SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE1980S

Created: 8/27/1997

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Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

Report of Investigation

SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS INIG)

.

. Cinquegrana

InspectorInspector General

for Investigations

CIA Policies Regarding Human Rightsnd

PROCEDURES AND

QUESTIONS

ANY OTHER CIA EMPLOYEE

ring sessions of hostile interrogationture in hond uras

What was the Olancho Operation and whoMata and Father James

iTgMpHlW

REYESE^

to follow-up cia reporting

responsible for killing reyes mata and his insurgeniszrposstbly including father

determinein view of repeated queries'from congressCarney

What do Embassy and CIA personnel recall

REGARDING REYESND

What. Govt::- tenJjj TED

RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING REYES MaTAAND

Carney?

follow-up on non-CIA reporting concerningand Carney? What do CIA and oiherpersonnel recall regarding this

u-i; ELA CII reporting

PROVIDEDIN VIEW OF DCI

Casey's commftmentto

IS Tit FA TWtENT OF

VftmWsscj Staff

ia employee provide conflictingthe fate of father carney to theSelect Committee on Intelligence and

What were the findings of the Hondurasdocumentary review relating toissues? What were theof the ig investigation in this

AIC AOG

Asset

AVS

C-2

CATF

CI CIA CIC CINC

CINCUSACOM CLFL

Collaborating .Agent

Validation System

Honduran Military Intelligence'

Central American Task Force, Latin American Division, CIA

Counterintelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Counterintelligence Center, CIA

Commander in Chief

Commander in. Atlantic Command

Clearance and Foreign Liaison Section, Counterintelligence Center, CIA

ormal-commitment tosppnds.to. tasking:

J

SECRET

erson who wittingly- responds to certain tasking from CIA but isnot controlled to the point that he/she will accept all tasking

of Central Intelligence

of Central Intelligence Directive

Director of Central Intelligence

of Intelligence, CIA

Intelligence Agency

Department of National

Investigations

of Operations, CIA

of Energy

Anti-Communist Liberation Arm

EYESrestrictive indicator used to signify that

information is for the exclusive attention of: specific person.

Democratic Force

of Information Act

SEBRE f

National Police Force

Permanent Select Committee on

. Congress

Rescue Force

Working Group, CIA

General

Management Staff, DO

of Intelligence and Research, Department

of State '

Army Intelligence and Security Command

Intelligence Oversight Board

Joint Special Operations Command

America Division, DO

Mfor the Record

Filenique number used

to reference an intelligence source.

Security Agency

National Security Council

OGC

OLL

OPS

PCH

of Congressional Affairs, CIA Office of General Counsel, CLA Office of Legislative Liaison, CIA Office of Personnel Security, CIA Communist Party of Honduras -Policy. Coordination

PRTCH

SDC

Voice '. "risis Communications Netwo.

Central America Revolutionary Workers Pai Honduran Branch

Honduran Superior Defense Council

Sensitive Memorandum ethod of disseminating intelligenceimited number of specific. Government officials due to the extreme sensitivity of thc information or source.

Forces Command, Honduran Armed

Forces

Select Committee on.

Congress

States Commander in Chief, Southern

Command

States Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Command

SECXET

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

Report of Investigation

SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS INIG)

INTRODUCTION

U) Baltimore Sun Allegations. Inhe Baltimore "unour-part series of articles based upon the resultsmonth investigation regarding the role of the United States in Honduras in. During that investigation, Baltimore

un staff correspondents reportedly obtained unclassified and declassified documents and conducted numerous interviews of US.

nd Honduran citizens- The Sun series alleged that:

Hundreds of Honduran citizens suspected of subversion had been kidnapped, tortured and killed inonduran military intelligence unit, known asth Battalion, that was trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

knew of the crimes committed byth Battalion, yet continued to support the unit and collaborate with its

leaders;

participated in interrogations and torture of Honduran military prisoners;

5EORET

U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, human rights reports in thententionally understated abuses by the Honduran Government; and

U. S. officials deliberately misled Congress and. public about Honduran military human rights abuses in order to maintain XJS. funding for Honduras in the war against Communism in Central America.

Sj Honduras Working Group Findings and Unresolved Issues. Congressional and National Security Council (NSC) interest in The Sun's allegations prompted then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John M. Deutch to directeview be conducted of all CIA files to determine CIA's role in Honduras and whether its personnel were linked to human rights abuses there0he Honduras Working Group was established in5 to conduct this review and published its final report inased upon the written record, selected interviews that were conducted by the Office of Personnel Security (OPS) on behalf of the Honduras Working Group, and responses to questionnaires that the Honduras Working Group prepared and distributed toIA officers in an attempt to resolve several issues, the review resulted in the following findings:

There is no iniormation in CIA files indicating that CIA officers either authorized or were direcdy involved in human rights abuses;

The Honduran military committed hundreds of human rights abusesany of which were politically motivated and officially sanctioned;

CIA reporting linked Honduran military personnel to "death squad" activities;

SECRET

lonciuran security units whose personnel wereTinked to killings, torture, disappearances, and illegal detentions;

CIA reporting corroborated the involvement in human rights abuses of two Honduran mi

The CIA's record in reporting human rights abuses was inconsistent. In some cases, reporting was timely and complete- In other casedf

foraidaorLwas not reported atwasa cnannels and not disseminated to

inadequacies precluded CIA lead quarters from understanding the scope of human rights abuses in Honduras and the culpability

id

CIA reporting to Congress in the

underestimated HondurarJ|BBi;nvo,vr'ineiU in abuses. By the, CIA provided more detailed information to Congress, but some of the notifications were inaccurate.

(U> The Honduras Working Group briefed House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select Committee on InteUigence (SSCI) Staff members regarding its findings onnd, respectively. Honduras Working Group members also briefed selected officials of the NSC, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

(sf Based upon its review of only the written record, limited interviews and questionnaire responses, the Honduras Working Group reported to CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin that it was unable to resolve the following key issues:

Whetheri

was present during session1 hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras;

to follow-uponduran Special Forces

ad killed

Wheth

reporting that the Chie Battalion

other insurgents-

insurgentossibly including American priest Father James Carney;Tdguarters-tas kechJBI ine what happened to Camey in view of repeated queries from Congress and ^Carney family; why Headquarters'did not pro videqJJjHBK^kT complete uuormation

WhetheJ

of'an-Agency .asset eithei whether there shoi

to report mistreatment

to visiting SSCI Staff members, and have been follow-up reporting

LV onight-wing paramilitary organization that allegedly committed human rights abuses, in view of DCI Casey's commitment to the Hill to do so.

Inhe Executive Director requested that the Inspector General (IG) initiate an investigation to address these key issues. Inhe requested that the IG also investigate alleged conflicts in the testimony givenIA employee to HPSCI Staff members and to OPS officers regarding information about the death of the American priest.

U) Inhe Executive Director alsoeries of potential accountability issues to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) for consideration. The accountability documents prepared by the Honduras Working Group for the Executive Director and presented to the DDO identified several issues and stated several conclusions based on the efforts of the Working Group. Inhe DDO deferred these accountability issues pending the completion of this IG investigation. The potential accountabilityissues that were deferred by the DDO are discussed at the end of this Report. Another memorandum was sent to the Executive Director by the head of the Working Group at the Executive Director's request. This memorandum identified specific individuals whose actions should be reviewed for accountability purposes. The Executive Director also deferred action on that memorandum until this investigation was concluded. That memorandum has been sealed and has not been reviewed by IG personnel, pending the completion of this Report.

ff Scope of the Inspector General Investigation. The IG investigation has been limited to information relating to the three key issues raised by the Honduras Working Group and the conflicts in testimony that were referred to the IG by the Executive Director in July and

SHCKET /

BACKGROUND

Honduras Relations ino address the issues presented in this Report, it is necessarythe political context

Honduras were conducted andrelated to

the Honduran Government and its military services.

(U) The decade ofime of great turbulence for Honduras, Central America's poorest country and the fourth poorest in the Western Hemisphere. At the beginning of the decade, the country was ruledilitary dictatorship that was beginning to cede power to civilian political leaders. This difficult process was complicated by an unsettled external environment. Bordered by three stronger and sometimes hostile neighbors-El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala-Honduras has lived with the threat of foreign attack since becoming independent. This traditional sense of foreign danger was heightened by the establishmentevolutionary government in Nicaragua9 and the outbreakeftist insurgency in El Salvadorhe emergent threat induced Honduras to cooperate with Elraditionalto support the expanding armed resistance to the Nicaraguan regime. This deepening commitment strengthened Honduras' traditional security ties to the United States and madeey player. Central American security

(U) Expanding domestic leftist subversive activity indded to Tegucigalpa's sense of vulnerability.upport for militants of the Honduran Communist Party and several like-minded radical groups were the main sources of this political ferment. Beginning with minor bombings, these organizations eventually progressed to hijackings and kidnappings. Inmall unit of Nicaraguan-trained leftist guerrillas crossed the frontier between Honduras and Nicaragua. However, it was ill-equipped,omestic base of support and was quickly overcome by the Honduran Army during what came to be called "the Olancho

EC^T

imilar incursion4 also failed lo incite the conservative Honduran peasantry. Although marginal, tlie perceived leftist threat led to an internal security crackdown. According to human rightsoint Army-police paramilitary unit,th Battalion,ampaign of disappearances and assassinations against Honduran leftists and Salvadoran exiles that claimed atictims.

U)nder the leadership of Commander-in-Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces (CINQ General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the Honduran armed forces sought to expand cooperation with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries. Alvarez's increasing militancy, however, as well as his blatant political ambitions, aroused the hostility of his colleagues, who ousted him inis successor, General Walter Lopez Reyes,ore reserved stance toward regional military ties. policy aims. He closed the Regional Military Training Center, sought to scale back the scope of joint military exercises, and demanded further increases in military aid in return for Honduran cooperation withew military assistance accord signed in5 generally scaled back the Honduran commitment to assist US. regional military policy.

nlvarez became the CINC of the Honduran Armed Forces. During the period1 through his forced removal from office by rival officers on, Alvarez was heavily involved in,trong supporter of, CIA programs in Central America. After his ouster from the position of CLNC; Alvarez resettled in the United States. He later returnedonduras and was assassinated onroup known as the Popular Liberation Movement claimed responsibility for this

act

CIA Policies Regarding Human Rightsnd.

40- CIA Human Rights Policies. The DO has issued several sources of guidance since thehat explained the CIA's policies regarding human rights to CIA employees.

jtf On, a'Headquarters cable advisedj|

must be especially sensitive to the political and possible legal ramifications of what theK___

cable alsoescriptionsportabilities if it

were to be ost or thud country

intelligence or security service was about to undertake actionsreasonably be construed to be eross violationsrecognized human rights

advised in this cable that,eneral

make* appropriate efforts to prevent or delay such actior

O policy guidj

human rights also

his notice stated specifically tliat DO personnel were not to participate, directly or indirectly, in violations of human rights.

SECKE

able]ontinuing process to proviclFspeaiic"guid" the human rights factoi

cable stated, in part7that:

lements of the (DO) must be continually alert toforeign governments or individuals have taken, are taking,to take, actions that constitute gross violationsrecognized human rights, induding torturemliurnane or degrading treatment or purushment,without charges and trial, or other flagrant denials ofto life, liberty and the security of tlie person

$ On, then-DDO John M. McMahonemorandum to all DO division and staff chiefs

)0se ot trus memorandum was to reaffirm Agency policies on human rights and other matters and_to emphasize to DO pereonnel that the policies were still in effc

jieadquarters cabl

oted the importance of

The cable stated, in part, that:

remember that if we ignore the importance of the human rights issue in the final analysis we do great damage to our mission. We are under great scrutiny.

Aside from the legal and policy considerations that are constant in any allegation concerning violations of human rights, we also mustasic moral obligation. We are Americans and we must reflect American values in the conduct of our business. We are all inherently opposed to the violation of human rights. Those who work with us in one capacity or another must also respect hese values.

human egrading

46. Theights violations as acts of torture, cruel, irmumaneToT treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges ort also includes causing the disappearance of persons by abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty and security of the person.

Janu first offidalnotic cable stated, in pa

Headquarters cable appears"tb*Dean interrogation policy. That

Interviewing and interrogation of suspects in custodyethod routinely used by police, security and intelligence services around the world. In many countries, the legal and basic rightshe suspect in custody may not be given lull consideration, resulting in deprivation of his/her human rights.

SE

CIA policy is not to participate directly in nor to encourage interrogation that results in use of :orce, mental or physical.torture, extremely demeaning indignities orinhumane treatment of any kind, as an aidCLA policy is to actively discourage the use of these methods duringositive role in.influencing foreign liaison to espect human rights.

ectionf thentitled Human Rights Violations and other Proscribe* provided guidance regarding CIA's interrogation policy. It stated, in part, that:

t is CIA policy to neither partidpate directly in nor encourage interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation.'

parUapation includes being in the room during an interrogation, sitting in an adjoining room monitoring the interrogation or providing questions while an interrogation is in progress.

secret

intelligence or operational justification /or indirect participation in interrogation and reasonable assurance that no human rights violations will

Theistinguishes between an interrogation and adeD nehn g: -J

nterrogation iserson who is not free to refuse lo answer the questions or leave at will without fear oferson being questioned who may refuse to cooperate or leave is being debriefed, not interrogated.

jf) Present and former DO managers and officers state that these CIA human rights and interrogation policies are well known throughout the DO. In support of this, they cite actions such as briefings mJr^'fieJd-byHeadqu^ers representatives'and inclusion of these policies in the Career Trainee program as examples of the DO's continuing effort to ensure that its officers are aware of these policies.

PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

50. Threeesearch Assistantecretary initially were assigned full-time to this investigation. The team was supplemented by two additional Investigators from January to7 to assist with Lhe research and interview phases of the investigation. CIA components were requested to provide copies of all internal and external documents that were relevant to the issues under investigation. This included official and soft files, finished intelligence, taskings, notes, letters, correspondence, communications, cables, and briefing books; all information regarding liaison, interaction and cornmurucation between CIA and the Department of Justice, Lhe Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, other federal agencies, and tlie Honduran Government and its personnel; and all relevant information concerning liaison, interaction, and communications between CIA and.

20

Aiso Included

.were documents, electronic messages, disks, tapes, notes, and other forms of recorded information.esult of tliis request, the OIG Team reviewedages of material in pursuit of relevant information.

financial

accountings from January to6 were reviewed. CIA policies and regulations governing human rights and participation in interrogations were also reviewed.

Sj Forty-five boxes containing me working files of the Honduras Working Group were examined]

Arrn^operauonal files were exaininea ana Department of State and Department of Defense documents were reviewed and summarized.

j6 Highty-four individuals were interviewed during the course of the investigation, including current and former employees

of CLA and othernti

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

liis Report addresses the following questions:

interrogation or torture in

flf^lA employee during sessions of hostile interrogi Honduras?

What was the Olancho Operation and who were Reyes Mata and Father James Carney?

Whatort concerning Reyes

Mata and Father Carney?to follow-up

CIA reportingresponsible for killing Reyes Mata and his insurgenisj^possibly mduding Father Carney?.Did Headquarters taskS^flttJBjfco

determine Carney's fate in view of repeated queries from Congress and the Carney family?

What do Embass;

Reyes Mata and Carney?

. Government assets reported relevant

information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney?-

I leadquarters task flMMflfeto follow-up on non-CIA

reporting concerning Reyes Mata and Carney? What do CIA and. Government personnel recall regarding this non-CIA reporting?

follow-up on the ELACH reporting provid

^KespeciaLly in view of DCI Casey's commitment to Congress?

mistreatment of in l'9S6 to either Headquarters or visiting SSClStaffmembers?

IA employee provide confHcting statements regarding thc fate of Father Carney to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the CIA?

What were the findings of the Honduras Working Group documentary review relating to possible accountability issues? What were the relevant findings of the IG investigation in this regard?

FINDINGS

BS^ EMPLOYEE PRESEST DURING SESSIONS OF HOSTILE INTERROGATION OR TORTURE IN HONDURAS?

f) The Origin of the Allegation. Inhe Honduras Working Group sent questionnaires to^currentormer'CIA employees who were deemed to be in the best position to answer lingering questions regarding potential human rights abuses by Honduran officials. Qne response contained an allegation thatflfc

been present during an abusive interrogationrisoner in. According to the allegation/

hadJ_

interrogation inale prisoner was be ins torturedl

SQ Upon receipt of the allegation that

have beer/present during an abusive interrogationrisoner, the Honduras Working Groupuestionnaire to theimployeej

(She also indicated that she could not be certain who was present during the alleged interrogation and torture and that she

to anyonei

. She hadolleague"about it inme early- to, she said, and it was the colleague who reported the in/ormation to the Honduras Working Group

rJUeS

id not mention*^ ^r" name of any her response to the Honduras Working Group

* InMt the re (jroup, two Investigato.

mterviewecB^jJjrhe interview covered various topics relating totheJiprtduras Working Group'sHuing the interview, '. .rJgen. present during an interrogation;^.

ontinues to deny the allegation J

69.

in an abusive interrogation.

that he never assisted the Hondurans in conducting interrogations, either directly or indirectly, nor has he ever been involved in inflicting torturerisonerBB|Bcannot offer an explanation

apatea m

for the allegation that he participat

70.

review of cables ancM Kproduced no'

relevant uifbrmalion. Furthermore, no indication has been foundrecords that any CIA employee participated in any interrogationtorture session in

CONCLUSION

(Sj No evidence has been found to substantiate Jhe

. allegationI^BHL^^an>',

! CIA employee was present during sessions of hostile interrogation or

torture in-

?9

What was thc Olancho Operation and who were Reyes Mata and Father James Carney?

3 Olancho Insurgency. Onmember group associated with the Central America Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC) marched from Nicaragua into the Olancho Department of Honduras. The PRTCeftist extremist group that was originally conceived7egional organization comprised of representatives of the Central American countries and was initiated by the Cubansehicle to spread the Communist revolution. The Honduran branch of the PRTCed by Jose Maria Reyes Mata, was almost entirely in exile in Nicaraguanhe Honduran Government became aware that the PRTCH and other leftist extremist groups had decidedune meeting in Mexico, attended by Reyes Mata, to begin rural guerrilla warfare.

n earlyhe Honduran military became aware that members of the Honduran branch of the PRTC, trained by the Nicaraguans and Cubans, had entered Honduras and were operating between the Coco and Patuca Rivers in Olancho Department. This information came from two Hondurans who had defected from the group. The defectors indicated that the group was organized into three platoons of approximatelyndividuals each. The members of the group reportedly had been issued uniforms similar to those used by the anti-Sanclinista Contras so as to fool border residents into tlunking that the members were Nicaraguan counter-revol utionaries.

ccording to information acquired by the Embassy's

Keyes Mata, tne group's leader, intencTed toase camp in order to recruit and train personnel within Honduras and hoped to obtain much of the support for this subversive movement from local peasants. Offensive operations by the group were to begin during September andeyes Mata was reported to0 to finance recruiting, propaganda and resupply.

p) Much of the tactical uoformation obtained by. Government regarding the Honduran military operation against this group was obtained fromdvised Headquarters that it was limiting its coverage to unique information in order to avoid duplicative reporting bj and

On, the Hondurans provided

iist of the insurgents who were in custody.and those whoeportedly still in the field. This listeferenceossible priest whose name was either Fausto Milla or Guadalupe

and was thought toears old. He was reportedly still inungle. Desertersere interviewed by personnelhat they had been deceived into joining the PRTCH and that thegroup sufferedood shortage. The guerrillas who hadaptured and who had surrendered were suffering fromalnutrition and exposure to the elements. Honduran Specialommandided by heUcopters, patrolled the area searching for the guerrillas.

Honduran military found the guerrillas' baseonnd, although there was conflicting

' information, several guerrilla leaders were reportedly in custodyeing questioned. Reyes Mata reportedly had separated fromroup prior to Septembern mid-September, the Hondurans

providedj with an analysis of insurgent debriefings.ocument discussed the infrastructure of the guerrilla group and

noted that "Father Carney" had facilitated contacts between the group I' and the civilian population.

Although the local media reported Reyes Mata's

; capture on, this was not confirmed by Honduran authorities. Honduran officials subsequently reported to kWWf thai Reyes Mata had been killed on, along witn four of his fellow insurgents, during an encounter with the SFC. On

31

he SFC hr:cfcd members of tlie national and international press on the operation and displayed several captured guerrillas and equipment.

nvolvement of the Hostage Rescue Force. Inrompted by hostage incidents, discussions between CIA, State Department and senior Honduran Armed Forces officials had been initiatedpscue Force CHRP) in Honduras.!

LNC Alvarez and the then-Chief of Intelligence forGeneral Staffho

ew organization be created to serve as the HRF. The new HRF was known as the "Special Squadron" or "Commando Operaciones Especiales"he unit was subordinate to the then-newly created SFC that wat IpHonduran military officer wh(

ipther Honduran military officer,!

'as the commander of the "Spfipallthoughreporting reflectsthis sub-unit. HRF training was held at La Venta military camp, which also served as SFC Headquarters.

CINC

weeksofll SFC officers, mclucUng those who were undergoing HRF training, were deployed to Olancho Department in order to particulate in the.counterinsurgent operation

Alvarez had.fiT^gflSL^.gKPf^SiSf?Ail anc*ie was believed

abreast

wi jdnthe unit' Beguuung in early

>eriodically obtained intelligence from members ot the Sr^'concerrung the status of the Olancho Operation and the debriefingaptured guerrilla, and inspected equipment confiscated by the Honduran military.

was Reyes Mata? According to CIA records, Jose Maria Reyes Mataonduran physician and long-time pro-Cuban who used the aliases of "Chema" and "Pabloeyes Mata attended medical schools at the Autonomous University ofHonduras and Havana University. He joined the Communist Partyof Honduras (PCH)6 and received guerrilla training in Cubae supplied food, medical supplies and information concerning the Honduran military to guerrilla groups in Guatemala.eyes Mata was involved with guerrilla activities in Bolivia.

eyes Mata was arrested in Nicaragua for attempting to buy arms but was later released. He also was reported to have arranged guerrilla training for Hondurans in Nicaraguaraining camp staffed by Cuban paramilitary instructors. Reyes Mata returned to Honduras and was imprisoned in connection with the0 kidnapping. citizen working in Honduras. Reyes Mata had also participated in the firebombingan Pedro Sulatextile factory.

f Ineyes Mata was freed underprogram in Tegucigalpa and subsequendy becameof the PRTCH. In earlyheservice notified US. Embassy personnel thatled by Reyes Mata and trained in Cuba andentered OlanchoUe^&nment with the intention3 and5

indicate thatcaptured in the course of theand executedin the custody of

the Honduran military.

U) Who was Father Carney? According toccounts, James Francis Carney was bom4 in Chicago, Illinois and served in World War II. Ins, Carney entered the priesthood and joined the Jesuit order.arneyarish priest in the Honduran town of EI Progreso and decided to call himself Padre Guadalupe, or Padre Lupe. Carney became committed to the plight of peasants, known as campesinos, and an activist for their cause. This resulted in hisontroversial figure within Honduras, including accusations that heommunist, inhe Honduran Government attempted to deport Carney because of his activism.. Ambassador to Honduras John Jova reportedly interceded and Carney was allowed to continue his activities in the country.

rOnecree was issued naturalizing Carneyonduran. He renounced. citizenship on.arneyispute with the leadership of the National Campesino Association (ANACH) that he accused of using strong-arm tactics, engaging in corruption and receiving support from. Embassy and CIA. Carney supported an insurgent candidate for ANACH president. The Honduran Government considered Carney toadical leftist agitator and he was stripped of Honduran citizenship and deported on.

U)hort stay in the United States, Carney began working in Nicaragua. According to media reports, Carney and an insurgent force ofndividuals led by Reyes Mata crossed the Coco River from Nicaragua in3 in the hope ofonduran revolution.onduran Government press conference, it was announced that "Padreho was known to the insurgents as "Companeroad apparently died of starvation after the guerrillas ran out of food.

Embassy arranged for the Carney family tothe second-ranking officer in the Honduran military-theapproximatelyf the captured guerrillas.insurgents interviewed by Carney's family andto the DoS, indicated that the priest hadweaker during the march through the jungle andguerrillas had been assigned to assist him. Helast seen alive on.

(U) During US. Consul General interviews with the captured gueirillas-all of whom claimed that they had deserted from the insurgency-it was learned that the priest was known to them as "Companeroany of those interviewed knew of "Padre Guadelupe" from his work, mduding educational radio broadcasts. One individual had recognized tlte priestonduran newspaper article and one knew him from past associationarish in El Progreso. The Consul Generalewspaper photograph of Carney to the captured guerrillas and aU confirmed that this was the priest who had accompanied them.

(U) One of the guerrillas who deserted on Augusttated that Carney had said that he could not proceed much further and that the march was killing him. Another deserter who saw Carney on

escribed the priest as "cadaverous" In appearance and requiring Lhe assistance of others to continue. Several captured insurgents commented that they did not know how he could still be alive, but none could confirm Carney's death or attribute it to the harsh jungle conditions. None of the interviewed guerrillas had witnessed any combat with the Honduran military.

(U). Embassy in Tegucigalpa obtained from the Honduran Government and provided to the Carney family religious items believed to have belonged to the priest, and continued to seek answers to the family members' questions after their departure from Honduras. Inhe Honduran Government advisediplomatic note that it had not located Carney's body, nor did it accept responsibility for the welfare or whereabouts of the priest since he had not entered the country legally.

(U) Thedition of The Nation magazine published an article entitled "The Mysterious Death of Father Carney" that described the efforts by the Carney family to learn details surrounding his fate. The article also contained allegations. intelligence and military personnel took part in the counterinsurgent operation and may have been present when Carney died. It was allegedeserter from the group, who was subsequently "shot trying toad talked to his relativesrison visit regarding certain events that were alleged to have taken place at El Aguacate Air Base. His story was provided to* the Christian Human Rights Commission of Honduras. That group later released this information and alleged. advisers identified as "Lieutenant West Blank" and "Major Mark Kelvi" were direcdy involved in torture and interrogation that culminated in the murder of Carney and other revolutionary leaders. These actions were purported to have occurred in underground cells at EI Aguacate. According to The Nation, no further evidence had come to light about the CIA's presence at El Aguacate. officials declined to make any comments.

In response to an4 letter to DCI Casey

I from Carney's family, the Agency's Director ofairso assure the family members that CIA had no involvement in the f. fate of the priest as alleged in The Nation. With reference tourported involvement of "West Blank" and "Markhe family

was advised that it was CIA policy not to confirm or deny the i' employment of specific individuals.5 letter toarney family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs advisedBlank" and "Kelvi" were not employed by CIA.

, (U) Previous CIA Investigations Regarding Carney

F

Office of General8 Investigation.

eport prepared by CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) summarized its review of the circumstances surroundingisappearance of Carney and the Agency's handling of his4 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)his review was prompted8 letter to then-DCI William Webster suggesting that CIA had been involved in Carney's disappearance and that CIA had information in its possession concerning his fate. Onarney's familyawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against CIA and several other agencies alleging violations of the FOIA.

OGCs inquiry was basedeview of documentsconversations with DO personnel who were familiar with the 7ot Carney's disappearance. The review found thatCIA's possession concerning Carney was obtained from aof deserters in Honduras,

lis w" th Honduran military^ officials and press reports. One of the deserters who talked with^B

mentionedriest was with the group and was in especially poor physical condition due to starvation. The deserter offered his opinion Uiat the priest did not live much longer after the deserter had left the group.

