Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGR RELEASr. AS SANITIZED
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
VolumeJUDGMENTS AND SUMMARY
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGNRT> CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation ol the Estimate};
Xht Centrol IrtlcVGoenc. Aoency, fhe Oefcroe kiteffiooxe Agency, iKe Ncrlionol Security Agency, ond (he intelligence ooooiiolioo of lhe CVof Slate.
Alio Participating:
Ihe Aifc'ttonl Chief of Staff fo* InteDIgence, Deoortrnent ofay The Direct o* ofeportmenl of thelhe 'l VI ot StoH, fnlcBgcnce, Oeportmenl of the Air forceOiieetor of tnleirigence, Hcodcjuoneri. Morine Corps
.. CONTENTS
Pcee
SCOPE
KEY"
Strategic Policies ind
C Future Strategic Form and
Strategic Offensive
Quantitative Indexes for Soviet Strategic
Offensive
Strategic Defensive
D. Operations of Soviet Strategic Forces in a
Preparations and Training of Nuclear Forces for
Scenario for Operation of Soviet Strategic Forces in a
E Trends in Soviet Capabilities To Perform Stf ategic
Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery
Neulraliring Enemy Comriiand. Control, and Communications.
Warning Capabilities, and Other Support
Destroying Other Military and Nonmilitary
Assuring the Survivability nf Soviet Strategic Offensive
Protecting live USSH With Strategic
Survivability ofCommand and
F. Co.-r'udu.g
PREFACE
This year's8 Is an updated version of last year's. Wc have incorporated new wtelLgence information and refined or changed some important judgments:
judgments of certain Soviet offensive programs are more comprehensive, largelyesult of new information. For
the Soviets now have flight-tested their new medium-
size solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic, themall solid-propellant ICBM. We now are projecting that solid-propellant ICBMs will be deployed as mobile systems, as well as in silos, in thcSummary. We alsoore* extensive understanding of long*0 kilometers) land-attack cruise missiles and their launch platforms, and have identified new larger sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.
We have expanded our discussion of projected Soviet strategic force deployments. Wc Include quantitative measures of Soviet forces configured to conform to the US and Soviet arms control proposals, and we compare them with forces projected in the absence of arms control constraints (Summarynd accompanying figures).
For the first time, we estimate, on thc basis of receni analysis, thc number of nondcployed strategic ballistic missiles that can be stored at identified storage areas
Wc have updated antiballistic missile (ABM) judgments to reflect those inSoviet Ballistic Missilencluding issues dealing with deployment of widespread ABM defenses and Soviet capabilities
Wc arc more concerned about Soviet efforts to developantisubmarine warfare (ASW) detection
Wc now project that laser weapons for air defense will become available later in this decade
We have revised our discussion of the initiation of theater nucleai war, on the basis of how we believe thc Soviets perceive
Tcp^eo-et
il mid how lltiy rclalcil lo intercontinental nuclear war. We judge thai the Soviet* see the use of longiange theater nuclear weapons as likely to be closely tied to the use of intercontinental nuclear weapons, and that they would sec initial, localiied use of battlefield nuclear weapons as probably being the but realistic opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear war. As the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict increased, Sovietwould face the difficult decision of whether to seize the initiative and strike, mt would be consistent with their general military doctrine: of to be more cautious in thc hope of averting massive nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. There arc no easy prescriptions for. what the Soviets would actually doarticular set of arcumstaaces. despite the apparent doctrinal imperative to mount massive preemptive nuclear1 ,
1
SCOPE NOTE
Uke previous issuances in the scries, this8 summarizes the latest developments and projects future trends In Soviet weapons and supporting systems for strategic nuclear conflict. Offensive attack force levels are projected, along with our estimates of the effects of factors influencing fuiure Soviet policies and force developments; including (he presence or absence of arms control constraints. The Estimate docs not contain caparisons of present and future Soviet and US forces or measures of the destructive potential of the forces remaining to the two sidesirst strike. The war-fighting capabilities of Sovicl stralegic forces cannot be conveyed by simplified static and dynamic comparisons of*Soviet and US offensiveoint assessment of Soviet and US capabilities-for nuclear conflict Is being prepared under live direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, for issuance shortly after this Estimate is published..'
In this NIE we are focusing on the USSR's strategy, plans.-operations, and capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict as we believe Soviet leaders perctive them. We have emphasized Soviet views on the origin and natureS-Soviet nuclear conflict and how the Soviels would plan to operate and employ their forces during the various phases ofar. There arc. of course, major uncertainties about how well the USSR's present or future forces would be able touclear conflict according to Soviet strategy.
In evaluating iheir capabilities to accomplish strategic missions, the Soviets differ from us in terms of the operational factors they consider, the analytic techniques thev use. and their criteria for success. In this Estimate we have assessed trends in Soviet capabilities In terms familiar to US policymakcn and analysts, although lliese assessments do not necessarily correspond to those the Soviets would make. We do not know how (lie Sovietswould evaluate their capabilities, and we* have limited information pertaining" to how ihey measure their ability to accomplish stralegic missions.
This Estimate Is in ihree volumes:
ontains key judgments aboutummary of Soviet programs and capabilities believed to be of greatest interest to policymakers and defense planners.
Volume II
Key recent developments.
Discussion of the Soviets' strategic doctrine and objectives,their views on thc probable origin and natureS-Soviet nuclear conflict
of Soviet prcigrams for the development andent of strategic offensive and defensive forces and supporting
systems.
of future Soviet strategic forces.
Discussion of Soviet concepts and plans for the operations of strategic forces during the several phaseslobal conflict
Trends In the USSR's capabilities lo carry out some missions of strategic forces envisioned by Soviet concepts' and plans for nuclear conflict.
Volume III contains annexes with detailed force projections and weapon characteristics.!
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Sovicl leaders view stralegic arms policy in the contextersistent, long-term struggle between two world systems of socialism and capitalism, fn whichMoscow inultimately to IriumplL From their viewpoint, progress in this struggle is measured by favorable shifts in the overall "correlation of 'ideological, economic, social, and military. Tne Soviets seek through strategic and other military programs to continue shifting the military component of the correlation of forces in favor of the USSR and its allies. They recognize that military power is their principal foreign policy asset and that continued high levels of defense
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investments are necessary to sustain and expand Moscow's global role.
Thc Soviets believe that in the present US-Soviet strategiceach side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that couldthe other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war with the United States wouldatastrophe that must be avoided if possible and tliat they do not regard such a. conflict as inevitable They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it serves their interests.they regard nuclear warontinuing possibility and have rejected mutual vulnerabilityesirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationslup. They seek superior capabilities to fight anduclear war with the United States, and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing inenet in their strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the USSR is to fight In various contingencies, tbe more likely it is that potential enemies will be deterred from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions. I
The Soviets are intent on improving all aspects of their strategic forces and supporting elements. We are currently aware of more thanew strategic systems that are in various stages of development. Over the longer term, wc believe thc Soviets have an expanded number of options in deciding on the size, mix, and characteristics of their strategic nuclear forces and supporting
Tcp
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The mosi significant new weapon systems projected forin Soviet strategic offensive forces are;
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for both silo and mobile basing. Thecdiurn-sile solid-propellant ICBM. which they have just started to test, will probably replace silo-basedndCBMs beginning inmall solid-propellant ICBM. which began flight-
testing inill probably be deployedobile system beginnings well as inolid-propellant ICBM could possibly be deployedail-mobile mode in the.
in hard-Iaiget-caDablendCBMs, although they will become increasingly vulnerable to USin the. We believe lhe Soviets will begin flight-testing of theseD Ms
Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) and ilsissile system to become operational
he Soviets will probably begin flight-testing of a
follow-on to theubrnarlnc-Iaunclied ballistic missile (SLBM)
Other new ICBM and SLBM improvements already infor deployment by the end of the decade. The Soviets regularlyajor improvement to their key missile systems about every five years.
New0 kilometers) land-attack cruise missiles for deployment on submarines (SLCMs) as early3 and on ground launchers (CLCMs) and aircraft (ALCMs) as early
Deployment of the newomber as earlys wellew variant of lhc Bear bomber capable of carrying ALCMs. which could be deployed as earlyhese new bombers, together with their cruise missiles, will give thcodern intercontinental bomber force lhat could vastly complicate US air defenses. |
If Soviet strategic force deployments proceeded without arms control constraints, we project thai the number of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would increase from the present number (moreiissiles) byoercent over thencrease resulting primarily from mobile ICBM deployments. The number of
deployed ballistic missile warheads would increaseuch largerto morethet the endesulting00 ballistic missile warheads by thc. Soviet deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. if constrained by the US strategic arms reduction talks (START) proposal would decrease by aboutercent from current deployments,pcrccnt decrease in ballistic missile warheads. Soviet deployed ICBMs and SLBMs If constrained by the Soviet START proposal would decrease by aboutercent from current deployments, but the number of ballistic missile warheads would increase slightly. Although the number of Soviet bombers increases only slightly, the number of bomber weapons Increases substantially In tlieecause of the large payload of theomber to be deployed later In the decade. We expect the Soviets to deployong-range land-attack cruise missiles over thc nextears-Many of these bomber weapons andndhowever'"be allocated for theater, and not Intercontinental; attack Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces will continue to be thc primary elements of thc intercontinental attack forces.)
Despite these impressive offensive force developments, the Soviets* potential future developments in strategic defenses could be of greater significance to the perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the strategic balance. We arc particularly concerned about their growing potential for widespread deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles well beyond the limits of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty using ABM systems currently in development. The Soviets" air defenses arc undergoing significant changes, and they will have improving capabilities to threaten current types of bombers at low altitude and,esser extent, cruise missiles. There is an alternative view that this Estimateunderstates the capability of the Soviet air defense system to defend key target areas against low-altitude penctrators. This view is presented in more detail in the Summary and in volumeccording to another alternative view, the Soviet Union will not have the capability in this decade to deploy strategic defenses that would significantly affect the US-Soviet nuclear relationship.'!
Some key trends for strategic defense include;
Extensive deployments of new low-altitude-capable fighters andurface-to-air missilesnd Initial deployment ofainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in3 or
haldr-ollKti eiixniiiaMoiof iht
holin of (hb sine If ihr Ot-ttlot. Bu'teu oftKflrtfc. Dcpoifmeil af Situ.
Deployment of tlieAM. It is premature to lodge tlie capabilities of this new advanced SAM system. However, if certain features that we have assumed for thb system arc realiied. its potential contribution to ballistic missile defenses would be of growing concern as the system became widely deployed in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the.
