STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
A collection of articles on the historical, opeiotlonol, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol Intelligence
n Allied Team with the French Resistance
Ronald Reagan and the President's Daily Brief
Calling the Sino-Soviet Split
The Civil War: Black American Contributions to Union Intelligence
The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA
An Intelligence Success Storyrogram: DCi's Perspective
A 'Hot' Front In the Cold Warussian Officer Remembers
The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair
Reflectionsold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs
Planning Satellite Reconnaissance to Support Military Operations
9
IF!ED EDITION
hate: may
_
Is
contents
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Article* (or Studies in Intelligertce may he written on any historical, operational, theoretical, or doctrinal aspect of intelligence.
Tbe flnal responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether, in lhe opinion of lhe Board. Ihe articleontributionhe literature of intelligence
editorial Board
Uoyd D. SaKetli. Cltairman
Thomas Behlutg
Ll. Gen. James R. Clapper. Jr..
etercnisClinlenbergcr Dougla< Gurthoff Jeanne (sham William Llie* William Nolle
Barry G. Roydcn
L, Britl Snider Jon A. Wiant
Members of the Board arc drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence Community.
editor
Henry Appelbttum
articles
An IntelUeence Success Story
rogram: Tbe DCI'a Perspective
George J. Tenet
A "Hot" Front in the Cold War
ussian Officer
Remembers
Alexander Orlov
historical perspectives
Jed Team Frederick
n Allied Team With (be French Resistance
Robert R. Kehoe
Morning in Peeifie Paliisdei
Ronald Reagan and the Preet'denr's Daily Brief Richard J. Kerr and Peter Dixon Davis
The CIA and Double Demanology Calling the Sino-Soviet Split Harold P. Ford
Valuable Sources
The Civil War: Black American Contributions to Union Intelligence
ose
Lookingogue Elephant
The Pike Committee luxand the CIA
aines
Lessons Unlearned
Tbe CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair
Michael Warner
a key player looki back
Reflectionsold Warrior: From Yalta
to the Bay of
by Richard M. Bisscll.Jr.
Book reviewed by H. Bradford Wesierfield
INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW
a new doctrine
Planning Satellite Reconnaissance to Support
Military
Thomas Behling and Kenneth McGruther
'
Most of these articles originally appeared in classified editions of studies in intelligence. Some editorial changes have been made for this unclassified edition.
Coverilot and reflection of cockpit
Courtesy of Colonel Charles P. Wilson, Office of the Secretary
of Defense
AH statements ol fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in studies in intelligence ate those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
DATE: MAY
a "hot" front in ihe cold war
alexander orlov
ussian Officer Remembers
US leaders sawelatively low-risk moms of ascertaining what kinds of strategic weapons systems had priority in the Soviet buildup, how far these efforts had progressed, and where Soviet airbuses and missile positions were located
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Soviet Colonel (retired) Alexander Orlovrofessorember of ihc Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. Hcspent mosi of hitcareer with the USSR's Ait Defense Forces, retiring
editor'i notts 'ihefollowing, article wasenter study writtenetired soviet colonel who spent "wo ofyrmrcarter with thefirmer ussr's air dtfinie fonts. cal alexander orlov personally participated in many ef thr events described below. the narrative artd the views expressed herein reflect his own recollections andanafyses af soviet responses to therogram. the periodircrafi were overflying the ussr. umfeaeneeedfaeo end ovens in this article came largely from the colonel's memory. Col OrUw's statements of fact ami analysis do net necessarily reflect the official views of any gevenumtnt, past or present, imrlnding those af Russia and the farmer soviet union as well as the government af the united staler.
r Response Us Soviet Amu Buildup
Thrvttftigha of the Sovietfrom Wieibadeo Air Bjk in what wn* then Wotplacehe rapid developrneni andof this light, high-alt nudr phiitotc .onnaiBancc aireraJi tiad been ipurrtii bj American alatrn over the USSR'* accelerating effort* to ouch up wilh and surpass the Welt In the post-World War II arm* rate. US leaden lawdatively low-riik meanirnajning what bind* of stratcgrt weaporx* syitemi hadin the Soviet buildup, how far these effort* had ptogrrsted. and where Soviet aitbascs and minilewere located.ould fly at an unprecedented altitude of5 kilometers0hich exceeded the reach of Soviet interceptor aircraft.
