S8 HtOVEDs
DATE:7
Intelligence Report
of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis
7
Colombia: Paramilitaries Gaining Strength
Sponsored hy heal powerbrokers and fueled by frustration over the military's inability io control ihe expansion of guerrilla activity, paramilitary group* are graving and art likely to continue lo expand Iheir membership, capability, and influence over economically important territory.
The climate of insecurity in vast areas of Colombia offers ihc
eady and lucrative market among wealthy businessmen, including drag traffickers .T
Although they are no match militarily for00 full time guerrillas who operate uationwidc, paramilitary groupsorce to be reckoned with, particularly in northern Colombia.
Paramiliury groups have long been regarded as allies, or in some cases, surrogates of the military.)
Nonetheless, enough data exist todraw the following
The attitude of most military officers toward these groups appears to be shaped by their shared interest infighting the guerrillas, and lo this end officers probably view the paramilitariesaluable source of information aboul local conditions and insurgent activities.
Instances of direct, high-level military support for paramilitaries appear* to be isolated,
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Possible military links to these groups are of particular concern because ol" the upsurge in human rights violauons attributed to paramilitary groups in recent years.
Victims of paramilitary violence are most commonly unarmed civilians who arc murdered for suspected ties to the guerrillas.
Amid these ominous trends. President Samper and other top officials have said that the government is prepared to take firm action against the paramilrtanes, but so far they have not matched their words with deeds.
have invesugatcdraction of the many serious incidents that have taken place in recent years, and.l
some outstanding arrest warrants have no! oecnerilurced.
see scant indications lhat the military is making an effort lo directly confront ihe paramilitary groups or to devote additional men or resources against them in an amount equal lo the dimensions of the problem.
The growth of paramilitary violence is likely to complicate I'S interests in Colombia in Ihe areas of human rights and counternarcotics.
Paramilitaries Growing. Expanding Activities
erm used by many Colombians to refer to bauds of armed civilians paid to protect the interests of various sponsors, are stepping up their activities in economically important areas of the country. The areas include key agricultural and cattle ranching areas, as well as mineral extraction regions ia the northern and central parts of the country'. (See map).
A former Human Rights Ombudsman claims that paramilitary activity has increased byercent over the past four years. Frustration over widespread insecurity caused by the military's inability to curtail the activities of the guerrilla groups-the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Armyrobably ire fueling the upsurge in activity by these groups.
The use of private security forces to compensate for shortcomings in the state's ability to provide security, especially in the countryside, is notut in recent years the seemingly unabated escalation in cases of ludnapping, extortion, theft, and murder by the guerrillas--who now number00 full time armed fighters, according lo government estimates-has led growing numbers of local powerbrokcrs to sponsor paramilitaries to strike back ac guerrillas and their sympathizers. Sponsors have come to view tbe weakness--or in some cases absence- of government authority in rural areas as an opportunity to use violence with impunity to consolidate and expand their control over temtory and licit and Olicii economic activity.!-
The civilian sponsors of paramilitary acuvity include business owners, such as cattle ranchers, coffee plantation owners, and emerald miners. In some areas narcoiruffickers. who, like other wealthy Colombians have been targets of guerrilla extortion and other crimes, have largely displaced legitimate landowners and are using paramilitaries to intimidate and eliminate guerrillas and others who interfere with traffickeraiamilUanes sometimes do more for traffickers than
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proieci against guerrillas; they arc used by traffickers to force owners and scuatters of! Lind.
the presence of large iandhokiings, particularly those owned by naicotraffickers, appears to be the strongest indicator of paramilitarism Areas with vigorous economic activity, such as cattle ranching, emerald mining, or oil production are magnets for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. As guerrillas target areas of high economic activity for extortion of "waro do business people in these areas hire paramilitaries to protect their interests against the guerrilla
Paramilitaries Seeking Unity
A growing body of reporting suggests that Castano and other key paramilitary leaders have been trying to join fdices under an umbrella group in an effort to portray themselvesegitimate force in their own nght. rather than bands of vigilantes and surrogates of the military, as the guerrillas chargeational conference in Uraba attended byctivists in mid-April, the largest paramilitary groups announced thai they wereational, unified coordinating committee known as United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUQ. The leaders of these groups appear to be motivatedesire to position themselveslace at die tabic if and when peace negoumions occur between the government and the guerrillas. Improved coordination also affords the possibility of creating belter networks for obtaining arms and sharing training expertise.
It seems unlikely however, mat this new structure willignificant impact on the paramilitaries' day-to-day operations. The groups have admitted that their various regional commander will retain independent responsibility for their respective military actions.
Personal rivalries between Castano and Carranza thwarted previous efforts at unity, but the two have put aside their differences in order to pool resources andore competent combat force against the guerrillas, accordingoreign government service official.
Top paramilitary leaders also have tried to build support among the groupsnified agenda,
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Other priorities arc to increase intelligence activities in urban areas, especially in big cities such as Bogota, Medellin. and Cartagena, and to establish influence in Putumayo Department along the southern border with Ecuador and Peru, where the paramilitaries say they fear the guerrillas have setirtual parallel government.
