate Chang',re likely to tc ptcdrspcocd toixture of authoritarian and risoderaie potrcies simila' mihai now followed by Brezhnev and eornpsn;
Domestic and intermlionilourse, could force these new leideis lo seek new policy directions. Ixonomie problems will probably become
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more severe and ihevirenmeni pan haps more dangerous. CorKeivaUy, someight lespond lo inch pressures by attempting lo libcraliie Ihc Soviet ryjtent. although il is ddTrcultmagine thai any Scroti leadership wooldn Ihli direction as. foe example, ihe Yugoslav--
A more likely response probaUy wooldeturn to .some form of neo-Stalinitt orthodoxy. Such an ip-proach would require more internal repression.order, and self-sscrifice wendd be required Fxorsoenic sdf-iulTickocy (autarky) might be adopted, with trade and commerce with the West reducedinimum. Nationalism, generally Slavic andRussian, would beto heighten patriotism and) legiiimire ibis effort. Abroad. Soviet leaders might be more willjag to use rnslitaty power ia areas where they Wieve ihc USSR holds an advantage over the West-
ourse would inherently cat try'considerable domestic risk. Some in the leadership might not readily accept it and there might be significant, if passive, popularern in this direction,ore coniute.it with the Russian and Leninist tradition than genuine re/orm and might be eaiicr for the icgime to pursue.
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Original document.
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