37

99was formed by

dieuKaj^naFacnaa toadly decomposed bodyjungle with religious effects nearby. The Honduran militaryattempt to recover this body, and that of two others found inreportedly because of the terrain and thedesire to pursue the group. It had been concluded thatnear the religious articles was thatriest, , '

tata representative of >onse to

from Congress, ha<

and queried

'or informatidiron portedly understood that most' came from:

The ormarion

and

information from obtained by

indicated that Carney died of starvaaon.^This information reportedly been shared with interested members of Congress.

The OGC review concluded that CIA was not involved in planning or carrying out the Olancho Operation, had no connection with Carney and had learned of his fate after the fact. The OGC review further concluded that the information that had been reviewed strongly suggested that Carney died of starvation. Finally, the OGC review concluded that CIA's handling of the Camey family's FOIA requests was consistent with standard CIA procedures, FOIA and applicable case law.

U) DCI Webster advised the Camey family in an8 letter of the OGC conclusions that CIA did not know exactly what became of Camey and that he most likely perished in the Honduran jungle from starvation and exposure. The DCI's letter also advised that CIA had no evidence or information indicating that Carney had been tortured or murdered. The Carney family replied in anetter that they continued to believe that Carney

was executed at El AguacateIA knowledge, complicity, if not actual" and that the DCI should further investigate tlie matter.

CIA's Office of Inspector General'sIn response8 New York Timescontaining allegations by Horencio Cabaliero, aof the Honduran military, CIA Inspector Generalinitiated an investigation onabalierocomplicity in human rights abuses perpetrated by theIn one specific claim, Cabaliero indicated that he hadin interrogation techniques by CIA and hadAdditionally, Cabaliero claimed that the priest andguerrillas had been executed.

In the course of8 investigation,ndividuals,mdudino CIA Offic

CIA responses to congressional inquiries also were reviewed, as was the8 OGC report concerning the circumstances of Carney's disappearance.

(U) Theeport of Investigation that was issued at the end of the OIG inquiry concluded as to the Carney issue that CIA learned of Carney's fate only after the fact and that the priest's death resulted from starvation. The OIG Report also indicated that information available to CIA concerning Carney's fate had been provided to Congress.

(U) The SSCl was not satisfied with8 OIG investigation's findings regarding CIA's alleged complidty in human rights abuses in Honduras and subsequenUy conducted its own investigation into that issue. During this process, follow-up questions were directed to CIA and Cabaliero testified before the SSCI. Transcribed testimony before the SSCI in8 indicates that Cabaliero told the Committee that, contrary lo the

39

r.tli-iluns.b, 1 V

CONCERNING REYES MATA

AND FATHERT0 FOLLOW-UP CTA

REPORTINGPON'S7Sf'EirOK KILLING REYES MATA AND HISINSURGENTSr-POSSTBLYLNCLUDINC FATHER CARNEY?1deteRM7NE CARNEY'S FATE LN VIEW OF REPEATED QUERIES FROM CONGRESS AND THE CARNEY FAMILY?

(U) Relevant Reporting, Follow-up and Tasking Regarding Reyes Mata and Father Carney.3

orwardet issue of Ef

% Krhc article reported the death in an ambush of Reyes Mata and, according- presumed death by starvation of another leader of the group, former Jesuit priest Guadalupe

Carney."

he El Tiempo article also cited an unspecified HondurahcArmy spokesman who was located in Nueva Palestina and involved in the Olancho Operation as reporting that Reyes Mata had died in combat. His body could not be recovered since the location was inaccessible and the patrol tliat had killed him had not yet left the jungle. Reyes Mata, described as thin due to the shortage of food, was identified by the patrol as he was well known and had unmistakable characteristics. Pictures and fingerprints of the insurgent Jeacler were taken for use in the media.

Recording to the El Tiempo article ofeserter^ said that "Father Guadeloupe Carney" had died of

tion are only those that include in/ormation cpon of Investigation containsThese

I nc communicalions summarize relating Jo Reyes Mata Of Faih^OmTw'rii additional summaries ofelate fo the Olancho Operation, thc insurgency

'but do not include i

41

starvation at the end of3 in an area called Somotiries between Bocay and Tablazo. The deserters ruiUier indicated that "they had to carry Father Guadeloupe for two days but finally he died, given his serious condition due tohe articleynopsis of Father Guadalupe's service in Honduras, his deportation from that country, his eventual travel to Nicaragua, and his return to the United States9 where he recovered. citizenship.

ccording tegpMguerrillas had been killed in encounters with the-Honduran Army,ad been captured or deserted,ere reported to have died of starvation in the mountains and one was reportedly executed by the guerrillas. ': Another guerrilla was believed to have returned to

Jimii^MfiiPiMilii i WW^

mfii an Associated Press (AP) story of

the same day concerning "an American priest who had joined leftist

guerrillas [and] died of exhaustion while trying to flee Honduran

he AP story stated that "Colonel Cesar Elvir Sierra said that

James Francisoman Catholic priest from St. Louis,

died while trying to escapeebel force in the jungles of

Olancho Provinceovernment sweepountainous area

near the Nicaraguanlvir also reported that Reyes Mata

had been killed during the operation.

STThe AP story stated thatesuit priest, had been expelled from Honduras9 after being accused of trying toeasant revolt. Sources at the Jesuit Missouri Province in St. Louis were cited as saying that their records showed Camey wasember of the Jesuits and had been reassigned to the Central American Province.!

to confirm tne tacts, surrounc

esoond to anticipate!

congressional queries.

what available information concerrung Carney led to th .on that he died of starvation.

'ho confirmed thatody was not round, that authorities did not know where to look, and that there was very little likelihood that the body would be found. What was known of Carney's fate had reportedly been provided by one of three deserters who were involvedews conference at Nueva Palestina on.

gflhe deserter reported at Nueva Palestina that Camey had been weakened by starvation to the point that he had been unable to walk for twoesult, he was being carriedelays by Lhc- stronger of theu;-ru!as^(J HB

commented that it was unlikely that this could have continued for long since all in the group were near starvation. The three deserters reported "last seeing Camey deep in the Cordillera Entre Rios.

11 ised that the biographical information

contained in the Septemberwas the

extent of its knowledge concerrung

that, under the name ofamey hadookHonduran peasant movement that was published inCuba. Inamey reportedly attempted totraining; but was denied the opportunity, possiblyhisa message stating that

Carney's sisternacnnquirea' about her brother and gave his birth year as7he Embassy had no information that Camey had reacquired. citizenship.

43

hat it did not have the resources

to devote to the task requested by Negroponte and that thehad devoted the full attention of three officers to reportOpera Lionstopped extracting and

refirdng key mformation from the-voluminous material. military had already reported the same information:

iSf5eptember?v - -

ised that it agreed in principle to the idea of carryingore focused analysis o: the Olancho guerrilla movement.

that task wasecision would be made regarc whether additional efforts were warranted.

eadquarters Memorandum. CIA's OLLemorandum to the'Directoratepishat Chairman' Edward P. Boland of Lhe HPSCI was personally interested in CIA information concerning the fate of Carney. HPSCI Chief Counsel Michael O'Neil reportedly advised that the DoS had indicated that the Honduran Government claimed not to know about Carney's fate.

3 Headquarters Memorandum. The

eporting substantiated

Acting Chief of DO/LAraft response to Boland's

iquiry. The draft indicate

cm. i

lhe press accounts of Carney's death and that Honduran debriefings of deserters revealed that Carney had been weak and died of starvation. The Hondurans also believed thai there was little likelihood that his body would be recovered. The draft response, whose final disposition is unknown, was forwarded through DO components to OLL.

S?-W rWjPJ* :

equesHor analytic ass is

raveled to Tegucigalpa. On Octobere reported his findings

(reviewed documents consisting of photocopies of unmarked maps; general lessons on guerrilla warfare; lists of medical supplies; inventories of equipment carried by some members of the group; guides to explosives and incendiary devices; books and other material on Marxism-Leninism, capitalism and political economics; pamphlets on how to reconcile Marxism and Christianity; the diary belonging to Reyes Mata; lists of radio frequencies; an apparent code; lecture notes; and personal material such as poems and songs.

n die cable that the SS-page diary found on Reyes Mata was missingnd recorded the hardships, lack of food, desertions, and personal disappointments of the author. WpjWiad the opportunity to interview several of the deserters and described them as young, uneducated and somewhat disoriented. Tliey all claimed to have been tricked into participating in the guerrilla operation.

lnpndica;ed Uiat thc documents, debriefings, local studies, and the deserters themselves all demonstrated little cause to devote time and resourcesore in-depth analysis. Although it was likely that additional attempts at guerrilla infiltration would occur, he believed that there were insufficient documents or high level deserters to warrant additional esources at that time. According to the Hondurans, only three

S^ET

of the original guerriUas remained at large. Another arms cache had

been discoveredcontinue to

check for any additional documents that might be uncovered in this or other caches.

taken to address the Ambassador's request.

insurgency was so quickly crushed that it failed tohis was in part due to bad planning by the guerrillas,lso reflected very well upon the performance of the Honduran Airmobile

inhat it had received information indicating that PRTCH guerrillas who had been captured by the Honduran Armed Forces in

OJancho Department had been summarily executed byrmy officers after being debriefed. Among those executedeyes Mata, his Deputy Commander "Commandanteicaraguan advisor who had accompanied the guerrilla force. The sxecutions reportedly were initiated after the "field commander" in Olancho-not otherwise identified-received an order fromonduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search andhis1 order was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive. The order came afterrisoners had been captured and evacuated from the area*

fff The executions reportedly were carried out by officers in an isolated area away from the enlisted troops. The deaths were

r later reported to the media as having resistingtared that

. the justification within the Honduran military for the executions was

! that the initialow-level and ideologically uncommitted guerrillas who had deserted or been taken prisoner were sufficient for

; exploitation purposes. The remaining guerrillas were judged to be dedicated revolutionaries who were beyond rehabilitation. It was also reasoned that the combination of impotent Honduran law and the protestations of leftist peace groups would result in the early release of the suerrillas who would then resume their activities.

additional information^ execution of nine PRTCH guerrillas.t;

sometiine between September and earlyune PRTCH guerrillas were captured and then executed by the Honduran Armed Forces. Three of these guerrillas had been debriefed and displayed for the international news mediaress conference held in Nueva Palestina; The families of the three guerrillas were beginning to inquire about their family members' whereabouts.esult, the Honduran military hierarchy recognized that it now would face the threatisastrous international scandal for human rights violations.

C Alvarez had reportedly told officers involved in the counterinsurgent operation that he did not expect any moredeserters from the remaining guerrillas in the area.C further stated that any guerrillas trurning themselves over to the authorities at this stage of the operation would be doing so because they were dying oft was not known whether the CINC had ordered the executions or lower ranking officers had taken it upon themselves to issue such an order.

fter being executed, some of the guerrilla bodies were deposited in the Patuca River and were begiruung to wash

ashore in populated areas.onduran military disclaimed knowledge relating to tliese bodies.

to: -

>ortedly believedM"ata was heldouple of clays before being executed,had no evidence to support this belief. Regarding theon Reyesthat the diary had been

found intact. He assumed that the missing pages were removed by high-level officers before the diary was provided. officials.

Hflt: not loiow the contents of the missing pages,that the document was closel

Based on the

rerxjrting

prisoner executions in Olancho, CIAn this iopicPresident'sthat at least three, and

possibly as many as nine, prisoners had been executedfield units captured and interrogated members ofguerrilla force that infiltrated from Nicaragua in

The Carney family was noted to be pressing tliein Tegucigalpa and local officials for'information on the fate and planned to bring the case to congressional attention.analytical comment indicated that exposure of the incident wouldsharp criticism on Tegucigalpa, which had one of thehuman rights records.

gf Additionally, the Alvarez correspondencessues relating to Camey family requestshronology ofnsurgents' activities, tactical and administrativeegarding the insurgents and more details on the death of Reyes

Mata. With regard to Reyes Mata, it was indicated that he wasonfrontation with the "Patuca Task Force" on Septemberear

Piedras Azules. Alvarez indicated that the Hondurans did notonfirmation that Camey participated in the insurgency although the

guerrillas at the press conference mentioned that he may have diedunger. Alvarez indicated that he would meet with the Camey! family, without the presence of the media,equest were properly

submitted.

vith an evaluation of its reporting from Octoberndhat theoncerning the executions of PRTCH insurgentsopic of considerable interest to the intelligence community and were graded as "excellent" and "good."

"ie need torj

>articularly urlight of'USrinvolvement in joint itaryon;

L .

provided information that appearedribuna newspaper article. The article reported that some parentshe guerrillas were beginning to protest because the Honduran I" authorities would not allow them to visit their sons. Additionally, the article indicated that three of the guerrillas who had beenpresented to the news media previously had been killed on3 when they reportedly attempted to escape.

ntelligence Report^ reported that, as ofINC Alvarez had initiated

44 OLL Memorandum for the Record, aa Februaryetter addressed to Congressmanrom Virginia Smith, Carney's sister, had beenDO/LA arid DO/PCS, for comment in preparationhe letter alleged that Carney was interrogated,and died'or was executed at El Aguacate. The letterthat Carney's interrogation was witnessedIA personnel and CINC Alvarez. Ms. Smith detailedefforts in detennining me circumstances of the priest'sasked that Broomfield investigate the incident.

4 Headquarters Memorandum, Anfor the Recordeeting betweenmember Steve Berry and LA Division Chief Duanereportedly advised that the minority members of theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee were concerned aboutetter from Carney's sister toto the memorandum, Clarridge explained thatcoUecting information concerning Camey. Clarridge alsothat the letter was not accurate and that insurgents who -the group had stated that Carney was emaciated and incondition. The Honduran Army hadadly decomposed bodyon-Central Americanlyingammock with religious uterature near theall the known facts "together, Clarridge reportedly stated,concluded that the body was that of Carney. Nomade to recover the body at the time of discovery andto locate it were unsuccessful. Clarridge offered toofftcerMMR/ho had interviewed three of the deserters, toBroomfield on what he had learned about Carney's fate.

