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Intelligence
Dimensions of Civil Unrest in the Soviet Union
National Inielligence Council Memorandum
This Memorandum has been coordinated within the National Inielligence Councilth the Directorate of Operations. It has been discussed iiih ihe Directorate of Inielligence. Comments or qucnes are invited and may be directed to the author la^sf^^Analytic Group, National Intelligence Council, on I
j
This paper prescnis ihe preliminary findings of an examination of all known reports of civil unrest in the USSR0ome of the findings may challenge our image of the Soviet Union as anrepressed socieiy. Thus, lhc larger significance of civil unrest in ihe USSR requires additional systematic and ongoing siudy by thc Intelligence Community. This paper focuses primarily on defining and measuring civil unrest rather than attcmpiing to assess its full implications. <u|
Civil unrest as defined in this paper does not, for the most part, involve the activities of dissident Soviet intellectuals whose efforts have been widely reported in the worlds press Rather, it refersroad range of actions by individuals belonginguch wider mass of the Soviet public, who are either protesting specific policies of various levels of lhe Soviet governmeni that affect them personally or who participate in spontaneous disorders even though they know thai such action is strictly forbidden Wc categorize and define these protest actions as follows;
ollective action by workersobsite to curtail economic production in support of specific objectives requiring redress byto resolve.
Demonstration. An activity of persons publicly assembled, or otherwise publicly identified, toovernment policy or loause noi supported by lhc government.
rotest action lhat resultsemporary breakdown of publicinvolving property damage or injuries or that requires the nwbiliu-tton of armed force lo restore order
Political Violence. Acts of or attempts at violence in which political rnotives are readily apparent or can easily be inferred, includingof polilical leaders or state officials. sdf-imnvolation. and sabotage of state functions, (u)
eported incidents0 to the present ate the dala on which ihis analysis is based These incidents do not necessarily indicate ihe existence of great subterranean political dissension orany acuie ihrcat to the regime, for Western democracies,scnis spanning moreecade would represent nolhing significant. Throughout Soviel history, however, public political activity, such as
blttfltj
protests and demons!rations, has been considered Illegal and politically impermissible Under Andtopov. no less than his predecessors, any public protesterignificant risk, no matter how peaceful the act, and at the *ciy least must expect harsh treatment by thc militia, including immediate arrest or forceable dispersal. Repeat offenders and strike leaders canombination of KGB harassment, loss of pay or jobs, longer prison terms, forced labor, or confinement in mental institutions. The fact that civil unrest nonetheless occurs in the face of these constrainu indicates the existenceroblem of some consequence for the USSR's leaders;inimum. Soviet elites are indeed more concerned now about thc poiential effects of popular discontent than they have been for lhc pastears or saf^^^
Because these incidentsolitical problem for Soviet authorities, virtually no information about them is available from publk Soviet sources. We are aware that reportingthat an event actually happened as the reporta rugging problem in research of thisost of the reports for this ttud> have comeariety of HUM INT sources: diplomatic rcporline. travelers, emigres, defectors, and
sensitive human sources iC
_jFew of thc incidents in this study can be considered "proven conclusively" in thc sense lhat ihey have been reported bv multiple, independent sources. Wc base used only those reports lhat appear to be credible, however, and we believe that the data basehole issound fl^lfltaaaaHft
Finally, the data basehorough but undoubtedly incomplete compilation of incidents of civil unrest In back-searching available reports for the, some have surelv been missed.12 the compilation of available reports is probably more complete, bul it is very likelyarger proporiion of incidents for these past two years ts noi yet covered in available reporting. This gap results necessarily from the time lag that occurs betweennts and subsequent reports lhal identify them. Nevertheless, if allowances are made for ihe uncertainties of reporting, the dala base compiled for this study shouldood approximation of the extent and nature of civil unrest in ihe Soviet Union0
In sum. care should be taken neither to overestimate the significance and potential of this study's data nor to assume that the oied examples have negligible polilical importance io thc Soviet regime kg,^
1ore dr tailed Discussion ol dm wliCii. and rriaird rntttvodolog'Til issues, sec ihendix
IV
Dimensions of Civil Unrest In thc Soviet Union
Keyunresi in the Soviet Union takes many forms.0 intelligence
airjli Hurt*hii KrupWi/"
reportases ol industrial strikes and work stoppages.
public demonstrations, and occasional violence, including sabotage, rioting, and even political assassination attempts. Virtually none of these incidents has been reported in the Soviet media, andew in lhe Western press. If there is error in thc estimated total number of these incidents, it is almost certainly on the lew side because of underreporting.!
Such unrest is gcogtaphically widespread Reported incidents hasein closeoviel cities (or oblasls)and in almost every republic during the pastthe Baltics to Siberia, Ccniral Asia io ihe Arctic; in large cities, small towns, and rural areas. Apparently no place is immune: disiurbanccs have occurred in huge factories and small plants, coal mines and food stores, and ai government buildings and Cornmunisi Party
A wide cross section of thc Soviet populace, including industrialcoal miners, bus drivers, and constiuction crews, has been involved in civil unrest. In several instances, white collar workers, union leaders, families, and Party members also have been
Much civil unresi is economically based. In particular, food shortages and dissatisfaction with thc quality of life in the USSR accouni for more incidents of unrest than any other faclor. Because consumer frustrations are rooicd in thc budgetary priorities of the regime and the inherent sluggishness of thc Soviet economy and bureaucracy, ihey arc no; likely to subside in lhc near lerm W
The combination of economic grievances with ethnic nationalism in the non-Russian republics (especially in the Baltic states) accounts for most of thc incidents of civil unrest observed0 and for most of ihe apparent increase in unrest during lhe past four years at*
ata and ihc problem of underreporting hue been discussed "ilh CI VsCenter.d|Si.ppori Group, shoseated on in appropriate natntical model for this kmd cf prob'em. ij;bai ihr act ml number of incident of unrtu for triet least doubleases (see test and apoer.di* for iiib-^in-^ifjaj.
In general, (he regime has been carefuliscriminate between strike actions and other forms of unrest, particularly if the issue is food shortage;
Limited information suggests that striking workers are more likely to kin concessions than demonstrators; thc latter are much more likely to be arrested or dispersed fjp
Even (hough political violence in the USSR is neither widespread nor organired. scattered reports since thef sabotage, arson, and political assassination attemptsepth of commitment in some antisystem individuals lhat has not been evident in earlier ycais Moreost kinds of civil unrest, poliiical violence shatters tranquility andote of unpiedictabilily in challenges to ihe public order. (SB
Thc regime is known to be concerned about the disruptive potential of Cm. unrest. Crash efforts to buy off striking workers with food supplies insteac of outright repression, the scale of the food program itself, and various expressions of concern by midlevel and higher political elites as seen in HUMINT source reporting point to an apparent sensitivity lhal anythingolish-type Soltdanly movement must not be permuted io
Thc scope and character of popularees {hat arc suggested inivil unrest probablyreater long-range challenge to thc regime than the narrower intellectual dissident movement. These incidents of ctvi! unrestopular willingness to hold ihc regime more accountable for perceived shortcomings Moreover, the srontaneits inherent in much of the unres( examined here may complicate the maintenance of public orderolicy response primarily based on repression may be more likely to cause additional popular alienation lhan to reduce ii. Such an ouicomc would undermine current Soviet efforts lo increase substantially labor productivity, one of the government's most important economic priorities For the Soviets, (his mayicious circle of greater potential domestic significance forjft theas Had toth anytime in the pasi three
Conienls
Preface
Judgments
Olimrx
of Keeping Order in Soviet Society
Gauging Civil Unrest t
a! Unrest
Profiles of Uniesi: From Thc Boiiom Looking Up
Violence
of Unrest
Interpreting Uorea From ihe Top Looking Do-n
l
19
Sovietc Si>.ff
Soviet Policies Are Aiming
Implications
Political Stability
(or Intelligence
Note on Methodology
Incidents c'. RepotiedUnrest. t>
Incidents of Reported Cml Unrest, by Republic and City (or
.
