Ethnic Balance in fhe Soviet Militaryecade of Manpower Shortage
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9 .
IXmtOc ale of
IfltcWirnoc
Ethntc Balance in the Soviet Militaryecade of Manpower Shortage
Aa InKUIgencr Aikmrkoi
Thuiepaied 1
K Office of*--
Key Judgment] aia";mj
iM fSJj report
Balance lo
So.lei Militaryhreadt of Manpower Shotiagt
The Soviet militarycmociaphic dilemma in. While miliUryccuiiomed toears of abundant manpower. wieniemaller supply, they mutt alio manage an influx of ethnic groups traditionally viewed by the military aa of relatively lower "duality" than Slavic comeripii. The ethnic "problem" it not new. The shift* in ethnic composition of the draft pool beian innd will continuehe proportion of iuhi Slavic minoriiics among IB-ycor olds will rise itcadlly fromercent0 to nearlypercent
New estimaies of the aire and elhnic composition of certain noncombai uniu indicate thai they absorb most of the minorityhereby preserving Slavic dominance in the combat services. Wc define the Soviet national security or "combat" force io include those elements of ihc miltury thai perform missions of national defense similar to those of the US military. This includes all miliiary personnel eteepi those in the Construction. Railroad. Internal Sccu.ny. and Civil Defense Troops Too-thirds of the personnel in the Const ruction, RaaL-cod. and Internal Security Troops arc minority cotuenpti !r, this sease. these ihcee services act a* an ethnicurrently, this assignment posicy holds down Ihe minority snare of corner ipu in the national security forcebout onc-fiflh. compared with one-third of thet-age population The Dots-Slavic share of the officer corps Is Crea less, presently csiirtited at enlyercent
Pail of ihc explanation for Ihe ethnic paiiern cJconser.pihe lower educational and Russian-language-fluency levels oi* some minority groups. However, this nlonc cannot captain lhc persistence over time of Ihc very high proportion of minorlilei in noncombai service, since minority educational and linguistic achievement* improved substantially ina|orrobably longstanding ethnic distrust, fanned by ihe participation of some ininoriucs on ihc German side in Wotld
On balance, it is likely thai the military leadership considers non-Slavic conscripts as relatively uneducated, politically unreliable, or both Wc cannot estimale (he impau ethnic distrust has on combat capabilities, butbvious lhal current asii|nmrm practices mitigate any adverse effcci.
Ma
lhc lack.of non-Slavs in theofficer tnnVifJ rcflevu 'V- traditional minority aversion to mililary service and noi official policy. However. C7 eport that noa-SUvve offkcri sometimes eaperier.ee unofficial prciuuice.
Cnughi between the economy's need for additionalharp redaction ia (he growth of Ihe "orkinj-age population, and ihe rising share of miaoriiiesS-year-cldi. ihe Sovieu cenrct maintain ihe suius quo on aX fronts.onger any slack lo be found isetdraft deferments, sioee tie Soviets virtually eliminated deferments for higher education early? The most promising responsehe manpowerextension of Ihe curreni two-year term cf service formaintain mililary manpower at present levels, but it would no: prcvem the share of minorities In lhc national security force front risingearly JO perceni0 from ill current share oTaboutecond possible rctpomeheeduction in the noncombii force,result in an even greater proportion of minorities in the combat servicesecause Ihe national security force will hove to absorb those ininarlilci who previously would have been assigned to the noncombat mililary.
The Soviets face even more difficult problems maintaining "quality" in the officer ranks. The career militaryarge share of college-educated male SU*i. bui, as their numbers decline during, the militHry will require an even largera currentercent to nearlyerccn: of male Slavic college graduates to
maintain the prcsem size,omposition, and educational standards of the officer corps
Since (be choiceareer as an officer, unlike conscriptoluntary. Soviei onions are sharply limned. Greatest emphasis probably will be on further encouraging college-bound youth of all ethnic groups to choose the militaryareer, but this is unlikely to succeed. Despite heavy prcpagandirmg and compulsory premilitary training for high school studenu. theSoleminorities in particular do notilitary career as especially attractive In addition, (he manpower shortage may give recent high school graduates more choices among civilian jobs. Unless the officer corps can crluncc its image or offer substantially higher pay. the prospects forubslu"1larger share of highly qualified high school graduate* are dim
ran
BLANK PAGE
I en Is '
Judgmcnu
Shortages and Ihc Military
In theegicy of Diutw
Coinporitton of ihc Draft-Age Population
of AntlyiU: Ethnic Compoiilion of ComenpU
Noueombai Fcoee
National Security Force
Compoiilion: Officers
olicy of Ethnic BiMI
Option!
New Estimates of Manpower In Noncombit Un.ti
General Method for Estimating the Eltmle Compoiilion of the Servlee*
The Soviet Noiteonibai Services
USSR: Kcporicd Ethnic Compoiilion of Conicrtpti In the NoncombatSO
EMimalcd Elhnic Compoiilion of nd Projected for IWO
USSR: Draft-Age
USSR. Conscript Dtm'rd and Draft-Age
Ethnic CompoiilionYcar-Otds in Ihc Soviet Union. Slavic Vcriui Non-Slavic
Ethnic Balance la (he Saslel Mlllur* laDecade of Manpower Shortage
Our amypecial army lit th- sense ihat llchool ofchool of Indoctrination offttllnti of brotherhood, solidarity, and mutual respect on the part of all the nationalities and ethnic groups la ihe Sonet Union. Our armed forceinified amicable family...
Leonid Breihner. trti
Alihcnajh we know ihc general dimensions of Soviet .military manpower problem) with some certainty
jwe know
link about how seriously the Soviets regard the growl* share of non-Slavic minorities. A* in any multiethnic society, prejudice is common, nuking It diffleuii to determine the impact on military effective-new. Before and during Wortd Wat IL the Soviei militaryariety of discriminatoryagainst minorities, but there Is linlr diroei evidence on their post-World Warutu-thnn auiemenu such as Breihnev't above
Th* paper attempts to identify the elhnic composition of lhc national security forte ands uncapeetedlyf It ii. we would conclude that It fs likely to be pan of miliary manpower polky.inding would not prove that. military has an ethnically biased polky, since we lack the direct evidence necessaryonclusive judgment. However, it would stronglylhal there Isolicy and thai In practkc the Sovicu are seriously concrned about tbe ethnicof their forces
'Orlhw the "Sonet miionil lenimy lorn" ai tbsa cleawau
il ltfinn iirotlir io( US
military. Turn are its SoiUi Omni fVen Ah Ford. Ale
UntMuSirjuik Rocket Farm Nary. uUoul 11
anai ft iht KGB Rcaeeuaisnt*JaJ tithckjibato. laterml Security. aik Ct.il Miw Tram
Theection presents the overall picture ofmanpower supply and demand. Before (timing to (he changing ethnic composition of theerspective on ihe "legacy of distrust" outlines why, despite protestations to the contrary, ethnicIi likely toource ofconcern to the Soviet military leadership. After describing tbc shifts in the ethnic makeup of the draft-age populaiion. the paper presents citimatca of the ethnic compoiilion of con-scripts In (he national security force. (TheIs described Inhe final sectionliscuuien pesalblcSovlet optiuni for addressing the deniographk changes of
Manpower Shortages and (he-
The demographic aftermath of World War II is apparent In figure I, showing (be Irend to Soviei males reaching draft age' The small cohort* born in the war years reached agen (he early3 tha number ofoles was onlypercent of iu levelust prior lo this period Khrushchev had announced massive reductions in Ibc armed forces totaling moreillion men. Although this was also pan of Khrushchev's shift away from large conventional forces in favor of strategic forces, theanpower crisis. Toorce equal toevel would have required nearly twice theyear-olds in IMS
Foriunately for the Soviets, the shortage duringassed relatively quickly.7 ihe number of miles reaching draft age was twice3 level.