Other i'o.iiblc Factor* In Timing
lights
oscow Air Sbowi Some obaerveti thought roar moreevents io Moscow had an impact on US decision* about the timing of thehe Sovietconcerned about violations of it* airapace in border areas by US rornnnaiatance aircraft, decidedhow foreigners that the USSR had weaponry capable of combating such intruded. Someoreign air force delegation* were invitedoviet air show onhe US team was headed by the Ait Force'i
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The Former Soviet Union
Chief of SiatT, General Nathan Twin-ir.g. The event took place ai Tiuhino airfield In ihe Mokow area. Seven new jet fighter model) were da-played. The demonstration night* sparked animated, positive comments tiom theho lauded the fighici planes' performance character-attics and the skills of the Soviet pilots.
Khrushchev's Blusten Following the air showeception hosted by Soviet Defense Minister MatihaJ G. K. Zhuknv. the Soviet Politburo metnben who attended die tcccp-ttou. led by patty chairman Nikira Khrushchev, took the leader* nf the US. Biitish, and Ftench delegationsark and tat them down at atable KhmsSehev then lunchedrotracted toast "in defense ofn the midst of his toast, he turned to General Twining and said, "Today we showed you our airaaJx But would you like toook at our rnissiles.* he General responded. "Veil, wc will not show them rneplied Khnishchev. "First shuw us your aircraft and stop sending intruders into our surspacc. We will shoot down uninvited guests- We will get all ofong-range reconna ilia neehey arccoffins."
At that moment, Khrushchev noticedS military attache was pouting the contents nf hi* glassush- Turning to USCharles Bohlen. the Sonet leader said.m speaking about peace and friendship, hut whar does your miliiaty attache do'" The attache was then pressured intojt.vely drinking an"penalty" toast to Soviet-American ftiendship. after which he quickly departed.
Thelights provided the US Government with considerable information on Soviet strategic missiles.
Ambassador Bohlen and General Twining clearly were agitated about Khrushchev's abrupt shirt In tone. The incident was smoothed over by Russian hospitality during a
queni trip through the countryside, and when General Twining and other senior US Air Force officers deputed from the Soviet Unionuly, they wereaim and rViersdhr send-off by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Chief Marshal ofiiyiicv, and other ranking Soviet military leader*.
The two aide* thus partedriendly note. But systematic Wesiern violations of Soviet airspace resumed almost immediately. These intrusion* appeared to some observers to be at least partlyesponse io the dernonitratians of the new jetat ihe air show and Khrushchev'* boastful and threatening behavior. In fact, however, these events inand Washington's decision toission* shortly iliceeafter were couxadcnuL Btfett General Twining went to Moscow foe the show. President Eisenhower had alreadyRights over the USSRen-day period starting in early July.
During the icn days beginningetachment from Wiesbaden made five deep incursions into Soviet airspace at an
altitude of0i obtained high-quality photography of such targets as airfield* near Moaeow where bombers were based and anear Leningrad (now St-Peteiiburg) where submarine* wete being built. Soviet radar detected and tracked* (albeit with some gaps haoscow repeatedly pioiested the incursion! to ihe US Embassy.
eveal Much About Soviet Weaponry
Over the near severalhotogra phy obtainedisston* uncovered some key dements of ihe Soviet air defense system, including tighter- interceptor airfields, lurtate-to-aii missile (SAM)adarndofhotographslights also showed that Soviet capabu-iiie* for producing siraiegic bombeit were quire modest by US standards, and lhat no significant program ousted for building such bombers. On the otherhotography revealed widespread const motion of nuclear-powered subntarines capable of carrying ballistic mi*tiles
Missile* and Satellites: Thelight* provided the USwith coniidcrable infoimatlon oo Sonet strategicfapttagiaphy establishedn ge missile* intended chiefly fot operation* in die European (heater were being tested at die Kapustin Yar missileinions alsout site foe Intercontinental missiles in the Tyuratam am and uncovered many important details about* dnioveiedat Tyuratam for launching
APPROVED FOR ^RELEASE DATE: KAY
us
satellites. In termi of ihe scope of iu1 (am wu comparable with me US (cat lice at Cape Canaveral.