The upgrading of ABM deployments at Moscow and active engagement in ABM research and development programs. The available evidence does not indicate with any certainty whet tier the Soviets are making preparations for deployments beyond the limits of the ABMABM launchers atit does show they are steadily improving their ability lo exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses in. If the Treaty were abrogated by either the United States or lhe USSR, we believe live Sovicls would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments lo strengthen their defenses at Moscow and cover key larcels In the western USSR, and lo extend protection lo key targets-east of the Urals. Widespread defenses could be in place by ther.
Wc have major uncertainties about howoviet ABM system would function and about thc degree of protection future ABM deployments would afford the USSR. We judge thai, in evaluating the technical performance of thc ABM systems they could deploy, thc Sovicls probably would not have high confidence in bow well these systems would performaige-scale, undegraded US missile attack, especially in they improved US forces. However, the Soviets would probably view their ballistic missile defenses as having considerable value in reducing the impactegraded US retaliatory attack if the USSR succeeded in carryingeU-coordinated. effective initial strike Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even if US evaluations indicated they could be overcome by an atUcking force, would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties about thc potential effectivenessS strike,
Soviet efforts In two technologysensors for antisubmarine warfarend directed-energyif the Soviets succeed in major breakthroughs, have profoundparticularly in areas of strategic defensive capabilities. The Soviets are intensively investigating ihese technologies and would place
a high priotily on deploying any capabilities that might iesu.it from their research efforts: -
Over the past several years we have learned that the Soviet research program to detect submarines from space is much more extensive than wc had previously believed. We have only limited knowledge of the precise nature of thc program and cannot jtate with confidence that the Soviets have not had some success in their research.
We
cannot judge whether tbe Soviets willreakthrough in remote setting of submarine-generated effects during the nextears. Even ifreakthrough were to occur, we do not believe, in view of the operationaland the length ofeeded for fullystem which could simultaneously track afraction of thc US SSBN forceealistic possibility during the period of this Estimate We arc more uncertain, and hence more concerned, about the capabilities that could potentially be
realized and deployed in the. An alternative
view is thatlC*
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I
Soviets have not had significant success in these
techniques and are unlikely toechnologicalin remote sensing of submarine-generated effectsthc nextears.1
Directed-energy weapons potentially could be developedASAT) applications, air defense, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile defensehere is strong evidence that the Soviets are pursuing development of high-energy laser weapons. We project that lasers for air defense arc the only laser weapons for such applications likely to become available for operational use during thc period of this Estimate We believe that within tlic nexteais. however, they will lest prototype space-based lasers for potential applications to ASAT or BMD weapons We alsothat duringbc Soviets will test the feasibility of ground-based lasers for BMD applications.
' Th, AoMr. ofh,of fJeoil Inl^tlte^e.
Deportment of the Nom
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Training of Soviet foiceslobal nuclear conflict isin scope and complex in the operational factors takenThe Soviets recognize that numerous complications andwould affect planned operations, particularly in thedifficult nuclear environment. The inherent uncertaintiescannot be eliminated by training for fighting underbut thc Sovieis believe lhal their ability lo continueeffectively in adverse conflict situations would be enlianced asof the experience'
Thc Soviets apparently believeajor nuclear conflict. If It occurred, would be likely to arise outATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict precededolitical crisis period that could last several weeks or longer. We believe they would anticipate aphase as lastingew days to as long as several weeks. Thesee little likelihood that the United States wouldormal peacetime posture; we believe il is unlikely that lhe Soviets would mount such an attack themselves. Key objectives of thc Soviets in the conventional phaseswduld be to weaken the enemy's theater-based and sea-based nuclear capability, while protecting their own nuclear force i'
Tlie Soviets, in our judgment, are unlikely to Initiate nuclear conflictimited scale, wiih small-scale use confined lo the immediate combat zone, because they would probably see it as being to ihcir advantage Instead to keep the conflict at the conventional force level. However, they appear to beeans for dealing with the possibility of NATO's initiation of such limited nuclear use. withoul lhc USSR's necessarily liaving to go lo large-scale nuclear war. Wc believe they would see an initial localized use of nuclear weapons as probably being llie last realistic opportunity to avoid largescale nuclear war. Once large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the theater occurred, thc Soviets plan for thc likely and imminent escalation tonuclear war.'
As the likelihood of large-scale nuclearor cased, Soviet leaders would face the difficult decision of whether to seize lhe initiative and strike, as would be consistent with ihcir general miliiary doctrine, or lo be more cautious in the hope of averting massive nuclear strikes on lhe Soviet homeland. There are no easy prescriptions for what the Soviets would actually doarticular set of circumstances.
despite lhc apparent doclrinal imperative to mount massive preemptive nuclear attacks;
arc unable to judge what information would be sufficiently convincing to cause Soviet leaders toassiveattack
They would be more likely to seize tlse initiative by launching intercontinental nuclear strikes if the war had already readied thc level of theater nuclear conflict, titan if It was stillonventional level We believe they would be likely toreemptive intercontinental strike if there had been large-scale theater nuclear strikes against thc western USSR.
tliey acquired convincing evidenceS Intercontinental strike were imminent, ihey would try to preempt. We believe that ihey would be more likely lo act on thc basis of ambiguous indications and Inconclusive evidence of US strike Intentionsheater nuclear conflict were under way thanrisisonventional conflict
For reasons such as lack of convincing evidence from their strategic warning systems or fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly initiating intercontinental nuclear war. the Soviets might notreemptive strike.
We believe the Soviets place considerable emphasis on assessing their strategic offensive capabilities under conditions where they retaliate after the United Statesajor strike. These would include scenarios where they are able to launch varying portions of their forces on tactical warnings well as the most stressfulonly aftera well-coordinated US counterforce attack. For the Soviets, these retaliation scenarios are the most critical in an evaluation of their capabilities and probably the ones to which they devote most of their training.)
The Soviets' offensive objectives in carrying out large-scale nuclear strikes would be to neutralize US and Allied military operations and warmaking capabilities. Their large-scale intercontinental strikes would be conducted primarily with ICBMs and SLBMs. We liclieve lhat the Soviets would conduct repealed atlacks in an attempt to destroy, degrade, and disrupt the United Slates' capability lo employ nuclear forces, and lhe reconsli tut ion capabilities of its nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure They would also allempl lo isolate the Uniied States from the theater campaign by attacking its power projection
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eapabililies. Depending on the circumstances, they might also attempt to reduce US military power in the long term by attacking US military-industrial capacity. Limiting thc initial strikes only lo command, control, and communications targets, or onlyortion of US strategic forces such as ICDM silos, is not consistent with the available evidence. I.
The Soviets probably have plans to reconstitute some surviving general purpose and strategic forces and to occupy substantial areas of Western Europe, whileTfeutraliring the ability of US and Allied nuclear forces to interfere with these objectives. They prepare for combat operations that could extend weeks beyond the intercontinental nuclear phase. Some Soviet SSBNs in protected areas near the Soviet homeland would be withheld for potentially protracted nuclear operations, others for longer term reserve. The Soviets would clearly prefer to accomplish their objectives quickly, but recognize that the later phases could be protracted, given the difficulty and complexity of conductingfollowing massive nuclear strikes. |
We do not know how the Soviets would assess their prospects for prevailinglobal nuclear conflict/ Sizable forces on both sides would survive massive nuclear strikes:
The Soviets have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehicles (RVs) today lo attack all US missile silos and launch control centersirst strike We project that, over the nextears, (he USSR will have substantially larger numbers of hard-taiget-capabie RVs and that the effectiveness of individual Soviet ICBMs against hardened targets will increase.ell-executed strike. Soviet ICBMs would have thetwo RVsamage expectancy of aboutoercent today, and abouterceni by the, although there are significantin these percentages because of our uncertainties about Soviet ICBM characteristics. Although the Soviets' hard-target capabilities will increase substantially, we believe that ihey will still be concerned lhal atortion of the US ICBM force would be .launched while under attack.
Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and destroy palroHing US SSBNs. alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, or land-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond the range of tactical reconnaissance systems.
Soviet mobile missiles and SSDNs patrolling in waters near the USSR are highly survtvable as arc most silo-based ICBMs and perhaps dispersed aircraft We believe tlie Soviets can launch ICBMs on tactical warning; assuming their warning and control systems are undegraded. However, with the increasingof Soviet ICBM silos during tlie period of this Estimate, as thc accuracy of US weapons improves, the Soviets will be faced with more difficult problems In assuring adequate retaliatory capabilities in their critical planning scenario in which tliey are struck first We believe the Soviets' efforts to eipand the capabilities of their command,and control network and SLBM force, and to develop mobile ICBMs, reflect their concerns about maintaining the capability to fulfill the missions of their strategic nuclear forces.
Moreover, tlic Soviets are well aware,,of their inability to prevent massive damage to thc USSR with their strategic defenses even with the improvements taking place in these forces. They also recognize that US strategic defenses cannot prevent massive damage.!
We believe that the Soviets" confidence in their capabilities for global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying thc ability of the United States and its Allies to command and to operate their forces. Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed command, control, and communications facilities, elements of the political leadership and military commands probably would survive, and redundancy in Soviet strategic communications would prevent loss of any one channel from disabling the overall system. We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied strategic command, control, and communications to prevent or impair the .coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces.;
The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their military forces for the possibility of having touclear war and are training to be able lo maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. They have seriously addressed many of lhe problems ol conducting miliiary operationsuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the manyofonflict, and raising tlvc probability of outcomes favorable to lhe USSR. There is an alternative view that wishes to emphasize that
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(lie Sovicls have not resolved- many of (he critical problems bearing on the conduct of nuclear war, such as the nature of initiation of conflict, escalation within the (hea(er, and protracted nuclearhis view, the SovieU recognize that nuclear war is so destructive, and its course so uncertain, that they could not expect an outcome that wasn any meaningful sense.*)
Thc evidence that we liavc on how the Sovieis would plan touccessful military campaign provides Insight into how ihey would seek touclear war on theirneutralizing the ability of US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces lo interfere with Soviet capabilities lo prevailonflict in
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SUM/AARY
evelopments
he Soviets hive nude topressive rains la chelr stutegle forces ilnce, particularly ta hnd-aod sea-bated billiBic oiialq. They maintain amilitary research, developmenl. and prod action base and continueevelop. Improve, and deploy offensive and defensive weapons of .ui.nll, every type. These ef forts are continuing, wtih no evidence la tbe past year to Indicate any letup!
In recent offensive force developments:
The Soviets continued deployment ofntercootinenul and submirine-buocbed LaJUs-
tic missiles (ICBMs aad SLBMs) arrned with -multiple htdepertdcaidy tantetable tecntry(MIRViX of the rnobilenterroediatc-range billUue missile (IBBMX and of the Back-fire bootber. Ar ofe estimate ibe Soviets hadeentry vehicles (rtVi) on their moreCBMs and SLBMs./
December lhe Soviets conducted Q
J flight lefl of their new. MIBVed medi-uiu-iiie, rolid-propellant ICBM to he deployed In silos.|ff
In3 lhe Sovietsmail solid-propellant ICftM.
