REPORT OF INVESTIGATION; INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CIA REGARDING THE 1985 ATTACK

Created: 9/18/1996

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

Report of Investigation

AVAILABLE TO CIA REGARDING5 ATTACK. MARINES IN THE ZONAIG)

September

P. Ilitz Inspector General

A. li. Cinquegrana Deputy Inspector General for Investigations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

GLOSSARY OF INDIVIDUALS

PROCEDURES AND

ISSUES

Investigation and Prosecution of

table: identtttes and rolesin the zona rosa

chronology of significant

Government Relationship with Anyone Known

or Suspected of Involvement ln the Zona Rosa

into the Untied States by Anyone Knownof Involvement ln the Zona Rosa

chronology: events relating to

pedro antonio andrade

Murders

. AND SALVADORAN ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE

GLOSSARY OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Martinez, Pedro Antonio

PRTC membereader of the PRTC urban commandos. Believed by some to be the planner of the Zona Rosa attack. He used the aliases "Mario" and "Mario Gonzalez."

vara do Martinez, Maria Elba

A PRTC member and keeperaiehouse usedeeting place by the urban commandos.

Ramirez, Americo Mauro

General of the Communist Party of El Salvador. His alias was "Comandantee was also known within the insurgency as Mario Americo Duran.

Rivas, Jose Antonio Participant in the Zona Rosa attack.

His alias was "Macias."

Cruz, Mardoquco

America Joint Intelligence Team; part of. Defense Intelligence Agency.

PRTC guerrilla killedun battle with security forces on. The PRTC group that carried out the Zona Rosa attack was named for rum.

of Central Intelligence.

DGOE DIA

Diaz, Nidia

Dimas Aguilar, Ismael

Dimas Aguilar, Jose Abraham

DNI

DoD DoJ

Duarle, Inez

Duarte, Jose Napoleon Duran, Mario Americo

Cuba's General Directorate of Special Operations.

U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

The alias of Maria Martha Concepcion Valladarea Mendoza deilitary commander and member of the Central Committee of the PRTC. She was captured on, alongarge number of PRTC documents.

PRTC member who led the unit that committed the Zona Rosa murders. His alias was "Ulises."

PRTC member who provided support to Zona Rosa perpetrators.

El Salvador's Directorate of National Intelligence.

Department of Defense.

Department of Justice.

Daughter of President Jose Napoleon Duarte.

President of El.

Sub-Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador. His alias was "Comandantee also identified himself as Americo Mauro Araujo Ramirez.

Estado Mayor farlp

farn

fmln

gallardo, fernando

garcia melendez, juan miguel

gonzalez, mario

jovel urquiua, francisco alberto

el salvador's armed forces joint general staff.

revolutionary armed forces for popular liberation, the military arm of the prtc.

fuerzas armadas de resistencia national, an insurgent group within the fmln.

farabundo marti national liberation front, an organization of guerrilla groups engaged in civil war against the salvadoran government.

aliasrtc leader who claimed responsibility for the zona rosa attack. it may be an alias for "walter"ame used to represent the urban commandos in public statements.

a prtc member who was apprehended by the us. border patrol and volunteered information on the zona rosa attack.

the alias of pedro antonio andrade martinez, prtc membereader of the prtc urban commandos.

secretary general of the prtc; commander of its military wing, the farlp; member of the fmln joint general command. he used the alias "roberto roca."

Lemus Figueroa, Jose Antonio

Lopez Alvarenga, Jose Mario

Lopez Nuila, Carlos Reynaldo

Mario, also Mario Gonzalez

Masferrer Valladares, Jose Anibal

Melgar, Jose Manuel

MLP

Morales Lucero, Juan Antonio

Alias of Jose Roberto Salazararticipant in the Zona Rosa attack. He was shot in the attack and died of his wounds. True name was possibly Jose Roberto Salazar Mendoza or Jose Roberto Torres Ortiz.

A PRTC member who was erroneously identified as "Walter."

PRTC Political Commission member.

El Salvador's Vice Minister of Public Security.

The alias of Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, PRTC membereader of the PRTC urban commandos.

A member of the PRTC Metropolitan Front.

PRTC leader in charge of the Central Front. His alias was "Rogelio Martinez."

Popular Liberationasas organization composed of sympathizers of the PRTC.

A participant in the Zona Rosa attack. He provided security from the backruck. His alias wase may also have used the alias "Pepe."

OGC

Office of General Counsel.

Mena, Axel Armando

Military and Political Commander and full member of the PRTC Central Committee. He divulged information leading to the capture of Andrade.

Romeo Gilberto

US. citizen and PRTC member who used the alias "Gerardo Zelaya."

PRTC

Rivas Bolanos, Wilian Celio

aliasarticipant in the Zona Rosa attack. There is no firm identification of his true name. He might be Juan Antonio Morales Lucero, who also used the alias "Ruperto.'

Central American Revolutionary Workers Party, the insurgent group responsible for the Zona Rosa attack.

PRTC member and self-confessed participant in the Zona Rosa attack. His alias was "William."

Emerson

commander of the Central Front of the PRTC. His alias was "Camilo Turcios."

Valladares, Ana Conception "Connie"

Rodriguez Guardado, Pedro Vladimir

wife.

A PRTC member who hid the weapons used in the Zona Rosa attack. His alias wase is the son of Pedro Rodriguez, alias "Raul."

Rodriguez, Pedro

Salazar Mendoza, Jose Roberto

SSCI

SIU

Torres Ortiz, Jose Roberto Ulises

Valladarea Mendoza de Lemus, Maria Martha Conception

Walter

Zelaya, Gerardo

PRTC member who helped hide the weapons used in the Zona Rosa attack. His alias wasis son, who collaborated with him, is Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado.

Possible true name of aliasarticipant in the Zona Rosa attack. He was wounded in the attack and died.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

El Salvador's Special Investigative Unit.

Possible true name ofarticipant in the Zona Rosa attack.

The alias of Ismael Dimas Aguilar, on-site leader of the unit responsible for the Zona Rosa attack.

A military commander and member of the Central Committee of the PRTC. She was captured onarge number of PRTC documents. Her alias was "Nidia Diaz."

The aliasarticipant in the Zona Rosa attack who led the security squad of the unit that did the killings.

Alias of Romeo GUberto. citizen and PRTC member.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

Rlport of Investigation

INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CIA REGARDING5 ATTACK. MARINES IN THE ZONAIG)

% INTRODUCTION

(U) On2 people were murdered by members of an insurgent group at an outdoor restaurant in the Zona Rosa section of San Salvador, El Salvador. Four of the victims were members of. Embassy Marine Security Guard, two. businessmen and six were Latin American civilians. They were slain by members of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Partyne of the guerrilla groups engagedivil war againstbacked Salvadoran Government.

(U) The Zona Rosa attack was one subject0 Minutes television broadcast aired on. The program contained an interview with Gilberto Osorio, an admitted member of the PRTC. Osorio referred to guerrilla involvement in the killings of the. Marines, and stated, "We madeoint to target some American servicemen in order tooint to Congress and to have themecond look about what was goinghe

inutes interviewer stated that Osorio helped plan the killings. However, from the context, it was uncertain whether Osorio meant

that he participated directly in the decision or that the PRTC. as an organization to which he belonged, made the decision Jo engage in the terrorist action.

onth after theinutes broadcast, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John Deutcheport of his firstays in office to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligencet that time, he was questioned about Osorio's presence in the United States and whether the former guerrilla had any dealings with the CIA. DCI Deutch was also asked about an5 retaliatory attackalvadoran guerrilla encampment during whichnsurgents were killed. Army Rangers. DCI Deutch promised to gather information and report back to the SSCI.

(U) Subsequently, CIA officers arranged to brief the SSCI onegarding these and other questions relating to the Zona Rosa attack. They reported that CIA had no intelligence linking Osorio to the killings, but they did provide information relating to another insurgent, Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez. Andrade was thought by some to be the planner of the murders and was paroled into the United Statesn addition, onIA provided written responses touestions from the SSCI about Osorio and the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack.

(U) On, the SSCI requested that DCI Deutch ask the CIA Inspector General to investigate the facts surrounding5 terrorist killings of the six Americans in El Salvador. Similar requests were made of the Inspectors General at the Department of Justiceepartment of Defensend State Department.

BACKGROUND

U) The Civil War in Eleries of repressive military governments held power in FJ Salvador for overears, beginning in. Throughout, the gap between the landless populationmall landed elite continued to widen as

wealthy citizens became more willing to use force to defend their privileges. The peasants, spurred on by religious teachings on social Justice, increasingly organized to demand change. Death squads, composed of former and active-duty military personnel, emerged to root out subversives. Clashes between the rival groups dramatically increased the incidence of assassinations and moreitizens were killed9 alone. Leftist guerrilla groups contributed to the violence by accelerating involvement in assassinations, kidnappings and bombings.

(U) Political polarization and violence intensified in theven as attempts were made to implement governmenteries of reform-minded juntas that came to power in9 were thwarted by both the right, which resisted liberalization, and by the left, which decided to forego cooperation in favor of revolutionary struggle. The left was composed mainly of five armed guerrilla groups loosely organized under an umbrella organization, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Frontne of the smallest, but more violent, of these groups was the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC, from the Spanish name Partido Rroolucionarios de Trabajattores CentroSee box on following page for more information regarding the PRTC)

(U) Even though there was limited support for the guerrillas among the general population, the FMLN maintained international support, retained military strongholds and engagedrotracted conflict marked by economic sabotage. During, FMLN influence expanded throughout the rural areas.

(U) Until the end of, civil war continued alongside the strengthening of the democratic electoral process. Salvadorans voted five times28 for president, legislators and other offices despite ongoing political violence. By the end of, insurgent leaders increasingly became interested in legitimate political activity becauseerceived improvement in the political climate.

PRTC

(U) The PRTC was officially formed6rotskyist regional party with branches throughout Central America, However, the PRTC shed all vestiges of Trotskyism by thendarxist-Leninist ideology. The PRTC organized along classic Leninist lines of parallel political, military and mass organizations. In Spanish, this latter group of sympathizers and support elements was called masas. The PRTC was the political arm, with key leaders in the military and masas organizations; the Revolutionary Armed Forces for Popular Liberation (FARLP) was the military arm; and the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) formed the masas organization. The PRTC and FARLP were further divided into three organizational echelons: directive, intermediate, and cell.

(U) Prior to0 admission into the FMLN, the PRTC, unlike the other FMLN factions, was attempting actively to organize armed insurgent movements throughout Central America rather than just in El Salvador. The PRTC officially renounced its claims to regional subversion upon joining the FMLN. However, it retained branches of its masas arm in Costa Rica and Honduras.

PRTC was the smallest of the five factions that made up the FMLN.exact size of the PRTC's components was never known by outside observers with any great7 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimate put the number of armed combatant$dHBH Tne number of supporters or sympathizersuch more nebulous figure, probablv even to

jffe The number of combatants was larger prior to the Zona Rosabecause of increased pressure by the Salvadoran military, thereto the same DIAin combatant

strength through military action and desertions.

(U) The PRTC combatants were armedariety of military small arms and explosives. Some of its combat leaders had received guerrilla training in Cuba or other Soviet Bloc countries.

(U) The conflict between insurgent and government forces cameead during the latter halfhe rebels refrained from attacking polling places during the elections, but they blacked out San Salvador andercent of the country by attacks on the power grid and generator plants andransportation shutdown. Inhe rebels launched their last major offensive, reaching the capital city of San Salvador itself. The righting resultedtalemate that forced both the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN to respond favorablyegotiated settlement.

(U) Talks mediated by the United Nations beganulminating in the Chapultepec Peace Accord ofhe accords calledease-fire and set forth numerous demands, including an independent investigation of human rights abuses committed by both sides during the war. To date, progress in the implementation of constitutional, judicial and economic reforms has been excellent and former adversaries are using the political system to resolve their differences.

(U) The Zona Rosa Attack. On, gunmen dressed in camouflage dothing opened firerowd at an outdoor cafeesidential area of San Salvador, killing. and six Latin American citizens. The victims were sitting at three outdoor cafes when the gunmen drove upickup truck and opened. Marines sittingidewalk table in front of Chili's restaurant were specifically targeted in the attack. Four Marines were killed and two others escaped as the attackers sprayed gunfire at patrons in Chili's and the adjacent Flash Back and Mediteranee cafes. The gunmen escaped by truck, carrying one of their wounded comrades with them.

(U) Within minutes of the attack, officials from. Embassy, who had been called by Americans at the scene, arrived and transported the four Marinesocal hospital. One died at the scene, two others enroute to the hospital, and one shortly after reaching the hospital. The Marines were:

Sgt. Bobby Joe Dickson,uscaloosa, Alabama;

Sgt. Thomas Taschner Handwork,ayton, Ohio;

Cpl. Patrick Robert Kwiatkowski,ausau, Wisconsin; and

Cpl. Gregory Howard Weber,incinnati, Ohio.

The Marines were examined by the medical examiner at the Diagnostic and Emergency Hospital in San Salvador within hours after the attack. The cause of death in each case was multiple bullet wounds.

(U) Approximately one hour after theuerrilla with bullet wounds in his back was lefted Cross station by unidentified men who claimed to be members of the FMLN. The wounded man was takened Cross employee to the Rosales Hospital where he died that night.

(U) Eight other people died and six were wounded in the Zona Rosa attack. The dead were:

George Viney,iami, Florida, employed by WANG Corporation;

Robert Alvidrez,exington, Massachusetts, employed by WANG Corporation;

Oswaldo Gonzalez Zambroni, Guatemala;

Richard Ernest Macardle, Chile;

Humberto Antonio Gonzalez Pineda, El Salvador;

Arturo Alonso Silva Hoffs, El Salvador;

Jose Elder Vidal Penalva, El Salvador; and

Umberto Saenz Cevallos, El Salvador.

The bodies of the Marines were transported toHospital in Panama and prepared for burial. On Junewere taken by military aircraft to Andrews Air Force BaseReagan met the plane. At the tarmac ceremony,the familv members:

They say the men who murdered these sons of America escaped, disappeared into the dry streets.ledge to you today, they will not evade justice on earth any more than they can escape the judgment of God. We and the Salvadoran leaders will move any mountain and ford any river to find the jackals and bring them and their colleagues in terror to justice.

(U) Onublic statement by President Reagan ordered the State Department, DoD. intelligence agencies to provide the Government of El Salvador with whatever assistance was necessary to find and punish the terrorists who perpetrated the attack-

(U) Two days after the attack, the PRTC claimed responsibility for the killings.ommunique issued over clandestine radio onuerrilla leadermall group within the PRTC, the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos, carried out the "annihilation attack" on the Americans. The commandos were named for PRTC member Mardoqueo Cruz who died onun battle with public security forces. Terrorist activities of the group in the metropolitan area had begun in4 and were limited mainly to dynamiting basic services such as electricity, transportation and communications, and attacks on police and business vehicles. The commandos were organized in three groups, orf five members each.

t was FMLN policy that Salvadoran. military personnel were considered legitimate targets only when at military sites. This policy excluded injury to civilians or actions at any non-military sites.ate5 intelligenceanking official within another FMLN faction is cited as saying that the Junettack had been planned and carried out by PRTC members without previous coordination with the FMLN. Once it was carried out, however, FMLN leaders had no choice but to express support for the attack in order tonified front within FMLN ranks.

