SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (NIE 11-13-82)

Created: 10/13/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense

CM HS[PROGRAM

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following inlefigenee organizations porllci'paled In Ihe preparation ol Ihe Estimate:

The Centre! Intelboencfl Agency, lhe Del erne IntdCgence Aoency, the Nolionol Sec oily Aoency. and ihe intelligence organ! wiiont of the Oeportmenti ol Stole ond Energy.

Also Porticipoling:

Ihe Atiiftont Chiel ol Sio" lor InieCgence, Deporlmenl of thehe OVocior of Naval Intelligence. Ocporlmenl of Ihe Navy The Aniilonl Chiel ol Sloff, Inielligence. Deporiment of the Air Foree The Director of Intelligence.arine Corpi

2 SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

VolumeJudgments and Summary

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CONTfcNTS

PURPOSE AND

KEY

1 < i. in Alio:!ing FuiureBallistic Missile

Mililarv Doctrine and

Soviel ABM

Miliiary

Political

CapaUliiies of Soviet Systems for Ballistic Missile

The Moscow

New ABM

Surf ace-to-Air Missile

Capobilities lor ABM

Upgraded ABM Defenses at

Options for Deployments Beyond Treaty

Radars for Baltic Management

Potential ABM Deployment

Indications of Postulated ABM

Economic Factors .

II. Prospects for Directed-Energy

Laser

Particie Beam

BL Capabilities of Soviet Ballistic Missile

Upgraded Moscow Defenses Within Treaty

Eipanded Defenses at

Widespread ABM

Soviel ABM

Bevlsions to the ABM

US Withdrawal From the

Soviel Abrogation of lhe

ii.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Estimate respondseques! of the President's Special Assistant lor National Security Affairsomprehensive assessment by the Inlelligence Community on Sovici antiballistic missile (ABM) defense. It has been prepared for use by lhe administration in considering strategic arms limitation policies, in planning US strategic force programs, and in reviewing the ABM Trealy. it is intended toour best answers to the following questions relevant to US policy and planning decisions:

Whai are ihe objectives of Soviet programs for ballistic missile defense?

What are the estimated technical characteristics andof present and future Soviet ballistic missile defense systems and supporting radars?

What potential do the Soviets have to deploy ballistic missile defenses beyond thc limits of lhe ABM Treaty during the nextears or so?

What is the likelihood that the Soviets will deploy ballistic missile defenses in excess of Treaty limits?

While the Eslimate highlights factors bearing on lhe effectiveness of Soviet ballistic missile defenses it does not analyze in any delail the degree of protection that future ABM deployments would afford the USSR. We have not performed the analyses of the capabilities of Soviet ABM systemsultiple-engagement scenario. The great complexity and severe time constraints inherent in ballistic missile defenseresult in our having major uncertainties in any prediction of howoviet ABM system would function. Any assessment of Soviet ABM effectiveness will be an aggregation of the results of technical analyses of expected component performance using assumptions about the characteristicsallistic missile attack, aboul some nuclear weapon effects, and about the phenomena associated with ballistic missiles reentering the atmosphere.

Given the gaps In information and our analytical uncertainties, there are understandably many differing conclusions and opinions about the technical characteristics of Soviet ABM systems andand supporting radars and about their eapabililies to perform all

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the functions essential lo ballistic missile defense. Some of tliese differences concern capabilities on which lhe success or failureuture Soviet ballistic missile defense would depend. We are not likely lo be able In resolve many of ihese issues wilhin lhe next several years. Moreover, we have difficulty assigning probabilities to alternative interpretations of lhe evidence. However, lhe consequeiKes of Soviel acnitisitionallislic missile defense, despiie unccrtainlies aboul ils effectiveness, are sn serious lhalow probability of such an achievement is cause for concern.

Volume II nf ihis Eslimate, "Thereats Soviet ballislic missile defense programs in tlve detail required by staff planners and analysts responsible for policy studies and military assessments. Its emphasis is on completeness rather than brevity. The important findings of the Estimate on the prospects for future Soviet ballislic missile defense are summarized in volume I.

2

KEY JUDGMENTS

Tlie Sovtrls are upgrading ibeir antiballistic missile (ARM)al Mtiscow and are actively engaged in ARM research and development programs The available evidence does not indicate with any certainly whether lhe Soviets are making preparations forbeyond the limits nf theARM launchers atil does slum ihey are steadily improving tlieir ability to exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses iuHOs. If the Treaty were abrogated by either the United Slates or lhe USSR, we believe lhe Sovieis would undertake rapidly paced ARM deployments to strengthen their defenses at Moscow ami cover key targets In the western USSR, and to extend protection to key target- east of the Urals. Such widespread defenses could be in place by ther.

Since Ihe negotiation of lhe ARM Treatyost of the trends in strategic forces have been favorable to the USSR. The Soviets probuM) crMuider that tliey are much better able touclear war than tliey wereo reduce damage lo the USSR in accordance with iheir doctrine and strategy for nuclear war. the Soviets are continuing to improve tlie counlerforce capabilities andof tbeir offensive forces, to strengthen iheir air defenses and antisubmarine warfare forces, and lo expand their passive defenses. In Ihis context, we believe that an assessment by the Soviets of the correlation of strategic forces would indicate that lhe continuing vulnerability of the USSR to ballistic missile attackeficiency they would want lo reduce.

Wp judge that in evaluating the technical performance of the ABM sysiems they could deplny. the Soviets probably would not have high confidence in how well these systems would performarge-scale, undegraded US missile attack, especially in they imprnved US forces. However, the Soviets would probably view their ballistic missile defenses as having considerable value in reducing tbe impactegraded IS retaliatory atiack if the USSR succeeded in earningellcoorduialed. effective initial strike. Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even if US evaluations indicated ihey coiild be overcome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties aboul the potential effectivenessS strike.

Anotlver view is thai thc Soviets,idespread deployment, would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to enhance iheir confidence in the survival of high value targets, even in the eventull-scale US aitack.'

If certain features which we have assumedew advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) syslem. lhere realized, its potential contribution to ballislic missile defenses would be of growing concern ascomes widely deployed in lhe USSR and Eastern Europe in the mid-lo. While we do not believe lhcndAM systems are suitable for ARM use as currently configured, the Sovieis could, with an unrestricted modification and testing program, probably conduct an overt upgrade of these systems that wouldotentially important supplement to an ABM defense. There is an allcrnaiive view thai tbcndithout any upgrading may be capable of operatingimited ABM role, and ihalf"

^upgrade to improve potential ABM capabilities could beQ

A decision by the Soviets on whether toidespread ABM system would be based primarily on the answerrucial Question: whether the USSR willufficiently threatening strategic situation in thend beyond, for which an expanded ABM defense based on llieir systems now in testing and development wouldignificant difference. If theii answer is yes. then they would probably moke thc commitments necessary lo deploy such defenses despite the economic and political costs. Since their answer probably will not be clear-cut. other important factors would bias their decision toward norideployment:

The USSR's two-trackcontrolilitaryfurther ils stralegic goals has achieved limits on US delivery vehicles and constrained US defenses, while permitting expansion of Soviet offensive forces. There are no indications that the USSR is becoming dissatisfied with this approach.

Under the Treaty the USSR has ABM defenses to protect critical targets in tbe Moscow area while the United States has no similar capability.

Thc Soviets apparently see live Trealy as having slowed US ABM research and development, while they moved ahead with their own.

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On balance, we believe thereairly* low, but nevertheless significant chance (aboul0eicenl) thai the Soviets will abrogate the Treaty and deploy ABMs in eaccss of Treaty limits in.lievcould sec the military advantages of lhe defenses they could deploy as being outweighed by the disadvantages cited above, especially of energizing the Uniied States and perhaps ils Alliesapid and sustained growth in overall military capabilities, bothand nuclear, that could lead lo an erosion inf Soviet gains achieved in.