The Sovicti itw probably hive Innew or improved ICBMs and
SLBMs. At least one SLBMCBMi areeipected lo begin flight-tatim later3
I
-Thc USSRigh succeu rate for flight tests of theLBM;2 tests
includedan deeded-
range launch from the Typhoon nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarineecond Typbooa was bunchednd al least Iwo, probably three, more arc under con-Struelion.1
- Tbe Soviets continued testing of their new later-continent il-ri neeomber,f wn)
They began operational testing of nevdrDear aircraft that will probably carry long-range cruise mi rules (or land
eoutinued flight -resting ofod tea-uiuracbed (CLCM. ALCM. and SLCM] versions0 Vilouicten) land-attack cruise missile-
n strategic defense programs:
Soviets continued work on their ballistic mvoile defenses around Moscow, including theo radar aodew anoballutte mimic (ABM) silo launchersotal ofvidently ai partUo to upgrade the perfoiminee of llveir defenses and eipand them to the ABM Treaty limitaunchers.)
They started deployment ofurface-to-air missile (SAM) Uiuliont withunchcrtvioudy deployednits have sia
performing at teas! fearihility lent on tluee types of hicjrenergy laser weapons for ait defense; bsers for point defense of high-valueon Land, ship-based bsers for point defense al sea,actical, bnd based mobile ivstem Thii year we project Soviet deployment ollasers for air defense in the period ol this Estimatei
IS
d
he Sovieu believe lhat in the present US-Soviet strategic reUtiooship each side powuei stralegiceapabililies that could devastate the other after abtoibing an atiack. Soviet leaders have staled that nuclear war with the United States would be alhat must be avoided if possible and lhat (bey do not regardonflict as inevitable They have been willing lo negotiate restraints on forceand deployments when it serves iheir Inleresls. Nevertheless, they regard nuclear warontinuing ponibility and have rejected mutual vulnerabilityesirable or permanent bam for tlie US-Sovietrelationship Tbey seek superior capabilities to fight andudcai war with the United Slates, andbeen working to Improve liselr chances of prevailing Ioenetheir strategic dilnVing holds that tbe better prepared lbco fight In various contingencies, the more likely it Is that potential enemies will' be deterred from Initialing allacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military'
nuclear forces support Soviet'policy aims by projecting an image of military
Strength. Soviel leaders appreciate the politicalof wodd perceptions of military power and have long stressed the coatribuUon of strategic forces to the USSR's superpower Status. Tbey view their current strategic position as supporting the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the expansion ol Soviet power and influence abroad. I
C. Future Strategic Forces ond Programs
proioclions of Soviet stralegic forces' forthree to five years arc based largely ooongoing programs. Daring thisof the Soviets' military planning andb unlikely lhal ibey wouldalter planned deployments. Over the longerwe believe ihey have an expandedoptions in deciding on the size, mix, andof ihcir strategic nuclear forces andOur protections foe five toears frombased on evidence regarding these options.reflect our Judgments of the factors thatfuture Soviet force*
apcor IV.It. tm0<uAcd(ivj OwA few lhc pcokKOom duottyrd In nhiinc lit
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later In this decade (subject lo possible rsegotiat-ed bans ot otber limlu) Inchade:
Sofld-propellaiit ICBMs for both silo and mobile basing. Theoediwn-atzeUM. which ihey have |uit started to test, wiU probably replacebasedndCBMs beapnnlng lamall solid-propellant ICBM. which began flight-testing IniU probably be deploredobile system beginnings well as Inolid-propeflanl ICBM could passably be deployedail-mobile mode In the.
follow-onRBM. first deployed
IRVcd SLBMoe' deployedhe otherariant of lbc later system possiblyaneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) payload option for greater accuracy.
An ImprovedLBM for Ibe Typbooa SSBN. proiected lo be deployed in tbe, and also possibly having an accuracy MaRV payload option.
Theong-range bomber, to beas eady
New0 tilornctcii) land-altack cruise missiles for deployment on submarines as early3 and on ground launchers and aircraft as early/
his year we have projected lis alter native strategic offensive forces (each protection is aof both intercontinental and peripheral attack forces) to lake account of uncertainties about tbe outcorrve of ongoing arms controlSTART and INF. Key assumptions underlying tbe projection! arc luuunarircd below.
ey among thesere:
oo (lie met of the SovieU to
Improve all aspects of their strategic forces and supporting rJemenlg
to prevent any eronoo of the military gains they have made over the past decade.
decree of success In Soviet efforU to use arms cootrolstrategic armstails (START) and the tails on luterme-diate-range nuclear forces (INF)protect the USSR's present and planned programs and,along vrith some Soviet roocessioru, toUS and NATO modernization options.
Perceptions of the capabilities of other countries' nuclear forces and icy weapon system programs.
Other factors that could potentially influenceoviet strategic forces are domestic economicand foreign policy set ba els. In general,we do not believe that these latter factoii will bear significantly on the lire and composition of futuic Soviet strategic forces because of the high priority thc Soviets place on such forces. |
ndhese two force projections represent our estimates of tbc diicction. scope, and pace of future Soviet forces In the absence of arms conlrol constraints.ontinuatioo of current Soviet trends lo upgrade Strategic offensive systems. Deployment rites forre consistent with available evidence on ongoing and new programs indends in deployment iiles and force composition.eflects somewhat higherand deployment levels, and In tome eases
undamental to lhc Options the Sovieis have for tlie composition of their future forces is their vigorous military research and development (RiD) andbase. They continue loumber of weapoo systems of virtually every type. We cuirently are aware of more thanew major weapon and support systems for potential strategicivinmiriied inpageare In various stages of developmenL The Soviets* research efforts, coupled with technology acquired from the West, have provided them with sufficient advances In certain miliiary technologies- -for cram pic, guidance andnu.Toeleetrentes and computers, signaland directedenable them to develop increasingly sophisticated weapons and suppoilingTbe pace and the overall quality of the Soviets' future weapons piogTams will dependarge degree on their ability to develop and rplait new technologies, including those acquired from tbe West. I
Strategic Offensive Forces
II. The most significant new weapon Systemsfor deployment in Soviet Wrategic offensive
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P^oCtl
technically advance systems, thin in Foiceeyond5 foe some peor^ama. The raoieetioei ittumr the Soviets abide by the lei nil of thenterim Agreement and ley provisions of lhcSALT II Treatyt and then begin eipanding their force* without such constraints. The difference between these two projections reflects our uncertainties about the tochnological choices andthe Soviets might male, (heir potential deployment levels for some rystems, and the Soviets" own evaluation of their potential offensivesnarlmuin effort,ot the upper bound for eitliee tecluiological orpotential, but wouldubstantially greater commitment of resources than Force I. Both proiections should be regarded as plausible and acliiev-ableof future Soviet force postures.'
nie have eaarnined the effects on Soviet forcei of the US negotiating position by assuming that tlte rides negotiate START and INF treaties based oa the US position and that the Soviets adhere tond SALT II agreements untilfter which tliey begin to reduce their forces to meet the US START and INF treaty limits. The US START Deration limits the number of ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic nussues; tbe INF posiUon tequila the destruction of aU Soviet fjound-based Intermediate-range and long-range cruisewithin one year.as some newbut emphasiies upgrades to eairting cyst ems;eflect! emphasis on newer and solid ptopel-lant systemsist Ing liquid-propellant systems,reater Soviet effort to compensate for the deactivated force of IRBMs and medium-rangemissiles (MRUMs) through deployment of more bombers and cruise missiles. I
e hive examined the effects en Soviet fotces of Moscow's negotiating position by assuming forces constrained by the Soviet START and INF positions. These positionseduction In ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to an aggregate levelellingn delivery systemi in Europe or Intended for uie In Europe by the endnd the banning of al long iante land-attack cruise missiles.as some new deployments but emphasiies upgrades to eiisting systems.mphasizes the deployment of newer systems Both protections eenphasire ICBM survivability through deployment ol mobile ICBM launchers-1
Ouoolitotrre Indeaes lor Soviel SUotegic Offensive Forcei frustrated on)
eployed latercentlacntal-Raitt* Balliitic tJUHle, (ICBbU andpage tO) Illustrates the trends tn (lie number of deployed Soviet ICBMi and SLBMs that result from our various force projections. Under the asrumptioai forndhat beginning in4 the Soviets would expand their forces without aims control coos'laic's, the number of deployedasxeted to Increase by aboutoercent, mostlyesult of thc deployment of mobile ICBMi. The US STARTwould reduce*deployed missilesyreduction bypercent of the currently deployed forcei Ihe Soviet proposal would reduce the number of missiles byercent below the current force. |
he projected aggregate throw weight of the missile force is shown in figure3hrow weight2 increases Iny aboutndercent over tbat of the current force. This increase il due lo the number of' missiles and the improved technological performance we espeet In the various Soviet missile development programs. The US START proposal would reduce tbe UVow weight by aboutercent, because of the decreased number of missiles and the constraint* on the number ofndlan ICBMs. Tlie Soviet proposal would resultmall increase in throw weight-)
s ihown inhe number) of reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMi and SLBMs it projected to Increase byercent (Forcer moreercenti lhe Sovicti eapand their forces without regard to aruti control constraints. Thesegreater in percent age than tbe increase Infrom the deployment of larger numbers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and from the increased numbers cf RVi on some of these missiles The US START proposal (Forceould reduce the number of luch warlveads loone-third reduction from lhe current force. Tlie Sovicl piopout (Forceould resultne-llnrd increase ovei the current force. Also shown Inre the protected numbers of ballistic missileall onof destroying hard targets The trends are ilmilar to (hose for total RVi The number of highly survivable SLBMs and mobile ICDMs is expected to increase
Top Sec,,,
Figure 2
Projected Number of Deployed Soviet iCnMs and SLBMs
Figure 3
Projected Throw Weight of Deployed Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs
at Kirkicnmi
tVT
U t< is I* iio fi
. .,
imt itm
l-H- MMM St -
usi i
over lhe nestears. Thii increase would beactoror Soviet forces notby irmi control,actornder the START proposals Il ihould be noted lhal Soviet ulo-bued miniles will continue lo carry the maj-mty of ballistic missile warheads, eacept under the US STAKT proposal |
oviet bomber forces are sot raped-ed to change much in overall lire; new bombers luch ai theill enter the force as older bombers such as the Iii von are phased out As ihown in. however, there willubstantial Increase tn lhe number of weapons carried by the newnd the Backfire. (Other strategicof lesser range, arc not shown) The payload of tlieiD be much greater than lhat for the other aircraft: also many of these aircraft will carry ALCMs. It Is Important to note tliat, because tome aircraft of the strategic bomber forceajor theater attack role, many of these weapons would be allocated for theater, and notttack. ICBMs and Sl-BMs will continue to be the primary elements of Ihe Intercontinental attack forces.