U) Onalvadoran citizen Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez was caught by the US. Border Patrol as he crossed

the border illegally into the United Slates near San Diego, California. Garcia volunteered to the Border Patrol that he had information about the slaying of. Marines in San Salvador, and he provided details of the attack in hopes of0 reward that had been offered by. Government for information regarding the Zona Rosa attack. He named other PRTC members and told authorities about two safehouses where the commandos met regularly. One was an upholstery shop and the other was an auto repair shop. Garcia was returned to El Salvador on Augustnd was arrested by the Treasury Police. He was later identifiedember of the PRTC's Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos.

(U) Acting on the information provided by Garcia, on, the Salvadoran National Guard arrested Wilian Celios Rivas Bolanos at the upholstery shop and Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar at the auto repairifth member of the commandos, Ismael Dimas Aguilar, fled as police approached his house.

ixth guerrilla was arrested onor assisting the PRTC by hiding weapons used in the Zona Rosa attack. Pedro VTacUmir Rodriguez Guardado and his father, Pedro Rodriguez, cached guns, grenades, rocket launchers, and ammunition for the commandos in barrels buried in the yard around their house. The senior Rodriguez, who was not at home when the National Guard raided the residence, escaped capture, but his son was taken into custody.

(U) Juan Antonio Morales Lucero was identifiedember of the commandos and was taken into custody on

. Jose Antonio Bolanos Rivas and an individual known only by the aliasere identified as additional perpetrators, but they were never arrested. Several guerrillas and other sources

' (Utesult of Cuban advice and for sell protection, insurgents adopted aliases as "warften fellow insurgents would know each other only by their alias Senior members ol insurgent groups tended to have more than one alias. In this report, aliases are noted by the use ol quotation marks.

identified Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, using his alias "Marios head of the three urban commando groups and planner of the Zona Rosa attack.

PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

the DCI forwarded to the Inspector Generalrequest to investigate the Zona Rosa matter in Februaryinvestigators from the Office of Inspector General'sStaff were assigned to the task. An auditorive-week period to assist in tracing financialsenior investigators served as advisors to the teaminvestigation and provided editorial, distributionguidance. The investigation team reviewed CIArelevant documents from the Latin America Division andand Resource Management Staff of theof Operations; the Office of African and Latinof the Directorate of Intelligence; the DCI Secretariat;of Congressional Affairs; the Office of General Counselopen source material provided by the Office ofof the Directorate of Intelligence and the ForeignService of the Directorate of Science andwork was conducted from February through.

ocuments consisting of overof text were reviewed during the course of thepresent and former Agency employeesThis included former Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs ofStation and officers who served at the Station during the

2 (U) Some members of the PRTC ki>rw Andrade only by"Mario' or "Marioheir descriptions usually included background or other information about "Mario" thai was used to identify him as Andrade, an alleged planner of the attack. Although CIA documents contain references to more than one insurgent who used the aliashe only references included in this report are those identifying 'Mario" as the leader of the PRTC urban commandos or by other positions thai Andrade. according to his own admission, held. His true name was not known to Salvadoran authorities until shortly before his captureor the benefit of the reader, the name Andrade. rather than "Mario" or "Mario Gonzalez" has been used throughout this Report, except when quoted from the original material.

, as well as officers who had served at CIA Headquarters in relevant positions during the same periods.

(U) In conjunction with personnel from the DoJ, DoD and State Department Offices of Inspector General, CIA OIG investigators participated in interviews offficials from those departments as well as from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Naturalization Services who served in EI Salvador or in Washington during the pertinent periods and were in positions to provide relevant information. DoD, DoJ and State Department shared their written records with CIA toore complete and accurate reconstruction of the events.

(U) Current and former government officers who were interviewed in connection with this investigation had to depend on their memories of events that happened six toears ago. Most explain that their recall of those events is imperfect, especially in light of the fact thereivil war underway in El Salvador. Because of the lapse of time and faulty memories on many topics, this Report draws heavily on documents prepared as the events happened, both formal reports and informal memorandums. When memories of two or more participants in events appeared to be contradictory, the findings are based on the written record.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The SSCI requested that eight issues regardingRosa attack be addressed by each of the agencies. In anensure that related information is presented together, thetreatedifferent order in this Report. (The page at whichof each issue begins is indicated ins applied to CIA, the SSCI asked that the

IssueWhat information the [CIAJ has on perpetrators/ intellectual authors of the murders and the subsequent investigation into the

IssueWhat action has been taken by officials from [CIA] against the perpetrators/intellectual authors of the

What information [CIA} received from perpetrators! intellectual authors of the

IssueWhat relationship [CIA] had, either before or after the murders, with the perpetratorsjintellectual authors of the murders or other individuals known or suspected to have been

Issuehat role ICIAj has played in the investigation of the murders, and what priority has been placed on the

IssueWhat role [CIA] played in determining whether any of the known or suspected perpetratorsjintellectual authors of the murders, or members of their families, were authorized to travel to or take up residence in the United States, and under what conditions and with what

"In addition, whether or not any wrongdoing, negligence,reach of procedures occurred in allowing known or suspected Zona Rosa perpetratorsiintellectual authors of the murders to enter or remain in the United States, and if so by

"If suspected perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murders are in this country illegally, or without current authorization, what is being done to correct the

IssueWhat dealings, since the murders, [CIA] has had with the Government of El Salvador on this matter, and whether in the course of that relationship the Salvadoran government demonstrated an aggressive effort to identify, prosecute and incarcerate the perpetratorsiintellectual

Issuehat specific action and or information (CIA] now has, or may have provided, regarding any reprisal forjhe Zona Rosa terrorist

FINDINGS

A. Criminal Investigation and Prosecution ofTiiose Involved

Issue: "What information ICIA] has on perpetratorsjintellectual authors of the murders and the subsequent investigation into the matter."*

ose Roberto Salazar Mendoza/Jose Roberto fflSes Ortiz. On, atickup truck drove up to the front of Chili's restaurant in the Zona Rosa section of San Salvador. Marines and other Americans attached to. Embassy frequently met to socialize and dine. Information about the attack was includedalvadoran National Police report to President Duarte, which was disseminated. intelligence report onJulio" and three other men dressed in camouflage shirts and caps and armed6 automatic rifles jumped from the bed of the truck. Following their leader, they opened fire on Marines seatedidewalk table in front of the restaurant. During the initial bursts of gunfire, "Julio" was shot in the back and mortally wounded when he stepped into the line of fire of another guerrilla. When the shooters returned to the vehicle, the leader noticed that "Julio" was missing. The leader returned to the cafe, picked up "Julio" and carried him to the truck.

Most of the information in this section was derived from statements of captured trators Rivas, Garcia, Abraham Dimas, Vladimir Rodriguez, and Morales. Salvadoran security lorces holding the prisoners Interrogated them extensively and shared that information with San Salvador Station. The Station, in rum, prepared intelligence reports based on the data, and, after Headquarters' review, those reports wm disseminated to other US. intelligence consumers.

octor at the Salvadoran Red Cross reported that,. on the same day, three menhite pickup truck arrived at the Red Cross facilityan who hadunshot wound in the back just above thehe men said they were members of the FMLN but did not give their names, and they left their wounded comrade behind. Because of the seriousness of the injury, an employee of the Red Cross transported the guerrilla to Rosales Hospital. There, he was taken into surgery but died before the National Police couldtatement from him. Paraffin tests conducted on the deceased guerrilla were positive, indicating he had recentlyeapon.

(U) The National Police report to President Duarte disclosed that identity papers on the body bore the name of Jose Roberto Salazar Mendoza, ageears. The identity papers had been falsified: the address of residence was non-existent, and there was no record of the mother and father of the individual listed on theolicemanentative identification of the body as that of Jose Roberto Torresormer school mate. Neither Salazar nor Torres was ever identified as the true name of "Julio."

f| An FMLN memberalvadoran security service that "Julio"lose friend of Mardoqueouerrilla who had been killed onattle with public security forces and for whom the urban commandos were named. The attack occurred just one day prior to the second anniversary of Cruz' death, and some have speculated the attack may have been planned in commemoration of the event.

'^BFln/ormarjon from tbe Red Cross was obtainedalvadoran security service and passed noan Salvador Station. It was included in an intelligence report disseminated to the US. intelligence community on.

IDENTITIES AND ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS INA ROSA ATTACK '

true name iinknow-n

rom gunshot wounds suffered in Zona Rosa attack.

Celios Rivas

Bolanos.

alias "William"

, found guilty of subversive associanon. cooperation tn propaganda, acts of terrorism resulting in deaths of several persons: sentenced toears in prison, released5 after servingonth*.

Dimas Aguilar, alias "Ulisus"

led the attack.

apprehended. believed killed in action.

An Ion io Bolanos Rivas,

alias "Maclas*

Xt.

captured, whereabouts unknown

Anionio Morales LucerO,

alias "Ruperto"

cover from back of truck

; charged with subversive association, spreading anarchical propaganda, and planning and carrying out terrorist acts; found not guilty;onth while awaiting trial.

true name unknown

cover from back of truck.

be the same as Jose Antonio Morales Lucero; no further inf.wmabon available.

true name unknown

at Brazilian embassy guard during attack.

apprehended, believed killed in acnon.

Miguel Garcia Melende2

uerrilla meetingid not participate directly in attack.

; found guilty of subversive propaganda, subversive association, and acts in support of terrorism; sentenced toears in prison with subsequent reduction2 years; released3 afteronths.

Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado, alias "Mauncio"

weapons used in attack.

. no further information available.

Rodriguez, alias "Raul"

weapons used in attack.

San Salvador when his house was searched, never apprehended, whereabouts unknown.

Abraham Dimas Aguilar

aluerrilla meeting site, ran errands for commando emu p.

; found guilty of acts in support of terrorism; sentencedears; released2 after serving6 vears 7month$.

Antonio Andrade Martinez, alias "Mano Gonzalez-

of 3orilsoi the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos; believed by some to have been the planner of the attack.

olice detennon unb)arole into the United States in the public interest; resides in New Jersey.

Gilberto Osorio, alias "Gerardo Zelava"

member; no connection to Zona Rosa murders.

dozen; resides in San Francisco, California.

WiUanCclio RivasBolanos, also known asas the ostensible ownerupholstery shop, Tapiceria Estrelta, whicheetinghen the Zona Rosa attack took place, Rivas was

ears old and hadember of the PRTC for four years.

'Most of the information in this section regarding, the Zona Rosa attack is from interrogation statements provided by Rivas to Salvadoran authorities after his arrest. The data was shared with San Salvador Station, and much ol it was provided to. intelligence community in disseminated reports.

lo

(If) Rivas was recruited into the guerrilla group by Ismaei Dimas Aguilarnd they worked together in Cerros de San Pedro for two and one-half years, in the rural areas, Rivas participated in sabotage of transportation on the Pan-American Highway and in clashes with Salvadoran armed forces. He relocated to San Salvador3 toRTC presence in the city where he again worked for Ismaei Dimas. He took part in the sabotage of telephone boxes and lamp posts, attacks on military troop transport vehicles and the takeoveradio station. He was paid the equivalenter month for his work in the PRTC.

(U) On, Ismaei Dimas told Rivaslan was underway to attack some North Americans, but he provided no further details. On the morning ofsmaei Dimas told Rivas the group would carrypecial operation that night and instructed Rivas to meet him at the Cafe'de Don Pedro. Rivas and another commando were picked up by Ismaei Dimas and other group membersoyota truck. Andrade met the group at Don Pedro's, spoke briefly with Ismaei Dimas out of the hearing of the other commandos and then left in his own car. Ismaei Dimas then told the group that .Andrade had said that North Americans were to be the targets, and "they were in the place where they would be massacred."

(U) As they drove to the Zona Rosa, the men donned camouflage shirts, caps and green knapsacks. Each of them also took

a weapon. During the trip, Ismaei Dimas madeivas, Ismaei Dimas, Bolanos, and "Julio" were to do the shooting; "Walter was to target the National Police guard stationed at the Brazilian Embassy across the street from the cafes; and Morales and the unidentified driver were to remain in the truck and provide cover in case the National Police arrived on the scene.7

(U) Upon arriving at the Zona Rosa restaurants, the truck stopped in front of Chili's, and the men jumped out. Ismaei Dimas started firing at the Americans who were sitting closest to the sidewalk. Rivas, Bolanos and "Julio" followed suit. Rivas was less than six meters from the victims when he firedounds at them. "Julio" stepped into Rivas' line of fire and was shot.

(U) After the shooting, the men returned to the truck and fled the area. Once out of the Zona Rosa, they removed their camouflage clothing and left the weapons in the truck. Rivas was dropped offark in the city.

(U) The day after the attack, Rivas went to the Tapiceria Estrella late in the day and found Garcia already at work there. Shortly thereafter, Ismaei Dimas arrived and the two men conferred regarding the previous night's attack. Ismaei Dimas accused Rivas of shooting "Julio" intentionally, saying there was bad blood between them.

* (U) Rivas' testimony about the guerrillas who participated in the attack and their roles changed several times during his imprisonment. The detail in this section is most consistent with information provided by other sources as well.

7 (UI During one of his statements, Rivasda participated in the attack. He later recanted that information, explaining that he had only said Carnaarticipant because the interrogator pressed him on the issue.

ivas continued working at the Tapiceria Estrella until he was arrested by the National Guard on. He was interrogated by local authorities andolygraph examinationIA officer onable from San Salvador Station to CIA Headquarters reported that the test showed that he answered truthfully when he said he had personally participated in the shooting at the Zona Rosa. He showed deception.

however, when responding to questions regarding whether he made inaccurate statements to the police, whether he was withholding information and regarding the others who participated in the attack. Later, Rivas said he did not know who he was supposed to kill-just. officials were the intended targets. He told police he had never before shot defenseless people.

A Salvadoran newspaper described initialagainst the shooter. On, Rivas,had homicide charges pending for the murder ofagents, was remandedilitary judge. The first phasejudicial investigation was completed on, whenjudge found there was legal merit to prosecute Rivas. Theelevated to the Decreeirst Instance Court where militarycases were reviewed and certified for trial.