An alternalivc view notes that Soviet benefits from lhc Treaty, under current and projected conditions, far outweigh lhe potential gains from abrogation.esult, lhe likelihood of abrogation is considered to be veryercent or less) innless current conditions change subslanlially. This view cautions, however, that the Sovielsotivation toidespread ABM system to fill the serious gap in their defenses, and thereigher probability ofeployment in. Moreover, they have thc capability to complele such aInew years.1

Another view holds that the crucial question for Soviet leaders is whether deployment of ABMs is required to attain Soviet strategic objectives According Io this view, the following factors should be given greater weight in judging Soviet motivations for deploymentidespread ABM defense. Soviet doctrinal requirements for damage-limiting capability have always provided the motivation to deploy ABMs bolh al Moscow and elsewhere. Now.esult of advances by the USSR in ABM technology, the USSR's counterforce advantage over (he Uniied Slates, and US plans to deploy survivable and hard-target-capable ballistic missiles, the Soviets may no longer deem it necessaryestrain themselves from further ABM deployment. They have taken essentially all the steps necessary to prepareecision to deploy and have demonstrated confidence in their current ABM technology by deploying Ihe new ABM system at Moscow. Thc Soviets may be expected lo accompany any widespread ABM deployments with an active*measures campaign to manipulate Western attitudes and actions and to inhibit energizing the United States and its Allies intoapid growth in military capabilities. The holder of (his view believes it is noi possible with current intelligence dala to evaluate and quantify with confidence the extent to which various factors would influence the Soviets to abandon or retain the ABM Treaty. However, given the preparations lhe Soviets have made and the fact that the motivations

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discussed above slrongly influence Soviel decisions, lhe main (exl have understaied lhe prospect for widespread ABM deployment.'

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lA widespread Soviet

ABM deployment by therwould give (he USSR an important initial advantage over the United States in this area. We have major uncertainties about howoviet ABM system would function, and lhe degree of protection that future ABM deployments would afford the USSR. Despite our uncertainties aboul ils potential effectiveness,eployment would have an important effect on thc perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of thc US-Soviel strategic nuclear relationship. According to an alternative view, the Soviet Union will not have the capability in this decade to deploy ABM defenses which would significantly affect the US-Soviel slrategic nuclear relationship?

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SUMMARY

The Soviets* antiballistic missile (ABM) programs svould enable them Io have deployed by lheoidespread* ballislic missile defenses thai would have an important effect on thcand perhaps thc reality of thc US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship Olher means envisioned by lhe Sovicls for reducing potential damage to the USSH from ballisticassessed in thisinclude Soviet cotinlerforce strikes on enemy ballislic missiles and facilities for their conlrol, attacks on ballislic missile submarines by Soviel antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, hardening and mobility of Soviet military forces, and passive defense measures. We believe the Soviets regard ABMritical element in their future capability to reduce damageS ballistic missile attack.

available evidence does not Indicatecertainty whether the Soviets are makingfor ABM deployments beyond the limits ofTreaty, but It does show thai, through theirand deployment programs, thesteadily Improving their ability to eiercisewidespread ballistic missile defenses. Indecision to deploy ABMs in esecsi ofwc believe Soviet leaders would giveto the net effect of ABM deploymentscapability to perform the missions called forstrategy, taking into account likely USand defensive force deploymentsalso consider olher factors such as thepolitical, and economic implications ofabrogating, or withdrawing from the ABM Trealy.

I. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE SOVIET

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES Miliiary Doctrine ond Strategy

Soviets* present military doctrine andemphasize offensive operations to neutralize or

ldepreed defense. In (he -otern USSR or nation wide, would be one deployed lo protert ley military, leadership, and military industrial lartcU.mploy Ibe ternunationwide" In tlie leil. It ihould be rated lhat many areas ol* kner Importance might not be proteeied bv ADM coverage.

eliminate US nuclear forces and rciectesirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship The Soviets prefercapabilities to fight anduclear war with the United States, and have been working lo improve iheir chances ot prevailing inonflict

4 We have no reason to eipect any maiorin Soviet doctrine and strategy duringnd Ixyond. ll is likely lhat In the luture the Soviets will ol necessity be unable lo rely as heavily on offensive forces lo destroy US strategic nuclearmeans They air clearly aware that US stralegic force moderniiation programs will make moreand less certain lhe future effectiveness of eoun-terforcc strikes by the USSH At the same time. Ihe Soviets are continuing to take measures to reduce lhe vulnerability of their own stralegic offensive forces as they recogniie lhat fiaed-base weapons are becoming increasingly vulnerable They will not view these trends as requiring them lo reduce the offensive, counlerforce orientation of their strategy in favor of some assured level of survivability, as wouldefense-dominated strategy. Rather, ibey will see thc situation alreater burden on active and passive defenses to achieve their strategic objectives

5 Changes in thc future capabilities of Sovietdefenses couldreater effect on the US-Soviet strategic relationship than at any time in the past, particularly if there were major reductions in offensive missiles of the Iwo sidesew arms agreemenl. Thus, from the standpoint of the objectives called for bv their doctrine and strategy, the Soviets may have greater incentives inoredible ballistic missile defense.

Soviet ABMPerspective

be Soviets apparently formalized programs for defenses againsi ballistic missiles early in, but our understanding of some of these early programs is quite limited and subject to interpretation. Since, they have devoted considerable resources to ballistic missile defense and have started deployment

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A IIM systems before developmental IcKloiicompleted. There are differing assessments aboul whether Ihe history of Soviel ADM research,and deployments indicates Iwo distinct overallfor defenses at Moscow and anotheridespreadwhether lhe Soviets have beeningle program with several potential applications. Tbe question of whether Ihey have beeningle orrogram has little Ikn key issues or the technical performance and effectiveness of live ABM systems and components under development and the USSR'l capabilities to deploy thorn. According lo one view, however, thc continuation of two programs in parallel is Indicalive of Soviet commitment to ABM and implies the Soviels may Intend to deploy defenses beyond Moscow 1

Military factors

he Soviets negotiated thegreements lo achieve political and military objectives that ihey believed could not be attained bv unconstrainedand deployment of slrategic weapons. From their perspectivehe Soviets eipecled thc ADM Treaty lo enhance their counlctfoicc capabilities by Inhibiting the United States from deploying an extensive ballistic missile defense of Minuteman Al the same time, they probably assessed lhat iheir own ABM syslems then under development would be unable to protect critical targets from US missile attacks al least throughhey hoped to continue their own ABM development programs while inducing the United Slates to slowow thc Soviets now assess the effectontinuation of the ABM Treaty limitations on llie preseni and future relationship of US and Soviet military power.

S. Since the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, most ol the trends In ilrateglc forces have been favorable lo the USSB. The SovieU probably consider that they are much better able touclear war ihan they wereo reduce damage to lhe USSR in accordance with their doctrine and strategy forwar. the Soviets are continuing lo Improve the counterforce capabilities and survivability of iheir offensive forces, to strengthen iheir air defenses and antisubmarine warfare forces, and lo eipand Iheir

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passive defenses. In Ihis context, we believeoviel assessment of (he correlation of strategic forces would Indicate thai the continuing vulnerability of tlie USSB to ballistic missile atlack is an obvious deficiency lhal should be redressed: however, various political and economic factors as well ai military requirements would figure in any Soviet decision to deploy ABMs in eicesi of lhe Trealy limits.

