INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER SURVEY (U)

Created: 9/1/1982

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Direclor of Central tBtelligmct

Intelligence Consumer Survey (u)

Intelligence Producer. CowcM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

IPCSl-IOOOJ

Intelligence Consumer Survey (u)

Preface

One way to measure how well wc in ihc Intelligence Community are responding io the needs of ouris io ask them. Thii report is based on the data from the most recent survey of intelligence consunv era. It is also the only such survey conductedommunity basis.enior policymakers from (he later yean of the Carter adminiflration completed the survey questionnaire. Of These respond-cnls,lso participated in personal interviews. These activities provided the dad from which were derived the findings reported here.

A continuing effort must be made to improve our understanding of consumer needs andssure thai our response to those needs is the best possible. This report provides some meaningful insights in thisBut the mere gathering of these data is not: 'i intelligence agency, manager, andmust put forth ihe effort to undcn:and the import of these findings in thef his ownto understand what the consumers need, and can and cannot use: and to plan and conduct theproduction effort to be responsive.

This information is Con^ff^i

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Intelligence Consumer Survey (u)

KeyConsumer Survey is the first Intelligence Community investigation of

how senior policymakers value and use intelligence products. The Surveyenior officials that served in Ihc Carterf whom returned ibe questionnaire and completed the essay responses. Subsequently.ere interviewed by members of the Consumer Survey Working Group.

The major findings of the Survey, based on analysis of data from the questionnaires, essays, and interviews, show:

Senior policymakers tended to know relatively little about intelligence or the intelligence process and relied on staffs or internal intelligence offices to obtain and present the products they needed.

Systems developed by intelligence managers to determine policymakers' needs did not always work well and sometimes prevented policymakers from articulating their requirements. Delivery systems sometimes created delays in providing intelligence products to policymakersimely basis.

Senior policymakers at Slate, Defense, and the NSC were regular users of intelligence and were often influenced by it: but in other agencies, intelligence products were not as well received or read.

Policymakers valued current intelligence but were often critical of analytic and estimative products or intelligence directly related to policy issues.

Policymakers were generally satisfied with the quantity of materials they received, but they complained that some products were not relevant, not timely, and therefore, not useful.

The producer-consumer relationshipirect bearing on the extent to which policymakers were satisfied with intelligence. Policy officials often preferred to deal directly with analysts or experts, but they indicated that the initiative in establishing relations was up to producers.

ConnaSffTal

The Consumer Survey Working Croup collated recommendalions from respondents and from iis own daia. To correct the problems surfaced in the Survey, ii recommends that intelligence managers:

rogram to educate policymakers about intelligence.

Develop more flexible and responsive arrangements whereby thecan task the Intelligence Community.

Clarify the role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO

Improve distribution and delivery systems.

Intelligence producers should improve the quality and utility of products by:

terms of reference for analysis in consultation with policymakers.

- Eliminating levels of review that fail to enhance the product.

Improving presentation of precis, key judgments, and summaries for the most senior officials.

Determining if self-initiated products arc meeting the needs of consumers

Because ihe producer-consumer relationship is so critical, intelligence managers should;

direct contact between analysts, supervisors, and managers with key consumers.

Finally, the Working Group recommends thai periodic Community surveys be undertaken to determine:

If the requirements for intelligence and uses of intelligence byhave changed over time.

If specific changes mace in intelligence systems have produced the desired effects.

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Intelligence Consumer Survey (u)

otid

There have been several aiiempu in ihe pastearsurvey intelligence consumers on how well they were icrved by (he Intelligence Communily or its product These atiempts. unfortunately, did not have much impact on cither Ehc intelligence producer* or their consumers Inembers of theManagement Staff (RMS) embarked on an effort io survey key policymakers dealing wiih Third World issues. They wished tc interview as rnaay outgoing members of Ihc Carter administration as possible,imned questionnaire, andil toozen intelligence uteri.

Inl was apparent that the RMS projectajor undertaking. The DirectorS and the Director of the National Foreign Allotment Center (NFACl agreed io continue the project under the aegis of the Interagency Working Croup on Intelligence Production.

The Working Group consiructed the questionnaire with the help of OMS psychologists io ensure that the responses would be valid and suitable for analysis by appropriate software and statistical procedures. The final questionnaire, which was coordinated with many intelligence managers throughout Ihc producingcontained multiple-chcicc and essayThe multiple-choice questions together with the aggregate answers are coniaincd in appendix A.

