THE U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD: HOW THE LDCS PLAY

Created: 4/1/1982

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN RILL

National

Intelligence

Council

The US-Soviet Competition for Influence in the Third World: How the LDCs Play It

National Inlelligence Council Memorandum

Information available as of2 was used in ihe preparation of this report.

Tins Memorandum was prepared by Paul Pillar of Ihc National Inlelligence Council AnalyiicGroup It was discussed with officers of ihe National Inlelligence Council and ihe Directorate of Intelligence. Comments are welcome and may be addressed to the author.

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AfirlttOSJ

The US-Soviet Competition for Innuence in the Third World: How the LDCs Play It

This Memorandum discusses the principal considerations thai leaders of less developed countries (LDCs) weigh in shaping ihcir relations with the United Slates and the USSR. It examines the factors that, from the LDCs' viewpoint, tend to make each superpower attractive or unattractiveartner and patron. Thc circumstances and concerns of LDCs vary widely, and no factor applies to all of Ihem to the same degree. But those addressed here are tbe ones that, in general, affect US and Soviet strengths and weaknesses in the competition for influence in the less dcvck>ped world.

During theears of US-Sovicl competition for influence among LDCs, ihc Sovieis have enjoyed several advantages:

Thc Uniled States has beenthc colonial policies of its West European allies, whereas most LDCs have had nowith lhc USSRolonial power.

The long-tenured Soviet leaders have displayed considerable continuity in iheir policies toward LDCs, in contrast to US rjoUcics thai have often appeared to move by fits and starts.

Moscow has been better able to identify itself with widely held positions in two of the most prominent and volatile issues in the less developed world: self-deierminaiion for Palestinian Arabs, and black majonly rule in southern Africa.

The United States, unlike Ihe USSR, is often blamed by LDCs for actions taken by allies not subject to iu control.

Thc centralized, authoritarian political siructurc of the USSR is widely seenore suitable model by lhcC leaders who consider de-mocracy an unaffbrdablc luxury.

The USSR delivers arms lo LDCs fasier, and appears to attach fewer strings to them, than does Ihe Uniled Sutes.

Soviet leaders are much less constrained by parliamentary and public opinion than US leaders arc. and thus are freer lo use armed force tothe USSR's clients.

Encndship with the USSR oficn bongs with it tangible assistance from Cuba- whichorm of military aid unmatched by thewell as from the East European stales and olher Soviet allies. Moscow ts more willing to use subversion or miliiary intimidation to pressure LDCs inlo cooperating wiih It.

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Thc Uniied States has offsetting advantages, however, several of which arc likely to become much more important during the coming decade than before:

The colonial era has virtually ended, and (he USSR's rote in ihe lessworld has reached thc poinl where it must defend its record there as much as the Western powers do.

The USSR has mismanaged its relations wiih several LDCs, suffering embarrassing setbacksesult. Ils inlervcniion in Afghanistan and ils subversive efforts elsewhere have angered and alienated many LDCs.

Most LDCs recognize lhal the United Stales isetter posilion ihan the USSR to contribute to resolution of lhc disputes over ihc Palestinians and southern Africa.

The United Stalesore successful model of economic developmenl than lhconlrasi lhal has become more widely recognized as modern mass communications have exposed more people lo the affluent US lifestyle.

There is widespread recognition that Ihc Uniied Slates is better able to provide the types of economic assisunce. investment, and technology-agricultural as well as industrial -that are most likely to raise standards of living and sustain economic growth in LDCs. The USSR's economic problems, meanwhile, restrict iu ability to make costly new commitments in support of its clients.

The Uniied Stales and iu Western associates conirol the World Bank and lhc International Monetary Fund, whose resources are of major importance to LDC development.

Thereidespread preference for (he individual freedoms found in the Uniied Stales,eneralLDC rhetoric to thetheir relative absence in Soviet socicly

Most LDCs will seek support wherever ihey can best mccl their needs, regardless of ideology. Mosi of them will noi regard Soviei and Western support as mutually exclusive, and will prefer to diversify lhcir sources of aid.

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Con lent*.

Past

Judgment*

1 ounJ/tlorn ol* LDC-Scrxipowee RcUtsom

Thc US and thc USSR airvvv.

US and the USSR aa Exemplar*

US and the USSR as Perceived Threats Type* of Support

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Economic Assistance and IrjcV Training and Education

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Military Suppon

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Contingencies

Thc Ability To Compete

1 he Limits to Involvement

The Record of Socceases and Failures

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The US-Soviel Competition for Influence in the Third World: How the LDCs Play It

Foundation! of LIX -Superpowert US nnd ih> USSR as Somrcri ofSupport. The

thief reason LUC governmentsajor power ii iheir need for support against foreign or domestic enemies. The LDCs most likely to move or remain close to Moscow are ihose confronting hostileparticularly neighbors that arc stronger than themselves or thai enjoy outside backing from anti-Soviet sources (such as Syria against Israel. Vietnam against China. India against both China andand several black African countries against Southn some cases (liken LDCs need for support against an internal security ihreal largely determines its relationship with lhe United States or thcajor secondary interest is in assistance (ordevelopment

In general. LDCs accept outside support wherever (hey can get it Thus, if other major Western powers arc unable or unwilling lo help, LDCs are more likely to turn to Moscow. Several leaders -Zambia'sKaunda is currently an outspokenexplain their approaches to lhc USSR as necessary responses to whal they regard as insufficient Western backing. Of course, it is advantageous for then to say this whatever their actual motives, but tt isiruc that Moscow has made many inroadsartner of second choice where other major powers declined to act. Throughout iheir quarter cenlury of active involvement in the less developed world, the Sovieis have quickly and effectively offered services ihai lhc Uniled Stales withdrew or explicitly declined Iu provide, from lhc financing of Egypt's Aswan Dam6 to ibe provision of fuel for India's naclear reactors)

To ihe extern lhat LDCshoke among poiential supporters, several factors influence iheir selection. Among Ihem arc the specific quantities, quality, and term* ol assistance that each major power offers, including military and economic aid.

(The characteristics of these and other types of US and Soviel support are addressedater section.)