There is an additional view thai lo appreciate Ihe miliiary lactors affecting Soviet attitudes toward ABMs one should consider lhe totality of thctrategic war-fighting capabilily. asby their continued reliance on thcforces and measures cited In the preceding paragraph Their doctrinal requirement for victoryuclear war dictates acquisition of all military forces needed to achieve lhat objective, including ABMs.1

Developments in military technology inhat could Increase the Soviets' Incentive for extensive deployment of ballistic missile defenses Innclude advances in ABM technology lhat resulndignificant inaease in systemand development of survivable radars that could contributeard-point ABM defense of ICBM fields Other technical advances by Ihe United States, however, such as Ihc development of maneuvering reentry vehiclesMaBVs suitable for use against Ivan)reduce Sovicl incen-lives to undertake widespread deployment of ADM syslems now being developed

An additional view holds that USprovide additional incentives for tbe SovieU to improve the capabilities of their ABM systems,prospects for US counter measures would have little effect on Soviel Incentives for undertaking widespread ABM deployments.'

Their Increasing vulnerabilityallisticattack could Influence the SovieU to expand their ABM programs. The growing site and sophistication of French. British, and Chinese ballistic missiles, and Ihe deployment of Pershing II would be taken intoby the Soviets Mostl. of course, thc US

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MX and Trident programs would, Uler in, confront lhe Soviets with much improved hard-target threats

Polll Foclors

ecision on whelhcr loidespread ABM syslem would be made by lhe top Sovietbased primarily on military rather lhan poliiical or economic (actors The crucial Question lor the Soviet leaders ii wlsether the USSH will lace adifferent and sufficiently Ihreatenint strategic situation in thend beyond, for which they would perceiveidespread ABM system wouldignificant difference If llieir answer Is yes. then lhe Soviets would probably make thenecessary to deployystem and would accompany the deploy mentropaganda blitz lo mintmlie short-term political losses The answer,probably will not be clear-cut to Soviet leaders and important factors would bias iheir decision towardploy ment* ,'

The primary (actor is the continued effectiveness of the method the USSR developed in lhco further its strategic goals- in essence, this method haswo-track approach calling for arms controloviet miliiary buildup Duringite USSR achieved limits on the number of US delivery vehicles throuch the SALT process, conslrained US defenses through lhe ABM Trealy, and gave priority tn building up Its own offensive forces. This two-trackworked well In, and tiicre are no Indications thai the USSR is becomingwith it.

A second factor is the advantage the USSR currently enjoys by virtue of the ABM defenses lo protect critical targets In the Moscow area, even though ihese defenses will remain limited under thc ARM Treaty. In contrast, the United Stales has no similar capability. Abo the Soviets apparently see the Trealy as having slowed US ABM research and development, while Ihey moved ahead with iheir own They would not lighlly forgo these advanlages and riskUS ABM development and deployment programs

third factor is the significant resourceforystem, which would have lo be

ei*hcd in llie resource-consl rainedofllocation of these "sources to ABM would probably affect some otherprograms, rather lhan simply add to the annual growth lhal has gone into defense spending.

A fourth factor is the absence of strongal the center. There itack of clear direction under the Breihnev regime Theof new power and personal relationships in the aftermath ofeparture are not circumstances conducive lo making thc lough decision toidespread AOMwithin al least the neil several years There is an alternative view lhat by the lime critical decisions would have to be made on ABMeipected beforeo thissuccession process is likely to be complete. It is unlikely, therefore, that the absence of strong leadership will bearicantlv onM programs in lhc near term*

The effectsositive ABM decision on the lelalionship with the United States and Westernsvould be counted on the negative side, but If the Soviets fell compelled toidespread ABM system, this factor wouldnot hold them back. The leadership would assume that the West would attempt to adjusthc lacl lhat the USSR was developing substantial ARM defenses, but the Soviets would stress thc defensive nature of the system and try to use Western public opinion to constrain the freedom of action of Western governrnents

n alternative view stresses that the crucial question for Soviet leaders Is whether deployment of an active AOM defense Is required to attain Soviet strategic objectives. In addressing thb question, the Soviets would consider lhe value of such deployment in the content of the totality of their strategic military posture, whichroad range of damage-limiting forces and tactics. The factors that arc lilted above would also certainly affect Soviet judgment, bui not necessarily toward the nettalive:

the Soviets have every justification for being satisfied wiih iheir two-track approach of

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factors thai may convince themiiwith regard lo ABMs hat served out meat nf Hi useful life These include the promt level of the Soviets' ABM technology, their current ICBM counterforce advantage, and lhe planned US deployment of survtvoble hard-laigel-capable strategic ballistic missiles

the ABM defense equation Is one-sided in the Soviet favor,ot clear lhal lhe Soviets believe lhat further ABM deploymenti would precipitate US offensive or defensivesubstantial enough to offset the benefits of their own ABM deployment! The SovieU would undoubtedly undertake active measures toWestern opinion and lessen such US reactions.

Thb view polnu out that consistency andulty of party control of miliiary doctrine and derived programs haveallmark of Soviet military development and deployment. Theof widespread ABM defenses, adoctrinal requirement, involves decisions over such an citended period of lime lhal it is unlikely lo be affected by leadership changes.

The Sovleti could assess the Increase in their overall strategic strength that could result fromeploymenl as adding significantly to

their Influence in Western Europe.'

Copabilitios of Soviet Systems for Ballistic Missile Defense

he Soviets' assessment of tbe capability of lhe ABM systems and components they areey factor bearing on their pralicies and programs for ballistic missile defense We do noi know how they assess these capabilities. In our own assessments, there are uncertainties and differences of view amongagencies about some of the capabilities ofSoviet ABM systems and the potential of some Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) lo perform In an ABM role. We have been unable to assess in any detail the degree of protection from ballistic misiile attack lhat lhe SovieU could achieve by deployment of the ABM systems and components they have under development

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The MoscowThe present ballistic missile defenses at Moscow consist ol four sites wiih aboveground launchen and en race ment radars, and the UrgeDot{ Mouse and Cat House-to provide taigeiii tlon and tracking data. {Seehese dc'ciisei now beingprovideimited, slngle-byer defense; that U, thev could interceptmissile reentry vehicles (RVs) only outside the atmosphere These deferises probably couldmall attack not accompanied byda such as chaff and decoys. Attempting toarger number of attacking RVs, however, would rapidly eahausl the available interceptors

New ABM Syslems

believe thai lhe upgraded defenses aland any additional ballistic missile defensesmay deploy Inillcurrently under development. Ofupgraded defenses at Moscow -willa new large filed engagement radarhave capabilities for search aod targetsiloodified version of theinterceptor deployed with the originalMoscow. The rapidly deployable system thesite for which could be deployedrather thanconsul ofengagement radars, abovegroundong-range interceptor or ainterceptor or both.

are maior uncertainties and gaps inabout/key performanceeters of theof ABM systemi Ihe Soviets arc developingAgencies differ in their analyses andJudgroenU about these key parametersa result, reach different conclusions about theof Soviet systems lo intercept US ballisticvehicles. These capabilities would vary,on variouseiample. whetheracquisition and tracking data fhatidover dala)to lhe ABM launch site from aradar providing battle management support

he characteristics of Soviet ABM components that have the greatest impact oo assessments of their effectiveness, based on evidence of test activity,the search and target discrtministion capabilities

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eoKagement radars, lhc target-handling eapabililies of all fadari. and. if Mali Vs arc deplored, lhe mancu-verabililv of Sovici interceptors. Our eilirnalei of lhc capabilities of lhe upgraded ARM defenses lhe Soviets are deploying al Moscow and rapidly dcptoyablc syslerns available to Ihe Sovicls are shown in lable I. Intelligence Communlly agencies" differingshown in the lable. about the potentialof the rapidly deployable ABM system are based primarily on ihcir assessments of the performance of its target-tracking engagementlhe Flat Twin. The table shows AIIM syslem capabilities for one-on-one intercepts of current types of US ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) RVs not accompanied by penetration aids. (One-on-one intercept capabilities do not account for lhe effects of mulllple interceptors being used against multiple RVs.)

gency estimates In the lable show lhat. wiih handover data, these ABM sysiems could intercept all currently deployed types of US ICBM and SLBM RVs not accompanied by penetration aids, wiih theaccording to one viewj^

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perating autonomously, without handover data, these systems according to one assessment would have virtually no practical capability to intercept ICBM and SLBM RVsinttle Flat Twin radar.