Rank-Order of Incidents of Reported Civil Unrest, by Republic and
USSR. Sue Fstimites of Repotted Demonitraiions and Riots.
USSR Reported Demonstrations and Riots Imokmg More
LSiKS 1
9I
Locations of Reported Multiple Strike
of"Rcpottcd Political Violence.
USSIu^ummaTy of Causes of Civil Unrest Incidents.
Type of Incjdcnijiyjvlain Causes of Civil 20
A Capture-Recapture Model of Unobserved Strike Activity 26
Based on Two Collection Methods,
(fold out)
of Reported Civil Unrest in lhe
A Trend Line Comparison of Reported Cases of Civil Unrest in
Average Incidents Per Year of Civil UnrestS2
Average Incidents Per Year of Civil Unicsi
Civil Unrest by Type and
Growth in Average Incidents Per Year of Cml Uniest by Major
ii*iW-
Fire Glimpses of Keeping Order in Soviet Society
pring dayublic park in Central Asia. Onarge-scale riot broke oul between native residents and Russians in Dushanbe, thc capital of Tadjikistan. Relations between thc two nationalities had been outwardly calm for years. This incident eruptedussian man beatadihik youth in the city's central park. Before it was over, troops were brought in to restore order; aboul OO rioters were injured severely enough to require hospital treatment. Several accounts were reportedestern visitor that as many0 Tadzhiksussians had been imolved.ajfc
oal mine in the Ukraine. In late May or earlyefrigerator train, which was loaded ai ihc Baltic port of Klajpcda. Lithuania, withons of imported meats, was diverted from its intended destination of Moscow. The train was ihcn urgently dispatched to ih: Donetsk Oblasl in the Ukraine where it was unloaded. Local workers explained that the meal was needed ioildown strikeearby coal mine. During the period of unloading, ai least one or iwocomparably loaded meat trains also arrived. In all, perhaps as much as Aidons of fresh meal were delivered to ihe striking coal miners at
Donmk am
ity square in Tallinn. Estonia.rowd oftudents gathered at Vo;da Square and carried placards slating: "Where is bread andWhere isAway withimilar leaflets were distributed to passers by and ai some schools. Dissidents said ihis action closely followed lhe cample of Poliih workers, and in fact ii had been closely coordinated wiih SolidarityttjB)
ith an SIVO special detachment in Serpukhov, near Moscow. Onecember Soviet authorities took steps toquell probable worker unrest in Moscow. Original plans lo employ MVD (Ministry of Interna) Affairs) troops garrisoned tn Serpukhov for the Moscow operation had to be reversed because authorities feared possible worker disturbances in Serpukhov in suppori of lhc MoscowAll loads in and oul of thc
town wen cloud No information is available on ihc activity of ihe Moscow workers lhai prompted ihc ihreai ofa sympathy action in nearby Serpukhov and Ihc apparent need for moic than one MVD unil to preserve publicordcr in neatby locations at the same limcf
n the Siberian eiiy of Krasnoyarsk. Two strikes in this city were met wuh different responses. In January, when ?Q0 workers demanded greater worker representation and improved plant condniohs, the KGB broke up thc strike and aircsied the strikers. Later that spring, railroad workers struck for two days over food shortages, etpeciall) meat Immediate deliveries were promised and the sin Vets returned to then jobs. Subsequently, meat and butter rationingreported in that city.
Dimensions of Civil Unrest in Ihe Soviet Union
I- Glutting Civil Unrest
Civil unrest in the Sovici Union appear? to hepossibly is even growing. This contrasts with thc prevailing condition of organised intellectualose vigor appears at kast momentarily sapped by the current climate ofCuirently, nearly all intellectual dissident groups are inactive, have disbanded, or have gone' Suppressing the dissident movement and its quest fo* human rights.r. has not removed the basis for tn ii unrest in thc USSR And it is chiefly the spontaneous protest acts of ordinal) ciiitemtownspeople, and families--not OTganircd activ ities of the Westernised intelligentsia that are the focus of this studyMM
Extent of Unrest
Approximately JSO incidents of civil unrett0 have been identified for thisll of ihem represent challenges to governmental policies oragains' goscrnmental performance About three-fourths of Ihese incidenls have been public demonstra-tions or labor strikes. Nearly all the rest have involved some kind of violence. (See tableore detailed discussion of incidents will follow in the net section.)
Closeities (or oblasts) in thc USSR have reported civil ditorder of one kind or another. Nearly half of rhesc cities haver more
' Seeittaeea Paper SOV IM0JOSX rSeeret NfCl
December. ike IvjrJaW
f'oiprai po It'll, rsaeciatl) ubkS (el
Th* inclutKin and ton"o far iht ineihu diia
aie diumsrd in ihe ippcnoii Ihc rtiTei ft^Ottda toaoanaost
labuliticnftoaj
events. Incidents of umcst have been reported inevery Soviet republic exceptn all bui three republics, incidenls have been reported in two or more septriic locations (Sec foldoul map and table 7Mjfsn
Unrest is distributed unevenly, nearly two-thiids of ii has been reported in just threelhc Ukraine, and Estonia. When compared to otherfrith ethnic minorities. Ihc Baltic slates iho* greater unrest. (Sec table>aaa>
Bccauie of longstanding and severe limitations on reporting activities of this kind, ii is almost certain ihat the data for this study understate ihe uue amount of civil unrest in the Soviet Union We cannot know with any ptccivion how much unrest occurs iheie thii is not reported in the West (openly or sccictlvi, butan perhaps get some idea of its order of magnitude bytatistical model thai has proved credible for other intelligence problemsimilar kind In general, byt of different collection methods, ihis model indicates lhat ai least twice as much civil unrest may have occurred in lhc USSR during thehan It refkcied in thc data for this stud) 'fjft
**tawesii i*otumm oa the tuiKii, of intelligent* (wrung then lhan on an) itt Ring titnjuillu) thereby implied Foi csampk. on*m acts ot lerroritm in the SovietUici iKji border *'i' i- in" is oppasinoo so ihen ikeit Tms>m of these iheee fepaWia.fgbaottiao. moreules.I
oieluaian ii derivedtatistical iqcHiM. not hardoei svtfcu ihai ih* dtine of ii.il unreal ia ihe So-wt If iso this parer Sui.sihilfor
'.'tI i 'Men! olim -n- -.
nit ihai asayccurred ban "eni* oo*
i(ilf" -i'l" Irvine
Centtr. Anal)tie Ssiprors Gro.p. Fullerhii rwdtl arc"Ca(iOa to init llvd> isnerdit faTaa
Table 1
USSR: Incidents ofhil Unrest, by
of
iil.-n.
