Created: 7/29/1982

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Tfca kmrnhw* CMof of Staff for rMdlawii. Dtpornnanl of Iho Amy

Anlrtant CMof of Staff, InMiaMci,of Iha A* Forco Tho dirock. of JntaBgonco, HoodquerMn, mertr* Corp.

scope note

sionolitical succes-

s,8r, the significance of thai outlook for

_lhe Unflod States^







A- TW of mm Simrrmttm

R The Preaen! LrtoVnbc


The Principal Playen

The Nature ol ihe OpccolUon Deng XJacptr*

C LWenfap In the IMOi

The Styk end rohcwa of

Tb- ScyU andofStrident BaokkA-Type Soco-ttoo

D. CoeakCQueneei fot the United Statn


The- problems China faces ate so enormous that regardless of who succeeds Deng Xiaoping, Its present tough, de facto boss, most of the major patterns of Chinese politics and policies will continue. China wlUast LDC, marked by wariness of commitment and lack oftechnical skills. Economic development will be halting and uneven. The PRC will tend tolosed authoritarian society. The twrtnership with the United States will continue to be arm's length In character, the Question of Taiwanrincipal ongoing source of friction.

At the moment, the transfer of political authority to Deng's picked successors, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang, appears to be offairly smooth start Their succession to top power will nonetheless be subject to numerous hazards: their requirement to achieve demonstrable results; considerable continuing opposition to their bold policies from within the militaryhe party, and the bureaucracy;need to establish themselves as national figures with potent top cadre support of their own by the time Deng leaves the scene

The possibility cannot therefore be excluded that strident or sharply divided regimes might return In China, at the expense of political stability, economic advance, and fairly predictable foreign policy conduct.

On balance, however, the chancesuccession to power of such officials as Hu and Zhao,eneral continuance by them of fairly pragmatic courses. And, the longer Deng remains active the better the succession prospects of Hu and Zhao. In the short term they would almost certainly have to share powerollective arrangement of some kind with party eldersew senior PLA figures. But if Deng remains in power until,5 or beyond, Hu and Zhao would probably-be able to establish themselves as first among equals within the PRC's succession leadership. Thereafter, one or the other of these two figures would become dominant.

It will be of great consequence to US interests that succession In China not Jeopardize the strategic benefits the United States derives from its relationships with the PRC. Broad US interests will tend to be



best served if generally pragmatic policies are continued by successors like Hu and Zhao.

Should Hu, Zhao, or other pragmatists indeed come to rule the PRC. they would place continued nationalistic emphasis on the Chineseess on ideology.RC would retainthough not necessarilywith the United States, and could be expected to explore ways and means of lessening tbe level of hostility with the USSR,arallel succession process might well also be takingragmatic regime would nonetheless stop short of basically changing China's anti-Soviet ooenUtton.trident backlash regime come to power, it would probably not lessen the level of hostility with the USSR.



The succession of political authority ia the People'i Republic of Chinaynamic, ongoingt began some yean before the death of Mao Zedong, ft continues now; it will not be completed when China's present boss, Deng Xiaoping, leaves th- Kane. Even then,n any other than an immediate sense -ill not have occurred and more leadership permutations will prove necessary before the transition of political authority from Maoist to post-Maoist China can be said to have been fully accomplished

In such an Interim succession, moat of tbe vast problems which mark China will continue. So will many of the responses of China's leaders to thosendlesa of wbo those leaders may be:

China willoor, vast LDCleveloping only slowly. There will continue tohasm between tbe PRCs goab end capabilities. Fxonomk de-veaoproent will be hailing and uneven.

China'smeet great difficulty In coping with the residue of Cultural Revolution folly:lethargy and cynic bm In theearth of skilled technicians,ureaucracy grown wary of commitment.

Whatever the degree of development achieved, the PRC will tend toight, cloeed,society. China's leaders will seek technical ajstatance from the outside world, but not to such extent at might truly open up China to significant "foreign bourgeois" Influences.

Tbe PRC will still be faced with the problem of bow (seat to deter Soviet power and preeauxca, and Beijing'sChinesealmost certainly wish to do so withoutignificantly closer partnership with the United States to displace the present, somewhat arm's length. Sine-US reUdonihln.

Furthermore, the Taiwan problem isransient one, as far as Chinese leaden are ccocerned. It will continue toivisive esemeot between Beijing and Washington, and the possibility cannot be excluded that it might come toajor variable affecting not only Chinese policies, but Chinese pohV tlcs and succession as well.

gainstackground thai the succession picture tn peat-Deng China will be played out. For some time Deng hai been trying to institutionalize the passing of political authority to his two chief lieutenants, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. No direct challenge to them exist at present; Indeed, the most recent appointments of new officials represent clear victories for Hu, Zhao, and their associates. The succession to top authority of Hu and Zhao will nonethelessomewhat fragile propoaitlon.

Even though their patron. Deng, to well oo his mmj to packing the PRC's governing apparatus with his own people, this tough party veteran does not himself enjoy an unchallenged position. He will continue to have to operate within the confines of collective leadership, and will again have to retreat when he provokes too much opposition from more cautious andleaden.

Such apparition to Deng's .acHcal changes will remainsJbelt often routed and foot-dragging in character. The principal sources of such opposition will continue to be certain old guard leaders in the PLA (China's military, the Peoples Liberationertain party leaders (national andbrought to power during the Cultural Revolution years, and China's gigantic, lethargic bureaucracy

Ecortomic collapseajor failure of the PRC's present development programs are improbable, but Dengolidify

the position of hb heirs sufficiently In the relshort

actuarial time available to bim, so that political succession can pass In an orderly manner.

Hazards abound, and if Deng, Hu. and Zhao do not bring denyonstrable improvement to the life of China they could become the skeptics' newest scapegoats. This danger will exist even though this problem may beymbolic one: that to, not so much that the policies of Deng and his associates must succeed inpecific degree of actual progress in this or that aspect of development, but that failure to achieve reasonable progress will give various rivals political weapons with which to contest the nailing down of political dominance by Deng and his associates

Their succaedoo will bang in important measure on how well tbey have established themselves as national figures with potent top cadre support of their own by the time Deog dies, becomes incapacitated, or leaves tbe scene.

Should Deng depart In the relatively near future (over the neit year oru and Zhao would almost certainly have to share power, probablyollective arrartgement of some kind with party eldersew senior military (PLA) figures.

Should Deng remain In poweronger period5 orhen Hu and Zhao would probably be able to establish themselves, at least Initially, as flrst-among-eojuals within the PRC's successor leadership

No confident estimates are justified as to what would occur then, for, in addition to the domestic and foreign circumstances of the time, the question would soon arise as to whether theof Hu and Zhao was to be one of shared authority, or of one superior to the other partner, or of Hist one leader alone.