4 Headquarters Memorandum.pparent response to LnquLries by DO Casey, CATFsssistant provided Chief, DO/LA with information concerning the _Olancho Operation and Carney. The memorandum, drawnnd OctoberS^HH^eports concerning

Carney and the Olancho Operation, stated that reviews ofocuments, debriefings of the insurgents and Honduran studies

demonstrated little cause for devoting time and resourcesore

; in-depth analysis. Regarding Carney, the memorandum statec

ubstantiated press accounts that Carneyied of starvation. Additionally, prisoner debriefings conductedhe Hondurans revealed that the priest had been carried in relays by

the stronger members of his group. Finally, it stated that theHondurans believed that there was little likelihood that the priest's

body would be found.

eadquarters Memorandum.eeting was held betweenroomfield, House Foreign^Affairs Committee Minority Staff Director

Everett Bierman anojMjj&The purpose of the meeting wasiscussLL Memorandum for the Record prepared by an OLL representative who also attended indicatedjgppoke for aboutinutes based on his travel tond advised that the deserters had said that the group ran out ofnd became primarily concerned with survival rather thanegime activities.WHtsaid he learned from the deserters that,ays before the deserters left the group, the priest was in such poor physical condition that he had to be carried. The deserters, said loubted that Carney had survived.

ccording to the Memorandum for the Record) also said he had learned from the Honduran military that it had comeodyon-Central American lyingammock. The body was badly decomposed and it was difficult to determine the individual's identity. As some religious materials were found near the hammock, it was assumed that the body was that of the priest.

57

SgflKlft

Because access to the area was very difficult, the Hondurans made no effort to recover the body. When the Honduran Government realized that the priest was an American and that his family was seeking his body, it made an unsuccessful effort to relocate it.

fff Sroomfield reportedly explained that he had. attempted to obtain from Smith the evidence. Government. complicity in Carney's death that she claimed to have in her ..ossession. However, she had refused to provide such information.

copy of an article entitied 'The* lysterious Death of Fatherrom thedition of The Nation newspaper. ^UJ^^rared that the article indicated that. military intelligencenamed "Wes"-allegedly were involved in the Olancho Operation andIA officer at Aguacate was calledeaning "Little Wes."

rfvlpBB^| mptedecond letter from the Camey family to DC! Casey, dated December 5, eLher it was aware of "Colonel, Major, or Lieutenant West Blank, in charge. Intelligence at Aguacate, where (Carney] was held; and Major Mark Kelvi, second in commandt wasBHBif anyone fitting these descriptions

kduring the period of Carney's

-

Canievwas never held specifically at El Aguacate or anywhere else.

not comment on the individuals referenced as "West BlaruV^id "Mark Kelvi."

5 Headquarters Memorandum. In response to the Carney family's4 correspondence to

58

DCI Casey, the Director of Public Affairs wrote that theCIA had information that it was unwilling to share withwas incorrect. The family was informed again that CLAinvolved in Carney's disappearance. Moreover, the familythat "Blank" and "Kelvi" were never employed by CIA.was referred to DoS for assistance in seeking informationHonduran.

o receive congressional inquiries

xoncerrting the alleged commission of human rights excesses by the Honduran Government and FDN.esult, CATF was attempting to determine the validity and scope of these reported abuses by surfacing as many specific cases as possible. Relevant Headquarters^ files and press items since1 were being reviewed^

s much information as possibleumber of individuals, induding several dergymen who had been killed in Honduras. Carney's name was not induded.

eporting relevant to the fate of Father Carney or Reyes Mata has been found to have been generated between5 and

ere provided oy HeadquartersDacKgrouno information concerningased onand press reports.Pveie advised lhat thereindicationsFOIA request in

the pastbe further

advised when more information was obtained.

5 Electronic Messages:

A Divisiontatus report and search tor records relating to the8 FOIAesponse from the Directorate of Administration's Information, Privacy and

Classification Review Division indicated thatocuments, consisting ofages, had been released to the family. The FOIA litigation initiated by the familyS had been closed on

eadquarters Draftraft reply to certain allegations madeunefrom Congressman Robert G. Torricelli, HPSCI, to theAdvisor. Torricelli's letter asserted that informationindicated that Camey had been captured, held atfor interrogation byth Battalion, flown bymountains near the Patuca River, and thrown out. Torricelli'salso alleged that the Honduran military officer responsibleexecutionaid CIA agent. Additionally,. intelligence officers were present at theCINC Alvarez ordered Camey captured and also at Carney'sTorriceUi had also posed questions concerningCLA officersriefing of HPSCI membersissues.

The DO/LA draft reply indicated that the DO hadinformationut that the DI was being taskedits records for additional information. Thehad not been corroboratedO/LA review ofOIG Report of Investigation.

he Nation*

Security Council had previously been providedackground paper onth Battalion, according to DO/LA, and DO/LA considered the Torricelli allegations toestatement of charges that had been made on several occasionsCI Deutch advised the National Security Advisor onegarding the Torricelli allegations that CIA only learned of Carney's death after it occurred.

GO

5 letter to Torricelli from CIA's Directorof Congressional Affairs formally responded to the questions that had been posed by Torricelli at the Mayriefing and in his June5 letter. The response, based on the DO/LA draft,eview of available information indicated that CIA had no knowledge of any plans to capture^Camey, only learned of his likely death after it had occurred, and had no direct or indirect involvement in his -death. The letter also stated that the circumstances surrounding Carney's death remained uncertain, but that8 OIG investigation had found no CIA involvement in the matter. The letter further noted that8 OIG Report of Investigation had been reviewed by both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and that they did not take issue with the sections relating to Camey. *Finally, the letter stated that CIA had been directed by DCI Deutch toeview of all CIA records that might bear on possible allegations of human rights abuses during the relevant period.

to touow-u

Mata.

Operation'"indicating that the insurgents were tired, hungry and too weak to offer resistance and that capturecUnsur^en^ interrosatecLbv members of the SFCH

a group when it encountered the SFC.

ndicated that Father Lamey was not with the

stated

possibly

ii IiHii,were

asked to participate in the execution of insurgents to prove their mettle, but some refused to take part. The SFC reportedly executedf tlie insurgents in the vicinity of the Patuca River,ore"disappearedland therest were presented to the press.

Reportedly had shot Reyes Mata in the forehead with >er pistol.

61

ie lnrormabon concerrurig trie aeatn of Reyes Mata, Carney's absence from the group when it encountered the SFC, and the Honduran rruutarv's belief that he was suffering

from malaria wasnp requestedcomment to txus effect to iniormcorisumers as to why they/were bemg advised of information3 event.

_ Thatndicated that both Reyes Mata and Camey had died of starvation and malaria and that there had been no confrontation betweennsurgents and SFC. The analysis was based on information that initially appeared in the press and did not draw uponccounts from the participants in the Olancho Operation.

also

claimed that he did not know of Carney's fate, but thought that the riest had separated from the main group as was.reported by the official Honduran version of the incident.

commented that it was probable that the analyst had been given instructions as to the conclusions he should reach and that Honduran Military Intelligence intended to use the analysis to influence public opinion.

JMHV Because of the research rectu^ementsoftheTlonduras Working Group,

any indication

uman

ntelligence Report

an additional account of Carney's death _j

. n^HppBHH^'o r

background information regardingth Battalion.

[who had reportedly toldHJ Vft': ': Carney had been captured, tortured to death and then dismembered by the Honduran

SHCRlff

' Armed Forces. Pieces of die body were then reportedly buried5 locations near NuevaPr; len the area of thePatuca

, she hacTreoerveathisinformation from insurgents who wereCarney at the time of his capture. It was not specified whetherinsurgents actually witnessed the killing of Carney or had onlyit. HBHpHfead also reportedly indicated that Reyesbeen captured and killed whilend man

critics of the Honduran military for alleged humannghts abuses.

iccordirig4 ethics complaint, Reyes Matabeen killed during an encounter with4 corxrr^nt^iledby an alleged participant inactemovingfrom the bodies of several insurgents and not submittingto his sup:elie

that all documents related to the encounter, including the etnics complaint, had probably been destroyed. . -

mat rus Knowledge or the event was basedethics complaint and that the "Special Unit" had lolled bothMata and Carney. He sajcUjehaojbeentokl by Mends in" theCarney was .killed.ted that

brmaaoncorrooorated and added to that egarding the ethics complaint.

ntelligence Report The information regarding the

ob tainet

Mm 'IWBWBB^Bii

. Army.Intelligence and Security Lommand

i (DMSCOM)/Army Operations Group (AOG) information4 to

single intelligence report. The intelligence report indicated thatJNSCOM had no record of cbssemmating3 AOGinformation concerned the execution of Reyes Mata by - Carney's body being covered by leaves andtheoung guerrilla. Additionally, thereport iridicated that.the Honduran Inspectordividing among his troop

money seized in the course of Tne Olancho Operation. Headquarters

1he ACC! in/omvuioniscussed iiideuil in ihc next section of ihis Report of Iiwcsrieal'.on

commented that the AOG reporting andit appear that Reyes Mata was execute

:ornmented thaFCamey's fate was s

"'

ne combined information was disseminated as an Intelligence Report

$ongressional Notification. Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations were notified by CIA officials onegarding CLA reporting relating to the death of Carney. Accordingffice of Congressional Affairs (OCA) background.paper, the CIA, had received one report)

Indicating that Carney was killedbetween the military and the insurgent group. Athat Carney was tortured to

aereci'rJy the Hondurans. Other scenarios in earlier CLA reports were that Carney had starved to death or was thrownelicopter. The CIA officials reportedly indicated that the Agency had not been able to establish or rule out any of these

accounts. The CIA officials also notedull report of thef CIA activities in Honduras would be provided to thehen completed.

ongressional Notification.

' Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of theCommittee on Appropriations, and the Nationalof the House Committee on Appropriationsby CIAtnG execution

of Reyes Mata. The Commitwesvvereuu^rmect tnata recent CIA report indicated that the execution had occurred. This report3 AOG information that had been provided by an AOG source but was not disseminated.

CIA officials reportedly indicated thatIA

CIA

officialslhe *Croup was

reviewing all information related

corroborate the reports of his involvement in the execution otand to identify ht have had to the

death of Carney.

sen toia tnat tne

istol and piece of clothing that they said belonged to the priest and these items wereJurnecl.oyer_toJjQnduran Militaj Intelligenc*

had indicated that Honduran helicopters^were unable to locate' Camey based upon information from captured insurgents.

Sfl

The leftist told lat he had entered Honduras with Carney aria mat tne priesfwasln poor physical condition before the border crossing. The leftist reportedly said that he and others had to carry the priest for two days iriaJigmmock before leaving him behind in the jungle, fl laid he did not obtain the leftist's last nameince returned to Nicaragua

romment was added to the original report, stating that id not say whether the leftist had mcucatea tnat Carney was alive or dead when left behind. The information was disseminated as an Intelligence Report

leftist had

!Carney in

a hammock for two days, the insurgents awoke on the thirdo find that Carney had died in his sleep. The insurgentsarney's body in the hammock.

rthe helicopter thattolbok forCamey^body after capturedhis death.unable,.according tO|

ictly where they had searched for &ebod% ilso reported thatscheduled to travelwUhroup naa described Carney as being in poor physical condition prior to the start of the journey.

uly6 Intelligence Report. This reportssued by CIA as an addendum to thet provided the recipients of the previous intelligence report with the additional informatioi

icUcating that Camey had died in his sleep and his body leftammock.

it Honduran Special Forcesan aide to Carney who was in possession of theand chalice. The aide said that he had left Carney in athe jungle. The guerrillas reportedly had not eaten for moredays andrjx^as unablethet^at

Forces backtracked wiiirthe'aide, andecomposed body,

(five patrols that were deployed by helicopter trom the Nueva Palestina base camp for the primary purpose of tracking down the guerrillas. The patrols set off from sandbars in the Patuca River in five roughly parallel columns in the general direction of the Nicaraguan border. The aide to Carney was discovered by one of the

week

of this even

the base camp via radio that Carney's oundand then continued patrolling for another

id notritten report

one ever asked hirn about Carney nor does he remember telling anyone about finding the priest.

lose confidant rliathe na<

participatedatrol ledThis patrol

reportedlyjrayeled to the location ot Carney's body and

>rdered the body to be buried at the site. ThesoIdTer indicated that the burial site was inon Congolon

commented that the patrol led byprobably a

follow-up patrol that had been sent to conJirm that Carney's body had been found.

y Theionwas

H&iinseminated asto

lerriliaooden cnauce guernUa claimed to be Carney's aide andhem that he had left Camey lyingammock that was protected by dense vegetation. Carney was described by the guerrilla asoo weak to continue with die march.

The aide reportedly had led the two patrols tohad obviously been deadew days. The aide identifiedto the

of trauma or violence and it was apparent that Carney had died of natural causesJM

back to tne base campcontinued to search for an armsbody was left in the hammock.

that the lieutenant probably killed CarneJ^aideasnewas not needed after finding the cache.

ubsequent to Carney's body being located,

[CLNC Alvarezad.vise

enough prisoners had been taken.four

or five captives who werejreturnedto Nueva Palestinaother.officers marched the

guerrillas into the jun|Te;ma^xfcufedlso had executed another capturedeparate, bu' sirrdlar, incident.

Lima ted that Honduran Special

Forces executed betweenndf the captured guerrillas who the jungles. In addition to other executions that ;aid hejvitnessed, hethat he observed an

*ga

reported'

I visor to tlie guerrillaswas

have participated in'the executions

77

and another officei

was in charge of the executions. Although iruui

having executed Reyesateracunitted that he did not know who had performed that Reyes Mata was shot and not drowned.

