AFGHANISTAN: THE REVOLUTION AFTER FOUR YEARS (NESA 82-10341)

Created: 7/1/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Afghanistan: The Revolution After Four Years

Ao loMUItetwf Awtiimnl

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9

Thdi prepared

coordinated with tee Directorate, of Operation! ond

<Xecr<T" '

Afghanistan: The Revolulion After Four Ycnn

Keyyear* after seizins power, (he Afghan Ctmvmumsu face strong

resistance throughout the coumry. The weak and divided Dabrak retime must depend on Soviei troop* to counter the insurgency

The Soviets are helping the Afghanet up the ieme kind of party and government institutions that the USSR uses lo control iu own population. The Soviets arc also urging tbc Afghans to adopt the same kind of social, ceo nond political tactics thai enabled the early Bolsheviks-to consolidate control over the USSR. Most of those programs, however, are implementeditterly divided Afghan Coniuiunist Party and by civil servants and military officers, many of whom secretly oppose ihe Dabrak government, The insurgency, moreover, denies these officials access to much of the population '

These programs have failed to overcome the papulae perceptionpolicies threaten Afghan traditions. Moreover, they haveestablish effective institutions for controlling Afghanistan or Torfrom democracy lo prosperity-ommunist government installed by foreigners isbui government programs could create conditions in which

ihe benefits of cooperation and the costs of oppeoition outweigh, for many Afghans, their dislike for the Communists. Such programs cannot he implemented, however, so longarge part of Afghanistan remains under insurgent control

The Afghan military remains largely ineffective. Overshadowing its other problems is its inability to find men willing to fight for Iheroblem unlikely to be solved until after the gcnernmCPt's nonmilitary programs arc effectively ImplementeC

The Afghan Government faces an impasse that prevents il from dealing with the insurgents:

Widespread popular hostility toward the government and lack of control in the countryside preclude the recruitingoyal army.

Information available as2 has been used In the preparation of ihis report.

irttAtl'IOI'l

Without an effective army. Kabul cannot establish enough contiol to implement policies that might gain it some degree of popular acceptance. The weakness of the Afghan Army, moreover, forces the covcrnmcni to depend on Soviet troops for survival, even though the Soviet presenceajor cause of popular hostility

A defeat of the insurgents by Soviet troops appears the only way to overcome this impasse. Moscow, however, has too few men in Afghanistan to suppress the insurgency. The Soviets currently appear to be countingar of attrition lhat will eventually make the cost of continued resistance too high for ihr insurgenLsear. Ir. thee Soviets will continue to cipcricnce human and equipmeni casualtiestendv drain On their resources

t

AluliatiiitJn: Tht Revolution After Four Years

Soviet Rot*

The keymanagingGcvcrnrncniti

plotrjnil kit eluded (he Soviet! Soviet adviseri pervade ilit government, andAfghnn Communist* eould rial lunive without Soviet militaryport Still, the Soviet ability toe Afghanistan, eiccpl through military force.limited, tun In the pant of Afghanin under lovernmcnt control, effective implementation of Sov.et-inip.red programsare.

thai

[Ofnilar nmtiluy to me Communists ia aopan bccauiei' icaieiit Soviet advice before Soviet tracesfew Algtians are witlingooper lie withSovieu

^JJ. have retorted many matinee* in which thepparency iclsc-tant to alienate the Afghan Communivii, have ncgoti-eud with Afjhan pcOI'.ical leadcri tather than tup-preat factional disputta in ihe ruling party or remove unqualified senior oflleials. Because ihe Afghan Cera-muniu Parly cannot furnish enough Inyal and capable errit acrvanu and nvUary officeo. the Soviets have allowed men to remain in office who through inaciicn. incornpelencc, or aabotage frustrate Soviet efforu.

Impro'lng tbe Covernrntai's Image In the iwoytara titter. Hi inatallatton by Soviet troops, trie Dabrak government haa made no ruogreu toward con aoling itipoiition. BnbreK's grcaieiiiability Is the presence of Sovieiituation thai coracMritm bunortiaa puppet Moreewer. almost all dipjoroau. luurnaliits. anC icho-'an agree that he ha* been onablc in convince moil Afghans that his gcvemmeei it any kaa doctrinaire, narrowlytyrannical. Of traU those of hti Maraiil tucdccciMrii He ha* tVctiuUrictil the maai aireati and ciecHtiOM carrieO out undei President Amin. and tin rate hat beta ivmr-d'ami than those of his peedeccnors Tbousands. however.

