NORTH KOREA: NUCLEAR REACTOR (W/ATTACHMENTS)

Created: 7/9/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

mooter being builtruoitar Naotaroh Canter,//

a nev nuoUar rtmearohof Horth Korea'* Jongbyon

the new

facility Is Similar to North Korea's only otheraavawatt thermal research reactor--

//Northuclear physicists are trained by the Soviets and have the theoretical and technical skill tomall reactor of this type. If the Soviets are involved, the reactor probably will be declared to tbe International Atomic Energy Agency for safeguardii was the first reactor at Hoscow's insistence.//

//If tha north Koreans areopy of the first reactor without Soviet Involvement and want to avoid de-to the iAKA.f

reacwrTwhTchwiTi not be" completed for several years, is not designed to produce the quantities^ plutonium neededuclear weapons program.//

stmt

SEpftET

WITHIN NORTH KOREA'S SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES. P'VONGYANG WOULD NEEO TO OEVELOP ADVANCED ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES TO MASTER THE REMOTE CONTROL OPERATIONS THAT ARE"NECESSARY FOR HANDLING HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.,

//THE NORTH KOREANS PROBABLY ARE TECHNICALLY CAPABLE OF BUILDING THE REACTOR WITHOUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. NORTH KOREA HAS NOT SIGNED THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. ANO IT IS UNLIKELY TO PUT THE REACTOR UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS./.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE7 north Korea'* Nuclear Efforts Suenary

North Korea appeera to be procreating toward helping leprove Hi energy-short econoev *ith the capacity to generate nuclear energy.

indigenous nuciearreacToraiay be under "way, although P'yongyang has yet to acknowledge the existence of the reactor or enterafeguards agreement as required by Us5 accession to the Nuclear Non-ProlIferatlon Treaty (NPT)., HHh tho7 deadline for enteringifeguards agreaeent ee are uncertain why

WARNING

SOURCES

INVOLVED

SECRET NOFORN

>

uclear Efforts

Pyongyang's Interest In nuclear power ttees frot for additional sources of energy as well international prest

Its need

Vongbyon Nuclear Research Center, the host of the

areaega.itt (m) research reactor under IAEA safeguardsrge support area. Since an expansion progress beganHW reactor and support buildings have been added. The reactor, whichraphite Moderated, ga|-cooled(coapleted

our opinion, the new reactor couldraining facility to support Pyongyang's nuclear efforts or it could be used to augment an existing Isotope-production capability. Generation of electric power It aeother possibility,f

|lf> addition to 'acuity, wi believe that P'yongyang probably has developed portions of the front end of the nuclear fueln1ng, nllllng, conversion, and fiprovide fuel for trie reactor.

SECRtT NOfOHN NQMWTRACT ORCON

The He. Reactor, the DPT. end the Soviets

TTeW^

the project's locatio WaaTaTlM*d'cate^M

The North's need for additions! help to advance Usappears to underlie Us accession to the NPT. InMoscow was Instrumental in (educing Pyongyang toHPT In The Soviets have been InvolvedKorea's nuclear power prograa since at to providing technical assistance, Moscow has suppliedresearch reactor and assisted in the construction ofNuclear Research Canter. Nost recently thein response to Pyongyang's accession to theto build at least one powar plant that could beas aeny asU reactors, neither tide hatproject's location, but tho Soviet

nuclear power plant will"

the Soviets' influence, the North's reluctance to publicly acknowledge the existence of Us nee reactor and bringromptly under the NPT's safeguard provisionsatter of concern. In accordance with tho NPT, the North should enterafeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA) within IB aonths of accession. Including astent irg _tc on-site inspection of Itt declared nuclear faciMtiat,