>iol<ncc
Civil unren appears to have increased in recentis almosi cenainly not decreasing Accuratebetween no* and ejrlier periods,difficult betause tenoning, quality andhave undoubtedly vmrdlime Anin Sosiei contactsiheuringseveral decades and the added coninbutior.reporting have surelv enhanced ourofheon Uaforiunatety. ithere- much of theia cjvfl unrestue io improvementsThus. Our improved sources ofrecent searsapparent growth
in civil unrest data ibuif course, thc actual number of cases) obserscd in ihc trend comparisons that foi lo* aajajB
The increase in reported incidents o'civil unrest appears to bchor.-termong-term trend For the short term, the daia clearly suggesi (in terms of numbers of incidents) thai more unrest has occurred in thehan in any other ihree-year period duringurther, theppear more active than thc early pari of ihedecade For thc long term, an increase is alsoallhough clear-cut trend lines are more difficult to establish- The lackes eloped daia base (as veil for mosl ofrecludes dircci comparisons here between lhc tworecent decides However, comparisons to earlierd:e> of uriroi for theuggest grcaier civil truest in the
han innd
period of lhe preseni study
In comparing lhe pasiears io thisyear period for which we have similar information, we findave nearly four times as many reports of civil unresi incidentss. (See figurehen these two periods are compared by averaging the number of incidents per year, this nearly fourfold45 per year) appears to suggest that lhe laslears of Brezhnev's rule experienced more civil unrest thanyear period that followed Stalin's death. (Sec figure I
More important, theeported incidcnuihe last four yejn of the Brezhnev period also suggests lha; more recent trends may surpass the longer term gros>th rates. For example, averageper year9 show an increase of aboul foui and one-half times lhe amount of civil unresi reportedComparehi* suggests that civil unrest may pose moreroblem for ihe Andropov regime than it has for his predecci-
Again, the reader should be cautioned that some of thisannot at this point reliably esti-mate he*attributable to improved report-ing. and especially the contribution from emigreshatever the rate of growth, we can state with confidence that it has appeared in all four categories of cisilstrikes, riots, and political(see figure i'u and that it has been stimulated primarily by economic and nationalist reasons. These causal factors are examined more fully tn section I! fJBjb
jo'n of si'iku. cdroeiiriiioni. mdfor HSJ-tr ?io"icd infClA EconomicR<;on RR7P'tiiuniSSJt. pp tg. Irscidcnis! art noted in CIA FcittimlcMoro*(nfJom RRunieri Souri t't/ibed)C'sm
l j c
iui")tonjnj ihror .'ollouri :l<nrtntur, t'nil uniti! HitSla'in Hutu cJ ihrb fullontsr nature ind causes ef otne-cd chimrsa NHfct
SC OUSS/ti
Table I
USSR: Incidents of Reported Ci.il Unrest, by Republic and City (or
Numberode no
Location!More
Tout*
USSR
eibncv *
on l
(ll
IV
i
;,n
edict*
Rot
rt
J
linr
mi Hod
interne asm
Alia
.<
ubliM
Forme.-lf N'ovvj*helny.
II i. tlKr ii
Joa^Seem--
SI/*I
Table 3
USSB:ei of Incidents ofprotests of Soviei polices or performance
CM! Unresi. by Republic ind Region.ibe most frequent kind of civil uw<k
i ident
ft^ubbc
ithuAnta
i
rMimn
(cn-Mio
i menu
an
Prima
stales
f Bcloriiiila
Am
icpobtia
>>flMHMBa8BMa8BaaVlaV
in ibe USSR Moreemonsiraiions have been repoiicdor example:
hen the laii mcs were doubled ihrosigh-oui lhe USSR, cabdrivers in Minsk protested.thai higher rates would result in fewer fares, several hundred of them reportedly drove (heir talis to Ihe Bclorussian Party Central Committeeand honked their horns indignantly Thewere anested.
Numerous spontaneous dcmoasi rations in Estonia91 revealed strong ethnic
.nationalism and anti-Soviet hostility Duringta
major protests broughl out thousands of demonsua-ICS The issues invoked anti-Russian sentiments, food shortages, and opposition lo educanonal and cultural policies Several demonstrations turned inlo riots
i Groups of ethnic Germans have recently traveled
long distances to Moscow io press lhcir claims to
emigrate, chiefly to West Germany Protesn in
Moscow's Red Square or in front of embassies
probably have not brought these demonstrators any
happier results than back home in Central Asia or
the Caucasus. However, they arc peri'Stent and
II. Profiles of Unrest;
appear little deiciied by repeated arrests and KGB haiassnicm paaaks
Soviet protestors demonsitaie for many reasons Two
iltsmxit visas
lesser degree in Uihuama andas ap-
istact
; Governmeni sulTicicntly strong ihnt the pan
rw;,h
ihe lently. in demonstrationshc Ukraine. Tadzhiki-
tneir
sun. .md Uzbekistan. Often nominally cultural issues
atrti
dcmo'risiralions. strikes, riots, and political violence
are discussed below, (ij)
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Figure 1
tcnd Line Companion of Reported Incidents of Civil Unrrsl innd
.4
/
Wl -) M
it
" "1
at
ll; Iu!
i^'or'.pnaara**oa*inIN ur-wiijmHi wmri s
tfNMtillp> ijfiflliKfxifi -
. i
rationalistic causes in ihese non-Russian re* publics dcmoniifiiiensew Mminer ol fc'du-caiion. fo* rumple, or unt>etsii> laaguige mftn menu ire Wliti understoodii develops lhal lhe new nmisur is alleged lo be pro-Ruitiaa (as *as ihe case ia 1i.he languagers for Russian (ii in Georgia)
Shortages of food and olher basic necessities hive emerged ii in additional imporlam cause ofSomewhat moreorcn of ihese cm
' Thr cvlnTiroium* ofi^ unifaciioni i-mnitx foxem of i - Mh* IMC* iloncmtAj.-ki FA -t
MTV, Cj'j*mftihi So>ir' Ril"ni ILI
be identifiedostly in lhe RussianiRSfSRl. but in ill major legions of the Soviet Uata is Aboul lhe same number of other eVrrsc**ir at-oris-*so':ited cases io bere-SLlltd from aa array of poliiical grievances, including tbc nien-entiori in Afghanistan, the arrest of otbererceiv-ed gcnernmeni role inrise in crime rates, an attempted village relocation, ngbis of invalids,n ihe fall of ihcather biurrc phenomenon has occurred on three occasionsself-idemified Maris, some in uniform,rkmoniirited in Moscow's Pushkin Square and Red Square, several distributed leaflets from the top of the Novcsli Tress Building before ihey were arrest-td.ff^
best corf
AVAIU8'v
2
USSR; Average Incidenls Per Year of Civil Unrcsl
Figure J
USSR: Average Incidenls Per Year or Civil Unrcsl
10
40
t
ZTTTTZ
dcrr.onsirahon oftudentsstudcnit) ai Moscow Siaie University on19JI mm probably related io ihcof niari.il ir. Poland Sitij arrests
Although ihc data on duration are sparse,apparently do noi lasl long, several in Red Square have been broken up in ooe minute or less Further or writers arc typically arrested or otter-ne forceabls dispersed Rarel>ublK demoasiraiioa mcioncihaiori response b> the icgime.ew of these exceptionsccurred in
the non-Russian republics; Iwo UrvoKcd protestsfood shortages Thc Overwhelmingof demon siraiiont base been suppressed b> gather uses, cause or lerisdtciaon not>>ilhitandir,Ei^b
Information is far tootypical" Soviet proieitot However. ate Baltics. >outh appears toacior. High school- and vollegcage vouth have participatedsionn and Lithuania
-
II 11
Alio, no patterns concerning ihr lire of clemonjtra-lions are discernible in ihe data. All sizes have reportedlyas few is ihree or four paiticipanis to as manyboulajor disturbances have involved moreartici-pants (seehese include demonstrations that turned into major itots in eight separate locations (see table tat*
Riot*
Mass civil disturbances resulting in injuries or deaths of participants, causing property damage, orihc use of armed ttoops or vehicles to restore otder are defined here as riots. Typically, though notthese arc Urge demonstrations that have gotten out of control. Of ihciots identified litre, at least half probably involved morearticipants, and several more0 Nearly all appear to have occurred spontaneously For esample.
Accordingormer Leningrad resident who based his account on numerous conversations with participants or witnesses to theiot was forceably quelled in Leningrad by tanks and troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) during the summerg. The cause of theas the cancellationock concert scheduled with the Rolling Stones and JoanA ciowd. which numbered, assembled anyway; itthe police from making mass arrests Rioters shouted political slogans,ew carriedth "freedom" written on them. Some injuries and arreils resulted.