Another consideration is tbc perceived consistency and reliability of major powers and their foreign policies. In ihis regard, the USSR hai thecompanion with thc United State, and other Western democracies- of leadership that has enjoyed long tenure and relative immunity to domestic public opinion and thus has exhibited considerable continuity in its policy toward LDCs. Leonid Brezhnev has been in power during five US presidencies, Andrey Gromy-ko has been Foreign Minuter during seven, and ihe main lines of Moscow's strategy for penetrating, lhc less developed world have noi altered substantially since the, even though some of iu tactics hate chanced, notably thc downgrading of economic assisiancc. By comparison. US policy towurd LOCs has appeared tooller coaster of involvement and non involve ment as US administrations and (heir doc utiles have come and gone, lhc American public went through thc trauma of the Vietnam war. and US relations wiih individual LDCs have beento such broader objectives as detente, .inns control, nuclear nonprobferation. or human right* The WW Europeans' relationship with the lev* developed world has also changed greatly during Ihis period, as they have surrendered colonial empires, pared other cosily overseas commitments, and adjusted to ihe economic ilout or the oil exporters.

The effect ihese differences can have on perceptions of superpower reliability is especially evident in India Tbc cover nment of Prime Minister Gandhi believes that the United Stales is unreliableource of suppori, and that US policy toward India and South Ana has moved by fits and starts. In the view of Indian leaders. Washington has failed to maintain a

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consistent recognition of India's impoiiancc nnd has subordinated US-Indian relations to oilier foreign policy concerns. By contrast. Moscow's courtship of New Delhi has appeared patient, pemiiteni, and attentiveide range of Indian interests. It has been supported not only by aid and trade but also by propaganda lhal reminds Indians of the help the USSR has provided at crucial points in Indianand by high-level visits that bottler India's self-esteemegional and nonaligned leader.

Nevertheless, widespread cynicism aboul thc Sovicis* motives in providing assistance lends in offset iheir overall rcpuiution for consistency. Il is clear to most LDC leaders thai Soviet slate interests, not sympathy for the underprivileged, determine Soviet policies. These leaders realize that Moscow's consistent pursuit of those interests can mean irtcorrmtent Soviet sup port for their countries if events in their regions cause Soviei objectives to diverge from their own

Altitude* toward foreign supporters also hinge on Iheir involvement in domestic or regional disputes. Bolh the USSR and lhe Uniied Stales have al times been cauglil on thc losing side of internal struggles. For example, thc US position in revolutionarysuffer* and the Soviet position therefrom memories of earlier US ties to thc deposed Fmperor llaile Selassie. Similarly. Moscow'swith Ali Sabri and other Egyptian leftist* who were challenging Anwar Sadat during thc early months of hi* presidency contributedadat* disaf-fcciion toward lhc Sovicis.

As Tor regional conflicts, the USSR's image i* belter than Ihai of lhc Untied Slates, largely because lhc Soviet* have been betler able lo identify thermc.'vt* with lhc majority position in two of tbciublc. persistent, and emotional *uch dispute*

IsraelArabs. Most Arab leader* perceive thc United Stale* to bc loo deeply committed to Israeli objccitves to bc an effective and reliable supporter of Arabhis perception underlies Syria's retentionlose relationship with thc USSR and Jordan's recent turnoscow for arm*.

Soulh Africa versus black Africans The Western powers -despite their efforts to ease thc transition to majority rule tn Zimbabwe and Namibia -will probably continue lo be identifiedome extent with Pretoria's policies, if only because Soulh Africaonservative, capitalist state whose governmeni flaunti iu anii-Commur,ism a: every opportunity The USSR, meanwhile, has been thc majorof black insurgencies in Ihe region. This givescadstarl in establishing positions of influence in counlries where insurgents come to power (as in Angola ands well as countries where insurgencies mainuir bases of operations Spiraling lention in southern Africa tend* tothe Sov ie is" rote Their activity in the region reed. South Africa'* sense of be leaguer ment.eadsote aggressive South African posture toward thc black-ruled states and this in turn to more requests by those states for Soviet aid.

In another currently turbuleni region Central America-the forces backed by thc USSR and its Cuban ally may notajority view. but they have lent credibility to the Sc*xU' vision of revolutions'y change in LDCs. Thc oligarchical,and often antireformist character of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and of several olher recent government* in thc area has made them highlyvillains in llie Sovicl script, and made it easier to portray their revolutionary opponents as champions of the people

Western ties to the "wrong- tide in each of these regional conflict*oixed blessing forSRX* in both Africa and thc Middle fast realize thai because of those ties it is the West, not Moscow, Unit offers the best hope of arrangingsettlements Western powers can negotiate with Soulhthey arc now- doing wiih respect to Namibia- while lhc Soviet* cannot In thc Middle Easi. even Syria realizes that lhc USSR, lacking Washington'* potential leverage on Israel, cannotolitical solution to :hc Arab-Israeli conflict In Centralotential mediator i* Mexico, which Moscow probably regards a* scarcely better than llie United State* in this role, and which is just us capable of excluding Soviei influence.

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in some eases il is (he USSR Ihai is embarrassed by being associated with one particular sideegional conflict, though none of Ihese have had political effects quite as pervasive as those in the Middle Easi and southern Africa. In the Horn of Africa, for example, the expansion of the SovieU' ticshiopu has caused ihem difficulties, first in their reUlions with Somalia and then with regard to Ihe Eritrcan insurgency, which is backed by radical Araband Syria -that Moscow docs not want to antagonize.

In some rcsnecis the USSR, like the West, derives some benefit fromool in thc enemy's camp But LDCs look io Moscow lesshannel for negotiation5 Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan is the Soviets' only clear success inegional conflict) thanestraining influence on ihcir adversaries. The MenEislu regime tn Ethiopia sought closer relations with the USSRartly to induce the Sovieis lo keepSovietpursuing its territorial ambitions in thc Ogaden. Similarly. India hasits lies wiih Moscow useful in forestallingSoviet assisuncc to Pakistan

Most LDCs do not regard Soviet and Western 1Upporl as mutually exclusrvc. Tbey prefer lo diversify Iheir source* of assisuncc. Because most LDCs arc former Western colonics whose poliiical. economic, andlies lo the West antedate their relations wiih the USSR, diversification has frequency meant moving toward ihc Soviets. In other words. LDCs maySoviet support not because il is intrinsically better than what Western powers offer but simply because it comesew. different, and compel, inn source By thc same token, diversificationeason such Soviet clients as Angola or Iraq- and perhaps nowseek support from thc Unit-ed Slates

Giving theote where Western influence bas hitherto prevailed can have these attractions, even for aa LDC that is not generally sympathetic to Soviet policies:

Reducing dependence on traditional supporters, and thus reducing their leverage

Demonstrating nonalignment by balancing one's relations with the superpowers. For this reason. LDCs frequently try to couple any apparent move toward the West with some overture lo Moscow. Kuwait's recently stepced-uph ike USSR,rnpie. appear designed to offsetsecunty coopers two wiih iu pro-Western colleagues in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

- Jolting Western powers oul of what LDCs see as complacency on an issue important to them. The desired Western response might be either additional aid io match Moscow's, or tbc solution of some longstanding diplomatic or military problem. Many African leaders, for example, believe lhat the USSR's miliiary role tn their region induced the West to pressure lhc white Rhodesian regime into accepting black rule, and that it is now spurring lhc Western efforts lo obtain independence for Namibia

OeraiKHUlly an LDC leader does concludeharphe Sovietecessary to obtain help from the West.ub:oos of Soviet advuen from Egypt2 and Somalia7 were undertaken partly in the hope of obUimng increased US (and Saudi) assistance Such dramatic gestures arc rare, however, largely because Tew LDC leaders would rest iheir nations' security on the mere hope of future support. Moreover, many of them doubt lhat ihe United Sutes-whose foreignunlike those of lhc USSR, must meet Ihe requirements or Congressional approval and public accouniabiliiy is responsive and flexible enough to fill quickly thc kind of voids left by Ihc Soviets in Egypt and Somalia.