Cruue Miitilet. The Soviets are projected to begin deploying0 km} land-aftsek cruise missiles on submarines as earlynd on ai.craft and ground launchers as earlys shown in. we project lhat. without aiins eontiolnd 2J, cruise missile deployments would reach levels of atmostly ALCMs) by the; under the US START and INF proposalsndwith only CLCMs limited, the numbers would be nearly as high. Tbe Soviet pioposab ban these weapons entirely.
nd CLCMi.hows our projections for the total number of Soviet land-based INF mimic* deployed in the Sovietibe European area as well as the Fas East Without arms control constraints the number cfunch-en it projected to Increase, with the phasing out of olderndomparable number of CLCMs would lie eipnctecl The nuniljer o( mi rales, those deployed on launchers as well ai tl. re for icfire. is expected to Increaseith twoefire* per launcher by the
Figure 4
Projected INumbci of Deployed Soriel ICBM and SLBM Reentry Vehicles
* ts I* ii itto ti 9*
fM
BJra
bi uiinM Si i
r.'. i: /
ia,
u "IMv.-Ii.
Mot
eieree Miitilei. Tire Sovietseserve force lhal Include* ICBMi pioduced at malnlciunoe spares and as Iraining missiles and. wc believe, also contains additional ICBMs produced as refire missiles.
missile productionarge enough lo support rxoduction levels beyond one missile per launcher plus mi intern nee and Iraining spares. We can, however, male anile ol lhe numbei oJ reserve ICBMi that can he itored al lhe identified lupporl bases for thb force- JT
ccording lo an alternative view, the hit nil gence suggests that, while the Soviets produce more missiles than thev deploy, for use in testing, training, ind maintenance roUtion, no portion of ihu additionalesignated specifically for use as refire.
r
Top^lt
Fimire S
Projected Numbei or Deployed Wai deads on Selected Soviel Bombers*
I
:
a
. . it . . . _
MHIT.II-iOp,
J
Evidence Indicates tne Soviet! plan lo usemiBJlcsefire fiomaunchen
TV kolJtrihu,ctttltftnee
j
We bet eve (hatiles wifl have been produced to that each launcher could have one re/Ire missilehe Soviets will probably continueroduction and build toward two refirei per buiieher.
SE^srtr
Projected Number of Deployed Soviet LonE-Raoee Ltnd-Attack Crolse Mlssllei'
ti MI..IU Tn-.
If!) II II I'. I'. II II II 1 II II
in-
f*Miwi
Defensive Forcei
ieivdi in Soviet forcei for strategic defense includes
and expansion of the ball uric oi utile defenses alhin the ABM Trealy limit* with potential for subsequent widespread deployment teyord theae limits..
Eateiisive deployments of new lowaltitude-eana-
ble fiihtecs andAMi. and initialof Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in3 or1
'Advances In acoustic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technology, and continuation of anand growing program to developto remotely lense lubrnasine-generated effects from lb-craft and spacecraft. I
Advances In terfuyologics applicable lond rpaoe based dbearted-energy weapons.
We also include In our defensive force projections:
Tactical air defense units based In ibe USSR that potentially could be used agalmt US strategic bombers and etube miniles.|
Tcojtxr**
Figure
ZfbT
Projected Number of Soviet Land-Based. Lone-Range INF Missiles"
I *nt 1
' ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' '
IMS W fo wiuiiM l| m %
MC
ond STAKT/IKF
Crouad-bascd laser weapons for air defense. I
An advanced tactical SAM. thehkfc sue believe veill have an aiiti-Uctical-ballutic-micnle (ATOM) capabllitv. and which could also lave some rapabdityomc strategicvebicaes1
Soviel capabilities to expand ABMaunchers at Moscow In the absence of tbe current ABM Treaty rcfUictioru.|
Ballistic MUtiUhis year ibe Inld-ligence Communityornpeebensf vc study of Soviet present and future eapibilities for ballistic missile defenses. Tbe ley findings ot (hat effort arc summarized below and treated Is greater detail in volume II of ihii Fall mate.;
The Soviets are upgrading their antiballistic missile deployments at Moscow and are actively co-gaged In ABM research and development programs. Tbc available evidence does not Indicate witb any
abo NIE ll-ISM. tocUl iloffurir Wtottr im |
eeitainly whether tbe Soviets are making preparation! for deployments beyond the limits of theABM launchers atit does show they are steadily improving their ability to exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses In. If Ihe Treaty were abrogated by either lhe United States or the USSR, we believe the Soviets would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen Iheir defenses at Moscow and cover ley targeti In thc western USSR, and to extend protection lo ley targets east of tbe Urals. Widespread defenses could be in place by tber
I
e Judge dial In evaluating the tcclirilcal per-foomancc of tbe ABM system! tbey could deploy, the Soviets probably would not have high confidence In bow well these systems would performarge-scale, undegraded US missile attack, especially In tbey improved US forces. However, tbe Soviets would probably view tbeir ballistic missile defenses ai having considerable valoe In reducing tbe Impactegraded US retaliatory attack If the USSR succeeded In carryingell-coordinated, effec-tive initial rtrila. Abo. widespread SovietvenS evaluations Indicated they could beby an attacldrtg force, would complicate US attack punning and create major uncertainties about the potential effect] veoenS strike. Another view Ii that the Soviets.idespread deployment, would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to enhance tlieir confidence ia (be survival of high-value targets, even in the eventan-scale US attack.^
ecision by tbe Soviets on whetheridespread ABM system would be based primarily on Ibe answerrucial question: Will the USSRufficiently threatening strategic situation In tbend beyond against which an expanded ABM defense based on Soviet fystems now In testing andould make a- significantIf the answer Is yes, tbe Soviets would probably make the commitments necessary to deploy such defenses despite tbe economic ud political costs. But, because their answer probably would not be clear-cut. otber Important factors could influence their decisioo toward njodeployuicut
Tbe USSR's two-trackcontrolilitaryurther Its strategic
TU AoMo-Se/oue IiCd&emer
Agmoa.
Top^cCel!
has achieved limiUom US delivery veritiesUS detente, while permitting ejpansiou of Soviet offensive forces. There arc oo Ind katJooi that lhc USSIt Ii bctfooslncdissatisfied with.
Under the Treaty the USSR has ABM defenses lo protect critical targets la the Moscow area while the United States has no similar capability.
The Soviets apparenUy see tlte Treaty as having slowed US ABM research and oVvesopaseaf. while Ihey moved ahead with their own I
o balance, we believe thereairly low. but nevertheless significant, chance (aboutlJt the Soviets win abrogate the Trealy and deploy ABMs In eicess of Treaty limits ine believe they would see the military advantages of the defenses they could deploy as being outweighed by the disadvantages died above, especially of energirlng the United Slates and pcrhapi fti Alliesapid and lustaloed growth In overall military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, (hai could lead to an erosion Inf Soviet gains achieved innd lSfithl
alternaUve view notes lint Sovietlhe Trealy, under current and protectedfar outweigh the poteniial gainsesult, tlte bkclthood of abrogationin this view to be veryercentinnless current conditionsThe holder of this view cautions,thai the Sovietsotivation to deployABM system to fill the lejVXB gap inandigher probability of suchin. Moreover, they Kavcto completeeoloyrnentnlyyearaM .
view holds that the crucial Questionleaders is whether deployment of ABMslo attain Soviet strategic objectives.lo thb view, the Following factors should beweight in judging Soviet motivationsidespread ABM defense. Soviet requirements foe damage limiting capability
* The koUrr of I AuUttM Ohi/ejMrt-iMir af lhe
33.
have always provided lhe motivation to deployoth at Moscow and elsewhere. Now.esult pf advance* by the USSR In ABMheounter force advantage over the United Slates, and US planseploy turvivable and hard-target eajuhlc ballistic missiles, the Soviets may no longer deem tt necessary to restrain (hemselvea from further ABM deployment They Iiave lahen essentially all tlie iteps necessary to prepareecision to deploy and have demonstrated confidence In their current ABMby deploying the new ABM system at Moscow. The Soviets may be expected to accompany any widespread ABM deployments with aories campaign to manipulate Western at'titudei and actions and to inhibit energirlng the United States and Its Allies Intoapid growth In military capabilities. The fielder of thb view believes It li not possible with current wtefligenc* data to evaluate and Quantify with confidence the crtcnt to which various (actors would Influence the Soviets to abandon or retain tlie ABM Treaty. However. In view of the preparations lhe Soviets have made and the fact lhat tbe motivations discussed above strongly Influence Soviet decisionmaking, the main test may havethe prospect for widespread ABM deployment-*
r
idespread Soviet ABM deployment by therould give lhe USSR an important Initial advantage over the United Sutes lo tbb area. We have major uncertainties about bowoviet ABM system would function, and the degree of piotcctioa that future ABM deployments would afford tbe USSR. Despite our uncertainties about Its potential effect!veness.eployment would have an important effect on the perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of lhe US-Soviet strategic nuclearAccording lo an alternative view, lhe Sovicl Union will not have the capability fn thb decadeeploy ABM defenses that would significantly affectS-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship'!.