iivnWH to il.iar iiddin--So.m
main ban Ii ihet
Figure- I
USSR: Draft-ARC
i
vi.ir*>.
jnd iii thai tameew law on miliary service ra.scd conwiipiiuft raics SO pereeni by lowering Hie icim ul service from three io iwo years.*
Asnfold, ihe second demonuphic "echo" (the children born to ihe siiull wanime cohortsi -ill rcich. This thonnae -ill be much lessnumber Ol mule, niching dull aic6 will beercent of lhc posiwar peak
'll> Of
ytiic iriiii.Caulii"10
bui. unlike Ihe shortage during, there will be no nuickpO-er levels. The number of moles rcachiniill nut return to0 level Ihrough ihe yearHence, even though the impending shortage i. less severe in ihe short .erm. its long-run effects will be more serious '
hows how in the past the Soviets hive subordinated conscription to changing manpowerWithout the troop reductions of thes preceding byew years ihe dramatic decline in draft.age males. Ihe Soviets would have had lo nearly double the three-year term or service then in effect. The increased demand resulting from (he changewo-year term of service (which took effectould not have been practical without ihe rapid Increase in drift-age maki. If (he Soviets make no effort to subordinate demand io flaaains supply inCH. as is assumed in the projections presented in figure I. requirement! *i" esceed supply within the neii five years." i)
Evidcaec of an official reaction to the impending manpower shortage is already apparent Early. Moscow essentially eliminated deferments for lugher education. This will mean thsi some students who would have been deferred previously will be eonteripied before ihey completeii begin their higher education. These conscripts, who -ill be better .ducaied lhan Ihe average conscript, will Improve the quality and number of coiweriplshole only marginally. This Change will add stereeni to ihe manpower supply, since we estimate ihn. in the past, only about half o' those withducation escaped conscription.*
- AiihBiH-cciiinwlratnC IM it.mwr elinil
(tin
KS32
-crftref
1
USSR: Cortccrlpl Demand mod DraR-Aec*
.
JjJOO
tit
Don ami" before IWI and II there .flei.eniMd tw IU? *id Isur mumii inn uul mlliU'i nunpaweemUnl. AlUUVih dfDUWC Jppol' loil wj.nt- MjIii ui he tndtnlca upn la llww Kill tiniiMmetd uvea
pioloviV-
Mlnorttlf. In thec, af Dl.tnui
Since lhc diyi of Peter Ihe Great, ethnic Russians have Oominiied (heoil non-Slavic groups, brought into (he Russian empire by force, have been vie-cd as unrellabk by Slavs. The German invasion1 provided dramatic evidence of ihb when Urge number) of Ukrainians. Baits, Caucasians, and others foughi againti their homeland under German com*
mind, despite certain death If recaptured. Therece-'dhai ethnic prejudice permeated manpower practices ihiough World War II.'
Whca firsi introducedOO. consciipilon was confined to Ruiilaa aicai only, ll spread to other Slavic areas and remained focused ibere until ihe military icfanru in lhc laic Iflh century. Non-Slar* could> etnlliery uniu known as irwpi Of diflereei aationaliiKi. but these were cot cocsidcrcd part of the regular army.'
The military refornu4 disbanded iroops cf diffcrenl luiionalttirt and relied ethnic maapowerew non-Slavic group* In European RuisiJ lhat lhc Tsariii government considered loyal were subjected loconscription, although Moslem and Asian people were specifically excluded- -lhc governmentim view of training potentially rebellious people in combat skills. The new policy required lhai lhc ethnic composition of Ihe annual draft cohort and of military unlit boatperccnt Slavic. By continuing to allow selected minoritieserve in special voluntary uniu, however, the government could use the military ia maintain Internal control more easily, for ou<np4Ci (roopi could be used to quell disorder in areas where ihey had no cihnic affinities.
When Wortdegan, ibe Turin governmentimited number of voCunteer uniu amongof ihe minorities peimusly excluded froen mfli-ury service, bat itrilaeiaat lo raise such "caiioa-aJ" vnnsarge seek for fear of encouraging
in* Mi is.Kihimi Grnut tlKi. SUM CarporaiUK RIM] ^A.. iiCVri" and OMiujWah u.i'-opso'iai. IM?
* Pitwl<ifirtclf
csnnan SsvWl him lot ilSnllliUi|>
ibi ainh.ni*'
.Wi
nationalist ambilioni. Tht pleasure ofleases forced ihc sbi.iilix.criint of Hut policy, touchingloodr revolt "hen nrcvlouilj cicmr* Central Asians were conscriracd for the tint lime In
ibe cLssi of tbc Civil Wr. both Reds and Wtiitci sought to gain ibcof miaxitjci wbertveroald. Tbc IMiWvIki' ability tooa-Russianproved*ndivotalensuring Ihciesweceaa. As the BoUheriki sk*wly consolidatedthe rote of these acm-Russian foicet In ihc [nitetlene Soviei Hate became an issue. Many of the minority people pressed foe the instiiationali saltan of their own armed forcei. Rather thanencouraac itttau to cenital control of the "borderhe Soviei leadctihip reairlctid lhc aire of national until and pal them under cloic tuperniion. Nonethetcii. Ihcie eventually fell under suspicion, and8 all national uniu weiedlibandcd.