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"^Therefore, for autonomous intercepts, many Flat Twin engagement radars would be needed at each defense site orefended region for defense against multiple RVs arriving simultaneously from different directions and for defense againstccordingnotheringle Flat Twin radar would have the capability forseful threat sector. All-azimuth coverage is not required at all defended regionsumber of operational conditioni. Where extended-azimuth coverage Is desired, multiple radars could be assigned adjoining angular sectors. This view judges that one

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radar could handle more than lhe ICBM corridorefended region and lhal several radars could cover the entire potential stralegic ballistic missile threal region*

orains' reentry vehiclesration aids, chaff, and decoys

assessment is lhat lhe estimated limitations in lhe performance of Soviet ABM sysiems make it highly unlikely lhat current systems deployed or under would be able to discriminate iiV-j

"T" Another assessment is that available Soviet discrimination techniques^

""Imakc It possible that current Soviet ABM sysleiTtTdeployed or under development could defeat ihose penetrationn additional view notes that, while such discrimination technique? may be available, it is not clear the Soviets are using them. In any event, ihey would be useful only againsi

ll agen

cies agree that the capabilities demonstratedew large Soviet radar under development, if incorporated into operational systems, would enhanceperformance.

hc capabilities of Soviet ABM systems against evader-type maneuvering reentry vehicles!

ould depend on the specific characteristics of the reentry vehicles and accompanying penetration aids. Achievementood-cjuahty defense would require multiple interceptors for each MaRV. Ineven with handover dala. multiple Flat Twin radars would be requiredite lo be able lo defend against two or more MaRVs arriving simultaneously. Since their traieetories couldingle Flat Twin from tracking more than one of them.

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these differing estimates inlobelice tl is unlikely lhat lhc most crilicalnee parameters of Soviel AMM componems will allthe mote threatening or less threatening end ofof our present uncerlainty aboul them. Inincremenlal imprnvemenls in theSoviel AIIM components under development,as new and follow-no components, aremake Soviel ARM syslems more capable in theand beyond. Thm. lhe likely technicalof Soviet ABM systems which could beto be sufficient to inject significantany US calculations of the effects of anymissile attack.

Surfoee-lO'Atr Missile Syslems

Our assessments of lhe capabilities of Soviet surface-to-air missiles to intercept stralegic ballistic missile RVs arc summarized in tabiche only Soviet SAMs that any agency believes could potentially be used in this role are: theidely deployed SAM first Introduced in the; thehich first became operationalnd then advanced tactical SAM stilt under development.

nde do not believe thedeployedndystems are suitable for use in ballistic missile defense. The Soviets are not likely to have developed these SAM systems with an ABM mission in mind, nor have Ihey overtlythe upgrade program required to give theseignificant ABM capabilily. Wc do not believe tbat the SovieU could covertly'upgrade Iherystems to achieve more than marginal capabilities to intercept strategic ballistic missile reentry vehicles.

penetration aids. According to this view, lhcin conninetlonedicated ABMhandle some RVs. thereby releasing theABM system to defend against moreThis view abo stresses thc significantbetween thend the demonstrated ant it act leal ballistic capabilities, and believed to have thelo intercept some ICBM and SLBM RVs asof these similarities, it is possible lhat thealso has antiballistic missile design features.capabilities of there sufficient forbe usedreferential defense of smallInto

improve potential ABM capabilities could bc

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e believe that in the absence of the ABM Treaty restrictions, and with an unrestricted rnodifica-tion and testing program, the SovieU could upgrade the capabilities of these systems to Intercept certain strategic ballistic missile RVs. Such an upgrade, even If It provided much less capabilityedicated ABM system, could be an Important supplementallisticelf-defenseoint defense against ballistic missiles launched from China or Europe, or possibly against SLBM RVi

e believe then advanced tactical surface-to-air missile system, will have both antiaircraft and antithetical ballistic missile(See'The system has two interceptors, one of whichhigher acceleration, speed, and range than the other-L

n alternative analysis concludes lhat thend theayimited ABMs view, theas intendedual SyStemL

^JWilh handover data thcystem should be capable ofimited regional defense against RVs not accompanied by

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^Theystem could be ready for deployment In Ihc neat year or so with the lower performance interceptor and somewhat later using the higher performance Interceptor.

vailable evidence suggests thats intended for use by Soviet ground forces.ystem wiih antitactical ballistic missile defensecould have many of the features one would expect to see designed into an ABM system. Making a

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taMaaaa-afe

number of assumptions about design lealurescould

conclude llial Iheith the higlier accrTcra-lion Interceptor could hive the capability la inleiccplcurienl types ofRM and SLUM RVi cicrpi [Asin lable I. theouldignificant autonomouslomall area against US ICRM and SLBM RVi. There is an alternative view lhal liver* arc insufficient data lo characterize the capabilities ol Ihegainst strategic ballistic missiles as" On the basis of less generous assumptions about the system's design features, its capability-would be marginal"

Capabilities for ABM Deployments Upgroded ABM Defenses oi Moscow

he Soviets are In lhe process of upgrading and eipanding lhe ballistic missile defenses al Moscow, thus far within the limits ol the ABM Treaty (seend 4*

The upgraded defenses al Moscow include silo launchersigh-acceleration missile tointercepts within Ihe atmosphere andong range missile to conduct intercepts outside the atmosphere. As long as the ABM Treaty remains in effect the Soviets will deploy lhe maximumMoscow.

While we are not certain of all the components lhal will make up the upgiaried defenses, the twO large radars providing battle management(Dog House and Cat House) will probably remain part of the Moscow defenses.

new large phased-array radar is under con atructlon near Pushklno north of Moscow, which willcgree coverage and Is piobably Intended to conirol AUM engagements. We are unable lo judge whether the Pushklno radar will have lhe capability (or search and targetIf it does, we believe It would be more likely lo have short-range rather ihan long-range search and target acquisition capabilities. If it were lo have long-range search and target acqui-sition capabilities, Ihe Pushkino radar would

- TU heUm of Ihu etna art lhahief of Suff. InirBlrtnce. Drvarimtnl of Ihr Air Force, end the Ditetttr of Navaleportment of lhe rtaog.

14

close canting gaps in radar coverage by the Dog House and Cat House and could provide target acquisition and Hacking data for expanded ABM deployment In the western USSR. If il were to have short-range search and target acquisition capabilities, it would be able lo provide battle management support for defenses at Moscow, reducing lhe need for lhe Cat House and Dog House radars

Options for Deployments Beyond Treaty Limits

e have postulated four options for Soviet ARM deployments which represent an expansionA IIM Treaty limits of the upgraded defenses now being deployed at Moscow, with Increasing numbers uf ABM launchen for defense of areas beyondFor lhe three options lhalidespread defense, we haveapidly deptoyable system using components the Soviets are developing,of radars for target tracking and missile guidance, abovegroundong-range interceptor,ush acceleration interceptor like the US Sprint. (See figurehese components would provide theefense permitting intercepts outside and inside lhe atmosphere The deployment options we have postulated are

Optionauncher defense at Moscow.

OptionOO-launcher defense at Moscowboveground launchers in the western

USSB.

auncher defense at Moscowboveground launchen throughout lhe .

