Created: 7/1/1982

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Pakistan: Tough Choices on AfghanistanlHB



Pakistan: Toughfghanistarfljl

Puklsian: ToukIiCIioIccs vtiHiiriB|

suftioruAfghan insurgents in order lo prevent ihe Soviets

from controiting Afghanistan and using itate to threaten Bdluchislun and nscddlc in Pakistani polities. The support lo (he Afghan insurgents also allows Islamabad to secure increased military and financial assistance from tlsc United States. China. Saudi Arabia, and Western Europe. Moscow blames its failure lo control Afghanistan in pari on Pakistan's supporl foe the insurgent! and has warned Islamabad that Its polices could threaten Pakislon'* security. The Soviets retain options io increase iheir suppon for opposition groups in Pakistan and to step up military pressure along the border.

Some Pakistani officials haveore flexible policy toward Kabul and Moscow because ificy beotvc the Soviets will nci withdraw from Afghanistan and ihai continued epposiiion endangers Pakistan's security:

Pakistan exnnoi successfully deferdajor Soviet incursion.

India is still Pakitlan's principal security threat, and sustained tensions along the Afghanistan border leave Islamabad vulnerable to coordinated pressure from Moscow and New Delhi.

Tensions between Pakistani ciiUens and the Afghan refugees in ihe border regions are mounting became of ethnic, religious, and tribal differences and ihe greatly increased burden on local resources.

Foreign support could weaken if the European Community, the non-aligned movement, and even the United Slates decide thai reducing tensions with Moscow is more important than continued confrontation over Afghanistan.

Islamabad's participation in UN-spctuored Indirect talks with Kabul is intended lo relieve the pressure from Moscow, to showsulTlcieniflexibility lo preserve PakiiUai broad iniemaikstal support, and to put the onus on the Soviets and Afghans for ihe failure of (he discussions. Islamabad would probablylightly more eoneilisiory policy if intensified Soviet pressure threatened Pakistan's security or political slabiliiy or if foreign secsriiyfrom the L'niiedperceived as inadequate for Pakistan's needs.

Information evaitablt as of IS2

has bftn used In iht prtporeUon of ihti rtport.

/ I,

The Pakistanis view US miliary assistance ai (heunderpinningheir Afghanistan policy.lrengthciieC military capability midc credible by ihc acquisition of medern weapons ii essential to mitigate Soviet pressure and to- deteron Pakistan.

The sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick by whkh Islamabad measures US support for Pakistan's political and sccwity interests, Failure by the United Siites to meet Pakistan's perceived security needs would ccafirrn Islamabad's doubts about the reliability of the United Stoics as an all? and arms supplier and harm US interests in the region:

evelopment would strengthen those in Islamabad who are arguing for anwith Moicow and Kabul, which would diminish the security of Ihc insurgents' base and propaganda platform in Pakistan.

Saudi and Chincic confidence in US resolve to protect its interests and allies in the region would be undermined.

Moscow might be encouraged to intensify its pressure on Islamabad and would question US willingness and capability to protect in intercut elsewhere in South Asia and the Middle Eost.

US willingness to provide modem arms to Pakistan would reinforce -Islamabad's policy of supporting the insurgency and would be well received is Beijing and Riyidh. Extensive US arms supplies to Pakistan, however, wosld also increase regional tensions;

Relations between New Delhi and Islamabad would become more strained, and the likelihood of an Inco-Pakisun war would increase until Pakistan's defenses were strengthened with the delivery of most of ihc US weapons In the.

India would become more vocal in its opposition to US policies in theand might give greater supportoviet policies and seek additional Soviet arms.

Moscow would still not compromise on Afghanistan and might increase its support for the political and subversive opposition to the Zla regime.