Ereau won began to confirm the rdiatnktyotrtiirrocc In the latter halfhe Soviets sue-caifiillv tested an imereontineocai'i launched the USSR's first earth satellites at Tyuratam. Combining this information with what wai known at (he time about testing of nuclear weapon* on Novaya Zemlya, US authoritiesthai ilit USSR was overtakir.p. the United States in ihe ira of nuclear-capable miiiila.
Ai Sonet miliary ipending rose ir. tbe, production ofmn-sjlc weaponi continued to expand. The US Dcfcnve Departmentthat by thehe USSR would br capable of purring as manyCBMson aim-enough. USinals thought, to destroy many USAir Command aircraft and ir.iisiles is well as the principal US duraurprise attack.
hotography in thelso showrd work under way in the USSR io create and produce SAMiuioni discovered an air defense tear, site tt Saryshaghan, and US authorities concluded thar successful missile test launches were being conducted (here.
.Shortcoming!
mono aJarmed the White House and the Pentagon, and ihe American press dwelt oo the notion that the*ehindUSSR inprop inn. Bui byission* had helped establish that actual deployment of missiles in the USSR was proceedingery slow
Byissions had helped establish that actual deployment of missiles in the USSR was proceedingery slow pace.
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hotography oho showed ihac mow. combat positions ibr Soviet missiles were located along the Trans-Siberian Railroad; US expertsthai ihe early Soviet lCBMseavy and cairnhcrsomc that rhey could be moved only bys abo collected uwriUgeneeanother major shortcoming ofSown ICBMs: the liquid piopeuani they used wu extremely unliable and had to be changed frequently, making itto maintain the missiles in constombat readiness.
Soviet Reactionsverflights
Soviet military intelligence was fully awareigh-altitudeflighn from their very beginning. Soviet radar tracked the Cistlights as dseyfrom War Germany through Eastern Europe and over rhe USSRhe first flight spent moteours over Soviet territory! ihe second was in Soviet airspace foiours, penetratingepthilometersiles).
The Soviets obarrved three moteKuruoiu into oSeit all-apace0 Jady. tracking don as they proceeded from West Germany at altitudes ofoilometers00hese aircraft spent from three to
i' over Soviet territory, penetrating ro depthsirometeijoviet and other Warsaw Pact radar observed each of these flights over rhe entire extent of their routes (with somend air defense tighter aircraft were vectored to the targets, but thr fighters' ceiling* werelutudei by several kikv mcters, preventing them from operating effectively against the reconnaissance planes.
The Soviets also took steps through diplomatic ehanneli. An officialnote to the US Government onuly stated that Americanof Soviet airspace representedeliberate action by certain USdesigned to exacerbate relations between the Soviet Union and the Unitedike Soviet notes of previous yean protesting intrusions by US military aircraft into Soviet airspace, theuly communication maintained that tuch actions were violation) of international raw.
A pause ensuedveiflights of the USSR afta those ofat tbeyreating new complies noru foi the Soviets. President Fisenhower, citing die dunenseness of the wodd situation in6 in light of the Anglo-French-Uracil invasion of Egypt and die Hungarian uprising, did not allow mote flights over the USSR untiletween Match and October of that year, Soviet ah- defense radar picked upverflight* In contrast to the6 flights,s7 reeonnnitered areas of the Tran-scauim. KaiaVhtun. and elsewhere ic Central Asia, Siberia, and the Soviet north. Flying at altitudes ofoilomeren00hey were beyond the reach of
DATE: 4
im
Soviet Ait Defense Forces' fighter planes and antiaircraft artillery.