USSR.

auncher defense at Moscowboveground launchen throughout the

USSR."

" W, emphaiu* lhat our low opt lorn wen created fornxMs only, id any actual deployment lhe Oic. tanM coverage, and mil of interceptor! and motor!ing ndan mold be duTrrear

ttmwtu*eTiui.hoe faetoo caa be mitt lar we ka US aWnwr aaahnet Tie iol kawarn la

fron irp"wM 'ill fern icrrm ol riled, and are aai aaard

anon aamflied Sonet nxmiirnwnti lo oVftnd acakwUS

attack or la provide alevel el'..ol key lailru alor beyond In nv oclioni we hava animal ABMi mould ba

loaebtn* cewiiceofand noanUUlaryi

W* nanaIbe Sovlrli TW Soviet) rntfU rain apaller* lhalaaaiiaVae lhe detenae of toedlte Iron ol

lor oiaiplr.ICHM alt*

17

5

Potential Elementsapidly Dcployable ABM System

nlrrieplor

n I. ninsemr.il Rmlai Shop Glii-taiKr-Acceleration

No" <

fo* Boftlr AAcinooernent Surjport

lisons lhc factors affecting Ihc pace of Soviet oepio.mrnii aie the requirements fee radars prenrtd tng baltle rnansgrincni suptTort.eir are uncertainties and diffetr-nces of new While agencies diufire about ihe autonomous capabilities of lhe laptdly dcployable ABM system we have assumed, there Ii agreement thai ihe ABM systems associated with llie four deployment optioni would operate most effectively using handover data from large long-range search and large! acquisition radars. The Sovietsumber of liigc phascd-array radars that, to varying degrees, ciluld prnvidc ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and battle management support data These radars include the two radars atDog House ami Cat Mouse and radars on lhe periph cry of the So-irl Unionolder Hen House radars and live new radars operational Or under construction Their live new radars will have Letter capab-lii-ei

than lhe Hen House The estimated azimuthal cover age of these Large radars, as well as the Push kino la-lar. is shown in figure 6.

ll aceocies agree that the large phased ana. radari on the periphery of thc USSR have lhepotcmial lo provide target-tracking dalaidespread ABM system, but agencies disagree about theirlocation anda battle management support role Agencies differ about whether the Soviets woulda widespread ABM system that relied on'thwe radars for battle management support, or instead would require. Ig assure the systemsclwork of olher radan in thc interior of the USSR-prohibited by Ihe ABMhave not yel been observed to be under consl met ion

ne vsew holds that lhe ABM defenses lhat lhe Soviets could deploy which relied on the peripheral

radars for bailie management lupport could be quick-ly and easily overcome by Hi' Uniled Stairs because of (lie vulnerability of the ladi'l lo allack. The rehire, lhe large radars are uidlkely candidates for lhe Ley etc menls uponidespread AIIM delense would depend

Thef the peripheraliheir present limited defenses makevulnerable lo desJrucl>nii by ballisticas well as aircrafl and cruise missileslhe interim mouldbe vulnerable (nrW'ec TW neri|ilieral radars do nmeiistine raps in battle iiiaiusrment covetmaking litem vulnerable

In bltrid-side attacks bi laillialic missiles,nf lite number nl AllMi deployed in defend Ihem.

of llieir low operating Irequencies thev arr ealtemrlv susceptible lo elmrorrugiseljc(such as.blackouOnf nuclear bursts.f

""frvarhrads drtonalrd beyond the range of de lenses could renderadar useless fot r jniimtri In

order lo lie potrnliallv rffr-clive againsiUS ballisticidespread ARM deployment lafynnd the wetlrrn USSR wouldetwork of 'our nr five new radars We assume the ne- radars wouldegree coverage, and would be located In the interior where they would be less vulnerable to attack. Finally.aiaume the new radari would operateigher frequency which would make them less susceptible to nuclear weapons effects.'*

nother vie- holds lhal the large peripheral radars, including lhe oldrt. less capable Hen House radars, are suitable for providing baltle management supporiidespread ARM deployment:

the most likely scenarios, it Is unlikely that cruise missiles or altera ft would suppress these radars0 to prevent ptecitlon tracking of attacking iliategie missiles. In addition, radars

located On tlie periphery would be no more vulnerable lhan (hose jn the interior toallacks uw'ng ballistic missiles. Likelyin lhe ballistic missile defense of lhe peripheral radars in lhe courseidespread ARM deployment would improve llieirfrom blind-side attacks

radars are susceptible to electromagnetic effects of nuclear bursts, but rrnderiiiR these radars ineffective by such meant wouldignificant operational uneJertakin*

3

radars on Ihe periphery would be unaffected by nuclear bursts In thc interior. Similarly, nuclear bursts associated with defense of the peripheral radars would not blind ABM engagement radars In the Interior."

f. for whatever reasons, the Soviets decided to' deploy ABM defenses in excess of Treaty limits, we beheve the circumstances surroundingecision would call for deployments lo be in place as rapidly as possible. To this end. we believe the Soviets would make use of the large radars operational or under consirucllon, Including those on the periphery of the USSR, lor batlle management support We believe the Soviets would provide some active defenses for lhe peripheral radars and would make evolutionaryin these radars. In addition, thev would probably construct new radars In the interior to improve battle management support. The large Dog House and Cat House radars near Moscow could provide batlle management support for ABMthroughout much of the western USSR, as Inystem, in order lo be viable, would probably require additional battle managementthr Pushkino radar (providedad long-range search and target acquisitionew search radar (possibly atnd Irom lhe large peripheral radats. There is an alternative viewsvhile not precluding Soviet deployment olacquisition radars for redundancy, possibly even

Tht heldrri of i'ii etew ere the Deputy DutHOi for talent-tenor. Cenlrol Intelligence Agrncv, and ihr Otrrtlor. Bureau of Intelligence aad Reieanh. Department of Siatr.

Tlie hoUen of lha ulrir are lhe Oiredor. Defente Intelligence Agency, and tke AuUlanl Chief of Slaff for Intelligence. Devon-

Hirnl of ihr Army.

with leu sophistication ihanolds lhal al presenio basis ia evidence for such an eventuality."

Poteniial ABM Deployment Roteia assessing Soviet capabilities for ABMwe have also considered requirement* lor sup porting command, control, and communications for produclion of nuclear materials and warheads, and for manpower and Iroop train;mr We believe lhal these would not be pacing factors in the rate of deployment. Launch site construction and ABM component produclion. however, probably would be There are uncertainties and differences of view, as captained in volume IL aboul the effect of these factors on the rate al which the Soviels could deploy silo and aboveground ABM launch sites.esult of these differences, as well as differences about the requirements for battle management supportwe have postulated ihree forces with differing deployment rates for each of the deploymenl options described in paragraphn all three forces,of the expanded defenses at Moscow is paced by lhe ralr of silo constOO-launcher defense at Moscow could be completed several years sooner if aboveground launchers were used instead of silos All three force post uiat ions assume, for lhe purposes of lheigh-priority program In which the Soviets would implement lhe necessary production andinitiatives2 (or. In ihisalready have taken such initiatives) and that lhe deployments in excess of ABM Treaty limits, under this assumption, would beginThe likeli hood of such deployments is addressedhe three force populations arr

Force A.aced by the coral ruction schedule for engagement radar production, launch site deployment, and, (or widespread deployments beyond the westernetwork of Urge new radars-

Force B. which is paced by the rate ofradar production and launch site deploy-

" Ta* helatn tl liu Mew tie iktWn> Imitllif**'ano* Ikt AaHusiMtuffrawn

menl ol ikt Arm*

"Foi ounxnei ol Ihii Etttmair.have aibiimll-1

ai lhe ill'- for ImplfiBrialifliai uwirvlfpLiv-

Mti if ihelot aheadr aaaeVt aoVcUson. ihe napainod peat ABM dt^fermei* rain we hat

prainW could bei earlier.

