The Soviet Approach to Arms Control: Implications for START and INF
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED
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THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL: IMPLICATIONS FOR START AND INF
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WARNING: The material in ihii oV^htT UMiuilivc.lirir)>ould be iwicllv limijeeLja-TH6ie officials who require lujaw itTiITi subject mailer for the utaieTTfTTnce of iheir duties.
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate;
Tho Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense inlelligeoce Agency, ihe National Security Agency, ond Ihe intelligence orgoniiotiont ol the Deportment al Slate.
Also Participating;
The AtfitoAt Chief of Stall for Intefcgence, Deportment ol the Army The Director of Naval intelligence, Deporlmeol of the Navy The AhoIooI Chief ol Stall, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Forte The Director of Intelligence. Headetoo'lerc. Marine Cotpi
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Fifteen years ago. when the Intelligence Community addressed the Soviel approach lo arms control int was estimated the Soviels would seriously enter into amis control negotiations because Moscow might:
lowdown in lhe strategic competition as the best means of preserving the improved relative position of the USSR.
See strategic arms controlay of relieving the strain in their economy.
Approach arms control from lhe perspective of having iheir
right lo equality recognized and be willing to work at the problem of equivalence by considering Irade-offs between different weapon systems of the two sides.
Since ihcn, intelligence assessments of Soviel practices and military programs show that the Soviel approach has differed from what it was judged lo beS. These differences have been noted over the years in support of the ongoing arms control negotiating process. This Estimate is the first national estimate of lhe overall Soviet approach to arms controlt should be read in conjunction with the recently published. Soviet Capabilities /or Strategic Nuclear. which documents and assesses lhe vigorous Soviet strategic arms buildup, and. tVS Capabilities To Monitor Soviet Strategic Offensive Force Limitations, which describes our ability to moniior Soviet strategic offensive force limitations.
In this Estimate we have distilled what wc consider to be the main elements of the Soviet approach- drawn largely from our experience In slralegic arms negotiations, from our assessment of Soviel weapon developments, and from Soviet strategic perceptions and objectives--and have attempted to think through how the Soviets are likely to approach llie INF and START negotiations.
Wc have nolet assessment of the arms control process or its agreements. The United States has had ils own purposes in
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lie arms control process, but it is not our role in this Estimate to proiKiuncc on that perspective and dimension.
The gains the Soviets have made in their stralegic nuclear postureis the United Slates have resulted primarily from their own military efforts and lite fact thai the Uniled Slates did notommitment to strategic force improvements comparable to that demonstrated by Use magnitude and vigor of Soviet programs. The arms -control processontributing factor, and the provisions of the aims control agreements were of lesser importance. The Soviets havetheir steady military buildup during the past decade within the agreed terms ofnd SALT II There have been instances ofSoviet behavior under these provisions, but these instances have not contributed in any significant degree to what lhe Soviets have been able to accomplish in their military buildup of the past decade.
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY
DISCUSSION
I Main Feature* oi the Soviel Approach.
oviet Strategy and Tactic*
A Protectine Mihiarv
8 Aiymnvelry oloncealment and Deception and theTreaty Language
C. Considerations Bearing on Soviet Compliance
Ill Implications lor START and INF
Al the New Leadershipourse?.
B Looc-Term Soviet Military Objectives
C Under mini tnj L'S Modetraiiarion Program*
Weight
ICBM Vulnerability
C. Monitoring and Verification Implications
H. The Soviet Approach to Third-Country Systems
he STARTINF Conoectioo The Soviet Came Plan
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KEY JUDGMENTS
On the basis of the Soviet approach to arms control negotiations during the pastears, our analysis of current Soviet military programs, and our understanding of Soviet strategic and political objectives, we expect the USSR to continue to seek strategic advantages through the arms control process and to weigh this more heavily than any concerns about the arms race, its cost, or its contribution to instability.
As in past strategic arms control negotiations, the Soviets' strategy In START is designed to protect military capabilities and programs under development that are required by their doctrine and strategy. Currently under development are new and modified ICBMs, including mobile systems, improved bombers, improved sea-based ballistic missile forces, and cruise missiles of various types. However, the Soviets will also be motivated in STARTtrong desire to curtail US programs because of their concern that prospective US weaponthe combination of, Pershing IInd cruiseundercut theii strategy and shift the nuclear balance, or the perception of the balance, toward the United States. The Soviets recognize that these systems will give the Unitedignificantly strengthened and more survivable hard-target capability and improved operational flexibility- Thev arc also concerned that US improvements in bombers and cruise missiles could outpaceto their strategic defenses.
As0 with antiballistic missile (ACM) defenses, lhe Soviets againituation that their approach to arms control was designed lo prevent: the marrying of American technology with the increased determination lo use it to advantage in lhe strategic competition. The Soviets musl be concerned that if lhe planned US strategic programs go forward there will be an erosion of the gains they have made during the pastears, even if they deploy new systems of their own Thus, inthe trade-offs in negotiations between protecting their own stralegic weapons and curtailing those of lhe United Slates, the Soviets may shift gears lo put more emphasis in INF and START lhan they did in SALT on slopping US progiams. The key lo Soviel tactics on this will be the degree lo which ihcv believe the United Slates will proceed with its programs.
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The Soviets obviously hope lhat one oi inoie of these US piottrams will be derailed witliout Moscow liaving to give up anything in return. Indeed, they haveroad program of overt and covert activities, for example, in INF. to ensure such an outcome. If this does not work, the Soviets' START pioposals suggest that they believe they may be able to trade bans or limits on some future systems, while retaining their lead in ICBM warheads and throw weight, as wellonsiderable freedom for force improvement to enhance their offensive force effectiveness and to mitigate the vulnerability of their ICBMs.
Although large missile throw weigh! gives the Soviets options to increase thef warheads in their missile force, we believe that theii desire foi flexibility in missile payloads is an important reason for Soviet interest in retaining their throw-weight advantage and in making throw-weight improvements. Large throw weight enables the Soviets to deploy different numbers and sizes of warheads on the same type of missile and gives lhe in room for "extras" like penetration aids. The latter would become important lo lhe Soviets if they were confrontedS ABM system in the future. The Soviets show every indication of planning toorce structure that includes substantial numbers of large missiles, such as thendhich in fact have high throw weight, while adding new missiles to the force to replace older, smaller missiles such as thendhey also believe that large missileserception of Soviet superiority.
For these reasons lhe Soviets undoubtedly want to retain their substantial advantage in missile throw weight. However, to limit US proclaim threatening their strategic gains, the Soviets might accede to modest reductions in their numbeis of medium and heavy ICBMs (preferably older,, and) in an agreement that imposed bans or tight restrictions on MX,. and cruise missiles.
The Soviets are not likely to deal with ICBM vulnerability byignificantly greater proportion of their force structure to sea, where they consider themselves lo beisadvantage. The Soviet sea-based force will continue to operate largely as the principal part of the USSR's total leserve force. The Soviets do not see itrincipal element in counteiforce strikes: that role will remain with the ICBM force, well into- They are developing land-mobile systems and will want to preserve the right to deploy them in order to maintainof their ICBM force.
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The Soviels arc very concerned aboul llie capabilities of US cruise missiles, including the prospeelew generation employing Stealth technology. One of their principal goals in both START and INF is to ban, or at least constrain, long-range cruise missiles. They hope to constrain the numbers of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and types of platform, as they did in the SALT II Treaty, and thereby make their strategic air defense problem more manageable. They would prefer to ban CLCMs (ground-launched) or SLCMshey might, however, consider trading cruise missilesype-for-type basis; for example, CLCMs for CLCMsertain range,
Wc doubt the Soviets feel themselves under lime pressure in START; they probably believe an agreement is unlikely before the next US Presidential election.