The paramilitaries may be coordinating plans to violently disrupt the coming stateelections scheduled forctober. The AUC asserted in late April that itleftist politicians from campaigning in areas under theirhreatthat of FARC, which indicated thai it would stop campaigning in its areasaccording to press reports. Presumably, however, the FARC willwho arc sympathetic to their cause to campaign.
Murky Ties Between the Military and Paramilitaries
Historic links between the military--especially the Army, which is the largest service and the one that bears the brunt of the bank against the guerrillas- -and paramilitary groups are well known and publicly acknowledged by the government, but the nance of the contemporary relationship is more difficult to ascertain./
ATJu jr, parami!itar'r.<dr;llegal inome members haveccodnned their ties to these groupsj
Many military officers have been embarrassed by several high profile, rebel-inflicted setbacks over the past year, and some who arc demoralized by the military's inability to make headway against the guerrillas may see tolerance or support for the paramilitaries as one avenue for striking back. These officers tend to blame the military's shortcomings on the government's failure to adequately support the armed forces. Such views have been indirectly, but unrnistiikably articulated by Military Forces Commander Harold Bedoya, who frequently bemoans ihe military's manpower shortage and the judiciary's lax policies co prosecuting guerrillas j
Bedoya complained late last year that the country needs to triple its Army tooldiers to adequately counter the guerrilla threat. To compensate for the deficiency, in early April Bedoya proposedivilian rmliua, but the idea has little political support.
He has also publicly cnticized judicial authorities for releasing thousands of guerrillas over the past several years whom the military had captured and turned over to ihe courts for prosecution.4
itlicali io corroborate ihe sketchy informaiion available on the cooperation al the local level and ihe extent to which top military officers are aware of such tics and approve of ihem. In theory, government-sponsored rural security cooperatives known as 'Convivirs" are the military's "eyes and ears" in remote parts of the country, but in practice some local coinmanders reportedly also rely on the paramilitaries for information on guerrilla activities.
_in October that al the local level, troop commanders often consult with paramilitaries to obtain information about guernlla activity taking place in their area of operations.
Nevertheless,
he larger paramilitary groups gain
strength, some ui me leaoers appear to want to distance themselves from the popular perception lhat they work closely with ihe miUtary-at least in iheir public statements -in order lo foster ihc image of powerful, independent actors.
Despite reporting linking him with Ramirez,
Castano and other leaders like htm appear to have "outgrown" the military
and act with increasing independence.!"
Growing Human Rights Abuses
As paramilitaries have grown and intensified their activities, so too have the number of human rights abuses attributed to these groups. Victims of paramilitary violence arc mostly unarmed, noncombatant civilians who are murdered for suspected tics to the guerrillas, accordingariety of sources. In some departments, paramilitaries carry out selective assassinations, while in other areas, particularly in northern Colombia, paramilitaries are suspected of carrying out numerous massacres ol suspected leftist sympathizers
local nongovernmental organization
sources say"(Hal more than half of politically motivated extrajudicial killings were committed by paramilitariesore lhan triple the level attributed to them'
Colombian human rights prosecutors blame paramilitaries for the majority of massacres in areas such as L'raba. Cordoba, Magdelcna Medio, and ihe Eastern plains,
In addition, paramilitary operations have exacerbated the already scnous problem of internal displacement caused by the long- ruunmgecent government report indicated that paramilitary attacks are now the primary cause of the rising number of internal refugees, findings thai are consistent within astody carried out by two human rights groups]
The study found that moreolombians were displaced by violencet blamed paranulitary groups forercent of the forced migration and guerrillas forercent of (he displacement.
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In April this problem gained international attention when several hundred refugees crossed the border into Panama to escape clashes involving
paramihur.es, guerrillas, and tbe Colombian Army.pursued the refugees, some of whom they apparently believedguerrilla sympathizers, into Panama, where they killed fiveto various press reports.
Paramilitaries also add-albeitelatively small scale-to Colombia's kidnapping statistics. In an effort to seek revenge and pressure ihe gaemllas lo release the hostages they hold, paramilitary leaders periodically kidnap collaborators, sympathizers, and relatives of the guerrilla leadership.
Colombia suffers from the highest rate of kidnapping in theboul half of theidnappings reported6 were perpetrated by guerrillas, and the other half were committed by common criminals. I
Bogota Has Done Mule to Stem the Tide
Amid growing turmoil, particularly in northern Colombia. President Samper and other top officials have uttered strong pronouncements in recent months claiming thai the government was prepared to lake firm action againsi paramilitary groups. Thus far. however, the administration has not matched its words with deeds.
urprisingly candid admission, the government concededecent report that il has been slow to perceive the gravity of the paramilitary problem and in mobilizing resources to confront it
A team of prosecutors who specialize in investigating human rights abuses has been pursuing cases against numerous paramilitary leaders and activists, but the problem has grown so large that they are only able toraction of the many serious incidents that take place each day.1
Last year, the team addressedases involving
massacres, kidnappings, forced cusappearances and extrajudicial killings by paramilitaries, guerrillas, members of the .truniriry forces, and others.