- koUeili rkrf Hrtmch. Ofpa-lmeml of Stall ^
VopJ^aeH
tolcntitl Technology fired it ihr ougAr. Soviet efforts in two technologyseniors lor ASW, and directed-energy weapons-could. i( tlie SovieU succeed inV:i- L. have pro-found eoosequcncea. particularly in aieas of strategic defensive capabilities The SovieU are intensivelythese lecfurotogtei and would placeUgh priority on deploying any eapabililies thai might result from ibeir research efforts. |
ver the past two decades, lhe Soviets nave devoted much effort to development 'of norueoustie submarine defection systems Some devices mounted on ships and submarines have reached limitedstatus. Even If these ihfp- and submirihe-rnountod systems are capable of detecting submarine-generated effects, we believe lhal they will nothreat lo SSBNt tn the open ocean because of,tbe low search rates Imposedow speeds of tbecarrying the limited-range sensors. Tbey may have limited utility In Initiating trading nearbases and other cboVe points. At least some of thb nonacosistic HAD Is related to the protection of their own SSBN force. Of morehenergetic and growing program loapability Io remotely sense submarine generated effects from aircrafl or srueecrafL Over tbe past several years we have learned Out the Soviet research program lo detect submarines from space is much more eitendve than wc bad previously belie vedj
system deployment,ystem whichubstantial fraction of tl^ US SSBN forcessibOily during the period of this Fat.rn.te. We arc more uncertain, and hence more coewned, .bout tbe capabilities that could potential-ly be realized and deployedhe.
n alternative view fa that f*
Jibe Soviets have not had lurnificant success la these techniques and are unblo achieve abreakthrough In remote sensing of mbenartne-geoentcd effects during tbe neatears. Tbe bolder of this view believes |
in
effective broad area search detection capability will not emerge fromctivity during thc neat decade. For maoy years tbe US Navy has bad inrogram la submarine dctretjorif-
e have limited knowledge of die precise nature and degree of success of Ibe Soviet program. We have seen no Instance Inubmarine operating at SSBN patrol depths and speeds was delectedoviet remote sensor."a.
annot
state with confidence lhat they live not had some success In their research. We cannot Iudge whether the Soviet* willechnological breakthrough lo remote sensing of submarine-generated effects during the neatears. Even IfreaVtbrough were Io occur, we do not believe. In view of (he operational considerations and the length of lime needed for full
J
irected-energy weapon* potentially could be developed for antisatellite (ASAT) applications, air defense, battlefield use, and. In the longer term, ballistic missile defense. Ol the three trpea oi directed-energy technologies with potential weaponlaser, particle beam, andfa strongest lhal the Sovieis are pursuing development of high-energy laser weapons. We believe the Sovietsrogram to develop laser weapons, although the full scope, eoocepU of weapon operations, and status are not clear. Tbe Soviets have (he expertise, manpower, and resources lo
rf thUke Puertorfir/rM.
'v 1
/
Top
Topi+eret
Uiose directed -energy weaponiliiary support systems thai prove lo be feasible:
Is evidence lhat the Sovieu arc workingcofoct toucga-aitoUss (pace-based Laser weapon Testingegawatt -ctass prototype, for ASAT application, oould" begin In thet tbe earliest, rnore Likely not unol tbe. If testing were successful, an Initial operationalfew satellites, eachega wart-elais laser weapon witb an ASAT range of hundreds ofbe available by, more likely In the. If Uiey werorototype with muchwer, it could be tested somewhat railier than the megawatt-ciass piotolype.
While space based weapons for ballistic missile defense are piobably feasibletandpoint, such weapons require significant technological advances. In view of therequirements, we do not capect them torototype rpaoe-bared laser balbsticdefense (BMD) system until0 or an operational System until after the
Soviet particle beam weapon (PBW) reaearch might eventually have some ASAT or BMD applications, but the achievementrototype system for such uses would be at leastoears in lhe future. An alternative view holdspace-based PBW system, intended to disrupt the electronics of ballistic missiles and requiring ngnificandy less power, could probably be developed and deployed in
Currently there are two facilities at Saryshagan that are assessed lo have high-energy Lasers and associated optical equipment with the potential to function as ground based ASAT weapons.
Wc eapectigh energy laser facility at the teat range will be used duringor testing the feasibility of BMD applications. If feasibility is rternonitrated, ourrototype ground-based laser weapon for BMD would then have to be built and would not begin testing until then Initial capability (IOC) probably would not be
achievedfter thcn alternative view boldi lhat, if tests from Uus facility proved successful In engaging ballistic missile"s. the Soviets would not have toewweapon, and thereforeeployed ground-based laser weapon system for BMD could reach IOC by theo"
The Soviets have at least three projects for the development of lasers for air defense.aval lystcni for ship defense. If live Soviets continue to advance at the level of tbe past few years. User air defense weapon! could become available for operational use In thenitial irouod-bascd iU dcfMM User weaponwill probably haveangesoilometer s. and fiaed. transport-able or mobile pUlforms. Because of iheir timjt-ff ed range and llieir IneffccUvenesi against aircrafl In or above the clouds, they will probably be used along with SAMs for point defense of high-value targets. These eady weapons probably wiU rely on destroying critical subsystems of aircrafl and Cruise missiles, such as fuel tanks, avionics, or electro optics.]
D. Opcroli of Soviet Strcrfofjic Forcesonflict
Preparations ond Training of Nuclear Forces for Conflict
s la last years Estimate we en. pi. ai ire Soviet views on Ibe probable nature and originsS-Soviet nuclear conflict and now the Soviets pUn lo operate and employ their forces during die various phaseslobal
Tfc* SotJc cfio fa rhe OfaeeW. Oe/nue InuU'tma
AgrrnvX
-dcf of Ihu ctrwhe Dittaor, De/our
e lop SrGcl
Se/eti
(raining. The SovieU* principal alms have beennhance (heir operational flexibility and force sustain-ability and to increase (be probability of mainulrving continuity of controluclear conflict. In line with (hit approach, ihey have:
I
believeundamental Sovietacquiring and operating strategic forces Is to assureprobability of prevailinguclear confiicr,many Impoitant aspects of the conflict tura outexpected. To ibis end, training of Soviet forcesglobal nuclear conflict Is Increasingly broad Inco copies In tbe operational factors taken IntoIn their military writings, tbe Soviets noteusually do not proceed acoarrjingriorand planning. Tbcy almost certainlyvariations in circumstances and events.that numerous complications andwould affect planned operations, particularlyunprecedcntedly difficult nod ear environment,
J Tbe label cutof warfare cannot be eliminated through such practice, but the Sovicis believe that their ability to continue to operate effectively In adverse conflict situations would be enhancedesult of thegained
respect to tlie first sentence of tbeparagraph, there is an alternative view thatacquisitions and operations are guided byand damage limitstioo precepts of.doctrine, and are constrained byand budgetary influences. Tbetbat the concept of prevailing In nuclearfar too imprecise to guide force acquisitionsand arc fully aware of the greatand catastrophic losses that would be Incurredpartiesuclear
4Z. Soviel perceptions of tbe growing complexity of warfare have led to greater efforts to plan forces and operationsackdrop of more varied contin-gesscJcs and to achieve greater realism fn combat
" The heUex ef thUhe Dtitetor. Bureau ef,
eadepertmenl of Sure,!
Refined their force employment flri terries In preparation for more varied contingencies, through measures such as developmentunch on (actual warning (LOTVV) capability for land-based missiles, and pbootng for coo-ducting theater and Inter continental nuclear warfare operaUons over an eat coded period and forortion of their forces after an Initial massive nuclear strikes;
Made changes In some of the operaUonal modes of their strategic forces, such as tlie cr cation of SSBN baitions where SSBNs can be more efvely coejicfled and protected by ASW for era, the operation of SSBNs la ibe Arctic near or under the polar Icecap, and the deployment of the mobileorcea.1
Cradually Increased the stress placed on thetr
plac
personnel In combat training.
J
Consistently worked to increase (he survivability and flexibility of their command, control, and communicationi system and thui to Increase tJidj assurance of retaining control during the complex circumstances cf extended operationsuclear environment. |
J
mm
rr fl
for Operation of Sovietin a.
Id liststimate, wc have structuredscenario, iu'mmarired briefly
we believe thispicture captures essential Soviet military views oa tbe operation of Soviet strategic forces and oa the natureajor US-Sovict confronUtioo thatthrough Urge-scale nuclear conflict)
The flow of events In an actual conflict would be likely to vary oonsiderably from that presented here. Our presentation, therefore, should not beasSoviet prescription for nuclear conflict Tbe presentation does not preclude efforts by thc Soviets to achieve political solutions at any stage, or to vary their military actions In response toOn thc contrary, the Soviets evidently intend to prepare the military establishment to meet the contingenciesong global conflict, to increase the options available to the political leadership at any point laonflict, and thus to increase tbeir dsances of controlling events and securing favorable conflict outcomes. |
Crura- Period. Tbe Soviets see little likelihood that the United States wouldurprise attackormal peacetime posture; we believe It is unlikely that the Soviets would mount such an attack themselves
they expect to have sufficient warningS attack to carry out the deployment and dispersal of their forces. They evidently believe that,eneral war occurred, it would most likely result from tbe expansionajor theater conflict, precededolitical crisis period that could last several weeks or longer. During this crisis period the Soviets would: I
Heighten their surveillance of enemy activity, to acQuire detailed informationide range of US strategic force capabilities and readiness.)
Shifteacetimeartime posture, while avoiding implementing readiness measures that they thought were unduly provocative.|
As the crisis intensified, seek to confuse Western intelligence and deny it information on the status
of tlieir forces and preparations. They would Increase tbe use of cocscealmeiit, deception, and disinformation for mflitiry. daptotcatic; aisd propaganda purposes In attempting to achieve tbeir objectives.
Conoentionaf Prune, The Soviets apparenUy believeajor nuclear conflict. If ft occurs, would be likely to arise outonventional conflict Tbc Soviets perceive the conventional phaseATO-Warsaw Pact eotuTict as lastingew days to as long as several weeks, during which the Warsaw Pact wouldATO attack god thenounteruffeauf ve deep Into Western Europe. Key objectives would be to weaken tbeheater-based and sea-based nuclear capability, while protecting their own nuclear
the outset of hostilities, the SovieU wouldtoheater-wide air offensive in
which hundreds of Pad aircraft, employingweapons, would be massed, witb tbc objective of achieving air superiority andNATO's command and control facilities, nuclear assets, and other high-value military targets1
believe (hat most, if riot'all, of die mobileRBM force would be deployed to (he field by this time-1
All available Soviet SSBNs would be ordered to deploy from bases. Soviet general purpose naval forces would piotect those SSBNs in areasto lhe USSR. In addition to thc protection of their ownrimary goal of Soviet naval forces would be to weaken as much as possible enemy sea-based nuclear strike forces,SSBNs and aircraft carricrsj
believe that thereigh UkcUbood that, during this conventional phase, the SovieU would attempt nondestructive interference withUS space systems lhat provide Important wartime suppori.'
nitial Nuclear Phases. We believe tbe SovieU envisage that it would beheir advantageapid conventional campaignccomplish (belt (heater objectives in NATO. In this campaign tbey would employ nonnuclear means, including some ele-rnenU ol strategic aviation to attempt to destroy
nuclear forces, wiih Soviet theater* and strate-trie nuclear forces Handing ready to preempt if NATO were detected beginning nuclear release procedures. Then our judgment, are unlikely to initiate nudear conflictimited scale, with small-scale use confined to the immediate combat iooc, because they would piobably see it as being to their advantage Instead to keep tbe conflict at the conventional force level However, they appear to beeans for dealing with the possibilityTOs butiatioa of such limited nuclear use. without tbe Soviets"having to go to large-scale nuclear war1
war with NATO asrief transitional period, with nuclear usebe NATO theater, whereconflict has been taking place, before tbc onset of Intercontinental nuclear war. This phase can begin with small-scale use of nuclear weapons confined to tbc Immediate combat zone. We believe tbe Soviets would see this Initial localized use of nuclear weapons as probably being the last realistic opportunity to avoid large-scale nudear war. We believe,hat tbe Soviets, if faced with or bitATO nudear attack that seriously threatened their theater objectives, probably would launch massedimited strike),
a widening conflict that evolves from the initiallynudear operations mto tbeatcrwidc use of openuclear weapons.'
an eaion on the part ef the Soviets, once such large-scale use of nudear weapons In tbe theater occurred,ikdy and Imminent escalation to Intercontinental nudear war, although theyprobably would stall prefer, even at this stage If possible, to confine nudear war to Europe and avoid strikes against US and Soviet territory, i
lhe likelihood of largescale nuclearDCS cased. Soviet leaders would face tbeof whether to seize tlie Initiative and strike,be consistent with lhcir general militaryor to be more cautious In the hope ofnudear strikes on tlie Soviet homeland.no easy prescriptions for what the Sovietsdoarticular set of cii cum stances.
despite Ihe apparent doctrinal Imperativeount massive preemptive nudear atlacks:
The Soviets would be attempting, as in earliero acquire strategic warning of strikes from enemy forward-based nuclear forces against lhe Soviet homeland, at well a* from tatercontinental nuclear forces. We are unable to fudge what Information would be Sufficiently convincing to muse Soviel leaders loassive preemptive attack.