22

rHjfiH-

inents and lor which we assume lhal thc radars operational or under construction will provide thc requisite battle management supportForce C, which is based on llie same assumptions as Force B, except lhal it is paced bv the rale of launch site construction and not by the rale of engagement radar production, ft alsoil of silo and aboveground launchers at Moscow

hese three forces for each of the rieployment options are shown In figure 7. esult of our assumptions more significance should be attached to llie pace of deployments we have postulated rather ihan to Iheir ahimate sire and composition Under the various force postons, significant Soviet ABMcould be operational by ther, as shown In tablessuming lhal the Sovieti made the decision lo initiate them thb year. However, because of differing assumptions aboutfactors, lhe dates of completion of the deployments could vary.

Indications of Postulaled ABM Deployments

Firure 7

Potential Soviet Deployment! Beyond ABM Treat* Limits'

IA

1.JO0

J.OK)"'

to IlunCirnuno.

WOin .die in USSR

14 14 II 40 tl H W

fle

ItU 14 14 II 14

iwiakast tn

IM--

MOran

JHI

t4 w ii w ti

I A

7.1

2

Dale* of Corrtplclion for Postulated Soviet ABM Deployment

it Mateo-(OptionuiKhc detente to* ley Urceti io -eiiem

USSR (Opt-xi IA) SXOOO-lauocher defenK leelanreu nauon-ide

(Option a

3.JO0-launchei defense lot ley lantrtt31

Poire A

0

C

3

Economic Focfors

heyrar procurement andn* centsauneher ABM(Opllonould amount to someercent of strategic defense expenditures and aboutercent of spending on all Soviet itialt'ttic forces., tbe estimated costsauncher defense under Trealy limits would amount loercent of strategic defense costsittleercent of tbe spending on all strategic forces, similar lo Iheof spending for ABMs in

" Tfcne lieunrrttalnlin in the coil erfimiline hi'i'in'rvi< iii.ii-Kimi

there are differing views about theImplicationsldwpread Soviet ABMon other military programs and oneconomy, we believe that, il Sovielthatrogram was necessary,consider atould not deter ihemit. ll should be noted, however, thatunder which the Sovietseployment would probably involveeffort!umber of other militatythe USSR (and the United States) Thesethe cost of the widespread ABMfurther strain an already strained

li. PROSPECTS FOR DIRECTED-ENERGf WEAPONS

Soviets' assessment of iheir prospectsoperationally practicalfor ballistic missile defense could affectabout ABM deployments in excess ofThe USSR hai been working on militaryof directed energy technology as long asextensively than ihe Uniied States. Thethe expertise, manpower, and resources Tothose directed-energy weapon and militarythat prove to be feasible.for ballistic missile defense, if they prove |oand practical, would most likely be usedwith conventional ABM systems andradars, al least Initially.

SfiCltf.1

Ol lhe types o( direcled-energv technology with potential application to ballislic missile defense,is strongest "'al lhe Soviets ate pursuing devd-opmenl ol hich-enei-jv laser ABM weapons. Welhat live Sovieisrogram lo develop laser weapons for ballislic missile defense, although iU lull scope, concepl of weapon operation, and slalus are no! clear. There are limiled indicaiions that the Soviets hove performed research lo investigate the feasibility of particle beam weapons (PBWJ.

loser Systems Ground-Based

are many unknowns concerning theand practicality of ground-based laserballistic missile defense. Wc do not know,how lhe Soviets would handle the problemcloud cover prevalent in many areas ofcontaining* facilities lhe Soviets would wantNevertheless, wc are concerned aboulof thc Soviet effort. It would beSoviet philosophy and practices to deploysystem even if its capability weresome conditions. There arc largeany estimate ofoviet laser weaponavailable. We eipect that the high-energyat the test range svill be used during thctesting lhe feasibility of ballislic missileIf feasibility is demonstrated, ourIsrototype stcound-baied Laserballistic missile defense would then have to bewould not begin testing until theperational capability (IOC) probably woulduntil after then alternativethat, if tests from this facility prove successfulballistic missile RVs. the SovieU wouldtoew prototype weapon, anda deployed ground-based laser weapon systemmissile defense could reach IOC by

Spoce-Bosed

space-based weapons for ballisticare probably feasibleechnicalsuch weapons require significant technological

" The haUtr ol ihuhe Dtticto: Defeat*

advances In largc-aperlure mirrors and in pointing and tracking accuracies Thev would also require very large space boosters having perhapsimes the capacity of those now in use. We eipect Ihe Soviets to have such boosters in the. In view of the leclmological requirements, we do not expect ihem torototype space-based laser weapon syslem until0 or an operaliOnal system until aller ihe

Particle Beam Weapons Ground-Based

particle beam weapon (PBW)related eflorts haveevel suitableexperimental research on thc feasibilityapplications. Including ground-baseddefense. We doubt that thc SovieU areof building PBWs. or that thoy are closefor the technical problems .involved.Soviet development of any prototypePBW. if feasible, would be at leasthe future.

Spoce- Based

PBWs would not bethe atmospheric propagation effecU ofPBWs and therefore appear more feasible;is one of developing an operationallyThe Sovietsesearch program.oosome of thc aspects of Space-based PBWs.would be quite different from thcPBWi; the particle energy and currentwould be much lower and the systemswould be far less stressing. Nevertheless,requlremenU forystem, suchprecise pointing and tracking,nlikely thai the SovieU could developspace-based particle beam weapon tohard targets like missile RVs before the endcentury. According to one view, systemsdisrupt the electronics of ballistic missiles,less power, could probably bedeployed in

Tht hotatfi of thu mew ate tht Dittetoe, Dtfe*atthe Aliment Chief of Stall foi tntettlgmce. Deport-

ment of lhe Army

wen? i

APABILITIES OF SOVIEI BAIUSIIC MISSILE DEFENSES

Upgraded Moscow Defenses Within Treaty Limits

51 The projected upgrade of the defensesBMTrealyprovide the Sovietsuch more reliable, two-layer capability to defend critical targets at Moscow against an attack bv some tens ol current types of US RVs and against Increasingly sophisticatedmissiles. Like the present system, the long-range, exoatmospherlc interceptors in the upgraded defenses could intercept RVs targeted against areas well beyondarge-scale attack, thenterceptors would quickly be exhausted, but they might be effective in preferentially defending selected targets in the Moscow area, such as national command and control facilities. The Soviets may close existing gaps in coverage of radars providing battlesupport of the Moscow system, either bya new radar or radars if the Pushklno radar does not have'a long-range search and targetaccording to one assessment,by relying on the Urge peripheral radars to provide battle management support."

Expandad Dofenses al Moscow

he upgrade to the defenses at Moscow is expected to provide thc Sovietsoundation for expanding their defenses.irepower level ofnterceptors (Option IX the. Soviets could make hatdened targets around Moscow, especially command bunkers, less vulnerableubstantial US force of attacking RVs The leakage likely to result from such an altack would cause severe damage to most of the aboveground. unhardened facilities and to some of the hardened target facilities as well.maller scaleefense tikeould

" We believe the .waded defema at Mam- ire Intended le protect Unset) In the Moscow atea Sonllaily. the cipanded SCO-ti tine her defense atIncluded in the four deployment option! which we potfuhredfor detente of Iticeli in lhe area of Moscowrinatmaphnic inteicepton launched fiom litei at Mover- could intricrpl OS ICBM and SLBMaiwted again*ew hundred klloraeteei dutiM. TW det'Ce of def<nle afforded larcett beyond Mmeow would, of coune. depend on Ihe number of inlcrreplori availablethe' penetration ilrii were turd by lhe atlaclina: force.