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esult of these efforts and those of the police, several important paramilitary commanders and lower level members have been arrested, but many other arrest warrants, some many years old, have not beeo enforced,!
Onpril police arrested Luis Alfredo Rubio Rojas, who was charged with paramilitsrism and participationassacremong other crimes.
In January. Jose Anibai Rodriguezember of Castano's Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Corboda and Uraba, was sentenced toears in jail for ihe kidnapping and murderenator and the massacre ofeasants in
Efforts to prosecute members of the military who have allegedly assisted these groups have been stymied. Prosecutors reportedly are concerned that all cases involving military assistance to paramilitaries will be turned over to military courts, which have traditionally been far more lenient on such matters. This action deprives civilian officials of an important deterrent in preventing security forces from becoming involved with paramilitaries.
recedent may have been set last yearudicial council ruled that the case against Farouketired three star general charged with collaborating with paramilitary groups in the Magdalena Medic region duringnd "intellectual authorship" of two massacres-could only be tnedilitary court
was unawareingle case inilitary court had prosecuted andenior officer for human rights violations. [
More importantly, ae sec scant indication that the military leadership is making an effort to directly confront ihe paramilitary groups or to devote men or resources to stop their activities in an amount commensurate with the dimensions of the problem
Prospects IMm Tor Reining in Paramilitaries
ignificant improvement in Bogota's capability to impose security incountryside--which we believe is unlikely before ilie end ofinparamilitary groups will continue to expand inand influence over economically important territory. Paramilitariesa long way from parity with the guerrillas in terms of unity ofof combatants, training, and equipment, and are unlikely to be able tofor many years. But as paramilitaries become stronger, they areto engage in direct clashes with the guerrillas -as they do now in partsCO By lo extend their operations into areas long controlledinsurgents.
HlTofU by key paramilitary teaders toormal, consolidated network are likely to meet with only limited success. In view of longstanding personal rivalries, these groups are more likely to operateoose corifcdcratioc, rathernified command element Smaller paramilitary groups will continue to function as "guns forngaging in ever changing alliances of convenience. i
As the frequency and intensity of violent confrontations between the paramilitaries and guerrillas grow, civilians will increasingly be caught in the crossfire. Local politicians, particularly in remote areas, will be vulnerable to intimidation by both sides, further weakening tbe already tenuous government control in some areas. This trend is likely to result in particularly bloody elections for state and local offices, even by Colombian standards.
Concern about violence in the runup to elections could prompt Bogota to try to crack down on paramilitaries in coming months, and perhaps even arrest one of the high profile paramilitary leaders. As the new UN human rights office in Bogota becomes more active, it is likely to join with other domestic and international groups in pressing the government for action.
The military is likely to react coolly to added calls by civiliansrackdown on pararmliunes. The deficiencies in manpower, transport, and tactics thai propels some
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members of (he security forces to work with paramilitaries is unlikely to change over the next year. The popular perception that the military is 'losing the war" against the guerrillas is likely to continue to tempt some officers to pursue all avenues possible to strike back at the guerrillas.esult, informational links and instances of active coordination between military and paramilitaries are likely to continue.
Implication* for the United States
Thus far. paramilitary groups have refrained from attacking IIS citizens and facilities. Nonetheless, Americans, particularly those working in remote areas in northern Colombia, arc at risk of becoming unintended victims of paramilitary attacks. The paramilitaries' victimization of growing numbers of innocent civilians runs counter to US interests in preventing human rights abuses in Colombia.
Washington's pressure on the Samper government could serve as an impetusrackdown on the paramilitaries.
In addition, powerful paramilitary group leaders' involvement in or links with narcotics trafficking could pose an increasingly potent challenge to US antinarcotics interests. Just as pararwhtaries have been directed against guerrillas who threaten trafficker interests, these groups could also be directed against US aided eradication activities and other countemarcotics efforts. |
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Convivirs: Civilian Assistance for the Embattled Array
The Colombian Government authorized the formation of Convivirs in5 to aid the military in counterinsurgency operations by empowering civilians to gather information about guerrilla activities in rural areas and pass it to localstimates of the number of Convivirs in operation vary; press and US Embassy sources sayonvivirs have been formed as of April,
majority
in central and northern Colombia.
Each group consists of up toeople,eader who is selected by the local Army commander The Convivir iswo-year charter, bat the government is free to revoke the license of the group and demand the return of any equipment issued to it at any time. <j
of guerrilla violence directed against Convivir members suggests that the rebels perceive themhreat.
For example, four Convivir headquarters were attacked and at least two members kil.cdccording io press reports.
' The official name ot nNcu (KiUpt it Rare) Cooperative* yt Vigilance and Sacunly. Cunvim manna 'livingin Spuiith. I
Original document.
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