In the Octpcrate monlbi following the Getslaaaal uniu wee revived IcsuppCe-mcnitiiag Red Army cveo though scene naoon-aliiici were peemaiia batik Wartinc jcnon by loyal ficaat. btit beah real aad imagined .mln[,rcdacee! tteieAlthough the Germans never vigorously encouraged disaffected Soviets io dcicn. Iai|edid io in/'iy The number of Soviets "tio foughttheir homeland ll notknown, but li wai probably wellillion and Included Balis. Ukrainians. Dcloruiiiom. Crimean Tatars. Caucasians, Genu si Allans, and some Rusiians.recaution aiainsi unreliability, ihc Soviets formed nominally national unili largely Iioin Russians who lived in non-Russian republics
Ah hough many Slavs were alioliable. non-Slavic (roups were clearly considered lac grtaicst laisC
a clrssificd orocc issued
ca'iy in ihcormal polky lor the management of cthax groupa. This directive divide" tbc nationalities lata thieelisted bclcv in order jf bait Icwcxi bines i
t.krainians, and lielorussUnsi. 2 Armenians, katakht. Volga Talari, and possibly
Georgians ) Jews. Gcrinam. and Ccnttal Asians.
Those in (he fi'it caicfory were alaime ia ihc second category to combat support, and those in ibc last category to ihe rear echcloni This directive was icportcoly still iaIn. but in present status is eoe known "
It wns probably In icspome to this order (hit, after lhc tide of war mined la ihe USSR's fovor. ihe proportion of Slavs in infantry divisions rose (mmercent, approiimaicly Iheir share In ihe papule' lion, to II peicent' Tht disproporiionaic aiiiinincoi olan la support anils is also evident ia the ethnic coespotittea0 recipients of the Soviet Union's highest combat bonoe. "Hero of the Sovietcrceal wereespite tbc fact ihat ihey accounted for aboutercent of the draft-age imputation.*'
After Woitd Warew national unitstbc her. ihey werehai ihetroops ta (in em incsr own4heof aaiional until
There is also evidence of ethnic prejudice In poti-Wartudy of the military0 Je-ish and elhnic Genua C_ suggests thai, during. Ihtu two iroupi wereekamong constiipis Wilh tbe onset erf the manpower shortages ofomcrtption appears to have become mocc imeur-lial.o evidence of prejudice in ihe eonserip-lion of Gonians and Jews" Wc have nc dirccl infuiiiiallon on the post-War iof othei elhnic groups, hut during the laitoears we estimate thai conscription met -ne sufficiently high lhal eonicripis were almost certainly ethnically representative
i, im r. /un.milure it.i*
Sc
He
CompotKlan of the Draft-Age Population
Since conscriptshole are ethnically reprrtfjita-live (ai least im the latt IS toemographic changes ia ibe draf(*etc population takeew significance for the aaihtarv.50 the cthaic makeup of lhc drift-age population au liable, with Slava maintainingpercent there. The ill major Modem nationalities came io no more lhanerceni of the total. The high mortality rate In World Wartoei not teem to have affeeitd the ethnic tluroi In the cohorts.
hai tbcre was substantial change in these prcetontonsa By IMQ rtoa-SMvs had risen to about one-thud. aad. for the fuelRiuiiana were no longer the majority of the drafl-age population. By Ihe tad of this decade, nearlyercent ofwin be non-Slavic, lhc Slavic advantage will ilip
The cause of ihis shift is the divergent trends in Slavic and non-Slavic birth tales In, when Slavic blnn rales declined rapidly vhila non-Slavic raie" iosc. tn iheirth rales for both groups
lore stable. Non-Slavic population growthapid than Slavic growth, but this will change ethnic shares only gradually. Therefore, we rMOjcct little change In th* ehoic makeup of draft-age males0C
Results of Analysis: El ante Cwnpoiiflon of Costacripis
Although csiimaling the cthaac balance Is valuable in and ofhe realhange 1st ethnic cornposillon will impair thaf Soviet forces. Tois itiue wc wouM have to evaluate both the degree of ethnir nrciudice and Ihe demographic Irenda of ihe future
ScctTT
and Organisation el tht fWoncombai Sen/eel
When discussing Ikei'otfer defente establishment, tie distinguish between Soviet aumpoM-erational security role and men In units performing other tasks. As Indicated above, the noneombat force or ethnic "sponge" consists of Construction,and MVD Internal Security Troops, forNT exclude CfW/ Defease Troops from Ihit discussion, which are letsercent af military manpower, for purposes of conscription, the Soviets Include Ihe noneombat units In their definition of armed forces. These units are not trained, organised, or equipped for combat, but they earry out functions for which militarised units art useful. In time of war. their Jobs af maintaining roll lines, guarding rear areas, andrepalrlngbattlo-damaged facilities would be critical. Each of ihe three noneombat services Is tltscribed in more detail In appendix C.
One function if the noneombat military Isocialtit young men from diverst backgrounds to common idtah. The Soviets place great value in prolonged political Indoctrination aad military discipline, and they consider It especially Important thai ethnic minorities be given an exposure SO ihe Russian language and enltucal uandards. In ihe drive lo make as many youths as possible undergo military service, exemptions are granted verye estimate lhai. In the pan. the Sovietsnd Ii percent of cohorts. Oferceni
J Krmanent medical aefermenis. and ihreceived repeated temporary deferments for education or family hardship^ '
Inevita-
hif1.canicrtpti are uaiuiiedfee combat unlli because af menial aptitude, health probleois.records, or political unreliability. The large slse of the norxontbat services helps make military service universal by absorbing youths not desired as national security force ptrxonntl without lowering theof combat uniu
The Soviets commitercent of their militaryto the noneombat force. This share Is basedevised estimate of the site of ihese units, which Is SO ptreent hlghtr lhan previously (seclthough we are Itst certain of the site of the noneombat mllitaey tn the past.0 it was probably. The dramatic Increase was facilitated by the rapid recovery from tht manpoirtr shortage of tiltnd by the adoptionolicy Of universal conscriptionJ. The Soviets accompliskrd near universal conscription by reducing ihe three-year term of service to two years while Increasing the number af drafttes by SO perceni. eomcrlpilng nearly all Ihe available drafi-age males.