There are courrtleas precedents in Chinese history for just one leader, and some jjrecedents (imperial, republican, and PROrime technician associated with themost recent example, Mao and Zhou Enlai. Zhao Ziyang has some of tbe makingshou Enlai. Butough, able official who might outlast Hu. Onelear: there are no examples In Chinese history of truly shared top authority.

any event, should the succession process elevate Hu, Zhao,pragma lists to top positions,RC would placeon China and the Chmeseass on ideology.continue to open itself up somewhat to foreign technologyonlyimited degree. It would keep its basic tiesUnited States, but would continue to distance itself somewhatto bargain toughly, to criticize many US policies, and Increasinglyitself with the Third World. As part of thb process, such aregime would probably explore ways and means of lesseninglevel of hostility with thestopping shortchanging China's anO-Soviet orienUtion.

balance, the chancesairly manageable successionto such officials as Hu and Zhao,eneral continuanceof fairly pragmatic PRC courses, at home and abroad. Further,clear that virtually all PRC leaders wish toeturn to theof the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, given the enormityproblems, and tbe many advene contingencies that mightpolitics and policies over the next few years, thebe excluded that intense instability might return in someSome ccmblnation of critical ecoocszuc setbacks orcould occur over the next few years that would bring to

power strident or sharply divided regimes of sotne kind whkh would cut beck sharply oo the generally pragmatic courses Deng. Hu. and Zhao champion In such circumstances China's development prospects would suffer. Beijing's behavior would bemore difficult to anticipate, Sino-US relations would almost certainly be further set back, and the Soviets would be given new opportunities to try to exploit China's vulnerabilities.hinese backlash readme, however, wouldnot lessen tbe level of hostility wttb the USSR.

he United Slates will have considerable stake in the outcome of political succession in China. It will be of great coosequence to USthat the transfer of political authority there not jeopardize the strategic benefits the United States derives from Ib reUboruhips with the PRC. Broad US interests will tend to be best served if generally pragmatic policies are continued by successors like Hu and Zhao.

ndeed, Soviet considerations will certainly interact with the working out of future Chinese politics and policies. The transferring of political authority in the PRC will be accrimpaniedarallel process in the USSR. The successors of Brezhnev will probably notenuine or full Sine-Soviet recoociliatloo, but they may see profit in some lessening of the level of hostility with tbe PRC Meanwhile, even though Beijing's leaders will continue to view the American connectionecessary adjunct to the PRC's development, the value to them of tbat connection will continue to hang Unportantry on their perceptions of the degree to which US world policiesis the USSR benefit the PRC's security and strategic interests.


Tht Skmlflcooot of th* Soecaislon Question

The lucteadori of political authority thai Deng Xiaoping ha* arranged nun* beragile phenomenonthough he and hb aatnrtate* -ive of late bean iiBLiMfWh- aaJUog tba PftCiburr* ucrac tan wtth thatr own people. Myriad probiecu hazard anrennBon of aatthortty toeinportr Chairman Ho Yaobang and Premier Zhao /lying. The rxchamu Dens and hi* luctearan (ace are ta enormous and to litgralned in the lyttetn and toetMv he hat Inherited from Mao Zedong, that they will not be quickly eaoectaad by newChlneo* pobcMa. whatever their character and wfaomr thair caneapton.

In tbe broadoat tenia China hai ban awadngintern of po lineal (uccennon ever Unce tho coDapK of Imperial authority there. Today mt taaatanwal of pollttotl aulhorlty In the PRC remainsdynamic, oncotng pfocmrn. It began tome year* before tbe death of Mao, It will not be computed when Deng leave* thehaanrdUai of what It*dm woceiduc-ceaBoo" lo any othar than aa ttninedttti nwm will not have occurred and mora Uadrnhlpmay prove nacaaary before the IrarMQon of poUtkal au-thortty from MaoUt to pcea-Maoot China tan be said to have bean fully ecconwluhed

American, Soviet, orknowewoing to Influencefor good orntil change* yet lo comepranmt-dny China.nionoubOow deeaoW iway. WhatChina therefore facet In the near lorn atrarafor of political authority, within amuch longer period of full tuec anion.

or thi* Interim period the fairly pragmatic poUcks of Deng. Hu, Zhao, aad their tatoctttaht Chinese pee ham their bett chance dnce the mkMKOj to deal whn Chinn'i many problctn* and lo helpXmaVbeoed. muie modern todcty. Avauahle evidence, however, makat rt dif hcult to he *tey tangulne tbout anytooaa la achievingmbenoot goab in the near future- Al baft, chances owing that period favor oafy partialmii uttered am and there to the economicf Clam Thr ratteens* eow firing Deng and haiad tadaad afl of Oaaa'tare aiaairtng.e* popnbbon ofuhon. China hi tHUoor and backward toekty. by far tba world 'i nraaal LDC h> dew agrieaonral growth in relation lo population {agriculturalUereent bather thanerely keep* pane with carront level* of per caprt* cootumpoon. In per capita CNPere US KM (aettmalodi It* energy rasource develoranent la listing. It don not have the capacity rapidly to medernlM Haalf alone. It hu only limited means of attracting foreign capital or paying for needed cortunodltlet and technology from tbroeid

he MCctnaon to Deng will be played outrop thai indeoe* not only probketm which the PRC (btrot wtth many othar of iha world'I UXX but aho nuraeroat dJf icuhie* unique to the PRChe teak uT the dinlac^tel taak iadag China and the aadecrty of the goeU fucceaave Ueden hive Ml; the PRC hai cometang way,ong way to go Abo.

na* If

doted mcaety whteb la many reapKfs punyjeeh can anal off from the worldoden are economk^-I. ^r* and poanca I,reu-jr Ltrge ncrawn of foreign lachnlctam ud pUnts tato Chtaa. Theae leadenoaaU retaOoewhlp wtth the USSR that demand)hineae mlhtary eaud*ufunent of conttdenble propoenona Chlae needt van acorn oftdaMMtatrilon ind technicaara, yet the Cultural Revolution has ceat China nearly aworth of trained id mm heritors, profeailoaala. and technkkms

ft Moreover, party turmotl bi China over the past ihrcc decedee hat devoured much of lis own leader-

ship. Cadre* it nl) Well wtiaee DoUcia later go tour cannot only be pulled down, but can (her be damned for having been *rong all along- The raauhlng raaes conluBOc and totunldation hu treumatUed wideofopularioo, made then wary of coco-mltmeni. and alienated them from the rhetoric of pollik* Thli prow baa sapped the regflme'i ebUKy to generate unique energies one* again fraea theMao did so wed at the PFtCe outset. The meat grievous ili mage tbeae processes havetdeapread tndividual cynlctan, ledofenos. andfor society at large need for sonse progress In the present context of polilicalot so maeo an economicbow ever, asynsfaooc one that b. aot so much that the policies of Deng and his aasodates must luooeed Inpecific degree of actual progrest la this or (hat aspect of oavesce^rnent, but that failure to achieve reaaeasabtV progress vfJlvarioos rivals political weaponi wttb which lo coatest the nailing down of political dominance by Deng and his associates.