The selection criteria of the policymakers to bewere relatively simple:

Policymakers had to be deputy assistant secretaries, equivalents, or above, incumbent during ihe Carter administration.ist of participant* is contained in appendix H

They had to be national policymakers.

They had to be recipients of intelligence from more agencies lhan their own.

The Working Groupolicymakers io survey, and inegan hand-delivering the questionnaires accompaniedetter from the DCI requesting participation in the project. Byesponses had been returned.

The selection criteria for the personal interview phase of Ihe project was more complex. It entailedof the multiple*choice responses for anomalies, intelligence gaps, and extremes of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Each completed questionnaire was evaluatedomputer algorithm thai considered all this information in addition io ihe respondent's willingness toollowup interview. This resulted innterviews.

An analysis of the data obtained in this project enables us toeries of important findings. These major findings reveal some important lessons about the quality and utility of intelligence to national-level policymakers.

The Consumer

Seniorthe Deputy Assistantlevel andthe most Importantof national intelligence. This is the group on which the Consumer Surveyof finished intelligence. The Consumer Survey also confirmed

lhat senior officials in the national security decision-makingNSC Staff. State, andwere the heaviest recipients of intelligence and generally the heaviest users. Thereecond echelon of users ai Treasury. Commerce, and Energyhird level at peripheral agencies, whouch smaller slice of intelligence and where use of intelligence was more limited. At all echelons, these officials were not necessarily aware of the full range of intelligence support available to them or received by their offices since ihey often did not receive intelligence products directly Instead they obtained their intelligence from;

Their own staffs, who selected items for them or briefed the principals and often wrote reports basedompilation of intelligence and other material These siaff officers were noi normally intelligence officers.

Some kind of intelligence liaison officer or briefing icam. composed of intelligence professionals, who selected material basedontinuing dialogue about consumers' needs and concerns.

Slightly more thanerceni of Ihc respondents spent at least one-halfay reviewingalmost TO percent claimed that intelligence frequently influenced their policy decisions; and almost half believed that they could have benefited from belief intelligence in formulating policy.

What Consumers Know About Intelligence

Senior policysome who had had considerable experience in nationalack of knowledge about intelligence agencies and functions They alsoesire to know more about the system that served them Many said they would have benefitedetter introduction io intelligence when they first took offica. Significantly,ery few took the initiative to find out more about intelligence on their own.

Specifically, policymakers said that they needed to know more about:

they could Usk tbe system to respond to specifics well as general judgments or assessments on larger issues

How to obtain material lhat already ensied in the system and how to find out what was available.

How to arrangeialogue with individual analysis or experts.

Consumers who were servedepartmentalorganisation knew relatively little about other production in the Intelligence Community. Theyon the agency that served them directly to provide appropriate products from all sources. They assumed lhat this was being done and seldom took initiatives to seek additional intelligence on tbeir own.

Policymakers did not always recognize intelligence or understand how much ihey were given. Because policymakers and their staffs tried to integratewiih other information they received, the unique character of intelligence frequently became lost. Thus, policymakers often did not realize lhat intelligence material was included in the papersby their staffs and they found it difficult to identify or separate intelligence from other materials. Perhaps the most extreme case was one senior official who thought he had received no intelligence ofproblem aggravated by the extenthich his staff bad filtered the substantial amount ofactually delivered to his office.

Tasking and Dclirrry Systems

The Consumer Survey sought to determine how policymakers made their needs known to intelligence producers and if they believed they were receiving what they had requested. This usually did not involvepecific request, but ratherufficient amount of information to intelligenceso that they could make the right decisions about what to produce. There were problems in the produciion tasking mechanisms and in the delivery systems as well.

Some systems developed by intelligence managers to determine what policymakers need are not working as well as they might. Policymakers believe they have only limited ways of making their requirements known:

ercent of senior policy officials in this study relied on the National Intelligence Officer system to levy requirements and obtain intelligence

analysis of the data from DOD participants showed ihat the system that had been used by DIA to determine Defense Department readerdid not accurately reflect senior consumer needs and was not usedarge proportion of its consumers.

Policymakers were not satisfied with the enisling means of tasking intelligence collectors and producers.1

Almostercent cf senior policy officials relied on ihcir staff or intelligence liaison to task intelligence producers,ppears lhat ibis system tended to "filler" requirements aad create, in part, thebetween what senior officials needed and what intelligence analysts provided.