In our Judgment, P'yongyang could opportunity to announce the reactor's would gain eaxlaua propaganda value. Us Indigenous nuclear reactorpportunity to project itselfat prowess. Further, the North can point efforts at proof of its national self-furthcr nuclear assistance froa the So

be waiting for an existenceay that Pyongyang's declaration of Ive the North an ion with technological

to its doaaatlc nuclear ralianco and still aceapt viets. Given Heseew't role

become i

SECRET

In the North's nucliar

to closely scrutinize

the existence of the nt- reactor lt in rf-rlgrim

SjfKf

SECRET

SECRET NOFORfCJ-OCONTHACT ORCON Cental wdipmtAgmy

f

SECRET NOfORN NOeONTRACT ORCON

no evld.nc. that North Kor.ap!IV pon option, but w. cannot rule out that poa.lbmty *

Pyongyang's Nuclear Efforts-

uclw

, tha earnered ofnanoperation

We believe Pyongyang probebly has also davelopid portlona ol the front end of the nuclear fuelmining, milling, end fualprovide futl lor Ita nuclear actlvitlae.

2 -

SECRET NOFORN^NOpDNTRACT OflCON

4a

OtfONTRA

SECRET NOCON TRACT ORCON

-And Nonproforminc.

unwlllloones. to ecknowledg. it.r. In T It.to tha Nuclear Nonpron.era.lonin dJup

acco.dar.ca with tha NPT. tha North

In our many month, away

>copa lefeguerdt agrtamant la. at bait

agr..ment"tncludrnB decl.ratlon andon ont..ntarnatlona. Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA] wl.hlnonth. mdata-lh. North. claimtno It Inrrlnne*in.!.

Tha So-lit Connection

k Mokowarge roie In encouraging Pyongyangthe NPT In Th. Soviet! hay* bean Involved Innuclear progrem atnoe at tent In addition to providingMoscow haaW research reactor ,ndof tha VongbyonenterI

Northo.itad lu in.trument of accession with tha Soviet, end the Sovietnnounced Pyongyang', daemon to Join the NPT The North Korean press, on the other hand, waa .Bent Mo.cow, apparently In ra.ponae to Pyongyang'* acca.alon to the NPT. agreed to build at least one power plant that could be compoied of aa meny a.W reactors. Neither ilde haa announced the project's location, but the Soviet Indicate the plant will be built1

DIRECTORATENTELLIGENCE

ay ISM

North Korea'* Expanding Nuclear Efforts

Summary

Nonprolllaretlon TfJIty (NPT) In5 obllgilai It to bring all of tts nuclaar facllltiai under lull-acopa International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, but It has yet to sntsr Into tbe required safeguards agreomant or acknowledge new nuclear-related facilities. These failure! have ratted South Korean concern* about the Norths nuclear Intsntlona. with Seoul publicly atatlngongvang could have nuclear weaponsew years North Koret suffers Irom chronic energy shortages, end tha Soviets have agreed to helpuclear power plant, suggesting tt least penongyeng's nuclaar program Is aimed atew energy

NINO NOTrC SOURCES OR

TELLIOENCE INVOLVED

IOTICe^tN*TELI WptfTHODS II

SECRET NOFO"fOrtJCONTRACT ORCON

SECRET NOfOKN NOCOA^RAcT ORCON

source. We have no evidence inn North Korea it pur.ul waepon option, but wa cannot rule out thai possibility.

Pyongyangs Nuclaar efforts

_ Th* VonOt>von Nuclaar Raaaarcn Center, the focal point ofA|(htha

, tha

tha Soviets under IAEA safeguards,arge support area tebegan he.^st.uct.dbuildingsMWod..tlsd fueled with natural

In our view, at least pantew energy source

jngyeng hatajor hydroelectric power project et Kumgangsen In southwestern North Korea, end Is constructing thermal power plenta throughout thehe Soviets have agreed to helpuclear power plant, and the North may wen hope this will be the beginningeries of nuclear profit that will help Its energy-short economy. I

Nonetheless, theMW reactc The reactor could oa used for power generation.1

Ilend its limited estlmat. output would do little to eaia p'vonavanai anamu shorts

Weor>gyeng probably hes also developed portions of the from end of the nuclear fuel Cvcle--urarUum mining, milling, and fuelprovide fuel for

us nuclear activities!