They would be mote likdy to scire the initiative by trundling Intercontinental nudear strikes If the war had already reached tbe levd cf theater nudear conflict, than If It was still at thelevel Dy taking the Initiative, ihey would espeet to reduce the capability of US strike forces and to disrupt to some extentS response. Evidence Indicates that ihey would not expect lo be able loS nudear retaliatory strike They also probably consider it likdy lhal the United State* would attempt lo bunch Its forces oo tactical warning.
We believe they would be Lkdy toreemptive IsHerroodnenUlhere had been largescale theater oodcar strikes against tbe western USSB. It Ii more difficult to joclge whether tbe Soviets would feel similarly inclined If they hadarge-scale preemptive strike against theater targets but bad suffered little or no retaliation fiom NATO theater strikes.
If they acquired convincing evidenceS Imercontfneolal strike was Imminenl. they would try to preempt. We believe lhat they would be more h'Vdy to act on lhe basis of ambiguous Indicatsoos and Inconclusive evidence of US strike intentionsheater nuclear conflict were under way ihanrisisonventional conflict-
ituation la which nuclear war In Europe was still limitedattlefield stage, the Soviets* recognition of the consequences of Inter connucleai conllict could give them incentive* to wait.
op Sjrret
lop Sotrel
reasons luch as lack of convincing evidence fiorn their itritegic warning rytferni or fear of unrarcei-Jiily or mistakenly Initiatingnuclear war. tbe Soviets nugbt notreemptive, strike, Tbeir LOTW capability wouldarger and mow. coordinated counterattacketaliation, while reducing tlie risk of escalation based oo insufficient or faulty strategic Information.
believe the Soviets recognize tbe possibility that tbey might fall to get reliable tacticalof an enemy Irttexcontincntal nuclear strike. Tbey prepare for tbe possibility that they would be unable to act quickly enough to successfullyarge number of missiles on tactical warning, and could retaliate only after absorbing an attack.
believe Ibe Sovieu place considerable em-pham on assessing tlieir stralegic offensiveunder conditions where they retaliate after the United Stalesajor strike These include sc-marios where they are able to launch varying portions of their forces on tactical warning, as well as tbe most stressfulretaliation only afterellUS counterfoioe attack. The SovieU strongly believe warfare rarely goes as planned and being piepaicd for adversity and unplannedit of paramount Importance. For the SovieU these retaliation scenarios are the.most critical in an evaluation of their capabilities and probably the ones lo which they devote most of Ibeir training.)
ements of Soviet strategic forcesbo-bly have ruffercd some losses during the previous phases of ibe conflict The Soviets eipect they would have tost some SSBN* in ibeir forward patrol areas. In tramit, and In tlve protected havens Some SHF assets might have been damaged or destroyed
Naval bases and
command, control, and communications facilities in the USSR could have been damaged, and louea of strategic bombers in conventional operatiom probably would have been ccAuderable|
oviet offensive objectives in canying out large-scale nuclear strikes would be to netrtralire US and Allied militaiy operations and warmialng capabilities
In Inter continental strikes tbe Sovieu would seek to destroy US-based nuclear forces and lo disrupt and destroy tbe supporting Inforiructure and control iyv terns for these forces.uld attempt lo Isolate the United States from the theater campi'gn by attacking Us power projection capabilities. Depending on ibe drcornstaoces. tbey might also attempt to reduoe US miliiary power In the long termit-nbl earaadty. Limiting lhestrikes only to command, control, andtargets, or onlyortion of US stralegic forces ruch as ICBM silos. Is not consistent with the evidence
I
n largo-scale theater nuclear strikes, which are lately to be conducted shortly before, concurrently with, or within hours of intercontinentall the Soviets probably would employ hundreds 'tactical nuclear weapons as wellarge share of llieir stralegic forces tint hive strike miiiioni against theater targets. Hie Soviet Navy would continuesing both nuclear and conventional weapons, against Western naval strike forces. Soviet itrategic aviation would conduct nuclear and convenlional strikes against high-value military targets.)
oviet laige-scale in! ercoo linen ul nuclearwould involve primarily ICBM* andassive Hi ilea probably would be delivered against worldwide US and Allied military targets, as well asore oomprebcosive set of political and industrial economic faculties. Wc believe that thc SovieU would conduct repeated attacks In an attempt to destroy, degrade, and disrupt lhc US capability to employ nuclear forces, and the reconstitutionof US nuclear forces aod their command and control:.
The Soviets have csxisiderable llcaibilily In tbeir employment of ICBMs for intercontinentalWe believe tbey would not launch Iheir ICBMsingle rriaa-ave Urike.
J
31
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ii leal clear how lhe Sovieli intend-to uie iheir SSDNi doling intercontinental nucleai conflict. Some foilass SSDNi would probably be uied in an initialt timc-urgcnt US command, control, andtargets and bomber burs. Other submarines alas might be employed In an Initial attack, againsi ta rue's 1st lhe United Stales and Eurasia-Some SSBNi ia protected areas ocas tbe Soviet homeland probably would be withheld lorpeolracled nuclear operations. Others for (oncer team iescrvc,|
Some itralescic bom ben mayolenitial Intercontinental nuclear strike operations,uri after tbe Initial misale strike. Wo believe It Ii. tliat bombers would be used later, for postal lack reconnaissance and Strikes againsttargets In the cocitioental United States. IJeplaymenl of lhe newong-range bomber and cf tbe new variant of the Bear bomber capable ol carrying ALCMs, however, will Increase lhe Soviels* flcxibiLcy In conducting bomber at riles it irrtesrantiisenlal ranges ass agaimt theater targets. There It an alternative view tbat Soviet long-range strategic bombers would, as currently constituted,efinite role In Initial intercontinental nuclear strikewithin hours alter the initial missile strike. Tbe bolder erf this vie- believes this role will eipand aa the new Bear andombers armed with ALCMs become available In substantial numbers in ibe late IS'HX "i
5S. Soviet strategic defensive operations In tlic Initial nuclear phaseonflict would Include:
Ballistic missile defense operations to protect key targeti in the Moscow area, by engaging enemy mimics until ley elements in thc ABM system were destroyed or aQ available Interceptors bid been capended.
defense in depth, to impose successiveto enemy penetration. The Soviets probably would have relocated some surface-to-air mi voles lo thwart defense suppression and avoidance tactlcv They evidently plan to use nuclear-armed
hoUt. of ihi,rfMuff,
1-Ii0lt'ml l i. iiof iht AU
SAMs against penelrators |
be rapidof damaged SAM sites, airfields, andcontrol, and communications facilities.
I
ASW operations to attempt to destroy enemy SSBNst
Attempts to interfere with and destroy USThese actions probably would be effected iust before this phase of conflict, at Ihe latest, -
Full implementation of cavil defense plans,earlier. Most of the Soviet leaders at both the national and regional levels would be In protective faculties from which Ihey wouldemergency rescue and- recovery operations by civilian units and civil defense military troop units.ew days for preparations, the essential workers either would be la shelters at their place of work or. If off duty, would be dispersed to zones outside lhe tities. Wc believe the Soviets would attempt to evacuate most of tlte urban population.!
Later Phaseiuclear Conflict The Soviets plan for later eaploitation phases following major Inter con tineotaj nuclear strikes conductedby remaining general purpose forces, but our knowledge of Soviet viewsthese phases Is sketchy. In the later stages of conflict, lhc Intensity of theater aod intercontinental nuclear strikes would dim! nidi. Tbe Soviels plan to reconstitute somegeneral purpose and strategic forces and to secure their theaterof substantial areas of Western Europe. The iin plication3seems lo be that Ihe strategic nuclear forces of both sides arc largelyor neutralized, but Oral withheld andSoviet strategic nuclear forcesmall but important, role In achieving Soviet objectives Incombat during ibe later phases'.
We arc highly uncertain about their actual capabilities lo reconstitute strategic forces. Overall wc believe tbe Soviets could maintain tbe combatof many of the surviving withheld weapons and would be able to reconstitute strategic forces at least to some extent with surviving reserve weapons and materiel although damage to tbe logistic system
Top^eeret
1 fori would fi, ,rh out the time required for reconstitutiofv Tlieoo of combat effect! vcasea would be contingent on restoring command and control coramuiucat.omj1
SS- Tbe Sovleti oeepare for combat oce cations' that could eatcod weeks beyond ibe Intercontinentalphase. Tbcy would clearly prefer to accomplish ibeir objective! quickly, but recognise tbat the later pbuei could be protracted, given tbe difficulty and complexity of cooducting operations following massive nuclear itbe duration would depend on such factors ai tbe capabilities of remaining theater forces, tbe tUtus of lurviving poblkal leaders, tbc viabilty of command and control, aod tbe conditions In the US and Sovietey objective for the Sovietshii period would be to prevent the Uoited States from rccTMulituting its command and control system. In addition.-'
We believe thc Soviets would withhold C
J of their Initial ICBM force,mall portion of thc peripheral attack forces, foroperations. We believe they wouldICBM andorcei using reserve missiles and eciuipmeot; we believe theyicierve missiles for their ICDM andorce, beyond those reoulred for maintenance and training. Wc believe these forces would be used against residual enemy conventional and nuclear forecs and command and control, and per ha pa key surviving elements of the economy supporting military operations According to an alternative view. Soviet ICBM rcconru'tutionto dale
ot thc li- liI-on of refiie In Soviet war plans. Moreover, the holder o( this view believes that
_'j estimated
missile storage capacity^
s eemsistent with maintenance andreo.ol cements. "|
Soviet planning for SSBN
operationsrotracted conflict Somepiobably would be withheld, under navalieserve foice role.