The desire of policy officials to have belter, more frequent and more direct access to analysts was one of the most comment and strongly expressedmade in the survey. Policymakers indicated that ihey desired the opportunity to have direct contact wiih expertdistinct fromto obtain information and to explore various facetsubject

Some policymakers reported that working through liaison groups was ihe most effective way io arrange briefings or dialogue with ihc working leveland lhus obtain ihe most relevant informanon.

Tbe combination of fillers between polKymaker and analyst, inefficiencies in established requirements mechanisms, and general ignorance about the inner workings of intelligence resultedystem that made it difficult for policymakers io ariiculate their requirements in terms meaningful to intelligenceThis sysiem also inhibited producers'tanding of what products would bc most relevant and useful.

houfk no ipeeltV quruion* were liked regarding tlx National Intelligence Toptci (MTU, Itbe ifgiiflicani thai in ihc elMji andITi we nol citedid effeciive means cf miking the Inldliiinot netdi ol pc/icymikeH knownroduced inda>

There were mechanical problems in the intelligence delivery system. Intelligence officials at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or higher rarely readproducts without an initial screeningiaff officer. Further, staffs generally sought to condense material for their often-harried bosses. This screening system was even more rcstriciive for sensitive or codeword material. Such products required handling by special couriers, reading in special facilities, or storage in specially secured areas. Thus, sensitive or codeword reports often were not read or, if read, were not used.

Other problems uncovered in this area include:

A reliance on liaison or staffs io obtain thematerial from existing slocks of intelligence products,ealization that staffs, andliaison, were often unaware of what was already available.

The lackeedback mechanism by whichcould tell intelligence producers what they thought about products. Policymakers oftenthey only had to pickelephone orote to provide such feedback, but seldom did.

Problems with distribution lists, mail points, and delivery systems within ihe consumer agencies themselves that sometimes mishandled,or misrouted intelligence.1

Policymakers used whatever systems were at hand to make their needs known and seldom tried to develop closer contact wiih intelligence producers. Where contacts had been established wiih NIOs or with producing components, these became institutionalized as the normal way of doing business. Policymakers often said thai they would havereater dialogue with the Intelligence Community, but most failed to take the initiative. They assumed thatdelivery systems had to be accepted and used. In other words, they took whatever they got.

'This informitiofli obtained from ihe consumers directly but wis uncovered by Ihc Working Croup in tricking ipeciftc compUintt Of eonwmen in 'he esuyt ind Interviews.

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a lust ion of Intelligence

Generalignificant number of senioran overwhelming majority of senior recipients in State, Defense, and at the NSCintelligence regularly and almoster-cent said that intelligence frequently influenced them in policymaking. The other side of the coin, however, is also significant. Many senior officials outside State. Defense, and the NSC Staff, while regular recipients of intelligence products, were not regular readers of intelligence. Collectively they were much lessby intelligence in policymaking than consumers in State. Defense, and the NSC.

In their narrative comments, policymakers stressed the need for timeliness and relevance in intelligence, and their responses to the questionnaire showed that products like che NID. DIS, or State Morningwere highly valued.

Since policymakers are reactive or event-oriented, tt is not surprising that national-level decisionmakerscurrent intelligence more highly than other kinds of products.

Consumers were consistently critical of predictiveintelligence in NIEs and Other publications that tended to forecastintelligence directly related to ongoing policy decisions.

There were several aspects of predictive/policythat were criticised by policymakers in the survey. Consumers said they found that such material was often produced too late to be useful, frequently did not relate to the actual policy questions under review, or often was"wateredthe point where the product was not as useful as it might have been if conflicting points of view had been stated explicitly.

Consumer perceptions of raw intelligence tended to polarize around two extremes, liking and using it frequently and disliking it and not using it at all.

Consumers received raw intelligenceery timely basis, often at the same time as intelligence

analysts. If consumers were under heavy timethe midsteepening crisis, forwere eager to obtain raw reporting and more willing to forego analysis from intelligence producers

Raw intelligence was preferred by some consumers who indicated that they were quite capable of performing their own analysis.

Many consumers who used raw intelligence noted that the volume they received was often excessive and that they had no way of separating the few useful reports from the large number they received.