* <U) In its review of the Zona Rosa attack, Dol attorneys concluded that the vs. Marine* were Internationally protected persons, and, as such, punishment for their murders was covered by. Code"Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons."

officers in San Salvador followed thecloseT^ind reported by cable to Statehat the judge determined the case fell withinof the general amnesty signed by Presidentnder the Esquipulas II Peace Accords betweenGovernment and the FMLN. According toreport prepared by. Government for theTruth Commission, on, ordersfor Rivas' release. When it appeared that he might beU.S. Government began to investigate the possibilityRivas in the United States for the murderprotectedrged by vigorousfrom.alvadoranRivas' release on. Two monthsAppeals Court upheld the lower court decision to grantthe Zona Rosa defendants. The Military Appeals Court sentto President Duarte for review as Commander-in-Chief of the

armed forces. On, however, Duarte overturned the amnesty finding. The basis of Duarte's decision was that the murder of. Marines was covered by the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, which was acceded to by the Salvadoran Government

interagency report further describedcounsel appealed the case to the Supreme Court,he Court ruled that Rivas' case should betried on the basis that he murdered internationallyThe case was remandedilitary court forhe case was moved to the Court of Second Instanceruling on whether civilian or military courts had jurisdiction.was that the military court should hear the case.

(U) Embassy officers who followed the case closely reportedable to the State Department the outcome of Rivas' trial. They reported that onivas was found guilty of subversive association, cooperation in propaganda, and acts of terrorism resulting in the deaths of several persons. For those crimes, he was sentenced to three, two andears in prison, respectively, with the sentences to run consecutively.

outine appeal was filed for the Zona Rosa defendants, but an appeals court judge upheld the conviction and confirmed the sentences inivas petitioned for amnesty under23 amnesty laws, but both petitions were denied.2 petition was elevated again to the Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court's decision to deny amnesty.

Salvadoran .security service notified San Salvador

Station that Rivas remained in prison5ew law pertaining to juvenile offenders was passed in El Salvador limiting the sentenceinor to seven years. The law was applied retroactively, and Rivas, who was onlyears old when the killings were committed, was released iny that time, he had servedearsonths in prison.

(U) Ismael Dimassmael Dimas Aguilai was known to the guerrilla band by his alias,o-conspirators Rivas and Garcia described Ismael Dimas as the leader of the commando group that met at the upholstery shop, and he had recruited some of the cell's members into the PRTC. Although Ismael Dimas did not work at the shop, he stopped by every day to meet with cell members. From4 tosmael Dimas and his men planned and carried out guerrilla operations in San Salvador, including attacks on National Police units and privately owned trucks, the takeover of radio stations, an attempted kidnapping, miningoad, and an unimplemented assassinationovernment official. Ismael Dimas was the planner as wellarticipant in most of those activities.

(U) During his interrogations by the National Guard, Rivas described Ismael Dimas as leader of the cell who was in charge of finances and seemed toreat deal of money available to him. He was also responsible for the weapons used by PRTC members. When not being used for guerrilla activities, the weapons were buried in barrels in the yardouse in San Salvador. Ismael Dimas was responsible for collecting the weapons before operations and returning them afterwards. Three days before the Zona Rosa attack, he picked up6 rifles, two Galil rifles, oneifle, and one machine gun that were used in the operation.

(U) According to the testimony Rivas gave to the National Guard insmael Dimas was the on-site leader of the Zona Rosa attack. He directed the men in his cell and two other cells, led the shooting and claimed credit for the attack over the insurgent radio station. Oneinal planning meeting of the commandos for early evening at an auto repair shop owned by his brother. Later that night, he directed each of the guerrillas to various locations where they were picked upruck. The last stop was the Cafede Don Pedro. Justsmael Dimas spoke privately with Andrade at the Cafe de Don Pedro and received final guidance for the attack.

v Ismaei Dimas gave last minute instructions as he and the men drove to the Zona Rosa. Upon arriving at the^restaurants, Ismaei Dimas jumped out of the truck first and began firing at the Marines. He and another shooter then walked through Chili's and adjacent restaurants firing indiscriminately at other patrons. Finally, Ismaei Dimas gave the order to return to the vehicle. He picked up the woundedeposited him in the truck and they all fled the area.

ccording to unconfirmed information obtained from Garcia on, Ismaei Dimas was one of the men who delivered "Julio" to the Red Cross for medical attention after thehat same night, atsmaei Dimas took the Zona Rosa weaponsouse in Barrio Santa Ana that was useduerrilla meeting place and buried them under the patio. Several weeks later, the guns were transferred by PRTC membersouse in the Colonia Gallegos section of San Salvador where they remained until they were recovered by the police in

(U) Garcia and Rivas told police shortly after their arrests in5 that on the day following the attack, Ismaei Dimas went to the upholstery shop where he discussed details of the attack with Rivas. When Ismaei Dimas questioned Rivas about shootingntimating it was intentional because of bad feelings between thedenied he was responsible. Ismaei Dimas commented, "'Julio' didn't go alone, we also killed the Americans."

(IT) On, Ismaei Dimas was interviewed about the Junettack on Radiolandestine station operated by the FMLN. He said he participated in the operation and criticized the Salvadoran Government for its ineptitude in investigating the attack.

able from San Salvador StationHeadquarters described in detail the Salvadoran Nationalof two members of the Mardoqueo Cruz commandos on

0 (UJ Garcia saidmael Dimas and Andrade transported "Julio" to the Red Cross facility. Accordingoctor at the Red Cross, three men delivered "Julio" for treatment.

ne of them was Ismael Dimas'brother. Under interrogation, he led the authorities to Ismael Dimas' house in the Barrio San Jacinto section of San Salvador. As the National Guard approached the housesmael Dimas escaped out the back door. He was never captured.

alvadoran security service notified San Salvador Station that five days after the police raid at his house, Ismael Dimas' wife and two children moved to the Bethania Refugee Camp at Zaragoza, an establishment controlled by the PRTC. Ismael Dimas was known to have visited his family and attended meetings with FMLN' leaders in the camp during

4fcuthorities learned from Andrade that the Mexican Ambassador to El Salvador had provided asylum to Ismael Dimas in NovemberIsmael Dimas had been hidden in the Mexican embassy and given aid in escaping from San Salvador.

U) In lateRTC informant told local authorities that Ismael Dimas had diedalvadoran Air Force bombing raidRTC camp at the Guazapa Volcano on the evening of. During the following months, three additional reports from PRTC members indicated that Ismael Dimas died in the bombing raid or in an ambush by Salvadoran forces that occurred immediately following the raid.

U) Jose Antonio Bolanoshe fourth shooter in the Zona Rosa attack was Jose Antonio Bolanos Rivas, also known asilian Celio Rivas Bolanos told the National Guard in5 that Bolanos was his cousin, Bolanos was one of the shooters, and they had served together in the PRTC in Cerros de San Pedro before moving to San Salvador to join the Mardoqueo Cruz commandos.

W FBI Headquarters notified State Department in2 that their records showed the Mexican Ambassador admitted he hid Ismael Dimas in the Mexican Embassy shortly alter the Zona Rosa attack.

(U) Bolanos worked in Abraham Dimas' auto repair shop that also servedeeting site for one of the three Mardoqueo Cruz cells. Bolanos joined other PRTC guerrillas in sabotage activities in San Salvador in the months prior to the Zona Rosa attack.

(U) Rivas further reported to the National Guard that on the afternoon ofolanos met at the auto repair shop with the others to coordinate details of the attack. Later that night. Ismael Dimas picked him up in the truck. Bolanos' assignment was to be one of the shooters in the attack. After the initial bursts of gunfire aimed at the Marines, Bolanos and Ismael Dimas walked through the restaurants firing at restaurant patrons who had taken cover during the first ha^of bullets.

RTC member who was captured in6 said at that time Bolanos wasRTC camp on the Guazapa Volcano. No other information was developed about his location, however, and he was never captured.

(U) Juan Antonio Moralesnformation provided to Salvadoran policeaptured member of the PRTC led to the arrest of Juan Antonio Morales Lucero on. After his arrest. Morales, who used the aliasas interrogated by the National Police and described how he joined the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nationaln insurgent group in the FMLN,e was taught toifle and assignedlatoon ofen in the Cerro de Guazapa area. Ine moved to the metropolitan area and gradually lost contact with the FARN insurgents. Ine was recruited by "Walter" to join the PRTC.

fter his arrestS, Morales confessed to the National Police his part as look-out in the Zona Rosa operation. Morales' version of the Zona Rosa attack was includedan Salvador Station cable that was eventually disseminated as an intelligence report on. During the attack, he remained in hire back of the truck to provide cover in case National Police arrived on the scene during the shooting. After the shooting, he was

dropped offark. The following day, he went home to Santa Ana. Apart from the driver, he never again saw the others who were involved in the attack. Fifteen days after the attack, the driver told him that the other perpetrators had gone to the Cerro de Guazapa region.

- < . Government interagency report to the Truth Commission in2 described judicial procedures brought against Morales. He was charged with subversive association, spreading anarchical propaganda, and planning and carrying out terrorist acts that resulted in the deaths of the eight foreigners (six Americans, one Chilean, and one Guatemalan) at the Zonaourt found that he was not eligible for amnesty under1ecause. Marines who died in the attack were persons protected under international law.

(U). Southern Command Weekly Intelligence Digest for3 reported on the outcome of the judicial proceedings. Morales' case was heard onrial that lastedours. He claimed his earlier confession had been coerced by the police and that he had not participated in the attack. Closing arguments were heard. The jury immediately took up deliberations, and just.erdict of not guilty. They were apparently swayed by Morales' relatively low level of involvement, time already served while awaiting trial (five years) and the fact the Salvadoran military personnel who had been accused of murdering several Jesuit priests" had been freed under the amnesty law.

(U) "Pepe'Vpossibly Juan Antonio Morales Luccro. Another insurgent who participated in the shooting was known aseember of "Walter's" cell that met at the auto repair shop. Garcia told the vs. Border Patrol that "Pepe"ame that had frequently been mentioned by Rivas and Ismaei Dimas in the upholstery shop. Garcia once heard Rivas say he thought

U) Onesuit priests, their cook and her daughter were killed near the campus of the University of Central America. At first, the FMLN was blamed. Later, it was discovered Salvadoran military personnel were responsible.

"Pepe" was stupid. However, after the groupational Police truck inivas changed his mindj?ecause "Pepe" proved he was not stupid. Rivas said that, during the Zona Rosa attack, "Pepe" was assigned to remain in the truck with the driver and watch for any National Police vehicles that might respond to the scene.

Eyewitness reports by Garcia. Rjvasartd Abraham Dimas were obtained by Salvadoran authorities soon alter the arrests or those individuals and were forwarded by San Salvador Station to CIA Headquarters in August and5 Information from Morales was reported in cable format by OoD in

(U) It is possible that "Pepe" and Juan Antonio Morales Lucero are the same person. Morales, by his own admission, remained in the truck with the driver during the attack as Rivas and Garcia said "Pepe" had done. Even though Morales admitted his part in the attack, none of the arrested insurgents mentioned the name Morales as one of the perpetrators. This omission would be consistent with their practice of referring to each other by aliases.

(U)ona Rosa perpetrators Garcia and Rivas identified "Walter" as the leader of one of the three cells that made up the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos. His cell included "Julio" and several others who were not involved in the Zona Rosa attack. "Walter" participated in sabotage activities in San Salvador with other PRTC commandos in the months prior to the Zona Rosa, including attacks on National Police trucks.

(U) Four perpetrators identified "Walter"articipant in the Zona Rosa attack, but they could not provide his truehe co-conspirators said "Walter's" assignment was to fire at the policeman who was guarding the Brazilian embassy located directly across the street from the restaurants. This was intended to prevent the police guard from shooting at the guerrillas.

(U) According to the account of the attack Rivas gave when he was interrogated by the National Guard, on the night ofWalter" was already in the truck when it arrived at the Cafe'de Don Pedro to pick up the last terrorists. Upon arriving at the Zona Rosa,

he jumped out of the truck and rued at the Brazilian embassy guard. General indications from witnesses at the scene were that the policeman immediately sought cover and did not emerge until after the shooting stopped. "Walter" fled from the scene with the other attackers in the truck.

(U) After the shooting, policeomposite sketch of "Walter" prepared from eyewitness descriptions. The sketch produced several leads, but they proved to be unproductive.

(U) Early leads in the case led President Duarte and the National Guard to announce at an August press conference that "Walter" could possibly be Jose Antonio Lemus Figueroa. Salvadoran officials subsequently discovered and announced publicly that Jose Antonio Lemus Figueroa, who wasember of the PRTC, had been held in Mariona Prison4 and could not have participated in the Zona Rosa attack.

member who was arrested inalvadoran 5th Brigade Intelligence Unit that "Walter" alsoabas "Fernando Gallardo" and had been at the PRTC camp atVolcano. That same source said "Walter" died inraid onoD reported8 thatMorales told National Police that he had hearddied in combat. No further information became availablefate ofnd authorities had no traces on histhe Zona Rosa attack.

Juan Miguel Garcia Melendez. Juan Miguelfurnished the Treasury Police with details aboutin the PRTC after his arreste became ain0 andombatant in the San Felipede Guazapa regions. He was assigned to work for the PRTCSalvador because his skill as an upholsterer supported the

Information obtained by the Salvadoran military from PRTC member Jose Anibal Masferrer Valladares was shared with San Salvador Stabon and forwarded to CIA Headquarters via cable on Januaryhe disseminated Intelligence report was released on the same day.

pRTC's use of an upholstery shopover for PRTC meetings. He met Ismaei Dimas, Andrade and Rivas when he movecj to the city int the time of the attack, he wasears old.

(U) Garcia claims he did not participate in the Zona Rosa attack and was at home when it occurred. He was cognizant, however, of PRTC activities that were planned at the upholstery shop, and he ran errands for the group. He was present when the insurgents were talking about the Zona Rosa attack, and, on the day following the attack, he overheard Ismaei Dimas and Rivas as they discussed the mission.

onth after the Zona Rosa attack, Garcia says he quit work at the Tapiceria Bstrella because he was afraid of the activities in which Rivas was involved. He traveled to Tijuana, Mexico by truck. From there, he slipped across the border into the United States on Auguste was partarge group of illegal aliens that was apprehended by. Border Patrol near Spring Valley in the vicinity of San Diego, California.

(U) During his detention, Garcia told the Border Patrol he had information concerning the murder. Marines in El Salvador. He was interviewedorder Patrol intelligence agent who passed the information. intelligence services. officials in San Salvador.

(U) Garcia volunteered to return to El Salvador, and he was deported from the United States on. Upon his arrival at the airport in San Salvador, he was arrested by the Salvadoran Treasury Police. Statements Garcia made to Salvadoran authorities differed in many respects from the version he told. Border Patrol, but the main difference was that he told the Salvadorans that he had actually participated in the Zona Rosa attack. When he was asked to reconstruct the events at the scene of the shooting, however, he was not able to do so. Eventually, he said he only told the police that hearticipant after prolonged interrogations during which he was physically abused. He confessed to having fabricated the account of his involvement based on

conversations he overheard of plans for the attack and PRTC members' comments afterwards. Rivas, the shooter, finally agreed that Garcia wasirect participant in the attack- Another informant within the PRTC said that Garcia only served the PRTC by running errands and was not involved directly in the shootings.