. Moat diploma lie. pollikal,military obicrvcrsl ihc Sonet, presence ia Afghantilan has increased Islamabad's sense of vulnerability and hat led it io rustcat Ms security policy and foreign relaiicwa. The Pakauu. lor the fusi time,criows ihrct from ihc aorUWmaddition to ihc 'rajiuaciaj larcal front late to ihc east. Afghaci-bu -it oacchatler iuiiihc USSR and Scuta Asia cad mo tmi threatikiiite'iubsd bebevcat it in miliary capabfttr Ii accessary to Incr SonetIndian aggicition and bat emphasised icqairisa modernfrom theonvincing dcd-.tcMI

, mlility bjfer

Pahttuo't Sactpori for the Insurgents liliirjoid'i luppoil for the Afghan Irtiurgcnit, in ours premised c* the iiralcgicf ncutraliiieg the Soviet threat from Afghanitian while ttrenttheniai Paiinan'i defcntci Support (or ihc isaurgercjt.inxbid merei.meniopraixin ar?icd forces wtiii iinrnllanrovt'r armm-eg i't Sonets from ccewolalauag ibe* hold or. Afghanis^ aajd astiag itase so thrtalc* aac desuMue Pakrttso- IttamtbcC hatreased tsiiur? and feancul aid from the United States. Chios, Saudi Araba. and Westernof which warn ia iirengthcn Pakistan to cousin Sfe poiiiieii and md.ury expansion in South Asaolicy, however, risks greater Soviet pressure tho: could threaten Pakistan's security and tlibilitv beferc Mdnart could finish improving iu defen

thai if* Soviet move into Afghanistan partong-term strategy lo gain access laike Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

'ressure onpallia will inevitablytuccin itioviets

icajoraksnai with the aimBaluchistan andcut tins the

Strategic KorakoesmhUia ia the north and bekmt with Indian forcci at the ladas River ia


tadtal casteh urn USSR ircatfy recreant Pakiius'iany ca-Uw-aenc observerseportedttrt thai Mcctc* and New Delhi arc conspiring toand neutralisemn so that iu politics dc not threats* their leierestt. India'i arms biUdup, prknarily with Soviet-lupplied weapons. It seen as preptrlm for an eventual war to establish iu hegemony over Pakistan.between Pa Hi la nil and varlou- I'S officials indicate Islamabad's worst nightmare Is that the USSR and India intend to din.tmber Pakistan inio ethnically based vaital iimci .npjihtunislan, Bllu-ehlsiaa, Smfl, and ihc Knjtt^B

Istaraibid's support for the insurgents Is crucial to denying Ihc Soviets control of Afghanistan. Pakistanupply baseanctuary for the insurgents, and Islamabad has allowed ihem to establish training camps and receive foreign armt in the border rcfioo. The cross- border infulretioa of mea tad weapons hai etw liibctcd iigBiTicanily lo ihc iniurcenu' tbcceu. A: lean eee of'i clotcai

i itxhxt,jTreamoended thai Pahistaa in-

ukiianee for the inter-Ocaeral Iqsal and ether tcnior Patn'.aai ctfleiiliand effective Lnsurttncy could cause Moscoa to reas-sets its policy In Afghaalitan andam rods lion acceptable to Islamabad, including the withdrawal of Soviet uoops and the csiabHihmtni nonsligrwd gnvcrnmttit In Kabul,

PakJitan's policy of giving sanctuary iotlllca Afghan refugee) and Its suppon for the ttsargenu hu broad public backing. Much of Pakistan's population In the Western Tribal Areas is cthnictllr related lo


Ilic Afghans and would ruppori ihcir Afghan brethren In Iheir fig hi agaiflsl IK Soviets even If lib mi lad did not. Some of Ihe domestic group* that nvaii urongly back President Zia'a governmeniimdiiional political lirs with icveral of ihe Peshawar-bated

nii-ii iindlj^hgh

corps and

IHuryIslamabad hai made only motet improvements in its mitiuryeapabliily nlom the Afghan border tincc the Soviet inlerwniion Iof the Army J> deployed in the caw agalnsi India lilamabad still sees as the primaryf Pakistani teven army corpi in II divisions ire opfotiic Afghanitian. aad Ihcy icncrally arc even more undtrequiprcd lhan Army anils apposite India. No major uaiistuvc beta moved from (be Indian border liner ihe Soviet ialcncaiion. and Pakittan'i plana lo increase forcei oppotiic Af-glunisUndcpcnd on suable arms purehstcs from