Tht VS and ihe USSR as Exemplars. The superpow-ers offer not only support but also alternative models for economic and political development, accompanied on the Soviet sideistinct kkotogy Revolution ary socialism -of which Soviet Marxism-Lenin ismubtype -has some attracttve elementsCs. mosi of wliich have little experience with sublc. competitive democracy or progress!re. responsible capitalism Stale ownership of tbc mean* of produc-

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lion appeal* consistent wiih lhc dcsiic of many LDC regimesestructure their economics, nnd with the desire of nil of (hem to gain firm and exclusive control over their countries* affairs. Conversely, theof free enterprise has suffered from its association witholonialrseocoioniat" present, and internal and inlernational disparities in wealth. LDC leader* often find it convenient to blame thetr ecooomic problems, whatever the true causes, on "monopoly capitalism" The authoritarian politics of lhc Soviet model also have appeal for the many LDC elites who consider democracy an unaffordablc luxuryistraction from the main task of economic development The concept ofa loyal opposition is alien to most LDCs, and thus political freedom for one's opponents is frequently regarded .iM(ir;-T^ aad divisive

Nevertheless, thereouple of reasons that Soviet-style socialism and specific tencls of Soviet ideology do not win broad acceptance in thc less developed world. One is ihc conlrast bclwcen Soviet and Western standards ofontrnst thai has become more widely recognized as modern muss communications Base exposed more people to ihe Western lifestyle and its abundance of consumer goods Western affluence, in other words, invites emulation as well as envy. Another reasoneneral preference for indigenous ideologies over imported ones, sometimes leading to resentment of doctrines that, like Marxism-Leninism, claim to he universal and scientific. Most of the ideologies propounded by LUC regimes emphasize nationalist or ethnic themes thatpecifically local appeal and are no) adorned with "scientific" theories of economicIraqi Ba'lhism is perhaps the most fully developeddeology in thc leu developed world: yet it places less emphasis on socialism per se Ihan on Arab unity and freedom from foreignIn instances where thc local dogmaariant of Marxism lus inhe Sovietsmust protect their own version of Marxismicservc their domcslic political legitimacy hnvc been inflexible ir adapting to the varum

Il Is difficult to assess the exact extent to which ideological affinity affecU an LDCs relations with the USSR and other major power* Other things being equal. LDCs naturally prefer lo associate most closely with state* whose internal political andsystems most resemble their own. Bul other things arc seldom equal, and, even when un LDC shifts iu internal policy leftward at the same time it makes overtures to Moscow, it i* impossible toideological considerations from its expectations .ooceriiinr. mayor power support For example, some regime* have strengthened lhcir ties with the USSR as they have nationalized major industries (such as Egypt's Suez Canalhc Iraqi oil industry in lhe, and numerous enterprises in Ethiopia, but this has been due less lo socialist solidarity thanudgment by ihe regimesthat their seizure of Western asseu had nvadc theeu willing source of support, andore serious threat as well.

Opinions aboul each superpower's political andsystem lend lo be distinct from attitude* toward them as actors in world politics. The Indian Government, for example, coosider* the USSR iu best partner even though India hat much in common internally with lhc West: extensive civilarge private economic sector, and one of lhe most democratic political systems of any IDC Conversely, the government* of some undemocratic, socialist slates (sueh at Sudan) profoundly mistrusi Moscow and pursue genuinely nonaligned or even pro-Western foreign policies, to the extent of cooperwith lhc Uniied Slates on securily mailers In short. LDCs' views of the United Sutes and the USSR a* great powers arc shaped less by shared values than by specific US and Soviet foreign policy decisions deemed to be friendly or unfriendly

Even for avowedly Marxist LDCs. thc practical bene ItUofaeUtioRship are more important than ideology. Ethiopian leader Mengistu'* turn to the Sovietss perhaps lhe bett leccni case of a

major overture lo Moscow that was, al least in pari, ideologically inspired. But the Mengistu regime's radicalism was important in this regard not simply because Ihc Ethiopians wanted lo fraternize with their ideological comrades, but rather because it madeore promising supplier than the West of desperalely needed assistance. The Soviets' position in Ethiopia today rests not on shared dogma but on iheir personal relationship with Mengislu and their logistic relationship with thc Ethiopian armed forces. In fact, Mengislu has dragged his feet inarxist-Leninist political party, evidently to avoid (he riskew Soviet-influenced power base could arise to challenge his own.

The US and the USSR as Perceired Threats. Thc perception of either superpowerhreat is likely lo have profound effects on any LDCs willingness to cooperate with it. This facior ts generally lessin Washington's relations with LDCs than in Moscow's,ew leflist leaders, such as Libya's Colonel Qadhafi and Seychelles' President Albert Rene, genuinely fear Western-sponsored coups or assassinations. Their responses to their fears vary. Qadhafi has perhaps mowed closer to the Soviets as his sense of insecurity has grown over the past couple of years. But Rene's mistrust of the West hasreinforced his inclination not to granl Ihc USSR miliiary facilities or other significant concessions, because lie believes this could be lhe very event that wouldS or French move to topple him.

The USSR's attemptsndermine incumbentin LDCs significantly affect its efforts to gain their cooperation, but again thc effects are ambivalent On one hand, LDC leaders whom the Soviets are trying lo weaken or replace have obvious reasons io hold unfavorable atlttudes toward the USSR. The warmth of relations between Moscow and several LDC regimes has tended to vary inversely with lhc level of Soviet support for thc localparty, ethnic separatists, or other dissidcnls. In some instances (again, as inhe Soviets' involvement in subversion has severely damaged Iheir relations with thc government. In others, resentment over subilcr forms of Soviel interference in internal affairs has inhibiled the developmenl of close and

friendly tics (as in Algeria, where the Sovietspromoled thc candidacyeftist the last time the presidency fell vacant).