E'aluetiom by Category. The Consumer Survey was designed to provide some insights about consumer views on the quantity and utility of intelligence in various categories, gcotopical as well as functional. Because the Consumer Survey did not askpecific measure of satisfaction from consumers, our conclusions about satisfaction remain somewhatAn empirical measure of -overall"however, was derived from responses to aof several survey items. This indicator of satisfaction provided an index for determining how-well consumers thought they were being served by the Intelligence Community.

Consumer views on the quantity of intelligence were the easiest to obtain, although as noted earlier senior officials often were not aware of the total amount of material received by their staffs. Some consumers indicated thai they received loo much intelligence, but the interview data revealed that this complaint related primarily to raw reports. Policymakers seemedsatisfied with the amount of current intelligence and basic data they received. Nevertheless, someercent overall said that they did not get enough material directly related to policy, andercent said specifically that they did not receive enoughor analytical material.

Senior officials whoroad range of topical and geographic interests or responsibilities believed that coverage of the Third World needed improvement. In

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those officials who had specificrelated to the Third World were more satisfied wiih the amount of in if Higencc. although theyarticular deficiency in regard to intelligence on Latin America. They blamed this shortfall on the lack of human source intelligence in the area. Analysis of the questionnaire revealed that consumers were nota sufficient amount of scientific andintelligence, largely because of distribution rather than production problems

Policymakers' comments about the quality ofwere somewhat more difficult to pin down. Consumers were satisfied with the Community'!to digest and compress large amounts cf material in current publication! and they were impressed wiih tbe large volume of carefully organized data presented in basic research work However, consumers faulted the Community for the quality of its analysis Criticism rangedack of cogent, thoughtful judgment to an inability to assess reasonable alternative outcomes of events. Beyond thii, the respondents could offer few ideas about howmprove the quality of analysis.

In the interviews, policymakerscontrastheir criticisms of publishedthey were impressed with the expertise of intelligence analysts in those situations where they wereeal with them directly Thus, briefings and oral presentations received high marks in terms of quality, andwere obviously impressed with the flexibility and depth of knowledge of Community analysts. An analysis of the data on the quality of intelligence by region yielded fewntelligence on the USSR and Europe was rated high in quality;on the Third World ranked much lower.the quality of military intelligence received high praise, while political aod economic intelligence was nol considered as high in quality.

The most important factors in regard lo the utility of product* related to relevance, timeliness, andSenior policy officials made it clear thai ihey had only limited time lo spend with intelligence, and that summaries, key judgment statements, or precis were extremely valuable. They also complained in interviews and in their narrative comments thatlhat were too long or did not relate to an issue of

current concern were not useful. Becausewereis. often caughi up totally in the issue of thetiming of intelligence support was critical. Intelligence products that arrived too early,ate, were not used.

Curreni intelligence received the highest marks in terms of utility because il was concise, timely, and relatedfront burner"olicymakers also commented favorably on event-monitoringfrom task force operations in covering fast breaking events, and alert memos that warned of imminent events with serious consequence* for the United States.

Basicdata, in-depth material, and descriptivealso considered to bc of great utility even though it was used more by the staff than by the policymaker. Many consumersthat thereeed for more factual data, particularly on the Third World. Some consumers were critical of fcographic reporting, complaining that il was not useful because it was static and not sufficiently comprehensive or insightful. Nevertheless, intelligence ratings of utility by both region and topic ranged from "fairly useful" io "very useful" with few exceptions.

In the interviews, the Working Group tried towhy policymaker* gave iheir lowest marks for utility to predictive, analytic, and policy-relatedThe major cause of dissatisfaction waiThe responsesiscrepancy between the materials the Intelligence Community though! the policymakers needed, and the information the pohcy-maken actually wanted.

Evaluation by Product. The Consumer Survey defined the intelligence product to include both writtenmaterials of various kinds and oral intelligence, normally in the form of intelligence briefings Nearly all senior policy official* who participated in the survey indicated that they usually received both oral and written intelligence and generallyix rather than reliance on only one form.

Clearly, the most widely used intelligencewere those that contained currentreat85those whothe NID said they read it regularly; those who received the State Morning Summary also were steady readers of that publication. Where consumers received both, theyreference for the State product because it was often more timely, more policy relevant, and its articles had more depth. Defense Department policymakers were slightly less avid readers of DIA's currentof those receiving the DIS read itwere much heavier users of current intelligenceAlmostat the NSC Staff who received the CIA and State current intelligence products read them regularly. Consumers outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff did not regularly receive or read current intelligence.