SECRET NOFORN NMoIStrACT ORCON

nd Nonprollferatlon Performance

Tha laaua of tha purpose forMWwith the North's unwillingness to acknowledge ItsPyongyang's failure to follow up on Us accession to the Nuclearon Treaty (NPT) Inn accordance with the NPT. the North should have enteredafeguards agreement-Including declaration and on-site Inspection of its nuclear facllltias-with tha International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) withinonths.devs before Hs tergal date--the North Koreans rejected the proposed IAEA safeguards agreement, claiming It Infringed on their national sovereignty because It was more restrictive thanmodel NPT Safeguards Agreement."*

The Soviet Connection

We believe Moscowarge role In encouraging Pyongyang to sign the NPT In5 Tha Soviets hava been involved in North Korea's nuclaer program since atn addition to providing technical assistance, Moscow hasW reaeerch reactor and assisted injhe construction of the Vongbyon Nuclear Research Center.'

North Korea deposited ita Instrument of accession with the Soviets end the Soviet press announced Pyongyang's decision to Join the NPT. The North Korean press, on the other hand, was silent. Moscow, apparently In response to Pyongyang's accession to tha NPT. agreed to build at least one power plant that could be composed of as many asW reactors. Neither side has announced the project's location, but the Soviet press

[indicate the plant will be built

Special Analysis

c!rtenter, aboulilometers nonh

tram.

North Korea, despite severe evononm constraints, has expanded activities atunghyon over the past decade. Itega*.till-lhernial (MWlj rcwarch reactor, supplied by ihe Soviets inndigciKiuslyMWt research reactor modeled after IvSlh Briinii plutonium production reacie

Programs Ciial

The North suiters chronic energy shortages, and ihe new plantsma> bv ugenomic clecirica

North Korea and Ihe IAEA: The Next Round

that

The North has repeatedly missed target dates for

is to postpone.

Even If negotiations are successful, there ere loopholes in the standard safeguards finitely or to limit coverag^sScct

re all facilities that

Nonh Korea must officially notify the IAEA that an agreement meets all internal staiutory requirements before it can enter into force. There is no explicit time limit for this step.

an agreement take* effect. Pyongyang has

Lengthy delays in implementation or incomplete declarations to the IAEA would increase international concern thai the North's activities at Yonghyon are noi strictly peaceful.

HS ORCON

mmmm

Korea acceded io the Nuclear Non-Prolifcrailon Treaty5 but hat not enteredafeguards agreement. Onlyoviet-supplied research reactor it under IAEA ufc^unliH

North Korea may be willing, to risk the international centure thainuclear weapons program would bring in order toecided military advantage over the South, the keystone of the North's national security policy. P'yongyang may bcljcve thai nuclear weapons arc crucial io preserving that edi

:^gaaaB

Year Projection of Possible Events of Nuclear Proliferation Concern fJpjV

ear Paction ofll Events ofdlferalion Cooccrs!

proliferation involvee capability and intent, lhat is, the ability touckar explosive and the monition to do to. Capability largely comprises physical facilities and know-how. Intent isolitics! question andountry's own balancing of factor* affecting its security, prestige, and other interests.

Th* proliferation equation is affectedariety ofoth politicaltechnical. Relevant political events include leadership changes or emergence of new governments, establishment of cooperation among governments, and negotiation of contractual arrangements or agreements betweenelevant technical events include *uch occurrence* at startup or acquisition of new feciliiiea.

This paper is intended tooncise overview of possible future events that could bear on nuckar proliferation. It is intendedeference aid for nonproliferstion policy makers to help prepare them to deal with such events, should they occur.

Tbe main thrust of thiso project aa integrated chronology ofpolitical and technical event* over tha nextears. The paper isby geographic regions and. within regions, by major countries of proliferation concern. Both supplier nation* and countries viewed as potential proliferitors arehronology of possible event* is projected for each country and for key international nuclear organmiiORS-Tbi* chronology is precededictogram that summarize* the near-term nuclear capabilities of countries of major proliferation concern.