Some Soviet Successes
Nineteen fifty-seven also was ihc year of thereakthrough in outer spnee. and Soviet successesoisy propaganda campaign on the part of theter, me Khrushchev declared pubbdy that the USSR *was makingc sausages-" Soviet iadlu-enee on Third World rations also wtst on the rise in the, as were rare* of economic development in many Cemmunist-tuled countries. AH this was received painfully by American public oprnion-
In response, the US Governmentintensified itsie Iron Otrtain in search of reliable irdormation. Soviet program, tor developing advanced weapons were of particular concern in US military and iniellirjence drdes. 'Hie Soviets were decoying witeatic missiles, building nutacar-poweied isibmarinea, adding new surface-to-air mkuilcs to their invetitory, and ccjuipping the Ail Defense Force* with advanced radar and other equipment
he Soviets still did not appear to have weapons capable of combarng tuph-ahirudc. Thailights were among the most important sources of mfonrsition on the USSR's arms programs. Eve* so, OA leaden recognrzed that the constantof Soviet air defenses waa makingcnetratjooi irtcrsaaistghr risky. Reports from US accents in the
USSR that Soviet inrdligenee wu gathering mote and more infot (nation aboutlight* were having an impact in Washington. Richard Helms, at thatenior manager of OA's Plans Directorate and of high-al(irude reoaruraissance operations against the USSR, recalled later (hat when the CIA learned from Pyuir Popov, one of its piite moles in Soviet military intelligence, that the Russians had amassed much information about, "it brought me right out of my scat"1
perations continued in theh. pbotogrsphy from these missions revealed that more and more Soviet Air Force and Air Deienie unit* were receiving new combat and electronic equipment. For0 (probably tbe FAN SONGadar systems that could detect
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aircraft at alatiiiln0 feci) began to enter service with Air Defense ur.ia during thu period. In addition, Soviet air 9 receivedptobablyHPOT) high-ojo-ludc interceptor ai reranupersonic speed and in altitude ceil' ing also aboveilometers. And SAM units around that time started receiving the highly regardedalmost certainly theUIDELINE movie system, whichkiro-tneter0 feet) engagement altitude againstng at upilometersiles) pel hour.
Air War" Heat. Up
In0 the Soviet Government announced that the USSR hada new branch of thethe Strategic MasCc Forces Tins development raised some newfor high-altitude iccom nuisance operations oy US intelligence Where were the USSR's strategic missiles being deployed' What modcla had been placed in service? What were their combat capabilities andwhat extern were Soviet air defenses capable ofmodem US strategic aviation? These questions had to be aitswetcd byncursions into Soviet airspace
Those encroachmenrs soon material-ited.oviet radar in the Turkestan Military District acquited an airborne target in Soviei Ceniral Asian airspace. Proceeding at an altitude ofoilometers (approximaO0heseveral legs over the Semipalatinsk nuclear cat site. Ii then flew over or near the SAM forces at Saryshaghan, and from
44
onclusions thai the Soviets drew frompril failure [to down a
hat remained in Soviet airspace for more than six hours] ledramatic successay.
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there proceeded to the Tyuratammissile testing range and over the city of Mary, (rom which it departed into Iran. The entireasted more than six hours.
Following this incident, the Soviet leadership appointed athat included the author of daisat dsn time was serving on the Main Stiff nf the Air Defenseinvestigate rhe reasons foi the failutc of (he Air and Air Defense forces to moveagainst the aircraft that had violated .Soviet airspace for so many hours. The investigation uncovered serious shortcomings in ait combat training and in command andof Air Detente and Air Force personnel and weapons systems. Many omissions were discovered in the operation of advanced radio equipment In particular,relatedhis reconnaissance activity had been acquired by Soviet communications interceptionin (ha Tianscaueasus several days before it happened, but thewas not reported to the commandir because of aof chance happenings.
Khrushchev was indignant. Reality had undeiuii his repeated ttatxmena about -he high degree of Sovietreadiness. Many generals and otherere penalisedaction also was taken: ihe Aj(
Defense Forces Main Staff chaired out anticipated routes oflights. The author of this articlein that undertaking.