XO. In INF, Moscow hopes to achieve ils lop foreign policy objectivetopping US deployment of l'-II missiles and CLCMs in Europe. At the same time, the Soviets seek to protect their own existing force of. The Soviets are deeply concerned about the military potential of the I' lis and CLCMs and the coupling of US strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe. Their interest in slopping US deployment is also motivated by the recognition lhat theyistoric opportunity to weaken the political cohesion of the Atlantic alliance through the INF issue. The Soviets are intent on making the most of it.
II We are uncertain-whether the Soviets will accept an INF agreement lhat sanctions some NATO deployments if it becomes clear lolate insuch deployments will go forward. Moscow may see its objective of undermining Western cohesion as paramount and will thus be unwilling to reach an agreement thai sanctions any US INF deployment. However, it may also be thai Moscow's concern aboul the military ihreat ofis and the CLCMs will lead it toeal thatap on US deployments. It is not clear at this time if the Soviets have determined what they will do in the event of US deployment.
he Soviet campaign against INF would nol end after an initial deployment. It would continue as long as Moscow believed ilhance lo force withdrawal of those missiles already deployed or to forestall full deployment. Political actions, including continuedand "activeould be complemented by military moves (so-called analogoushe Soviets have implied they will leave lhe INF talks if deployment goes forward, but we doubt Moscow has made thai decision al this lime
. ISf TU Pwiiiopmn Dtfth-rnuml arul lh* VSSR'i
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While ihe Soviels have used the third-country issue foi negotiating leverage in both START and INF, thev are genuinely concerned aboul the strategic nuclear threat from third countries, particularly China, but also Britain and France. Their concern is greater than in the past because of the prospectubstantial increase in third-country warheads. For this reason, we believe the Soviels will continue to demand some compensation for third-country systems.
The Soviels have broad strategic force goals they will want to pursue, irrespective of any START or INF agreement Thus, their negotiating strategy will be designed to protect these goals. For instance, they are not likely to accept any limitation thai would slow their broad-based research and developmenl efforts, and they will not agreereaty worded so tightly as to prevent themignificant level of continued force modernization. Whatever comes out of the START and INF negotiations, we expect that the Soviets will:
Conlinue to rely on silo-based ICBMsey element of their strategic forces.
Develop and probably deploy mobile ICBMs tourvivabte element in their land-based missile force.
Significantly improve their SSBN/SLBM capability.
odern intercontinental bomber force.
Put greal emphasis on defensive systems, includingof improved ABM and air defense capabilities.
The Soviels will also devote considerable efforl lo nonacousticwarfare and directed-encrgy weapons for multiplereakthrough in either of these strategic defensive areas could have profound effects on the strategic balance.
SALT record indicates the Soviels have abided byprovisions of strategic arms accords that are specificpoliced by strong US monitoring capabilities, andfor addressing compliance issues. We think it unlikelywouldtralegic arms limitation agreement if theywould have to violate it lo meet their strategic requirements.the SALT experience suggests that in lhe negotiating processwill protect programs essential to their militaryat the risk of not reaching an agreement. During the period ofthe Soviets' incentives lo cheat would increase ifin the strategic environment altered their militaryor if their view of the political value of stralegic arms limitation
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agt cements diminished- These incentives would be strongeratified agreemenl lacked precision, effective verification provisions, andmechanisms for resolving questions of compliance and If Ihe Soviets believed they could evade the agreement for military benefitow risk of detection or US reaction. At the same time, Soviet behavior with respect to chemical and biological warfare agreements demonstrates thai the USSR may violate arms control agreements lhat have lower political and military value in an East-West context, that lack clearly defined limitations, or that are not supported by effective UScapabilities.
he Soviets will avail themsetves whenever possible of the flexibility inherent in ambiguous treaty text and asymmetries in information in order to protect their own future developmenl and deployment options and to hamper US monitoringe cannot predict how (he Soviets might exploit the verification problems associated with the INF and STARTagiecments proposed by both sides, bul wc can expect thai they will work to create loopholes and exploit ihcm. Moreover, lhe Soviets feel no obligation lo comply with US unilateral statement or interprclalions, or with what others may regard as lhe "spirit" of an agreement.
companion Estimate.. US CapabilitiesSoviet Strategic Offensive Force Limitations, concludeswill have serious problems in accounting for nondcployedinventories and deployed mobile systems and inaspects of cruise missiles.level ofencryption continue^
pressed hard enough, the Soviets may prove more flexible than in Uie past with respect lo cooperative measures including monitoring on Soviet soil. Such cooperative measures will notraise our confidence in being able to monitor Soviet compliance in certain key proposed limitations. They would, however,oviet cheating effort and mighteterrent effect, even if they did not assure usigh monitoring confidence. Wc expect lhe Soviets to resist on-site inspection. They might ultimately agree to some limited-access schemes, bul only if ihey viewed them as posing minimal risk to the security of iheir military programs and necessary to securing an agreement
projections of Soviet behavior in current negotiationsby lhe conclusionseview ofears of Soviet efforts in
. US CfliwMilM To MvmHO* Smttl tmttffeti* ftrw IMftaMltt
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arms control- For llie Soviets, arms control is partroad effort to Bain political and military advantage over lhe West. The Soviets have sought to use the arms control process to lead Western nations to unilaterally slow their military programs while protecting their own military programs, to promote detente, to gain recognitionuperpower, lo foster divisions in NATO and erode confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, and lo blunt Western technological superiority. Nol unlike lhe United Stales, the Soviets have sought to preserve advantages ihey already have and lo protect their force programs and options. The Soviets have also shared some arms control objectives with the United Stales, such as reducing the risks of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation,ore predictable basis for military planning,ore predictable US-Soviet relationship.3
The Soviels have certain advantages in negolialing agreements with lhe United States. Theyighly integrated political-military decisionmaking structure, wilhconiinuity of policy and personnel. They are able to affect andthe Western political process, while their own is all bul immune from outsideey faclor in lhe US-Soviet negotiating process is the inherent asytnmelry of information each side has about the others programs and intentions. They use secrecy and concealment, and sometimes deception, to considerable effect.
Thus far, economic considerations have not been afaclor in Soviel arms control policy. The USSR's growing economic problems may make the leadership more inclined lhan before to see the value ofore predictable environment for lhe utilization of resources- However, significant cosl savings would not accrue lo the Soviets even if Moscow concluded INF and START agreements lhat considerably reduced their strategic nuclear forces The USSR's slrate-gic forces represent only aboulercent of their lolal military costs. Moreover, although the USSR's economic problems are severe, we see no signs that the Soviets feel compelled to forgo important military programs or lhat ihey will be under great economic pressure to make substantial concessions at the negolialing table.
in ol the DiiMor, Delemr Inirtl'&ru* Af-nty; the AuUtanl Chuf of/ for Intelligence, Dcpailmenr of th* Amv;Amilant Onef olInietbrmet. Department of the Aftnd the DiiMOr of IntelXIgtmr, Headouatleit,S ond Soviet una control ob/Mlm ate fundamentally rrrwOtrd TJieSovfc'i Io%ae at mi toatrolooi lot shifting ihr "am
relation ol facts' In lieirond for lonineling thr tttalnmint ol tuptfrforftyXhr Writ.
h'y do icrk to gain Ihrti ohjKttiriitdeo' ndf. In the lattnm, lhe United Stateo ond thr USSR may taoe tome ilnu'oi tnttltal gooli. dfthed. houeirr. /mm di!fitful itraleglo motivation!.
DISCUSSION
Main Feature* of iho Soviel Approach
oscow believes ihit aimsthe process tod any agreement!fromfirst and foremost protect and enhance the capabilities of Soviel military forces relative lo their opponents'. The Soviets attempt to use the arms control process to impair the West's political will and its ability to counter Soviet military powero has used the process lo further its foreign policy goals The integration of political and mililary objectives Is lhe hallmark of the Soviel approach to arms control.