01 gsfl Umme alone oa measurable eeossoxDtC nsceeei, technical coraa"oerauons, or even ihe personel polilical power pceiuons achieved. For all their skill, the political style of Deng and hbas certain reeueuU an ahen one lo nsost Chlneee, for In so faery acknowledging the sjggJsaSSsssi ol China and Hs need of outsldo support iheee leaden risk Injuring Chinese pride and provoking widespread reaeertrncntsthe Chlaese.erribly garp break from what Mao prc-ided China: for -Ith all hb drawbacks and changes of Hne Mao did call up an Intangible but very real strength lo the makeup of the Chtnrae, their traditional ethnoorntrbm and sense of aaoral superiority Swob senrJaeerts ntiO dominate aot carry the bulk of China's huge popubtloa. but the party tfsekf, which eipamled rapidly during theRevolution

To thb aUiartkxa Dang Xiaoping bringsreelUencv Thb tough veteran of party Infighiing has climbed back to the top from three purglngs. He has worked hb willeluctant bureaucracy and military, even though they In turn bav* forced bun to back off on many goals and pares of advance. In the Chlneee case.ttempting to createa factarvssseaaat Otmmuntst regime andAnd, Chinese leadership ha* ceased damning the USSR for beingpresent Soviet suss having become "bureeixrausD" aad 'social loperlal-btn."

B. Deng must solidify the top position of bki beirsha reastligfi abort actuarial DraeM him, so lhat polHical surossalon can psai in an orderly niannar. Haiardt abound, and If Deng, Hu, and Zhao do not cooOaue to brtrg some demonstiable improvement to the Ufa of China they could becorne the skeptics' newesthe history of the PRC abowf that China's leaden and people coatcemsWersbie economic setback and disarray The

hat Dang bee broogka nor order to tbe PRO politicsttempting lo reetructureemment and to arrange for accession atletts to the skill with which he km fashioned an eaqulelteof pobttoal forcea The fate of hb suceeescn will be krgeb- determined by tbe waking out of domestic currents, as haa been the case with all Chinese leaden But as foreign Udloencea helped shape events In Imperial and republican China, so foreignSoviet andto someeffect political leadership and succession In tbe PRC


b. The Pfixnl Leoderthip Sifuollofl

The Settle*

o question that Deng Xlwping re-malnt tba PRC* forefooat kinder and poheyrnaket. even though be now operate* more from behind tbe tcene* He ilnc^ledged driving force behind implementation ofurho present mainline policies continue to reflect Deng'* desired programi. a* do the preeent anbttkna effort* to dream Sine the bureaucracy and pack It with more riaportthi official* The recently promulgated draftala for Deng and hi*rc the parttcuUr namehjtj of new offtcUb appointed or promoted Deng ud htt dote aaexiate* hive the initiative; other* react to them and than1 policies.

There era nonrtheies definite llmtta to Drag's Influence. He canoe* be compared to Mao In poll feel Mature.fatged to there power wtth other leaden ud to operate ia tha oaliit of collective leadenhip rather than dictating policy atby the numerous retreati Deng hat had to make In the lait few yean when he provoked Haunch opposition from the more cauttou* and ccntervattre. The constraint* on hit authority have been registered In many wiyi. It tookear (and Hi revinont) to produce thabtfauthentanve Reacfutlon, which among othar thing* eel forth the preterit gcapel on how lokaatt al theMao and hit mlMakea Dang hat Joined contervativn party and military leaden In sharply delimiting the earlier area of pexmlolble criticism of tbe regime. Deng wai unable to submit the rev-bed date constitution lo the National People* Congrats Int had been original!*Theoat certainty involved craning dneord over such key bowee aa Mttlng forth the formal relation of the party te tba Mate,hief of Kaleommander la chief of the PLA, aad In particular determining the command releti among the PLA, the party, and the government-

Indeed, (he llmia to Dena'i authority were clearly lagsatered la Deeaj'i having bad himself to

Mem,aatna at eke penwat itodar-nae'i tnaraa eitmi a. www,or neat leaf rmux m> aaand* th* leaagw *ad eiaunv at

mdlartMv Ib (pWwIlun UtduMry. irtancK andnd

ami me the pott of Chairman of theilitary Cooimlardon1 after considerable, undligulied copoaltlon had developed within the PLA to the kite of giving that pcealonHa Yacceng. as Deng hadIn fad, until tucb tune a* Deng and hi* aato talra are able to resolve thi* central Question of who and what command the PLA tbere willaior mitring equation In Deng* ability to nail down an orderly nxorattoo of political authority. Drag will meanwhile have to be careful not to ahow hi* tornc-ttmea abrasive tlA impetooui manner damage hit toe It. especially since, ate Li in an overall lenaeoceeec* Maoeader endeavoring to channel ultimate politicalIn <ftrectton* of hu own choosing

t it fromosition of rrurrus Inter para that Deng Is seeking to reorder the Chinese Corrtrnu-niit regime. Even at now cut back In icope, the "ntodevantatioa" na<ikmnawtt programitarfy aasbtnoot effort acres the board. Perhapsl ni loos are certain ofcconiptnying meat-urea deelgned to provide the political and social pre-reQulaUe* for CVrna't economic and technical develop-atent Hare Deng and baa attodate* are veklag to create tubatanllal chanaat In theWofcgy. organiralmn, ud poiicMa These leaden art:

Trying toora effective, prafea-riooal bureaucracy. Id the proccn attemntlng to neutralize or bypaai ineffective or makcrtraM organt of tha party, tke gpvvrnnseat. ud thecount,ete ranks meanwhile with reformut lupporten.

Separating: lechnical ud adnuotttratlve Iaad laganlralion* from partya ao doing creating more ipecialiration of (unction and fewer mulHple portfolka

Revuing official interprctatlon* of the PRC's myth f'erure. Mao Zedong, and of hit political ok&maomv.

Trytng toote formalized legal tyttera.

Sending manyeculiar abroad for training.

Upgrading Chinai edocauocval lystanx to abuaed Ib the yean of ihe Cultural Revolution

1ft Ferbapi meat Important, Deng and hitare now taking tbe drastic tfep of trying sharply

aiplkillv lo cut back th* iwoflee ranks of the PRCs dvillan and militaryamble, for thb erabJtloui effort to out oo! dead wood, the oi sasgjrd. ud tba recalcitrant will meet ccasskser-abet flerencf. la thb scheme of Deagi tboo remainbut law vtdble. tod withose reduced:o longer to rncaioporlxe ell ofieu before,o there Influence more than It hu with the (tate ipparatui and with new, aUetnalive bcdlee coocernlog idance. tecrrneeogy. economic*,and military maten

hem new arrangements reflect the broadtotting In which the leadership and awcceadoo dramai ere being played out in China.one, and with him many of the patterns which cfwractettard politic* In the Maoist PRC The extremes of earlier debate and fectlctaUlsm have been narrowed.ore confidence and lest paranoia preterit among elements of the PRCs leadership for esample.esi concern ibour the Imminence of military attack by ihe USSR;atisfaction lhal Chins haa sow been widely acceptednajor power, andope that China's leaden haws made the Culturalhing of the past The fdcas of much of China's dm malic political attention bas meanwhile shifted to Improving the quality of life In iha PRC, and In the regime's present effort to create what It ceils "spirituala China

and rural

t should be noted that mark tbe Belnng and ihe lop rnore than they do tha broad provincial settinga which still contain the bulk of Chins'i. tvoo and cfflcUlddrn. With certainuangdong and Shanghai, forloots are much stronger in the provinces, patierni mora sat, borne oerats more wary, and skepticism of great new national Initiatives more pronounced. "Suc-wtll certainly not be worked out alone by