U) An Embassy cable to the State Department onescribed progress on Garcia's trial after he was turned over to theourts for prosecution. His case proceeded through the court system together with those ofRivas and Abraham Dimas. After the initial judicial investigation, which lasted six months, the case was remanded to the Decreeirst Instance Court for trial. Garcia's testimony before the judge and confession of his knowledge of the Zona Rosa attack were duly ratified. The case moved slowly because Garcia initially did notefense attorney and there were few judges to hear cases on crimes of terrorism."

f State Department officers at the Embassy determined from sources in the Salvadoran judicial system that Garcia was being considered for release under7 general amnesty law int that time,. Government became involved in determining whether action could be taken against Garcia. courts. He was interviewed by representatives oftate Department and the FBI who traveled to San Salvador in. Government conclusion was that there was not enough evidence to proceed with legal action against Garcia within the United States. President Duarte overturned the amnesty finding of two courts, however, and Garcia remained in prison.

U) Salvadoran judges who heard cases of terrorism or human rights violations were in danger of assassinabon by the supporters or enemies of those bring tried. Consequently, few judges were either available or willing to try such cases.

U) Embassy officers following the case reported by cable to State Department that, inhe case moved to the Salvadoran Supreme Court in an appeal of Duartes decision. The Supreme Court heard the appeal in9 and ordered the

case reopened on the basis of. Marines' status as internationally protected persons. The case was eventually remandedilitary court for trial.

U) Onarcia was found guilty of subversive propaganda, subversive association and acts in support of terrorism. He was sentenced toears in prison. The attorney for the defense appealed the sentence, and it was reduced to seven and one-half years. Garcia completed his jail term and was released in

S3.jb^Pedro Vladimir RodriguezRTC weapons cache was discovered on, when Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado, also known asas arrested. The National Guard raid on Vladimir Rodriguez's house was reported by San Salvador Station in an intelligence report disseminated on. His residence was usedtorage site for PRTC weapons, including those used in the Zona Rosa attack. The weapons were buried in barrels under two feet of soil in the yard of the home that was occupied by Vladimir Rodriguez, his father and younger sister and brother,Rodriguez had been recruited into the PRTC by Ismael Dimas when he wasears old, just two months before the Zona Rosa attack.

Vladimir Rodriguez described to the Nationalfive days before the Zona Rosa attack, Ismael DimasRodriguez to prepare6 rifles, two Galil rifles,rifle, one submachine gun, and two hand grenades toup later. Two days later, Ismael Dimas and Andradethe weapons. That was the last time Vladimir Rodriguez sawmen. The weapons were returned to the house severalby two PRTC members who were not directly involved inRosa attack.

Salvadoran security service reported toStation that, after Vladimir Rodriguez's arrest, he wasthe Mariona Prison and his case was turned overilitary

judge for the initial phase of the investigation. As of, he was still held in prison. No information was provided to CIA after that date regarding his ultimate fate.

<U) Pedroedro Rodriguez, also known asupported PRTC activities by storing weapons at his home in San Salvador. After his arrest, Vladimir Rodriguez, the son of Pedro Rodriguez, described to the National Guard his father's role as an accessory in PRTC activities. Pedro Rodriguez's responsibilities included storing, cleaning and guarding the weapons used in terrorist operations. In exchange, the PRTC paid the rent on the house. Living with Pedro Rodriguez was his son, Vladimir Rodriguez,RTC member, and two younger children who were not cognizant of the guerrilla activities. Either Pedro Rodriguez or his son were at home with the weapons at all times.

(U) Vladimir Rodriguez said "Julio" stayed with the Rodriguezes for several days in5 when he first moved to San Salvador from the Guazapa front. Vladimir Rodriguez further reported that his father dealt with Ismaei Dimas, Andrade and "Walter" when they delivered or picked up weapons for commando operations. When the National Guard raided the house on, the cache of weapons includedifles, shotguns, pistols, and moreounds of ammunition.

(U) Pedro Rodriguez was not at home when the National Guard raided his house. Neighbors reported later that he returned during the raid, saw what was happening, and left the area. Salvadoran authorities failed to discover his whereabouts, and he was never captured.

(U) Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar. Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar was the brother of Ismaei Dimas, and he operated the auto repair shop that was used by one of the commando cellseeting place. According to his statement at an5 press conference sponsored by Salvadoran authorities, Abraham DimasRTC member but wasombatant and did not participate directly in the Zona Rosa attack. He ran the cell that met in his auto repair shop

and assisted the two other cells with support activities. Abraham Dimas knew of plans for the Zona Rosa attack at least five days in advance, and he aided one of the shooters after the attack. He wasears old when the Zona Rosa attack took place.

(U) After he was arrested by the National Guard ont his auto shop, Abraham Dimas led authorities to his brother'sven though Ismaei Dimas was at home when the police arrived, he managed to escape.

(U) State Department included an update of Abraham Dimas' case in its cable to all diplomatic posts inhe cable reported that Abraham Dimas was charged with acts in support of terrorism and was committed to Mariona Prison. The cases of co-conspirators Rivas and Garcia were joined with Abraham Dimas' case, and they passed together through the judicial system. After being moved through several civilian and military courts and after various amnesty appeals were denied, Garcia's case was heardn Maye was found guilty and sentenced to four years in prison. He was released on, after serving six years and seven months.

edro Antonio Andrade MartinezTMariohe CIA Station in San Salvador began to inquire into the connection of Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinez, known by the alias "Marioo the Zona Rosa attack immediately after it occurred. Andrade came under scrutiny because he was the known leader of the PRTC Metropolitannit of which had carried out the attack.

eport ol the National Guard raid wasisseminated intelligence report thai was prepared by San Salvador Station and disseminated on

U) Americo Mauro Araujo Ramirez (who was also known within the insurgency as Mario Americoub-Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador, one of the FMLN factions, was arrested by the National Police inraujo told police that Andrade devised the plan for the Zona Rosa attack without coordinating it with the rest of the FMLN general command.

Araujo met .Andrade frequently in the Zona Rosa, and they noticed that some of the patrons were VS. Embassy Marine security guards. Andrade joked that the Marines wouldood target for an attack.

Garcia only knew Andrade by hi* alias "Mario."

Dunng interrogations with the Treasury Police. Carcia said he paroapated in theit was later determined he was not on the scene. He claimed he made up the story ofbecause he was coerced by the police.

(U) During Garcia's extensive debriefing after his arrest. Border Patrol agents, he described sketchy details of guerrilla operations that he had overheard in thehop. He said the insurgents mentioned Andrade was the commander of several participant cells, Andrade was the "keynd Ismael Dimas had to do everything Andrade asked of him.16

(U) When Garcia was deported to El Salvador and arrested by the Treasury Police, he said that, when he moved to San Salvador. Ismael Dimas had introduced him to Andrade, who was head of several guerrilla cells in the city. According to Garcia, it was Andrade's idea to use an upholstery shopover for PRTC activities. Garcia reported that Ismael Dimas said on Junehat an operation to kill Americans was being planned with Andrade and "Julio" doing the casing.'7

(U) Rivas told police soon after he was arrested in5 that Andrade, who was overall commander of the three squads, ordered Ismael Dimas to undertake the Zona Rosa attack. During subsequent interrogations, Rivas told the National Police that Andrade met the guerrillas at Cafe de Don Pedro on the night of the attack. He arrivedancer model car, talked with Ismael Dimas privately and drove away. Rivas said Andrade was not present during the actual shooting. Abraham Dimas statedress conference arranged by the police in5 that he knew Andrade, "Walter" and Ismael Dimas had been planning an action just prior to the Zona Rosa attack. Vladimir Rodriguez, who maintained the weapons cache for the PRTC, said Andrade and

Ismaei Dimas delivered various rifles, pistols and explosives to him onnd collected some ofew days before the attack.

PRTC finance chief Jose Anibal Masferrerarrested int that time, he said Andrade wentin5 following the Zona Rosa attack.Andrade as Chief of the PRTC Metropolitan Frontauthor of the5 Zona Rosa massacre."Maria Elba Alvarado Martinez, who was arrested byGuard on, livedouse that was usedmembers for meetings and to cache weapons. She rentedon orders from Ismaei Dimas. From February through

he said the house was used frequently for meetings by Andrade,olanos,ivas, and Ismaei Dimas.

According to captured PRTC documentsndrade did not have the full confidencePRTC Centraletter, written in code by theSecretary to other committee members, complainedbehavior and made recommendations toAmong other complaints, the letter listed the following:

Andrade repeatedly threatened to resign from the parry.

Andrade does not have the PRTC's interest at heart.

When all goes smoothly, Andradeood party member, but when there are problems, he flies off the handle.

Andrade acts as an individual ratherarty member and takes personal credit for the work.

Axel Armando Orellana Mena, PRTC MilitaryCommander and PRTC Central Committee member,on, and voluntarily providedPRTC operations and members to Salvadoraninformation led to the capture of seven insurgentsof weapons and explosive materials. He said theattack was planned and executed by Andrade. Accordinghis information about Zona Rosa came from ahimself prepared. Orellana surmised that Andrade's motive

for the attack was the major role of the United States in the Salvadoran civil war. Orellana believed Ismaei Dimas^surveilled the Marines and designed the basic attacklan that Andrade refined. Orellana further reported that, immediately after the attack, Andrade helped the perpetrators escape the country. Andrade then fled to Mexico where he stayed for about one year. Orellana's information led to Andrade's capture by the Salvadorans on.

Plmmediateiy after Andrade's capture by the National Police, he stated that he would not talk unless three conditions were met:

His capture was to be publicized;

His family's safety and safe conduct to the United States were to be guaranteed; and

He was to be permitted to talkepresentative of. Government.

The CIA Station in San Salvador speculated that the last condition was levied because Andrade wanted to divulge information about FMLN activities but feared the National Police was infiltrated by FMLN members or because he wanted toeal. officials over his case. When subsequently pressed by Salvadoran police regarding precisely why he wished to talk. Government representative, Andrade said this was no longer necessary.

U) When Andrade was arrested, his wife and children were also taken into custody. This was consistent with Salvadoran practice. In exchange for their freedom, on, Andrade led Salvadoran troops to the largest weapons cache ever captured in the history of the insurgency. At three different sites in San Salvador, policeotalifles, explosives and one-half million rounds of ammunition. Andrade claimed he would pass along equally important intelligence information, but he wanted guarantees from the Salvadoran Government that he would not be put on trial in the United States.

(U) Andrade's version was that he was one.of four PRTC members who planned the Zona Rosa attack. He identified Jose Manuel Melgar, PRTC Political Commission member, as the primary organizer of the plan. Melgar went to San Salvador from Guazapa in5 and began directing activity of the Mardoqueo Cruz cells. The Zona Rosa attack was Melgar's idea, said Andrade. Melgar collected information for the attack, including data on the Marines; coordinated with other perpetrators; and designed each team's tasks. Emerson Rivas, PRTC Political Commission member, was to obtain the weapons and set up the routes to and from the Zona Rosa. Ismael Dimas handled the operational planning and directed the attack itself. Andrade was assigned the responsibility for arranging support bases and contingent medical care.

(U) According to Andrade, he met with Ismael Dimas on Junernd discussed security arrangements and the problems they were having in obtaining medical support. Ismael Dimas told Andrade that the safehouse arrangements had been taken care of, but there was still no medical support, and this aspect was vital because they wereignificant confrontation. According to Andrade, Ismael Dimas still did not tell Andrade any details of the operation being planned. Melgar met with Andrade on Juneo discuss the need for medical services and directed him to meet with Ismael Dimas later that day. Andrade went to the Caje'de Don Pedro0. There, he met Ismael Dimas and told him he had not been able to acquire medical services for the group. Andrade claimed he still did not know about the operation that took place later that night.

(U) In addition to the four planners, Andrade named three men who actually took part in the attack: Ismael Dimas (whom he referred to by the alias "Cesarn alias not known to other PRTCJulio" and Misael Cruz. Misael Cruz may have been another alias forll three of these men had died before Andrade was arrested. He did not mention any participation by the five individuals who had been arrested previously and charged as perpetrators.

<U) Andrade further told the Salvadorans that he talked with Melgar on Junehen Melgar told him things had become serious and the group had gone too far. Melgar reportedly told Andrade that "Julio' had been wounded in the attack and taken by Ismaei Dimas to the Red Cross for help. Melgar further advised that the PRTC wouldommunique concerning the operation and that Andrade should not contact any of the cell members until Melgar gave his approval.

(U) Andrade stated further that PRTC Political Commission member Jose Mario Lopez Alvarenga directed him to travel to Mexico in mid-July to discuss the Zona Rosa attack. While there, Andrade told Lopez that he did not know the details of the attack since he did not participate, and he referred Lopez to Melgar as the director of the operation. Andrade traveled to Cuba in5 and met there with PRTC Leader Francisco Alberto Jovel Urquilla who also wanted to hear about the operation. Andrade said he told Jovel, too, that Melgar had gone to the metropolitan area and assumed the lead in carrying out the operation.

I il . Embassy personnel arrangedto be subjectolygraph examination administeredSalvadoran Special Investigative Unitan Salvadora report of the polygraph session in9 withThe SIU had been trained in polygraph techniquesFBI. The test included questions about Andrade's participationZona Rosa attack and the roles of other perpetrators. Theresults indicated that Andrade was being truthful whenhe did not secure weapons for use in the attack; he did not visiton or about Juneo prepare weapons for use inheicture of Rivas asRTChe did noticture of Garcia that was shown to him.

Andrade's SIU polygraph results were judged to be "inconclusive" as to his responses that: he did not participate in planning the attack; he was not present during the shooting; and he

did not arrange for medical services orafehouse for the operation. The SIU polygrapher qualified the test results by explaining that Andrade was recoveringold and stillough. Because of this, Andrade was scheduled toecond test two weeks later. The SIU polygraph results were to be sent to the National Academy of Ue Detection for quality control review.

A second polygraph examination was conductedSIU on Julyo review the areas that were previously deemed

ccording to SIU information that was eventually provided to San Salvador Station, the results of this polygraph supported the truthfulness of Andrade's responses in the following areas: he was not present during the attack; he did not arrange for medical servicesafehouse for the operation; and he did not participate, individually or with others, in planning the attack. Thus, the SIU polygraph results concluded that Andrade was truthful in stating that he had not participated in planning the attack even though, according to Andrades own statement to the Salvadoran police, he was one of four planners of the attack.

Inhe Agency's San Salvadorthat the Salvadoran Government had promisedthe time he had already served in detention would bepenalty for the crimes for which he had beenpromise was contingent upon Andrade's full cooperationregarding the FMLN and PRTC.