" Tie holder of Ihuhe Director. Oefenie laiellteenei Acer**

allow the Soviels to spread iheir interceptor coveragearger number of targetsarger area The effectiveness ofefense against attack by third count rirv such ai China, would be considerable

Widespread ABM Defense

f the Soviets were to deploy an ABM defense involving as manyaunchers, as in Options IA,ndssuming Ihe deployed systems were reasonably effective, the poteniial effect on Ihe US strategic missile force would beS first strike in the face ofeavy defense would bc degraded, perhapsignificantS second strike would be degraded even more, because the lower number and rate of HV arrivab in most areas would result in lower leakage rates for tbe defense

he actual effectiveness ofefense would depend, not only ran lhe performance of the deployed ABM systems, but also on the Vulnerabilities of key elements of tl* network and the potential of an attacking force to exploit them. We have not analyied these problems in detail. For example. In addition to protecting the key targets, considerable numbers of interceptor! would have to be allocated for protection of thc radars providing battle management support. Hundreds of RVs might be requiredirect attack on all these radars for the attacker to have high confidence of their destruction An attack to open selected corridors wouldsiderably fewer HVs to give Ihe attacker high confidence inthe targeted radars{_

""VGivcn the uncertainties involved, theofTr. attack withew RVs per radar wouldoviet planner's confidence In theand survivability of lhe radars. Planning and execution of an atlack to destroy or neutralize these radars would be more difficult under conditions in which the United Stales rode out an initial Soviet strike, because of lhe reduced number of surviving US weapons and lhe potentially degraded US capability looordinated attack.

e have not quantitatively assessed, and are

uncertain aboul. the potential abilityidespread

AOM system lo reduce overall damage and lo protect key military functions ll would probablv be more effective againit SLOMi than against tCUMs. if ade-quale coverage of SHIM approaches were (MOvidcd by battle management support radars USsuch as decoya, chaff, and maneuvering RVs could reduce its effectiveness.^

**jln any case, widespread Soviet deployment of anyslem. even if US evaluations indicated it could be overcome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planning and create maiorfor US planners about lheS strike. Add il tonally, according to one view, any evaluation of the effectsidespread ADM defense to reduce damage should consider lhe potential ABM capabilities of thendystems, .which could further complicate US attack planning."

the capabilities of theoted inare realitcd, its potential contribulion todefenses would be of growing concern aswidely deployed in Ihe USSR andin the.

IV. FUTURE SOVIET ABAAOEPLOYMENIS

umber of situationsTreaty revisions, abrogation, or withdrawalby the United States or the USSR whichIn Soviet deployment of ABMs beyondKmlts. At present, the SovieU apparentlyABM Treaty for both political and militaryIhey are probably concernedajorto ballislic missile defense. We doa Soviet initiative to revise, abrogate, orfrom the ABM Treaty within the neatThe SovieU do not need to revise thelimits to support whal we beheve tounently observedof the Moscow ballistic missile defensesconsiderable uncertainties about whatprevail beyond about the. There ttview that, while noting lhat the upgrade to

" The hotdtt ol ihuhe CH'tcte. Or/ewe IflrlUttore Ageiaev.

the defenses al Moscow is currently consistcnl wiih tlse limits of the ABM Treaty, holds lhal thc evidence is insufficient to judge whether or not lhe Soviets have near-term objectives to deploy beyond Ihe Trealy limit*.

3"

Revisions lo Ihe ADM Trealy

he Uniled States is considering ICBM basing options which include ABM defenses that couldrevision of the ABM Trealy Any US defense of MX which the Soviets view as viable wouldasic ree.aluat.ion of their offensive snd defensive strategies The Soviets* response would dependumber of factors, including the sire of the additional defenses contemplated by the United States. They would be I'esistantS Initiative to defend MX; should Ihe United Stales insist oo Trealythe Soviets might flatly refuse, thus forcing the United Slates to withdraw from the Trealy to defend MX. Nevertheless, should the Soviets agree toS-proposed modification, it it unclear to us what concessioni ihey would try to catractevisedtheir ABM program objectives would be lo increase deployments al Moscow, along the lines of Option I, lo defend ICBMs. or lo establish ABM deployment areas elsewhere in the Soviet Unioninimum the SovieU probably svould make othet adjustments in their strategic forces, such as Increasing their offensive system deployments and giving them better capabilities to penetrate US ABM defenses:

We have not specificallyeployment option for ICBM defense alone, but the systems thc SovieU could deploy in theould be used toegree of ICBM defense, suchefense of their heavy ICBMs

The advantage ofetter defense for Important targets in lhe Moscowfor eiaraplc. to defend againsi Chinesecould be offset by the disadvantage of allowing the United States comparable numbers of ABMs for defense of ICBMs Wc would be concerned, however, thai lhe expanded ABM production and deployments (hat such capannon would require, probably including radars al Moscow to

- The hetAet ol ihu vUo> tr ihr th'ttloi. Or/ma* IfltOltmet Age iieu.

close caps Io battle manage ment covcfigc. would put the Soviets in an improved position to eatcnd their defenses beyond Moscow

We doubt that the Soviets thcmscl.es -ould initiate revision ol the Trealy in order to deploy AtlM de-lenses as noted above.

US Witbcfcawal From lhe Treat.

1 the Uniied Slates weir to withdraw Irom the ABM Treaty, we bebeve that the Soviets would in-crease their ballistic missile deployments and Improve their capabilities toS defense. While varlous factors mighl potentially constrain Soviel ABMe believe that, under the conditions thai svould be likely to attend US withdrawal. Ihe Soviets' damage-limiting objectives would almostlead them to rapidlyidespread ABM system on the scale of Oolionor completion In the, as noted below. They might noibeginidespread deploymenl after the US withdrawal, but rather would eipand lhe Moscow defense! while assessing US Intentions and their own options

Soviet Abrogation of Ihe Treaty

GO Whale all agencies agree that lhc Soviets are not likdy to abrogate or withdraw from lhe ABM Trealy within the neit two years or so. ihere are alternative views (see paragraphsbout Ihe chances that they would do so after lhat time and about the large radars for battle management support. Theseviews are based In part on differing assessments of the potential effectiveness of the ABM defenses the Soviets could Iiave by thco- All agencies agree, however, that, if the Soviets abrogated the ABM Treaty, thev wouldidespread ABM defense In the western USSB. by Iheo, and most agencies agree the defenses would be eiiended east of lhe Urab. To esplaln their actions and minimize short-term political losses the Sovfets would claim lhat Ihe United Stales was about lo abrogate or that, because of US offensive and defensive force actions, the USSR was forced lo act

e believe that if lhe SovieU decided toorithdraw from the Treaty at any time during lhe neatears, iheir decision would be based

on the intention to initiate deploymentystem, in both the western USSB and cast ol

the Urals, on the scale ol Optionor completion In tbe:

If either ihe USSR or ihe United States abrogated the ABM Treaty, we believe the Soviets wouldidespread ABM defense using the la ice radars now operational or underfor battle management support, and wouldetwork of new large radars in the interior of the USSR, less vulnerable than those on lhe periphery Thev would move lo enhance the Moscow ABMprotecting lhe highest concentration of national command, control, and communicalions. political, military, and military industrial targets in the Sovietwould expand these defenses as quickly as possible to cover other critical targets in the western USSB. including many of their ICBMidespread western USSR deployment could be completed by lheo, if key decisions were mades postulated in lhe several options

The Soviets would abo deploy by lheBMi to protect selected important targets east of lhe Urab, with battle manatement support provided bv lhe large peripheral radars, and then by the new interior radars as they became operational Some of these radars also would be built in the western USSR Io Improve the battle management support capabilities for ABMthere. The pace of construction of the large radars would depend substantially on the degree of urgency and the availability of neces-sary components; these radars probably could be completed by the.