remain in prison, bade frctdom* arc deniud. and some oflVcial* aaaoclaied wiih the oppressive larnkiarn government* ail! bead important poita.

haa sought uniucceaifullyiden popular auppori by including prominent non-Communin* in iht governintM-

J moil tenter official* of fwc-Communistmil remain hostile to the Communists andand aoinc rtfuar to cooperate evenThe mtn>ee of insurgentollicn. In addition, Ihe Cceiimuniili'give prominent non-Commiiniitt realthe aiiraciivcncas of high office. The fev-accepted governmtn! posiUons art luipcctAfghani.The

rnmi pcniiiincnt. Commerce Miniitcr Jalalar. the only non-Communist in the cabinet. Isaaany Afghsas toMigiirrrc KGB agtnt. Some other appoimmenti have led to embar-raislng defections including Hjbeak's economic advu-trelrgtuN conference who used the meeting to denounce Ibe Sovitii

llabrak hai been unable to diiprl hostility gtcmmlng from the btlitf that hii government neltestroyontrast to haaia; prcdteesuci rtatirak clairm Iuevout Muslim; hi* frequent attendance ti religious icrvicca ia well publicized.fh reading* freer the Koran. Council) of religious tenders regularly encorae government pio grams, citing pass*get from the Koran to prove regimeere Islamic.

According to diplomat* in Kabul an. Cm ho have talked lo manynesi Afghan* dcubi the tinCciily of the government! devotion to religion, both because of the elm* bnhi between Kabul and ibe avowedly atheistic Soviet regime and bccauie many government programs art >een ai anii*Islamic, hoi

^report ihai land tf.lt*rn ii ncned contrary to liiiniic precepts governing properly rights indprogram! as ano prop*!'ian anti-IsUmic ideology Most peotiiincei religious leaders lie cillxr in jail tn openly support Ihe inst-'gcnti

ohc tie* ihe server nirefti ateegard-cd ft tiaitorsod.

Spniadlc attempts to democisirate concern foriicrcaii of mtnotiucs b> iuch measures as inertaiinf

n their languagesadReports

ontinued strong opposition la rr-inoeiiy areas to the tcnerarneet, wilh rnosi people noi even aware of lhc gorrnmentshoae who seek greater (rtedam fromby lhcGoasUlutG about half the peculation--regard the Babrak rttime. like all of

prtdCCCSSOft. Pushtun Viiiirwi fe>

lhc IIarara areas of AlRhanisian report no Icsienini of hosiilily toward the government since Ihe elevation of ihe ethnic Hatara Sottas All Kcihimaodhe pnrrtc-ministership, ibe highest rankon-Poihtun in more lhanears

Piomlso and I'oUeU.

la oui view,olicies hase generally failed bou'auic they have lhc conflicting goaliol winning poiiular support and turning Afghani tuniilisi Hate cn lhc Scrricl model. The land reform program iUustrstea most of the procaeaai fovcenrncnt efforts have encountered. The Taraki icrcrnmcnt inicndcd tbc programin peasam luppori and destroy ibe power ofeudal" landowning elite through fcdiiirsbutioA of land, so increase production, anday the basis for oeganiiing Afghan agriculture on the Soviet model

Like man; other gevernmcnt programa. itMsralti misconceptions ibenit AfghanMost pcatints had little reason lo supportFragmentation of headings was aproblem than large ciuiei. Landmuiailly beneficial relationshipslarge landloids and the tenants or imallAccordingpeasants regarded land redistribution asand hence inei-lslamK. In any tan. Uselacked the powernforce iht program or io

protecti gave land. hcaliriiic Ihe program was'only fueling resistance, ihe Tiiatii gov-cr'nmcnt eventually announced il hid been completed ahead of schedule and quietly abandoned ii *"

Notwithstanding cailici failures, ihe Marxist) Mill iccmcfaid ihe program aseans of restructuring Afghan society and--despile wide-spreadeural tupforl. Babrak announced thai land reform would be one of his immediate goals. His government did little about the program until the summerhen ila revised progiani lhat virtually abandoned tnc original Maiaitt goali in favoe or winning popular lupnorl. Almost anyune who agicedupport the government wouldhis holdings tailored, and ihe government would even Iwlp toililary officers increase iheir holdings. Still, the government kept grievances alive by discussing such unpopular institutions aa "cooperalive" forms, and in Ijnuary Itrobably liclitioui survey ol land reform (hat both

ai reform wmild fullmv Afghan Iradilioni

and^pfopened measures itui violated (hose traditions.