Th* technical event* are heavily concentrated on the startup of two types of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities: reprocessing and enrichment plant* Fast breeder reactors also arc included, to the extent plans Tor such reactor* can be anticipated. Other reactors are included only where they would have particular proliferation significance. Likewise, other fuel-cycle facilities are mentioned (for example, fuel fabrication plants) if they will materiallyountry in reaching nuclear independence.

For case of reference, events concerning leniitiveaao* riproccssiniabo presented chronologicallyeparate appendix, grouped by type of facility and by icoeraphk area.

Thisn update of an earlier research paper published in

North Korea: Potential for Nuclear Weapon Development-^

North Korea: Potential for Nuclear Weapon Development,

_ HKorea acceded 10

the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPTV renouncing acquisiiiM of nuclear explosives and accepting safeguards on iu nuclear activities.North Korea's penchant for military secrecy makei it unlikely that il wouldrimarily military reactornown research center or agree, as it has with NPT adherence, to open it to Inter nil tonal inspection.

' The Soviet role in extracting the NPT pledge and subsequently selling Northuclear power reactor pnu Moscow's prestige oe ihe line InKacefuljfOg^ram^jjjith renewed economic and military aid the lever to"

A

In considering whether lo embarkenture as costly, haiardout, andensitiveuclear weapons program. Pyongyang wouldomplex calculation of benefits versus costs, as well as considerable uncertainty regarding ihe effect ofrogram on Its ultimate goal of reunifying thets own terms It might sec nuclear weaponseans of forcing political concessions from Seoul,edge against possible South Korean developmentuckar weapons capability, as leverage toreer hand in paramilitary operations withoutilitary response, atS nuclear response to an stuck on the South, oreans of carrying out offensive operations in an all-out attack aawaassssl

P'yongyang would abo tec disadvantages, particularly if it recognizedof concealingrogram. Exposure could leadIts superior nucleardevelop nucleara response. P'yongyang would also have to neigh the etlect on theto Seoul under such an increased threat. Moreover, tbehave to calculate the leu tangible, bat still significant, impact onit has pursued for over two years aimed in large panthe eventual withdrawal of US forces. P'yon*yani wouldthe likelihoodeapons program would complicalsrelationsI

Norte Korea: Potfotial lor Nuclear Weapon Dcidopmeatl

hthu

m

tsmi ticliutal

I

Once Ihe raw materials and device design ire avai able, it might take several months touckar device. Suitable delivery systems arc already available, and crude versions of the necessary avn-mtctcaf coflipunenis could be adapted from ibem. Another yeni might be required loevice so lhat it could be mated to the dclivcty system and be

NPT Ac

On IIorth Korea deposited with Ibinstrument of accession io the NPT. Into (he treaty. Pyongyang foreswore the manufacture or acQuisilion of nuclear weapon* and agiced io IAEA safeaaards on all in peaceful activities.'

Pyongyang, moreover, must no* nc (otitic itn laryagreements and actuaBy opemlime, to IAEA inspectors. These arrange-menu should lead to |Teller lorclm acceu to North Koitari nuclear facilities, more openneu in the North Korean nuckar program, and improved estimates of North Korean eapsbsutica. Safeguards ahou'dimely indicator of any North Korean constructionpioccssinf plant or any at tempi to divert Plutonium or speni fueleapons program. If North Korea inttoot touckar weapon* program, it has madeuch more eUhVt.lt by signing the Nl

_nuliury ail almost certainly object to rcvclai-on of un> projects In which it might be involved, even peripherally. We ultu especi P'yongyang to preclude access io its facilities by IAEA inspector* from most Westernight it wcuM have under standard IAEA insnectioo proced

Appendix A

aUckgrouwl of North Korean Nuclear Program

USSR

r. during the visit of North Korean Premier Kant Song-san to Moscow inccording to official presse two countries signed an agree mem on supplyuclear power plant. North Korea's acceuion to the Non-Pro! iteration Treaty (NPT) "is announcedsimultaneously, meaning theall other North Korean nucUar actrvliiea would be subject to safeguards!