The holJn ef ihiihr DOntet. Svreav. efepanmen'
suggests they do not espeet most
aircraft lo survive the earlier pbascs of nuclear conflict. Wc believe lhat any rrsmelnlng bombers would conduct reconnaissance and strikeagainst key surviving targets)
Soviet air defense taoits plan to restore airfields for defensive operations. Fighters and SAM units would operate from alternate sites if Decessary. Qvil defense units woold continue rescue and recovery operations aod aid with the distributionf reserve supplies to thc cJvdian popuUtion. The Soviets evidently eapect that some economic restoration would beaftermultiple nuclear strikes.]
evidence lhat we have C
n the later stages of general nuclearwith Ine conductuccessful militarywithforces reconstituting after heavy lossesoccupying much of continentalrope. 1
Soviets vould seek touclear war on theirneutralizing lhe ability ofeater nuclear forces lo Interfere with Soviet capabilities to prevailonflict In Eurasia.
have no specific evidence oo whetherwould attempt to endar byor on initiatives they might undertake ifthey could not achieve their military
E. Trends in Soviel Ccipobdit.es To Perform Strategic. AAisiiexn
uring the neatean lhe primary wartime missions of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive lorces will continue lo be lo
Destroy enemy nuclear delivery mum.
Neutralise enemy command, control, andwarning capabilities, and othersystem!
r
Destroy other military and no run Hilary targets.
Assure live survivability ot sufficient offensive forces and command and control capabilities to perform the missioru envisioned by Soviet strategy.
Defend the Soviet homeland against attacks by! ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles.
Protect llie Soviet leadership, economy. andlation through civil defense./
Destroying Enemy Nuclear Ocfocey Means
The latest types of Soviet ICBMs havepotential toigh probability ofa US ICBM silo. The SovieU have enoughICBM RVs today to atuck aUsilos and launch control centersell-first strike. We project that, over thehe USSR will have substantially larger numbersliard-target-capable RVs and that the effectivenessindividual Soviet ICBMs against hardened targetsincrease. As shown In figuren aSoviet ICBMs would have thefRVsinutemanachieveeaperctruxy of aboutoercentaboutercent by there significant uncertainties in these percentages
as shown, because cf our uncertainties about Soviet ICBM characteristics. (With one RV. the damage expectancy would beoercent today, and aboutercent by tbemprovementshe accuracy of Soviet ICBMs projected for theill giveigh probabilityamaging silos hardened
J Although thcard4argct capabilities will increase substantially, wc believe that they will still be concei ocd that atortion of the US ICBM force would be bunched while under attack. Also, the Soviets could notthe timingoordinated attack by ICBMs against US missile silos and by forward deployed SLBMs against US bomber bases and other time-urgent targets because of the difference In flight rimes of these Soviet weapons.
Aircraft. Tile SovieU almosttry to altack US strategic aircraft on tbeaircraft not on alert and unableatter of minutes would beFor alert aircraft the critical Issue Is their
Seeret
ilssivMil^^
to lake oil and escape safely In the few minutes before enemy mlniles arrive. Our anadytls of tbe prablemi thc Soviets would face In flructuiiiaf aad carrying out rucb an at lad leads us to Judge thatnlikelyoviet attack would be able lo destroy roost of the US alert strategic aircraft, assumingof Defense planning factors for alert bomber escape times. We do not believe iISoviets will be able to develop (lie capability during the neatears to target and destroy, with itntegic offensive weapons, US aircraft In flight.!
SBN: Tbe Soviets do not now have lheto detect US SSBNs eventing In open ocean areas except by chance, or to maintain contact with or trail themhance detection occurs. Overt trail by modem Soviet nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) using activeechnically feasible if they establish contact, but It bas the potential of alerting tbc target submarine almost Inuncdiately. Moreover, Overt trail could potentially be thwarted by US counter-measures. Q
3 Proiected
Improvements In Soviet passive acoustic sensors, plus deploynse/it cf .more ASW platforms, probably wiU enhance the Soviets' capabilities to detect and destroy US submarine! operating in confined areas or close to the USSR but will not give them an tifective broad-ocean detection capability or Improve significantly their capability to trail US SSBNs. We rapect Soviet ASW capability to increase over the neatears; however, barring any technical breakthrough in non-acoustic ASW (sec1 we believe that thc overall effectiveness cf Soviet ASW against tbe US SSBN force will be more than offset by planned US improvemcnta.1
yeUar Force* in Eur aria. We believeand proiected Soviet strategic offensive forces would be more tlian adequate In numbcri andto atiack nuclear forces in Europe and Asia In hardened and soft fined facilities We ate not able to assess the Soviets capability lo locate and strike mobile missile launchers that have left their fiied bates Soviet targeting iMoblerns would be compounded severely by planned Western deployment* of add ilk-sal mobile systems CLCM.nd SI-CMi onparticularly those deployed beyond the range of Soviet tactical reconnaissance systems./
I teutioGiiEnemy Command, Control ond Convnumccrtionv Warning Ceapobuitiei, and Olher Support Systems
Tluo>ugbout tbc neatears, the Soviets will bave weapons of sufficient numbers and capabilities to give them high confidence, under any circumstances. Id tbeir ability lo destroy most fUod, land-based nuclear support facilities la the United States, such as depots, nuclear storage sites, maintenance bases,and ports. Tbey have ibe capability to destroy or Interfere vdlh most major elements of the US tactical warning and attack assessment system, shortly before orarge-scale nuclear strike. Although the Soviets ptobably could substantially degrade US tactical warning systems, wc do not believe ihey would be confident that such interference alone wouldIhe launch of substantial numbers of US weapons.
Wc cannot assess the likely effectsoviet attack on tlve US command, control, andsystem However, the Soviets* military doctrine, their emphasis on radioeleet conic combat, and theirtargetingas well as their preoccupation with theof their own command, control, andsystems, lead us to believe that they would devote substantial rlforts to-.l
Disconnecting and destroying the US National Command Authority, some operating alternates, and critical intermediate military conlrol points. I
Delaying or preventing tranunluion of launch orders by disrupting the various com munitions paths with direct attacks. Jamming, andInterference, and by undertaking a
.coordinated, minimum warning attack on many rontiol points and commuons
reconstitution of residual command, control, arvd communications capabilitier through repeated attacks/
umber of factors thai couldSoviets belief in iheir chances of severelycritical US command and control of nuclear forces:
Soviets' inability lo use ballistic missiles to destroy US airborne command posts and other supporting aircraft in flight
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reduced vulnerability ol US Ktaieglc corn-mind and conirol Inperiod of Crisis Ot theater conflict,esult ol Increased readiness and dispersal
Improvements to US command, control and communicationsai greaterand redundancy.
Major uDcarrtaintiei aboul Ihe effects ofpulse on elect ionic equipment.
aboutether tliey have Identified all lite Important fiaod or mobile'. and communications facilities.1
Destroying Other MiC terry ond MonrnEtory Toroeti
oviet attack usingwarheads against US based Strategicand supporting facilities, moreIntercontinental warheads could still befor attacking ether targets worUwIde, Ifwere fully generated and not degradedstrikes. In addition, tbe Soviets wouldof warheads on shorter range systemsground targets adjacent to the Sovietrelationship between tbc number of Sovietavailable and ibeir capability to attacktbe estimated required damage levels Is easierwith analyticallyreemptive attack than for
a retaliatory attack. The Soviets would be likely to retain good control over their nuclear forces, and most of their missile forces would still be surviving. |
The retaliation situation is much more complex. Tbe command and control over forces would bo degraded, withliiowni for the Soviets in dear" of control remaining Initially, and In tlie ability to reestablish control, where it has been lent, and to maintain control over time. Thus, numbers ofweapons and the capability lo employ themoordinated fashion are both critical |
In tbe six forces projected in chapter IV,2umber of strategic intercontinental nudear warheads remaining for these other worldwide strike missions following an attack agaiast US-based Mrs logic nuclear forces and supporting facilities, could be up tec
0 (Force00 (Forcef unconstrained by aims limitations.
f constrained by tbe US START proposals.
f constrained by the Soviet START proposals.
This assumes tbe United States does not deploy ICBMsew basing mode, or defend them with ABMs. The numbers tn these forces, moreover, do not ind ode potential reloads. |
ith Ihe increasing vulnerability ef Soviet ICBM nlos during the period of this Estimate, as tbc accuracy of US weapons Improves, the Soviets wiQ be faced with more difficult problems In assuring:retaliatory capabilities in lhe event of being struck first- We believe the Soviets" efforts to eapaasd thc capabilities cf their command and control network and SLBM force, and to develop mobile ICBMs. reflect (heir concerns in nsaintaming the capability to fulfill the missions of lhcir strategic nudear forces after being Struck, i
Assuring the Survive bility of Soviet Strute-jie Offensrec Forces
CBMi. We eincct that silo based ICBMs will continue to be the largest and most capable dement of Sovicl strategic offensive forces through the decade. As illustrated in figureios for the latest Soviet ICBMs. and their lsvxiatcd launch control facilities, wouldigh probability of surviving an attack by Current US offensive weapons, but US weapon systems In development wouldonsiders bit greater threat Fuither silo hardening would result In only modest improvrsmeiils lo Soviet ICBM survivability. We eipect lhe Soviets le-:
Continue to improve their ea pa bullies lo bunch ICBMs on tactical wariiing- f"
J
obile MIRVed ICBM by lheode similar lo that used with the
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DM, and perhaps *Iii|h,ulJr MIRVed ICBMil-mobile mode by Ibe
Be capable ofallulic musilefoi selected ICBM com plea et in ibe.