2 Soviet leaders have sljied that nuclear war with the United Slates wouldatastrophe and that they do not retards inevitable They have been willing to negoiialc restraints on forceand deployments when it serves ihelrenet in iheir strategic thinking holds thai lhe belter prepared the USSR is to light in various contingencies, the more IiVeryhat potential enemies wilt be deterred ftom initiating attacks on the Soviel Hii.nt! and lis allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political ami mililary actions. The Soviets do not accept that theretability in the nuclear telalionship thai can he upset by ihelrof weapons that threaten the war-makingof the United Stale, Thus, the Soviets have 'csisled US efforts lo modify, thiough arms control negotiations and agreements, the USSR's mililary stralegy.
3 The fmied States and the Soviet Union have been meeting al the armi control negotiating table for mute lhan Iwooreoiennegotiations The Soviets have faced different issues and diffetenl trade-olfi between military and poliiiral obtectivcx Yet. there are consistent elements in then approach. Not unlike the United Slates, the Soviets have sought lo pieserve advantage* iheyhave and to protect their force program* and
options. The Soviets have also tried to use the arms control process io
limate conducive to the slowing of US and Western mililary procranu, through the process of arms control negotiations ai well as by reaching specific agreementsnd II)
Protect the weapon development programs and mli ol forces necessary to meet the requirements of iheir mililary strategy (most nolahly Including large. MIRVed ICBMs in SALT and START).
Eliminate or constrain Western militarythat undermine key aspects of Soviet military strategy (ABM defense of US ICBMs in SALT I, unsuccessful effoit lo ban cruise missiles in SALT II, and US/NATO force modernriation programs in START and INF).
Curtail US options lo translatenlo deployed military hatdwaie (ABM in SALT, Trident, and cruise missiles in SALT II. MX. Trident OS. and cruise missiles in START).
Cain recognitionuperpower (all bilateral US-Sovtet negotiations and especially SALT I)
Promote detente with an eye to its attendant benelits in trade, economic development, and technology acqunitlon (process in general and cspeoally SALT I)
Formalize Ihe World War II division ol Europe and prevent the rcrmcrgeneernnanthreat to Ihe USSR (CSCE and MBFR I
Diwde the United States from its West European allies (INF)
Erode confidence in (he US nuclear umbrella (INF and SALT).
Isolate and constrain China (SALT. Limned Test Ban Ttealy. chemical warfare, and MBFR).
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Soviel arms control goals have beenthose of the West:'
To reduce Ihe risk of nuclear war and ofincidents or accidents that could lead to nuclear war (Hot Line. Incidents at Sea, and SALT II).
ore predictable future for military planningore predictable US-Soviet(SALT and the arms control process in general).
- To reduce environmental dangers from nuclear testing (LTBT)
To limit nuclear proliferation (N'on-Proliferation Treaty).
To foreclose future weapons dcploymcnl ingeographic areas (Outer Space Treaty.Treaty. Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, and Seabed Treaty)
To foreclose potential types of futuredevelopment (Environmental ModificationRadiological Warfare negotiations, and Seabed Treaty).
pursuing their goals through arms control,have certain advantages in negotiatingagreements Because these arise fromdifferences between Soviet and Westernsystems of government, they will persist.have:
highly integrated political-military structure for arms control decisionmaking, with greatof policy and personnel. The military establishment provides tho principal arms control slaff support for Politburo leaders andear monopoly on detailed classified Information on
1ocui ol lhe Oitreier, Dtfeme fitirififmcr Agenn. the Auiirinr Chief of Stall lot Intelligence. Department of the Army; the AuUranr Chlel ol Stall. Intelligence, Dnatl-incur of the Aitnd the Director ofi-ic'i, Marine Coept. VS end Sottet or mi control obltxlUiet oit fun/tamenloltv owoied. The Sown leeiefrefa loot fo' ihtjtlng the "correlation ol foreei" tn iheit low ond foi focilltatlng the eltoinmenl of lue'iionia over lhe Writ, otthvugh Ificb do teei lo goin iheir. In lheiTi. the United Slolet ond lhe VSSR meg heoe tome timilot laclieal goali. derived, howoei. from different rtrateglc moll-tatiom.
Soviel and US weapons programs Thesegive the Sovieturposeful-nest and discipline lhat are great strengths in negotiations and essentially en re lhat proposals and agreements will be consist, nt with military perceptions of Soviet strategic needs.
Little or no susceptibility to the influence of Allies, public opinion, or political opposition.
The capacity lo maintain secrecy, which enables them to hide important aspects of their military programs from US negotiators, while they have good information on US programs.
II. Soviel Strofeoy ond Tactics
A. Protecting Military Objectives
6 The key elements of Soviet strategy In the event of nuclear war are rounterfoior- strikes against enemy nuclear forces and damage limitation. To protect this two-pronged strategy, the primary goal of the Soviets in theegotiations was lo ensure theii freedom toil of quantitative and qualitative offensive bath Uic rnirsde capabilities equal, if not superior, to those of the United States and to limit I'S ABM deployment
n negotiating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Soviets agreed not toidespread ABM defense of theii territory in exchange for the United States forgoing planned widespread ABMof Iti intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force Because the Soviets had previously atlached great importance lo active defenseeans of limiting damage lo (he USSR, it was widely held in lhe United Slates al the lime lhat accession to the ABM Treaty signified thecceptance ofto retaliation as the basisong-termof mutual deterrence.
8 However, by denying themselves the near-term option of widespread ABM defense, the Soviets did notamage-limitingeeipccted the ABM Treaty to enhanceapabilities by preventing the United States from deploying an eitensive balltslie missile defense of Minutcman ICBMs. They probably abo concluded thai their own ABM systems then under development would be unable to protect criticalfrom US missile attacks at least through.
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Aware llial theirechnology WM considerably inferior lo lhal ol the United Slain, the Soviets hoped to continue their ABM development programs while inducing the Untied States lo slow down. Indeed,2 they have not only mad* considerable efforts to improve their air defenses, but they hare worked hard oo ABM technology, pet hips wilh the intention of future widespread ABM deployment It is also now dear that the Soviets had no intention ofountetforce strategy.eat of ratification, it was evident the Soviets were continuing MrategK force improvements of major proportion.
the end of theegotiations. Moscow's desire to protect ilt plans for new, more capable ICllMs took pteccdcnce over its almoststrong dftsite to halt US ABM deployments and to buttress its detente policy by icAchlng an agreement. Indeed, the record of bothnd SALT tl negotiations suggests that fot lhe Soviets, il il comeshoice between satisfying important mililary needs and reaching an agreement, militaiy needs usually win out
The record also suggests that when competing mihlary objective* arise in the course of negotiations between protecting iheu own weapon programs and limiting, those of the United Slates, the Soviets* bias is for protecting their own progiams. Their primary reason is to ensure that tlieir fotces are sufficient to meet their military requirements Moreover, theknow that their weapon procurement decisions arc not subject lo the vagaries ol the Western political process They believe that they will have opporlunities lo influence Western perceptions and policies and thai Ihcie isood chance lhat some planned Western systems may lie substantially delayed,or never actually deployed.
Along with diplomatic moves, the Sovietspromote lhe Western "peace movement through aggressive propaganda and covert activities They have lotused iheit recent efforts primarily on those countries scheduled to base new NATO missiles, with the chief emphasis on West Germany. Their campaignhole spectrum ofovert efforts toear of nuclear war to covert measures, including forgeries and disinformation, to put NATO governments In the worn possible light.