ClmUima

CtmtrtA rW Mm

CswWnW

Snftty eoatrol raW

measure of reactor fuel consumption For exa-ole, Ihe percentage of fuel atoms thatndertone nassoa. or the ainount of energy produced per aalt wtujhi of real la the reactor.

The outer sachet of Becker fed tla meets. Il prevents corroaaoa of the feel and the raleaaa of fission prodocu lalo the coolant. Aluminum or ils aaoya, iiiirhni ited. magnesium alloys, and asrcoewm attoyt are common cladding materials.

Mechanism used to actuate the movement of control rodsuclear reactor

A rod, paste, or tubevaieriel that readily absorbs acastroee (haimeaa, boron, and sosed to ooatroi tha powerackee* tunaootrol rod prevents the neutrons from causing funher

A sundby control rod used to abutuclear reactor rapidly id

A reactor control rod seed ia sssshsag reactivity, aa ia atartap or shutdown.

Care CHlicmJ

CHlUmlttJ

substance circulateduclearto remove or transfer beat Common coolanu are water, air, carbon dicaide, helium, and liquid sodium.

The central aorlsoauclear reactor, containing the fuel elements and usually Usei

Aa assembly of sufficient fission* tie materia! and moderator ioYsa.on chain reactionary low power leveL

The stateuclear reactor when it ishain reaction.

A panicle accelerator in which chanted panicles receive repeated synchronised Bccckratkoas by electrical Mat as lac particles spiral outward from their scarce. The parisclet are kee- in the spiralowerful tsuiaagtsc heM

Having more than one application (that is, nuclear and nonnectearl.

ercentage of aIsotope presentaicna) has

artificially increased, so that it isaa ibc percentof Ukal isotope naturally found a* is*Enriched uranium oopia.ru snore of ftsalonabk isotope ureniunvDJ than Ihe naiaralry occarrvng percentage of OT

failneutron with energy grcatsr lhanlectron tolls.

Thermalneutronqailibriaan with its surrounding medium. ThctMl

Matron* arc those thai have been stowed downncderaior so aa average speed ofeters per second (at room lempcraiarc) from the match higher isiual speeds they had when cipdkd by ftassoa.

material

sometimes usedynonym for nssionabk material, this termeore restricted meaning, namely, any material fissionable by aetiiroas of all energies. tnelueaing (and especially) thermali neutrons as wdl as fast nautrau, for ciampk. uraniu*vjl5 and

material uaed or tssebk lo produce energyeactor. A"ppliedisiircsuchas natural uranium,lch only part of the atoms arcRisaonabk, if tbe miiture can be made lohain reaction.

Saem/mH

which has not beta Irradkiedas not been placedeactors.

Nssckar reactor fad that has bass Irradiated (nscd) and persnaiscaaly removed from the reactor.

met cycle

Front ernlle/mmclemr fmrl cycle)

aarlas of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power reactors.

The series of steps iflchldiag uranium minlag. concent ration, eonverston, aanehmcsu, and fuel element fabocaiicc

taeleyeUl

of the nuckar fuel cyck indudmg handling of doe-hanged feel ckmcats from reactor, chemical reprocessing, recycling of racovcred fissik and fertlk material, and disposing of radioactive wast*.

water

containing lignilkaniry snore than the natural proportion (one) of Navy hydrogen (deutenam) stoms to ordinary hydrogen atoms Heavy wiles is aacdoderate* i* scene reactors because it stows down aeatroas effectively and aboo* cross section 'or absorption of an trues.

water lem euktete

water.

A chemical proceas involving the revarsibk iinerehange of various tonsolutionolid tnaierial.tostkein.sod to separate and purify chemicals sack as fissionant earths, and so forth, sa

rial

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Ajemcj, .beted UN-affiliated organisation withembert. founded lalu purpose la to feeler peaceful applications of nuclear energy and carryrogram of on-alls inspections, auditi, and Inventory comrob known eollocirvely aa safeguards.