Intelligence Report

"and the related lum. The report and addendum were

reissued on7 with the following Headquarters caveat:

The following report is aissuing Ihe report, we

have learned that the source may not have been honest in his

account of the events detailed in the intelligence report

Consumers will wish to ensure that any finished intelligence publications that drew on this report are edited as appropriate.

londuran citizen claimed that he had been part of an insurgent group that included Camey and Reyes Mata. The citizen claimed that he had evaded the Honduran military and witnessed themass grave for betweenndf his deceased comrades in the Nueva Segovia region.

y<iT

LTainin

officers were ordered to participate in an operation to capture the

d deserted the*

[orders were to search and stop the group- "capture" as opposed to "search andll SFC officers andoldiers attached to the Air Mobile Unit quickly deployed to Nueva Palestina.

Afteruerrillaoutine supply mission, more guerrillas were located, captured and sent to Tegucigalpa for questioning and propaganda purposes. According to

the guerrillas were in poor physical condition and suffering fromthat these individuals, numberingver^?oT!^torrured. He notes that torturing them would not have served the Hondurans well as the guerrillas were to be presented to the press.

get information from them

andlace they can't benly officers were to be involvedn carrying out the executions and each officer had to participate so that they would not disclose their at

Jjl^iniven overall

responsibilityensuring that tlie executions

were performed by each officer.

states

)

5 he was not present for the interrogation or

he two origiria] deserters had indicated that Carney, *veferreaUoas"fotheras traveling withthat Honduran military intelligencearge

file on Carney andC Alvarez was eager to use him forpurposes. This desire stemmed from pressureChurch had applied on CINC Alvarez forof the Church and its representativethat there was never an order to kill Carney, only toalive and bring him back to the

the importance of capturing Father

Guadalupe alive andeek of leave to the patrol thatreturned the priest to Nueva

ome point in the _

apatro^ndassist another patrol that was in theapproximatelyen, located the first :

patrol, and they then came into contact with an individualhimself as jheaideJo^Carney. The individual had ina carved wooden chalicetole

and mcUcatra^aTCarney^asweakenedack of food,to continue the march, and was left hangingammockjungle. The individual led the patrols to thea badly decomposed body was found and

presumecHcHjethe body of Carney due to the story told by that the leader of the primary

patrol radioed back to the"base camp and reported the find.

fter observing thedeparted the area and the first group continued its missionout arm caches while traveling towards Nicaragua.may have taken along and executed the individual daimingCarney's

Carney's Doay patrolling.

not return Carney's ed.

The first patrol did not return 'was ordered to continue

d vised CINC money rrom the guerrillas received some of the proceeds. The id reassigned

because of this theft, was the "field comman

recall any CIA personnel

specifically requesting information from him regarding theor the fate of Camey

that, afterwo-month periodnterest in the Olancho Operation olrrurushed quickly-there were other issues to address and the operation wasilitary success.

9

CONCLUSION

intelligence on

/'JS Bjioduced timely and substantialancno Operation, including relevant miormation regarding Reyes Mata and Camey:

that

j^PPllJPPHBaid thai prisoners captured during the Olancho'Operation had been executed by Honduran Axmy officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed. The executions reportedly were initiated after the "fieldommander" in Olancho-not otherwise identafied-received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces -Geriera^taffto "searchn

ortJarideid for a

couple of days before being executed. Neither of these reports contained the identities of the alleged executioners or any information regarding the fate of Camey.

OnS3J

to report on any repercussions related to the

83

1"

Despite these effo unknown to CIA.

he supervision

f In Augustand advised him that they would be traveling toas two PRTC guerrillas had turned themselves inauthorities.MB|recalls

him before their departure that it waserrilla group mightS. citizen.

recalls that the Hondurang had been charged with finding and neutralizing the guerrillas, nfmwl says he interviewed sbe to eight captured insurgents, but is uncertain whether these guerrillas had deserted. They were interviewedoercion-free environment. Two guerrillas claimed toflB that they were the last to have seer. Carney, whom they referred to as "Padrelive.

Two insurgents indicated Uiat Carney had made it, in the company of the PRTC insurgent group,ase camp on topill between thc Coco and Patuca Rivers after eight days of marching. Traveling down the hillorthwesterly direction, Carney was described by Ihr two guerrillas as being so weak that he could only covereters in Uie triple canopy jungle before

requiring rest. Before reaching lhe Paluca River, Carneyad to be assisted, sometimes carried, by the two insurgents.nsurgents reportedlyear of capture and Camey urged

them to continue without hiin. They then placed the priestammock and left. The guerrillas believed, says-B| that Carney

had died of exposure and

In addition to suffering from lack of food andelements, Camey was described by the guerrillas who were

I interviewed by mm as being spiritually broken, mmearning from the captives that Carney had ministered tonsurgents but came to odds with Reyes Mata who prohibited .Carney

from performing religious services. According to mmm Camey wasf also emotionally affected by Reyes Mata's executionember of

the group.

it was hoped that Camey was alive and

I would be captured. After mm interviewed the deserters,e recalls that tlie conclusion within the Embassy was tliat Camey had died of starvation. There was never any indication, says mm that the Hondurans had captured or killed the priest. By the endo information had been identified that contradicted this conclusion and theto focus on other matters.

i

he prepared several intelligenceon his findings and the subsequent discovery byof religious articles that apparendy belonged to Came'

recalls that

de inquiries of the Honduran concerning the fate of Camey.

. initial inv >lvement,

reportedly assumed full responsibility for reporting on matters relating to the Olancholsuspected, but never had Honduran Army confirmation, that Reyes Mata may have been captured and subsequently killed by the Hondurans These

suspicions aroseicture of the dead Reyes Mata appearedmedianiform Uiat appeared to have been surprisinglyand clean for someone who had been on the run in dieweeks-advised that these pictures appeared after heother duties and, thus,have

followed-up on the suspicions. subsequently was

killed in an automobile accident

hat the Embassy was cautious in notstreet rumors or unverified information on issuesbe politicallyno reason to believe that the

Embassy or its components, including ihefj^lp suppressed any intelligence reporting.

that tlie _

Olancho insurgency was not of crucial interest or viewed

luran program, and intense: viewe

d nothreat. or as consumed with the Contra -was interested in the insurgency and in reporting related details. The insurgencyroadill conceived, badly im plem ented operation, wherein the insurgents paid Uie price for self-destructive behavior. Many of the insurgents and Carney were thought to have succumbed to exposure and starvation.

S^j Recalls that Uie Carney familyr,c" mv0^vec' with

believes that Tegucigalpa Embassy's Consular Section would have been responsible for pursuing Carney's fate, given Ius_presumed status.u^iridicatesl

the Embassy didfurther collection

on the fate of Carney or Reyes Mata.1

ns it was thought that Carney had vanished in Uie jungleor starvation and

90

CJZf

Ibecause the

Questioning them further would haveacl not necessarily resulted in theore in this regarc notue

trust and id not do tion did

indicated that

er barney was left to die in asuffering from starvation "and was too weak to continue.reported to be by far the oldest member of the insurgentthe account of his fate appeared to be plausible.that he was other

ls.mainly Contras, had suffered the same iate in the Honduran luneles'ahCl this added to the credibility of the account

terest in Carney-was equal to its interest in the iate ot Keyes Mata, but there was no information left to pursue'in the Camey matter.

' 1it knew aboutperation.-

iewed the Olancho

Operationarge-scale overt military operation. As suchj was largely responsible for reporting on thehe information concerning Carney dying of natural causes was credible then and now.esult, there was no further reporting oh-the priest's fate after it was deterrriined that he had likely died of.-starvation.

purposely exclude the "doimyoltHe "held commander" who was referred to ineport aslresponsible for'f

prisonern tne

executions were damaging to Honduras and did not protect anyone.

did notignificant interest.in the Olancho Operation asa great

ecame aware of3 om" accounts carried in the Honduran media.

MtBHBBBBfrveri

ursue the insurgents. During the short-lived

OlanchoFC officer

ecalis that insurgents surrendered and gave details

summonedperation

of the group's history and make-up. Thisescriptionriestather' 9flPJHMRifl ot realize that this priest was Carney until after nis family contacted. Embassy for assistance and media articles described his participation in the PRTCH guerrilla penetration.

md that

'personnel* provided informatioi reading the operation,were describe'mtOKSEtit7 s

being very enthusiastic about collecting information concerning this rnilitary action and were considered to be the reporting focal point for it within the Embassy.

-aveled by vehicle to anoutside of Tegucigalpa and talked with capturedguerrillas appeared to be in good health and told of beingCuba and sent through the jungle of Olancho. Once in theran out of food and the leader of the group sent twoillage to obtain supplies. These guerrillasand the Honduransilitary operation.mentioned

riest accompaniedthegroup^anocued oFstarvationJjj|Br

K

ays he can no longer recall the name the prisoners used to the priest.

;ca lissorting throughdocuments and photographs taken by die guerrillas. Hephotographs were worn, dirty and greasy. Amongwere pictures of guerrillas who were obviouslyin bad physical shape. ^Hj||BHHHtBfilBivs tnatthese individuals appeared to be dead and he attributedto starvation.

' one photograph,

e

onT The oes not viauai, orelieveds unsure of how he

possibly black ana white, that pictured the bodyale lyingammock. The individual wasears of age, with grayish hairong face, concluded at the time that the indivTcruai haahotograph alsopurplelthoug recall whether this item was on tlie hammock, the in ground.

individual to naverney,came to this conclusion.

jj^jHBHBBH^

were not showing an interest in the seizeditems and he pointedhe photograph of the individual in the hammockombined Military Intelligencefficer. He recalls doing so because he was aware that the Carney family had expressed its suspicions to the Embassy concerrung the priest's fate and its belief that it was not receiving adequate cooperation. representatives. He betieves that the photograph indicated that the priest had died of starvation and emphasizes that it would have forced the family to accept that Carney had died of natural causes in the|

jelieves that this photograph was provided to Carney's relatives'rJ^DoS personnel at the Embassy.

ft ^jffPWPWM oecollection of reporting or recording the information relating to the photograph he thinks may have been of Carney. However, he says he regularly:'

passed such information to Embassy officials, given the highthe case. Me believes that tiusjruormarion was usedthat neither*

nor Embassy management ever sought to suppress the dissemmation of any information on this or other event

o* ao^eidentify

photographs of Camey from trie Honduran media asesemblance to the individual he recalls was photographed lying in the hammock.lBfiBBBBPW?*amhotographeceased Carney could have been taken and developed by the Honduran guerrillas in the Olancho jungle. He believes that it is possible that he is mistaken in his identification of tlte individual as

ney. ^MBBIW at thereot of misinformation concerning the Olancho Operation.

He was assisted in this assignment by locally-hired Hondurans who referred to him as "Wes" and "Corruxiandante Wes."

f) When the Olancho Operaiion begamgjjjecallsHonduran Armed Forces settaging area at tlie Airsupplies were stored and then trucked to the Tinto River.area consistedew tents and was staffed byfrom the Honduran Armed Forces. He says

discouraged his personnel from interacting with the individuals assigned to the staging area and indicates that there was no reason to have contact with them.'

26S.fter the staging area was established, one oi^HBfi|

Honduran assistants advised himruckload of guerrillas haa been brought to the area and then transported to Comayagu; says he never saw these prisoners and advises that the staging'area did not have any detention facilities. He also says he is unaware of what happened to the prisoners. Upon completion of the counterinsurgent operation, the staging area was.

t) Prior to the Olanchodviscsroupnewspaper rerxjrtexsjraveled to Lepaterique looking for an American known as "CommandanteBBelieves that the inquiry related to him and opines that the reporters had apparently^confused the name of "Wes"_withn reaction to this inquiryBHtlKaVs be returned to)

loes not recall any additional references to an individualHe also says he has ho knowledgeWest Blank"Kelvi"serving

that they were not aware of prisoners being held or interrogated at El Aguacate Air Base during the Olancho

96

1that tlie only support

; provided byb mili lary in the Olancho Operation was. helicoptersations to Nueva Palestinaalmerola, an Air Base in Comayagua. He says.ent by. Military Group, stayed on the ground for

approximately one hour while delivering the food and'departedrea without providing further assistance. .j

271

. >A iscussion witl4 and5 regarding Carney' that he had previously learned from local new: allegedly had been murdered. According to]

that he[ pflftjcipafpH in thejQlancho Operation, but

involved..V; *come uponand that Camey was either dead or near death attime. Tf the latter,onduran patrol had left him tonot ceftamhim .

That^arriey was dead or left to die, mSaoesprovided any information that would indicate that Camey was murdered.

'ecalls that Carney had reportecuy died of exposure and that most "of tlie guerrillas had alsnsuffered the same fate prior to the Hondurans finding them.

says he was not privy, tq.the OctoberHK^teexecutions and does not recall executionsplace during the insurgency or what specific actionsdarify the priests fate. . '.

forthcoming and

ig to assist him with whatever avenues he.

dedded to pursue. There were no restrictions placed ol pursuit of mformation. InitiallySHHwas provided with seized documents for his review. The most substantive documentopy of the diary belonging to Reyeshe other materials were considered to be mosdy propaganda and of littleo the Olancho Department for one day and was

W)

capturec

lereoe says the

prisoners were clean, lacking visible signs of physical mistreatment, well fed, without chains, and dressed in military fatigues. There was

an armed guard present during this general questioning session andew of the prisoners talked. They spoke of being starvedhe field and of wanting to surrender. They surrendered whenondurans encouraged such action with leaflets and messagesbroadcast from an airplane.