In SALT II and STAHT the Soviets havesought to forestall future US weapons, while lhe United Stales has generally sought to modify the existing (or soon to-be eiisltng) Soviet force structure. The Soviets have strongly resisted US efforts to alter lhe composition of then lorces. Inor example, the Soviets from time to time proposed lo trade bans on follow-on systems, including new types of ICBMv inter continental bombers, and balrtsttcsubmariner However, they never proposed to reduce any current Soviet force component of special concern to the United Stiles, like large ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVsX in exchangean on any prospective US system lhat concerned them.
One objective of (lie Soviets In negotiating thenterim Agreement was to minimize the impact of any agreed limits on their plannedThe Soviets had lhe capability lo build and deploy more ICBM and SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missiles) Launchers than they actually were allowed underowever, evidence obtained and analyzed subsequent lo the signing ofuggests the Soviets achieved an agreement essentially compatible with iheir previously planned strategic offensive programs.hus appears to have had atarginal inhibiting ellcct on previous Soviet intentions for production and deployment of strategic offensive weapons.
t several crucial points in the SALT Ithe Sovietsossible choice between iheir programs and an agreement. The evidence suggests they were deleimined to protect their programs, above all else- In the end they both achieved an agreement and pioleclcd theii programs. The Soviets accomplished ihis by taking advantage of USabout their plana, by refusing io accept US proposals for treaty language and provisions that xould lave been more restrictive, and by agreeing to reduce their older ICBM and SLBM lorces.
IS The SSBS/SLBM fmie. The Soviets' approach lo SSBN/SLBM ceilings was lo attempt to ptotect the construction program they evidently had already scheduled. At the time the agreement was signed inhe United Stales did not know exactly how many nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
thn Soviets were planning lo build. In(he baseline foi existing submarines and SLBMs and llioie under construction, the Soviet! maiiinizedumbei of submarines and SLUM launchers thai would be counted under construction2 Their purpose was lo ramirnixe the number of old launchers ihev would have to deactivate to reach the SLBM ceiling As it turned out. the numerical ceilincs that were agreed lo were lower than the Soviet capabilities lo build SSBNs (hiring the period of the actoenvenl.
MortOm, in negotiating SLBM ceilings the Soviets wore careful not to reveal the planned eaten* sion in the range of their new SLUM lheo do so would have undermined the "geographical asymmetries" argument they used to lustily Soviet SI.BM ceilings higher than those allowed the United Slate* The other argument they advanced for this higher eetlinc "as their need for compensation to offset British and French nuclear force*
The Minilc/Silo Size liiue. During theegotiations the Soviets protected their plans to replace mans of their lightCBMseavier and much more capable follow-on. the MIRVed SS-IO By the limeas signed, thead not been flight-tested, and, although the United States had sufficient evidence to indicate that it was going to be larger than thee could not nidge how much larger In the negotiations the United States made dear its concern with the threat posed by new large Soviet nmules, particularly if they replaced the many SSI Is Trie Soviets refused lo agree lhat any follow-on ICBM tarter than thehould beeavy ICBM and, therefore, subject to the agreed prohibition on deployment of additional heavy missiles The Soviets Insisted lhat the agreement limit only increases in silohich they knew would allow their scheduledo replace
eufot/inerif of Heavy Miuile: We arelo what extent Soviet plans lor deployment of heavy ICBMs -ere affected by SALT I. We beheve the Soviets deployed fewer SS-lBs than they had once intended, although the ertcnt of ther nnndetvlnymeitts. is in dispute While some evidence suiwsls the reduction was slight, other evidenceit could have been as highercent. In anyimproved iH-rformancc charadeMstlci of fol-
low-on medium and heavy ICBMs more lhan offset anyauncher deployment.
ALTrincipal objective of lhe Soviets in SALT II was to protect their previous strategic gains and to prcseivc iheir options for the future.lhe SALT II iiegolialions. the Soviets rejected US proposals that would have impaired Soviet capabilities toamage-limiting strategy through offensive counter (or ce means. The Soviets regarded both the Interim Agreement4 Vladivostok Accord as havingontinuing Soviet advantage both in lutal ICBM launchers and in heavy ICBMpurchased by what they described as the major concession of accepting continued US deployment of for ward-based systems (FBS) in Europe and elsewhere within range of Soviet territory. They refused to accept anv reduction specifically aimed al numbers of ICBMs or ICBM throw weight. While ihey accepted important limits onas only one new tync ofSoviet* managed lo protect tlieir ability to increase overall ICBM and SLBM capabilities significantly in that they could replace some of their older systems with missiles having more warheads and greater accuracy.
symmetry of Information, Concealment ond Deception, and the Use of Treaty language
A key factor in the US-Soviet negotiatingis the inherent asymmetry of the information each side has about the other's programs and intentions. As illustrated above, the Soviets have sought to exploit US uncertainties about Soviet military programs during negotiations. They have also attempted to play on these uncertainties once an agreement ha* been reached. This asymmetry In information derives from the Soviets' longstanding obsession with secrecy,when military Information is involved.
Tlie Soviets' secretiveness has been evident throughout arms control negotiations. In the early days of SALT, Soviet military representatives not only refused to provide the United States with information on Soviet weapon systems but asked US counterparts not to provide such information to civilian members of the Soviet delegation. In essence.ason the basis of informal ion on Soviet systems furnished almost exclusively by the US side. Tlie
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Sonets usually did nut even point oul where US in foi mat ion was in error. Since the signing oroviets base gradually recngnized the necessity foi Mime exchange of infoniutkiu and have permit led iheir negotiators to provide some information on their systems:
In the Slanding Consultative Commissionhe Soviets have provided technical information necessary lo conclude agreements on procedures for dismantling arid destruction ol strategicand defensive systems and have in al least .some instances been forthcoming in providing information concerning activities ol concern to lhe Uuiled Statesompliance standi mint.
In SALT ll, in addition lo quantitative holdings in the agreed data base, Ihc Soviets haveinformation on their weapons programs when such information was required to teachon individual issues.
The information provided was usually therequired to resolve the issues involved, was provided reluctantly, and by no meanseneral relaxation in the Soviet attitude toward lhe guarding of mililary information.
Experience in MBFR, moreover, shows lhat when it serves their interest the Soviets are fully prepared to provide the West with false data and then give misleading answers to follow up questions tothe erroneous information. The Soviels sought to use the false data to sustain their position that there was rough parity in numbers of troops on the two sides. They presumably believed the West could not eflcclively challenge the validity of the official Soviet figures on the actual siac of the Warsaw Pact forces in question.
In addition to being reluctant to volunteer information, the Soviels work hard lo keep the United States from'deriving an accurate picture of Soviet military operations and capabilities. Oneis their nationally directed progiam forand deception in all defense-related programs and in the conduct ol military operations Thisincludes camouflage; the use of dummies, mock-ups, and various covering devices; the dissemination of disinformation; and the denial of telemetry. The Soviets have increased the variety and extent of their
concealeasures since lhehose incisures havc|^
y|i" Some cases hamperedi>ilily to monitor arms control agreements-
reaty Laneuage: The Ueht/Heavu ICBMood example of the care with which the Soviets negiiliate treaty language to imoIcti theirprogiams occurred duringnd concerned the issue of light/heavy missiles, discussed earlier in this paper. As we have noied. to protect ihc already scheduled deployment of thender SALT, the Soviets refused lo agreeefinitioneavy missile, signing thatefinition was unnecessary because, both sides alieady knew, through national technical meanshich missiles were heavy. The Soviets finally agreeda.vimum increase in silo dimensions ofercent, which the> knew would be sulficienl to allowo replace SS-lis. In the face of adamant Soviet refusal to agreeefinition of heavy ICBMs. Ihc United Statesnilateral statement on the subject. The Soviets subsequently made it clear ihey did not consider themselves bound in any way by US statements lo which they had not agreed.