The baste purpose of IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion of aackar materiah from peaceful uses to snikitary or espeotrre pttrpossa by timelyThe agency moanors the Sow of aackar nuieriats at aackar iaaialiaticct* by aaditlng plant records and oowdticting physical isrvtatceiee. Seals and cameras are used to ensure thatrials arc not dimted whits IAEA inspectors are not present.

Process by which uraniumubjectedrocess to separata lbs pure urr -mam from other waste mater sals. Both sods, sack aa telluric acid, andarbonate, can be used

NmtwreJ ansaiaai .Ntwrrew/Ia.

malarial, such aa ordinary water, heavy water,pause, uaadeactor to alow down Ugh-velodty neutrons, thus iiicrsaslng the likelihood of furthce fkalon.

i trews

arc of UK Intensity of

q.tr.

Uranium as found in nature,ercentercentrace ofIt is also called normal uraMaaa.

3se numberh-ea tnrgci in one second

TnmiytNrT)

treaty opened for slant lurentered Into forcend now hasarties. The treaty binds nuclear waapceu-susWing signatories not to traasfsr nuclear weapons to any other countries and requires them toon-.espons-hold,

d to subject ell

IAEA safeguards II but to iransfcr materbl and equipment only aadci aaicrvirdt

grsuw/M

faufmafsariaa sWMfew aVterrm Xavatlarfse aWasrrry

of high purity usedoderator ta reactors. Reactor-grade graphite ii mtde artihciilly {ilnce naturally occurring graphite is ralalrvely Impure) by grapkltUation of patrokum coke.

The process of subjecting materials (frequently raeetor feel)ariety of machaakal and caemKal teals to determine the efecu of snacbsisoa.

thai detect and record the chsracterbtics of ioniiing radkiion. For eismple, Oeiger tountor or dosimeter.

The measurement of th* amount of radiatko delivsredpecirVc plsca or the -mourn of radkiioa thai -as absorbed these. For cample, dosimeter or

Rmii nmknrmmttwutml RfJttmmcllmt

GisomU

A ledioecir'e isotope An iiniUbk isotopelement ihit dtctyintegrates spontaneously. emitting radiation.

A radioactive ito:opt used for medical purposes.

A radioactive nuclide.

A device inission chain reaction can be initiated.and controlled.

Plutonium thatgh Pa" content. currently in ihe range of ISt could be substituted for weapons Pit,ionium in scene weapons appuca-lions, eat with decreased yield

A Ujer of material isnenadiaialy wrroundeaeior core thats hack or reflects into tbe core anany net,irons thai woaM otherwise escape The returned acairasss caa thaa caaaa marc fis.icau and improve the neutron economy of the rtaetor Coasreon reflector ma tenth are graphite, beryllium, and natural uranium.

The processing of reactor fuel to recover the produced and unused fissionable materials.

The chemical streamcproccaslng plant containing nitric acid and dissolved uranium, plutonium. and Cumm products-

Tbe chemical streameprocessing plant lhat coos aa organic solventto extract platoniam and uranium from Use aeneous phase when brought

faaw-aiiiag utmrtJimi The aqueous and

organic phases are mised to allow Use orgaeK scevent to combine with tbe arss**an and ptatceuam. The phase, most thca be scpsraiad to allow the season products remaining in the aqacoas phase so go so waste sad the fissile material to go to further recovery Equipment used includes nrusef-settlers, pulse column citractors, and caatrifugal coniaciors.

Storage pools constructed st part of the power plant complee for dischargee fuel elements

Tbe chemical and metallurgical operations involved in purifying and converting virgin or recycled uranium to forms suitable for use in the fabricaiion of reactor fuel elements or as feed to uranium enrichment facilities. The principal product forms are uraniumluoride, uranium metal, and uranium dioside.

XXI-

int tha urging of iha USSR. Nonh Korea acceded to tha Nuclaar Non-Prolifaraiion Treaty (NPTJ. rencvnclng acqulaltion of nuclear explosives end accepting safeguards on its nuclaar activities.