The Soviets'9 intervention inmost blatant and ruthless inierferencc in anytended, in two ways. Io discourage olher LDC governments from close involvement with Ihc USSR. First, it has made such involvement seem even more incompatible than before with theirobjectives of peace and nona'ignmcnt. Second, itesson in the hazards of admitting (he Soviets into one's country in the first place. After all, the deposed Afghan government of Hafizullah Aminsupported Moscow's policies and relied heavily on Soviet aid and military advisers. Thc Soviets' stake in Afghanistan evidently led Ihem to protect their investment by overthrowing Amin when il became clear he could noi quell the anti-Communist(here, and their military advisory presence clearly facilitated the inicrveniion.

On Ihe olher hand, the USSR's capabilities for subversion, military intimidation, and support loop-position movements can also serve to pressure an LDC inlO Cooperating wiihulnerable regime may conclude thai its best strategy for coping with the dangerovicl or Soviet-inspired move is in cffcci to buy protection from Ihc USSR by voicing support for Soviet policies or otherwise appeasing Moscow. Such cooperaiion gives lhelake in ihe regime and undercuts leftist opposition al home. Threats thus can supplement blandishments in thc USSR's approach io LDCs. Moscow is currently followingarrot-and-stick approach in North Yemen, where thc shaky government of Ali AbdaDah Salihilitary relationship with thc USSR (despite considerable strain lo ils rclalionship with Saudi Arabia) partly because it lives under thc gun of the pro-Soviet National Democratic Front andos'iet-instigated NDF challenge lo its rule.

In shoit. the threat ol Soviet-sponsored coups,or intervention con lead LDCs either to distance themselves from the USSR (and perhaps to enlist US help) or to accommodalc thc Soviets throughEach government's strategy depends on all of the consider."iions mentioned earlier regarding thc choice of supporters and, mosi important, on the extent to which the Soviets have already penetrated theAl One extreme are LDCs where there is no strong pro-Soviet opposition and where thehas taken only limited, tentative steps toward iftvolvement with Moscow {Botswana. Jordan, several Latin American statcsl They are likely to be highly sensitive to thc dangers of permitting lhc Soviets loosition ardack away from Moscow if Ihose dangers appear lo be growing There areLDCs where, although thc USSR's role is somewhat larger, ihe local leadership has set clear limits to Soviet influence. But at thc other extremeew states where thc Soviets already have soole (Benin. South Yemen) that Moscow would be tempted tu frustrate any political changes that jeopardized its interests. This might mean assisting the overthroweader whose policies begin to appear heretical or, like Amin's in Afghanistan,ineffective. More nficn, it meanseader from drifting out of thc Soviet orbit in the first place.eader isear, he finds it safer to hold onto the beast than lo try lo get off.

T> pes of Support

LDCs look to lhe United States and lhc USSRide range of suppori WU many types of assistance, they can sec specific advantages thai one superpower offers over the other.

Aran. The USSR is the leading ei porter of arms to LDCs Soviet miliury sales to non-Communist LDCs0 reached SUof all military purchases by LDCs in thatcompared withS sales. The USSR has an even more impressive lead in maior weapon systems alone, which constitute about three-fourth* of Sovietsales but only one-third of US sales(ihc rest being instruction, maintenance, training, and other forms of support).

Cs consider weapons thc most critical type of foreign support, because their chief concern is security againsiin some casesthreats. The large political role of the military in most LDCs alsoactor.onservative officer corps may steer its couniry away from thc USSR, the overall effect of military involvement in politics is to increase the priority given lo the acquisition of arms, and this sometimes means giving particular care lo relations with Moscow because of its importance as an arms supplier. In Peru, for example, the government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry isami-Commu nisi and pro-US, but Ihe politically powerful and Soviet-equipped miliury has influenced some Peruvian foreign policy decisions to make them less offensive to the USSR

The principal advantages thai Soviet arms sales have over US sales are:

Advanced equipment'. Although the USSR has long had many customers for simple military equipment that is rugged and easy to maintain, since thet has also exported some of its mostproducts,5 fighters.urface-to-air missiles.itack helicopters,2 tanksew cases Moscow has sold advanced weapons to LDCs even before they were deployed by ils Warsaw Pact allies. Thc United Slates has generally been more rcluciant to offer ils lalcsl products to LDCs. andime explicitly renounced ihe introduction of advanced weapons to areas where they had not previously been deployed. Whatever the military utility of such sophisticated cquipmenl to LDCs, thc Sovicls arctrong demand for it. especially among states with the abilily to pay. Governments naturally like toualitative edge in regional arms races, and military officers usually prefer state-of-the-art cquipmenl.

Ready availability The USSR generally canmore military equipment and deliver it faster than any other exporter Itarge capacity for

manufacturing arms, and substantial stocks of surplus equipment U> contrast. US arms sales frequently have long leadtimcs. due cither to the competing demands on production Imcs of US armed force* or lo administrative and Congressional approvalTo expedite their arms shipments, the Soviets have, in addition to scalift, sufficient airlift capacity lo rush significant quantities of materiel to distant region. (The need for overflight clearances, the lack of an aerial refueling capability, and thc limitedf most Soviet transports remainhc Soviets have mounted major military airlift* -to Arab states7o ihce in tbc Yemeni civil war. io Angola. and to Ethiopia during thc Ogadenemonstrated Moscow's abilily and willingness to support lis friends during emergencies

* Ac explicit conditioni. The USSR seems to attach fewer strings to its military assistance than docs lhe United States It docs not require its customers, by law.orswear "offensive" uses of its arms, nor has it expliatly linked arms sales to the human ught* performance or other internal policies of thcSome users of US-made equipment haveMoscow about possible arms salesbecause they were annoyed at such conditioni and wished io demonstrate their independence from Washington. Actually, thc USSR imposes dc facto conditions of its own. it surely considers the internal politics of LDCs when exporting aims. and. evenormal prohibition on "offensive" use. it has been chary of militarily strengthening any LDCay thai would encourage it toar The latter policy contributed to friction wiih Eeypt in the, when Sadat wanted aircraft that could aitack targets deep inside Israel. For most LDCs. however, it is importantsctdocs not impose explicit restrictions on their policies and thus docs not appear Io infringe on their sovereignty.

Favorable financial terms used to be an attraction of Soviet miliiary assistance for most LDCs and still are for some. But since the, as thc wealth of the oil exporters burgeoned and arms sales became an

increasingly important source of foreign exchange. Moscow has charged mosl of its customers prices :omparable to ihose for US equipment and has. like thc United States, required payment in hard currencyew of its most important friends, such as India and Afghanistan, conlinuc io pay in local currency.