Telemetry Encryption.he Soviets began to encrypt some of the telemetry on their ICBMs being flight-tested. The United Statespressed the Soviets on the importance of flight tesl data for verifying compliance andan on telemetry encryption. The Soviets adamantlyany such blanket prohibition. Alter years of negotiations, the final language in the SALTreaty permitted encryption, provided lhat verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty was not impeded. Under this ambiguous formulation, II was left to each side to determine what level of its telemelty lo encrypt without impeding verification, and the Soviets are exploiting this ambiguity.
Sincee have noted an expanding pattern of encryption and other practices of telemetry denial. The newoviet ICBM is being flight-tested wilh the most extensive level of telemetry encryption wc have ever observed on any ICBM or SLBM tesl
TOP ftFCflCT
C.iom Scoring on Soviet Compliance
nd SALT ILeflection of llie political importance the Soviets attach to the strategic arms control process, they* have remained within the numerical limits imposed bynd have not exceeded the levels that existed at lhe time of the signing of the unratified SALT II Treaty (reductions are not required until after entry intondeed, violating these numerical limits, which are at the heart of the accords, would most likely signal the endrocess lo which live Soviets haveigh priority.
here haveumber of instances of Soviel activity under theccords and the unratified SALT II Treaty that have resulted in US concerns being raised in the SCC about Sovietwith the accords. Recently, they have included the po&ibilily thatobile ICBMs were deployed al the Plesetsk Missile Test Range, the concurrent testing of components of ARM and air defense systems at the Saryshagan test range, and the telemetrylevel on lhe newCBM. In none of Ihese instances, however, has the evidence been such to cause the United States to charge the Soviets with violation of the SALT agreements. (Likewise, although the Soviets have raised issues in the SCC about US compliance, they have not charged the United States with violation of the SALT accords.)
he SALT record indicates the Soviets have abided bv quantitative limits and agreed provisions that are specific and detailed, such as the dismantling and destruction procedures of SALTthough in this case the United States had to raise issues in the
r
j
S CapabttUiu To Mcmttof Sovtriorce LifiUauoni
SCC of repotting and strict adherence. On the other hand, Ihe Soviets obviously feel no obligation lo comply with US unilateral statements orof an agreement, or with the "spirit" of an agreement. Indeed, they have demonstrated that they will take advantage of ambiguities In arms control agreements, US sensitivitiesase In point is Soviet practice with respect to the provision of SALT II addressing telemetry denial, discussed previously.
Chemical and Biological War/ate. The Soviet Unionignatory to the Biological WeaponsUnder the terms of the Convention, aundertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peacefulr to develop weapons and means of delivery for biological agents or to tins.
In0 Ihe Intelligence Communitydetailed infomiationevereof anthrax that had resultedignificant number of fatalities in SverdlovskheCommunity's assessment of this incidentthat:
Tlie Soviet explanation of the Incidentatural anthrax outbreak of limited scope)to be inconsistentumber of respects with Ihe information available to the US Government.
The number of deaths and the medicalindicate inhalation anthrax as the probable cause of the incident.
For various reasons, an identified biologicalfacility in the Sverdlovsk area appears to be the probable source of the Infection.
US calculations of the concentration of anthrax spores necessary to produce the number of deaths reported suggest that the Soviets are maintaining quantities of anthrax spores beyond thosein the United Slates for purposesby the Biological Weapons Convention.
production or possession of toxins for usein armed conflict is not permitted underWeapons Convention, regardless ofinvolved or the method of production. Use
ii-.Tir.il weapons in war violates ihc Ocncva Protocol nnd customary international law.the Convention prohibits the direct transfer of roiins to any recipient or any assistance to any country In acQuiiing or manufacturing them The Intelligence Community hat concluded that:
Lao and Vietnamese forces, assisted by Soviet logistic* and supervision, have used lelhalagents against H'Mong resistance forces and villages since alnd Irlcholhecene tonus have been positively identified as one of the classes of agents used as well as types of chemical agents, including nerve agents.
Vietnamese forces have used trie hot heccne toiinsariety ol chemical agents againstn troops and Khmer villages since at8
The only hypothesis consistent with all theIs that the Irichothccene toxins wereIn the Soviet Union, provided lo the Lao and Vietnamese, either directly or throughof technical know-how, and made into weapons with Soviet assistance in Laos. Vietnam, and Kampuchea. It is highly probable that the USSR also provided other chemical warfare agents
Soviet foices in Afghanistan have used lethal and casually-producing, agents on Mujahedinforces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion invidence of the use ot mycotosiiu has been obtained through sample analysis
hus, the Soviets have showniTing to engage in activities prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention and the Ceneva Protocol on chemiial weapons Soviet use of and complicity in the use of toxinsariety of chemical agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan suggest two ctmcluirons .
deciding on the use of these weapons, the Soviets apparently concluded that lhe mililary benefits outweighed the political value theytoConvention and the Protocol They also probably judged lhal the risk of eiposurc and resultant international condemnation would be low because these weapons weie being used in remote areas.
Moscow is prepared lo lisfc violating arms control agreements like lhe Biological Weaponslhat have lower political and military value in an East-West contest, lhal are not supported by strong US monitoring capabilities, that lack cleaily defined Jimllalions and agreed pioce-duies to aid verification, and that lack forums for addressing corn pit ance issues.
III. InspTKOtioni for START ond INF
A. Andropov: Wjfl Iho New leodership Change Course?
The death of Brezhnev raises Ihe question about the possibility of change in the Soviet approach to arms conlrol Brezhnev's track record on arms control is clear: he sought to me it in combination with ihe Soviet miliury buildup to gain pohlical and mihtaiy advantage over the United Slates, and he allowed the Soviet mihtaiy establishment toajor voice in lhe making of Moscow's armi ronlrol policy
Andropov and the Politburo would like to make detente work for them again Andropov probably is more sympathetic than Brcihnev wai lo new ideas and policy adjustments and is well aware of the Soviet Union's growing economic problems and what some have called its crisis of spirit. In his early months as leader, Andropov has attempted to play on Weslnn, especially European, hopes that heore flexible and innovative leader, more inclined to smooth the tough edges of Soviet policy in the interestsetter East-West relationship He has moved quickly and adroitly lo keep Moscow's "peace" moving However. Ihe evidence so fai suggests that lhe Andropov-led 1'oliltniro is unwilling to make Important changes in its international policies toan easing of the atmosphere in relations svlth lhe United States. The continuing misgivings about the very ntodesi changes in Poland, the implementalion of an earlier decision lo send SA-Ss lo Syria, and the attempts to scuttle President Reagan's Middle East imitative, ate evidenceasic continuity in Soviet lorelgn policy Andropov is also likely to be highly sympathetic to the ohicclives and the interests of ihe Soviel military establishment, and. especially while he consolidates his power, he will probably Iry to avoid antagoniring it.
here is also little leason to believe lhalwill be more inclined than Btczhnev lo weaken
HOP St-OftO*
llie Soviel mililatv's enormous influence over Soviet aims conliot policy Indeed. Andropov came lo power wilh ihe apparent support ol Defense MinisterAl one lime Andropovlose professfonal and personal relationship wilh Ustinov, and thatdoes not appear to have weakened.
77ic Econtiniic Motivation.8 Rslimate on the Soviel approach to arms control projected that the Soviet Union would have economic problems innd that these problems would causeto want to restrain the buildup ol US and Soviet forces Growth in the Soviet economy did slowinhe slowing of economic growth, however, did nol tesluce lhe Soviel commitment to their military buildup On the con-liary. Soviet spending for defense Increased each year through.
Untdffklal Soviet economic forecasts were optimistic. The signs nf lhe approaching economic dislieu were evident but were obscured by the progress that hadade and by lhe prospect of significant inputs into lhe economy coming from tlie Westr-nehl of detente. This Is no longer the case.