1 The three days of rioting inarge city in the Caucasus region of (he RSFSR, in late1 reportedly Involved mass assaults wiih bricks and clubs against theovernment building was occupied. Many arrests and massive property damagesecent accounteliable sourceifferent inicrprelation of these events than that described ia earlier Western press reporting While eatlicr coverage described ethnic tensions between minority Caucasus groups as thc catalyst for the disturbance, this source heard
21
H- SO
IV
SII CO
5
0
More0
HPMtcd arrsMnuf lou!
fiom residents that public reaction lo thccorruption of local government officials was
the cause oi the outbreak.enioi polilical official was sent from Moscow during the riotingolomentses. Poluburo Candidate and RSFSRis attempts to address ihcere met with shouts of "you don'l tell us you listen, and we will id! you.'
Thc above account of thc Ordrho-iikidze notinga significant popular reaction to Ihe widespread corruption that many believe to character ire ihe Soviet polilical system' However, the causes ofin the USSR are diverse Two cases appear
' Sre rsreosUy Komi inn ftSR Tht Cotii.plSimcn iadorme.iW miacacna*i* UMli-es t* the Wenl) enhanceske in lb* iptem ind by itlorOirnH> aa oahenise iff btiu*craiMMviK beloet.ihii ir*.ihc So-iei syiiem -ill cmmuiHtlobe a<tt of ihtt'ri'eil "fl
iiinri on Ihr tan nf ihceei Theatn.relr tapped ihaii het- ia
rejimi aa>ss>aarrassvaK
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
Tabic S
USSR: Reported Demonstrations aod Rlols In.otving More
Dementi rations
4k if nd
0 participants
Grff.il (JI
RSFSRUI
I9S0
Emma
l*tl
isiry of lr.ier.ul Affairs
Estonia
eampl
Lithuania
Georgia
RSFSR
Kiukh.ian
kraine
RSFSRUI
than tO.OOO piitiripants
ailK-.pant.
r unitsnSO.OCO
Estonia
IviO
ck-.miu It
Tadihikitua
Uble n
related to recent food and consumer goods shortages (Esionia and Lithuania) Nearly al! of Ihe noting in ihc non-Russian republics has involved nationalist sentiments The eight known riots in the Baltics are the clearest cases of ethnic nationalism inspiring major civilfueling them if the ouibreaks result from other causes such as food shortages.
Riots have also been reported in Central Asia and in Georgia. At least two smaller incidents were related to thc Soviet interventioniliiary induction center inecond insobed ihc violation ol Muslim burial rights in Kazakhstan when lhe closed eolfins of Muslims were returned from lhe Afghanummary of rcccni rioting is found in table 6.
Strikes
In ihc Soviettrike Uabaaovko)entiill> lhc same as it doesereollective action tocurlail producllon in support fif specific objectives. In thc West, where strikes are ar.
icccpted mcjns of collective bargaining,liretv carry placards and man picket lines. In the USSR, ho-ever. workers ivpically report tomplovmcnt nation, bui then sit down andork. Work stoppages mav thus take the formSiwown" strike. Alternatively,ork slowdown In other instances, worker, en masse may simply refuse to show up. Whatever the tactics, the larger objective ii always the same-ollective will and cohesbeness in forcefully seeking redress of specific grievances fromThese may or nuy noi be jobrelaicd For example:
Ai thc Volea Motor Plant in Tolyatti, sinking buvdrivcrs in9 forceably blocked buses from leaving ihe bus garages, disrupting essential mass transportation for factory workers. Their pay raises and the removalaiedwere mei. In0 the
:u
BESTCGPY AVAiUBLE
Tabic 6
USSB; Summary of Reported
Ci
ftrtti
Till.*.
9
Mlnal.un
I9t0
cc
(SIC
0
hund'ce!
iioru
tbvK
tto-iind.
im, tufno*f immoliiM
th.Tiiiii
.uk
k'ir.Jilia ihiM
ad1
er^wi'aitsraaeitae eii/afararbaia-
IHI
eta'uo
e,
WlV-lfl'
i9H
Ala
tut or0
ed
itii
|
1
Ctllir iaju
l-rt--li.il.
JO
in
atnduciian
fotrii'j abound torn:
n
[
went on strike again. Thii tine iheyengthening of bui routes without an increase in pay Of significance, they were support, ed bj assembly line workers apparently angered by foodact figures are not known, bul acco.'ding to Western piess accounts as manyOO0 workers may have participated in tins strike More strikes in Tol'jatti over food shortagesin the fall0 and agam in the spring
Inanagers in Norilsk and ihicc officials in Moscowengthy telephone call discussedays toitdown strikeilitary construction unit.an workers were protesting the delayromised pay bonus. No amount of cajoling, promises. Or threats fromofficials seemed sufficient to break the impasse The strike leaderart) member.and he evidently enjoyed the support of the local trade union. The apparent subordination of the strikers to the Ministry of Defense evidently made noThis strike involvedoorkers and continued for two weeks. (See excerpts of theconversation in thet was resolved to the workers' Satisfaction. }
We have reports oftrikes in Ihe Soviet Union in the past doren years, slightly fewer than the number of demonstrations. These two forms of unrest are similar in the directness of their challenge to Soviet authorities; but they differ in causes and in probable outcomes
In general. Soviei workers strike over relatively few issues in contrast to demonstrators who lake to the streetsariety of causes. Workers usually strike over food shortages, inadequate pay, and poorconditions. Abouttrikes have involveddemands, mostly for food supplies, especially meal. These have occurred primarily in the RSFSR, thc Baltic republics, and in the Ukraine. Typically, the regime will promise moreoften supply it. selling up food disiribution systems within fac-
Sccond in importance is pay dispules; abouttrikes have been reported involving pay and salary issues.ut in piece rates or an increase in produclion norms willtiike In one case, when paychecks were not available on payday because ofasnafu, workers seized the plant and prevented the ncsl shift from entering Authorities relented,oscow bank after hours to settle the dispute fajtjy-
Unpleasani or unsafe working conditions havefewer strikes than Tood and pay. but workers can be adamant on these issuesold airaulty grating causing injuries,ack of fuel for healing have been Ihe cause of strikes. Ai least one Strike involved demands for grcaier worker
Information on numbers of parlicipanli. and follow up actions againsi them, is sparse, but (wo character:!lies seem to stand out First, and not surprisingly, strike actions continue to be risky for workers. Some reporis mdicale strike leaders wCrc later aircsted (forinome strikes are crushed by militia. MVD. or KGB iroops (for example. Krasnoyarsk. Kuvbyshev. and Kohtla-Jarvel'l
Second, even if strike leaders are often punished, strike actions seem togci better results thanTo judge from incomplete information, where regime responses to these incidents of unrest can be discerned (abouluir soroughlyercent of those includedhe pattern favors strikers unambiguously: by an1 ratio, demonstrations result in repression (arrests.
' Accordm* iothi'dhind tecevnt. one notibiy brutalrite is alletrd toulled in the deaths of JCOiners. The niuei -ete pit aod -orlint coodriient. Tic -oik siopoage occaiied in thc mine shah. >hKh the mlbotitici decided to Hood All iiiAci dic-ned. The action wai intendedeitutiK to tike-minded workers bul was officially reportedanThe location ii aw dear, bul it wasoalfield I" Katikhttan or Siberia The upjnsnararnsKd-fJp^
12
BEST
EcUing roughed up. or forccabltatio, slnkes retail infrom thesupplies are rushed in.food distribution systems established. senis fued. and pay scales adjusted By nohis ibr only outcome (and strike leaders probably know the tisksl. but limited data suggest it is the most likely one Aft
oil utte.i
Finally, strikes differ from demon si tal ions in their geographic concentration. Worker unicsi occurs most often in thc RSFSR (especially lhe Utahhe Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia, thai is. lhc moreparts of tbe Sonet Union. Thc industries most affected are transportation (for example, the auto factories in Tol'yaui. Gor'kiy. and Kharkov and the Kama Riser liuck plant in Btcrhncs) and coal mines, especially in the Ukraine {notably, theegion and ia Dorttlikhe principalIraas basing experienced at lean two nrikc actions arc noted insak
Political Violence
three moic self-immolations were attempted,< ecu fully."