One of lhc most frequent complaints about Soviet military assistance is ihc insufficiency ofspare parts, and other logistic suppon.rms deals make less province for such follow-on assistance lhan US military sales, which usually guaranicc spares and supporting services 'or several years. At the same lime, the Sovieu provide little help to LDCs in developing Ihcir own maintenanceinsisting on shipping major equipment to the USSR for repair rather lhan (raining technicians lo do lhc work on lhc spot. LDCs resent this practice because it tt inefficient and prolongs iheir dependence on thc Soviets.

The other principal drawback of Soviet military assistance is thc frequent need for Soviet military advisers to instruct rrsdirersotis forces in the use of thcthc more sophisticated types olthe often poor performance of thesein comparison with their US counterparts. LDC military officer* who have worked with the Soviets have variously described them as arrogant, insensitive, indifferent, racist, or more intcrcsied in theirthan in theiroreover, regardless of thc quality of thcerformance, many LDC

arc wary of ihc political, diplomatic, aad security risks of permitting any Soviet militaryon tlieir territories.

Economic Anitiaace ami Trade, ln economic aid. unlike thc arms trade, the United Statesignificantly more important role than the USSR. Soviet economic assistance commitments loLDC*0 totalillion In contrast,iited Slates ia03 billion in bilateral development assistance and economic support funds, plus6 billion to multilateral

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banks. Soviet aid it mofcew recipients than is USattern tbat reflecit Moscow's special interests in such key LOCs at Cuba. India, and Ethiopia and alto avoids spreading limned Soviet resources too thinly

Soviet aid planners, unlike their US counterparts, need not answer to any informed public ordebate about the welfareCs and ihe economic utility of different types of aid. Sovietuance it designed to hav; maximum political impactemonstration of Sovietas well as to yield economic benefits to thc USSR. It is not primarily intended to meet basic human needs, lo promote the economic and political stability of LDCs, or to raise the standard of living of very many people over the long term Moscow devotes most of its assistanceew large and prominent projects in thc public sector, particularly heavyIt provides very little commodity or hard currency assistance. Western governments and the multilateral banks have also financed many large public sector projects, but in recent years have decmphasized ihem in favor of other types of aid.

Despite ihe USSR's comparative stinginess in offering economic aid. Soviet assistance hat several potentially appealing aspects

Dams, steel mills, and other large projects arc highly visible and icadily identifiable as products of Soviel aid. Mjny citizens in thc recipient country are impressed by them, and hence by theirabilitybtain support through friendship with the USSR.

The cmphjsis on heavy industry accords with the ambitions of many LDCs to develop rapidly and to close Ihe economic gap between themselves and the industrialized stales. The Soviels contrast lhcir aid wiih the "Liiniilevclopmcnial" Western aidwhich Moscow contends are designed lo perpetuateCs' subservient status as suppliers of primary products.

Thc emphasis on expanding thc public sector also suits most LDC gnvernmenis

Unlike the United Stales and thcInternational Monetary Fund, thc USSRdocs not require bruad economic reformsondition of ils aid. This helps ii to advertise its assistance as having "no strings" -an advaniage in Ihe eyes of most LDCs because of their desire to avoid even the appearance of interference in iheir internal affairs.

Thc extern to which an individual LDC leader finds these features of Soviet aid attractive naturallyon his social and economic philosophy' and the course he has charted for hiseader who it committed to reducing governmental interference in tbe economy andustained nse in his country's standard of living (Jamaica's PrimeSeagaurrent example! would tend to be more comfortable with Western aid programs. Bul leaders under heavy domestic political pressure may,their own philosophies, be pushed toward policies (hat arc well tutted to tbe Sonet aid approach. Prominent public-sector projects canore immediate boostovernment's popularity ihan measures intendedosler private enlerprisc, and such necessary but unpopular reforms as theof costly food subsidies may be consideredsuicidal.

The financial terms of Soviet economic aid areless favorable than those offered by the United Stales and oiher donors. Unlike thc West, the Soviets provide very Utile grant aid. Loans obviously arc less financially beneficial io LDCt than are grants, and some large Soviet clients have found themselvesrepayments fasicr than Ihey were drawing on their line of credit. Thc USSR charges about the same interest rate for development loans as Western powers do, bul usuallyhorter repayment period Soviet loam, however, often permit repayment in (he product ol Ihc industrial project foroan is made, or in Ihe recipient's own currencyilateral clearing account. For an LDC whoseare am readily salable in thc West or which does not want to subject its earnings to thc vicissitudes of volatile commodity markets, such an arrangement can be valuableeans lo conserve scsicr hard

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huch less valuabletate whose good* are more marketable and il can lead to thc frustration of watching tbe USSR resell these goodshird pany for hard currency that Ihe LDC could otherwise have received on thc open market.

The least attractive aspect of Soviet development loans is thai they arc rigidly tied to purchases in the USSR. Moscow insists that its credits be used for Soviet equipment even when comparable items are available Iit superior itetaj j'c IwDabkWest. The absence of industrial competition within thc USSR makes ihis requirement even morethan it would be if imposedestern lender. Thc World Bank, in fact, requires competitive bidding for thc projects it funds

Trade is closely linked to aid in LDC-superpower relations, particularly wiih thc USSR, which has tailored its aid program to encourage the expansion of trade ties The provisions in ihis program forin kind, local currency accounts, and use of credits for Soviet goods arc all partly intended lo stimulateC commerce as an offshooi of development loans. In some respects, Ihc structure of lhc Soviet economy is welt suited to the expansion of trade with LDCs:

Tbe USSR has more need than the United States for imported food.

Trade with the USSR requires negotiations onlyovernment agency, unlike some purchases from the United Stales (particularly ileitis wiih possible strategichich oblige the buyer lo deal both with thc US Government and with private corporations.

Central economic planning and conirol permit thc Soviets, if tbcy so choose, to subordinate profit to polilical objectives when making trade offers.

Thc USSR's potentialrading pniinci, however, is limited in that ils economy is smaller and more autarkic than those of the United Stalci and the Wothole. Moreover, thc Soviets' own immediate economic needs weigh heavily on thetr decisionstrade and aid. thus negating some of the trading advantageentrally controlled economy

Moscow rarely makes financial or commercialsolely io placate an LDC. Thc Soviets have at times been hard bargainers even with soartner as India. Only in the case ofamong LDCs in its value to Soviet foreignMoscow provided aid and iradc(such as purchase of Cuban sugar at above-market prices and supply of oil at betow-market prices) thairolonged and significant drain on Sovicl resources.