U> These CTimn did not includeonnection with (he Zona Rosa attack. Under Salvadoran law. the testimony ofGarcia, Abraham Dimas-could not be used against Andrade because it was considered mere hearsay

he United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador issued an unclassified report regarding its investigation into the Zona Rosa attack andther acts of violence committed by both sides during El Salvador's civil war. According to the report, Andrade was tried9 on charges of complicity in the Zona Rosa attack before the Third Court of Criminal

Proceedings.'9 The report did not explain the outcome of the trial but stated that Andrade was freed under7 amnesty..

B The Truth Commission report stated there was credible information that Andradearger role in the Zona Rosa attack than he had admitted to, and that he personally selected the targets of the attack. The report concluded that Andrade was one of the planners of the attack based on the fact that he confessed in court to having prior knowledge of it According to the Truth Commission report, Andrade admitted that heafehouse to provide medical treatment and shelter to individuals wounded in the attack. This contradicts both the statements Andrade made to the National Police and the SIU polygraph results that judged him to be truthful when he denied any involvement in the Zona Rosa attack.

U) On, Andrade traveled to Miamiarole that was granted to him by.nformation from. agencies indicates he currently resides in New Jersey with his wife and children.

1 (U) The Truth Commission's report that Andrade was tried for charges relating to involvement in the Zona Rosa attack contradicts intormation from the Embassy itiSan Salvador tha: Andrade was not tried lor crimes relating to the attack.

U) Andrade's airplane ticket was prepared (or travel on Juneut no other evidence-has been found to verify the actual date he entered the United States.

omeo Gilberto Osorio/"Gerardoomeo Gilberto Osorio came to the attention of the Agency's San Salvador Station within days of the Zona Rosa attack. On, the Station requested that CIA Headquarters and the FBI run name traces regarding "Gerardoho had been identified in captured PRTC documentsRTC member from San Francisco, California. In response, the CIA and FBIden fi ed "Zelaya" as being an alias for Romeo Gilberto Osorio, an American citizen of Salvadoran ancestry who had served four years in. Air Force and was honorably dischargedsorio, who was then the gallery curator at the Mission Cultural Center in San Francisco, had been arrested in connectionake-over of the

Issue; "What role (CIA) has played in the investigation of the murders, and what priority has been placed on the investigation."

pCIA personnel reacted immediately to the Zona Rosa attack. Two minutes after midnight onFlash" precedence cable from San Salvador Station notified CIA Headquarters of the attack. This was the first report to Washington of the incident from any agency represented at the Embassy.

1 IShe day following the attack, officers in the CIA Headquarters Central American Task Force (CATF) participated. meeting of the Regional Interagency Group. The

U) Insorio appearedegment of theinutes television show and discussed the role. military advisers in the Salvadoran civil war. Osorio described how the insurgents' fight against the government was made more difficult because of. military presence and said,ean it was them or us. So we madeoint to target some American servicemen in order tooint to the Congress and to have themecond look about what was going0 Minutes narrator Ed Bradley said during the broadcast that Osorio had helped plan the assassination of four Marines at an outdoor cafe in the Zona Rosa. Osorio did not state, however, that he participated in the Zona Rosa attack, either directly or indirectly, and no evidence has been found in CIA records to indicate that Osorio was involved.

purpose of this meeting was to discuss each agency's response to the killings and to plan actions pertinent to President Reagan's Junetatement pledging assistance to find and punish the killers and an anticipated National Security Decision Directive ordering that such assistance be provided. The CIA representatives explained the Agency's intentions to enhance and expedite intelligence support to the maximum degree possible. This would include information exchange with the Salvadorans, assistance in collection programs and training, including an ti-terrorist capability training. The CLA participants reported that the Agency's San Salvador Station had already proposed severaUteps to enhance information collection to identify thr in nnBB^^r

the Salvadoran services that were directly involved in the investigation.

The Chief of Station (COS) of San Salvador Stationtime recalls that the killing of the American Marinespersonnel. Many Station officers were friends ofersonal interest in finding the killers. Pursuit ofbecame the absolute top priority of theelse was put in second place. According to the COS,urgency in working on the Zona Rosa killings broughtcooperation among the various Salvadoran services,them and the Station. The COS says he also was ablefor extra help from the Defense Intelligence Agency'sJoint Intelligence Team. Marineof. Southern Command; and CIAthe first assignmentirectorate of IntelligenceSan Salvador Station.

an Salvador Station cablesupport for its activities by requesting allconcerning the PRTC, especially the Mardoqueocommandos. The Station cable noted that it washed tostone unturned in pursuing this5 cable advised Headquarters that the Station hadspecial joint PRTC Task Force to serveentralized analytical

iaTvadoran mtelligence services were persuaded by the COS to participate. As the. intelligence officer and the DCI's representative, the COS also coordinated the San Salvador efforts of the other. intelligence entities.

For its part, CIA Headquarters coordinated closely with the State Department. State Department asked that the PRTC Task Force be the focal point and the channel for. support to the Salvadoran security services working on the Zona RosaATF officer also ensured that the FBI, which had declined to participate directly in the effort in El Salvador, was provided with all CIA information regarding PRTC members who were believed to be in the United States.

he PRTC Task Forceigh level of activity and kept CIA Headquarters closely informed of its workeries of Task Force reports. The contents of these reports variedequest for more aerial photographic coverage of suspected PRTC base camps to an announcement of the inauguration by El Salvador's Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI)atabase regarding PRTC members. Details concerning various PRTC leaders are also included in these reports. The reports included "Mario Gonzalez" (later to be identified asho was notedRTC Metropolitan Front member, and "Gerardo Zelaya" (eventually identified as Gilberto Osorio).

g Part of the PRTC Task Force was based in the Salvadoran DNItation officer assigned to the Task Force describes its work as follows:

the Thursday [the day] following the Zona Rosaas in the office alleryone in the Station began to work "flat out" in response to the attack. The Station set up the PRTC Task Force at the DNI. [CLA DirectorateoLfc^lligence] analysts, intelligence officers from.iiJitary Intelligence Detachment,. Marine Corps analysis augmented the Task Force staff. Prior to the establishment of the Task Force, the Salvadoran services would not permil its officers lo work on captured documents for fear they would be corrupted by Marxist propaganda.esult, the documents, of which there were many, had not been used. The PRTC Task Force changed that philosophy into one of thoroughly exploiting the documents. Through analysis of documents, the Task Force was able to form an Order of Battle for the PRTC andout the names of suspected perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack and PRTC leaders as liaison and military action was successful against them.

rA CIA

tys that the COS madeto go after the PKTC" and pulled out all the stops" inAll otherand total

concentration wasrCTC base camps.

nhe COS provided Headquartersomprehensive report regarding the Zona Rosa inquiry as of that date. The report noted that, if the Station had not organized the PRTC Task Force, the Salvadoran surge effort never would have happened because of bureaucratic problems. The report described two dozen specific operational activities that had been generated mainly by the PRTC Task Force. Included were the investigations of "Mariondrade-and of Gilberto Osorio, who was then thought to be living in Nicaragua.

f When Garcia was detained by. Border Patrol inIA Headquarters performed name traces for the FBI regarding him and all the perpetrators he implicated. San Salvador

station also passed lead information provided by garcia to the salvadorans. using this information, the salvadorans raided the upholstery shop that was used as cover by the terrorists and arrested rivas,

flpl'he station, in pursuit of information regarding the zona rosa attack, reported to headquarters onhat it was pressing all its contacts for the fullest possible reporting of information the salvadorans had derived from the debriefings of garcia and rivas. the station also reported that it had arrangedolygraph examination of rivas to verify elements of the information he supplied regarding the zona rosa attack, including his claim of being an active participant.

g^whroughout the period leading to, during and after5 arrests of garcia, abraham dimas and rivas, the station continued reporting to cia headquarters regarding the salvadoran effort.eview of the station's performance for fiscalia headquarters commentedhe station'sj ability to respond to crisis situations, such as the zona rosa attack, with surge reporting was particularly noteworthy."

jl^^vith the successful arrests of rivas, garcia and abraham dimas, the efforts of the task force slowed somewhat and were diverted to work on the kidnapping of inez duarte, president duarte's daughter, which occurred on. aiding president duarte in this regardigh priority for. government. however, the station continued to collect information regarding the zona rosa perpetrators who had not been arrested.

etter to chairman david durenberger of the ssci, dci william casey noted that the cia helped the salvadoran governmentoint task force thatignificantn attachment to that letter mentioned that the prtc task force had focused all available resources on the prtc to bring the perpetrators of the zona rosa attack to justice.

The attachment further noted that the CIA's efforts had led to the arrest of three people involved in the Zona Rosa operation and the confiscationarge number of documents and arms.

elegram from the Embassy in

San Salvador to the State Department discussed the possible prosecution of the Zona Rosa killers. This telegram reported that the CIA Station "actually did the vast majority of the legwork in the Zona Rosa case."

plnhe Station reported the arrest of Vladimir Rodriguez, whoafe site for weapons used by the group. Int reported the apparent deaths of "Walter" and Ismaei Dimasombing raid at Guazapa Volcano. No record has been found to indicate additional focus on the Zona Rosa attacks by San Salvador Station or CIA Headquarters between7 and the arrest of Andrade by the SalvadoransWhen Andrade was arrested, CIA Headquarters, at the request of the Assistant US. Attorney who was responsible for considering possible prosecution of the Zona Rosa case, instructed San Salvador Station not to have any direct part in actively collecting information from Andrade about the Zona Rosa case. The reason for this instruction was to avoid potential complications if any information obtained from Andrade were eventually to be used. prosecution.

Issue: "What action has been taken by officials from (CIA]perpetrators!intellectual authors of the murders."

. action directed againsl the perpetrators or

planners otthe Zona Rosa attack can be separated into two categories: actions involving the specific individuals who were involved and actions against the PRTC in general. Specific CIA actions were directed against only two individuals, Garcia and Rivas.

iaJ^bfl^^f

.rere in contact with. Border Patrol, Investigative Service and the FBI when these organizations

were interviewing Garcia regarding the Zona Rosa attack.directed that the officer who met withthe other agencies obtain as much information as possibleparticipatingriminal investigation or beingduring interviews. The purpose of this instructionitness in any

future1 i fficer explored with the FBI and the Border Patrol the possibility of recruiting Garcia to operateenetration of the insurgency, but both the Border Patro! and the FBI pointed out that Garcia did not seem capable of such a

San Salvador Station that

Garcia was returning to San Salvador on. The San Salvador Station, in turn, notified the Salvadoran authorities, and Garcia was arrested when he landed at the airport in San Salvador. The Station was instrumental in Garcia's arrest both by providing the Salvadorans with information about his return and by energizing the Salvadorans to take quick action in this regard.

ctions Regarding Rivas. The Salvadorans arrested Rivas on. This action was based upon information provided to them from Garcia's revelations to. Border Patrol that had been provided to the Salvadoran service by San Salvador Station. The Station was further involved directly concerning Rivas on, when CIA officers were allowed by the Salvadorans to interview Rivas andolygraph examination to him to clarify his degree of culpability and the veracity of the information he had provided to the Salvadorans. The results of the examination, which was conducted with the knowledge and approval of CIA Headquarters, confirmed his guilt.

ctions Regarding the PRTC in General. Other potential CIA actions against those responsible for the Zona Rosa attack were discussed immediately after the killings took place. At thenteragency meeting in Washington, steps were discussed to implement President Reagan's statement. assistance to the Salvadoran Government in finding and punishing the Zona Rosa terrorists. CIA representatives stated that the Agency would enhance and expedite intelligence support to the Salvadorans

CHRONOLOGY Or SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

JuneZona Rota attack occurs. Four Marines,. businessmen

andLatin Americans are killed by insurgents,

JuneCentral American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTO claims

credit (or the attackelephone callan Salvador newspaper.

luneSalvador StationRTC Task Force to work exclusively

on the Zona Rosa Incident

JulyReaganational Security Decision Directive in

response to the Zona Rosa attack, including direction to the DCI to "undertake an expanded program of improved intelligence support to El Salvador."

AugustCIA learns of LJ.S. Border Patrol apprehension of Juan Miguel

Garcia Melendcx and receives an initial debriefing on his knowledge of the ZonaIncident

AugustCelio Rival Bolanos and Jose Abraham Dimas Aguilar are

arrested.

Augustreturns to El Salvadoirrested.

Septemberof the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents President Duarte a

letter from President Reagan congratulating Duarte on success against the PRTC

JanuarySalvadoran National Guard raid discovers the weapons used in

Zona Rosa attack and captures Pedro Vladimir Rodriguez Guardado, who hid the weapons for the PRTC

JulyAntonio Morales lucero, who admitted participation in the

Zona Rosa attack, is arrested.

May 28

Salvadoran National Police capture* Pedro Antonio Andrade Martinea.

MavlO

leads the Salvadoran military to the largest arms cache discovered in El Salvador.

:S

Department personnel at the Embassy request parole authorization from State (or Andrade.

une 28

Department telegram to Embassy authorizes Andrade's parole.

The probable date when Andrade leaves El Salvador and enters the United States.

i

Abraham Dimas and Rivas are wnlenced by the Salvadoran military court

18

is found not guilty of participation in the Zona Rosa attack after spending five years in jail awaiting trial.

to the maximum degree possible. This would include information exchanges, assistance in collection programs,and training, including anti-terrorist capability training. Existing legislative and Executive authorities for Agency programs were sufficient for these purposes.

, immediately after the PRTCfor the Zona Rosa attack, San Salvador Station informedby cable that it would concentrate its resourceslife difficultfor [thehe Station cable statedpcrsonnr^

organization.'

U

"no stone unturned in pursuing

, the Station reported to Headquarters concerning the first meeting of the PRTC Task Force it had established to serve as the central analytical and operational focus of the effort to identify and arrest those who were involved in the attack. According to this report, Salvadoran elements of the PRTC Task Force were developing an all-source intelligence assessment regarding the PRTCasis for major Salvadoran armed forces military operations. These operations were to be targeted against PRTC field headquarters, training camps and logistical facilities with the intention of inflicting maximum damages in reprisal for the Zona Rosa attack.

[TTieSajv^dorans, with encouragement and enhanced

services from San Salvador Station, conducted attacks on PRTc camps with air-mobile units, ground forces and bombings. This Salvadoran military activity reportedly resulted in increased rebel casualties, sufficient pressure to force the PRTC to move out of its main base area, the removal of PRTC members from San Salvador to the rural front, and the reported deaths of cell leaders Ismaei Dimas andhe military actions also resulted in the deactivation of the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos and an affirmative decision by the FMLN leadership not to kill any more Americans.

officer who was

oi

savs:

cooperation was as good as one could expec^B

The cooperation with the Salvadorans at this time was probabTTatits height.