general demographic trends i. relatively easy, and, assunving lhat the ethnic makeup in the noneombat military remain* constant, we canhe overall exposition of the national security force* (sec insettcieription of the noneombatext, wc would have to determine the present level of ethnic tension in the military aod draw the iniplkn-lioni for combat effect[veneaa. Unfortunately, the extent of ethnic prejudice in the military is much more difficult to determine. It requires al least some subjective judgment by human sources: rcliublysuch data should be donearefully
(enrolled survey, which is impractical with current intelligence reporting
Rathei (linn attemptiagicture from incomplete evidence on ethnic tensions, the focus in this assessment ts on ethnic corruption because it isa simple, objective indci of Soviet attitudes andthat wo can measure despite the limitations of humun-iuurcc data (see inset in appendSi. Finding an unequal ethnic coitiposilion does not prove that
kernel
Table I
USSR; Reported Eibnlc Composition of CowerIpu In (he Nontomaat-
is an slhnic bias in Soviet manpower policies, became wc expect (hat (he limited Russian-language ability of some non-Slavs results in their being con-ccnireted in ncncomhai positions. As an indirect indicator, though, unequal ethnic composition at lean raiics (he possibility thai ethnic tension is serious
Tbe Noneombat Force
eports of noneombatere examined for information on the cibnic composition of conscripts. Although only M2 contained useful Information, reported ethnicwas remarkably similar for all Ihree noneombat servlcci- overerceni of the rcpoits mentioned disprocoftionaic numbers of non-Slavic minorities (see" In one-half of the reports, the source gave sufficient information toercentage figure for the ethnic competition of his unil. The
mode (most frequently reporied) pctccniagc of non-Slavs In the "unrepresentative" units was extremely high, overercent- Nearly all of ihe remaining reportsmajority'" oi "mostly" non-Sluvjc makeup. By taking the menn value of all lhc reported percentages ond assuming tluii the majority or mostly non-Slavic reports averagedercent non-Slavic, we estimate the proportion of non-Slavs among noneombat conscripts at aboutercent, twicen the draft-age population'
A key uncertainly is whciher the concentration of non-Slavs in these units is because of their lower educational levels or (heir ethnicity. If assignment to ihese units were based primarily on education, their composition should have become more representative time because of improving minority educational
rcrciini rcquiriminiitannic cotvetnioa in Klatiit*
wront iddrtit ildiiuui.ixyiircifnnte la cither rcaiiccAeei* tcnxiipiri ineaiiOflIntnO pioitde mutftn. Of'lirnflcvm.iflalcta
i'-iiillnml flaw oltet
" Vfucor rcrom vete treat ther
viiHn iM piacunitnornui Mmdnfi jh yuuin
*>jbe<ji JSnil cuendrrcd to Save jet tctrcrvc-eni'iln. ci'irr (OWpoHiiai i' lh( fWUun0 [vrcea* or waihjnc?ti
levels. On Ibc other hand, if oasignmcni re bated primarily on otnniciiy, one would coped their ccmpo-litron over lime to be relatively rued
Although (beoo small to etsimair
Hindi III ethnic CUUtpwoilion, by artnirariiy Cki Ji*i> it
In half we obtain two puiooVJ-M. intervals (at enough apart that improvements ineducation shouldm percentile of unlli reported ai disproportionately non-Slavic ii Identical for both periods at roughlycrcitil Thil liabilityeriod when the number ofbattalions nearly doubled suggests thai eih-nxity wg< lhc more Irnpoeiani criterion fcrenlhe ncoccmbat fence However, ihii firding ii ori) icniaiive becaiuc of the imaN aample and be-cauic recent Soviet atatiitica may overstate (haicblevement of minoritict. Noncthclen. Ihe coniiiientty lopsided ethnic makeup suggests thai more than impartial assignment critciii are involved.
Table
Ciller.ted Ethnic Composition ofnd Projected0
Total NiIleal Sicn.r NuaeaavtMl
,
i*H
*J
National Security Force
Aiiuming our mcaiurc of the ethnic composition of the noncombai military it valid, we can estimate the non-Slave compunent of ibc national lecuriiy forceiidual of lhc total number of non-Slavicla to doing, we assume that ihc at hale con position .vf the- nonccmbat mi titan is csniiar? over time ai ii-percent non-Slanc
Given the assumptions outlined above and using Ihc "icsiduar approach,0 non-SUvs wereartem of conscripts in Ihc national security force.0 (hli proporlian had doubled becausaof the rapid growth In the share of non-Slavt in (he draft-age cohort (iceven so. this was jut ilightly more lhan half ihc proportion of non-Slavt among daft-age youih at that lime. Assuming no changes0 manning levelspcrccnt non-Slavshe (Bree noncombai services,0 the proportion of nor-Slavi among national securityn scripts will rise ioercent still Considerably less lhan tbcf non-Slavi in Ihc draft-age populationajor change from the pas i
i- Hit toi.ilit nail Imrou'i ef iHiieliiio eoaiiailolMonty (uin ud ill ne-iconibai astlilary.
itomtotiiioiiii ninnedti remain
ccmlanl over time.
Of course, the Soviets could ilow the rise in the minority share of tbe national security force by increasing the share of minorities In the noncombai military For instance, if0 the Soviets increased Ihe share of minority conscripts in ihe noncombai miliary fromoercent, the minority share of national security force conscript* would decline fromoercent. This would it'llignificant rise from lis presentercent.
Finnic Compoiilion: Officers
Although the ethnic makeup ofconscripli is changing, ihe officer corpslavic preserve. On lhc basis of an analysis of both open and classified
Secret
wc estimate thaierceni of office is arc Slavic wiih aboutercent of (he total Russian. Lo-cr level) of education are Insufficient to explain the virtual absence tn"have comprised slightly overercent of collagefor manyore probable eiptanaiions lie in the traditional mlnoriiy avenlcn to military icrviceariety of both formal and informal barrier* to minority officer candidate*.
Prospective entrant* to the nationwide system of HO military college* mult pot* difficult cxama. Includingian language and literature. Minoriilea are typicallylaadvantage, cipcctilly if officially aponiored coaching sessions arc not offered locally. Further dlicouraglng minorities, who umally have elotc tic*heir nativehe location of moit military college* in the Haitian republic, tn addition. C ZJeport 'hat the etreeri of minority officer) are Often iiymied by uno'ficUl prejudice and ilow promotion
Pcrhap* most forbidding tohe fact that becoming an officer cxscntially requires culturalinority officer will have few opportuni-tie* to apeak hi* native language or associate with member* of hi* ethnic group and is unlikely to be stationed in his native republic His ability to practice non-Russian customs (particularly tbe Moslemwill be severely limited. If hoamily, it will be difficult foe htm to pass on hit cultural heritage to his children. In short, becoming an officer meanson, an unang prospect to most non-Slavic ethnic groups.
As both Ihe number of college entrants and Ihc sharr of Slavs among them declines in, it will be difficult for iho miliiary ia maintain its highstandards. Wc estimate thai0 thetookerceni of all male Slavic college graduates.0 this figure "is nearlyercent, and0 could be just under JO percent, again assuming ihn military manpower stay* at present
f Soviet college enrollment continues growing despite the declining number of coHegc-ajc men. ihii projection may be too pesiimiitic. Nevertheless, we doubt tht! military colleges will be able io be as selectiven ihe post. Military and civilianfor the highly educated It bound to intensify and may exacerbate ikill ihortagea
Iiolicy of Ethnic Biaa?
In Ihis sect ion. we discuss the significance of the ethnic composition findingi for the possibilityoviet policy of ethnic bin. Ethnic composition is only jii indirect indicatorolicy of elhnic bios, but ihc confirmed presence or absence ofolicy would have important implicationi fortealf Soviet combat effectiveness. Its presence would imply Ihai Ihe military leadership is seriously concerned about an advene impact on cambii capabilities and that the riling percentage of draft-age minorities may lower combat effectiveness in the future On the other hard, the alienee ofolicy would imply ihat the Sovieit haveuccessful break with (hend thai non-Slavic groups arc considered as reliable ai Slavs, although Russian-language ability Kill hinders Iheir military occupational assignments.