Soviet economic growth has fallen fromercent per year during most ofoercent per year8 Stagnation in lhe production ol key industrial materials has constrained growth in machinery output. Oil production is flat and the output of high'quality coal and steel Is falling Declining wotld oil prices and flat demand for Soviet aims are limiting Moscow's hard currency earnings Four consecutive poor grain harvests have contributed to persistent food shortages, disrupted the USSR's livestock program, and worsened its hard currency payments position
Wc espcet the USSR's economic problems to continue through much of, as the cost and difficultiesbtaining industrial raw materials and fuels rise end the increments lo labor and capital fall. Economic giuwth will beercent per year through thend will hover nearercent level through the latter pail of the decade. Under these conditions, rnainlaining historical rates of growth in defense spending will be economically more difficult. The particulars of these economic problems are well understood by Andropov and the Politburo, even if the solutions are not.
owever, the potential direct savings lo the Soviel economy, even if the Soviets had accepted Ihe US START and INF proposals in their entirety, would have been relatively small. We estimate thai, if the US arms proposals were accepted and were not offset by shifting resources lo other military programs,Soviet eipenditures for strategic attack forces during ihe nestears would be about0 billion rubles less than we would otherwiseavingsillion rubles per year would alter the defense share ofyew tenthsercent and wouldegligible impact on the overallThis is because production resources consumed by strategic attack forces are small in relation to overall Soviet investment requirements, they aresl.lv speciahrrd and not easily transferable lo civilian uses.
Soviets will continue lo be motivatedattitude toward arms controlesirea more piedictable environment forplanning. Their bleak economicmakeomewhat more Importantin the past, but military requirements willto predominate in their decision ma kingthe economic rxcWems they are facingwe sec no signs that the Soviets feelforgo ini'mMint military programs or lhat theyunder great economic pressure to makeat the negotiating table
ong-form Sovietbjectives
The Soviets have certain broad strategic force goals they will want to implement, intspectiveTARThey will not let any agreement slow their research and development (RID) efforts, and thev will not agreereaty worded so tightly as to prevent themignificant level of continued force model nidation- They will try to accomplish several mnfor objectives during the notears, including development and probably deploymentobile ICBM force, deploymentodernized intercontinental bomber force, and deploymentuch improved lea based ballistic missile force
The present Soviet START positron Is designed to protect llieir current and planned programs, or at least tlse most important of them Ai inhe
'For ohm* dclitlod lnfeima(ion. sm NIEm tlralrft) Nuelrat.
1 TOP SLCBOt-
Sciviell propose an overall aggregate ceiling onvehicles, alongIHV launcher lubceihnc andlimili on total warhead* They have hm led they would romidci subceilings on ICBMi. but they have refused thus far to be specific. They propose lo reduce the aggiegalr celling for strategic nuclear delivery vehicle*0 (tho Backfire bmnbei is notontingent on US agreement to forgo PershingT? and CLCM deployment, and not to increase any other US forward-based syslem* Thb wouldeduction in launchers of more thanercent for the USSR and somewhat lest for lhe Untied Slates. Under their proposal, lite Soviets would iKoluihly minimize tlie disruption to ongoing modernization by dismantling mainly olderol their strategic forces, like the Yankeeands There wouldan on long-range cruise missiles of all tvpes. limits on new dan SSBNs, and eomtiaintson new and modernized ICBMs similar to those constraints found In the SALTrraty, but the Soviets have implied In the negolistions lhat mobile ICBMs would be permitted. The Soviets have held out the prospect of teducing warheads; but, as It now stands. Iheir STAUT position would pcrmtt the deployment ofarheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. more thann their current missile lot re Ifoweter. under iheir proposal, lhe Soviets will be unable to modernize the missiles inf their ICBM silos, which we believe ihey would do in the ahsenee of arms controlhey would have to reduce or lorgo deploying hundreds ofnd silo-basedissiles, in order to deploy the several hundred mobile ICBMs we believe they intend to have They would also have lo limit the deploymenl ol Typhoon SSBNs
f the Soviets were unconstrainedew STAUT or INK agreement but continued lo abide bynd SALT II.believe they would also:
- Replace theCBMs with four reentry vehiclesith the newVCBM beginning3
Deploy additional Dili and Typhoon SSBNsipped with MillVcd SLBMs and modernize Ihe missiles onlli while dismantling older SLBM launchers. If the Soviets were loIRVed ICBM launchers, their SLBM programs would not bring them to the manraurn SALT allowed totalIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers5G
Deploy additional. up. as well at long-range CLCMs and SLCMs beginning aa early as
tome long rerige ALCMsaiearly4IRVed ICBMs and SLBMs wereupombers (Bears, Blackjacks, and perhaps Backfires) carrying long-range ALCMs would be permitted.
venTART agreement the Soviels may want lo eilend certain SALTimits beyond5 expiration dale. There would be some precedent lor tins, as in the case ol iheir willingness to observefter it expiredhev might see an advantage in preserving ihc aims conlrol process and some degree of predictability about US force levels, while pressing ahead wilh (heir own advanceddes riopment. even though it would restrain some of their deploy ments
owever, il the Soviets decided tn expand theii lorces beyond SALT II limits, sve believe they would:
Increase the number of MIRVed ICBMby deploying additional MIRVedCBMs and hundreds of new additional MIRVed ICBMs to replacendCBMs
Deploy additional ICBM launchers by fielding land-mobile ICBMs.
Increase the number of teentry vehicles on tintICBMs, including the SS- IS heavy ICBM
Increase the number of SLBM launchers by not dismantling older SSBNs as new ones ire deployed
I'tAsibly replace single-RV SLBMs onlass submarines with new MIRVed SLBMs
oncerns Beyond START. The Soviets would maintain strong capabilities to attack (he United States even under the constraintsTARTalong the lines of the US START proposal The Sox lets wouldCBM and SLRM reentry vehiclespf them on ICBMs This wouldbe enough tocoser US strategic foice largely and US command, coo tied, communications, and iniflligencehe absence ofew basing mode However, il would significantly reduce the Soviets' ability to covei other key mililary and industrial targets Const taitilt on
Soviet cnirtc mimics would do faille to reduce USufaicvabihiv to Sovset boi-hcrs and eiuisciven ihcof any clfcclive air defense for the iun( incut al United Stales.
we utdMSTART, several possible Smiti futuicat.initialise! need to be eotisitiVied Theremain fot (lie Soviets lo dvulordefenses by theihey will deploy an advanced lacticalmissile (SAM) lhat could have someagainst some llralrglc icenliy vehicles STARTimpose constraints on Sovirl ail defeiuca.ronlimie to lye Impiovcd. The Sovieli willconsiderable eflorl lo technologies forweapons, with potential application loand lo nonacouillc antisubmaiincA breakthrough In either ol tlieseareas could have profound elfccis onbalance
C. Undermining US AAooVniiolions
Sovietsrge number ofunder development'ilhngnessconslraints on theseSTARTon their stralegic requirements anddegree to which they are concerned about,to limit. US systems under developmenl.desire to gain political benefits
he new piogiams now under way or planned by the United Slates and NATO will pose major challenges to Soviet political and mililary strategy in ihc middle and. Moscow must be concerned aboul the implications of US determination to counter Soviet strategy and fotce improvement throughaction and about tin: Implications for NATO cohesionI and'CIXM deployments go forward. From the Soviet perspective, il Ihe planned US slrate-stie force programs go forward, there will be an erosion of the gains they have made during lhe pastears, even if Ihey were to deploy new systems of their own. Specific Soviet concerns about current US/NATO force modernization plans probably include
In the near term:
The potential threat fiom Ml and CLCMs to some ICBM bunch facilities and lo somenational-level command and control sites.