. ffcould

talk with any of4he prisoners as he desired and this resulted in his 'nterviewing three or four insurgents individually. During discussions about the group's leadershirJURays he learned that the group hadGuatemalan priest. The priest was not identified by any name, nor was he described. citizen. The priest was said to be accompanying the group's leader, Reyes Mata, ind suffering from malnutrition. He was further described as being in the worst physical state of all members of the group. Reyes Mata reportedly ordered that the priest be carried and one insurgent mcucate^JhaLthe priest would die because of his failing state of

alth fUpndicates that he did not have prior information concerning the priest, nor did he develop enough information during the interview to cause him to focus on this individual.

e was

' Embassy. It was at this time tha^HHpnade the association between

the priest described by the insurgents andhe diary of Reyes Mata, but says he did not find any noticeable '

references to Carney.^HKouud the diary to be consistent withprisoners' stories in regard to the hardships that the grouphe was provide^with informationassist in hisobtained additional seized

documents^some orwruchwere signed by "Fatherut

ccalls questioning' ut the bodies of Camey and Reyes Mata.

these, say; not helpful his review as theyonsidered lo be propaganda.

secj^et

id vised that Uie bodies were not recovered due to the inability of Uie patrols to carry the bodies through the rough andcessible terrain while also carrying tiieir own equipment.K>elieves the patrols probably were not mclined to recover tne aecomposing bodies of individuals who had tiueatened the security of their count also advisectjjjjjthat Reyes Mata had diedircfight and"thai it was behoved maKjameyhad slaived.HM^

made sense, say^BWHUpoes not recall seeing any pictures of Uie bodies of Carney 'orfoyesMata.

Pmmmmw'as as^ed to meet with Congressman Broomfield several months after completing the3 analysis of the Olancho OperaUon. AsBRfeemernbers it,

Broomfield had been contacted byamily which was seeking an appointment with the President. The family daimed that itigned affidavit,ape mcUcating that CIA had ordered the priests deaLhfllBEiys he had no knowledge of any prisoner executions at the nnrcana that he advised Broomfield of what he had learned about Camey.

21the Octobernd Octoberregarding prisoner executions. He says that heseen the documents before and believesIA] had[regarding prisoner executions]entand no one toldhould have been tola, asexpert [on Carney]flKf ^utions that thisriot have been Pjgposely withheld from him, as CATT waseven if all the information

had been shared withould not have changed his condusion Uiat Camey starved to death, but would have createdittle doubt in my mind" concerning Uie fate ofCarney and Reyes MataRM^ says that he did not senseHBBlHj^^if{'libe^'y^ withheld information on Uus subject froinluriiaHBfem Uiat every piece of information that he had collected or reviewed indicated that Camey had died of starvation.

(recalls thatmade Dy lia to collect uuormaaon on tneCarney's disappearance in order to answerfrom the oversight committees. He believes thatwas provided onlyinitial

reporting by CIA, he recalls that Deo was responsible for follow-up eporting on matters relating to Camey since he. citizen.

totes that

there was significant interest during his tenure in alleged human "rights abuses. This resulted in an experiencecaByrepresentative being assignedrt^ponsibihty for

nonitoring hurnan^gnts^Tesaysuus allowed CATF torights allegations prior to the receipt of official inquiriesCIA management andno -

recollection of matters relatine.to Camevarism^aurmghls tenure in

'as the individual primarily responsiblereparing congressional testimony and correspondence that originated in CATF' She recalls tremendous scrutiny of theolitically charged atmosphere.esult

[took great care in crafting congressional responses as" she did not want to take any action that could negatively affect covert action funding. Thus, she says congressional inquiries were interpreted and answered narrowly.

f) During the winterhe recalls thatEdward Boland requested information fromthe fate of

Headquarters traces and quen^KJH(jJB determined, she recalls, that Camey had died from starvation while marching through

SEflRET

During herecalls receiving several additional congressional inquiries concerning Carney's fate that were substantially identical to previous requests. She says that the Agency responses to these requests were based on previous Agency responses. If the substance of the questions differed from previous requests, then additional research was performed before providing ansays she was never limited in tlie amount of research that she could do to answer congressional inquiries.

J(lf Tlie Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyst who wasrecallseport'Jj9 3 concerning executions that occurred during the Olancho Operation. She recalls that the Operation had ended prior to her assignment. Based on at least this CIAports, she says she prepared the3 H rticle concerning prisoner executions in Honduras. From an analyst's perspective, she says the identities of the executioners were not necessary in order to ensure that policy makers understood the event. The DI analyst does not recall there being any issues regarding Carney's fate during her assignment.

REPORTED RELEVANT

AND CARNEY?^mmW

O FOLLOW-UP ON NON-CIA 'ORTING CONCERNING REYES MATA AND CARNEY? WHAT DO CIA 'AND. GOVERNMENF PERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THIS ON-CIA REPORTING?

(U) Relevant Reporting and Follow-Up Regarding Reyes Mata and Carney

^fflPlHBHHHHHHiHl ENSCOM, Army Operational Grouport Meade, Maryland, maintained a

'relationshipMBBRmjfaaUycame to AOGsulyattending the

'having been selected toosition on

the

tS)ix-month period of assessmentgreed to function as

Additionally,

!IA was to be Kepriuiiy informed of all intelligence production and significant developments in the operatioi

107

'h':V

intended goals and information obtained from deonefmgs.'Atadvised the flRMficer

subjecrsihatweresensitive in the eyes of [Ambassador NegroponteJ and asked that ifpicked up axiything regarding and-Sandinista activities, corruption and terrorism, could they Bkiiow

Operation indicating tha

Reyes Mataervicepistol after his capture and CLNC Alvarez had probably been consulted. This information was sent for informational purposesJJ^jBto numerous organizations,

owever, it was never disseminated as an

y

lancho Operanformationad personally killed

dica tedriest saw Carney

information regardin

Ror reportsMata. Regarding Fathera young guerrilla who hadpurportedly covereaMusbody with leaves and left itthe guemUa wasB MB^yi.-idicaled

investigation for the theft of money fromjhe guerrillas. Thisreportedly splithis troops each

time they killed oruerrilla.

folJovvingiriontfi, 4hV prepared, fully coordmaled and published iHMVPtemport jIlv.jsy During Lhjs ;ame month, the Ji andlinghis

eluctance on the part of the Embassy

jersonnel to publish information regarding discontent/turmoil within the [HonduranJ armed forces for fear/of. political repercussion [affecting funding votes in Congress] in the

ubsequently, three reports obtained fro

4 were determine inaccurate and were precluded from publication by

IA analystsJ^^MHBconLmue'^ to be met by thecr

5 and draft intelligence reports based upon hisprovidedcoordination within the

Embassy.ol^HHBBHBfe

reports45 were identified as "politically sensitive" by the Embassy, which requested either their non-publication or restricted'dissemination.': si.-.

CIA Response to

lBBBHlBHHHHi qKBNjB^HM

oint Chiefs of Staff messagentelligence report concerning the capture and executiononduran guenlUaJfl(Joriginally sent Uie draft report for comment HHhI an^ USCINCSO, and for information to DIA, onn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the draft, for informational purposes, to elements within CIA, State Department, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and NSA. Witfurt CIA, the draft was electronically distributed to various components within the DI. Additionally, copies of the draft

SEcaflrr

were distributed to elements within the Directorate of Administration, tlie Directorate of Science and Technology and the DO.

The draftreport specificallykilled Reyes Mata some days afterin ulancho. It also indicated that CINC Alvarez was before and after the execution^^evesMata reportedlyin his possession i> :edand

split with the CINC.

lemrr&ted two

>ensitive Memoranda regarding prisonerlancho Operation on,'lHBHHHft

:ould neither name the executioner nor stateigher authority was aware of or had approved the

..

military ofhcerswerencTsupportive of CINC Alvarez and that some of the informadon contained in the draft (pB report ought have been designed to smear him; However, the basic information conveyed in theeport-that prisoners had been executed-could not be refuted, according tc

BBB^^jsaid he had obtained the information that was included in the draft HB report from an unspecified officer who witnessed tlie execution. The draiffll report saidJUf

R-vould not elaborate on the specific rumor that he had exe" Key es Mata, almoughB

CINC Alvarez had commendeda job weu aone in the Olancho Operation. Alvarez was reported to be fearful that Reyes Mata would seek revenge against him becausencident during which Alvarez, then commanding the 4tli Infantry Battalion,

purportedly tiirew Reyes Mataliff. Reyes Mata survived the fall andtrong hatred for Alvarez.

32

I Response. On, mmrnW

sent its comments to tlie ^Rft^orrlmaodei with informational copies to DIA, INSCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It indicated that the Hoftekaiar^hiliiary had advised that Reyes Mata was killed in combat onhile operating in Northern Olancho. Two days prior to Reyes Mata's death, according to theBB comment, the local press carried articles alleging that he had been captured. Although this was denied byuthorities, the press stories led to unsubstantiated rumors that Reyes Mata had been captured, interrogated and then shot by members of the Special Squadron. According to AAttB these rumors had not been confirmee

^yWk mmf response also indicated that it had learned that Reyes Mata had been in possession ofn local currency that had been, at the direction of CDMC Alvarez, divided among all members of the Special Squadron. JKBtfpsaid it was unable to locate in its files any

reference to CfNC Alvarez having thrown Reyes Mataliff, inPcornment noted that tlie remoteness of the Olancho region and the secrecy of the operaiionumber of rumors.p:pmion,id not have direct access to the information concerning Reyes Mata's death and probably was repeating rumors.

325

Reporting. Onhotocopy_and English translation of BF roducedtranscribed on cheated in the message that he

dividual.

tdvised thai

personally killed Reyes Mata after his intei significant information.

In regard toHBIijStr::ecl onlyoung guerrilla who accompanied the priest had seen him dead. The guerrilla covered the priest with leaves and left him in thealso said that jplit money confiscated from Reyes Mata with his otticers and'froops each time they killed oruerrilla. The Honduran Inspector General was reportedly conducting an

114

ET

investigation into the theft of the confiscated monev. This

^provided

information was forwarded.

fi

additional details concen lingon

reporting of prisoner executions during the Olancho Operation. The flflflHHHBRfe included comments reportedly made lBr-erween March and

he request ot CIA<fl|^Hfl| BB* ^id not follow-up on (the Intelligence Information. Report regarding capture and assassina tion of Rtvtgruos'th^CJIimchf^int^ pera rioni'at as

- wi. By1- '

(rack except ior the amount of money that they calculated to be in the neighborhood0 .

IVThey considered it an inr mattereen taken care of by the Armed Forces Command;

ad been replaced and changes in policy had Deerimade. The prindpal interest was to avoid any recurrence of the abuses that had taken place during Olancho.

indicated that

BBBraised Ihesuli)ecRlpnsonerexecution.', againubsequen^rneetuT" witl< fl flAt thatladvised

admitted to killing Reyes Mata and was

indicated thaVfne"generai speculation concerrung the confiscated money was that it was split beiweeiaPfBEJ|flBfc;he Honduran

Forces Chief of Staff and CINC Alvarez.

(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel

for hanclling says that all matters concerning

who was unng the relevant time frame were coordinated with

115

icluding travel approval, the eventual submission of reports ana'briefings on collected information. He specifically recalls dealing witl^B Hpn issues relating to]

visit to leguagaipa wnue detailslancho Operation were appearing in the local media, thej

IB':'p this ^venl 8BP(PHfrePortediy

HHHB^bxecuted Reyes Mata and hadaptured guerrillas. CINC Alvarez was thoughtreceived some of the money and to have orderedbriefed unrecailed

ie was advised that this information was not consistent with

M.Jffiesultheinformation was notmeeting and brought with him asaid he had witnessed the execution of Reyesconfirmed the information thatpreviously by flHIHntl On thisa draft intelligence report thatr coordination. fl|^HHP was tasked

for further iruonnation on the Olancho Operation and this later resulted in the

dissenuna

[vising himnot support

intelligence report as it would disrupt

he

interpreted these initiatives as being Contra-related. fl^flHHW

he believed that he had fulfilled his reporting obligation in tfus matter. Thus, he did not further address the dissemination

] 16

: Lhat Lhen disseminate d that the Embassy Country Team in Hondurason subjects such as this to be benign "as to avoidover its shoulders" and to keep Congress satisfied withongoing implementation.

says he believes that the3pressed"elements within the Embassy,..

'. political reasons. Reporting murders, execub cms andcorrup tio n, (flftwould reflect negativelynd not be beneficial in carrying out tf_S. policy. _He stilt believes "that the information he obtained fromll BBwas accurate.

"ii -ne did not have the

opportunity to revlew^BlBHIBP reporting on theat the time. After receipt of the Novembera possible follow-up meeting wi

says he

and not

on human rights

to discuss Lhe information itM was not tasked to collect further information relating to the insurgency. The major focus forccording to-as on coUectrngforeisnintelhgence

3 recalls the general subjectf tlie draftiHBfr report-executions and stolenindicates that sending it to the Embassy for comment was routine, fl 5 he bebeves Lhat the Embassy in Tegucigalpa was sensitive to all reporting on matters internal to Honduras due to the political climate at the time.

117

elieves Uiat ^Hfcreporting did

ip orients within the Embassy, to "

not receive fair treatment

indudcfljHHj He recalls that

mnwitsost instances, wereinor of State'sBiiscussion3 wherein the latter indicated Uiat unspecified individuals at Uie Embassy did not want information concerrung human rights abuses during the Olancho Operation lo be disseminated because it was viewed as an internal Honduran matter.