'There ass so reasbb few- on the ictdha PS.Cs sarwsSwSSbra tarty and en. wt. al the asanas! pre-inciat nd leal krvskanmrwa Pwtr Is know* lo duiwofiw eilllos alull, of wboos SO nlflfcn have IMaed stsos Iks ones of tha CaJtaal tm^mkmam Xlsoelae and hii assnsssasi sr* csnsciUy carta* base iha swabst of otfta bolh (I)edixt-ai tb*laas-

lor namoU.o 1ST. bureau and beadsad (li llw pert?tcsslaallby ITS psrosnl Tlwss hartaw recent pwbKe stataossats thsl Drag and hM aasxtslrs worn to rashes tsw sets! ibe el tha party.

eon pet log pis ten In Beting, bul In Interaction with growing iiiifiiii'iiuiii] Interest! there and throughout the country, and with greater Influence eaertod from provincial and local levels

The rrlactrsd Nsfsn

lft Deetg'e iVSsueoa Swccessen. While Dang has mil nam nl lln Tiil Tini il ed aiccsaaors. by making them perty Chairman and respectively, and by according Increasing to them. Deng bas In fact arranged an scheme which ihe Chinese clearly The outcome of thb succession scheme of uncertain. Hu and Zhao are both off Ida Is of cctanoVable ability, but Zhao has gained hb experience primarily at tbe provincial level, andet widery known hs bis own rightational figure act are they ipparenlli backed up by extensive senior cadre support of their own. At the moment they remain isb rates of and front men for Deng. tbe. hava been iocreadrigty called upon to make anthotitallve statements for Deng,oteworthy thai In so doing they hava been careful thus far senerally to Invoke Deng'i name or that of the party's Central Secrets rial in living down what the officialo be on key

lft Of the two, party Chairman Ho Yaobang (nowaslose eseocUte of Deng since, far longer than hai Zhao. Hu gamed much of hb early esjterience tn Deng's home base, Sichuan Province, then had yean of senior party smignnvents in Belnng. was purged during the Cultural Revolution and againogether with Deng, and at lait was



rehabilitated and elected to the Politburo8 and to General Secretary of the party. sometime* self-effacing official, Hu ccrncentratei onarty wracked by the Cultural Bevohilion. In so doliai he appears to enjoy Dona's full trust.

By contrast. Premier Zhao Zlyangmooth, utbane official who generally prolects an ettractlve Irnagc and serf-confident manner. He cosnearMleaed background and served as aa sari-cultural eapert and then party first secretary ta Guarasdorar Province before being ported7 ta the CuJural IWrsehansm ftehabdBated. he was stationed la baser MoneoJi* mQl1 when Zhou Enlai tranaferred mm to Guarsgdong Province andlateSichuan Province, where Zhao became the top party and government official Zhao gained repute In Guangdong and Stohuaa,or not, for mcoaaifnlryumber of far-machlng Improvement! id agricultural prodeconomic integration.ctoctstoo-makutg. end the consbrnnsg of agrtcult unl. Industrial, and commercialalmostof certain of the measures he and Deng have gases Initiated at the rastfsooal level Heeal Pont bum membernd Premier0 He has traveled to Europe, tbe Near East, So ablest Asst. and lapse, and has had occasionaln the past for foreign policy or military mailers. Hb foreign policy role seems clearly lo be on tha Increase, marked especially by hb recent meetings with Tokyo's leaden.echnocrat and administrator to date, Zhaokilled and valuable eapert, not yet tbe header of prune political power He has certain of the attributeshou Enlai. best Zhao's principal asset at tbet-niirj tSe support of Deng.trust was early shown In htm when5 Deng mads htm the Wo man la Deng's own home bam of power, Stcboaaary few yean after Zhao had been paraded In the Streetsultural Resolution enemy of the people.

il. The party and government roorgantiatloo and personnel changes announced In2 clearly strengthen Hu's and Zhao's portion tn theThe streamlining of government, In particular, generally promoted men who share their views, and some, like Vice Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and Secretary General of the State Council Du Xingyuan, have dose personal ties to Hu and Zhao respectively. Just asumber of men who could be expected to challenge Hu and Zhao or their policiesuccession fight lost some of their access to the bureaucracy. Specifkally, someast associates of Hu can now be Identified at very senior national party or governmentnlike Hu's associates. Zhao's are generally In economic and technical ministries and not In potitinns ofltleal power. Zhao nonethe-leai does enjoy coo tactsew very senior offi-dak. ihe venerable Ye Jlenyiog for one, which Hu does not As significant as these gains are fot Hu and Zhao, however, they are little moreeginning. They must further strengthen tbeir grip on Iheespecially over such control organs as the party Organisation Department and the CentralInspection Commission. Tbey must abo cultivate or place supporten In key military positions.

or deputy dlrwSen al Ootid CmmDlsa of the SUMministers ormbmua, sasbswseon. or -U* memberi ol Ihe OaBsaaolr <rf SOdaln [Mill


Table 1


of Associates of Party Chairman Hu Yaobang aod Premier Zhao Ziyaog Wbo Are Known Currently To Hold Major National-Level Positions

CCT toi/ln

Numberi of Associates of Parly Chairman Ha Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyensj. Who Are Known Currently To Hold Senior Provincial-Level Positions



DMolot. CCT Certnl CaeMiwa onauMBMaea

Agvisw, CCTnrssnlsanfi

i weill

aSassatf Cisatal mm tjassal DM Sesrstary Ceaaral sua*

Caortl AaSww,5Ua*CuwicUowlpsapiv.