'Sea NIK IISou* Cm-Uuunutft .Vwirer Ctmfhci. IBO-Bf
capabilityoeulttii and eiuise missiles lo penetrate improved Soviel air defenses
he widely dispersed sea luted nuclear capabdi-tv permitted by Totwliawl SlCMs
In tier long termnd beyond)
The additional ihieal posed lo Soviel haid targets from MX andissiles.
The ability of US St.alth technology on aircraft and cruise missiles lo render Soviel air defenses much less effective and to force development of more capable Soviet defensive systems.
The impiovcd survivability ol innyt of these systems, including MX if deployedew ha sing mode
The substantial Increase In US/NATOnonnuclear andall of thesearc deployed in combination.
he Soviets obviously hope lite new US weapon Systems will not go forward, without their having to give up anything In return They have suggested trading off bam on some specific new systems on bothncluding the improvedornd cruise missile* for cruise missiles They seem also to be laying the groundwoik to trade the newedium solid ICBM for MX These trade-offs are in keeping with past Soviet proposals lo trade future systems for future systems Tliey would enable the Soviets to proceed with most ol llteir ownwhile stopping the major US modernization programs, especially those draigned lo improve coun-terfoice capabilities. The Soviets probably calculate that these proposals will not be acceptable Io the Unitedor this reason, the Soviets may propose some trade-offs designed lo be more attractive to the United State* if thev believe thev have no other way to constrain US strategiche Soviets' attitude toward throw weight, their ICBMand cruise missile* will be an important factor in their position on tradc-of fi
hrow Weight
he Soviets are committed to retaining aforce of medium and heavy ICBM* This commitment ii clear from what we know about their current programs and follow-onurther, tbey
16
seem to be committed to technical programs tomissile throw weight. Although there Is potential (or further warhead fractionation,believe anreaion for Soviet interest in throw-weight improvements is the flciibililv thev provide in missile payloads Large throw weight enable* the Soviet* to deploy different number* and size* of warheads on the same type of missile and gives them room forike penetration aids The latter would becometo the Soviets if Ihey were confrontedS ABM system III lhe future.
lie Soviets undoubtedly want to retain their substantial advantage in missile throw weight:
large missiles are an integral partorce structure lhal has existed foe years. The Soviets have carefully built these forces, and we believe thev arc determined to retain luge numbers of their SS-IH andiquid propcllant missiles, which its fact have high throw weight. The smaller sohd-propcllant missiles that are now being tesled will add lo this force, as well as replacing their smallerndiquid-propellantowever, for the Soviets to restructure their forces on the basis of fewer or
snialle"ubstantial redirection would
be iCQulred
thiow weight missiles have political as well as militaryhe Soviets almostbelieve that their existing large missiles contribute to ihe perception held by many In the West lhal having tbe largest missiles equates to stralegic superiority
he diiiurtiv is lhe resort of major difference* between US and Soviet force structures, Hemming fiom choices made tears ago If thai Imbalance were to be significantly narrowed, tlie Soviels would have to make substantial reductions In their medium and heavy ICBM forces, whichthink is unlikely. However, to limit US progiams threatening their stralegiche Soviet* might accede toeducttorn in their numbers of medium and heavy ICBMs in an agreement that imposed bam or tight re'irictions on US systems of pellicula! concern to them, such as MX.. and cruise missiles If so, the Soviels would calculate that restrictions on the United Slates, in coniunciioiiimproved follow-on systems of their own, would work lo their net strategic
advantage. In any evenl, the Soviets would tiy to keep any reduction in their medium and heavy ICBM forces as small as pouibte and would seek to reduce only their older,nd
E. Soviet ICBM VuloerobiBly
lthough they are dearly concerned about the future vulnerability of their land basede do not think the Soviets are likely lo respond byholesale move to sea with their strategichey will continue to place heavy emphasis on hardened silo-based forces. To mitigate their ICBM vulncrabihty problem, however, they will probably add land-mobile ICBMs to Iheir force as well as improve their SLBM force Although their SLBM force Is improving in size and capability, it is nol ai capable as their silo-based force, being neither accurate enough nor tellable enough to fulfill the missions now assigned to Ihc land-based forces. The Soviets also are wary of US ASW capabililies and are not confident of the survivability of their SSBN*
Ihe Soviets are increasing thewarheads based al sea. lhe proportion of Sovietwarheads to land-based -aiheads is notto change sigtiifscant ly. The Soviet sea-batedcontinue lo operate largely as lhe principal partUSSR's total reserve force The Soviets do not seea principal clement in counteiforce Utiles; thairemain with the ICBM force, well into theare likely to lestst pressures to go loto >vork in START lor eonslraints onlhal llueaten Soviet ICBM*
F. Cruise Missiles
Soviets are very concerned about USWhile the Soviels are in the processa full range of cruise mbulc systems,now believe they aieear or two behindStates in deploymenthey arethe Quantity and quality of US cruiselhe serious problems they will one for SovietThe Soviets have technical problemswith delecting, tracking, and interceptingtargets, with Ihc limitations of theirami with the diversity of Systemsoptions wilh which they must contend.developing new responses to help them meetIn addition, the Soviets worry about future
imiuovemcnl* in US cnilm missiles, in particular the application ol Sli-allh Icchnology lo AI.CMs. which would further complicate Ibeu strategic defensive problems
nei ii principal goab In both START and INF is to ban lont-iante cruise missiles, and. failing thai, lo sign if*mi lit romirain ihem Realistically, the Soviets do not oped to succeed in banning AI-CMS in START They dope, however, lo be able lo constrain the numbers of ihese systems and the types ofas they did in the SALT II Treaty, and thereby male their slrau-gte defense problems moreThey also nould prefer lo sec deployment of CLCMs and SLCMs banned, as they were in lhe SALT II Protocol They might, however, consider trading cruise missilesype-for-typc basis- This docs not mean that Soviet cruise missile programs are simply baifsaining chips, although they will be used inthey could also be deployed, and. if so. would have military utility lo tlie Soviets
G.ond Witkolion Imputations '
GO The Soviet approach lo the verification of START and INF will be generally consistent with the atiiiudcsduringnd SALT II and with the precedents established in those agreements Inhe Soviets insisted on dealing withthrough reliance on national technical means, and Ihey strongly resisted on-site inipection. In SALT II neither side raised on-site inipection. but the Soviets accepted some passive cooperative measures toNTM
herobably recogniie that the United States will not be satisfied wilh NTM alone to monitor compliance wilh Inline agicemenU At the inception of tbe current negotiations, the Soviets suggested some degree of receptivity to on-site inspection Our esperi-ence in lhe nuclear test ban negotiations in (hendicates that the Soviets are not in principle opposed to tussive and active cooperative meaMires under carefully controlled conditions In lhe contest of the current negotiations, we would eapect the Soviets to resist on-site inipection at first, but they might ultimately be willing lo agree in principle to some limited types of inspection schemes if they viewed
S GnatainttfJ To Uonlloi Sowei Sinner*foiee
such schemes at posing minimal risk to the security of their military piogrnms and as neeessaiy lo securing an agreement However, we would cipect them lo seek to defer lhe negotiation of inspection procedures until an agreement entered into force, and then lo agree only to various forms of limited-access schemes
ey indicator of Soviet willingness to meet US concerns on verification wouldhange in their treatment of the issue of telemetry encryption Olher keys lo tho Soviets' attitude on verification will be their handling of such issues as the exchange of dala about weapon systems, the drafting of adequatemeasures, and. perhaps more critical for US monitoring, lhe acceptance of cooperative measures in Soviet territory (including both technical sensors and inspection teams)
he ability of the InTelligencc Community dur rngo monitor the types of limitations the United States has proposed for START and INF agreements could be lower than was tho case for mostihe provisions of lhend SALT II accords. While lite proposed limitationsumber of tasks for which out monitoring capabilities are strong, they also encompass several areas that historically have posed significant inobU-ms for US intelligenceand analysis These include accounting for noode-ployed Soviet missile inventories and for deployed mobile missile systems and distinguishing among cruise missiles on the basis of launcher, payload. and range canabilily.r"
3
Cooperative measures that supplemcnlarj or faohtated our intelligence collection would increase our confidence in monitoring some types ofUnimpeded access to Soviet flight test dala and on-site inspection would raise our confidence inthe characteristics of Soviet weapons and in accounting for numerically limited systems Infacilities and areas Cooperative measures,wnuld not appreciably raise our confidence in being able to detect Soviet actions to stockpile missiles beyond allowed inventories, to deploy mobile missiles innd areas where Ihey are not permitted, or to produce and deploy- prohibited cruise missile types
Soviet noncompliancetrategicouldariety of forms.