S)*heas acoping with

poUtical sensitivities at Uie Embassy. The coordination process allowed MmWistributed, albeit in draft form. BB normally would noteport if the coordination process resulted in negative comments, yet consumers already would have been made aware of the information in draft form.

eceived similar

negative reactions to. its reports from other Embassiescontributing factor may have been the, lack of expertise on Uie part of

that the initial reporting

provided by fl BBbwas geneial in nature and that CIA and

concerns in thate says that reporting became more specific and substantial over time. The generality of thc early reporting may have been caused by

attempLstc^ohc^nforination regarding interna] Hondurancomfortable

The DIA Analyst does not have any

gf DIA Personnel. DIA's Honduran Analystays there existed an informal arrangementmet with him to discuss future debriefings ofwould provide draft copies of its intelligence reports toAnalyst for his comments. The DIA Analyst recalls r.lermitlently3 and[ as BH9: rides and periodically consulted withAnalyst about information he had obtained. ^| sought out issues to explore withflHIto assess his credibility and to obtain information ofintelligence consumers. The DIA Analyst recallsto have the access he claimed and generally

: 19

recollection of any comments by *BHbHHhB anc* USCINCSO and says that he was unaware of any efforts to suppress reporting in this or any other matter.

ccording to the DIA Analyst, the focus for analysts during the Olancho Operation was on how well the Hondurans reacted to the first insurgent penetration from Nicaragua. Analysts were impressed that the Honduran rruhtary could mobilize and effectively address the threat. The Honduran response was viewed asessage to future groups that were plotting similar actions. In addition; analysts were interested in learning whether the population witiun Olancho supported the insurgents. Camey was not of primary analytical concern to the DIA Analyst as other nterests took priority:

The DIA Analyst recalls3 draft AOGbelieves that certain details in it were inaccurate. Specifically,CINC Alvarez was not believed to have ordered theAlvarez was too smart to leave evidence of hisknew that such acts would neverecret- ThethatflflBHBada negative bias against.Inhe DIA Analyst believes that the Honduransobserved human rights'issues being addressed in El SalvadorImew that it made sense.fo use Reyes Mata forrad^erJharTejcecutehebe corrupt and capable oispUtting the

igents mbiilrywiiti CINC

he DIA Analyst recanttallting with,

3 concerning Reyes Mata's fate. He says that, 'understanding was that Reyes Mata was wounded in combat, would not talk when interrogated and was then left to die. Analytical attention was focused on thc Olancho Operation for only two- to three-month period and, byrie issueorgotten at the Embassy.

he DIA Analyst says hc was not privy to the twoS3 CIA Sensitive Memorandum reports concerrung prisoner executions. In regard to the identity of the "fieldhethat this was not the officer

>ut his superior. He describes commanding the SFC units that were split up and lent other military elements in the Olancho Operation.

concerned with issues relating to the Honduran rriilitary.

alls mat there were "no requests to tone down, suppress, stifle, withhold, or manage information"-in regard to3 draftor any other instances during his tenure in Honduras.oes not recall Negroponte having particular sensitivities to issues, nor does he recall Embassy personnel seeking to limitjflflflk reporting. He recalls rumors that prisoner executions had taken place duringtlie Olancho Operation, but that did not have evidence to substantiateV believes Uiat LheJ comment on3 draft ^Breport was prepared by who subsequenUy died ^HHHH^HHj|P

jas no recoUection of

ie exchange'of related messages

[He says that severalduty and

that their reporting was not balanced or placed in the proper context.

larea, ne says, v

witn mWMmWFirst, the AUG report was redundant in that thealready had been reported bythis respect, he says, the AOG report would naveto the event and focused excessive attention onthere were concerns regarding the objectivity andthe draft AOG report and whether the detaiJs concerningmvolvement

BBWBBWB^HEjnotosition to know readily whether Alvarez was involvedecision to execute the prisoners. The third area for concern related to the amount of money that was cited in^he report as having purportedly been stolen

ays that the amount reported was absolutely wrong.

report >ad

a 'phrasingWhile it was factually correct, it failed to emphasize Negroponte's concern over reporting on an event that had pre vioiislybeen reported by CIA in two disseminated intelligence reports HHMRtcknowledges that the Ambassador was sensitive to

political ramifications that might have resulted from such reporting

However, he indicates that this wasactor in the absence of further reporting regarding the executions and emphasizes that CIA had previously reported on that issue.

I discussed3 drafthe agrees thataccurate,that it does nothebasis forfurther reporting on the prisoner executions-the event hadpreviously and there "was concern'bri" the' part ofNegrbpohte"-'over-emphasis would'aeat'e'an unwarranted human rightsfor,

ie executions had

occurred and had been reported and there was nothing new towould be of importance to consumers. Although theeports cUdmilitary units involved in executions

provided sufficient information to permit identification of the perpetrators by cross-referencing of other reporting. The fact that executions took place was not an issue being addressed by the

londuranS. The (new* of Honduran officials wa* on invpsh>atint

elieves that his actions and NegTOponte's concern were parts ofegitimate effort to manage the perception ofe notes that information concerning the Olancho Operation and the executions was not suppresse< acknowledges that Lhe amount of reporting that should have, been developed regarding the executions is debatable, but stat(

124

political vacuum, although it did not delay, withhold, or suppress intelligence reporting."

iphasizes that the Embassy did not want to change or stop an AOG report from being published, but only wanted the opportunity to commentflBBfl not aware of any attempts byithhold

human rights information from Washington.

361

A DI Analyst with responsibilities for Honduras at the time recalls3 draft AOG report regarding prisoner executions and explains that one of her assigned duties was reviewing message traffic and forwarding it with comments to DI branch and division management. The analyst says the significance of the draft AOG

i?"

report was that it iiriplicated CDVC Alvarez iii the executions. Although she does not recall the disposition of die draft AOG report, she says that AOG's reporting was not considered reliable by CIA analysts.

CONCLUSION

; onth

reportedkilled Reyesthis AOG'3 ana rerrunae"cflBBMBfcjfthe two October

indicated'that unnamed HondurariArrrvy^incershacit _ ^

3 that the

Ambassador wasparo!cuJarT)^erisrc^ regarding the issue and was concerned that earlier CIA re^rting on the same topic mightuman rights problemforHonduras. Based on the Ambassador's reportedB^^Rehvelynggj^from followmi^jpuiemformation reported by the] source.

this action by noting that the

executions by the Honduran Army had, * beenthe two3 reports.

While these reports 'cUcrnot contain .the names of theHonduran military units that were

believed that receiving these identities in the AOGreport wouicf not have made^^ifferenceto intelligence consumers^BH^Bso beileveBHHHB^HBrorovidedsufficient iru^ormauoriurpennit identificaucSioiiri^erpetrators by cross-referencing of other reporting.

executed during the Olancho' Operation. The executionseportedly initiated after the "held commander" in the Olancho Department received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search andhis order reportedly was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive. The executions were carried out by "officers" in an isolated area away from the enlisted men. No further information relating to the identities of the "fieldier the specific

aaBMCMThe'second

dooimgntl

Mf^MBnclicateQ mat captured PRTCH guerrillas in tne uiancno Department were executed by "the Honduran Armedo further identifying information regarding who had performed the executionsrwas contained in the report operational cable.

Draft AOG Report On, CIA Headquarters received3 draft AOG report from wdicating that Reyes Mata had been executed bi Electronic copies were sent to components withinI's electronic records storageeceived tne report in paper form only,1

)3 AIK

INSCOM representative(s) provided

_tr.a

paper copy of the NovemberThe message alsofor the theft of fundsbeen confiscated from the PRTCH guerrillas in Olancho andCarney had died of naturalshared the money with officers ancUoldierseach rime

) document

13 draft AOG report frox

as having killed Jose Maria Reyes Mata some days afterlusrabtuTein Olancho Department, and says that

fCTNC

Alvarez]." he.

related to

executions, but noted that

neither name the executioners nor statewhether higher authorities were aware of or had

CONCLUSION

'response indicated that there was no )gatory information regard in "IftEBBHHBBan^ did not make

reference to indications <field

commander"-may have par ft"3 Olancho Operation and prisoner executions. Factors that appear to have contributed to Headquarters' failure to locate and provide thisJ^

to document the specific identities of the

alleged Honduran Army executioners, including "the fieldho were referred to in the two3 CIA reports.

Thus, theH^reports that implicated "the fieldn prisoner executions.did not contain any reference

ip failed to

T

failed to request additional information *egarding the identities of tlie Honduran Army officers who were referred to in the two3 CIA reports as having been involved in prisoner executions.

ius, the two AOG reports that were received bynd4 and .one o; those implicated in

the executions were not retrievable by']

Since none of this information was indexed or retrievable MB did not to

attention of Headquarters Dersonnel who!

EJJ-RET

Hondurans who

aside red to be leftists.

equest N

that the reports be converted to Sensitive Memoranda dissemination format due to the sensitivity of tlie subject matter. One report addressed the structure and function of ELACH- The second report identified the victims of ELACH.

^AHBHHMPiatedhat Mario Izaguirre had been the Director of ELACH sinceIzaguirre reportedly maintained direct contact with

Director Colonel Guillermo Pinel Calix, who provided Izaguirre with the id entities of individuals who were to be placed under surveillance. It was reported^flj^hat ELACH members also maintained an informal liaison with members of the DNI andth. Among the names of those inth Battalion who were contacted by ELACH members to discuss ELACH operations was Captain Siro Pablo Fernandez Cuevas, also known as "Captain Urquia."

eported onhat Urquia was responsibCTorth^verall commandUSEP interrogation site and that he conducted kidnappings for ransoi

*

ie second report on ELACH based uponl

This report identified Honduran lei who were allegedly executed by ELACH0ablo Moran, Tomas Nativi, Fidel Martinez, Angel Manfredo Velazquez, Hermino Caceres Castellanos, Samuel Perez, Nelson Makay, Jose Ernesto Velazquez, and Eduardo Lanza Becerra. It was reported that Izaguirre participated with DNI operatives Carlos Alfredo Martinez, Marcos Hernandez and Tranquilino Campos in the

fifiBlflP1

kidnapping of leftist student ariivist Omar Gustavo Vazquezho died during interrogation. Consequently, Martinezeparated from the DNI and DNI Director Major Juan Biasesa was fired. The report alsoist of Honduran leftists who had been_placed under ELACH surveillance!

m-

all persons reported I

illed

or missing12 were identified IJnoSeDOOKimunan Rights in Honduras" that had been published by the Honduran Documentation Center

j/^mW

luring04 penod when executions had been carried out, each execution hade approved by the Honduran Armed Forces Commander andresident of Hondurasmments indicated, however, tliat no requests for approval of executions had been made sinceeneral Walter Lopez Reyes assumed command of the Armed Forces in

^^The information contained in the two*]

, reports regarding ELACH was dissemmatedHH^fa^fHgjg-

5 Sensitive Memorandum to the Director of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Director of the Defense

| Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,. Ambassadors at Tegucigalpa and

( Panama City, and the Commander-in-Chief of. Southern.

: Command.

and noted that it was important to

"RF.r

continue to collect information in order to obtain more details about the past and present operations of ELACH.l

[indicated that it would be useful to determine the identities of the individuals who were aware of the existence of the ELACH operation and its victims.

SOL^efQmgressional Notification. On, a

letter was

DCI William Casey's signature and transmittal to theXhaunren of the HPSCI and SSCI. Tne letter described theLACH and

the6 repoiiUietta!ion

had ordered ELACH to mount surveulSoeon several Honduran leftists. The letter noted that, prior to making the ELACH information available to the Committees, every effort had been made to verify its authenticity and the reliability of the source.

f The letter also stated that Casey was personally committed to investigating fully any additional information the CIA received in this regard and that CIA would at

reporting regarding ELACH. The letter indicate

id asserted that,

over tunc, many of the individuals who were implicated in human rights abuses had been reassigned out of positions of responsibility in the Honduran intelligence services. The letter expressed Casey's concern that ELACH would continue toiable organization with high level contacts in the Honduran Government. The HPSCI and SSCI Chairmen were assured by the Casey letter that CIA would examine possible measures lo resolve this problem and would bring

9*f

the matter to tlie attention of the appropriate senior Honduran Government officials, mcluding then-President Azcona. Casey

; signed and forwarded letters containing these statements to Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator David Durenberger on

.

fffonesponse to aWhite House request for information concerning an inquiry from Congressman Gerry E. Studds regarding what CIA knew of the Honduran Government's invoIvementTn death squad activities. The response indicated -Jeen allocated to determine whether any information was available that confirmed the allegations. The response also noted that the CIA had not tried to cover up or discourage the publication of information regarding death squad activities and that no CIA officer had tried to influence assignments, promotions, or continued military service of officers in theJjonduran Armv. This response was signed

td forwarded to the White

House on.

IA responseuestion raised by the SSCI regarding Honduran human rights abuses was also preparedfi question focused on what the CIA knew about human rights violations in Honduras priorhe response indicated that CIA had been investigating allegations of Honduran Government-sponsored human rights abuses.

egations that the tonduran Government was directly involved in human rights violations. The response noted that, prior to the5 receipt of the information regarding ELACH activities, the CIA did not have specific information that linked Honduran officials to death squad activity and had only unsubstantiated allegations of official involvement. This response was signed byJB

HHflHH| on May6 andud^an of

icy

gf SSCI Staff Members Visit Tegucigalpa. An SSCIvisited Honduras from Marchoemberarchemorandum for(MFR)tne visitors that he was

"absolutely certain that4 there had been no murders, kidnappings, or torture of any Honduran leftists."