S o


0 i

i *


kill. Sis if Council

Oflfclii. otlbfw AenSway of SoSsnce^Aosdtrny of Sodsl SeSsoess

1 i




e la not only theanking officer, but serves on two major policymaking bodies of Ibe party (the Secretariat and the Militaryand ts Inice Minister of Defense. Deng has long had military and political confidence In Yang, who now supports Deng's policies within the PLA. Abo, Yang has had greater contact with the outside world lhan have most of the PLA'i top


nother chief political lieutenant of Deng's who may figure prominently In the succession picture Is,neenber of tba party's Central Secretariat aad the senioc vice premier. He was case is! cesry two ol tbe original IS vice premiers to retain bis poaUsoa, and he is one- political figures wbo ervl head both senior party and govern-menllose associate est Dessg's stace, Wan was purged twice by the Macesta Heeputation ss an eieel lent adnslninrator.

eng'i principal Heuienent for military matters Is Yang Delhi (nowurrently PLA Chief of Staff, having succeeded Deng in thai poMtJon In

hemong Ihe disparate and unorgantord skeptic* of Deng's policiesumber of 'liiUngaiihed old guard leaders, many of whom continue to have leading roles In China's economic life and political life. These leaden worry less about the direction of Deng's reforms than their pace and scope They are enscerned lest bis drastic reforms undermine the party's prestige and podrlon in Chirjme society aadadversary on China's axial order

rominent among such figures is party elder Chan Ytm (about 7SX whom resooemeabnes Include overal long-term economic planning, organisation work, end party work style. He It Influential with various factions because he has never been an assertive rival of anyone's. Active fn the party since,op leader off and on since, Chen continues1 to aide with Deng at various luncturcs, and

sheret Deng's destret to rfvcm many of the CuJlura! Revdittion'i lecaciea, to isodeiite the myth of Mao. end to drew pragmaticallyariety of economic rocdek He nonet heora orthodox Communist economic planner andeam wtthln tha top leadenhip at preaent. He often toes lions with Deng but on occaaon regard* him aa too veritureeoene and notcommitted to wrong central control of the economy.

element! who wouldora Stalinist PRC; and (c) certain elements of the conservative militaryNone of (heat figure*eturnew Cultural Revolution, but together tbey doonsiderable body of doubt about iheand pace of Deag'i "reformbt" poilctet, mote tkepti-eal aad more doctrloalre than Chen Tun and other of thel*cu**ed above

or hit put, Hua hat bad to relinquish hi* tne former nipt erne pcets todptckcd rocces-tan the pt>thip to Zhao and the partylo Hu And rinoe giving up ihoae rxaittoni, Hua hat lufferad further *etoacbow the lowest tanking mcmbrr of the PolHbaro't Standing Coentarttee- Hua retain*residual ttreragth tn the middlef tbe bureaucracy, but he hat never been able torong personal bate of tupport among keyb fort urealearly to be declining, anducce**ica> erbb should occur In the near future, Hua'l chances of playingilatnlfi-caM poat-Deng role will probably dual pate.

More clearly Iridepeodent, though tn ihirply failing health, hat been toother partykan-maaa -at China's tecond-ranklng vice preanler. tensor eeoaoestc planner, and tha vice premier with the longest conttnooat terviee. As HI ih raniina parly leader, he hat frequently Mood In for Deng on formal occasion, and hat considered hlmtelf Deag'i equal Ui strength ta part hat Hemmed from hn long tervice and hti role as ipokea-man for ceotral economic minbtrlee lhal stand to lose influence If Deng and Chen tueoead tn decentraludng economico making.olilical fortune* have been In decline slncaL and haritically ill andmbkel, to peatbaeani for Hn and Zhao much longer, but other advocates of itrong ceolrai planning and Soviet gyle economic development are itUI preaent tn the leader-thip and will fight rearguardt. w

aa iVJafoel aaaf MOUavra Oww.ii etf Drag aaaf lifeoot, coalition eiiau whose daeualki rneenben arson*imited return to the past. Theae srouotns* of officials, who often have Little tn common otherutual ttxpMcUm concerning Deng and hb reform measures. Include. raapacttveV (a) the turvlvlng Cuhural Revolution remnants who formerly Loitered around Mao'tdealgnated tucceater. Hua Cuofeng; (b) certain "coniervatlve" old guard party and security tervice

ignificant opposition to Deng'* broad reform program* eornee from certain military elements. Op-poMllon to Deng from wttbtn theot oonstaot, total, or cohesive; It vartate to issue and, from time to time. Many PLA linden understand why military raodctakaatton hat beenower priority In Deng'ind they also support hit effort* to gain Western military technology and to modernise and regularlre the PLA. Certain of the younger PLA ekcmeoU are theenaehet reformat, and In any case are a* err to replace the old guard leaden who have dominated the PLA for to long. Many leadingof tbe PLA rwoetbeiea*ulwark ofeng twaUuatod either thorp PLA crtrlebai byhe past year to take greater account of PLA views and interbut the RtMircet of dttcontcnt among PLA leaden are deep-taated ggaj, among them:Since 'bee, toasa eltmitb of the PLAey pcoocal role; the high command of

the TLA became iKa "guardian" of (he political,and eceasotnlc itaiui quo during ihalUrofurlcaa, aodpenly and bluntly rpoie of Id rote a* iha guaioMD of the "correct" political line- Thii political role eroded duringnd hai accelerated under DcTUi He hai forested thep Its political role 'ndet fad onits prof eauonal duties.

Some PLA figures are displeased that military matters has* the lowest priority In China's "mcdernliatlon" programs, and tbat eccootnic emphasis has shifted from heavy industry toand light Induatry

Some PLA leaden cetvslder Deng's seml-llberal-trlng of psjbbchreat lo army rank-and-file dbraphne and to social order They feel that Deng has carried eriOcasss of Mao too far. and they point to events io Poland as an esanspL of the unforeseen disasters that can flow fromchanges such as Deng's Such PLA leaders similarly consider that hb poucses permit far too many "dangerous foreign Influences" tothe put mi .turn and moral fiber of China's youth.

Many PLA leaden have bad trouble with Deng over bread-and rrutter bsum Agriculturalstirred resentment when the dependents of military men were forced to rely on their own efforts rather lhan lupport from the communes In which theyeal disadvantage wrtb tbeir able bodied men away bs the service. The party made special efforts to Improve thb situation, only to be faced with new lesblance from within the PLA to forced retirements andSenior ciflcen remain reluctant tothe perquisites that come only with rant and autrsortty.

I should be noted that escept for some dbgrm-tletnent over what certain PLA leaders const dec Deng', "too soft" tactics toward Washington'$ Taiwan

ooticke. there seem to be few agndkaet differences at present between Deng andad en over foreign policy questions. The same appean to apply with respect lo security and strategic bsum that b, how beet to defend Chine against military attack. Abo. Deng

derives support from within tba PLA os. certain issues.