We believe Parisian could deictic igains! limited Afghan or Soviet border Incursions, bui ii could not viUniand Large Soviet operations. Army uniu in the North-Wen Frontier and Balichisu* Province*C defensive posilloni, generally stell behind Ihewhere they proteel major wppty fines]

Moti of the improvemenu Pikuun hu made in lu western defenses haw teen in strcegttanlag the lightly armed, paramilitary Frontier Corpa. which is reif-jniibte for border security and for maintaining order in the Western Tribal Areas. The Frontier Corp* it commanded by Army officers and is orga-niicduuosome TObaiialJon-iiie "wirai"of 7SOach.I

RSnforeemeao from Ike Indian border would be needed lo dealnajceSovkt Ihrsist from rhir.uian

Since9 Pakistan has added overen inew wings lo the Frontier CorpiJ

aad hu reinforced some border anils with Armyhe major bordere believe the expansion of Ike Froatlrf Corps msy have been at much to help control the large number of Afghano strengthen border secsniyJJ

Sonett is clear from IbeirgBHHpublic Miiemenii thai ihe Soviets pot pari of itiebeame for ihelr failure to control AfghartiiUQ ontuppori fee ihe insuri enu acd areombinttio? of pressure and blandishments to try so change lilsmibad's poM-ey. Mosco- has fiequcnUy warned Itlimsbid to end Its (uppers for the Inturgenli indoldier*

k unable to cope with So-Uw andn pice violations and could sot ma Inn in airor provide effective close air tuppori In border

io the Afghanistan problem with ihs Kabuleoi. The Soviets tniist. both publicly ind privately, thui an endoreign support for lac ItiurgtFiit mutt eomc before any withdrawal of their forcer and thii. in any cue. the subject of Sovietailer esclvsWely for MotcowcllMJ

PMtital Pitiuut. In ourMoitow believes that Islamabad's policy on Afghaniitaa ii linked lo Pmioenl Ziaf

[Nutrat Bnuiio. taairrmn or the PPP

and widow of populist Prime Mlnitier Zulfikar- -ihas pleased Moico* by raying ihe would recognize ihe Kabul government. Hop Insurgentat ion from Pakjtiaa, and tend the Afghannic: o'^V HHIprc-Ssviete MSOppontd by Moscow, and they neje to provoke violent ailigovrrnrrtni acn tint vculfl1 threaten ZU's

terrorist grout, ltd by Bhutto's sent rtcoives arms and money indirectly from Ihe Sarie's ibroujh ihe Kabul governmeni and uses Afghanistana unetu. try from whichperate against Pikiitaa- The Sovieis, however, have been careful In public to avoid identification wilh Al-Zulfikar andrror in groups, and we believe they reiiitr. QUI iheir ictli hurt lie credit Llity and popularity of the mr!

ieu hit long maintainedithBaluchi ad Puihtun iirauiln groupi ladnugM try to use tkcm to gain leverage over Paktsuai policies, lo our view these groups, islike ihe PPP, arc too weab to Uirtaten the survival ofegime, but they are capable ofoostly aeu of subversion and can cxpleil tradiiianal tribal rivalries along the Paki-Stsa-Afihanisiin border. We bdamware thai Ha nipport for Use stpantHt groups would be oppoirdJmi it sironglyPP-led govtcamcnt

groups hive been reluoanTTo at;tpt help frora Ihe Soiitti. who arc trying to suppress iheir triballa Afghanistan]

Soviei murvcnlion in PiknUan'i domcwic affairs bynneaiiian pttliicil growra or ethnie srro-raii'iheir leliv.nei against ir* 'It regime tu lutk pnaci- erf in laectit. if ear newot veil ceocakdtub (hvier in tnmnd IMSwci The Scncu gueiive looraed anta tie Pataui's praacy b> acgarfanum of postticil and miliary preiwrr and ofier.-ni tcoacotc aid aad an ci-eg <'. lonon We rxlot the Solicit hope al lean io crKoe'ij; Senile amoifaCrotrtilmuhc^iioom of Pakitun't

miliary Prrimrr. The Soneti hue warned lilim-abad oa many occasions thai oonilauing to support lie iniurgau. and nrrngihrning tecunly retiixeslist US. wouldcainiy Foreign Mrbslrr Crcmyio lardQikmui risked ill iriaepeedenec By islag toe aaurirats. US dipleeuu in Pitutua were:elc

hr!iiuj:r ii!.',

warned byrsatug Send officialihe Foroja UWstry hi1 that Pifaatans policy weld cenualb lead loith.