Shoot down1 The Francis Gary Powers Episode
The conclusions that the Soviets drew frompril failure ledramatic successay. Hoars before the beginning of ihe annual May Day paradeoviei Air Defense forces detected atarget flying over the Tajik SSR in Central Asia. Its altitude was mote thanilometers0t, piloted by Francis Gary Powers.
An alert signal summoning staffto their command poststo rise officers tmAs members of the comof the Air Defenseand went to theiran uncomfortable siniationup. The May Dayscheduled to get underwayand leadersnd the
Armed Forces were to be present aa usual. In other words,imea)o( parade aimed at dernontuat-ing Soviet military proweai was about toor-yec-id-.it if ed foreign aircraft was flying over the heart of the country and Soviet air defenses appeared unable to shoot It down.
The aircraft thus was tracked from the groundense atmosphere. Nerves of military people at airfields, missile positions, command-and-eoo-Ttoi facilities, tbe Air Force, and the Air Defense Forces were badly frayed. Marshal S. S. Biryuinv.of tbe All Defense
HAY
M
Foiors, was die taiKt of Irate phone calls from Khiushchiv and otbei Kieralui leaden. The lone of these eft. wuShsmef The MMCtJF was spring tii defense cveryduogneeds, and sill! von tansioi shootirruno iciponded enso-r. "If! couldtusaile. FvwtddrV aad down this dsmisedbtcudn.'
Ai oftennsniieipaeed eireumseanra ineer-<ered withhe aircraftr.rrg the Central Asian lest of ns overflight of theissilewhose inne was tnerttowr. byas aot on alert duty that dflfoote was such that a
i weic unable to get to ihi rlgmfb. .hoordown attempts. Andaintained md* silence, (fo fact, it had norwe,)
Khrushchev demanded that dse Int tuding aircraft be shot down at all sts The Sarin letder and hisdearly viewed the violation ofsucraft on (he dsvoviet national holrday. and just two weeltsummit conference io Paris,tovocanon
.andhitU-ii
i,
fighter airctaft. which was in the stcs on an unrelated mission. tookolT
L(sse-
.Tfse pilot ofrrdTar'
:appinpmtely aimed ttr equipped forission, was directed to dote wiih and ram the iniiuder. Tbe risk was enormous and
66
[Francis Gary] entered the engagement zoneAM battalion near Sverdlovsk. Toe unit's officer-in-charge issued tbe order "Destroy target" (and tie SAM unit succeeded in doing sol-
5?
the chances foi success wet* negligi-hie. The pubs managed briefly to gaaa the tsetonarv afwude. hut be did not catch upst of the rargee, and at atternpt was abandoned.
hen entered the *ngagt-ment aooeAM raualno near Sverdkmk Theflket a>
gn-irst einiik eaploded behind, and in fragments pierced tht tailand the -ring, without trxxlsmg dse cockpit. Those of at "bo were ac rhe command past in Moscow remembet reports about the mimic firingtatement lhat the target "began tuither in enujroyingoicejkins up- Tne (acurned our, was the tnse.
Powers. rtolmng (hat he had lostover th. utcraft and had to
, .hip. irtnsoord the canopy IfVeenrnecrxir-wi* llewastusabk-iociect ilosion had shoved hit seat forward and hit legs were caught Leriesih th. imtrurneni panel After he .banoooed the aircraft and -asas hit diretdy by another missile. The fuselage, engine, wings, and cockpit ended up scattered on the
I over an area of several square
At first, no one on the ground in Sverdlovsk and Moscow realbed that the intrudingad beenarget Nip reappeared on radar andirnirrfdUtrt. hhrtsssile .'torn uHibei SAM battalion. But this "rat-get" turned out tooviet fighter jet that had been scrambledr* moeitoe(ken cleared up, and it beearr* canst lhatad been shot down. Marshal Biryujirv phoned the news to Khtuthcbev, who voiced doubts. Bjyvraov immediatelyeam of etnas* itswndkwsfc and get iWe deni, The Marshal then headed for the May Day parade.