Training and Education.orin country or out ofa significant form of superpower support lo LDCs. Thc largest par! of Sonet itmruction carried out within LDCs is military, with the Soviet military advisory efiort being substaniially greater than the US one0 Soviet advisers in LDCs, as comparedor the UnitedDC students are educated within lhc United Statesar larger scale than in Sovietowever. There areiliuryechnical trainees from LDCs studying in Ihe USSR, as well asDC university students, while there arcDC students in the United Stales.

Training in the USSR is cheaper but generally of lower quality than education in the United Slates Thc SovieU pay all Ibe expenses of their LDCbut the curriculum* often appear to emphasize political indoctrination more than the tmpartaiion ofducation in Ihe USSR isecond choice for many students, who would attend Westernif they could gain admission and afford thc expense. Some of them return home to findill equipped to compete for jobs, wealth, and power with Iheir more highly skilled countrymen educated in the Wesl. An additional advantage of being educated in tbc United Sutes is lhat the student enhances hi* fluency in the English language, which is used far more widely ihan RusMsn.

Thc long-term polilical dividends Io the superpowers of these programs are al best uncertain. Playing host lo bright foreign ltudcnts is one way to cultivate lhc friendship of individuals who might sorrseday assume positions of influence in their home countries. Bul the foreigner's experience is often an unpleasant one in which he encounters an alien environment, strange food, and subtle discriminaiion. Tlte bad memories may permanently color his altitude toward the entire host country, its government, and ils policies.

The United States has had ungrateful graduates, but the USSR probably has many more Thc foreign student in the USSR must cope not only with the unfamihartly of his surroundings but also with the regimentation and other unattractive features ofa police stale, noi toold climate and often cold people Two of ihe more noteworthy alumni are Taiwan's Chiang Ching-kuo. whotudent in tbe USSR in, and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who received air force training there in. Their accession lo the presidencies of iheir countries would seem to demonstrate Ihe wisdom of establishing lies to potential leaders early in their careers Their -indent experience, however, obviously failed toasting pro-Soviet outlook

Diplomacy Diplomatic supportuperpower is generally less critical than arms and other forms of material assistance, bul in some circumstances il can be important Thc support furnished by the United States and thc USSR lo LDCs engaged in regional conflicts has included general statements of approval, specific warnings against enemies, and actions in multilateral forums, particularly ihe casting of vetoes inecant) Council. Thc Soviets, for example, nave used the veto several times to back India on Snuih Asian issues, including the Kashmir dispute and1 Indo-Pakistani war.

Diplomacy, like other kinds of lalk, is cheap. It is especially so for the USSR and other totalitarian states, in which the regime's foreign policy suiemenis are not scrutinirrd in open domestic debate aad measured there againsi moral or legal standards. Accordingly, ihc Sovicl regime is betlcr able to tailor its statement* to make lhe desired impression abroad.

Unlike Ihe United Stales, (he USSR seldominority vote at ihc UN solely to be consilient with fairness, international law, orderly procedure, or even its own principles. In short, Moscow is less obliged than the United Statesiplomacyenuine expression of values and objectives, and thus it freer to use il lo curry favor with LDCs.

Military Support Except for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, superpower military backing for LDCs is currently confined taims, training, and other measures thai fall shoit of lhc dircclof combat forces. Thc possibility of suchcanritical form of support, however, particularly for an LDC thaterious and immediate threat toils security Even before(he USSR had demonstrated iu willingness to fill combat deficiencies of ill friends at wat. Soviet pilots or surface-to-air missile crews have fought In Northnd, and Soviet advisers have supported combat operations in Angola, Ethiopia. Syru.Vietnam, and elsewhere. The USSRcurrently better able than the United Suic* tothis lype of relatively discreet but direel miliiary support The costs and risks involved can be concealed from most of thc Soviet populace, while lhc US Government's freedom to engage in similar operations is severely curtailed by thc legacy ot the Vietnam war and the climate of public opinion it has produced in the Unitedecent public discussionlhc statu* and actions of US military personnel in El Salvador, for example, demonstrated io all LDC* just how constraining lhat climateine years aflcr ihe US military disengagement from Vietnam

Another way ia which superpower armed forces can support a* LDC in trouble i* lhe forcea naval deployment designed toii threat, and to be better posiiiuned to execute lhc threat should it go unheeded. The US ability to stage such demodulations was once un-equaled, but during the pastears the USSR ha* greatly improved its own capabilily to back updeclarations with show* of force. In6

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crisis. Moscow supported Egyptian Presidentwiih threats againsi France and the Uniled Kingdom bui lacked the miliury resources lo influ-ence events in Egypt directly (and in fact thc United Stales was much more responsible for endinu the Anglo-Frenchince then, thc Soviet* havelobal naval capability that enables them to project military power throughout Ihe lessworld. Using that capability. Moscow hasdeployed warships to reassure ils clients or io warn against Western intervention in regionalIt augmented ils naval presence near India during1 Imso-Pakistani war. in thc eastern Mediterranean during7 andMiddle East wars, off Guineaash between Guinea and Portugal seemed possiblend in the South China Sea when China atucked Vietnamoday, the USSR is correctly perceived as the only suic able to offset lhe US capability to proieci miliiary power to distant areas, and io deicr US aciion by raising the risk of an armed confronlalion bclween ihe superpowers.

f/.re tfAlllu. Supportuperpower oftenfrom its allies as well. The connectionthe two is by no means automatic on thethc West Europeans, after all. have Ihcirto provide extensive economic andexpori arms, and engage in other(he less developed world, without anylhe United Stales. On the Soviet side, theaad Cubans would be very unlikelymajor assistance to anleast

lheprovj! of Moscow But. oo both sides, help from lhe allies may be an inspceunt side benefit of friendship with the superpower.

The help provided by thc USSR's allies can be substantial. East European aid to LDCs includes arms (especially from Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, andassistance to internal security organizationsfrom Easiost of other military, technical, and economic services. The East European stales currently haveilitary advisers0 civilians working in LDCs. But by far the mosl active Soviet ally is Cuba, which0 miliury personnel0 civilians over-

seas Thc Cuban miliury presenceortion of the combal force that helped Ethiopia to dnve Somali forces out of ihe Ogadens well as lhe more0 troops thai prop up lhc regime in Angola. Although slates friendly to lhc United States have also sent their miliiary personnel abroad (the dispatchoroccan battalionire during ihc Shaba crisis, the use of Pakistanis in thc armed forces of several moderate Arabhc United Siaics has no equivalent to the Cubans in terms of thc size, scopt. and impact of their operations.