ate glimpse of activii* ihat may involve mote lhan one republicood source reported acts of sabotage and assassinations of Soviet soldiers90 in the republics bordering Afghanistan These acts were reportedly earned oat by Soviel Asians protestiflg the Soviel intervention in Afghanistan
"Oinei self immolationi hive ooeviird in Ihe Soviet Union, butMi neetsiiily political acts Tbe nasi rtceei caie occioed io Redio poliiical nwt<<ci sresii"i'i1 artdtnilt tlrtpondeni. also cons-niiittd seirimmolitionI
Fe* incidents of violence have been reported in Ihe Soviet Union that arc attributable, implicitly orto poliiical motivations, llo-cver. report, of train sabotage and subway bombings, shootings of police, and efforts tc assassina ic top Communist political leaders in ai least five different citiesigh degree of commitment in some Soviet political opposilion.on of cisitsuch violence shatters tranquillity andoic of unpredictability in challenges io ihe publk order, it may thus represent an increasingly importantin the Soviet political equation Nearly ao such incidenls have been reported in the past decade
Onn an extreme act of nationalism, an otherwise unknown Lithuanian youth named Roman Kalanta committed sclf-immolalionublic park in Kaunas, ln ihc nationalist turmoil lhat followed, including two days of mass rioting,
13
have identified two attempts1o assassinate Ihc lale Genera) Secretary Drerhncc and attempts against Communis! Part* leaden in four republics P. Gnihkavichyus in Lithuaniaj.no in Estonia9
E '. is.nl alvu7
and E.eorgia36
- Violence in ihe Baltic nateseporiedly included the sabotagingV tc-er. ihe huirvingovernmcni and an at-itmpi to blowridge in Ejtonia. Si* fires were set simultaneously in Latvia, including one at thc Supreme Soviet building in Riga,ithuania, the electrical power supplyarge factor) was sabotaged
In Georgiaerrorists -etc recently sent to prison. and four were executed,cr.es of raids against the rriiliiia and military installations corrrniiied during the past eight )can>
of police hase beca reporied inareas In Kazakhstan, in what one source described as parteries of assassinattons of state officials. two po>teemen were shot lodeaihai their homes, for the most part, the victims have been Russians In lhe Russian city of Rosiov, several policemen were machine-gunned, one of whom was killed, when unidenlified assailants opened fire wiih anweapon.
he incidcci. included hen. bke rami ahm ihiirceaCdwTumed "'epeai.thtolhITicnihthe*eljimsc bii be> iaiaodcattacreappttM atta.siMiion sncanpulack hII-kv detail tnppareml/ tveeestfolesttuded foe riswoi afaMfcl raihei ihai tr.ilulilets thai .he KCBafiacor ihc "lurdersranf tieof Miauterindrhtiian! Anotherai.inaiioneluded Beeaowccurred inolish nanonat
1 Three tiains reportedly have been sabotaged in recent years One was blown up jn Chelyabinsk. RSFSR, resulting in many casualties, ino motive was apparent. Incod irain bound for Russia was delayeden iu wheelsbotagcd.ilitary convoy was diiiugcdolotov cocktail while en route io Afghanistan, between Bukhara and Dushanbe
Iniain nationubwaybombed7 resulting in injuries
The political motives for much of this recent violence do not appear io differ greatly from ihe motive, lor olher forms of civil urroi: but Ihe intensity of feelingiolenceoubtlessly significant Extremen a! Urn and peiennial resent men: againsi Sovici rule in ihe Balucs. for example,urelyore volatile basisaUiing reactions to food shortages ihcreh;-clscwherc in ihcSonei Union Similarly. Central Asian ethnic and cultural affinities for Afghanistan piobablyole ir ihc violence that acccmpa-nied oiher unrest following the Soviet invasion (See table S
Palterns of Unresl
Civil unrest in the USSR is geographicallyil is expressed in different ways, andl is economically based To be sure,iny fraction of ihc Soviet population has icpoiiedtyin these forms of political challenge; bjl ils messages lo the Soviet leadership areQuality of life here is poor. food, especially good fox is often scarce, pay is low- and working conditions ar disagreeable. In ihe non-Russian republics, many wani greater auionomy from central conlrol; olhers simply, want to emigrate from the USSRY*)^
r^iVtee-
BEST COR*
AVWLABLE
Table 8
USSR: Summit) of Reported Political
lacitfeat
if.Cconn (I)
in Lam* ll)
m Ln tim nit
ol policrtli
RSFSR
mo
MkCMMfgl
Seba'aicluawilfitm
.
O-
latiimatLkraiac
'y. itm
to-ti, Tallinn
(aiitmpii. Tallinn
tula. Lama
aad lab-taow Ol
chat
PicCvnRiia
SU jiw.n*a
a few incidents of unrest appear to involve more than one republic simultaneously One reportabovel mentioned violence along thcborder. Two Olher incidents, both hunger strikes, apparently occurred in several republicsThey were occasioned by0 opening in Madrid o' the Conference on Security aadia Europe One hunger strikelved JO Jewish rerusen.ksarious Soviet cities (at the least, cities in the RSFSR and thc Ukraine -ere involved) to protest Sovici emigrationarget strike reportedly0 Penlccostals protesting So**ci reli-gio-js oppression. %f ^
A variety of reasons explain rcccni cavil unrest The following discussion is based onercent of ihc cases forcausal informaiion ts available In general, ih.-ee mamfrustrations.
ethnic nationalism, and workplacefor about two-thirds or the incidents reported. (Sec^
Consumer frustrations, thai ii. dissatisfaction with living standards,ajor cause of civ il unrest These explicitly account for aboul oneiroid of all cases -here specific caases have been reported or are readily appareai; food shoruges clearly head .he list Similarly, other incidents have been caused byof consumer goods or other banc necessities (for example, "lhc shelves arer "there is nothinguy' I. which probably, although not necessar.lv. involved food.*gW
Table 9
USSR: Summary of Causes ofUnrest0 82
Ruuna Re.