* Hie otimilccf mllttaiy re-jvlremrntiSlavic oolitic a'tOu-
atea aaauAiu iKal SO rareew at at- eCfiEcre arc careerlata frailer
than 'wiiti en lev-marirecu or all oaTkeri *re Sla>is, aad Sc-irce>io( officers litns ally. On tin Uaa-i
of Snki iiaiimeala on itx (ducali-dil baiipa-nl al efTiccn In
tin aii', tOe liKtSen elcemmliuoncd olYlcoi with hliiiaI
In untied aln* VOpcrcint inWI) vitui at ii rarccM iiitMi iKii the Sovietsachieve
ill lime cosviinlb rajtior aOMaitoa (tin the Uiludea currently has
The mraMr of male Slam eolliia iiieviici ta lha aaii |>
Uk4 or So-in it senior niiiiiio aidcMlnvaiuDie US Ctnioa lomv'sceMf raphk Aiuly-im niiiitoa StM future liurat-or of ccliaieumn ihai Ihee al colons with Blihir coleilvM wB icmain the aanc aiI WO Officer wrscwtr is bene en tifniwr BftKlin Ooi/oveilil Army and Nary.
WtBsBB
ret
^(cre
mriilloned above, we Cv noi believe lhain have anud jv! i> for illnci Although ihe cibitie raehaup of oiTtccra ia sMxhiSlavic. ii be the resuli of officer recruitment peacitcca aad minced* preference raiher thai deliberateecent article In ihe military prtfi suggests lhat attaining even the currentof eibnlc minorities in lhc officci corpi is due in pail iu jr.ipee.ritO efforli lo emu re "aoeejuau"'rcsvcMeuauoe- Since ceeucripu. oa ;kt otber MM. have ddehorcc i" ihetr esiignncni. ihei a res In the national accuriiy force and in the nuncombat military arc marc suggestive.
There It additional evidence that the military leader-ihip vicwe minority conscnpti wiih, staled thai iaI Iih An Ocfawc
m*tm ITVO] Array nsauaiaincd quotas aas lhc per-cartages ofta aubordusaic dii.Steni Tbe pol.ucal department dmiion hcadquenara
aiponiiblc for monliorini divisional cihnKiiiiiir. and notified Army headquartersow continent of conscripts contained loo many. minorities
A bod* o/ indirectikij reporiiaoce. wt know that ibe Sovieu keep dciaittd recordi on the ethnic composition of liien unns ic pan of mdineit rcpaeis. There la also evidence lhai the ii ul. unut have piefrrenee in receiving Slavic consthe emphasis on the militaryschool cf imeinaihtralism" onmaang ethnic loyalties sua |csii ihai ocncictc and fractionary aiuludca" persis: and are of realiO(iealIy. wc also know that Song Handing policies of ethnic prejudice were re.-iil'iiil by the large number! of noo-Sluvs who toot up arms against the Sovlri Union duilng World Wj; II Tims policies or some modiricailon ihcieof carried over at least until IVoO. ahenand ethnic Gerauaa begsr io be cewwnpied iaumbers In aOdilaaa. Jcwi indGeimaiuo report ihev arc frequently assigned
:. positions oi reiini.ied if ipiaitd inc posillont
Perhapa she (noai telling evidence of policies ofj.dice In ike ntilliary is isos -hai lhc Sovieu say. but what ihey do not aay. Given ihe long hiiiory of Slavic control over Ihe military, lhc elimination of ethnic prejudice wouldinkingotnpltic revcraal of Ihe systematic prejudice or Ibe pan wouldormal, deliberate, end public effort rovcMeg high-level policy decisions, cadaeas . crcplca revamping of assign-meat practices. An elaborate reporting system would be necctiery to monitor compliance If at all lucctu-ful. the Soviets would watic no lime in boasting aboul (he fact. There are nom. howevct.yticn Thiasug-gists that in reality little has been don'
Whether conscripts arc assigned according to iheir ethnic group al the present lime is uncertain, bui wc considerady eaplacsiio. alongminor.ly rducaiieoa! shortcomings,ssignment peaclices.
Soilel Optluni
The pressure cn the Sorirt conscription system is mounting, bui onecitension of the term of servicea way cart Unlikeast, ike Sc-neis -ill noi be able in absorb Ike growing numbers of rntnoriiiai by expending the noneombat mililary. Of-feci procurement In the coming decadeore difficult problem. Although there are several actions Ihe Senc.it might take. Ihe miliiafy probably will be wnabk so be as selective ai tn the cost,o aC-cepi lower quality peitcmiw! lhan at raeient
Corner lata
Strtlct Tirm Exiiaiion. We estimatela-month otension of lhc cuircnt taro-ycar teiiii of service vould maintain mililary manpower at ill present level Coucriplien ritet nojVj mi; b* high at aboulercent, but this is well within historicalia-rpcAih eaieaiion would incur eioocmre cosU byne time sta-monih delay of conscripts' entry into the laboi forec. bui ii would
non
provide (lie manpoweraintain Ilic forcei project-td through lB*0. would 'ciulioner itowih of lhc labor force daring?steaderceni crrcr ibc.illtoa lest lhan otherwise. SuKe-Jueni io Ihc chanie. tie growth rate of ia* labor force would rtlurn io iu ge.ginil course In addition,din* me iioncemhai "iponge" at In present aire, an extensioncchanitm for dealing with cihnic ihifu In lhc draft-ogconger term of service will not affect the estimated ethnic compoiilion of conteripti inecame Ihe military would nil! be com-poicd of eiicniially (he *amc population ai before. Thetcforc. barring other change* in conscriptionthere will aiiltignificant increase in the start of minority eeatcnpU In the Mt social sccsirity
force
Forxr ffraWriMi. If the term of service Is not citend-cd. onlypermanent troop reduction ofillion to (he miliiary would be sufficient tothe shortage in the.eduction would be of value to the civilinrt economy,G-percent addition to ihe capccicd net growih in the labor force during iherafi-age youth are largeunihilkd and ineiperi-eroed. aad. even alter this large mulitary fnree reduc-Loa. tbe civilian labor shortage would temain acute fu'ther, any cut* lo the ncocombai services would entail an economic loss, because the productivitymoniiruciioii urdu it higher than thai ol civilians In addition, the availability of militarlted labor for priority projects will become increasingly important as lhc labor shortage wotsens
If ihc noncombai "sponge" look, iht brunt ofthe national lecurit; forcesoonwftc would have been atsifnrd to the nceicomtial ranks, raisingpcrt-on of ethnicnoiiliei Is the national security forte accordingly The Soviet! either would have lo conscript fewer minorities orot renal security forceuch higher proportion of minor)lies