Otherhave

to

omen greasermen measures as abolishing dowries and forbidding forcedhavee- Wetieinized Afghans bulmost of themost

iew tut!!mi'amity And

religion. They also rcpori that prograrni lo ealabliah rural schooli and teach adults io read are regarded as cltons to interfere in local afi.ni and eoirupl thegirls. The destruction of ihouannds of schools by ordinary villagers as well as by hardcore insurgents demonstrates both Ihe adverse popular reaction and u"nmcnt's inability to carry oui the plugiam

Marxist Proiperliy

The Ma ruin have tried to justify the changes they icck in Afghanistan by pointing to potential materialou< years of civil war, however, have brought shortages, inflation.and vii-tually no sign of improvement

In agriculturcihe government hasunnoiincto *iti' incicase in ihe area under culiivjljon. but even if the claim is irue. this motl Important sector of the economy faces serious problems. The flightillion or moreas in mine part* of the COunliy drastically reduced ihe manpower uv.iil.bls for labor-intensive phases of agricultural activity tucli ns the harvest. The livctlock populalioneen reduced by the ciodus Of herds belong! if to rcfugei-i. by increased slaughtering, anddm-atc* rcsulilne from inadequate nuitiiiw I

Agricultural problems have hut Mho gcvcrnmeni(hey have the insurgents

who hove visited uvereports of serious food shortages in aareas, bul ihey also rcpoei id"living In most of thelav.than br.fr,liahting began.

confirm that ihe fighting has noi intcirupico inc crup cycle. The disruption ofan spoliation lystcm. the govcrnmcnt'i Inability to eollcei e'ain und other agticuliural products in insurgent-eontrolled areas, and Ihe reluctance or some larmcrsellhe government, however, have Created seriouiin government-Contioiled areas.1 Kabul announced agreements te>ons of wheal from Ihe USSR

The imdll industrial scctcr suffers from >l'.ui'.arc>raw maicrisis, spare parti, and labor Inin the processing of such map! productstvu and vegetable oil more than offsetgains In lesser field! such asgas

induitrial aid piojccsst>en! behind achcdulc because of lUipenJed economic aid Irom the Wcat and Ihe lack of sccurily ai manye fe-Sovkt-sponsoied protect! under intended io

ease military supply problem!

Accordingovernment iiaiiiiici.govein-itsent revenue collectiuvit areecordmputithe most important source olplummelcd, icvenucs from tourism have almost stepped, and in ir.col of the country the

government cnonot collect laacl Official iiatUno

jlso iiOoic llial1 budget <mtt fuslacCif

pnnanly by Scries grams trd leant aadrawakg downillion monthly a>iMip re-servei- comroicc! i* aa tinicol Sth.dditional Soviet subsidies in2 and the purchase of foodt from the USSR rather lhan non< Communist countries have kept for ciiii cichanac reserves stable this year

Mtebanltmt for Control

The Corrsmumsii hare beentn-tionieaU'OI the pofi*lalion

} itabrat government mi txin unable iu rT-uosn effective local government in mosi ofni'y. Officials appointed Uy Kabul are freoucml-itol.ted in disttict or provincial capitals without the means and often the will to eitend their authority into ihecouairrildc. In many peaces local goer amen is arc cantrotstiligi elekii aetttta ineMpcadeally or by laesl iMwrtcnleme places ladimcaiaiy governmentsfor la reelcentrale ireaicr part of ihrccreporrcdly-developing in oitoctiiionentralidily

Kabul's efforts tobuyin over local Iradcis have usually failfd One tactic has beenromise almost complcie autonomyillage c* tube if it stealsI'line Suenfreemen Is. however, in effecti an arcrbc insurgents andyIhr [ovcrnmeiil triei IP esttcise its aalhuitty. Although promiici wf arms, tnmcy. o: supportraditional encrttrct havevrun lhc supportew tribes, iribai.cnniinicnli have proved highly unreliable in combat.