Preitdeniai tou) by Dttviy let Firyubin it1 thai Scr.ct luppeci (or lh* Afghan revolution wn run) and

and that ft was ap la Paiitian to ease iffiiowrecognlilng the Kabul governmeni.

The Sorlcis hare not lyiiemiticilly attacked iirgeti ia Pakistani territory, but rteonniissance flights (long ihe border ire routinely flown by Soviet and Afghan lircnft sad there arc frequent airspace vkdilrons ind and i

a mach

imaller number of border violations on the ground linee the Communlti coup In Kabul inrHd last tall we believed few of the violations were deliberate and lhal many occurred because the border is illdefited. Some of the border violstioni tillwhich iorofrtd atrial mining and bomUrj icd iirif-tagdeliberate, however, indlined al Intensifying pressure on Isnnubad to


came to lernn will. Ihc So icl-Com inn tedabul no lerloesJiiont ha* occurred net Uxa

axkotait the Scwta bit beerote the pcroui frontier by null comer patrols tnd minlni border limit end here also been unsuccessful inilamibad politically, (bay couldmilitary pressure on Pakistan with moregeeai and severe almrikei and artillery firr acron ihc border or with quicl. airmobile uuuit raids agsintibaiei isordere bebetc ihc Soncti would probably try to control iheby hnutasj iter aitacU to laswrgcn'. baseser* lino, cot ttrikiat deeply lvo PakitUi. and trying to iroid clathci with the Pakiatan Army lhal couldarger conflict and provoke iharp iatcinaiianil

Croll-bolder operations, in ourould dune* ihe stability and security of insurtcat supply lines and tuf-at sren in Ptbtitn and iKreasa or mure an Islamabad to ud is support fee the iesuettati. tut tkoyotsfi lira irongcaaistun. the failure of suchpprtcn-tty dampen the lniui|escy mi|hl convince frutrated Soviet military planners that lai|er erou-bardir oper-Hknu were neccsiary, perhaps includlni tho torture of Pakistani territory. We believe Soviet policymskcrs would weigh the dubious military beocflti of tuck ctcalatioa agaiast the risk that gross violations cf Palistaa* Nuilauij would(rcatti US coJ and ssahuiy isnaheBXStt iaiHB

jlslamiltd echoes that the Sovtctt wantaeraau Indo-Pakiita* ten si ens lo prevent Pahsian from itrrugih-cnlng in defenau la the west and to forea tint Pakistani! lo reduce lent lens with Afihualitan in cedar to concentrate on the Indian threat. They alto belie* that the Sonata have ctaourtfcd New Delhi fraea serious neaea*Hons on Ztti inpatilcaaurcssion pact between lecta and Pci-itn: ul save ren'oreed new Dears be-icf that lia-nabufi tunhiica cf modern US irmi roeal aa intention to ktlk account! with Indii

We do not believe New Delhi would be willing in Increasu ijciwioviet interests.

elhi told ihcla Aprs, thai India hadnopraicai Intention ol going toh Pakitioo and would strongly coposc Sonet plans to dismember Pakistan. Prime Minister Gandhi hsi mioviei policy on Afghinliun.Hu ihe is

I that the cnafQot ia ihreatenji|Trrdia'i policy and teeuriiy inicrcsts by coAUibeiinahe US0cre vtaponi to Ptkntan. New Mfli posnM en Arjhasustaa laovrkwabo reflects itshal Mosco- -III not accept say aewertutwni ia Kabul that ihrcatana Msevca if this ibowtif auay;

Warrrhag About the Future

Pakuunielieve the Soviets will becomeium in iryiag to n'tn Iilamibad to rcoo|niie the kabal pricmm it and end IU tupheithe Soviets will incicatc their assistance to pjutani icrroriit troupe tad etcaltieorder!

