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Implications of Saddam's Departure
Thisxamines the likely implicationsudden change in regime in Iraq, It posits the replacement of President Saddam Husayn by other Sunni Muslim military leaders, either with or without the Baath Party. evelopment could Be sparked by:
War weariness; facedeteriorating financial posture, steady loss of terrain and Iran's unrelenting prosecution of the war, Iraqis try to offer up Saddamcapegoat.
New battlefield reverses; Iranajor tactical success on the front.
Assassination by Shia or other dissidents; the assassins probably would lack the forces to seize power themselves.
We discount for now the possibilityopular Shia revoltlerical regime to power given the SMa's lack of cohesion, leadership and independent military force. Should the Iraqi regular armyhia regime could emerge butevelopment does not appear likely in the near term.
A new regime in Iraq would be tempted to seek an accommodation with Tehran 'to end the war. New rulers probably would try to blame Saddam for the war, might offer to give Iran territorial concessions and perhaps agree to pay token reparations. It might also seek to establish Its Islamic credentials by consulting with the Iraqi clergy (both Sunni and Shia) and offering to allow unrestricted Iranian pilgrimage access to the holy cities at Najaf and Kerbala (important Shia shrines and Khoceini's residence forears). Shia military officers might be given nominal positions in the Junta as well.
Iranian Reaction
Ayatollah Khomeini would welcome Saddam's departure as his third great victory (the Shah's removal was his first, President Carter's humiliation the second). Sflme in Tehran woulduick settlement with the new regime to allow greater devotion of resources to other issues. Others, however, would urge Khomeini to keep the pressure on Iraqhia Islamic Republic emerges in Baghdad {perhaps centered around the government-in-exile set up In Tehran In November). This faction would argue that Iraq's total defeat Is at
hand.
Khomeini would closely examine the 'Islamic' credentials of any regtiw tn Baghdad. He might be able to work with an acccwrwdating Sunni regime but probably would want it to give Shia clerics some governing role. We would be reluctant to abandon his new Shia government-in-exileespecially if 1t
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the NIO/NESA.
establishes itself on "liberated- Iraq*nd might well deirandoncessions (massive reparations, total clerical supremacy) unacceptableunnl milltay junta. Even If the Sunnl juntaower-sharing agreement with Shia clerics, Khomeini probably would see this astepping stone to total clerical rule. In sum,s unlikely Khomeini would
?ver.thfunn "accoffl-odn.'ny regime in Baghdad that Is not an .Iraqi sim islamic Republic. cdus vivendi withegiete for tactical reasons might be possible only temporarily.
If Khomeini rejects the new regime's overtures for an end to the war, he would probably order new offensives to break the last semblance of Iraqi resistance. Iraq's ability to resist the Iranians will beunction of morale than of quality and quantity of weapons. If Saddam Is rr?moved and his Tlkrltl clan of supporters purged, the cohesiveness of any subsequent regime basedunnl military could well falter, usheringeries of weak regimes and possibly opening the doorhia takeover. Moreover,lerical Shia government be set up in "liberated" territory, dissldence may grow In the Shia inhabited south and desertions Increase In the army. On the other hand, Sunnls could rally to the regime as their last hope for maintaining their supremacy.
In the long run three basic outcomes appear possible:
The post-Saddam Sunnl regime gains coheslvenesstalenate persists in the war.
The Sunnis lose all power, the military collapses,ilitant Shia Islamic Republic emerges under Iranian tutelage.
The country Is effectively partitioned as Iran makes gains into Shia areas In the south where an Islamic Republic rules and the Sunnls hold onto the central and northern areas.
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Longer Range Speculation
Should the war result inilitant Shia Iraqi Islamic Republicartitioned Iraq:
loser Sunni security bloc may emerge, particularly among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Egyptian troopsaudi Arabia wouldeal possibility.
slamic fundamentalists In the Sunni bloc may be encouraged. Their resulting boldness wouldource of instability.
yria may enjoy special status as "Intermediary- between the two blocs.
There would be contradictory Impulses affecting influence of the superpowers In the region. Unrest in the Sunni area may produce situations at least temporarily exploitable by the Soviets. The Shia fundamentalist bloc would probably be relatively staunchoth its anti-Communism and antl-Uesterlsm. The Sunni bloc would initially wish stronger Western security commitments. The relative importance of the Palestine issue would recede somewhat In the near terra.
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Original document.
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