He has some backing, for eiampla. from PLA leaders

whoore precessions! army along modem lines,estored rank system, leas party control, and an emphasis on quality over quantity; and who agree with the need to limit military eipenditurea In the short term la order to provide more resources for China's modernization programs. These supporter* behave lhat,uitable eccasrsmfc infrastructure bas been erected with foreign technical assistance, China can later proceed to accord greater attention to : b military power along more modem Imee. That thread of reasoningong history ta tbe PLA snrtendsng back tot was overshadow id ckartsg tke Cultural Bevcsutson when Mao's doctrine of People's War held fun sway, with Us stressore politicized army wWh greater party control. Today'* PLA "modernists" are endeavoring to move Deng more clearlyosition which holds that the doctrine of People's War must take Into account the military reauNbs of theh century

eevered military leader who chain the PRC's National People'i Congress and holds other leading party and military peats, symbollies the attempt of cad-guard mililary leaden to maintain the PLA'i prestige, and has eierclsed significant constrain* Ing influence within both the Army and tha Politburo On tbe other hand, he has supported Deng's call lor reform of the bureaucracy despite what that wifl entail for sensor PLA leaden Te could reappear toarticularly cceiMnrJous Dengbt reform, or otherigures might attempt to do so In hb name, but for the moment Te appean content to withdraw from active political maneuvering. In any even!n falsing health, and may no longer be able to coftptUatlrta*-

ats PssasaVnCe. By tha regime's aclrntsMon.ercent of China's population are oat-spoken disaffected critics, dismayed that Deng and hb

associate* have not gone fort her then they have In condemning Mao'iperrnHUng freer dttcu*-lion In China, and the like. Party Chairman Hu yaobang hai dismissed them, outwardly at -mt. as "monkey-like clown*.'" But old Ye Jinn mi huthat. If thereercent of China's1 Ulbon people who fitategory, tht* Kill rnean* that the regime ha* mllUon* of cbasWen with which to deal Tbcae dwatdont* ore atisparate lot without ccgJinUation. power, or coherent program; they have; been silenced for the moment, and they Mem unlikely In the oeer future lo have any effect on nationalheir critic lira* have nooetheleai beenThey have (truck *orne reaponalve chord* imorig the public. They may come to Influence some of the PRCs urban policies. And, since many of theseare youths, their grievance) in time will come toonsiderably greater problem to China* leadership than tbey do itespecially so If the well educated among them are not comtructlve-ly abeorbed Into the system in the meantime.

The Nature of the Opposition Deng Xiaoping Faces

he situation is not so much one offor powerrticular factions or lop leaders, one of whom may ultimately unseal Deng andt i* of his being circledost of constraints on hb freedom of action and leadership potential. Some of these constraints eitst among the top leadenhip, although most such opposition at pre-*ent take* the form of hesltince or braking action, rather than head-on collision, and it comes generally on certain specific issues, wilh sometimes differing or shitting coalition* of leaders. Other, more fundamental constraint* arise from Chinareet basic problem* and wouldace any Chinese leader. Still other constraint* stem mora from the specific circum-ttarsces of Deng's particular position ind policies: of these, great "opposition" to Deng cornea simply from the skepticism present among the million* of dvlUam and military official* throughout the country who comprise China's governing cadres. Unless Deng can

The problem ofing cadre work styletie moat difficult one facing Deng,gejjkral whether ihoto

and imtuV* oaaeaV lo* (ha SoctslH came will

ever reasmft* the elaa of earlier dm

Pasaphrurd opWUbi of toureewithta PRC caiVlaloW January IMt (Secret Noiora Ho corstract Orccas)

Thtr* ti toepeople dotag amrana

al ef db* ha*an iktiMirj .eaotmblee lack regularei eaptoriae. re-irdlng aad puraahtng. retiring. dumliBrai andrid ofM of thas* have an Iron ricacowt ao matter how well or how badly ibev perform.

DengAO, lo an inlarred moettag of Ihe CCPJ Politburo Iffortg Kong Cfsen Wang, IA And)

succeed lo overcoming Inertia, iinpartlng cocjtniotlve momentum, and weeding out veal layeredhey may have the power to thwart ma iretiitl.es and ihoae of hb lucoeaaora

C. Uctcfaxshlp in

trticularnd policies aalda. Causa'i contleaatn, baatc protaWeaa will face ail efeader* alike, will affeot their political lucoeanon. and will In turn be affected by that tucoeetloo. Theae baiiC laruea. whichense *at the framework for the working owl of ineceaaoa. are Ihaaa

How areoader* to bridge the chaaro between the PRC* goal, and capabilities

How can China* lender* lead If the giantof (late do not follow?

Howlicradlled party mobuirr China*and eipecUlly It* alienatedtoreat new China of lomonow ?

How can China* leaden relax authoritariann an effort to apnr the aetata*'i creativity and productivity, without *etttng loom force*Infurther undermine the ruling party'* authority?

Howelatively weak China beat eeeure art nal .ecertly?

iven euch formidablehere will almost certainly be tome coWtrrulng. thiftingofnd tome controlling cyclical twlngtn relative freedom aad reawtKe ceptetaioa. In tht* atution the collide world thou Id be prepared for tha rxjaalbUtty ihat luceeanon Id China could take any of manyontinuation of DengM leadercanewhal ratch at thatley. by Chentae leadenhip. forced by ad eerie ctrcumatancn. In which itignalhjii and repression might becomehe avowedly Ideological perspectiveseo-Maottt readme; or even an explicitly PLA regime

M Hu and Zhao milong way to go before tbey wfB be able to itand alone. The policy charaget they lymboiiieiiblv he beaten down. Aad in any caae tbe iconer Deng diet orreater the difficulty they will have inuecetsion

If Deng ihould die. become incapacitated, or leave the loene In the very near future, lay, over the nest year or ax tha lira Lmpaxlae of PRC leaden would probably he an aaaeaetng of how mccenful and acceptable hit new tneature* bad beam China might torn inwardeeled,acuam drreaoolng In leretgn pohcy making. Any oneumber ofor tuecaarive axceston. might come to power inolled of drift Aad vt cannot be excluded that In iuch cucumWxnce* anmotivated leadenhip might come to the fore.

It to more Hkely, however, thatcollective ruccvaaton ofkind wouldrouping which included Hu and Zhao, Chen Tun. and vartoat centrist party and PLA leaden Theanace there of Hu and Zhao, despite

ifcjfHj tmalcjl( Ot hhjcfs isuqport infttwpottattwttl

from that of Deng, would be due to *uch political progrent at tbey would have made to that dale, icognition of their impbcll ntcceauon ilatut, the lieutenant* they had lucceeded In bringing In topoan, the feet that He and Zhao (with Deng) had been lucceedtng in filling up the Center of Chinese politic* fasrfy well, and the general reluctance of all on the Chtnere *cene to revive the extreme pontic* that marked the Cultural Revohatioe yean and the probreprd

auaeaMCnhat went oa for yean during

Mao* long decttoe.

It follow* that the longer Deng remain* tn place, the greater the chances that Hu. Zhao, and llke-rnlnded pragmatltti will dominate theDeng alao bat dated that he hope* to retire from active pobtka5 If by about that Um* Deng hai been able lo maintain al least hi* present degree ofthen the meat probable transfer of politicalwould be one la which Ha and Zhao (or otfam picked by Deng) would ttjcosedrimus Inter pares typevdataWp atuaOoa Shouldraarlo take piece. It thooU be rioted, iha* would caxatlrute tbe only aifcteafuHy arranged politics! nkcrwnon In China In thia century.