If the national security force too* Ihc brum of Iheonventional combat capabilityolitical and military viewpoint, lhcational security force reduction are sufficient io rule It oui. It wouldtamatic shift in defense philosophy and foreign policy, and it wansM diarapt costly operating and procurcmcBi protases The Sonets *uy aitempt to obtain some economies in minpo-cr but they are unlikely la offiet much of ihe shortage
Limited Dt/trmtmt.ountry already practicing universal conscription, there is link slack io be found in deferments and not nearly enough to offiei the manpower shortage We estimate ihat. prioretweennd I) percentraft cohort cacaped service altogether As noted earlier, recent change* reducing deferments fear bigber cdutaiSoa* will add at mostercent io the manpower (apply Majc gains from further limiting deferments ai* not
Larger Minority Shore In Hnnremtti Military. By raising ihe proportion0 of non-SUv-it conscript! from theevel ofercent toerceni. for caamplc. (tic proportioo cf minoritiesb* national security force waaM rite fronto II percent instead Of ioercent Although the Stands may increase Ihe minority concent ration in (He noncombai militarythey ptobabty would noi raise it by as much usercent. The apparent durability ofercent Itveleriod ol sirable de-mo-graphic ihlfu aaggcits that iieliberate choice by the Sovicu (or other rcrsooi The noncombai miliiaryseful, safe place lovs -ho are not desired tn (be rulnss-al security fore* far political, physical, oreasons. Few et ihctt would be acceptable aubatilato foe aNe-bod-td minority con-Kripts. In addition, the pretenceimbic, albeit ui. hort of Slav* tn the noncombat military make* it catler for predominately Slavic officers io maintain discipline without arousing cihnic animos-ities
m.rC -
Unlike conic dpi service, the choken officer ii voluntary. ThU aharply limits Soviet option foe maintaining the educational standard) of offiecri. The lighl labor market ofill offerider choice among civiliannd the mililary may be forced to accept officer candidate) who aic leai lalcnicd lhan prucntly
Facedhoree bciwcen lowcriag entrance re-Qui'cmtnil orecline inhc military college* probably wilt lower their HandarCk Tail mighi lake place directly. In the form of lower entrance requirements for mililary colleges, or irtdi-rcx'.iy, ia the form ofiranafariingof theof junior offlcefi to warrant officer!
Limited measure* to relieve the problem mightencouraging officers to poitponc reiiremcni. making greater uie of icured and reserve perionnel. and further encouraging military "tplril" amongchool youth. Theao effom arc unlikely to beThere are. however, ihreo lung Handing policies that might he pursued more vigorously, thoughow payoff:
Tht Sovietsup Iheir effort lo promote cthiucRussian-language inilruction In ichool and
hereby overcome Ih* traditional- The Soviet* have reported major garni ir. Ruuian-laikgaagc fluency in9 census, but there ia evidencere of Ihae gains were ciaggcrated. For eample ccnsui self-assigned raiher than objectively deter-mined, lending ia inflaic claims of flucacy. Inr.i.o doubt lhat etbrwc ekavagc* ptrroi and air baskaBy uavhanged Asucilaiion ofSlavic groups byxirtrr.cly limlicd
Prwlgt. The Sovieu could continueto improve lha public Image of militaryAs tho demand for better educated ofTiccrio have efforia to appealoreyouth- Neveriheicii. surveys of occupational prcsiige in the Soviet Union suggcat that, although officers enjoy com id (ruble prcallge genenslly, young people do notilitary career
l no* dies are likely lo be particularly* resistant io increased recruitmentven aside from Iheir iradtilonal Indifference to the Soviei infllidfr- They arc reluctant to relocate from their native republics; ihey have been leti likely to choose college ipccialilc* in technical fieldi of inicrcii io ihe military; and In many casei ihey arc all loo familial with unofficial ethnic prejudice in Ihe military fiom lhc experience of friends and rele-Irvn.
- tmcwutd I'ii mad frlrlligtt- The Soviru may consider irurcaiing offioti pay orumber of (acton weaken the impact af monetarynei. boweicr. Military pay ici'j arcinfonrution and are not widely known, and. in any caie. ihui to scarce consumer goods would probablyuch greater Incentive. Yet. Soviet officers already enjoy com miliary privileges. Since any added benefits would have lon ioiog officers, this wouldery eipca-sivc incentive- Further, such bcnefili ere available not only to officers, bul to Communis!outh wary of (ha hardship] of mililary life could obtain ihe same banafusivilian party member, ollhough ihn usually lakes some yuri of apprenticeship.
"All! IiK<Hi. irOi! CkjAf MHt-wK Urrl-eiU-i, Piiu.CiiiiIclase.i.m.
SSH. MIT Ctnler fa.
tll.
tav Ssail DavlCSiiylct cJ
CiwnacAi.avi.ii,O.
Itn, pp
(he manning of Ihc Com (rue nun, Rail* road, end Inicinal Security Troop* pose* difficult intelligence probieasi. Bc>*usc tbey would noi be tmtAfd directly la an aimed conflict. Uiehtasnall) in< iMclltgcnct Comm-nit j- kai not awed them clcatly. la addition, their noncombai mnitoni give Ihcm lowaking it difr>culi forintelligence louicca lo Identify all iheie uniu. That it. there are few distinctiveeapons, or equipment aiiociaicd with meat of these unilt. nor do there appear lo be itandatd aeti ofuacf*cn(lv. until rceantly, out tsunim -ere weak aadtome caves outdated At nan of tht* assets-nrnt. the (tan* lerki foe iheie citimaieirented and updated. The new eiiimaie2t mllhon. an upward reviihwi ol aboutercent. Although our eitlmtiea of manpower levels In the pist arc kit certain,0 we believe (hey numberede Flace ihe uncertainty of (heie estimates atperceni Tbit it yfh.tr lhanOaaraxat for our eitiroale 'j- the ni'ie-iil MCodlybulubstantialeat in our coaifidcoce compared -ilh our urc-iout cstimalce
(ii. tn the magnitude of ihetehe poaalbillty ofonscription "eeilihu" merits special attention. Of coarse,eiling tinoi fued bul can vary depending oa bow uracil) mental and phyiJeal tuodards are asspa-id. On ihc basis ofwitsMC.