The Station designed the I'RTC Task Force so the Salvadoran services would cooperate to identify and arrest the perpetrators. The Salvadoran Government representatives on the Task Force were members of the DNI,tional Police, the National Guard, the Estadoa^La^La^MMf

the Treasuryach service made specific contributions as follows: the DNI Metropolitan Front Referent provided its Chief of Special Projects, the Chief ofenior analyst, and two secretaries; the Estado Mayor assigned the Chief Analyst and the Chief of the Regional Document Exploitation Center; the National Police furnished its Chief from the Counter Subversive Branch; the National Guard assigned its Chief of the Intelligence Section."

he Stationeries of almost-daily reports toeadquarters regarding the Task Force operation, especially as regards the activities of the Salvadorans. For example, the following summary describing some of the Salvadorans' activity was included in the PRTC Task Force report covering the first day of its work,:

The Task Force began by bringing together all available documentary materials on PRTC such as the Nidiaocuments. National Police reports on interrogations o( prisoners, and reports from various informants.

j* (u) The Estado Mayor was the Salvadoran Armed Forces Inint General Start

CiA records do not indicate whether the Treasury Police actually contributed personnel h> Ihe Task Force effort.

v (L'l *Nidia Diaz"op ranking member of the PRTC who was arrested by Salvadoran forces in

Identification of listings of PRTC members, including true names, pseudonyms, date and place of birth,ask Force is preparing report on the basis oi which military region ;

commanders and public security forces can undertake investigation and arrest of PRTC members.

Intelligence on PRTC special forces base camps provided bv three PRTC [insurgents] to Sixth Brigade is being provided to Task Force.

Documents captured with Nidiaeing prepared in intelligence report format. Attempts underway to contact family members for

Investigate interrogation reports that link ERP [another FMLN group] urban elements to the acquisition of information in San Salvador for specific assassination targeting and sabotage. Follow-up to include investigation to determine if ERP may have supported PRTC inune [Zona Rosa attack].

Investigate document containing substance of PRTC Metro Front Regional Committee meeting in1 which gives names of PRTC Metro Front attendees and leaders. Attempt lo locate family members of these participants through public security service units.

Tactical exploitation: DNI's Chief of Analysis and the EstadoI [the intelligence section] are developing an all-source intelligence assessment on PRTC as the basis for major military operations targeted against PRTC field headquarters, training camps and logistical facilities with intention of inflicting maximum damage as reprisal.

uring the month following this report, the Salvadorans engagedariety of activities focused on the PRTC and on locating the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack. Demonstrating the degree of Salvadoran Government interest in the Zona Rosa investigation, President Duarte visited the Task Force, accompanied by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Joint General Staff, for briefings on the Task Force's operations. The Salvadoransedia campaign to enlist the public's assistance. Police sketches and written descriptions of three suspected participants in the Zona Rosa attack appeared in all the dailyhot line" number was provided alongequest for Salvadorans to call with information.

Salvadoran leads developed duringthe mention in captured documentsCerardoas GilbertoRTC member who, according towas from San Francisco, hadrant fromCommission of San Franciscof

The Salvadorans also captured documents thatetter signed by "Mario Gonzalez" of the PRTC Metropolitan Front requesting that no more PRTC members be sent to the Front because of the excess of personnel there already. Former FMLN leader Napoleon Romero Garcia, alias "Miguelassassinated by the insurgents for his cooperation with the Salvadoran authorities-helped inketch ofccording to Romero, "Mario* hadourse with him in Vietnam and had been in San Salvador the previous December.

ofix weeks after the Zonaand just before Garcia was apprehended by the vs.the San Salvador Station COSormalregarding the progress of the investigation,

ccording to theeport, immediately after the Zona Rosa attack, the DNI placed continuous coverage on known PRTC communication links and intensified efforts to identify PRTC communicationsalvadoran forward collection team was placed in central San Vicente Department to provide enhanced coverage of PRTC tactical communications and radio direction finding efforts in San Salvador to locate PRTC elements in the capital. The urban direction finding effort was successful in deterrruning the presence of numerous insurgent related emitters, but none had yet been confirmed as PRTC elements nor precisely located at the time of the COS's report. These operations were continued with the PRTC as the priority target.

an Augustable, San Salvador StationCLA Headquarters that the National Guard had raidedshop, arrested Rivas and followed with the arrestDimas. Garcia was arrested by the Salvadorans whento EI Salvador as CIA reported in anhe intensity and competitiveness of theconcerning the Zona Rosa investigation, the Treasury'considerable effort to "beat the National Guard to theit could make the arrest. The National Guard wasfor Garcia, but the Treasury Police wished tofor his apprehension. The Station noted in anIA Headquarters that the competition among theservices was intense as each wanted to be first

Salvadorans suffered coordination problems

>ugnlthough they continued their fairly good collaboration as participants in the Station-led PRTC Task Force. The National Police was designated the lead agency in the Zona Rosa investigation even though the National Guard was traditionally responsible for investigating the PRTC. Consequently, the National Police did not receive complete support from the National Guard or exercise operational control over National Guard investigative efforts. In addition, thehe 1st Brigade and the 5th Brigade pursued investigative leads independently and without always coordinating with the National Police.

early

AugustDuarte's security advisors informed him of the coordination problems in the investigation. Ont Duarte's prompting, the Minister of Defense and Public Security General sent an order concerning the investigation to the Director General of the National Police. Copies of the order were also sent to the Directors General of the National Guard and the Treasury Police, the Chief of the Intelligence SectionI) of the Armed Forces Joint General Staff, and the Director of DNI. The order noted that it was

being issued in compliance with instructions from the President.Rosa case was described as of "singular importance becausecharacteristics of the act, the different victims involved, andaffiliation of thehe order directedorganizational principles be followed, includingcoordinated investigation at all levels,of informants, and "strict and total cooperation of allof public security or military, regarding PRTC informationrelated to the

Lopez quoted the Augustuarte order and announced that, innified command had been formed with the responsibility and authority to centralize, analyze, prioritize, direct, and assign missions to the individual security services in order to solve the case as soon as possible. To facilitate solving the case. Colonel Lopez ordered that all PRTC members in custody or subsequently captured were to be immediately turned over to the unified command along with any captured documents, weapons or equipment.

'Colonel Lopez held another meeting with Salvadoran officials who were responsible for the Zona Rosa investigation. He stressed the needoncerted effort over the next five days because publicity over the capture of Rivas and Garcia would complicate the investigation. Other perpetrators would thereby be alerted to the advanced state of the investigation, complicating further progress. Colonel Lopez also ordered formationroup to focus on Garcia's and Rivas' information, which included repeat searches of the safehouses, preparation and distribution of sketches of the perpetrators, analysis of interrogation reports of PRTC prisoners, and follow-up contacts with perpetrators' family members.

(U) Oneneral John Vessey, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,etter toj'resident Duarte from President Reagan. The letter congratulated Duarte on the Salvadoran Government's success against the PRTC. Duarte, at this public meeting and as reported by the Embassy, responded that "the intensive effort both countries mounted to collect intelligence on the PRTC, and then go after them,ore productive way to tackle the terrorist problem than simply to look for ways to viscerally lash out at them."

(U) The Salvadoran search for the perpetrators still at large continued. On, however. President Duarte's daughter, Inez, was kidnapped by FMLN insurgents,overnment crisis in El Salvador. The insurgents used herargaining chip to obtain the freedom of imprisoned insurgent leaders. Salvadoran security and police services concentrated almost all their efforts on the kidnapping.

J^For the next year, CIA records indicate pursuit of few new avenues by CLA and the Salvadorans regarding the Zona Rosa case. There was considerable continuing action concerning issues relating to the possible prosecution or potential amnesty of those who had been arrested. However, the vs. Government's involvement in these issues was the principal responsibility of. agencies.

lnht- National Police arrested Andrade based upon information provided by Axel Armando Orellanaaptured member of the PRTC Central Committee. The Salvadorans provided the Station with intelligence as it was derived from debriefings of Orellana. When Andrade showedignificant arms cache was located, the National Police provided anf the cache and also gave the Station information from the debriefing of Andrade regarding the source of arms and of PRTC plans to disrupt the inauguration of the new government. From the time of his arrest9 throughhe National Police held Andrade in cas tody, cooperated with the Station by providing the

results of its debriefings of him, and made him available to the FBI and the Embassy Legalor interviews regarding the Zona Rosa attack.

U) No evidence has been found to indicate continued CIA involvement with the Government of El Salvador on the Zona Rosa attackhen Andrade was allowed to depart El Salvador and came to the United States.

. Government Relationship with Anyone Knows or Suspected of Involvement in the Zona Rosa Attack

Issue: "What information [CIA] received from theauthors of the murders."

ne exception, no record has been found to indicate that CLA received any information directly from the perpetrators or the planners of the Zona Rosa attack. That exception is information that was obtainedan Salvador Station interview and polygraph examination of Wilian Celio Rivas Bolanos after his arrest by the Salvadorans. The Agency did obtain information indirectly from others who were implicated in the Zona Rosa murders in. Government entities and Salvadoran security and police services provided the CIA with intelligence derived from their interviews and debriefing of the perpetrators. CIA disseminated notable information it received from the Salvadorans in this regard to State, DIA and. Government intelligence consumers at the time.

LT) The Embassy Legal Officer in El Salvadororeign Service Officer responsible for dealing with the Salvadorans on legal matters affecting the United States.

nformation Obtained Directly From Rivas. On, after receiving the permission of CIA Headquarters, San Salvador Station conducted an interview and polygraph examination of Rivas in order to clarify conflicting information he previously had provided to the National Guard. During the pre-

examination interview with an Agency polygraphed Rivas recounted his involvement in the attack, identified others who had taken part in the operation andketch of the murder scene. This information was essentially identical to what he had provided to the National Guard. According to the polygraphedeport, Rivas indicated no deception on the polygraph when he admitted that he personally participated in the Zona Rosa shootings. There were indications of deception on the polygraph, however, when he denied that Garcia participated in the attack, that Rivas provided false information regarding who took part in the attack, and that Rivas deliberately withheld information about the attack. There is no indication in Agency records that CIA officers had any contact with Rivas other than at this polygraph session.

Information Obtained Indirectly From Perpetrators.

5IA received information from various Salvadoran police and military agencies as they debriefed six Zona Rosa perpetrators and accomplices about the attack and other personnel who had information about it. In addition, CLA was provided with reports from the US. Border Patrol's interviews with Garcia

The most significant intelligence collected from anyperpetrators or alleged perpetrators on subjects other thanRosa killings came from Andrade. During the year he wasAndradearge amount of information toPolice. CIA was provided with this information byPolice and distributed it to. intelligenceprovided most of this information only afterpromised him that, contingent on his fulltime he served in detention would be construed as his penaltycrimes for which he was arrested, that his family wouldfinancial support during his detention and that he andwould receive financial assistance to relocate outside ofThe information Andrade furnished the Nationalshared with CIA personnel and formed the basis for

^intelligence reports that were disseminated by CIA. Government consumers.

Immediately after his arrest, Andrade provided the National Police with his version of his role in the Zona Rosa killings. He admitted his alias was "Mario Gonzalez" and that he was involved in the planning for the Zona Rosa attack. Aboutays later, he furnished more details on his involvement, and these were passed to the Station by the Embassy's Legal Officer who was meeting and interviewing Andrade. The Station cabled the information to CIA Headquarters but did not submit it as an intelligence report because it was Embassy-acquired information. Andrade claimed four men planned the attack, with Jose Manuel Melgar being primarily responsible. Andrade was given the job of setting up safehouses and making medical preparations, neither of which he claims he did. Heeeting where other insurgents told himestaurant in the Zona Rosa where people of importance, including US. intelligence officers, met and where it was possible to carryseriousndrade claimed not to have known the target of the planned action in advance, however. According to Andrade, two of the planners, Melgar and Emerson Rivas were close confidants of PRTC leader Francisco Alberto Jove! Urquilla. To protect his friends, claimed Andrade, Jovel put the blame for the attack on Andrade when he discussed the attack with FMLN members.

Within two days of his capture, Andrade told the National Police about PRTC and FMLN plans for actions relating to the9 inauguration of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) government. These actions included attacks on the Salvadoran armed forces and sabotage of electric linesydroelectric substation. Andrade alsoRTC plan to attack the Legislative Assembly and the Supreme Court, and he gave details of the Mardoqueo Cruz group's command structure.

eek of his capture, Andrade also provided the Salvadorans with information about the source of the materiel found in the arms cache to which he had led National Police onhe arms cache contained rifles, pistols, one half million rounds of ammunition, and explosives and was the largest insurgent

arms cache discovered as of that date. Andrade said the weapons came from North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. He described how they were transported overland on trucks that started out in Costa Rica and transited Nicaragua.

if Beginning inhe National Guard began to provide the San Salvador Station with information based on both Andrade's written reports and oral debnefings. The Station worked closely with the National Guard by furnishing it with questions and requirements for use in debriefing Andrade. The first information that was acquiredesult related to the PRTC and FMLN infrastructure in Managua,ouple of weeks later, Andrade amplified this information with more details about the location of PRTC and FMLN offices in Managua and the location of the radio used to communicate with PRTC units in El Salvador. Inndrade provided the Salvadorans with further details regarding the FMLN's presence in Nicaragua, including its use of computers, security practices and relations with the Sandinista leadership.

-^Andrade also reported information to the Salvadorans regarding theetropolitan structure as it existed when the National Police captured hime said the Metropolitan Front, which was under the command of the PRTCs Modesto Ramirez Central Front, was divided into three areas of focus: rrulitary operations, political operations, and logistics. The military structure consisted of three urban commando teams and two militia teams, one of which was incomplete. The military structure also included front group self-defense forces in the San Salvador suburbs. Andrade also listed PRTC members who worked with front groups and those involved in logistics.

he next report from Andrade that the National Police furnished the Station concerned Cuban support to the FMLN and Sandinista involvement in facilitating Cuban support. He said that Cuban support of the FMLN was handled through Cuba's General Directorate of Special Operationshe DGOE planned, coordinated and supervised training and logistical support for the

FMLN and planned FMLN operations against strategic or special targets. Cuban diplomats in Mexico provided funds arid documentation, such as visas and false identity papers, to FMLN members. The active involvement of senior Cuban and Nicaraguan officials had been instrumental in allowing the FMLN to continue hostile activities in El Salvador. While Cuba was the center for training, coordination and planning and for storing Soviet Bloc weapons destined for the FMLN, Nicaragua served as the bridge for the flow of materiel into El Salvador. Andrade provided the names of Cubans involved in the logistical support, the senior Cuban who coordinated support to the FMLN and the Cuban diplomat in Mexico with whom the PRTC had contact.

n >ther of Andradc's reports to the Salvadorans stated that Cuban leader Fidel Castro gaveillion to the FMLNhe reported purpose of this payment was to improve the FMLN's infrastructures and transfer increased amounts of armament into El Salvador.