Touts
of Incidcnu
of Total
of Incidcnu
Tl-.iI
mbeiee* Inodeau
of Toul
frustrations
-Iii'
<
ihiriifl
niiiooiliiffl
VIV
J
li
ith
i
'
i
ind titiry
cavi/i
ItlutV
Thimblethose cues efe-.vil onreft forliisuif "pa^Mal"
ciflcwviei-neededoi rcadil> apparent frcoihcor'i iff iiaSetitMuses,
hf ihe :it total utet.ot about eijhl out of eeryS>,ei Nat it.: icein-
^.utiilta*Viof iiwahdi. TTiove
most irrtponani one--it tibulited to. each incident in thiiif "other" inclsde tuchn tillage
Thcieu no doublerime uiei-oiiaa
3
te tibulited if "aiiionilitl"eeason for ihe event.while Olhci
TV.'i ublc it
consumer frustrations, especially foodhave accounied for more labor unrest ihan other causes, Ibe related issues of pay and workingarc also important io workers. These workplace grievances have prompted fewer strikes than food shonages. about one-ihird or the strikes included heredJJt
Filmic nationalism in the non-Russian, republicsignificant, though complex, source of umest In practice, it is ofien analytically difficult io separate nationalist causes from other causesasis for
incidents in these republics. In the Baltic slates, for example, where civil unrest appears greater than in other minority republics, nationalism has been an overriding element lhat gets mixed into other issues that spawn demonstrations, vole nee. and often Strikes In general, because of the aided factor of ethnicity, some issuesreater potential for fuelinghepub -cs lharthe RSFSR. Usui* exhibiting this poicriial range fiom
WSTCOW
concerning living standards, such at food or pay. io ihose impinging on ethnic autonomy, suchi educational ot cultural administration. The ti Ii o inteiptet these grievancesationalistic xrsjiective appears more pronounced in Estonia. Lithuania, and Georgia than else-here ia the Sovici Union, although it it possible that we may simply know mote about these areas. At theit. ihose few elhnic disputes lhat are noi targeted againsi Russians lack lhe greater destabilizing potential of moil minority nationalism in ihc L'SSR 'ajg*a>
The main causes of overall civil unrcsl. thai it, ihose
When Ihc main causes for incidenls during ihcH are comparedhose. those stimulated by consumer frustrations and by ethnic nationalismreater8 times each) over thu periodncidents caused by otherJob issues, namely pas and working conditions, abo gress.ause of unrest, although the amount of increaseunes)some*hit less than for consumer and rsaiienatist unrest Emigrilaon issues also contributed to some of this growth, but ihe increase in cmigiaiion protestsimes) during this period accounts for the smallest share of thii surge -hen compaird -uh the olher major causes (See
bj type of incident inl is notable (hat consumer frustrations -eipcciall) foodfigured in all types of unrest, particularly ihc strikejob grievances (such as pa> and workingrOfls) are added loconiamer users, the strike emerges as ihe preferred instrument of protest for bread-and-butter concerns. In contrast, ethnic nationalism appears prominently in demonstrations, violence, and riots, but not in labor unrest Finally, although demonstrations result from all major causes of unrcsl. ihey arc used rnore by those seeking visas (especially ethnic Germans) lhan by protesters rtvoii* vated by any other issue |ajf>
The recent upswing in civil unrest during the past four yearsndombination of grievances and cannoi be explained by any single factor. As discussed above, some of thishe result of improved reporting, bui wc cannoi know precisely how much. Leaving aside the issue of how-much of ihis growth is rent or artifact, wc can still compare lhe causes underlying most of these recent incidents to the reasons for incidents before the apparenl upswing. All four of thc principal causes for unrcslrc reflected in thc growth of Ihc pasi four years, but some more so lhan others njjjaj,
" Twon smaller minoiltlts art included in thisase In on* lonfilmdint rcoootnic andleianrci ol Abltiaiiant erupted into anu (itoi|<an aemonn rattccitit in noriham Georgia in1 la tie second tenuonj bet-teairi-r. prooded tke bain for the OrdakonUudiea
ncassed earlm lbc pope) AaajafJaj moot account ibeah foe cura patmu to
rriei in* estimation louiStd oft the inodenl Throe days of
violenl aninjitrrn rioiinf folio-ed djaakaaaaa)
19
In tuni. economicevidenced in consumer
nd the bulk of the workplace grtcv-ancesnuai for more ineider.li of unrcti. and for
moie growth in unrest, than an> olher single cause.
When nationalist unreit in ihr ro.vRussian republics is added io ihese cconorsic issue, ihc bun for moil of ihc known civil unrest for thes Ihus explained, as well as for lhc aprJ'ent growth in ihis tensity during these pastcaiiajV*
III.rest: From tbe Top Looking Do-n
As is shown by the example of certain socialist eoumries. especially Poland, if ihe Pany does not promptly nme conflicts Inails to concentrate the efforts af society on overcoming them, this can lead to serious social and political (rises At the same time, profound knowledge by theParty of the Soviet Union] of thein our society enables it correctly to determine the direction and character ofand argani rational work, to overcome these conflictsrompt and irmely manner, and to ensure this country's unswerving advance along ihe road to communism
V Orlov, in the Ukrainian language parly daily, Radyans'ka UMrailna.JPRS. USSR Report.7) (u)
sc antral
Table 10
USSR: Type of Incident by Main Causes of Civil
m.tmiOB
liiuU
lEirxmlly
u-ii
Pm, ,3
ilt present levcli. civil unre't hit no! visibly endangered Soviet polilicalnolitical crisis, and Soviet leader* arc not acting as if il has. Civil unrest. however, is nothon-ierm ptoblem.
The real significance of popular unrestts potential to disrupt political stability in the USSR Soviet leaden apparently are sensitive to thisecent CIA ir.telhgerKC study has concluded that Sonet clues ate more concerned now about ihc poienlial consequences of popular discontent (and official corruption) ihan in ihe pasiears."for this concern can be deduced from (lie public piess. privaie commentary of Soviet officials, and from receni policy initialises clearly responsive to the threat thai civil unresi may grow.
insiders conclude that more cml unrest is noi only possible but tlui itn get oui of
A Sovicl official confidedS diplomat in late2 thai Andropov's priority would bc to restore order in thc country Thc workers arc losing iheir inccativc and ambitior. he noted.more widespread drunkenness and corruption ihc result ajfe
About the same time, iwo Scvct officials privately laid Polish officials thai the Soviet Government was seriously concerned about the emergenceolidir-iiy-type worker's movement in thc USSR because of ongoing economic problems These Sovicl officials added that lhcas particularly worried, since it fully realircd thc ecowmic situation would not improve substantially in ihe near future
fficials Are Saying
Some midlocl Soviet officials have privatelyto foreigners within ihe past year thai all is not well at home Officials from various Soviet minisirics. state commiltees. institutes; and paityroubled Soviet lociely: domestic morale is down and ihc public's Outlook pessimistic; Ihe populace has become more demanding, youth undisciplined, and workers ceslive Several Soviet
Such private commentary about the prospectsolish spillover effect in the USSRandor that Ihe Soviet press cannoi match The Soviet press, however, has not been restrained in its condemnalion oflabor unions and in portraying Soviet unions
'See CIA ItiuHitriM* Aiicismrni SOVMl.ar^lar
pi.ial Co"tfi:ji Jrffa
OVSfinW Cer'.wo* ^r^
BEST COPr MAILABLE
Figure 5
USSR: Growth In Average Incidents Per Yeir of Civil Unresl b> Major
Ilk
II J
J
1
r>
37"
fully representative and responsive lo workers' imcresis "fija.
Where So'iei Policies Arc Aiming
Beyond private and public acknowledgmentsasis Tor growingaricly of Soviet, policies appears to be aimed at nddrcsiing this problem directly. In Soviel terms, each polk) is fullyOft its own merits: together they amountroad approach lo stemming further popular unreM ^
ISSKNF KC OCX MarM IMI
TKc iflir-xi ar imCimDw-wsiierfii -i i". Ft wrxisim Sc-timmftlM* II and ten.Ulo.oM
riolUm: Food shortages cause strife The single most imronani cause of ihe incidents reported here,industrial unrest, is the popular reaction to food shortages. Po-lieitt: Upgrade food supplies and defuse
hostilities:
The Central Commit leeomprehensive food program ai lhe3 plenum, which Brezhnev had publicly advocated as early
s ii jare)eti,haiisp.M's SreCU Imttt.ftMeSOV 0l SF NC. ItWCaabW HU, Th,
Tin fin if
enerally been conciliatory where unrest his been food related. The pattern in labor strikes his been to rush in food supplies, and. in two rare instances, public demonstrators were met bythanthe issue was lood
Problem: Industrial unresi is widespread, and could get worse.uanccd cartoi-and-stickis in evidence.
The carrot,ushing in food during strikes, has been to institute new food distribution systems ia factories and plants (often resulting in food rationing in nearbyo change unionand refurbish thc image of labor unions through favorable media portrayals: to publicize blue collar promotions to higher party offices, and even to publiciic recent sessions of the Politburo devoted to discussion of letters from Sov kl workers.