The reason it has nohat ihe Castro regime's purposes io dbpatching so many of us people overseas arc largely thoseevolutionary sute. and ire not found to nearly tbc same degree in any pro-Western country. Havana warns to advancenternationalism,he Cuban populace, divert attention from domestic problems, and create sibling revolutions to protect iu own. It also seeks to maintain some influence with the SovieU and to export some of ils surplus population.

Cubans offer certain advantages to the host country Unit personnel from major powers do not As an LDCember of lhe nonaligned movemeni, Cuba's presence can more easily be portrayed as brotherly aid. not great-power imperialism. Cubans are more tolerant of tropical conditions and apparently less concerned with perquisites than their Sovielarc Culturally. ecc<wrmcally. and sometimes linguistically, they are closer to the LDCs. Africans often delect racism among Soviets but seldom among Cubans, especially since the Castro regime take* pains to use Afro-Cubans for service in Africa.

Wheilwr ihc demand for Cubans' services will be as greal durings it was ini uncertain, given that Castro's stock in nonaligned circle* declined as hc shared some of Ihc opprobiium of ihe Soviel iniervcniion in Afghanistan. Bu( thc supply of Cubans, including iroops. available for overseas service will probably remain undiminished. Castro can be expected to coniinue looking lo overseas adventuresevice to pursue his international goals and lo cope with domestic difficuliies

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Kry Contingencies Considerable political msubilily and regional tension, much of il deeply rooted in ethnic, religious, or other animosities, will continue lo provide Moscow and Washington with opportunities toin thc less developed world, lhc attractiveness of US and Sovietand support during the nexl several years will depend in part on several contingencies that arc not wholly in cither superpowers control:

The course of important regional conflicts,those over Palestine, southern Africa, andAmerica. Sovici opportunities will depend on the intensity of these conflicts and on the success of Western powers in resolving them. In general, the USSR's role will be larger to thc extent that these conflictsilitary cast, while US influence will be greater the more that diplomatic channels arc used.

Thr use of armed force by either superpower. The Vietnam war profoundly affected LDC perceptions of US power,nd reliability. Thc Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has also hadthough somewhat different, effects onof the USSR. Any future US or Soviet military expedition in lhc less developedwell as (he future course of (he Afghanistan war-would probably also maleeep impact on how LDCs ihink about their relationships with the major powers Depending on thc outcome, such events could be read as an indication of strength and wisdom, or of weakness and folly.

i Oornettic upheavals In important LDCs.political change con, of course, suddenly and drasticallytate's relations with the United States arid the USSR. Upheaval in an especially large and important LDC. comparable to thc fall of the Shah of Iran, may abo be read in other countriesesson in thc danger of relying loo much on one or the other superpower, or perhaps on either nf them.

The course of East-West relations. Althoughis not about to curtail ils penetration of LDCs for the sake of better relations with tbc West, any thaw in East-West relations would probably make tbe USSR appear less usefulounterpoise to the West and an alternate source of supportexperience during the, when some of its efforts to preserve detente with thc United States strained its relations with LDCs. isThe Soviets anugonircd and embarrassedfor example, by welcoming President Nixon ic Moscowime when New Delhi was railing against expanded US bombing of North Vietnam

Tie Abiliiy To Compete During tbe next several years, the Soviets' economic difficulties will conlinuc to limit their ability to support LDCs. Thc Soviet economy shows no signs of overcoming severalproblems

Sluggisheflection of declining capital productivity and slow expansion of tbe labor force

Limited ability to earn hard currency, caused by thc high production costs, uneven quality, ondmarketing of most Soviet manufactures

Inefficient agriculture, which requires the USSR to spend much of iu scarce foreign exchange on imported grain

Meanwhile, the East European allies are becoming increasingly dependent on Soviel economica trend being accelerated by economic disruption in Poland and the reluctance of Western lenders These requircmenis close to home will undoubtedly weigh heavily on Soviet decisions regarding the helpe offeredCs. Moscow will think twice before assuming sponsorshipouniry lhat could become as economically burdensome as. say. Cuba- which has been receiving mote than SJ billion annually in Sosiet economic and trade subsidies. Thc Soviets have accepted lhal particular burden because ihcirwith Havana brings substantial noneconomic bcncfils They arc likely to be at least as selective as

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Ihey arc now in pursuing additional clients, and will incur significant financial cents only where, as with Cuba, major political or military dividends seem assured. LDCs will perceive that large-scale Soviet assistance can come only to the handful of states whose policies are. by design or circumstance, most helpful to Moscow.

Economic difficulties will not. however, keep thc Soviets from continuing to offer development projects that would provide them with economic benefits (such as access to needed minerals) Nor will it constrain Soviet arms sales (at least none made oo any but the moil concessionary financialndeed, arms exports have become increasingly valuableoscow as an earner of hard currency. The Sovicis will continue to be formidable competitors in tba field, and will base even more economic incentive than before to sell advanced -andA large proportion of Soviel arms sales are likelyemain concentrated, however, hi the few states that arc wealthy enough to pay for such weapons(like Libya) or lhat receive fundingealthy third party (as does Syria, financed by Arab oil-exporting slates).

The Limits to Intolvemeitt. Thc enlargement of thc Soviet role in LDCs since (heong bul finiic retreat of Western influence from the less developed world. As colonial nitcis. thc Western powers were the natural enemies of independence movements, which continued todominaie the politics of many LDCs even after independence was gained Thc Soviets avoided thc opprobrium ol colonizers and posed as champions ofsubfcci peoples. The United Stales, as the West Europeans' most imports at ally, was less able to do so. even thoughong record of opposing colonialism. Since Ihc Portuguese territories in Africa became independent, however, there have been no significant Western colonies to be freed Political change in lhc less developed world is no longerne-way flow of Western losses and poteniial Soviet gains The Sovietscquired enough interests in LDCs so that they can bc. and have been, occasional losers as well.

In attempting to expand lhcir influence in LDCs. the Soviets arc running up against the same pretensions to nonalignmcnt thai have also limited US and Western influence For some leftist governments, remaining nonaligned has becomeuestion of restricting lhcir involvement with tlte USSR than with tbc West. Avoiding tbc appearance of dose alignment with Moscow is particularly important for states that rely on the support of more moderate LDCs. For example. Ugandan President Miltongoodwith Moscow during his earlieraot given the Soviets and Cubans any significant miliiary role in Uganda today, partly because he needs to stay on good terms with ihe moderate neighboring states (Kenya. Sudan, and Zaire) that have cooperated to improve security within Uganda.