73. In latendrade provided the National Police with information about the PRTC's presence and activities in Mexico. He said the PRTClandestine explosives workshop in Mexico City that produced an explosive similar to TNT. Some of the explosives that were found in the PRTC arms cache Andrade exposed were produced in that workshop.

Andrade also provided information to the National Police regarding the general location of the PRTC Central Front Command Post and identified the staff assigned to the Command Post. He also furnished the names or aliases of the members of the FMLN Joint Central Front Command Structure, whichenior member from each of the FMLN factions.

n earlyndrade reported to the Salvadorans concerning FMLN and PRTC communications, especially radio communications and encryption procedures. He also offered insight into the FMLN's knowledge of El Salvadoran armed forces' efforts to intercept and exploit insurgent communications. He

stated that the location of the Salvadoran Communications and Information Processing Center was well known throughout the FMLN7 and that he had learned about the complex and its functionuban operations officer while in training in Cuba. The FMLN General Command issued guidance as ofe reported, that the complex was not to be the target of attacks because of the presence of American advisors.

nndrade gave the Nationaletailed description of the PRTC's strategic logistical operation that supplied the PRTC with materiel from Nicaragua. This information included the routes traveled, the types of concealment devices constructed to hide theescription of the trucks used, and the names of the drivers and others involved in the transportation of the materiel.

"flflnndrade furnished information to the Salvadorans concerning the PRTC's finance system. The PRTC reportedly obtained most of its funds through project proposals submitted to international organizations. Funds received in this manner were deposited in bank accounts outside of EI Salvador. ?Ie named two priests who assisted the PRTC by presenting project proposals in the United States and Europe and by collecting funds sent to El Salvador from international donor agencies.

B^In the last report that the Salvadorans shared with the San Salvador Station, Andrade told the National Police about FMLN efforts to infiltrate the El Salvadoran armed forces andetired colonel who was recruited by the FMLN in the. The colonel reportedly supplied the FMLN with information concerning the infrastructure and functions of the Salvadoran military. Andrade also identified another officer who he said had sold military weapons to the insurgentshe information on which this report was based was passed to the Station by the Salvadorans in

n summary, the San Salvador Station received reports and new information from the Salvadorans between

and0 that were the result of Salvadoran debriefings of Andrade. No evidence has been found to indicate that.the Station ever had direct discussions with Andrade regarding these or any other matters. Reports prepared by the Station from Andrade debriefings material were provided to CIAntelligence reports based upon that information were disseminated by CIA. intelligence consumers.

[issue- "What relationship {CIA] had, either before or afterwith the perpetrators/intellectual authors of the murdersother individuals known or suspected to have been involved?"

(U) No evidence has been found to indicate that the CIA had any relationship with anyone considered toerpetratorlanner of the Zona Rosa attack, either before, contemporaneous with, or after that attack.

Wm As explained earlier, Rivas, one of the shooters, was the subject of an interview and polygraph examinationIA officer shortly after he was arrested inhis was conducted with the permission of the National Guard, and Rivasonsent statement prior to the examination.

v Andrade quicklyarget in the search for the Zona Rosa killers because heember of the PRTC.eek of the murders, the Station identified Andrade (known then only by his alias "Marioember of the PRTC. At that time, the Station's efforts to collect information concerning the Zona Rosa attack included finding out everything possible about all PRTC members whether or not there was any information specifically linking them individually to therom captured documents, Andrade was identifiedember of the PRTC's Metropolitan Front, and he then became of more interest to the Stationnit of the Front was known to have carried out the attack.

U) After their arrests inarcia and Rivas named "Mario" as the PRTC leader who directecUhe unit that carried out the murders. At the sameeparate source identified "Mario Gonzalez" as the man who devised the plan for the Zona Rosa attack. From that point on, Andradearget of CIA efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Wrhe National Police captured Andrade on. He immediately became of keen interest to CIAotential intelligence source. As mentioned earlier, he led the Salvadorans within days of his capture to the largest arms cache yet discovered. This indicated he had access to useful intelligence. Moreover, he admitted he had some role in the Zona Rosa attack although he did not give specifics at the outset.

.inting any possible prosecution ol Andrade, CIA Headquarters onirected the Station not to become involved in obtaining information from Andrade regarding the Zona Rosa attack. Oneadquarters told the Station that DoJ had advised that, in preparation for any possible prosecution, the Embassy Regional Security Officer or Legal Officer should perform any debriefings of Andrade pertinent to the Zona. Rosa case, and the Station should not participate or be present.

he Stationtrong interest on |une9 in directly participating in debriefing Andrade on all topics other than the Zona Rosa attack. Onhe Station formally requested Headquarters approval to do so. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Richard Kerr approved the Station's request onnder the condition that the Zona Rosa attack not be discussed with Andrade. If it were brought up by Andrade or others, Station participants were immediately to excuse themselves from the interview.

l^Ihe cable transmitting the DDCI approval for the Station to debrief Andrade also expressed the caution that anyone present atiscussion potentially could be calleditness if Andrade were to be tried in the United States. In response, the newly

arrived COS expressed concerns about the potential involvement of Station officersrial and deferred any direct participation for the time being.

1 - If he Station also responded that it believed Andrade could provide significant intelligence, including perishable information, that might bringuicker end to the civil war and noted that it believed it was fighting against time in obtaining the information. According to the Station cable, Andrade was dealing with his Salvadoran captorsuid pro quo basis and refused to cooperate unless he was offered something in return. Foremost in Andrade's mind was reportedly the possible prosecution for the Zona Rosa killings. Until the State Department, DoJ and the Salvadoransecision as to whether they intended to prosecute, reported the Station, his cooperation was in abeyance.

fact, Station personnel never did have directAndrade, but the Station contributed to certain actionsto an arrangement Andrade worked out withThis primarily involved the Station serving asof funds that were given to Andrade's family as one offor his cooperation with the Salvadoran

the moment ol his capture, Andradeon his furnishing of information about the insurgencyNational Police. Initially, he refused to talk unless thepublicized his capture, guaranteed his and his family'ssafe conduct to the United States, and permitted him to talkU.S. Government representative. By mid-Septemberdemands had become more specific. Heto the Salvadoran Vice Minister of Public Security thatdivulge everything he knew about the FMLN andthe FMLN" in exchange for clemency, financial assistanceand his familyash settlement. As part ofeffort in collecting information regarding thethe FMLN, on, it proposed to CIA

Headquartersund, not to, be created to support Andrade's family in relocating to another courjtry.

was also concerned about whether or notbe prosecutedS. court. In lateLegal Officer informed the Station that DoJ had noprosecuting Andrade and the Salvadoran Governmentfree toeal with him. The Station passed onto the Vice Minister of Public Security who thenNational Police to provide Andrade's wife witho travel to Mexico to bring their children back toThe money was paid from funds provided by the CIASalvadorans.

Headquarters learned onelephone call to DoJ) that theadreliminary indication that he was unawareproposal for humanitarian parole or for the support ofCIA Headquarters informed the Station on the same dayof funds to Andrade's family as the Station hadas not authorized until DoJ provided assurancesnot prosecute him. The Station was cautioned that CIAmake any deals with Andrade while he was the subject of a

v On the following day, attorneys from the CIA's OGC met with the AUSA. According to an OGC memorandum dated Octoberhe AUSA reportedly indicated that, at that time, DoJ had no plans to extradite, indict, prosecute, or call Andradeitness in the potential prosecution of other individuaLs involved in the Zona Rosa attack. The AUSA also made clear that, due to his past activities, DoJ was not willing to grant immunity to Andrade or allow him to be paroled into the United States. The AUSA reportedly indicated, however, that he would pose no objection to the CIA providing assistance to Andrade's family in exchange for any intelligence Andrade might provide.

CIA Headquarters authorized the Station on9 to continue to provide funds to the Salvadoran National Police to assist in the resettlement of Andrade's family. In this regard. Headquarters authorized the Station toor the resettlement costs and temporary assistance to Andrade's family. The Station was told to refrain, however, from inducing Andrade to cooperate with the Salvadorans by having any other type of commitment made to him without prior Headquarters authorization.

eeting in. onhe AUSA and representatives from the State Department and the FBI agreed there was no objection to the resettlement of Andrade's common-law wife, Ana Concepcion "Connie" Rivera Valladares, and his children in the United States or to the CIA providing relocation assistance to the family. All agreed the Station could debrief Andrade for foreign intelligence purposes but should refrain from discussing the Zona Rosa case with Andrade and from making any promises to him about coming to the United States. DoJ requested that the CLA not provide any relocation assistance directly to Andrade or pay him directly for any foreign intelligence. This request was basedesire to avoid tainting Andrade's credibilityitness if he were ever called to testify. court.

pln earlyhe National Police0 in cash to Andrade's wife to support her and three of her children who were with her in San Salvador. The Station later reimbursed the Police for this amount. In late November, the Station arranged for Headquarters toirect deposit0 for the family's assistance to. bank account of the Andrade's mother-in-law.

even months after Andrade s

capture, CIA Headquarters informed the Station of the results of separate reviews by OGC and the AUSA of information in the possession of CLA5 regarding the Zona Rosa attack. Both reviews reportedly had concluded that Andrade was involved in the

planning of the Zona Rosa attack. OGC had also advised that the CIA should review the propriety and implications of any continued dealings with Andrade.

in response, the Station statedable to Headquarters that it had consulted with Headquarters and DoJ (through Headquarters) every step of the way on the case, and all actions it had taken were consistent with the limitations and specific authorizations it had received. The OGC and AUSA conclusions regarding Andrade's culpability, the Station argued, should not rule out intelligence dcbriefings nor fulfillment of the agreements that had been made previously to provide support to his family in exchange for the intelligence he provided. He had been told, stated the cable, that he would not be immunized from US. prosecution and that. Government had no plans at that time to try him and would not seek extradition unless evidence was obtained unking him to the Zona Rosa attack. The Salvadorans had also promised him that, contingent on his full cooperation, the time he served while under detention would be construed as his penalty for the crimes for which he was arrested, that his family would be provided financial support during his detention, and that he and his family would receive financial support to relocate outside of El Salvador based upon the sincerity of his effort and the value of the information he provided. The Embassy Legal Officer had told Andrade, reported the Station, that there was no assurance he could enter the United States, and it was possible his family might have to join him in another country.

According to the Station, Andrade was ready to cooperate and, although most of the tactical information he could provide had lost its value because of the time lapse since his arrest, he was judged to still have important information. The Station asked for continuation of the authority to fund the family's support in order to encourage Andrade to provide further intelligence to the National Police. Headquarters advised the Station onhat the OGC and AUSA conclusions regarding Andrade's culpability in the Zona Rosa attack did not preclude providing assistance to his family.

^FOn, the Station requested that Headquarters arrange another transfer0 into the New Jersey bank account belonging to Andrade's mother-in-law. The first intelligence report, based on information that Andrade prepared of his own initiative and without direction, was sent to CIA Headquarters on. Station liaison officers worked closely with the National Police debriefers to provide intelligence requirements and questions for use in the Salvadoran debriefing of Andrade. Onhe Station requestedhird payment0 be wired to the same New Jersey bank account for Andrade's family.

^PDuring most of the time that Andrade was in Salvadoran police custody, he was heldafehouse located just outside of San Salvador. He was moved there from the National Police Headquarters because the safehouse atmosphere was more conducive for elicitation and debriefings. Initially, Andrade shared the house with two other PRTC terrorists and police guards. Then, when Andrade's wife and children arrived in El Salvador from Mexico, the family stayed together in another house, also under police guard. Salvadoran police paid for the rental of the houses, food and household goods. Those costs, which totaledoronths, were reimbursed to the National Police by the CIA. This was in addition tound that had been created to support Andrade's family in relocating to another country.

/[The Station acquired the last intelligence repor: from the National Police debriefing of Andrade innalvadxirarijTiili^

propaganda

ropaganda film that featured Andrade. The film was typical of propaganda media used by the Government of El Salvador at the time in which the insurgents urged their comrades to lay down their arms. Station officers were not directly involved in the filming but were knowledgeable of the film project and provided guidance and direction to the Salvadoran propaganda unit.

l^With the completion of his obligation to provide intelligence inf ormation about the PRTC and FMLN and to participate in the propaganda film, Andrade was freed by the Salvadoran National Police to leave El Salvador. He, his wife and children departed El Salvador onor Miami. Andrade's airplane ticket to New Jersey was provided by the Station. In addition,0 balance ofhat was originally earmarked for relocation and assistance costs to the family was given to Andrade's wife in cash by the National Police.0 was reimbursed to the Salvadorans by the Station.

C. Entry into the United States by Anyone Known or Suspected of Involvement lx thesa Attack

i Issue: "What role [CIA] played in determining whether any ofor suspected perpetratorsiintellectual authors of the murders,or members of their families, were authorized to travel to or take upresidence in the United States, and under what conditions andjustifica tion."

1.explained earlier, soon after his capture on, Andrade told the Salvadorans he would provide information to the Salvadoran Government if it made certain concessions to him. One of those conditions reportedly included relocating his family to the United States. The Station advised Headquarters on, that "The [National Police] guaranteed [Andrade'sl family's safety and safe conduct to the IX S. where he has family and where he may have residentn addition, there was uncertainty at the time as to whether Andrade alreadyegal right to enter the United States. When he was captured, he had in his possession several documents, including. social securityalifornia identification card,tudent body card for the Inglewood California Adult School. These suggested he mightS.ermanent resident alien,egal immigrant. On, CIA Headquarters informed San Salvador Station that the CIA could not be responsible for Andrade's entry into the United States, but that

Headquarters would discuss the matter with DoJ and advise the Station once further information became available.

eek later, the Acting COS (ACOS) of San Salvador Station informed CIA Headquarters that Andrade reportedly was afraid of being released in El Salvador and wanted to be taken out of the country. The ACOS also advised that the Embassy's Legal Officer and an FBI Special Agent, who was serving as the assistant Legal Attache* in Mexico City, indicated they "would be willing todeal' with Andrade for him to appearitness in prosecution of the other participants in the Zona Rosaccordingemorandum of this conversation, "the DoJ representative" (meaning perhaps the FBI Special Agent) had been in contact with the AUSA and discussed the possibilityeal with Andrade if he were to testify in the United States.

|^According9 cable from CIA Headquarters to San Salvador Station, it was agreedeeting in Washington attended by an attorney from the CIA's OGC and representatives from State Department, FBI, and DoJ, that it would be best if Andrade were to stand trial in Elallback position would be to send him to the United States for trial. The DoJ representative reportedly said he was exploring options and'illingness to deal with Andrade, but the deal would notrant of immunity from prosecution.