lilamatad aspects IhTSovjeii lo conduct an increasing number of eicis-berder artlEtery andagainst ihe nf.iet carne* end isolatedreiitfl

President Zia now ccunmartdcr of the Frontier Corps till Islamabad did notilitarywith the Soviets, (tea though en increase In Soviet military pressure was expected along theA wire of their military weaknesses, thelack confidence in their forces cocosite Afghan-atan|

Islamabad Ins auUioeued only border unhseact to


shallow bolder violation! and hn restricted ihc Army and Airto defending only ngilnst deeper Sonet or Afghan penct

An escalation of Soviettilitary pecsiurc luoog ibe border would present lilamibad with hard chokes on ho* and whereespond, especially if the Sonetscnccricd effort ia attack insuricat ease camps in Paegular basis. In our view, failure to defend Pakistani territory would have severe political consequences for any governn Islamabad. It would undcrmiac public coafidcace ihc governexni. erode Army support for Zla. and cndadter swaerious military defeat,coukl have equally severe consequences,if It resulted tn territorialorward defense of resitting Soviet aiiacks ia ih. border regsats might dcta further attacks, but It could alto pro-oka an unwanted escalation of force against wfcjeh Pakistan could no!efense-In-dopih strategy would allow the Soviets to operate in the border regions with virtual impunity ami could cm-beaten them to apply greater rrulitaty pressure on both the inargenti aad Iilamibadl^BH

We believe that so lent as Soviet and Afghan air-strikes or border incursions are small and limited to attacks on insurgent targets in the border area, Islamabad probably would not risk defending ihe insurgents. The Pakistanis could inflict serious lotttt on small Soviet or Afghan forces operating In the border reflect ia chance ancouniors or if there were time enoujh to use their better knowledge of the terrain to set up ambushes, but it is reporting by many reliableears such clashes wouldrge Soviet response. Wc do not believe that small border akjr-miihei LnvsCving mortly Frontier Corps unit! wculd be seta by Islamabadajor proiocsttOn that wodd cause the Soviets to escalate, aad Pakistani border potts would be expected to Fire on attacking aircraft and ground forces as in the ptil. Wc capect the Pakistanis will keep Army units deployed ia defensive positions away from the border to guard against deep incursions. These ualts could be more easily rain-forced withan newer, triiaery, and air defease weipoi

Pakistan's Petty LNbatel

Most Pnkisisai official! do not believe the Sovicn willreo Afghaaiiian. ind tome influential poLcycukemrdi ligi.fleam nu-ber uf nstatTIe-lcvc! Army ccTrcsa bcurvc thai lilaswiuad should techcdcccorderArif. ihc Amy Oe' ce* Stall.General Kahisntddin. the Gcrcrnsr ce* Baluchistan Peonncc. and former Farcer* Misiccr Aght Shahl are among these who have urged enwderjiionooeiliaiury policy on

Army officers, has frequently advised Zla to moderate tit policy tecaose. Anf teliercs, no amount of US political support and military aid would be sufficient loajor Sonet attack. Agha Shahiand Cetera! Rahimuddin both question US rclistSiyrisis and worry about Moscow's increasing pressure on Islamabad to come to term* wilhkab

[many Pakl-

sianii belicieduction ia tensions *nh the Sonets it needed to aOow Islamabad u> belter cope with the mere serious threat to Pakistan'sIndia. Prctidaii ZiaS Ccngressicnalto Islamabad but January that many Indian officials have not reconciled ihemsctici lo Ibelief shared by many Pakistanis!

iarcccoccrncd that Islamabad's ncnemphasii on Afghanistan allot India to increase ike presturc on Pakistan as wed as allowing Moscow and New Delhi to ttvmen Islamabad implicitlywo-fronttore conciliaiory poucy towardbated tn the prevalent view that Moscow will not withdraw its forces, could Induce the Soviet- to press New Delhi locate tensions wiih Pakistan and would ens ire lilamibad to concentrate oa Improving its defenses against India1)