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and all acu of noncompliance would be Importantonitoring perspective, even though aactivity conferred no apparent military advantage. Some uf llie limitations under consideration for START and INF agreements, how'ever, would provide the Soviets wilh opportunities lor military gainow probability of being detected.
espite these opportunities, wc think it unlikely that the Soviets would sien an arms control agreement if they knew they had to violate il to meet their strategic requirements During Ihe pe'iod of anthe Soviets* incentives to cheat would increase if changes in the slralegic environment altered their military requirements or if their view of the political value of strategic arms limitation agreementsThese incentives would be stronger if anlacked precision, effective verificationand bilateral mechanisms for resolving questions of compliance and if the Soviets believed they could evade the agreement for military benefit with low risk of detection or US reaction.
H. The Soviet Approach to Third-Country Systems
iewed from Moscow, tlie strategic nuclear forces of China, France, and the United Kingdom further complicate the strategic environment.small in number, British and French forces could devastate many major Soviet cities andmilitary installations, and they are scheduled to increase substantially during the nextears. The Soviets apparently believe the British would most likely use their strategic forces only in unisonS nuclear attack. They are less certain aboutFrench nuclear employment.
he Soviets recogmrc lhat Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities are vastly inferior lo their own Nevertheless, the Soviels are probably not confident they could destroy all Chinese capabilities in an initial strike .mi!.arc aware lhat ongoing improvements will enhance the retaliatory capability of China's nuclear forces. Soviel leaders arc concerned that China might take advantageATO Warsaw Pact
hile the Soviets have used the third country issue Tor negotiating leverage, they arc genuinely concerned aboul the threat front third countries This reflects not only the current military realities, but also
the longstanding tenet of Soviet military doctrine that the USSR must have forces superior to those of all the potentially hostile powers on the Eurasian periphery. The Soviets have made third-countryentral issue to successful negotiation of an INF agreement All their proposals ihus far have been premised on the need for compensation for British and French IRBMs. SLBMs, and "medium-range" aircraft. Soviel concern is greater than in the past because of the prospectubstantial increase in French and British warheads. For both military and political reasons, we believe the Soviets will continue to demand some compensation for French and British systems in INF or. lacking an agreement there, in START.
ive Soviets also argue that theirn lhe eastern USSR are Intended to counter Chinese and other nuclear assets in that region and thus are irrelevantegotiation on "medium-range nuclear systems ins they describe the INF talks Their position uneductions suggests thewould be accomplished mostly by withdrawal to tlie eastern USSR. Those withdrawn would beto attack target! in China, Japan, and elsewhere They would also be available for redeployment to the western USSR
inally, the Soviets have indicated Ihcv arc concerned aboul the potential proliferation of cruise -missile technology. They have argued that thisinexpensive technology could be within the reach of almost any slate. They may hope anwith the United States to curtail long-range cruise missiles wouldtep toward containing the proliferation of the technology to third countries
he START-INF Connection: The Soviet Gome Plon
The Soviets have directly connected INF andeneva they have repeatedly stated lhat their proposal to reduce strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVsJevelor each side by the0 is contingent on an agreement that there be no buildup in FIJSl and CLCM) capable of striking the Soviet Union. They have also said that, if US forward-based aircralt were to be reduced,NDV limit could conceivably be lowered.
For the Soviets, thisong-held position that the FBS threat to Soviet territory represents an
asymtncliv in ihc overall stinteglc balance lhat favors lhe United Statu At Vladivostok4 the Soviets dropped thou insistence on limiting FBS In SALT ll. At the same time the United Slate* agreed to carry ovc' intoheimits on heavy ICBMi that allowed Ihc Soviets luch missiles. The Soviets could reasonably havethat the US START position would include some effort to reduce ortheir advantage in heavy ICBMs Consequently, one reason thev have returned to the FBS question may be to protect llieir heavy ICBMs
he Soviets consider the' Pershing II and CLCMs scheduled to be deployed in Western Europe as strategic systems If an INF agreement wereallowing tome deployment of Pershing II and CI-CM, the initial Soviet reaction would probably also be an increase inNDV level in their START proposal Assuming they would eventually agree lo lower niimbcts of SNDVs, Ihey wouldcontinue to use the FBS issue lo delcnd their right to continue to deploy heavy missiles.
evelopments in INF will allect START, both the politics and the nature ol the negotiations. If there is aeven aINFthen the Soviels arc likely to sec themselvesuch stronger negotiating position in START. We doubt the Soviets believe Ihey are under lime pressure in START, they probably believe an agreement is unlikely befnrr ihe net US Presidential election. They probably would increase the public pressure on START, not necessarily in the expectation of an agieementut with the political purpose of affecting the American election dialogue on thecompetition and the future of US-Soviet relations.
uring the nest year or two ihc Soviet plan for the maior arms control negotiations will center on INF. and the positions ihe Soviets tale in START are related lo devrloptnenls in INF The goal of the Soviets in INF is to stop US deployments. They are deeply conccined about tlie military potential ofls and CIXMs, ai well as their Impact on the coupling of US central strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe Their interest In stoppingis also motivated by lhe political dividends this outcome would pay Moscow. Tlie Soviets are building on the legacy ol III feeling generated by the "neutron bomb'* deploymentin (he, athey sought lo eiploli at lhe time Moscow views lhe INF deployment issueay of using West
European public opinion lo influence lhe US-Soviet strategic dialogue. The Soviets recognize theyistoric opportunity to weaken the political cohesion ol Use Atlantic alliance through the INF issue, and ihey are trying to make the most of it. despite recent setbacks in the West German elections.
We are uncertain whether the Soviets will accept an INF agreement that sanctions some NATO deployments if it becomes clear tolate insuch deployments will go forward-Moscow' may see ils objective of undermining Western cohesion as paramount and wilt thus be unwilling to reach an agreement that sanctions any US INFHowever, it may also be that Moscow's concern aboul the military threat ofls and the CLCMs will lead il toeal thatap on US deployments. It is not clear that the Soviels have determined what they will do In the event of US deployment.
The Soviel campaign against INF would not end after an initial deployment It would continue as long as Moscow believed Ithance to force withdrawal ol those missiles already deployed or to forestall full deployment.
Throughout Western Europe lhe Soviets will intensify their public campaign against US INFThese efforts arc likely to include:
Stepping up contactroad spectrum of European politicians, media representatives, church leaders, and student groups, with the intention ol purveying as widely as possible an image of Soviet reasonableness andegotiated INF solution.
Employing propaganda to arouse public alarm over alleged US intentions of making Europe lhe "nuclear battlefield"S-Soviet conflict.
Introducing new "peace"-initialIves, such as Ihe Soviets' latest proposalactical nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.
actions, including continuedand "activeould bemilitary moves {so-called analogous responses}'have implied they would leave the INF talksgoes forward, but we doubt thatmade that decision al this time.
' Sec2 INF: Ikr FionxtU forirtfjiiiMI and lAe USSR* flcecrtonr.
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