No confident rstimalea are ratified a* to what would occur then, for. In addition to the domestic and

foreign circumstance* of the lime, Ihe question would iooa arise es to wnether tbe succession of Hu and Zhao was to be One of shared authority, or of one superior to the other partner, or of hat case leader alec* There areprecedents In Chine re history for Bast one leader, and scene prececients (imperial, repebhcan. end PRC)rime technician assorts ted with the boss the most racesrl esampie. Mao and Zhou Enlai Zhao ZI rem has some of the makingshou EnlaL But Zhaoough, able official who might outlast Hu. Onelear; there are no examples In Chinese history cf truly shared top authceSty.

a aay event, the succearion leadership would cootlnue loundamental agenda that In many respects would aot be significantly different for scene years from that of the present Further. China iHa and Zhao orbegin progress!xly to be one whose peisyevtl es hava been formed Isrgely by post-IMS events. As compared with the geoeaatloo that produced Mao. Zhou, and Dana, their pcestlge will tend to loss, their posses bams more institutional tn nature, and their reteo*km bT leecVrshlpatar* dependent on pers-wl networks of power that can withstand setbacksew

tgawOGsTatfeOft Caf ItMsltaTIf*CbCtrX iO CaJasJiatstTeaft,

leajltlmacv. sad unity wiB lead at hasst lasHafr to bo cautious and bureaucratic, both in makeup and tactic-Al theime, as cesnpared with Mao and hts Long March generation. China's coming leaders will have been more ci posed to technological and urbanas well as to ihe outside world In any cam. the generating of mass support for them aod for their programs will be difficultitus (km wheredeveloprnent. the centerpiece of the PRCs current policy pact age, will almost certainty ptrxead too slow ly end distribute benefits too unesenry. Not least, ebreeras wtthm the PLA will probablyrake on social and pobtkal Innovation, ashe ultimate arbiter of civil dLsorder and, In estremli. perhaps of political succearion Itself.

ithin this general contest, (he rtvlt and domatUeenglst-type succession would probably have the following tendencies:

A leadershipredisposition to gradualist pcsicles forged throughovernment system marked by competition among rival insti-tutiom andore technical society.

nationalistic emphasis on "chins" and the Chineseittleother thanideology

But withand conservative mililaryi of the torch of orthodoxy,duaphne, andwfflelent residual Influence to constlluie continuing brakes on the nature and pace of reform.

The unique PLA-perty closeness, forged by war andears ago, would corstioue to give way. with Ihe new military leadership becoming more professional, and the political leadersthe rriilltary moretate instrument

provincial and local Influence upon neutng politics snd poilcles

engnt succession Indeed occurs, itsas*ran wffl iLstaubls those of th* preseai. but with these particular tendencies:

Increase In tbe importance of security tames, si - the asp widens between Chinese and Sovielcapabilities ind lorne of China's particular weapons systems continue to beby even those of Vkstnam

A desire to avoid renewed border hostilities with either tbe USSR or Vietnam.

uance ofnotwith the United States; an arm's length partnership in "ruth the question cf TaiwanrvsSve one, with continuing PRC criticisms of the Untied States and Hs policies, lough bargaining, and occsucmairy dUflcub Chi-nean behavior.

A gradual Increase la ecortomic ties with ihe West, Europe, and Japan, so the limit of China'sbut StJ cceatraloed to hmrt substantial Westers psrtidpstlon la Chase's ecrmesrsk life.

Continuing Chinese emphasis on and rhetoric concerning Third World matters

Eipfccstloo of ways aad means to lessen the present level of hostility with thewith no fundamental change tnasse anti-Sovlet orientation

There are small pockets of opinion ot influence within China, which would champion tha prac-



benefits of mote normal mUtlnnthlp* with Ihe USSR, but there t. no .mbmmiy tn Ui rule thinking(be character or aim* of Soviet poltes Furthermore. Deng's opening to the United Slates end thelu concomitant esplotlon In cmphasbaining1 probabfrsic national orieraUtMt for lone time, despite certain present Chinese altackr on the "corrosive" effect! of the "openo the United Stale* and the Weal

The only dlflerence that can be found between themnd Soviet leadership) and Usehat Hauled by lis iBenath. Ctarltt Risstit sought heaemony tn Europe; Soviet ratassmcaustt,trned al eacsbtoolrit their heencnocir over the whole world.

Beijing" party Journal. Red1

Nrjcvetfveieaa, there appear* to bebody cf opinion among Chinese leaden (of variousthat certain praotical benefits would flowore normal remltoeuhtp wtth the USSR, and that the present revel of border hottlllty with the USSR must beened. if only to Increase Chinese diplomatic fresJbthty. The Infloenoe of nach rpanlcn wiB probably grow tomehai. dependent aa weO on how ham handed or mbtle the rjoboles of Brenmnev or hli sucoeaaort are toward China meanwhile, and. to leaner nicest, on how Beti-Lng can lessen the levesl of rta rscatHlity with the Soviets without leoperdirlng any ngnJicanl Chinese Interest* with Wtahlnsrton.

ver the neat few yean, the above pro* ports could vary aawlfloaatly In the low likely event that critical aetbacaj ahoukd occur In divolopmeat or atea-rttythe fevel or nature of those anticipated by Deng aad Maa backlash regime of mem kind.egime could be of varying makeup, pomlbly including even some of tba Pteaent Deragnts. The most irtrten* swch cast wouldacklash regime headed by SuHnttt-type conearvatlvot, petatUy In association with aof teeurlty Krvtce and certain tenlor FLA of fleen.

The out look foregime, or terfet of regimes, would probably be fairly bleak, having been born of critical national setbacks of some tort Leadenhip ttablbty and continuity would doubtless* tuffer What remained of the Dengitts would constitute the new acenem.naai In tJL tho PRC rwot-btv woold haveew and attended time of iroublaa

he thvfe end dotnetfsc peUcU. of bacUash successor regime* might rend to thane crsaracterlaics

No turn! rat of the clock back toreally inaeated relit noc on ideological ortrrodoty and coercive power.

A clear prtdltporitloa to favor the military and heavy Industry al ihe expense of light Industry

Renewed ernphans on "red" at the espente of "espest" Witharsher treatment of1eserstnta. andI how with eipcaure to the Weat

A return to more intense leadership ftctiontllim..

he /ofeiasi poIieiV* of such backlash regimes might tend to iheoe characteristics

prnmrvabon of tome ties to Westernanducoort. bul within an increased over all eshprattina favoringareigneot There would be greaterInfor new plants and technology. in eatab-lashiag rules for foreign partkrlpatton In the development and roplc4utlon of China'* re-touroea, and lastudents abroad for ad-vanoed Budy.

A more toncphobic China.