Some Pakistsu olfidab, concerned thatillion Afghan refugtts ia the border region arc straining local eccnomc resources and ciacerbatini cthalc and religious tcmiars, arc alsoore flceible



laiton inuriu-Weit riumlci Proiince andhu accepted the Afghan refugeesand wppori. uji lomr daiarbanccibetween tlie relucrctePf an

fJPJ^Pilniaei o' f'ronner ;rc one-ires" about wudcrtrwig lesions brtwrcri tic

Plkoura BaJucki The U'fc auuaocr of rcfagcci ihoanning loeompric >ub the tucal popuktira for erngaVayncnt. food, waur. aad ftcLvailable resources in the border rej

Itlamabod could, in our new, tn to caitlgitc umiom between the refugees aad the local population by tightening regulations on ibe rcfugcis to minimize ire insurgents' freedom of movemom and permitting only UN-ad mini it ered refugeeno iuufunction on PakUuni tcrrltcry

i maiu at nu inot for lb: obierrenl|

of the North.WtK

ttaa kronnee plana to move many of the rofuaeiiifrom ihe border io minirouc bolt the prospect of local diiturbaneea and the Lkcuload of Soviei itrilci across the border. Many Pikir.iimi living in ihe border regie* bdirve ihai then woaM be no Soviet threat from Afghan suai refugees, according lo oe-Ue

[tfce acvcraor of iH Non 'rowuer rrovinn waiby |H< Savutt Ambaaia dorll ma bad that border icssuona would nmii> high tolama bid continued to allow iheperate from PnklKIW tuilior)

Pnkiiinnl offlciili alio worry that the longei the SovLtu occupy Afghanisun. ihe moic readily ihe occupation will be accepted by mier nilin the European Cornmuniiy ind in the non-aJigucdtrc more latoii on recac-tag wtawoai nt Meaeow rlttaujattiM c'r'me'r" i'm ieirrsmcmi icm


espceiailycorKerrTsnai tne United Stitei. perhira acting io niauaie domestic and foreign concern iboui in Soviet policies andini mitt polity diffrrancts

about ua rehabilliy ai an ally and especially at an armilegacy of the US armshe lido-Pakistan wirisbcfecve ihai US inability lo assure promsrd delivery toe-mc aopa.itK*ledarc prrxecred try US eauonai dh tints, ev,the prospectonal turgraueuai review of the fordgi rnl.iary sales prcgrim beta niaforee IsUsiabad'i eoeeera tSa; ihe USu^t- ttlniomhi? wauJd


rnwillrQgncii to cmwnit uicllFikiuan's recuriiy beyond (ho assursnoii comalncd In9 Esceu-livc Agreement alio eauut some Pakistanis isIslamibad'i polity of relyi'a on US backing

many Pakimnl afficiilt suipeei US luripart ISemporaryo ocipoie the Sovicu and that in imiru-euieii ui US-Sovietcai would staveleae so cealreattx Sonets, aad their luerai antes, ia South AsisJH


last January that the Unary of unreliable US tuppcrr forced lilamabag io renin the option of changing its policy on Alghiniiun. perhaps to include tien icoogniilcn of igovernment in

Ai the lime time. Iitamibad hit filled touch-hoped-for ceenmlltxat frem Beijing WdefBnd Pi fame, despiu Chiaii urongisflH

Wd UlimiMd thl!tkisun inmQitaty crssta, but It lUtsscd it eouU not fightruataiscdhe Sevieu er India in nneteei eoucuy. Instead. Beulng )niinai the United Statesirm eemmltment to defend PakisUn and hai Implied thai Clinest troops would Pakiitan only after US troop hid arrived.