The siick policy has been selective arrests of strike leaders afiet the dust tut settled (we have very limited data ono crushminiscule but independent trade unionan uncompromising forcefulness even by recent Soviet standards, and to campaign lor improved laborak
Problem: Greater public awareness of popular unrest couW lead to more of it Policies: Constrict rcloan! informal ion in every possible way:
unbroken official silence has been maintained On ctvd unrestord has appeared in lhc Soviet public media about strikes, food-relatedor acts of political violence In one revealingopular Soviet poet was allowed to travel to the Urals for poetry readings only on the strict
'Secunhip. "OiSMM ia lhe USSR Iu Role andieienicdhe Nauonil luefieence Council, I* Avon HI J.nd Bttir G'tN'tr.bor Unrest in ihe Soviet UfiuUimi in CVMMhnilM. November. Decemberp JJ-If SMOT nth* ICfclfisiTi Tor SiBhodaivOtffil't'i,r Tiercuni tn Seentelligence Aro-'iiiil.retl.Marts mi.t
hehe not make reference lo any strikes there (five were apparently in progress at thai lime)
KGB repression against all forms of public dissent has escalated Thc campaign, which really beganas further intensified inspecially targeting those groups lhat had been successful in getting the aiiention of Western media (Helsinki Monitoring Group, the fledgling peace movement. and Jewish rcfuscniks).
Communications of dissidents wiih Western news reporters and tourists have been disrupted: Western reporters wilb "unapptoved" cilicen contacts base noted increased harassment (one tcponei wasexpelled) Foreign visitors haveightening of customs control* it border crossingstelephone transmissions to the West,irect dialing, have been substantiallytti in the past
None of these policies is Out of character with tbc customary management of Soviet domcsiic problem by the Communist Parly. However, taken together -and especially given the priority these initiatives appcn toclearlyop-level concern about the public mood and an en<ieiy it could become even more sour. Thus, to judge froT. these recent policies, and againsi the background of civil unresi and the Soviet private commentary cum-iried here, the new leadership it acting as though it perceives ihe emerging dimensions of lheued, bui definite, political problem of civil^
IV. Implications
The data wc havea mined show that declining standards ofeal orclearly associated with civil unrest inSoviet Union. Intelligence studies show that the earlier growth in per capita consumption in the USSR has declined in
22
recent year* and that real growth in consumer welfare will be jeopardized in coming year* as the Soviet economic slowdownhus, we maythat there are no ready remedies for much of this recent unrest. Further, ii is possible lhat there could be an increase in civildevelopment lhat would have important domestic implications. Aft
Domestic Political Stability
A significant feature of the Soviet political culture is the apparent distinction Soviet citizens draw between thc economic and the polilical aspects of their system and the differing levels of support they accord to each. In general. Western scholarly studies have shown that there probably hasigh level of uncoerced support for thc Soviet system, bul it is limited aod conditional Much of this support has been based on the generally creditable performance of the economicmany who have left the Soviet Union for largely polilical reasons haveigh regard for its welfare policies Popular support for thc political system, however, has been much moreThis finding, first made in thc major Harvard emigrant survey projeci of, has beenby new dala in more recentecent sludy of the Soviet political Culturethe Implications o( ihis finding as follows:
Liberal democracies, buttressed by the "come rain or come shine" legitimacy which their political institutions confer or. them, may find it possible toeriod of static or even falling Ihingoseis based more narrowly upon "perform-ance" criteria may find it rather less easy."In)
"ISSR MoHihl, /tow* (Secret Nf NC PROClJune "Mwrial Well-Beirtj in thehe nod, declinerne jnn.il gitxnh in pei carala con it ma tun cin be irrn inrjeei ft*ilithiliercent,ercent.I. tro-ihei capiu coawmpnon hid d'opredercent, (c)
Stephen White. PMUtat Ofiv*Pelnttt iNe-i Mjnin'sPreiv.lS>TOi.pp'1
Recent reports from Soviet sources also support thiseliable Soviet establishment source with varied contacts in Soviet society has observed lhat continued economic discontent has tended to make Soviet citizens more politically conscious. They regard food shortages as the key indication that the sysicm has failed ihem. fMaia^aallBla)ajak|
Another Soviet source, who predicted an increase in polilical violence, has noted discernible erosion in the legitimacy of the regime. Forears, he stressed, there has been neither terror, nor war. and living conditions had improved. All three have changed: repression has been increasing, the arrival of coffins from Afghanistan is extraordinary, and agricultural reverses have led to food rationing for ihe first time in many
Thc growing malaise in Soviet society is now widely recognizee* in thecivil unrest rcprcscnls only one off citations. An important issue is whether ihe charge in public morale in the Soviet Union is shallow and therefore mar.agc.ible orii is deeper ard more politically significant If what we are observing isemporary mood shift, then speculations about any erosion in the regime's political legitimacy are probably wrong or premature If. on lher,d. the problem is more deeplythe scope of civil unrei: surveyed here suggests that ihis may be thetheor significant future Soviet political problems may be in lhe making "Jaa^
.replications for Inti-lligencc
If civil unrest is accepted asreater problem for Soviet leaders than is consistent with ourimages of an effectively repressed society, il behooves us to pay more attention to itscauses, and implications. We should renew and
upgrade out collection efforts whereomprehensive data base of civil unrestto serveontinuing resource for analysis, and revisit the issueontinuing basis. Thc present effort iseginning. This study has surely missed some data for the years examined, has not gathered data for earliernd has not'fully explored the many implications that growing unrest mayReaders of earlier drafts have offered many potentially lucrative suggestions for further research that could not be pursued in tnis initial investigation. Much work on this subject remains to be done.jajf**
Appendix
A Note on Methodology
Dili, ind Caveats
The problem, ln thu study, civil unrest refers to the activities of individuals and groups lhat challenge the authority, policies, or performance of the Soviet Government and that risk oroerciit retponte by the regime Thc followingarc included a* case* of civil unreal public derrvoniirj lions, strikes, riois. and violence lhal appear politically motivated (operational definitions givenctivitiesassociated wiih intellectual dissent- -such as petition signing, meetingWesternb'ishing samndot ai home or books .ibroad. or cen individual hungernoi included in ihis study fjgt
Sources of data. The information base 'or this studs consists chiefly of inielligence reporting on incidents of civil unrests noted in thc Preface, although the data compilation doci not claimc
com.
Do lhe data comey an accuraten general, because field collection efforts have always been severely constrained and reporting fragmentary, the data give usanial picture First, these data almost cenainly understate the phenomenon of civil unresi in the USSR rather than exaggerate it And second, some distortions of time and place inevitably result. Hence, statistical generalisations aboul this data arc harardous. In this sense, ihr inci piled her necessarily amount to more ofumpithe total picture Asscs<ing precisely ho* ttp icntave thai "sample" is pees difflnh mcihodo"issues Two ofKak and ikew'.cr CdntlSMM Iffjp
IIf the total picture ofl wits' does our
leporting pick up* We car.noi answerithrecision, but we can gain sonshe degree of underreporting through the usel.ltcchnlflue iuttab> Cv<
diplomat
and from ihe USSR, and sensiiive human sourcesf
Arc iho dataIncidents discussed here .ire seldom "eonfinned" reporis o: fully n'^staivi^tcil multipleunder Soviet condi-
but all were
wc icriin
arc much more iciuaiivc
laiedisB'b) case basis isurcd thai all incidents arcare has been takenvoid double counting Any inc-es wdl be more likely to de As might be cipcctcd. ocnts are sparse Trc^Dcm-N. general ' and due. or ihc occttrrcecc Lest often rticipants. theireboui thm latter factor*
isomparei!tvc lhc ssmenly one cc'Scction probably fairlyreporting is small, ing event* thai ihe neither methodood chi missed by both soi ory. it isissed by both soi deriving suchr indepe
i-r"
In this study, we compare reporting on civil unresl from classified and unclassified sources. For our purposes, labor unrest provides the best area for comparison because recent studies of strikes in Ihe Soviet Union by Western scholars have broughta wide range of unclassified materials against which we can compare strike data derived from classified sources. Using this capture-reca pi uiewe may say thai, if wetrikes in these Iwo distinct ccllectionn open sources.n classified sources, with seven cases reported intandard probability equations would indicate thattrikes also were unobserved by cither method (See. Thus, by assessing the amount of overlap in these two collection methods, this model predicts lhat ihe actual number of strikes is closer.5 limes ihe number repot led from available sources. If expressedange, we wouldair amount ofoddspcrcent confidence inlerval) lhat we would bethe ituc number of strikes in Ihe Soviet Union rangeds compared toor which wc have actual reports. (We can increase ihe odds of our being fight toypercent confidence interval; lo achieve this higher level of confidence, we would have to expand the range of total strikes ioor thisft
Lacking comparable Western studies based onsource material Tor demonstrations, riots, and political violence, we cannot apply thcmodel to these data However, if ihe overlap ratio of classified to unclassified reporting for these events does not differ markedly ffom that observed in strike activity, we can similarlyote likely estimaie of actual civil unrest in lhe Soviet Union. By broadening lhc model's prediction for actual strike activity io the full range of civil unresl (lhat is. to include demonstrations, riots, and poliiical violence as well ase estimate thatctual incidents of cb-il unrest occurred in the. Again, etprcssedange, we would allowciccnl confidence interval) lhal the actual amount of incident! of civil unrest for this period :angcd. on the basis of ihe assumptions above (Again,percent confidenceaffordingdds thai we would be right, wc may project thc actual range of
Tahle 11
apture-Recapture Model of Unobserved Strike Activity Based on Two Collection Methods,
f porno
ir ported
1
(A
'(poor 0
r
lo'j)
Pi'SMW* unctf Kind.