^ and cm an analysis of Ihc rruhl*ry service operlcncearge sample C3 wc catimate that In the past the Soviets deferred betweenndercent of draft cohotu. Olercent received permanent medical de'er-mrnii and the rett received rrpeaied (emporary dtftinwnts far family hardahtphigher cdaeadoa. Tht taricasts so noescomtsat ma'powcri ben iciitdomputer model of (be Soviet draft pout. Th* letulis showed (hat htsiottcal conscription tale* in ihe model were within ihe higherhey
alto showed that, to maintain the noncombai milltaty at IJ million, tba Sovicu would have to modify conscrlpuoo practice*1) Lendvagtuoporl to Ibis analysis, tbe St-kis viftualy climinaied deferments for higher education early
Cooi (ruelloa Troops "
Coniiruciion Troop* consist primarily of strotoati or labor battalions. There arcew higher echelon units Tberefocc. tbe main objtttivc is to estimate rile order of battle of eorslroctvao ta Italians. Prior0 wc coiinicd battalions as they were identified by intelligence sources.such an approachhc actualof battalionsakes no adjustment foi units thai are noi picked up by our sources. To correct for ihe inherentn this approach, werobabilistic adjustment based on the number ef unit! identified morete Ifew uans arc iCeatifie; more than uiMt. (hereeod chance (hai coverage by our sources is incomplete and thai our estimateiic low.arge upward adjustment i> in orJtr. If many units tome upoverage by our sources is relatively good and our sample it likely io be mistingew onto In this case onmall adiustmtube accessor)
Combinatorial probability (henry can be used(be "maaimum likelihood value" fotbu( unknown number of conitructlongiven Ihe rite and ropeon in ourUsing this approach,ata biteas inalytcd ei(ensi>tly. In
oar sample onlyartem of ibe esaitttsutii wat reported mi thaa ctoca. so sac tstimate coenpated bymethod wai rr.cn< iban laic* the naatber of
riili amlyili .pOiiuimiu Hi iiimiii
IM
reported battalituti. The fictvl result for battalion manpower lor (lieTqIB
Finally, nn updated estimate uning tnil procedure ni prepared lhat incorporated Information received from0 topcrccni increateur data bate. Thit placed battalion manpower, nearly the tame ai before, bul narrowed the confidence interval, ercent.en were in headquarters and training uniisotal
Railroad Troop*
The organitaiion of the Railroad Troops it only somewhat more hierarchical than that of the Con-aiructionhe basic field unit, the brigade, it made up of labor and support battalions, but the number and types of battalions can vary widely. Our previous estimateypothetical table Of organization, bul thit dated4 undbased on seamy evidence.
Ihe remed csiimale is basedmodel" brigade constructed from information provided by aThe manning levelt for its compo ncni -and headquarters arc based
Jreporif Manpower in ihe model brigade is
he average reported manninguu compares favorably withC0 in the model brigade. Oecauie newly inducted conscripts aic fiitt tent io training regimeni* before being assigned to brigades, there is relatively complete information onraining regiments, estimatedotal0 men. When higher headquarter; and schools are added in. the overall total comes
Iitr'iul Security Trees*
The ciilmcied number of men in the Internal Security Iroops it lie least certain of the three cf-ntorribat services.lely silohere arend moilose tested I* tne prison gaaiu cornpoaeni rather ihaa in the Regular Troopt of theRVM) This ia probably bt-cawte coASCtipti telecied for the Internal Troup* mull be politicallyJ
J3
Thereotal ofnown Ministry of Internal Affair* (MVD)eported divisional strength0 menotalOQ in divisions. The citimatcd tola! for the Internal Troopt ofs (he sum ofn divisions plus separate esiinuies for national command and support, achoali. and uiiiu located Inropc The subjective unetri. of Ihit totalercent, icflecting ih* poasibiliiy (bat ihe re may be some units as yet leniificd
Several different approaches were used tothii eiiiri'iibiMI ilk method described above was appliedciiimaia the number of men in MVD regiments and resulted in an average forHowever, becaiist neaHy all of the reported icgimcnit wart in the prison guardihi* figure must be assumed loric'ueV the RVM. Thu may teem large for pruon security alone, but (hi* can be corroborated independently Ratiostoncr* to guatdt were calculaicd from J) rcporn specifying both (he actual number of troopt ard the number oftoners being guarded
Guild Unn
ule
ii I
ml
The smeller raiios lot (he dryer unilt sre continentrcporilm on Ihe laricr support "slice" of hiajlicr echelon uniu Fifteen percent >ii aufatmctcd from Itic regimental ratio It account for training and divisional suppoil above the rrgimeniol level, giving anltoince the MVDg.trdtillionhit ratio impllctuard personnel, roughly the same asusing the probabilistic method. '
Unlike Ihe pritoa guard .omporent. there fa iunafft-cicnt information let an Independent tMimaie of (he other cetmpcewtM of Internal Troops the RVM. Con-seojuenily.estimate itesidual based oa the total number af men in MVD divtiloni. Subtracting the prison guard componentOD men for the RVM This is res-enable coniid-erlog thai the MVD Is responsible for mainiaming public oidei tn oil urban areas of ihe Soviei Union. Thit figurelto reasonable -hen comparedthe per capita number of internal security troops in other Wsriav- Pact and NATO eaiiont
Appendix B
Cenrrai Method (or Estimating the Ethnic Composition of the Senlcei
Ideally. %ve would like lo tiscss ihe level of ethnic lension or lhc status of ethnic relation* In the Soviet military and evaluate the Impact on combat effective-nets. However, (his require* at least some subjective judgment by humannd reliably collectingdataarefully controlled survey, which li impractical with current reporting
Documentary evidence on the current status of ethnic relations In Soviet society it sparse, and It Is isonexiit. ent for the military. Rnthcr lhan attempting toicture from incomplete evidence an ethnic relations, the focus here is on ethnic composition because Itimple, objective indei of Soviei altitudes and practices that we can measure despite the limitations of human source dat* (seen addition, our findings can be readily compared wiih the known cihnic makeup of the draft-age population to determine whcihet ethnic composition li demo-graphically representative
'Soviet^
The fact thai certain unit! arcydoes not. of course, prove (he existence of ethnic prejudice net docs it prove the existenceolicy lo that effect. However,inding dearly indicates the possibility ofolicy, sincetissignincnis arc determined by the Ministry of Defense
Our princ'-ial source Is the lar" "umber of ?