3 sonic inbal IcaaCTi lake ibandc Iiglaiingi Ihe government

Kabul lacks the miliiary panel inhehe ne* system of local lovernmcnt that ii announced Inespite somelowatd Afghan tradition, ihe system is modeled on thee.lt in ihr USSR The onnouncen-airogram thai cannot be implemented but that to Clearly reveals the laicatacai to lara Alghsatitanemei-siyle Mateudgment by Alghaa

-Icadcrl ihat cllortstlttblisli local governmente riiuk until the imurgents arc defeaieeTThe Com-m'ani it. anticipating Ihai ihe rei_cnon would be

stiong only if Ihey triedmplement ihcsysitm. may

have decideds no need to ptopoac lot ihan

ihe program they wanted

The Crarnmorsitl Patty

The Kabul govcrpcixnl's main polilienl iauiuencntibe People's TScanocralicfailed to control even Afghanistan's Communists, lei alone ibeAccording to Afghan officii Is. the party hat only0 members -not0i tli itand even Soviei peocagarnliiis have ai limes casiradtcice! Kabul's claims- Piotprets for lhc pally gaining new supporters aie dim. In tural arcu ihoicn Ihen irnvel tafcly onlytiong miliiaryew join in hope of obtaining personal benefits, such aadiciKi or the miliiary. but the party ^at nothing to oiTu most Afghani Mas: potentialmbsn bellcvt Ihey hare little chancedvance in ihe parly, and Ihe disadvantages ofip outweigh the hcncfill lor many. Parly mcmbert arc prime targets fur asiastinalion by urbaneportedlyislkd ia Kabul in one three-week period late last year. Adding to Ibe unpopularity ol party membership arcy parly leader* tn 'orce member! into the Army .

c

Jthere

it rampant dttaaaly and disloyaltyibe A'ghae Government. Fighting between Ibe rival Kbalq ami Faicham faciioiis may account for ai many deaths of pally members ai insurgent activity. Even someOf Babrak's Parcham faction object strongly to bit reliance on Soviet support. AltXmgb thereo firm evidence cf icnsioaa between Babrak and Prime

Minister Kcihlmand. the latter coatdtv.

ocus of opposition to Dabral

There is little chance the patty wilt resolve in majorheof reducing what little ivppott the* havefghanistan- -have bee*inglow other faciioa to purge the other. More over, Soviet efforts lo resolve parly dllleieneei have

beenear ago Moscow apparently tried to workompjoniiir. one clement of which would be tbc apcointmeoirime minister acceptable to

both

-si soon laced mih Krtalg. demands (or

uji coatrol of the government ant) Parchamlst

refusals to yield power. Altrr mileonth of

itons, Moscow abandoned lis effort, itdtct with

Paieltam. and allowed Soltan Aliof

ihe most anli-Khaloi of Dsprak'sbc-come prime minister

la1 the Sewicts btaanarly conference thai Ihey apparc.MSt ItOptd wouldunity among 'he Afghan Communists, resolve factional differences, increase support in the parly fot government policies, and enhance the party'sand legitimacy in Afghani it an In generally honcator delegates, the Klsahibirong showing, hutioat* Uercred soemike reiuMt and chose iheir own delegates Tbe two-day semon. which Opened u. Kabul on I* March, was completely controlled by ihe Pare hamuli, whono serious attempteal with ibe parly's many piobletns. The Soviets presumably decided thai facilonal diffe.-eni.-cstllll So grca: that il wai infer lo concede to lhc Parchamiits' control of Ihe latheringluer fight en-cr party organisation and policies. The heavjhaaOed met beds useduarantee Parch imat control =eve-iheleii addedhahlimi Ox.

Party fronlt to attract specific social groups have been less tucecufu! in Afghanistan than cli-wherc.causc Afghan society is loosely org tailed and iiadi-uooal la Other eounirtei. forommanis; controlled labor fronti have ce-optcd Ibcof non-Communist unions, in Afghanistan almost no labor unions existed when the Cornrnirnisii sored power, and lhc government created most or those organisations thatmpnie the Central Council of Tiade Unions

Afghan fronts are used primarily lo generatedirected at foreign countries rather ihan to wm sappori or eiert control in Afghanistan Fot ciamplc.

the i" ni'Sry fund ion of Iht Democratic OrganiiatiOn

for Algtian Women Is to ntiTj world opinion of the

COM'nil between lhc government'i progressivetoward women and lhc much more traditional view* ol most insurgent leaders. Meet of the fronts seem to do liltle mOre than ittue cccationnl slate-menu in support of Kabul's policies: ihey apparently do .loiccnscck nesv members, at least outside Kabul