We cannot evaluate ibeemenbility of ibe USSR'i strategic bomberibe nuclear phasesonflict.Include llie ertent of bomber losses duringphases of conflict, capa bill in lomaintain aircrafl at until get ed locations,for bomber force reconstilultoD-1
Soviet SSBNs al sea would be potenUally vulnerable to ASW forces, primarily because of their relatively high noise levels. Typhoon-class lubnurincs are expected to be Quieter lhan the currently deployed SSBN daises, thereby Increasing tbeir ability lo avoid detection bv acoustic means. SSBNs with long-range SLBMs can remain In range of targets In the United State* whale 'in waters close to tbe USSR, eiploiting foe cover and shallow ocean depths, and avoiding Western sound surveillance system (SOSUS) arrays. Tbc Soviets haveignificant portion of tbeir general purpose naval foice* lo protect iheir SSBNs in waters contiguous lo the USSR. These piictices Increase tbc chances lhat Soviet SSBN* woulderiod of conventional conflict, be able to participate In an initial Soviet nuclear rtrike. and be available for use In protracted nudeai war.I
Froteding, the USSR With Strategic Defense
USSR deploys massive air defense force*.its ballistic mlasile defenses at Moscow,an extensive civil defense program. Althoughan assessment of tbe capabilities ofindividually, we have not assessed tbcoverall protection, now or In lbc future, thatafforded Ihe USSR by tbe combination of Itspassive ddcrisea-l
of Soviet Baflfilic MirrifeThe project rd upgrade of theBM launcher* willuch mine reliable, (wo-laycr capabil-
ity to defend critical lariets at Moscow against an attack: by some lem of current type* of US RVs and against increasingly sophisticated third-country mb-silcs.arge-scale attack, thewould quickly be eduuited, but tbey might be effective In preferentially defending selected Urget* in the Moscow area, such aaommand and control facilities. |
bc upgrade lo Ihc defenses at Moscow isto provide lhe Sovietsoundataon for expanding tbeii defenses.irepower level ofnterceptors the Soviets could maketarget* around Moscow, especially command bunkers, less vulnerableubstantial US force ofRVs. The leakage likely to result from such an atiack would cause severe damage to most of the abewegroond, unhardened facilities and to some of the hardened target facilities atmaller scale attack,efense would allow thc SovieU to spread tlieir interceptor coveragearger number of targetsarger area. Tbc effectiveness ofefense against attack by third countries, such as China, would be considerable.'
f the Soviets were lo deploy an ABM defense iovolviog as manyaunchers, aa in the eapansion options addicaacd la volume IL and if the deployed system* were reasonably effective, the potential effect on the US strategic mimic force would beS fint strike In the face cfeavy defense would be degraded, perhapsignificantS second strike would be degraded even more, because lhe lower number and rate of RV arrivals in most areas would result fa lower leakage rates tor the defense. I
bc actual ef (eetiveneis ofefense would depend, not only on the pafornaance of the deployed ABM systems, but also on tbe vulnerabiLiici of key elements of tbe network and the potential of an attacking force to eaploit them We have not analyzed these problems In detail Moreover, wc have not quantitatively assessed, and are Uncertain about, the potential abilityidespread ABM system to reduce overall damage and to protect key military functions. It would probably be mote effective against SLBMs dun against ICBMs. If adequate coverage of SLBM approaches were provided by battlesupportS countrruieaiuies such as decoys, chaff, and maneuvering RV* could reduce its
Secret
effectiveness.
J la aay cue, widespread Soviet deployment of aa ABM lystem. even if US cvahialkun. indicated it could be overcome br an Bltaeling force, would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties foi US planners admit tbc potential effectivroesxS strike. It Islo bsdge tbc capabilitiesew advanced surface-to-air missile system, theZ. However. If certain features that wc have assumed far ibis lystexn are realired. its potential con tribu lion to ha Hi-tic mh-ale clefeauea would be of growing eonccro as it became widely deployed in tbe USSR and Eastern Europe in thcdditionally,to one view, any evaluation of lhe effectsidespread AIIM defense to reduce damage should consider tbe potential ABM capa bill ties of tbcndystems, which could further complicate US attack
SL Air Dtjenie. Tbc present Soviet air defense system, undegradedallistic missile aitack or effective electronic countermeamie*robably would perform well against aircraft at altitudes aboveeters, although It does not have tbe capability to conduct intercepts much beyond the Soviet borders. We have not assessed the eateot to which its performance would be degraded by defense suppression, rueh as ballistic missile strikes likely'to precede bomber and cruise missile penetration Tbc current Soviet air defense syslem would be lelatively Ineffectiveow-altilude attack. It could, however,iigber probability of Intercepting low-altitude aircraft In areas where radarense andigh concern ration of- ground-baaed terminal defenses, unless the attacker used standoff missiles or effective counter measures and lactics.
hc Soviet air defense system from lhen will be qualitatively different from the
current system. Thc Soviets will haveariety of new systems lo Urge numbers that possess the tec Imapabilities to defend against current types of bombers and cruise missiles at low altitude Wc cannot assess with confidence the overallof these defense*'
-T
J
n. Judgment about tlse overall effectiveness of the future Soviet air defense system against an attack by bombers and cruisehus subject to enniSderable uncertainly. Penetration of Improvedair defenses by currently deployed bombers will be more difficult. Theseowever, would be connderaldy less effective againsi US cruise missiles Our Judgment is thatombined attack of penetrating bombers, ihott-range attack missilesnd cruise mimics, Soviet air defenses during the neatears probably will not be capable of inflicting sufficient tosses to prevent large-scaleto tbe USSR. We believe, however, that the Soviets will be able to provide an Increasingly capable air defense for many key leadership, control, and military and Indu-trial installations essential to wartime
n alternative view lhat this Estimate substantially understates tbe capability of the Soviet air defense syslem lo defend key target areas against low-altitudeccording to thb view,effectiveness in these areas could be high today
against bombers. The holder of this view believes lhalS the effectiveness in auch areas would be Significantly higher againstcombined ttUck of. penetrating bombers. SRAMs, and cruise missiles than tbe Estimate
W Defense. We believe that, with as tittleew hours*arge percentage ef Soviet civiliangovernment, andwould probablyrge-scate US nucleararge-scale retaliatory nuclear .attack directed against Soviet economic Installations would causedamage to tbe plant and equipment at the vast majority of these facilities Timely implementation of sheltering and dispersal plans would provide effective protectionarge percentage of the essential work force at key faalities. Soviet population casualties would vary greatly, depending on the eatent to which civil defense measures bad been Implemented! Irn*-provernents In Soviet civil defense preparations during the neatears would Increase the livelihoodarge percentage of the leadership and essential work force would be able torge-scale attack, but casualties among the general population would remain ,high. I
StxvrVohJfity of Soviet Command and Conirol
e believe the Soviet command and control system for nuclear forces, even If directly attacked, can ensure transmission of launch instructions;retaliatory strikes could be delayed and not fully coordinated. Although US attacks could destroy many known fiaed command, control, and communications facibties, elements of the political leadership and military commands probably would survive, andin Soviel strategic communications would prevent loss of any one channel from disabling the overall system.)
be Soviets could experience difficulty,in maintaining the endurance aod effectiveness of strategic command, control, and communications for weeks of continuing operations, particularly ifto US strikes. They would be relying onprimarilyposts. Tbe cumulative impact of residual nuclear effects could endanger command personnel and degrade communicationsIt Is also unclear bow effectively the Soviets
- TVfhe etutfUif chief of Staff foi
'rVruermenf ofnw.f
could retarget and employ surviving or reeoostituted weapons. We believe ibe Soviets might eipcet to lose most satellite reconnaissance and would thus rely primarily on long-range reecrniaiuar.ee aiicraft and signal tatercept capabilities.'
F. Concluding Observations
doow bow the Soviets wouldprospects for prevailinglobalSuable forcei on both sides wouldnuclear strikes;
Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and destroy paoolling US SSBNs. alert aircraft, aircraft In flight, or land-mobile miiules. particularly those beyond the range of tactical reconnaissance systems. We "believe that.sists or conflict, the Soviets would creditII US warning and control systems with the ability to launch ICBMs on tactical warning.
,mobile missiles and SSBNs patrolling in waters near the USSR are highly survivablc, as are Dtost silo-based ICBMs and perhaps dispersed aiicraft. We believe the Soviets can launch ICBMi on tactical warning, assuming theirand control systems are undegraded
Moreover, tlie Sovicis are well aware of their Inability to prevent massive damage to the USSR with their strategic defenses even with the improvements taking place in these forces. They also recognise tbat US Strategic defenses canoe* prevent ma rove damage.
brbeve lhat the Soviets' confidence Infor global conflict probably will bedependent on command and control <on their ii-i. for disrupting andability of llie United Slates and Its Alliesand lo operate their forces. Theto make eatensive efforts to Improveof their comraand, control, andcapabilities Wc believe they would launchattacks On US and Allied strategicand communications to prevent or Impairof retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the
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oa Sovicl strategic defenses and impairing US and Alliedto manhal mtfitary and resources to reeorutitule forces. We believe tbat plaiuvd US and NATO Improvements ta com mind, control, and communication! will Increase tbo Soviets' irncertalnties about their capability to disrupt enemy force operations, f
IW. The evidence shows dearly that Sovicl leaders ate attempting to prepare their military forces for the possibility of hiving touclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over llvaranng-ty complex conflict dturlionc They have sertously addressed many of lire problems of conducting nuii-tary operationsuclear war. tlsereby improving
their ability to deal with (lie many coolingcocacs ofordlict, and raning tlie probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR. There is an alternative view lhal wishes to em pbasixe that the Soviets have not resolved many of thc critical problems bearing oa the conduct of nudear war. such as the nature of the initiation of csaoflict. escaUlaoo within lhe theater, and protracted nuclear operations. According to this view, the Soviets recognize that nuclearo destructive, and Its course so tsncertaln. that they could not expect an outcome that wasla any meaningful
" IT- KaUa cf thu li th* DftttM.mf Ufttlco**
41
Top SejCct
DISSCMINAUON NOI ICE
I. ihrtwot ctiMnwvafed by tht Oueclotot. ol Inie&gonco. Ibiioraod oie of tb.ofvjV hii or bor fjra&cte* oo,oMliortJ cattM-atanyby ffu fotWng olnoob
wilhin'r*
ol UlcJCpcnce ond RclearoS. for Iba Deport wit ol Slot.
b.gency, (or Hwi Office al lb* Secretary ol Defense
and lhe orgorJrarion ol the-al Moll e. Aiwtaol Oriel of Staff for. lor Ibe Deportment of ibe Army d. Doctor of Naval Wrlfl-yr. far ^Deportment olNavy
ArMtarrt Chief of Staff. arirCgence, foe thef the Air Fore.
of Im^aagmce.orp,
(j. Deputy Aunt or* Sccrrtoiy far lalemalk^ol InwCgence AncJywi. far tba Dcporf-ment of Energy
h. Auutonl Director, ft) I, for trie Fccterol Bureau ofirector of NSA, for the National Security Agency
j. Special AtuVtanl la tha Secretory for Notional Security, for the Deportment of the Treasury
k. Tho Deputy Direclor for birCocnoc for ony olW Oeportrnenl or Agency
Z. TKi document moy b* irto-wf. or oVsirojrdilh oppVobt* lecwity rrputar-Mt. or returned la tho Directorate af
tbn cfoevrnent Ji cCiie-vooledIh* ovrrieoioy retain it farnot in enters af one year. At Ihe end af thii period, tha document vbould bereturned lo tho (orwordlvj crgency. or permission ihould be reouetted of thola retain2
1itU of (huwbtr. wadm the 1ert h
Original document.
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