North Korea's penchant for military secrecy makes It unlikely that It wouldrimarily military raactornown research canter or spree, as It has with NPT adherence, to open ft to International Inspection.

The Soviet role In extracting the NPT pledge and subsequently selling Nonhuclaar power reactor puts Moscow's prestige on the line Ineaceful program, with renewed economic and military aid tha lever to enforce it.

In considering whether to imbirttantura as costly, hazardous, and politically sensitiveuclaar weapons program, Pyongyang wouldomplex calculation ofersus coats aa wall at considerable uncertainty regarding the effect ofrogram on tts ultimata goal of reunifying the peninsula on ita own terms. It might see nuclesr weaponteans of forcing political concessions from Seoul,edge against possible Sooth Korean developmentuclear weapons capability, aa leverage toreeraramilitary operstlont withoutilitary response, asS nuclear response to an attack on thea meant of carrying out offensive operations in an all-out niicil

Pyongyang would elso tee dltsdvantaget. particularly If it recognized the difficulty of concealingrogram. Exposure could lead Southitt superior nuclear technology--to develop nuclear weapontesponse. Pyongyang also would hsve to walgh the affect on the US commitment to Seoul under such an increased threat Moreover, the North would have to calculate the leas tangible, but still significant, impact on the diplomacy It hsa pursued for over two years aimed In large part at encouraging the eventual withdrawal of US forces. Pyongyang would also consider the likelihood that^^jajgons program WOl,ia comptlcete its Improved relations with Moscow.

Nuclear Proliferation Surrey: The Next GcneratioitlB

Nuclear Fuel Crete Ginnery

glossary provide! brief eipUnationi at tome ie> technical lerne* rctttlng io in* eericar feel cyele as

usedthis paper. The glossary is oat intendede

definitive or comprehend >r

Nuiltor furl cycle. The urtei of steps from uranium mining, through fuel element fabrication and uu. todisposal foe nuclear power reactori. and. foe nuclear weapons, continuing tkronen reprocessing. febeteatUm. and testing of urapoms.

Criticaluclear asternal/ that hat lufficlrni fissile material and moderator tohainubcritleal assemblyuclear atsemUy Inelf-sustaining chain reaction cannot be maintained.

areauW Id at trial In which ihe perteniote of the fiuionabit Isotopeas been mfttbetally Increased so that It Is higher than the pererntage found naturally In the material. The naturally occurring percentageercent: low enriched uranium ILEUI has lessercent; highly enriched uranium IHEV} has more than 20

IUtileaterial (for example, uranium-2Si orthat Is fissionable by neutrons of all energiet. especially thermal (slow) neutrons:

rhcrmal aeuiront. Neutrons that have been slowed downoderator to an average speed ofer second lot room lemptrat urel from the much higher Initial tpeeds they had when expelled by fission

A material, inch as ordinary witter, heavy water, or nuclear-grade graphitt. usedeactor to slow down hlen-mrloctty mettirem. thus tm-reaiine the Itkehhuod of further fusion

water. Water ruauauerag slgntfieanily more than the natural proportion (one part1 of heavy hydrogen (deulrfluml atoms to ordinaryatoms.

Ngrade graphite. Nlgh-puriiy graphite, which Is made artificially from petrol rum mar because naturally on urrtug graphite is relatively Impure.

Reactor I'ude /lutealum. Plutonium thatighboutercent:

pUtonium. Plutonium that, as now meed In weapons epelitat-ons.ercent or leu

Reproeeitlng. The proceiilng of ipent nutleae reactor fuel to recover usable Attionable materials that hove been produced.

Stletuerg, The basic purpose of the Inr^nattcutal Atomic Energy Agency flAEA) safeguard! is tothe risk of timelydiversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to military or explosive purposet. IAEA monitors the flow of nuclear materials at nuclear insteJImeions by auditing plant records and conducting physicalSeals and photography are used for ensuring that materials are not diverted while IAEAI are not present.

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