The only group not concent rating on piorugnndi. the Democratic Organisation lor Afghanafiri lhc Sovietgiadually become aa ad-uoct so lhc military tithe*echanrsm for or (inning Alghan youth The Afghancpotit ihai the group hatew miliiary units to fight in the couniiyside and also provides recruits fee lhc Defense of ihe Revolutionocal Defense force. Finally. tile group iries to leialoree dncifslaae and prc-pegtic Commaaisl idcoies-gy the miliary

The way in which lhc govern mint esinblnlicdNil'inal Fatherland Fronturtherthai Kibul finds their or gamut ions uiefulfor gineraiing ttreesaginda- Provincial"prominent" ndividaab.ormed the Faihcrlard From al ameet ing in0 and ainhe organiirri of bothclearly devoied effoilt toagathering, but Ihey evidently paid Utile ato the Front'so oraanuc theirlccling

provt-icisle onlyior- mini lo have been lo ensure lhal the government muld claim every province was represented, if only by civilmi from Kabul posing as provincial delegates Tbcfi.lerjoerce prumineal nee Comm.nuti into order lo give ihrmore Credibilit;

ThelvIlllliiySolulVoo

W|th link prospect thai its political and locialig give it effective cont'd of Afghanstiia. Kabul appears IO be counting increasingly on asolution. Several public statements by Dabtak in receni monllis appeal io make com baling

thethan pursuinghighest priority lor the parly. Tlicaa stilllitor tedol cm" but oxr the past year tt haipretending thai Ihe iniutfiencyinor problem und now rcporli citenaive fighting, ll recently noted, lor example, trial forcei subordinate to the laierioi Ministry had beenlashes with insurgent*'

When inihiary and other pr.gram* conflict, priority is aimcs; always given to IM miliary. Communisi leaders have been vilhag to ml damage to both the party and the youth rargaruiatuan by forcing member} iatn the Army. The goicrnmtnt almail certainly *at :aui that ill attempt to call up aoeral hundred tbouiaad reaernii' in1 would be unpopular The apeedwtieh it begancn. however, luggcata it did not anticipate the severity of the economic iJlii.pt ion caused by ihe flight of rcterviiti Forced conscription also fuels public rcicntmcnt. Economic programs lhat might win popular lupporl have been largelythe emphasis la on thoia dlrecily rehv.ed to the war ctfoit.

The government'! armedoatcannot or will not oopa with the insurgents.major offensive operaiioni thaArmy-I'houiovietparticipationfailures. Information

indicates itiai in tha ipcing1 an Afghan offe.^ive Oetigned tortajc* Uuorgent suppty route i- not hern Paktta Frervince cdlapud cuiclly. in pan becaute of deail-jen thai I'dudcd the defce-of airmail all of on* rag>rtaant la Ihr summer1 Soviet adviser* ordered Afghan unit!roup of unnamed cadet* lo clear lainracnu from tbe Paghrnan area near Kabul C

OO Afghan troops parlici-

pafd In the ill-fated operation inereeserted or were mining, and 1BO vehicles were lost Afghan loree* have fared juit a* poorly when they had ligmflcant lupporl from Soviei troops.

August and1 the Afghan* lulTcrcd heavy loDca in men and equipment in the fourth jranl effort to clear iniurgonii fiom ihe Panjihcr valley

north ofeffort thai accomplished even lets than previous attempt! io wresi control of the valleye retina nee.'

Probably because of the repealed defend,offensivee become rare.northeasternponcdly almosloperailoi, between July and October* bservers report

that certain special unm. auun at commandos,small-scale raids, but in larce-scaleunit* are generally used only In supportiroops. and even then results are usuallyOne of the few important Afghanthis year wax in Samongan Province J

the Army, althougn accompaniesovict unii. auffcrcd heavy losie* and last control of three district*eek of fighting.

Afghan iroops seem urmblc io ropund effectively to insurgent ambushes of road convoys. Their tendency to slow down or (top when underfirela high casualties,ack of coordination among convoys, mainnd the Air Force nuke* matter* woric. Afghan unit* are also unable or unoilting to counter insurgent attack* in the main urbannly majcr Soviet effoits have been able to bring the second- and thtrd-largcatandtenuous government control

Afghan Mid-eis and police Li isniaicd towns and military posts maintain what government pretence cam* in much of the countrywide. In manyowever, thete unit* survive because commanders have established tacit arrangement* with localgroups. In exchange for noninterference, the iniurgent* bypass the cooperative garrison and attack other Afvhirand Soviet