More truculent foreign policy rhetoric, though In the main cotttinsiing actual prudence

Compared wtthooler refa-lionship wilh the United Stales

Compared with Derigltt tuccessors, perhapt lest chance of reducing the levels ol. hottlllty wilh tbe

D.for the United States

n general terms, many Chinese question* of ilicrvlllcarice for US interest* can beto corrtin-



in main of Im present patterns over the neil lew years aJmcat regard lew of whichc>-trerabtto dominate the lucceaion In China. Thai country will be poor and will be developing only slowly. Population growth will pre* increajuagfr on the limited rraouross of China, let leaden will with the Chinese people lo maintain lent lhan fuD and meaningful economic and (octal contact with the outiide world and wttb foreignerr Those leaden will probably not return China to Cultural Revolution patterns, nor wiH they alter the primacy of the party or China* bealc authoritarian intern. The pace and pattern* of present development programs may start froag these to rinse, hot those efforts wii probably neither collapse Chinas ecoaorny nora development miracle. Chinese poisties and domestic policies wii probably avoid ertremes, heldIn checkttD deeply felt wounds from ihe prtJUkal> peat andthe inertia ofa's vaat burettietaesea Chens's foreign policy -ill meanwhile remain fairly prudent despiteoud beatings cf gongs aadhe country will remain too absorbed In Its many dorneiric i* cfsetus to be very Interested In foreign adventurism hs leaden wii probe bey beccen* more odtsposxofy independent, aad will not heattale lo criticise numerous aspects of American life, ityle. and policy. Not least, the PRC will remain Intensely nationalistic

long as Taiwan has not been Wned lo tbe "mutfer-land" Frustration continues becauae Taiwan Is so near and yet sothe ability of tbe PRC to conquer or to cajole hs the foresees ts* future. The Taiwance will aim resale high importance to the PRCs leadeneady litmus of US inieoBom Within thb framework, there ought be scanewbat greater opportunity for Washington to resolve,at by specif Ic Taiwan problemsragmatic regime thantalinist or estrerrtlst one of scene kind.

abruaryarge army led by our csststandlng national hero Zheng Chencsotta [Xoi-IngaL wilfa ihe keenhe people ol Taiwan, drove away th* Dutch sssssssssssg that bad occupied Taiwan lorears, thus bringing Taiwan back to the embrace olnyone whoto separate Taiwan from the mainland is hated by the people and cannot be forgiven

issuing Worker's2

Idea ofinis!en daring th* Opium Waro) "use foretgners to overcome foreigners" was aimed at resisting forssan sggres-ik-n. safeguarding nsekassl InuepesKlsnee and achieving theuaDtaapstlog tie eawesy by asnicatlng ih* consrsasenOa bate ma rke aarne-son aad sdeettag different eieeawrei k* eeal wsth tbcea In aerordam with differ mlndoubudly. this strategy eftoresrswri in oveeceme lorsisiwnC must be affirmed

nllahitnmenl Dativ,l

he cruestlon of Taiwan willpecial case of difficulty in Slno-US relations. Belting'snever give up tbeir ambition to reunify Taiwan with Ihe mainland. They consider lhal the revolution they wonA remains unfulfilled as

aiwan apart, mperienee suggestiegime dominated by Hu, Zhao, or similar prsamstUU would rwobabjy benefit broadetore thantrident PRC

The Deng geverruweoteLai ive)nownto the LBiied States. BtWse regimessrniksr successor regime would lend to be also American eff Ida Is would probably haetter feel cf what to esgstct la the way of Chinese conduct, ss compared to lees predictable and more unstable successor regimes.

Despite occasional eertous difficulties between Washington and Belling, the strategic Interests of



will rsrobebly keep It and the USSRalot lorne yean, there Vvill continue to be area* of coliKrloeiiee In Chinese aad US IntereaU durkat the parted of tkli eatlmatf: aad Densrot (uccesaon would probably *nd to continue to cooperate with the Unitedwtth many frlelloee la various way* again* aSoviet adversary Bachlaah Chrneee susxeseor resprnea would alroeato be arsfl-Soviet. bat their coopers th rosea wtth tha United State* would double, be mm.

corsaderattaiu would appfy to those cases where the PRC and lb* United Stains arela the world, tha value oto Vietaftrrieee and Soviet designs In SoutJiaajt Asset I'llCcf;Faauatari and of Afghan realittrtce to Soviet Ihvajtorr, PRC eoooui-age inent to Japan to Mat ScMtN^pfaaturea; and

restraining InfleseVv oh North Korea

Scaratmutuenty of rntresti hrt-eon Beijing and VVggmngJonai well, concerning the corittfruanVeVTT earaffl ecorscenie. tecfaraslcaical. andhanaye rjeasef Its. Theae might -ell diminish were backlash regJmaa te come to power toCaaaa

Ai ran been discussed, DengW raccemxi would probably be somewhat has difficult concernrng the Taiwan quaatJBri than would more strident BctBng realmes

hai the United Stales and other friendly outside powrm can accompllih in iffe.-tlng PRC pott-tlcs and pollclei wlU be limited by rwmcrous the style of US pohcles will impact on PRC politics and policies.

basic primacy of Chinese doeMeuc forces, as compared with foreign, in duping soolitical succraalon.

The relative rpovsety of China aad the dartacllr-rionaadeaa to epea up Clean too much to fceratgnars.

The many rredsstac ceesstrsints on both China aad the UaMed Statai wisleh make ossuntve USor military anaalliliJl to ihe PRC unlikely.

difficulty of predicting Just how the content and

SO. It will be of considerable consequence to the Unitedtopolilical succession In the PRC will not be taking placeacuum, but In parallel wtth an accompanying excess!on process In tbe USSR.successors mav well be ashostilegreatly concernedas are be and the preaent Soviet Government. The neat collegium Soviet leaden may prove more willing


he Direttorata

hen tatnaa**tnJliJ evwsoos, the cworteas recipients may reSoai Iteriod not In eaceei of one year. At HstNea^of Ha* period, the deeunwM ehould be destroyed ar returned to the forwards* agency, erihoJcl be rees-nted of the forworolno Downey to retain it In occorodnc*

hiiwo*y th* Dlr*lo-c, ofThisot the trJotmotion ood wmnd of pwtow under Kk or bar pffaoscwoaeed-to know boat. AddrHonca aatwlrjl dfcainMratkxt ovay b* owtkoritaa by laa fosewingrtbin the* respective deeeatwwr.rs!

a.Bureau ol

and ReeeoroV, for the Deportment of Stole

Director. Dtfama InrelVaanc

Aoaacy. far the Office ot the Secretory of Defame

tha orgoniiotton ol *

Joint Osiersoil

l Staff h*

for the Deoorrment of the Army

Dfcactot of Novolor rbam*nl of tha Navy

Atalitont Osef ol Staff, kwi

for the Daps*ot the Aa Force

Daoctor offat i

Marine Corp*

Depot, SecrtSon

lra)err*Btlenal InteWjwaefor the Oettort-

of Energy

ABMtoat Danarter. HI, tar the fiawdf

Director of NSA lor the Nc

Seoawy Aowvy j

tar Naelaaal Sacartry. far ate mm lain ef me

hewe*ar lee Im.

way be rasewwd.

it**gok.cm<Jorvf> avlPiS OppaWQat*Va>

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