. i> :Strategy Dctpite Ihcic ntlig wings. Pakiusn Iibiicieluic in maintaining iu conditions (or in Afghan seiUchichbeen crdorml by both the UN Assembly and ihe Istanic Conference endkstnw cf Iili-.badamibidirc-oul>.grica beck publiet) and privatelyall lot the immr-diat*of Sovies forces, ihe ereaiton of ihc political necessity for the return of the Afghan rcfugcei In Pakiiiaa and Inn. lelf-dcicrmiau-loa for ihc Afghan people, and nonai.giuneat for Afghaaoua lalanubtd doo eel rccceuioc the Kabul ge-ertUDCoi and insists that acgoUatioai only mcicac nprocai?um of the Alghae Communalikeaddition la the governments of Pakistan and linn and rcprcxnlBtivei from the insar-gem giouinaHft

Islamabad, because ll is necc-tsin about ihe dcpib of fertign backing and feebu Seel prcs-aorcku ^ocithekurteiKetro* and hai been carefal rettow cojcj optioro. Pikiitanhe UiS" fi igri-lcci delegations to diacuia Afghaoaun. alihough they have made no progress in reaolring Iheirlear lhal ihc Pakistanil coinnrnmlied Their paiiKei on Afghaaliian dcipite Soviet threnls aed offeri of ccortcantc and even miliary aad aad bines itit Kabulrceikjnitc Uc Darted Lite at Afgrw-li-.i'l border mih Pakaun. la our rice.inti lhal it might tome day teen an accommodation, with Moscow ted Kate1 and perhaptlffticnt goverflflwui in Afghanistannot only genuine consideration of policy titer-

ihcir support tor the iesurgents lequtrel assurances o! foreign baching fee Islamabad, apcoally in military

We do not believe Is!emtbid'i involvement in Ihc UN-tponiceed iodirocl ulkt whh Afghanistan at Geneva last month metns (hai Pakitttn has wflened its conditions; instead it wot Intended to showfleajbilily and io increase potiijcal prcsiurc oa



null ucie hesdN inicrmcdi.irj. mire iveccKut)elieve Ihc prenyls fromanil to prcuirvc the uroug dinlonuiikis rccci'cd front the UN. the islamic Conference, ihc nenutigaed mcrtntmL and ite Etropcnn Cccnsnieaiy tun though the forrnat waivoid nrcjudMiat Islamabad* ncwreeoBiuion of Ihc Soviet-tucked guv crnmeni, the Pakistanis rukedodicum of respectability on the Kabul go* cm merit They hoped thai tdlerence to their -tdety boded toodi-uena tee on aceasptnbk Afghan antletueai and Iranie kepi Informed on the prugroa of Ibi talksdeflect criticism of Pa kit ten and preclude early rnoicnient to direct tains between ihe govern-


io discvii the

f Soviet troops and return of ihebet lb* talks do not ecceu to haveolitical leeVJen to the Afgluwuttu problem any

If liiimsbid believed lhal Intensified Soviet pressure ihrcotened cHhcr Pakistani lecuriiyor polliicslcipcetiicmpi to - its A'jViujUd noisy biiMui teeming to abinoa*tapper! Im the ituntrgency.coaid mum insurgent edMikt in ibe border rcgiee but tut! dtirr it supported the political objectives of the Afghan Insurgents. Islamabad could discreet') begincoalith the Kabul government at UN-spomored pnnimlty talks but still publicly inslit ill condiiloniolitical setilenvcsu hod mi changed. Scntrtif*S. Chinese, and Saudiar view, weald probably not draM&aUr change its porky bui gradually thifl tovuidn innoefrorcatrtn.hift could amphittteN-brokered location--which would nave implicit Internationalthat could Include the lefuiec* rGturnlng to Afghani-tun. Afghan expedition group* neajouaiini with, and perhapsevtet-backed gpitrad SovwS irooeu bragby bdntcral agreementen broadly based KabtJas Ptklsisn ended foreign support for the Intur-< fafaaV

Implkaitoii for US I'ollt) IsUiiiabud hi* rUyta the In role tn Mirrorting the morgan* itml in focusing attention on the Solid intervention in Afghanistan, ind anyakistanhiKil jtooiuniod.ilionMvwutt and Kabul woulditre Wow to IA policy in Suuili Asia. I'llitun'iio nceoiuicu-vici-backed govcriu'ncni in Kibuignuould notiic attain. BccacM tcWtvinaj lit political and Miliary goals of ihe Afghan insurgency depends oa PikMiui "apron. tabauBJd'i lanrsted aceepunce of ine Sana (ml atcuunrul inurt (or tlx insurgtau aad crock lac instcr-uiaarra* consensui aciiest ikt Soviet iRxrtttim inert Tat intafirwti wouM bt deniedsecure sane-iuif; aad Hdtplfalmar aad the actrritici of Afghani there could bt greatly