Jand the insurgents report mat tonic A'zhan commandersoughtfrom attacks by supplying arms and ammunition to Ihe insurgent'

-

The Army'* moil in nun problemil* inability to Had men willing to light (nr die llubrak government. Monctaiy incentives loi enlistment and rccnlistmcn; have Toiledi metowering tbe offlci.il drr.fl atc0 at well at endme many deferment* hat not strengthened ihe At my,urther lowering of lhc draft ageV In? it unlikely lo be any more effective In ihe falll. according

3 "My0 metool of JOW.enW siller responded or weee caught by nrcsi-gangi when lhc govern will tried is recall all vcteraniibe ageabul l> now force-ely on press.gangs a* in primary means of conscription. To IHI their quotas, recruiters have taken boys a* young aaears old. canting Afghan Army officer* lo complain ofc*-aualiiyhai the draft hnt brought in.

The moiimion and tinning or recrulu it catremely poor. According lo

iits arc taken from ihe

areas where ihey are captured directly lo ttnilt far from their hornet. Most men receive onlyoays and some ai few as (our days of tinning. Small arms mining includes firing less lhanounds. Units somciimci van three months before giving arms lo recruits because of fear that deserters will iu* Jien lhc) defect.

Deaej irons and casualties haveeavy tollrriaapower. The Afghan Governmentthere were al0 desertions intuettcriptt feel any allegianceheand many clearly are hostile to it andaoor living coed it mm and Ion morale-pari because cf manycontributehemcrrhastsg of that Army. The govern memIon the services of monyinI Kabul decidedinvoluntary (itension of Iheirof the high probability thai these menAccordingthe Afghan

Government estimaiei lhal the Afghan Army has also lost0 killed0 wounded.

Adding to lhc Army's problems aie Ihein the ruling party, corruption, andfor the insurgents from wiihin lhclhal Khnlqiofficer*

in armored units in Kabul tried to avenhrow Babcal anleasi two occasionsut they were stopped by Soviei troops. There have also been many instances ofiing between Khalcjr* andmelts- According to C

3 some Kbalgra in the mdi-taiycoTcrily sappty arm* and information tc Ihe insurgents and encourage government troarw lode-sen. Khalqi* are an overwhelming majority of the parly member* in ihe miliiary. bui dcipile iheir disloyally, the government cannot purge Ihcm without decimating an already waok officer corps.

Many Afghan Army officers arid veterans ore at untrustworthy or disloyal at mosi recruits.*.

J report tbajruomccmbenlc funds allocated for troopandrocess aided by in/latiaa:rcpans.alto say conscripts arc

oftes allowed lo escape by sympsthetic or vena! sddicrs. The Soviet* do not tell Afghanperations, dej--oy menu, or obyective* until just before the action begins ia order io limit thepassed to the insurgents. AccordingC

j. some Afghan troops also engage inmosi spectacular (nuance was lhc dutruc-lion of the ammunition tioiage aiea at Bagrnm Airbasc in1

Relations between Afghan and Soviet officers arc often bad. According lot

3 Afghan miliiary ofrieer* have comptamcd lhal Soviei troops in many areas will not lake the offensive They blame tbc Soviets forairocitiea against Civilians, gad Afghan troops reportedly have refused so follow Soviet Orders fee "scorcbed earth" tactics. Mealed dispute*Soviets and Afghans have followed joint eperatjons The Afghans, for caample, blamed lhc Soviets far the high casualamong theIhe pjgh'iisn operation

Thee*ied Iheir low opinionoviet

officer iaroup c' Afghan o'fieeri aboul ihoi lack el politicaland their failure to make an effort canal to the Suricii. Inectured11about their liMHicomiag*,including sympathy foe the inturgcnii. factional squabblei. and the lack of poiiutcttni cMenuvc Soviet training

Thendirectly control the Afghan Army but have Utile contact with moil of ita acJicnOQ Soviet ndviscra arc attached to Afghan unita donti lo the battalion and perhaps company level and mull approve all orders. Soviet* routinely approve and oversee all tuanbai operations Soviei orders, however, arc implr mealed through Afghan eaffKcri and non-ccmmiitioncd officer* Tbaar men arc aiitl largely icsiuniiblc for the handling of Afghanal ihe lower cchclom where direct tupcrvuion

by So'iut* it rare

g*MM

Sovietontributinc to ihe failure of troth com bit operalioa* and clforli to rebuild the Afghan ir.ilitafy. Thilhe iciull of inenmpe-tencc, ineaporience, poor relation* wiih theympathy lor the irj-urgcnti. and the desire to avoid eombai. Purge* and masiive dcaertiooi have rciullcd in aap* Compoied of pee>Tca*>onil tolrhCrageaeiiliy seek to avoid trouble nth either the iniuf grnd ce the Communnta and of party Vovaliat* promoted rcgardlca* of experience or competence.