A second widelyoftenof publications were those published by the National IntelligenceSNIEs. IIMs. and Alert Memos. Aboutercent of the survey respondents said they received some or all of these products, andercent claimed to have read them regularly. State, Defense, and the NSC Staff were heavy readers of tbe NIC publications; others read them less than half the time.

Other periodicals received mixed reviews and were of varying utility to consumers. The CIA's IEEW was received by about two-thirds of the surveyand about half of those reported that they read it frequently; other CIA serials were read by less than half of those who received them.

Of the remainingassessments, and researchwere the most widely circulated, but readership at senior levels outside State. Defease, and the NSC Staff was limited. State Department publications were received and read with consistency in the Department and at the NSC. but DIA publications tended to be used mostly in DOD.

After discussing these patterns of use with the senior level policymaker* wc interviewed and after reviewing

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oullined hereollation of these ideas and ate designed to stimulate discussion by intelligence managers. The recommendations ate aimed at improving intelligence support to thedecisionmaking apparatus: an additionalconcerns (he utility or further surveys of this type. The bulk of these recommendations are directed toward individual intelligence managers. We recommend, moreover, the establishment of anworking group for addressing those problems that are conducive to centralized solutions.

The Consumer Survey clearly indicates that theof consumers are very satisfied witb the support provided by the Intelligence Community. Were the Community to do no more than maintain this relative level of performance, it would more than justify its budget. There are. however, areas in which itsto the decisionmaking process could bcsubstantially. To improve the Community's responsiveness would notostly undertaking, but it would require important changes in ihe way its production elements have grown accustomed to doing business.

The Survey suggests lhat the Community does best when it describes, and not nearly as well when it seeks lo analyae and predict. This in effect was the message consumers were conveying in the high marks they gave to current, crisis monitoring, basic, and military intelligence, and the relatively low tatings accorded predictive/ana lytic intelligence directly related toissues.

Historically, intelligence managers have dealt with specific problems as they arose without seekingsolutions. More comprehensive and perhaps daring approaches will be required if the Community wishes toreater role in tbe full spectrum of policy formulation.

The Working Group recommends that theCommunity,hole, take actionariety of issues to better serve the consumer by:

rogram to educate seniorand their staffs about intelligence, the intelli-

gence process, and the intelligence bureaucracy. This ought to be done as an administration takes office and then be continued as personnel in key positions change.

Learning more about who actually uses theproduct and how products are handled in policy offices, especially ouiside the NSC/Stale/ Defense cluster.

Assuring that policymakers are aware of existing Intelligence Community bibliographic systems for publications and documents and that they know how to use them to obtain material already in print or retrieve intelligencethey are needed.

Problems in tasking and delivery systems also figured significantly in the Survey. The Working Group recommends:

Developing more flexible and responsive systems for articulating consumer needs. This would include formal mechanisms (such as the NITs andJ, as well as informal arrangements for dialogue between the consumers and producers.

Determining the appropriate division of labor and responsibility between ihe NI0/DI0/NS10and the intelligence production offices. The lines of authority between these two entities arc not at all clear.

Improving communication in the tasking process. The present system has too many "filters" that often serve to change the nuance and priority of requests. Ideally, analysis and consumers ought to be able to discuss consumer requirements to ensure that the product is relevant and timely.

Reviewing and overhauling distribution systems to ensure that customers receive the appropriatethat delays in mailrooms are keptinimum, and that codeword or other sensitive material is handled as expeditiously as possible.

Working Croup recommends thai production managers also undertake effortsmprove the qaali-ty and utility of the intelligence product by:

the relevance of the analytic product by developing terms of reference tn consultation with policy consumers, and by ensuring that in-depth analysis and research actually meet the needs of policymakers.

- Taking action to ensure that products arrive on policymakers* desks when they can be used.

levels of review that fail to enhance the quality or utility of ihc intelligence product.

Policymakers' comments about the utility andof raw intelligence suggest that individualshould:

lhat policy consumersorequantity of raw reporting suited to their individual needs, ratherdump" of total incoming take.

The suggestions already made in regard todistribution systems and reviewing production requirements will also contribute to improving the quality and utility of the product. In addition,the Working Group recommends that production managers review the existing product mix to determine:

If some better method of presenting precis, key judgments, or summaries can be providedegular basis to senior officials

If production initiated by the Intelligenceis meeting the needs of policymakers.