ew hours, an invesDBSiive ream flew from Moscowtd-I.eople from the Centra:mintermtelligence, the KGB, (he General Staff, and theferuehe Invest igat on began looking fee aircraft parti and chercross IseUi and groves. They ftn-nd latge, wide tcJIs of exposed film, much or which was developed later almost without losses, enabling the Soviets lo sec what tar-geu bad been pbotcfrapked and with
FrsixJs Gary Powers survived the dsooitlown ami waa taken toDuring the fine several days in May. tie Senna did not acanmltdge that he waa alrre and us
Soviet and US Maneuvering Over [Pilot
Ihe invesrigartvt mmmacii-iia report on'* performance characteristics,and missions accomplished Based on recovered parts and
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APPROVED POP RELEASE DATE: 4
equipment, the investigators quickly asuriaihed some key death abouiamera system and its capabilities.
Washingtoo, meanwhile,over storyay to the effect that the US Government had been usingrogram Ibr studying met core logical conditions in the upper layers of ihe atmosphere, and dial one such aircraft had disappeared while in Turkish airspaceay. This "repoti" ssid the aircrafi may have crashed in lake Van (in cut em Turkey) after the pilot had reported
upreme Soviet sessionay, Khrushchev made public some of the details ofbut he did nor reveal that the pilot was alive and lhat lecovetcdpuis and equipment were already starting to allow conclusions lo be drawn about ihe natureissions over the USSR. On the same day, US authorities made fiir-tlict atwmpis to camouflage Powers' mission. State Department and NASA spokesmen made statements
reiterating and embellishing the story issueday.
iplomatic reception on the evening,ay, lite USio the USSR. Lk-eUyn Thompson, overheard Soviet Depury Foreign Minister Yakov Malik tell the Snedrsh ambassador thatarc still [the pilot" of ihcwo days laterhe pilot was alive and in rhe USSR; US government agencies then admitted that thehad deliberately flown into Soviet air space. President Eisenhower confirmedress conference onay that US reconnaissance Rights over the USSR were part of rhe American effort to collect information on the Soviet Union and hadumber of
years. I
had "issued orders to use any possible methods to collect informationfor defending the United States and the tree world against surprise attack and to give themedkb in me
hoordown incident had important consequences. US-Soviet relations worsened. The US halted its manned reconnaissance flights over the USSR; it soon began using Midas and Samo*ummit conic rente slated for mid-May in Paris did not take place,isit by Eisenhower to the USSR, planned for,
Thus ended the frisr phase of US artempts to 'open the sky" over the USSR and peneitate the iccreu of Sovici weapons programs as live aims race accelerated.
Fate ofverflights of the USSR
Inowers was subjectedhree-day open trial in Moscow. He was sentenced toears by the USSR Supreme Court's Military Cases Collegium, rowers was exchanged inowever, for Soviet intelligence officer Rudolph Abel, who hadn rhe United Slate*.1
Although the US had endedflights deep inro Soviers continued flying miliiora close to Soviet territory that were designed to monnoitcr Soviet military sites without actually violating the USSR's borders. Some violations nonetheless occurred.or example,verflew Sakhalin Island and another violated the Soviet border in the far north. In bothhe Kremlin sent protest notes and the US
.
and iha Cuban Mh.ltt Ctud.