Kabul's effort* to improve it* armed loree* have accomplished link. Recrorticg inogiam* clearly have laded. The Defease of the Revolution unita formed for rural defense and border battalions intended to pre-vent insurgent infiltration from Pakistan and Iran are evenffective thnn Ibe rcgulai Aimy. The divl-won ol the country Into tones, each headedenior party mciiwur. which ll Intended to mc-ciie cooidina-lian aaaoog the varloua aceneiiy orgaouatioai and give Kabul more control over militaryid noi slow insurgent gain*1

There alto-ii hill's lhe Sovietrcan do icon to improve Ihr Afghanarcimprcmen giouivS rapeta-lata* and boot! the Airnrrettly weak capi-balny lo supply iicriaied unit* and evacuatef caTiecr*. including Detente Miaiatcr Rafi. arc now In iheralie the profetsional competencethe military and mightadre nroundfghan Army eventually could be built. ilaouM thereebirth of the Amy's loyally,nd irati.ai.on Ai tOOg ai mOU enliiied men and maay olTiceri have little detire is fight for the Babrak government, potential improver-sent* in moodily and firepower will havearginal impact

Outlook

Both tlx Soviet* and the Afghan Communliii will continue to try to win popular toleration, if noir the Uabrak government and luragthcn party and gevcramcni mcchaniicn* for control nf the Alglun people. The reluctance of prominent oon-Cir't io be associated with theie popular perception thai thorn who do cooperate have told out to the enemy, and the inability of the government to purineai reducing the Sovietwenild cm*birth it*aoreoviet puppet arroosi pecetwJc ihe formaiMnovernment mcee acceptable In Ihe Afghan ifcople The Sovictt are trying tooyal cadre ol Afghan: vi& may totneday be able lo admiiuitcr an effective Communist government, bul itill be yean beforerogram will have moci irnpne-

C-wcrnnvcat economic, political, and lOCial pragrams might not make the government more popular, but they would Increase the com of opposition and make coopciaiion wiih Kabul more attractive For example, development prog rami, technical and financial nuiit-ancr fornd poutrvc governmcni laflocrtcc on nil (en ng and taa faolrcjca nil could br ined to encourage cooperalion lather lhan retina nee among the rural population Greater political control would inhibit coopciaiion with the insurgent* and give the

i *ii;ifTl i

Government, cum nppje tun dietin overee-place tool elites by making it oopaaticn

withi i t iIk route to

pecsiigc awler Socialibc

tone pcoeeii of changing tte CoiVoh of lhc Afghan people io ope more compatibleomm.nil) Mate.

The piogramt. however, cannot be implemented to long at theeicncc in much of rural Afghanistan i> limitedew notaicd police and army ronI The govcinmrri can neither protect norJ hail who might be inclined to cooperite with it. '

A> long ai the govcmmeni appcari tooecii" puppet puttuiai polkivi that do noi bee* Itfghan people, few will be willing to fight fee it. The Army will hive to rely on forced recruiting, desertion ratca will remain high, and govc-nmcnl units will be undefendable in combat

With Afghan Government forces una tie to hold their own againal Ihe insui gents and hiitc proapcci that social, poll"*'! and cceoocmc peofuriiimucCI. the burden of niaiiti.ining sod ciicnding government authority falls on Serviei troops The Soviet military

doea-not appearetrategy designed tojulek victor;.Soviet troops to maimain control over lie mosi importantsuch as the capilal and major miliiarybui Soviet fornys into the countryside have brought no lasting control because the Soviets cannot spare men to establish permanent garrisons in the areas they clear. The clearing operations, however, raise1 of the war to boih the insurgents and their civilian supporters and demonstrate Soviet miliiary power, lhc Soviet general! iippcar io be basing iheir strategy on Ihe belief thai continued military pressure will eventuallyihe cost of continued resistance tea great for the Afghtn people to bear. In the meantime, the Soviets will continuexperience human and equipment casualtiesteady drain on their resources.

Original document.

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