>aid that he could not guarantee that there was no sharing of information betweenth Battalion and ELACH because of the high level contactsaintained with members of the Honduran Armed Forces. ". ccording to the Ml aid thatth Battalionontinued to conduct surveillance operations against Honduran leftists and that President Azcona had not yet been apprised of the high level contacts ELACH had in the Honduran Government.

he MFR noteduormed the Staff members thatth Battalion had been scheduled to be disbanded in6 and converted to the counterintelligence componentew Honduran intelligence service^BHA'

"iThe MFR also

indicated mat^^HBtold the Staff members that there hadelay, and it was now anticipated thatth Battalion would be disbanded in March or

(TJ) Recollections of Relevant Personnel

tffj Headquarters Personnel.

notes in anetter that, during the period under

"and all

50S.

recalls that ELACH was not an issue that Casey wouia nave concerned himself with, nor would he have raised it as an1 es tliat, while there were conversations of Casey's to whichnotiscussion of ELACH would not have been one of them..

s that then-DDO Claire George, ever heard of

follow-up action that is referred to in Casey'setter to the HPSCI and SSCI could easily have been forgotten because of more important issues. The focus at the time, according to

never mentioned ELACH, nor ha ELACH.

being fully committed to keeping the oversight committees well informed of CIA actiYities^Fiersalso^

g"^jj|jJKcpea t

congress lona

interest in human rights issues and abuses' says that Fiers asked him personally to address the human issi

to report on human rights violations, that no information would be reporte ELACH smcfl fliad no information

were tasked routinely lieves it was not unusual bout

to report, i

l"*ggcahat Contra-related issues were discussed^jj JfeliflflflMM*l flbut he docs not recall discuss ine ELACH inetting,

loes not recall being informed at the time that CIA had notified the Congress of the existence of ELACH and had promised to follow-up on the issue.

to verify information on ELACH.ielieve that ELACH was so s*

'ould be ignorant of

' ' would

iaveosition to know whether ELACH existed had never heard of it.A fltiuesLions whether ELACH ever existet

pWwsavs that thereonstant and pervasive requirement to

collect information regarding human rights abuse:

172

recalls

and its importance to the oversight committees and CIA. He saysj that the Embassy was required to report on human rights abust

CONCLUSION

rovide conflicting statements regarding

FATE OF CARNEY TO THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE NTELLIGENCE AND THE CIA ?

st

nd that which he provided to the HPSCI Staff members inlie specific discrepancies,0 ^e

regarding them, are as follows:

ecords do not indicate thatj attributed any statements regarding Father Carney's fate to

HPSCI Statement^TheflHJ^ecord indicates that stated that^^fl djpiad said that the priest was dead when found by the Hondurans.

IG Statement^ Hps aysnot

say that he pefsoWfly had found trie priest" but only that the priest had died of malnutrition.

jtatemen^AccorcUngecordsM gpid

former member oftlie

Honduran Special Forces Unit that participated in searching for the guerrilla band with which Father Camey entered Honduras, claimed that he had been present when the priest was found dead and decomposedammock in the jungle and that he placed the skull of the priest into his backpack.

HPSCI Statement The J ^indicates that said Lha: B| imed that the Honduran troops carried the priest's headnapsack.

IG Statement. || folates thatj| ^claimed to

have placed the skull of the priest into his own backpack-

tStatement. According toMfl-eco rdsJ| Qsai

tliataH Bl: iad provided him with information56 regarding the fate of the insurgents duringonduran military operation to locate the group

eportedly said Uiat^JJ^^zlaimed that he was aware that captured prisoners had been pushed from helicopters as part of the interrogation/in timid ation campaign against the guerrillas.

HPSCI Statement Thepi^cord indicates that' said that he had heard rumors5 from junior Honduran irulitary officials that some guerrillas were thrown from helicopters during the Olancho operation.

mer.L^ HJ^tntes that rumors of peopleout of helicopters were

tates that it was89 that he had heard street rumors that the Hondurans may have thrown individuals outelicopters to their deaths. He statesever mentioned anything about this to him.

he record of

statements to the House Permanent Select Committee on _itelligence and the record ot^HHHII^tatements toflHHUHl

contain slight discrepancies. However, none of the discrepancies appear to be significant.

19o

Possiblenterrogations.

Bf HWG Finding: The Honajui

received an allegation tha

pricingave been

presentostile Honduran interrogation ofa prisoner. On behalfpf the HWG, investigators froi

BBk"ll(- denied that he had

everTppn present during any interrogation, hostile or otherwise, .

conducted

G Finding:

to substantiate the allegation tha

-was presentostile interrogation or participated in torturerisoner

Failure to Notify Congress of Significant Developments.

HWGhe Honduras Working Group found6 letter from DCI Casey informed Congress of his commitment to investigate fully any additional informatiori the CIA" received regarding ELACH, the right-wing paramilitary organization that was allegedly implicated along with Honduran officials in death squad activities. The Honduras Working Group noted that,*

failed to provide additional formation on ELACH and failed toisiting SSCI Staff delegation in6 oi

i*Gadditional information on ELACH

none could provide additionalsay

thatconfirm the

alleged existence of ELaCH. Information regarding the alleged existence of ELACH and the identities of its members was reported!

InCI Casey informed the SSCI and the HPSCI by letterj-hat CIA would investigate fully

additional information

impossible6 Lhat^H

inding: The Honduras Working Group concluded Lhat Headquarters managers failed to devote sufficient attention to routine support activities

(d) Potential politicization by die Directorate of Intelligence (DI)4 in that DI analysts allegedly revised their judgmentemorandum to Congress

<e) Potential politicization by the DI8I

manager allegedly told subordinates that he was reluctant to disparage the Honduran Government in an intelligence report:

wo issues identified by the Honduras Working Group relating to alleged politicization of DI analysis be investigated by the IG.

".IA EMPLOYEE

PRESENT DURING SESSIONS OF HOSTILE LNTERROGATJoN OR TORTURE IN

Honduras?

c^videncehas been found to substantiate the aUegatiohHfr

employee was present during sessions of hosbUe inTerrogationin

.

Reyes Mata and Faarise*toCIAMpvAS responsible forMata and his insurgents^ossfbly including

produced timely and substantial intelligence on the

Olancho Operation, mcluding relevant information regardingand

An

dicated that

^^aid tliat prisoners captured duringlancho,Uperatipn had been executed by Honduran Army officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed. The executions reportedly were initiated after tlie "field commander" in OlahchcH-not otherwise identified-received ah order, fro^ri the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search andn

?0y

(indicatedxoniiJtried the

earlier report and added that Reyes Malagas heldouple of days before being executed. Neither of these reports contained the identities of the alleged executioners or any information regarding the fate of Camey.

Despite these efforts, however, the precise fate of Carney remains unknown lo CIA-

railed to document the specific identities ofHr^ujding "the fieldwho'wer^'referred to in th'etwd

also failed to

Thus, theJ|Pg-eports that implicated "the field commander" mprjscinexexecutipns did notcontain any reference t

ml

identify "the field commander

the identities of the Honduran Army ofricerslvho were referred to in the two3eports as having been involved in prisoner executions-

-Thus, the two AOG reports that wereAgency in3 andne of those implicated in

the executions were not retrievable by CIA.

attention of Headquarters"9 file review

id not come to the ersonnel who conducted the

209

ione could provide additional information.

Furthermore,^ conni*m

the alleged existence of ELACH.

IA employee provide conflicting

STATEMENTS REGARDING THE FATE OF FATHER CARNEY TO THE HOUSE

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the CIA ?

The record ol

statements to tlie House Permanent Select Committee ontheto the Office of Personnel

Security contain rsugntTuscrepancies. However, none of thediscrepancies appear to be significant

RECOMMENDATIONS

U) The fmdings of this Report of Investigation should be reviewed in any individual accountability deterrxiinations that are to be considered on the basis of the Honduras Working Group (HWG)

fm dings.

U) As recommended by the Inspector General on, the Directorate of Intelligence Ombudsman for Politicization should be instructed by the Executive Director to review the two potential politicization issues that were identified by the HWG.

P. Hitz Inspector General

i

ANNEX

(TJ) Additional CIA Reporting Regarding the Olancho Operation

ntelligence Reporteeting was held in Mexico City in late3 thatttended by representatives of various Honduran leftistroups. The PRTCH was represented by Reyes Mata. Thegreed to form the Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) and to

begin implementation of the initial phase of rural guerrillahe groups were in the process of studying potential targets within

Honduras.- :

2

Honduras from Nicaragua3 afterin Cuba. The leader of line groupolitical officerrespectively, as Reyes Mata and "Father Faustoashe guerrillas had planned to consolidateguerrilla fronts and recruit new members untilorhis group was one of fourall of which were to be unified under the command of.

;_the Cordillera Entre Rios area was planned. Theffort was to confirm that the guerrillas, who had mfiltrated from Nicaragua, were estabUshing base camps in Honduras.

ational Intelligence Daily.in an item published in the National Intelligence DailyCuban-trained insurgents were present near the Patuca RiverOlancho Department and planned to begin unspecifiedinommentary noted thatwere following through on their threat toactivities against Honduras. The difficult terraintoactor in the outcome of the coun terms ; .

Honduran Armed Forces intended tbweep operation against the guerrilla force affiliated with the PRTCH. The operation was planned to begin onue to the difficult terrain, it was predicted that the operation could lastays.

lUgust lo Honduran television program that Hocumentea tne history of the PRTCH guerrillas who deserted. During the show, the guerrillas talked about their recruitment, trairung in Cuba and return to Honduras via Nicaragua for subversive puroo;

organizational structure of the PRTCH in Honduras as provided by guerrillas who deserted. The PRTCH consisted of four major commands that were broken down into various sub-command centers that were further broken down into operational cells. The PRTCHs Central Command was located in Tegucigalpa and was divided into three sub-commands.

ie Honauran

uicu rorces were prepared to continue patrolling* the area where die guenillas were believed to be operating

ieven guerrillas had turned themselves in to the londuran Army in Olancho. These individuals complained about having been recruited by the PRTCH under false pretenses and the lack of food and supplies.

uerrillas had turned themselves inonduran authorities and it was believed that others had deserted. Deserters advised that one of their officers had been executedellow insurgent officer for defeatist statements and at least two members of this group had died of starvation.

ational Intelligence Daily. CIA reported in an item in the National Intelligence Daily that the Hondurans had captured several guerrillas who all advised that they had been trained in Nicaragua and Cuba.ommentary, it was

SECflET

noted lhal the apparent attempt by Cuba and Nicaragua to start an msurgency in Honduras was doing poorly. Tho remauung guerrillas were beUeved to pose little threat to the internal security of Honduras, although it was believed that the Sandinistas were likely to continue sending trained insurgents into the country to put pressure on the government.

ie Monciuran authorities should do with the guerrilla deserters once they had been debriefed and he noted that some of the deserters were sincere although some had turned themselves in because of

BII^SB^ecominei'dgd that the

Honduran Government treat all members of the group aswhile giving them dothing, food and shelter in abut would be under

observeg^ecommended that the deserters be allowed visits by their families

advised that Camp at Zamorano.l

21.

the deserters would be sent to the Artillei

licated that

lOvernment understood the importance of treating the captured guerrillas well. However, the Honduran Government also realized that some members of the groupounterintelligence problem and could not be monitored if all members were released immediatdy. On the other hand, some of the deserters appeared to be genuinely hostile to the Nicaraguan and Cuban Governments for the deception reportedly used to recruit them into the insurgency.

l&flfa

Withouteapon, the [onduran Army reportedly had takennsurgents into custody. The insurgents, suffering from malnutrition, disease and low morale, continued to desert and surrender to the Army.

lelieved that there were three reasons for the Honduran Army's success in the counterinsurgent operation. First, the Army responded before the guerrillas were able to consolidate. Second, the Army won over the dvilian population that had originally been sympathetic toward the insurgents. Third, the Army treated the prisoners humanely-evacuating them to Nueva Palestina where they were fed, provided medical treatment, debriefed, and then taken to Tegudgalpa. These factors had encouraged others to desert.

PRTCH guerrilla by Honduran authorities. The guerrilla was taken into custodyrewonduran helicopter that was resupplying counter insurgent forces in Olancho Department. He reportedly stated that he joined the gToup because the recruiter promised him training in accounting and was subsequenUy told that die school was in Nicaragua. When he arrived there, he was informed that he would receive political and military training in Cuba. He spent one year and six months in Cuba being trainedlatoon leader before being infiltrated into Honduras.

SEOftT

f The guerrilla also reportedly indicated that the group's leader was Reyes Mata and that its mission was to recruit and train sympathizers before conducting raids on Honduran military installations. He believed that the principal reason for the group's failure to accomplish its mission was its early discovery before it could consolidate its position in the countryside. Additional guerrillas were reportedly waiting in Nicaragua to be infiltrated.

)ncerrang

londiudrRomtenhsurgent activity near El Aguacate Airfield.member insurgent group reportedlyngaged Honduran troops on the outskirts of the village of Rion tius first actual military engagement of theperation, one guerrilla reportedly was killed.

:_insurgents were armed6 rifles that were dean and

. mamtained/farigues'uba, and

. junglevledical

any 'of th'e^renadeswere armed with fusesero or one second delay

indicated on the detonators. The captured guerrillas stated theyot aware of the timing capabiiity.and would have injured themselves ifeen used!

3 Exclusive Intelligence Report^communication had been received by theSandinistas from tine PRTCH guerrillas in Olancho Department. One message reflected that Reyes Mata had ordered the executionieutenant for aUowing-the defection of subordinates. In another message, Reyes Mata asserted that the members of his group who were being held by the Honduran Army were not deserters, but a econnaissance platoon that had been captured. Several messages complained about the lack of logistical support to the group.

sf-oPet

"35

ational Intelligence Daily. CIA reported in an item in the Nahoh^TnteUigence Daily that.the "Si-Honduran* Army.was mopping up remnants of the insurgent .groupV.Vand that Reyes Mata had 'died in'a battled Operations against the insurgents were continuing and the Hondurans planned to follow-upivic actionomment stated that the success of the counterinsurgent operation was attributed toffectiveness of the Honduran Army and the ineptitude ofuerrillas. The decimation of the group and death of Reyes Mata,apable guerrilla leader, were envisioned as possibly prompting the Sandinistas to reevaluate their efforts to promote an active insurgency in Honduras.

12

Honduran leftist extremist organizations had been relatively inactive. One exception was the PRTCH insurgency'in Olancho Department that was quickly neutralized by the Honduran Armed Forces. As of

PCH leader reportedly had counseled Reyes Mata against the operation during its planning stages. Reyes Mata replied dial he could not back out as he was under too much pressure from the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and that he believed the time was right, especially with the presence of. troops in Honduras.

Original document.

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