Following ihrumat
mvuion of CubaIn April
aahlaasaaiof u
< Wu kid* hi Cuba, and srhnlit mIttH Cmid rtpntt. Hm
m UN ussb fcr baly in Leyingus avnMM On*fcwhadoan IMaJajt, dfcvf, to iu. piaaajIanit-m' in tiap auia'ea oa
ib* auniulapoaMaOt
mtViha pnuivl US tfutai to
Gatn. buthaof
uropebiiiik,aod TlnlaqrV
Toihi ih.nihr ussr poaad by iha us nmilaidiqx dnldad
oauthai ofn tha United Sumf upuonuntnmTht Scvhu tbe
preparing in opto*md noop*
iM All Pont andrl'miota)ortei oAroru aad man andiixloH mkaadt fai ihetHHudi mad oo ihc tia-nd. MM iiiiiviunajy. ihr
bis ihr
p*nvtd impcuiblc to conceal. The Uniird Suns. Hi i
tjilicei-on Biiim Prom inmi among thcareconaaitunce lir-
Kennedymeot aft raniqwraminc* of Cuba. The3 nival ahipi into the Caribbean. Ship commander' meived inimk-nont to March cargo wch headed for iheviolaiieei of the tula of Uiiciniiioiiil law. Savinae-tnwhitc. were proceeding te Cubi ii wdL The USiiood In thru pith. Ttnuoiuommon uodrniioiiog oimd an boih odd dial -omnhinj iiiepaiiiJe couldny rune.
The crua rorhed in apiece oneicbtr "hen thehoiby Major Rudolphilt he war pho-rocraphine nwiik pnfcieiu in Cutu.Anderaon wai fmilj infilled) AnoidingtoaSTivni Major Grrxial who worfred Ibr the covmandcr of So'iet forcea on ihe
illmd. ihr deeiikin io daney ihe aii-
eraii wa> node by lieuitiunlrcehlioi whon Ail DdcnK loniihiiid pou in Cabi. Gre-chlo had funto itach (ui mpcAon by phone, pce-'twith ihetn
Shordy ifiai Kijor Aodnaan'i
riu-je came
from Mowow io io Ibnra in Cuba.
) irs-;rtt: ra: "Vou
r hiny. Wiyi of nnVninii have beenn fact, ihe ridi of eteaJiooo hid betn enotmont. So no jfrti (be rhoordoun. for aav-pte. die Detente Dtjonmene ^eopeitd dtot the US iinmttfiieh/ rnounci irrair ipirwCubi Piaii. deni Kennedy rranilVrd the propotal.
During dieu oer-peraenl ai (he eenual command portiei AirFaec. I
DATE: '1
remember this extremely Kmc time. The entile Main Stiff combat team
ftom the BrJd, including those Irom the air detente units in Cuba, grew rnore alarming each day. Immediately after President Kennedy'sonctober, Use number of US strategic bombers on airborne alert began to grow menacingly. Intel' ligence of all kinds was being produced and uied with mail mum intensity. Then, on the nightctober, President Kennedy's proposal tbra withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchangeuarantee of US non-inien'enrion In thenternal attainettlement was toon announced by Kennedy andbringing sighs of relief on both
Aftermath
In those nerve-wracking days, when it seemedilitary con (lice was about to break out, both sides had
enough courage and wisdom to begin intensive diplomaticand make mutual concessions. After the Cuban missile crisis, the tensions of the global secret "airn whichadentral role, began to abate.into Soviet airspace by reconnaissance aircraft became lest necessary with rhe emergence of US satellites, although USnights along the USSR's botdeisoccasionally violated Soviet airspace.
Nudear missiles gradually sup-plinted air power as the chief arena of superpower com peri lion. Broadly speaking, mutual suspicion between East and West remained deep for many moretheera of (hend the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and breakup of the USSR. Until then, the arms race was vigorously pursued by both superpowers. Inndis, at the height of the Coldbad not
I. Oesehloss,s) Day: Eimtemr. fCfntMra,ew Yooc rtuper and Row,
he Soviets deployedvstiety of radar sysicms capable of detecting aircraft at long-range distances ana high attitudes. The radar deployed with theuideline surhtce-co-ajl rural* (which Has used io thaoiFrancis Guy) was known as the FAN SONG.
Beschloss,
Quoted from "Atiessotov kpatot-nomuggressorsheoscow. IMftpp..
Powers was killedt the agen the crashdicoptci tic wis flyingos Angela tele virion station. He was buried wilh honors inecade later the US A* Force awaided him poK-hurnnusty the Distinguished Hying Cross.
-Knunaysebruary 1HP0
Original document.
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