The efforts of left-leaning LDCs to appear nonaligned sometimes pay direct dividends lo the United Stales, inasmuch as they need to make some friendly gestures lo Washington to "balance'* their relations with the two superpowers. Il is partly for this reason that socialist President Rene of Seychelles, despite his fulminattoni against US military activity in thcOcean region,S Air Force tracking station lo remain on has own territory. Given his frequent support for thc USSR on other Issues, he can point to this facility as "proof of his evenhanded approach toward Moscow and Washington

In countries where ihe Soviets have become thc principal source of foreign support, the) tend to receive criticism and resentment for Ihe same reasons thai the United States has incurred them elsewhere Among those reasons are xenophobia in LDCs and lhc friction that results from coniact between dil'fcrcni cultures. Thc friction generally intensifies as the Soviet presence grows. The foreigners* privilegesmore visible, their impact on the local way of life deepens, and awkward incidents involving Soviets and natives multiply In some instances -South Yemenurrentcitizens dislike Ihe Soviets for using up scarce supplies of housing, food, and consumer goods

disagreements arc virtually inevitablegovernments tha!omplex pairon-client relationshipide range of military and economicingle misunderstanding canycle of recrimination and retaliation. An LDCs displeasure with the amount of Soviet military aid or the accompanying repayment schedules may lead it to withhold payments, suspend access to ils ports or airfields, or initiate contacts with Western suppliers. Any of these actions could in turn make thc Soviets less generous in extending further aid. Such episodes have occurred in Moscow's past relations with LDCs. and. evenlose relationship with the USSR continued (as in Vietnam oregacy of mistrust has remained.

Serious disagreements arc most likely to involve thc physical security of the LDC, and more specifically the extent of Soviet military support during crisis or war. LDCs undertundably consider foreign support most critical at such moments, but thc USSR, just as understandably, tries to avoid entanglement incampaigns lhat do not serve its own interests and lhat couldarger East-West conflict.(and many others) in LDCs long remember how foreign slates rcipondcd in emergencies, and if the Soviet response it lukewarm they are likely toihat the USSR has tailed the test of friendship Egyptian President Sadal evidently reached thisabout thc Soviets* behavior during3 Middle East war, when Moscow pressed Egypt and Syria to halt Iheir offensive early, refusedhare satellite reconnaissance dala. and provided whaiconsidered an inadequate amount of military assistance Iraqi leaders are probably reaching similar conclusions aboul tepid Soviet support during ihcir currentwith Iran, although the full consequences are not likely lo be seen until the war is over and Iraq's immediate dependence on Sovici supplies has lessened. Thc newest lest of Moscow's friendship has been posed by Syria, which responded to Israel's annexation oi ihc Golan by attempting tothe face of obvious Sovietconsulia-lion provision, of theici friendship treaty.

Whatever its genuine grievances, an LDC government may use the USSRonvenient scapegoat for its problems, just a* the United Siaies has often been

used. It is easy to blame economic oru!cquaic foreign support, and berating one's chief supporter can pay domestic poliucal dividends by playing on popular resentment of foreign influence For example, Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypi2 -even before Moscow's disappointing performance during3was immensely popular among Egyptians. Thc inciTici-eacy in Egypt's air defense system ihai tbe expulsion caused was probably offset by the boosi ii gave to morale within thc Egyptian armed forces. Sadat's move was an assertion of national pride and. us he later noted, was necessary for tbc subsequent miliiary "victory" over Israel io be credited io Arabs and not to the Soviets

The most successful Sovici assistance efforts carry the seeds of their own demise by possibly making thc LDC more self-reliant and less interested in the future in lhc kinds of support Moscow can best provide Evidence of ihis has already surfaced in Soviet-Indian relations. Whatever gratitude the USSR may have earned during1 Indo-Paki-stani war, ihc elimination of Pakistan once and for allerious conventional miliiary threat to India made Sovici military assistance less critical to New Delhi than before. In addition, ibe Indian economy Ls developing in ways that make Soviel economic aid and trade less useful. India's demand for nonmilitary Sovici manufactured goods has slackened as tt has expanded its own industrial capacity New Delhi has become increasingly impatient with thc prepackaged nature of Soviet doelopmcnt projects, which allow no role for Indian planning or Indian-made pans India is now looking less foi help in lhc basic industrial sectors that most Sovici aid projects involve and more for high technology to be used in specialized plants Thc Soviets' inability lo provide lhc latter isandicap in their com pet it ion with lhc West, and will become increasingly significant lo the extent lhalDC ccunomies mature in the same direction as.

Soviel involvcmcni in tne lessworld is also self-h'miling in another sense; Moscow's relations withCs lend to rest net its influence in certain

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One reason for this is the difficulty oleither panyegional dupuie without incurring thc wrath of the other. Sotnalias break with Moscow as the Sovicis enlarged their support to Ethiopialear example. Another reason is that ihe widespread use of Soviet-made arms has givenof this equipment alternative sources ofsupport LOCs thai want Soviet weapons but do not want Soviei military personnel on theirsometimes tan- -at least with unsophisticatedfor advisers and instruction to other LDCs thai already have these items in theirIn this regard. Jordan has been looking to Iraq. Kuwait to Syria, and Botswanandia for help. Although such arrangements may in some instances expand thc market for Soviet arms, they also make arms sales less useful to Moscoweans of influenceirst steploser relationship

TMe Record of Suceeties and failures. The greater exposure and vulnerability of the Soviets is not Ihe only respect in which competition in the lessworld today differs from thc situationears ago, when decolonization was just beginning. Another difference is lhat lhe various approaches to polilical and economic development that were chosen by newly indepcndeni LDCs nowrack record The LDCs have acquired ample experience to demonstrate which approaches work better than others. Overall, thc record argues in favor of the US model over lhc Sovicl one. lhe movi prominent success stones have been such counlries as Singapore. Taiwan. Soulh Korea. Brazil. Mexico, and Ivory Coast, which have achieved rapid economic growthtrategy of fostering free enterprise and retaining trade and investment lies to thc West, even though some of them lack substantial natural resources, Thc record of socialism in LDCs has been much less impressive It has, in fact, been downright dismal in some African countries such as Tanzania. Even Cuba, despite thc strides it has made in health care and education since the revolution, remains heavily dependent on thc USSK fur iis economic survival

To the extent thai LDC leaders learn from these experiences, Ihey become more likely loath closer to the United States than thc USSR. Oneader may clearly and boldly switch paths in order lo overcome past misiakcs. as President Sadat did in redirecting Egypt, politically andloward (he Wesl. Most of Ihe lime, the lessons learned will be implemented more subtly and quietly. In many cases old socialist and ami-Western themes will continue in rhetoric bul will bc gradually abandoned in practice.

Original document.

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