US policy toward Pitman will be ike koy dctcrmi-mm ia ihe dircttion o( lilamibod'i Afghanistan policy breoute of the Pakistani belief thai US support it crucial to rciiiirni Suvloi orcsiura. It ii clear from Pakistan' officers and govemmoni ofTrcitli (hai the iak of ad ia need ueaporu It tie yardstick by which liia ma bad meaiarci US support for Pakiuani potiii-ol aad Kcurily inlrreiu In our svew. US wdtingatu to meet Pikimn'i perrcired teeuriiy requiremcno would reinforce Zia'i ajlky of Mpportiiui.erception of madeeuatr US uppon for Pi lau si aeearlty lataretti. neirrever. woiud nrerigta-ea anumenti in lalaimWdftrt more oatKilUtory nancygHirWuna^B

A luorutrr US cc-ersmiimtiit to Pal.uaaiccarviy lo cocoanrr lumMOl firm corouiioa lo lb*ttr-mlme in Afghanistan wosJl norsest ecru inly further teur US rt'aiioni wilh India and farther strain rc j'.cii between New Delhi and It Inmost piniculntly II l| invcJrrd more rrsilrtiry iilci ll Ii dear front both their public ind prri-ile iiatemenu tr-a! ihe "it view the US-Pikdian iccuHiyt both thrratanini their political and mil, ury predominance and invitlni increased superpower competition lo South Atli and the Indian Ocean. More US support for Pakistan mtiht ciuo India lo heighten military icnilom on Piklttan'i tit tornand would Incieist ihe likelihood of on liida-

iir within ibt iieil few yean India di>-irutisntentiom andreventive uar would be noecssurs. before US arms suks cosld greatly improvemiliary earn-bililics in ihondia might ahoitrcnrlhon iuith the USSR iindeivc more support to Soviet policy in AfghanittoaH

US pohty in the event ol Inicniiflcd Soticl pressure on Pakistan would likewise bo iiibjoci io close uoaljiii by regional powers In the MiddleSaudi Arabia. Tlie Saudis have elate sccnriiy rcla-tions *uh Pakistan and would welcome increased US supportslamabad Wtronger US commitment to Pikistan't iteurky would lamrc Riyadh of (Jm USrotect Saudi scciruy micrcUi in ihe Persian Gulf ma* The Saudis were eisconectrd about the US failssrt io supocri is uorerUH an illy aa toe Shah of Iran,iraiLuupptri Paknun wouM iWlr their rpor-Jr* deace in ihe erodibviir of USt-ec so.ipcet Riyadh wouM eoatinut ill csase rolaions with the United Stilts because of id eerendentx on the Uniiod Stales for nrivu and In fern iboui Iranian icilcntrdns in ihe Pcriiin Gulf Siudl Arabia might, hrawevcr. put funhor ditlinct betwocn itself and US policy ia ibt Arab-Israeli conflict as well ai US effort! lo build rcgionit tuppori for lie mcof the Rapid Deployment Joint Tnkhe Porsiin

Rapie Ucploymcnl.

Soviet peeleyin AfghiMsiin would alto be ilTtetodUS rus-ponsa io intoniiAed presiurt onour vkw, if Moscow Believed there wu noto Pakiiun'i iteurlly, tBo Sovicti

robably conduce thai :My cowld conduct deeper racursionn into hkssstnntrong US itso autsnoo US wUlingnrss and enratili ly so prouct iu tsaereau chcvbcri iaW aad the Middk Em Oa lac ether baud, racreascd rssihtirynilace lo PilounolTuraijori of1 US-Pit nun Esecu-tire Ai-retmeot mighi lead ihe Swutu so refrain from Occp irciriicnt nndeiuioiis norj if: border, attiouah il would nol cibm thorn to camprc-mise on Afghiniitantristsgnr US commitment to Pakistan'i lecuilty would receurifi iecrcoitdsupport for sutnenm and political opponents of President Zli'i regime

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