c
esult, we have
uui loiormaiion in eases where ethnic assign-mem prejudice is mostccond problem is whether lhc reported ethnic coenposltion of amiliiary unit arises because of ethnicity per sc or because of cihnic differences in education and Kuj-sian-languagc fluency. Because skill-basedpractices would lead to system*lie variations in ethnic compoiilion nerosi units and even across ihe
nuhtaiy services, il Is cruciil lhal wc take ii into account. Otherwise, we would be unabtv to determineemogra phi tally unrepresentative unit -ere Ihe result of il) high ikill tcquiicmcnts or (be resultolicy aimed al elhnic groups
The limitations of human source data and tbc impact of skill-based assignment practices are two(bat wc arc unlikely to resolve regardless of the numberTWc conclude lhalviaence ss an ubasis for directlyihc ethnic makeup of the rational security later
(he other hand. we believeJ'Mence (or Ihe noncornbal ml-tary ll relatively ITce o* lhc problem' mentioned above. The funelioni o( Ihe nekvome-ar mtUlatyt-rimari'y unskilled and non-Bern ii.t ewstiuctioe, labor and guard dutyfree lutet. "Role and OeaaaUaiMa of iheUtake aa Imnoruni iiunpiion: (here arc levind eisigameat cri icria within ihe noocoaabal mll.iar,iee substantially rcpristntaitic of ooncombat. peritonei. This gives trs math higher confidence Inaaeitiraateof ellmic
Iaimp!ed approachit iSlavic and non-Slavicon lhc two group* (ore moit obvious. This Ud.miction made meal frequentlyuch more reliable iciulu can be obtained by aggrc-sating data Inio their iwo group* than if we convid-ered each of (be many ethnk gioupt aaparaicly
With thcie aiiumpilont. we canffcei centralkey unceneinttea andigherof the ethnic makeup of thethan we could for lhc national securitythis analyilt eitlmaiei firit. direcllyIhe cihnlc makeup of .he noneom-
bat military tat Conon. Railroad, andSecurity Troopt. Combiningiih newl) re-vited eitimaiei of manpower in (heie unitt fire appcndii Al. wc can derive the number of ean-SIavK cctienpti In (he noneorilat military. Smec lie Seviet Union practicet umversal coottript ion. loatcriptihale appear to be dr magtape, we Byltner. wc can uiimMe Ikeumber of bob Slavicnd tubueci (lean It lhc number ia the Boncombat mililary. kaviae ttv cwc-iber amincd to lhc national leeuiiiy force To ihuiitalc the impact Of faslarrc Ckrnc*grar>aacrojection0 it made thai asienica overall military manpower level) will remain constant and lhai (he ethnic makeup of 'he noneombat mililary rcmaini at in liliioiical level.
"Jliut relatively (ewpp-ac to mio this category. However, former Interntl Sc-rlty Troopi coiucflpti may netandom tampte became there Is much lighter security (ur boifi coittcription andg"** orainVaiion. Most notably, ihere are very few former fail tr no! tecurlty conscripts who served In urban areas. There It also some evidence (hat former Railroad Trcopt conscripts may notandom sample. Of those Railroad Troops ecotedpu who reposed being scnl to training regiments, mm; were teat to five out ol theuch regiments. However, there Is no Indketiun that Ihe location or function of these five regimentss (here any evidence off former Railroad TroopsOvcrau, -rtelieve thai our sample ii cloic enough lo being randomly drawn to warrant lhc assumption
The ctlimolc0 Illustrates the generalptoach. Thii involves csllmailng the number e' non* Sla>ic conscripts in lhc mililaryhole end sublraCiing from it (he number oflaviccripts in Ihe noneombat services.
"" ' which showsi in mu'jn..naui up mi percent ofillion noneombat personnel andercent or the'.l'on national security force personnelotalillion conteriptt. Since there is no evidence cf ethnic prejudice in conscriptionassume ehei (he ethnic composition of all conscripts is (he same ds (hat of (hehis was li percent non-Slavic. This equatesillion5 million non-Slavic conscripts in the miliitrrholc.'
Sthe nor.combal mililary, we estimate thaiercentrc non-Slavs. The dS-pcrccnt figureoied on ihe analysis ources dnenbed in
making ihit estimate, we assume thatandom sample of former iwrnmnbat personnel There Is evidence ttiitC
L
Nail ihit. it ibe cinair cwivmniwi or ecruciirmi ihi-.ef ihe duli-ate pn-.lal*tn. Ur* thisi Ihi aiiiln-.il Ktuiilibe in inn
-Se-
ine iccoan. "Retulii ofn page J. The estimated number of non-Sleat in (tic nations!orce ii limply) million total Ins8 million In ihe noneombat military7 million. Thit iterceni of all national security force conscripts, although non-Stan made up one-lhird of0 draft-aic populeuon
Tbe esu ma let0 repeal tbcteanpower levels for the mil-lary endethnic composition of thi drafi-atcethalc mateup ia ihe noneombat militarylo be constant over umc This Islimited informal ion fromThe
estimates0 use the proimcd cihnlcof the draft-age population and aatumc lhatercent of conscripts in tha noneombat services will be non-Slavic and that mililary manpower will tcmoin0 levels
Appendix C
Tba Soviet Noncombai Service!
Troop*
The Soaici Comimclion Troops build and maintain miliiary facilities and provide labor for numeroui civilian constructionn wartime, they would build fortification! and repair baitie damage behind the frontlthoughbefore World Wor II their ilzc. ihey reached iheir present slit ornly ia Ihe. Conlributinihis dramatic growih wai the recovery from Ihe severe monpower shcciagc* orthc. Inurge in military construe-lion in iheequired an espanded supply of corstruetioji laborers
The use of urotban (labor battalions) reflects not only the high priority Ihe Soviet! place on defense projects,ational response to the chronically backlogged conslruction KGlor. Compared with civilians, srrcv-bett win high) praiio for coil efficiency. They can be assigned lo remote areas al will, requiring no cosily financial incentives or amcQilies. Turnovet,and alcohol abuser.ajot cause of low pioduc-livltyican be str-eily coniroiled, ant! cooieripis fre-eiuenil, worxence, ccn though lhc ilraibaii contain ihe leas; educated and leastttalronalitics. then jtroductivily is much higher than civilians.
Rather than reduce ihe Construction Troops after the surge In miliiary construction wo* completed, the Sovieti have increasingly used them on civilianwhich now employ at lean half of their numbers.
extendilomctcei. In wartime ihey would build, restore, and operate rail lines as needed for the movement of combst troop* and supplies. The basic field unit ii the brigade, which hai several sirotbais as well as equipmeni maintenance and luppon
The Railroad Troops were probably noi substantial ir. Site until the, after ilie post-Sialinrcleaied the convict labor pesviouily responsible for much of Soviei rail constructThe addition4ourth corps dedicated io BAM construction brought them lo the preient level
MVD Iniernal Security Troopi The Internal Security Troops consisiam componenli: ihe Regulsr Troops of (he Militis (RVMJ and the priion guard component. Thehe teeth of Ihe authorities in suppressing public disorder: il assists in law enforcemenl and provides securityong list of sensitise industrial and governmentn IU lions. The prison guard component provides security in the Gulsg. tic networkrison* and prison camps, end foe prisoners in transit. In lime of war. the Internal Troop* would maintain order in ihe Scmei reer and guard POWt
The variety of duties callery large force, estimated aihe prison guard component accounts for tbe mojoriiytruarding2 million convkii
Railroad Troops
Like Ihehe Railroad Troops are ihe Soviei response to chtonle inefficiencyigh-priority sector. The Railroad Troopi build and repair rail lines, particularly Ihose import ant for military transport at ion. and Iheyrge war reserve of heavy construction equipment. They arc also responsible for the completion of lite Baikal-Amur Mainlinefiich.complete, wil".
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