Special Analysis
USSR: President's Legacy
President Brezhnev's death at agefterears asthe Soviet party and five as head of state hasfor Soviet policy. Re wielded less personal power
than any of his predecessors, but at least until recently, heregime's pivotal figure, the primary architect of policy,chief arbiter of differences within the Politburo. will evoke little emotional response from the largely
6 apolitical Soviet population. The leadership will move rapidlyhie immediate replacement as party leader, but hia demise will
accelerate policy debate already under way in the Kremlin. Brezhnev'schief legacy is an ambitious program of military spending that helped the USSR attain unprecedented power and influence both in absolute terms and relative to the US, but which is increasingly difficult for the economy to support.
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In the immediate aftermath of Brezhnev's death,restraints on his successor's power willnew leader's ability to deal forcefully witheconomic situation. Soviet policy acrosswill be less predictable. The resolution of leader-
ship debate over many issues, however, may await theof the power struggle, which could be prolonged.ew leader consolidates his position, prospects of significant policy changes will increase.
Economic and Social Problems
Brezhnev's death comesime when Sovietprospects are gloomier than at any time since Stalin
Since the, economicincreased, and GNP is currently growing at its low-
est rate since World War II. This slowdown has called into question Brezhnev's economic strategy.
Brezhnev sought to ensure popular quiescence byincremental improvements in material well-being, while dealing harshly with dissidents among theand with the national minorities. The slowing
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economic growth, however, by making it difficult to continue to raise living standards, has increased dissatis faction in Soviet society. This mood manifests itself in such ways as the growing consumption of alcohol and has contributedharp decline in the growth of labor productivi ty.
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the pressing need for new approaches to ameliorate economic problems, however, the veryof these issues will make it diffidult for the post-Brezhnev leadership to uniteew approach. Moreover, the lack of slack in the economy reduces the leadership's leeway in dealing with the most distressed sectors. Any significant reorientation of economic priorities wouldpainful trade-offs betweenilitary spending, and consumption.
on the Successor's Power
Brezhnev's replacement will have less powerprevious party leader to push through his ownat least initially- Brezhnev's era represented
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action. Moreover, the new party leader will not inherit even the full measure of Brezhnev's power.
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In previous successions, the Politburo did not readily submit to the successor's attempts to assume his predecessor's full authority. None of the contenders for Brezhnev's job has had the range of experience that would giveersuasive claim to succeed on the strength of credentials and political following. In thesethe new party head will almost certainly be denied the state presidency, and other actions to dilute his authority are possible.
Prospects for Policy Change
How different leaders will line up in forthcoming policy debates cannot be foreseen with any confidence, because opportunism is likely to prevail over any desire for consistency. As they maneuver for political advantage and attempt to win allies, Politburo members will not necessarily refrain from attacking policies they previously
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Brezhnev himself may not escape the fate that befell Stalin/ Khrushchev, and most other former heads of Communist regimes and may be blamed posthuiaously for the policy shortcomings of his incumbency. J
It is improbable that the post-Brezhnev regime will scale down its foreign policy ambitions significantly in the near term because of internal problems. Increased debt and long-term hard currency shortages could affect the level'of Moscow's economic commitrae'nts to clientin the Third- World and could make Moscow moreto take on major new economic burdens like those it has in Cuba or Angola.
The military will probably retain its effective veto over many aspects of- national security policy. During Brezhnev's tenure, the military's prestige and influence expanded along with the expansion of the country'srole, as was made manifest in the elevation of the Defense Minister to full membership on the Politburo In addition, the military hierarchy's weight in policy deliberations has traditionally been especially strong during succession periods.
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Brezhnev's address to the military last week suggested that economic investment priorities haveubject of recent debate. This subject was certain torimary issue at the Central Committee Plenum scheduled for next week, and itubjectew leadership cannot escape. In the short term, however, new decisions on investment levels are not going to cause significant changes in living standards or economic performance.
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Significant reforms, however, could well emerge in particular areas. Some economic reforms would bewith conservative social and political policies. In any event, although the precedent may not prevail, in previous successions the contender with the moreprogram has triumphed over the candidate advocating more "liberal" policies.
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In the past, once the successor has secured hishe has modified his programliberal" direction substantially. Thus, Khrushchev adopted much of Malenkov'sconcentrated on consumer goods, cut thebudget, andialogue with the US. Brezhnev, after establishing his authority, took over former Premier Kosygin's championship of detente with the US and his greater attention to consumer problems.
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Original document.
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