nirrwl rtioSJJ! ;il io495
right, we may project the actual range of incident to vary0 during this period itci
Anote. Thc real>!ce of the itions is heuristic: ihey should help us bctio appreciate Ihe limiiitionsofour reporting and, pet baps, also help us to betterore valid picture of civil unrest in iht Soviet Union However, because these figures are derived from statistical modchrtg and not actual reporting. ibe> cannoi be more than rough appron-mattont and ihould not be interpreted as validfoi reliably acquired informatioi
Mo* much distortion does our reporting Introduce into this study? Collection taps and spottylime andintroduced some distortions lhat arc even less amenable to statistical corrections For rumple, coverage of Moscow and some Baltic areas surpasses othei reeions Rural areas andrepublics receive very uneven and very inadequate coverage Skews from emigrant reporting deserve note; for example, virtually all of the unresi in Kiigiziya consists of activity by ethnic Germans seeking emigration. Thisicture, andisleading one. lhat this is the only kind of unrest in Ihai republic. Similarly, emigrant reportingmuch lo our picture of thc upswing inbetter reporting from different sources could lead us to modify the date, magnitude, and apparentof this notable surge The considerable activity ia Estonia also reflectsegree our better and more diversified coverage of that republiccomparedlher
In sum. reporting skews such as these again remind ui of our gaps, but also caution us againsifrom these data We cannot know how faithfully or unfaithfully civil unrest in the Soviet Union is being mirrored in this information, we can only be sure that wc are not getting ihe full siory^gaW
Rules for fJalhcring and Tabulating InformaUon
A quantitative study of this sort is problemaiicil. but it should enable inferences that no olhei methodology can produce and at the same time tell us where ourdiffidence-is justified The building of ihis data base required developing several basic rrvelhodological rules -none eaotie. but aU fashioned around those special problems posed in using report mg from ihetbe reader may want to rev ww as an aid to evaluating this study, (u)
In practice, all incidentsevaluatedase by-case basis. Inclusion and coding rules were developed to answer three key questions of every potential event of civil unrest considered in ihisid ithai wasow much of it was thcie^ (u)
(I) Did li happen? Whether some events included here actually occurred could be disputed. Mostingle source Few are "confirmed" reporis or substantiated by multiple accounts (ifto Ihese events, there would probably be too few cases totudy ofn all eases, ihr iriienon of tiedibilily was applied. Twoprevailed: richness of detail in then conjunction with reliability of source's) Forairly detailed descriptionource of unesiab-lished reliability would probably be counted; so alsoketchy reportource believed lo bc reliable. Thc mere assertion of an eventource of unknown (or apparently dubious) reliability would not be counied. nor wouldevents Incases, the case was discarded^"*
While only credible events are included, it is abo possible that one or several of ihem never really happened Ho-cser. for every false event included in this daiaspite of ibe precautions cierted -ai least one or two others (probably more, were missed in thc fragmentary and shackled reporting, and hence eludedtudy completely. In addition, all of ihe key conclusions in this study were designedemain valid even if their supporting evidence is readplui-or-minus lOpcrccnt error margin, (t)
Wha'All events included in the study were tabulated inh the following operalion-al definitions
ublic evenl reported as aor disturbance againsi ihc governmeni or its policies, orh the following description ihe acii.il) of persons publicly assembled, or other-wtse pubbcly idcnufied. toovernmeni policy or toarticular cause notby Ihc government
ublic event reportedot, or comment -iih Ihc followingreakdown of public order resulting in property damage or injuries or requiring the mobilization of an armed force or
armored vehicles to restoreublicisiotemonstration, never both. If an event is codediot, it will not be counted alsoemonstration.if it grew outemonstration.
abor action reportedtrike, work stoppage, or labor disturbance, or consistent with Ihe followingollective aciion by workersobsite to curtail economic production in suppori of specific objectives requiring redress by management to resolve.
Political violence. Acts of violer.ee for political motives or objectives, including:
of political leaders and states attempts.
Sclf-LtTimolaiions. also attempts.
Use of firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, arson, or other violent means lo sabotage state fencuons
Typically, poliucal motives or objectives are readily apparent or can be inferred from reportage.of cases of self-immolation and assassination that failed ihe Criterion of Credibility or thc test of political motive are noted in footnotes)
In practice, iwo issues were problematical: whethernclude incidents that were threatened or attempted but not carried oul, andunger strikealid demonstration of civil unrest. Both issues were resolvedasc-by-case basis, bui generally only ihe most exceptional eases wereAttempted acts of political violence (for example, assassinations, scir-immolations, and saboiagel were recorded, other attcmpicd incidenls were not.one strike threat was included as an exception because the report was highly reliable, il involved
moreorkers, and management offered concessions to avcri the slrike. Hunger strikes were rarely included. Three were recorded aswhich were notable because iwo involvedrepublics (and0 participants in onehe thirdunger slrike. followeddemonstrationsroup and appeared lo have influenced thc group's early prison release. No hunger strikes by individuals were includedlWOr
ow much of it was there? Arriving at quantitative answers regarding the duration and incidence of civil unresl poses special, but not insolvable, problems. The rules worked out were fairly arbitrary, but they were applied consistently:
Event duration. Demonstrations and riots werevents. If they occurred for two days or more, they were countedeparate events for as many days as they reportedly occurred, on Ihe principle lhat participants renew the political risks of the initial event each day they protestlrike lasting for more than one day. no mailer how long, ho-ever. is regardedontinuing activity and is therefore labulatcdingle event. For example, two successive days of Nazi demonstra-lions in Moscow, or three successive days of rioting in Ordrhonikidre. are counied at two 3nd three incidenls.ay strike in Norilsk is counted as one incideni.
Plural cents. If an incident is credibly reported to havepecific number of times, ii is tabulated for that number of occurrences. However, pluial incidenls reporicd for unspecified numbers of occurrences 3re counted for two. but never more than iwo. Forredible report of three demonstrations will counl as ihree incidents.the following unspecified
Ti.
reat deal of activity- were tabulated only for two ifinances each: "repeated demonstrations on Saturdays"numerous rcccni strikes" iPa*lo.skj. "many strikes-altimes over the lastonths"spread to every mine in the area" (Kohtla-Jarvck
oreries of raids over an eight-year period"
(Georgia).
In sum, ihe data base is imperfect, but the procedures outlined above should help minimize the impart of error.The key conclusions ire not based on any single event but rather on lhe cumulative effect of allomprehensive data set now in progress willore systematic procedure (indci of intcfcoderto be developed for subsequent studies,<
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