Many of the issues uncovered in the Consumer Survey derive directly from problems in the relationship between producers and consumers. The ultimatefor this relationship rests with production managers at all levels. The Working Group believes lhat this relationship should be nurtured andThis would ensure that intelligence producers would understand more readily the needs ofand policymakers would be able to make their

needs known or provide feedback more effectively. The Working Group, therefore, recommends that

managers ensure direct contact between their analysts and key consumers.

Production supervisors and managers should be expected to establish and maintain contacts with key policy officials at appropriate levels.

establishment and maintenance of consumer relation should be an integral part of performance evaluations.

- The role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO be more precisely defined.

Our final recommendation relates to tbe desirability and utility of surveys of this kind. The Working Group recommends thai this survey be replicated within the next two years, and periodically thereafter. This would serve at least two important purposes:

It would provide intelligence producers with an empirical mechanism for gauging the effects of changes made in the intelligence products and the tasking and delivery systems.

It would enable intelligence-producing agencies to see how requirements for intelliger.ee and uses of intelligence fluctuate over time.

Detailed comments about future surveys are con-tamed in appendix C.

This information is G

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Appendix C

Recommendations for Future Surveys

first survey of this magnitude invariably brings to light suggestions for methodological or procedural changes. Predictably.have discovered that some things which were covered in this survey should have been bandied quite differently, other things which were included possibly should not have been present at all. and still other things which were excluded should certainly have been included.

We believe it advisable to replicate this surveyThis would serve at least two importantFirst, it would enable intelligence-producing agencies to sec if problems which were identified during one administration arc genctal and pervasive enough to carry over into other administrations.and just as important, it would provide the intelligence-producing agencies with an empirical mechanism to gauge tbe effects of changes made in either the content or Ihe dclivtry systems used for their products. Ideally. Ihe responsibility for carrying out this type of survey should restroup of indivtduaK who collectively.

Arc familiar with survey methodologies.

Arc in step with current data-analysts techniques.

Possess the computer power and software to handle the dau.

Have no preconceived biases concerning theoftudy,

Have authority to make methodological decisions in the interest of maximizing the objectivity of the study, and.

Are thoroughly familiar with the Intelligence Community.

The study group must work closelyanel of senior representatives from each of the intelligence-producing agencies, so that Ihc views and concerns of these agencies can be factored into the design and analysis of Ihe survey instrument itself.

The study group must agree on the exact charter, purposes, goals, and objectives of the study and also on the line authority for the study so thatquestions may be resolved without unnecessary debate. It is imperative that every member of the working group know exactly:

Who requested the survey.

Why it was requested,

What specific questions it should seek to answer.

Who has responsibility for designing il and carrying it out.

Where the final decisionmaking authority lies in the event of disagreement,

What form the final report should take,

For whom the final report will be written, and,

What other mechanisms might appropriately be employed for dissemination of the results.

The fact that these were not at all times clearly understood by every member of the working group during the current effort occasionally made it difficult to progress smoothly through the various stages of the project.

In general, the methodology we adopted for this effortood choice and seems highly appropriate for future studies. That is, an "objective" instrument of carefully selected, structured items should be used in combination with essay items and follow-upto collect the basic data for the survey.any future survey should attempt to collect data from as much of the entire population of policymakers as can be persuaded to participate in the effort. The issue of "sampling" the policymakers should,not surface at all.

Specific changes to be made in the items on the survey, or in the procedures and questions used in the interviews should come from members of the working

Co

group. Aiiennor. should bc focused oo any important conclusions lhal arc tuggrtied but cannot explicitly bc supported by responses to particular items on the survey. Several conclusions have suggeited themselves to the members of (he current working group but cannot be reported ai objective "findings" because no hard data dealing specifically with these areas was collected. The survey should be expanded to cover such topics and should be narrowed in areas that did notistinct payoff imolar as tbe goals of the survey were concerned.

Finally, the interview phase of the study, while it produced data difficult to quantify, addedto our understanding of the real issuesthe problems identified by the respondents in the questionnaire. Our recommendations woulduggestion for expanding the topical scope of these interviews as well as the actual number of interviews held. With sufficient manpower, time, and resources, il may even be feasible (and certainty desirable)nterview every willing survey participant.

Thisappendi* is CajtiWhiial

ConHjkfMal

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