The Soviets probably would not have highin the capabililies of this widespread ABM defensearge-scale undegraded US missile altack On the other hand, the SovieU might believeell-coordinated Initial strike on US mihtary foices and supportingcontrol, and communications facilities would resultoorly coordinated,educed US retaliatory stiiie. The degree of protectiont achieve against this type of US atuckombination of widespread ABM

IIMf

defenses, improved air defenses, and passive defenses might weigh heavily in any Soviel as-sessmenl of lhe USSR's ability lo satisfy miliiary objectives. We cannot evaluate the extent to which this factor would influence the Soviets lo abrogate the Trealy. bul we believe it would be the key military factor Iftep were taken.

On balance, we believe thereairly low but nevertheless significant chance (abouthat the Soviets will abrogate lhe Treaty and deploy ABMs in excess of Treaty limits in. We believe the Soviets would weigh lhe military advantages ofeployment as being outweighed by the disadvantages, especially that of encrguing the United Slates and perhaps Its Alliesapid and sustained growth in overall miliiary capabilities, both, conventional and nuclear, that could lead to an erosion inf Soviet gains achieved io.

An alternative view holds that ft Is unlikely (lesspcrceiit chance) that the SovieU would uke the initiative to abrogate the ABM Treaty inoviet benefits from the Trealy. under current and protected conditions, far outweigh lhe potential gains from abrogation. Thisased on the following:

The ABM Treaty allowed the USSR toclose the gap in ABM research andand to surpass lhe United States In rapid deployment capability. Furthermore, as noted Inhe Treaty slillrag on US research and development for ABM.

The asymmetries in the value of a'single ABM deployment greatly favor- the USSR. The value of what' lies within the Moscow ABM deploymentery high, as noted ino similar concentration exists in the United States. Therefore, thc USSR's strong Incentive to protect thisnother reason why Soviet leaders are unlikely to abrogate the Treaty.

SALT limits give Soviet defense plannersabout the inventory of US RVs. Thus, when the strategic defense of the USSR Is planned, the Soviets know the size (outer limits) of attack lo expect. Thb makes it possible to estimate the requirements for various leveb and types of defense. Thus, theretrong Soviet incentive to retain both the ABM Treaty and the RV limits under SA1-T

Significant technological breakthroughs by thc Soviets lhat would drastically alter their ABM capability arc unlikely in.reakthrough In principle would not bc easy to apply in practice within the decade.

In sum, tbe Soviets have effectively combined force structure development with arms control innd II. as noted inhus the holder of this view believes there are virtually no objective reasons for the Soviets to abandon the treaties unless current conditions change substantially. Thb view emphasites, however, that, while the probability of abrogation is very low in, tbe Sovietsotivation toidespread ABM system and thereigher probability of deployment in. To complete their strategic defenses, theand expensive air defense system (and the passive defenses) must be complemented by ABMs.thdr1 ABM program would permit widespread deployment inewime duringt least Initially, the deployment could outpaceUS

nother alternative view holds that the Soviets are unlikely to abrogate the ABM Treaty during, because the conditions that led to Sovietof thethe perception of the potential for US technological and manufacturing capabilities to outstrip those of thepertain; the political cosU of abrogation, particularly jnrn Europe, wouldurther restraining factor, and. finally, the Soviets wilt not have the capability to .deploy during thb decade ABM defenses that could significantly alter the US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship.1*

nother alternative view holds that thesignificant factors should be given greater weight lo fudging Soviet motivations for deploymentidespread ABM defense

Soviet doctrinal requirements for damage-limit-ing capability have always nrovided theto deploy ABMs both at Moscow andThe Soviets' restraint in thc, as noted in paragraphas driven by thc overriding requirements to limit US ABM de-

Thr holder ef ihu etnahe AatiUnl Chief of Suff for IrtiitUgtnct. OrparrmealAr Army.

" The holder of (hiihr Olrtelor, Bureau of InlttHeenc* and Rneorch, Deportment of Stale.

1

that,es Ihe miliiary ad ABM edilitary

- This view notes for judging

. effectiveness in damage-limiting to fight and win view concludes proof defense, usingelopment. com ures and possibly in an ABM role,

ployments to enable them loounter-force capability against undefended US ICBMsv lhe Sovieti' recognition thai tlieir systems were no* then capable O* adequate defense. Since then, however, Imporlant changes in the naluie of both Soviet and US svslemi liave occurred: Soviet ADM technology hai evolvedolnl where, as noted int is judged capable of defending against many kinds of ballistic missile RVs, lhc USSH hasIRV counlerforce advantage; and the Uniled Slates Is planning lo deploy survlvable and hard-larget-capable ballislic missilei This view holdi boviets now may iudge thailies en the side o;nd that restraining the Unit lhe ARM Trealy is no longer a

critical targets In

the Soviets, in Iheir criteria uacy of performance, consider total conical of iheir overall pabiliiies as pail of iheir plan nuclear war. The holder of Ihis while noteak-widespread ARM deploy ment rsology and systems under de-with passive defense meas-gmrnied by SAMs performing Id satilfy the requirements of

Soviet military strategy for limiting damage to

would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM*systems confidence in thc survival of even in the even!ull-scale

USSR. Also. Ihe Soviets

lo enhance their high-value targets. US attack.

The Soviets have taken essentially all the steps rieccssary to prepareecision lo deploy. ABM radar and interceptor developments have proceeded to the'point where deployments of viable systems is possible, and ihey are in lhe process of improving ihetr network of long ranee acquisition radars on the periphery of thc Soviel Union. In this view lhe Soviel ABM system for widespirad deployment appears to have the general featuresood ABM system design with lhe technical potential lo engage alldeployed types ol US ballistic missile RVs. Moreover, confidence in current ABMis demonstrated by deployment nf the new

ABM system ai Moscow, f

^^wictesptead ABM defense, the Soviets appear lo have aa adequate and cipanrfing production base for such deployment. It is unlikely lhal ihey would have carried development and testinghe point they have without planning for lhe production base loeployment decision Similaritiescomponents of the rapidly deplorable system and Ihe new ABM defenses being in-palled at Moscow demonstrate that atartial production base already eiists.

Thiscertainly not precluding Soviet deployment of additional radars lor redundant battle management support, possibly even large numbers with less sophistication lhan the petiph-eralthai they would not beand al presento basis in evidence (oe them In this view, large fiaed acquisition radars, whether located in peripheral or Interior regions of lhe Soviel Union, would have the same vulnerabilities.

The Soviets may be eipected to accompany any widespread ABM deployments with an active-measures campaign lo manipulate Weslernand actions They would attempt to lessen the impact of abandoning lhe ABM Treaty by focusing attention and blame on the United Slates and by laking action to inhibit energizing the United State* and its Allies intoapid growth in militaiy eapabililies. The Soviets may therefore perceive long-term militaiy and political advantages as outweighing any short-term poliiical disadvantages connectedapid widespread ABM deployment.

On balance, lhe holder ol thb view believes that the Sovieis have prepared themselves, and may have sufficient motivation, to deploy ABMs beyond presen! Treaty limits The decision for such deployment could be made at any time. Byapid deployment in lhe thc Soviets could confront the. Uniled Stalesatterew yean with Soviet ballistic missile defenses effective enough to create serious doubts aboul thc cicdibility of the US nuclear deterrent. The holder of this view believesot possible with current intelligence data to evaluate and quantify with confidence lhe client to which various factors would influence llie Soviets to abandon or

DISSfMfNAHON NO net

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