W A: cordingGC memorandum, the CIA had yeRo receive any written request from the AUSA for CIA information relating to Andrade.eeting onhe AUSA reportedly had reiterated his promise to sendrequirements/laundry" list of questions he would need answered. The OGC memorandum stated that CIA information could not be shared with the AUSA until he informed CIA of his specific requirements.

JKSubsequently, OGCetter, dated

rom the US. Attorney requesting an inventory of all documents and objects potentially relevant, all documents pertinent

to Rivas, Andrade and9 OGC memorandum notes the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Intelligence had been requested toecords search for information regarding the Zona Rosa attack, including information on Andrade, which would be provided to DoJ for use in prosecution of PRTC members who had been incarcerated in El Salvador and allegedly were responsible for the killings.

, OGCetter to the AUSA detailing the status of CIA's cooperation with rum and his predecessors, and the CIA's intent to provide relevant information to him. It noted that CLA records were being searched in response to his Juneequest for mformation:

Onay, we met with you at CIA Headquarters to provide for your personal review CIA information identified by your predecessors in the US. Attorney's Office as that most pertinentS. prosecution of these individuals. It has been our understanding that you and your predecessors have beenairly dear description of (he extent of OAs knowledge of the Zona Rosa inddent and related matters. At that meeting, however, we asked you to provide usritten list of information necessary for your prosecution and how this information might be used in order to guide us in our support to you. Yourune letter does provideequirement list but is silent as to use and purpose. Without more spedfic information in regard to how sensitive CIA information is to be used by you it is very difficult for this Agency to respond meaningfully to your request.

The letter also explained that the Agency would appreciate being informed about any specific plans that the AUSA had for use of Agency employees, assets (current orr Agency information that he might wish to use in prosecution of the case. The9 OGC letter to the AUSAurther offer for the AUSA to review at CIA Headquarters all of the background material from which his predecessors had culled the documents he reviewed on, plus any further information that may turn up in the records search that is responsive.

etter to OGC from. Attorney,

but signed by the AUSA, statedave no specific plans for utilizing any past or present CIA employees or assets as witnesses either at the grand jury or at trial. This does not meanight not want to talk to them [in thehe AUSA explains that he never discussed with the CIA using CIA employees or documents at trial because his past experience led him to believe thatequest would be denied. The Julyetter also stated that, although the AUSA's predecessors had reviewed CIA documents, the current AUSA needed to review the material personally. This was necessary, the letter explained, because he might evaluate the same information differently, and because there hadonsiderable passage of time since prior reviews and there were recent developments, such as Andrade's arrest.

jB^The Julyetter also presented the AUSA's synopsis regarding how he learned of Andrade's arrest from OGC. The letter explained that the AUSA met with OGC attorneys who informed him that "Mario Gonzalez" had been arrested and indicated that, if he could come to the United States, he could "finger" someone who had masterminded the Zona Rosa attack. The OGC attorneys also reportedly said "Gonzalez" might be involved in the Zona Rosa attack, asked for the AUSA's opinion regarding whether "Gonzalez" could be brought into the United States to provide testimony against Zona Rosa perpetrators and stated that CIA Station personnel were eager to debrief Andrade. The AUSA's letter continued, "Subsequent events have convinced me, that not withstanding Andrade's current denial ofhe CIA had correctly identified himlanner of thehe AUSA now states that he felt CIA tried to mislead him in discussing the parole by withholding from him "Gonzalez's" involvement in the attack. However, the letter he wrote onhows that, at that time, CIA had presented to him the information it had concerning Andrade's involvement in the attack.

BciA's OGC was advised by the Station throughout the summer and Tall9 that the Legal Officer was claiming the

AUSA could notinal decision on Andrade until he reviewed applicable CIA documents. Accordingable to CIA Headquarters, the Embassy Legal Officer mentioned to Station personnel that the AUSAat" because of CIA's position that it could not provide documents to him until it was advised how the AUSA intended to use them. OGC explainedable to the Station, datedhat it hadariety of relevant documents available to the AUSA and provided rumummary of CIA information regarding Andrade's involvement in the attack. San Salvador Station later was advised by the Legal Officer, according to an9 cable to CIA Headquarters,enior DoJ officer believed CLA was withholding information concerning Rivas' polygraph examination that implicated Andrade in the attack.

gency memorandum indicated that CIA was attempting to obtain the permission of other US. Government agencies to share Zona Rosa documents they had originated with the AUSA. AnGC memorandum records that onhe AUSA again was advised that all CIA records were available for his review at any time. However, he declined to review them until CIA categorized the documents according to subject matter.

S9 San Salvador Station cable to CIA Headquarters, the COS and the Station's Chief of Liaison met with the US. Consul General and the Legal Officer in San Salvador to discuss the Andrade case. The Station representatives asked if Andrade's request to be sent to the United States, which the Station had been advised Andrade had made earlier in the presence of the Legal Officer and the Salvadoran Vice Minister of Public Security, was feasible and what steps would be required to bring it about. The Consul General indicated that this matter would be the responsibility of. Attorney General and requested, before the Consul General took any action on it, that the Station ask CIA Headquarters to "test the waters" in Washington. The Consul General also reportedly suggested that CIA ascertain and, if possible, influence DoJ's reactiontate Department recommendation were to be made that Andrade and his family bearole. The

Consul General remarked that it would be helpful if he knew what State Department would have to demonstrate in this case "to ensure that Justice would have no problems when satisfying its reporting requirements beforeccordingly, the Septembertation cable asked CIA Headquarters to act on the Consul General's requests.

able, the COS reported to CIA Headquarters that the DoJ, the FBI representative from Mexico City and the Legal Officer at. Embassy in El Salvador all "are on board regarding possible humanitarian parole" of Andrade. The COS's cable also stated that the Station and the Embassy were asking CIA Headquarters to support the attempt to gain parole for Andrade, who was of "extremely high intelligencendrade had reportedly agreed to cooperate in providing information but would not do so until heromise of parole into the United States and immunity from prosecution.

IA Headquarters informed the Station that the AUSA said he was unaware of the humanitarian parole proposal. The Station responded on Septemberhat it had been assured by the Embassy's Legal Officer that DoJ had no intention of prosecuting Andrade. Accordingeptemberable from CIA Headquarters and anGC memorandum. Headquarters representatives met with the AUSA on Septembernd were told by him that DoJ had no plans to extradite, indict, prosecute, or call Andradeitness in the potential prosecution of other individuals involved in the Zona Rosa attack. The AUSA also reportedly made clear, however, that DoJ was not willing to grant immunity to Andrade or allow him to be paroled into the United States. The Station was warned by Headquarters that, in the future, it should seek Headquarters guidance before acting on uncorroborated information provided by the Embassy's Legal Officer.

TheGC memorandum contained information regarding the Septembereeting between OGC and the AUSA that was not included in the Septemberable to the

Station. According to that memorandum, the OGC representative informed the AUSA that the Station had:

dvised Headquarters that the Consul General at. Embassy in San Salvador was prepared to formally propose that humanitarian parole be provided tohis proposal was apparently prompted by an offer by [Andrade] to provide information of intelligence value to the CIA. if [Andrade] and his family were located to the United States and given of [sic] finandal and other resettlement assistance, and if [Andrade] was granted immunity from prosecution by the governments of the United States and El Salvador for crimes arising out of the Zona RosaAndrade] refused to provide any information until these demands were met,he intelligence that he could apparently provide was deemed to be of suffident value to fadlitate his demands.

The AUSA in reply reportedly explained his position on the questions of immunity and parole and noted that:

f CIA wished to formallyrant of urununity to [Andradel in exchange forritten request for DO] concurrence should be made through channels.

In his view, since DoJ did not contemplate prosecuting [AndradeJ, and also did not contemplate using himitness in other prosecutions, DoJ would not agree to paroling [Andrade] into. under its own authority. Accordingly, the only role his office and DoJ could play in enacting [Andrade's] proposal would be in granting immuruty from prosecution. Since at least some evidence, albeit insufficient to prosecute, implicates [Andrade] in the murder of therant of immunity would be contrary to (his] understanding of DoJThe AUSAl mentioned that Congress and the press would likely portray such action in unfavorable terms.

The AUSA maintainedinal decision to prosecute Andrade could not be made until the AUSA had reviewed all of the CIA's information concerning Andrade.

^ DoJ and State Department officials and the Embassy Legal Officer reportedly met in Washington ono

discuss the possibilityarole for Andrade. The AUSA stipulated that, before he would approve of any proposal to bring Andrade into the United States, he would have to be granted access to relevant CIA documents. He alsoesire that CIA provide himritten analysis of CIA intelligence reports concerning Andrade's involvement in the Zona Rosa attack. The CIA was not represented at the meeting, and no record has been found to indicate that Agency officials were informed of this discussion at that time.

According to anIA Headquarters cable to the Station, representatives from OGC and the Directorate of Operations" Latin America Division met onn Washington with the Legal Officer, the AUSA and representatives from State Department and the FBI to discuss Andrade. All reportedly agreed that the CIA could debrief Andrade for intelligence but should refrain from discussing Zona Rosa matters with him and also refrain from making any promises regarding his coming to the United States. Reportedly,. Government agency represented at the meeting appeared interested in bringing Andrade into the country, and neither State Department nor DoJ saw any advantage to such action. Both also indicated they would want to be assured that Andrade was not involved in the Zona Rosa attack before bringing him to the United States. In informing the Station of the outcome of this meeting, CIA Headquarters noted that it would appear to be premature to decide whether or not to bring Andrade to the United States.tep would not be considered, advised Headquarters, until it was determined how the debriefing for intelligence proceeded in exchange for financial assistance in relocating Andrade's family.

GC memorandum contained

information concerning theeeting that was not furnished to the Station in theable. According to that memorandum, the Legal Officer from the Embassy in San Salvador stated at the meeting that, in his conversations with Andrade and representatives of the Salvadoran Government, Andrade's conditions for providing intelligence information did not involve immunity from US. prosecution but that his family be provided financial assistance and brought to the United States. Andrade also wanted to

be allowed into the United States, even though the possibility existed that he could ultimately be prosecuted. The meeting participants reportedly discussed the possibility of allowing Andrade into the United States. Three possibilitiesumanitarian parole by the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; ii) parole by DoJ in order for Andrade to aid in the Zona Rosa investigation or subsequent prosecution; iii) and use of the authority provided by Publicor CIA, DoJ and Immigration and Naturalization Service to determine that Andrade's entry into the United States was "in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission."

According to the Octoberemorandum, the State Department representatives were pessimistic concerning the possibility that State would agree to paroletate representative reportedly said that he could not argue convincingly that the factsumanitarian parole. He did offer that his opinion would change if Andrade subsequentlyreat deal of valuable intelligence, if no credible evidence was found to corroborate his alleged involvement in the attack and if Andrade provided credible information linking others to crimes prosecutable in El Salvador or the United States. The AUSA, according to the OGC memorandum, then offered his view of DoJ's positionarole:

[The AUSAJ said that at this time, there are no plans to either prosecute Andrade or use himitness in the prosecution of Rivas Bolanos or other individuals. Accordingly, DoJ did not plan to bring Andrade into. on its own behalf. Further, [the AUSA] presented his views concerning possible parole of Andrade at the request of CIA: 'if you (CIA) want Justice to concurecommendationarole, you have to explain to us why you don't think heThe AUSA] said that in the past, CIA characterized Andrade as being involved in the planning of the Zona Rosa inddent. However, now that Andrade is perceived by the CIAource of foreign intelligence, Andrade's role in Zona Rosa is being downplayed by the CIA. [Two OGC lawyers] disputed this characterization, nodng that CIA has notosition on Andrade's guilt or innocence, but has only collected and reported information bearing on that Issue. [The AUSA]

then remarked tha: he was unable to comeetermination until he had been given an opportunity to review all CIA records relating to Zona Rosa and Andrade. IThe AUSA] was reminded pointedly that as ofeptember CIA records were available for his review. [Emphasis added ]

possible use of Publicas alsotheeeting, according to the OGC memorandum:

The possibility of CIA bringing Andrade into.as raised byustice representative] and briefly discussed. CIA representatives made it dear that CLA was not contemplating such an action at this time, which wouldifelong commitment by CIA to support Andrade if necessary. Under the circumstances, such actions did not appear appropriate.

The final sentences in the OGC memorandum summarized the consensus of the group:

It was also dear that State and Justice were similarly not willing at this time, for policy reasons, to commit to any direct support to Andrade, inducing his parole into. The meeting condudedeneral agreement that any proposal for the parole of Andrade into. would require funher interagency discussions.

GC memorandumdescribed the Agency's relationship to Andrade andissue in the following maimer:

At one time the [Directorate of Operations] considered the provision of assistance to Andrade induding his possible parole into the US. if the information [he|roved to be of suffirient value to. Government. However, ttis tentative proposal from our Station was put on hold by Headquarters after failing to receive any support from State and after. Attorney's Office raised substantial objections. [Emphasis added.]

AGC memorandum recordedthat OGC and the AUSA had eacheview of

irdormation in the Directorate of Operations' files relating to Andrade. The memorandum stated:

The AUSA believes that CIA documents dating fromhich include the statements of other Salvadorans either allegedly involved in the incident or aware of Andrade's PRTC activities, as well as Andrade's own statement, contain sufficient evidence to condude that Andrade was involved in the planning of the Zona Rosa massacre.

Eleven days later, onIA Headquartersthe Station of the AUSA and OGC reviews andthat Andrade was culpable to some degree inanuaryeadquarters cable stated that thewas independent of the AUSA review and "points tomasterminding the Zona Rosa

Station responded on, statingits actions had been consistent with limitations imposedFurther, it was of the opinion that thehis involvement in the attack should not ruleAndrade for intelligence purposes. It also noted thatLegal Officer had reportedly told Andrade there washe could enter the United States.

COS recently put the situation inhe said that5 reports were not available to thethough the data originated in San Salvador, becausehad been required to be pared to ihe barestto perform its current mission;

o evidence has been found of any further communication to or from the Station or CIA Headquarters regarding the Andrade parole question between Januaryndhen the Embassyarole request regarding Andrade to the Statehe Central American Task Force at CIA Headquarters, but not OGC,opy of the cable indicating that it was for information purposes only and not for any action on the part of CIA. Information on the cable showedopy had also been sent to the FBI. The cable also listed offices at the Embassy with which the cable had beenhat is, had been allowed to review the cable before it was transmitted--and offices that received information copies only after the cable was sent. The Station was identified on the Embassy copy of the cable as an "info" addressee only and not as having "cleared" the cable in advance of it being sent. No evidence has been found to indicate Station personnel saw the Embassy message or were afforded the opportunity to comment on it before it was sent.

tation activities from the fall9 through spring0 were disrupted by an in"ffltgent urban offensive that began in November IW During this period, the Staocm and Embassy's primary concerns were holding the Salvudoran Government together and coping with daily threats to American lives, including their own. The home of the COS was demolished by insurgent explosives, for example, minutes after he was rescued from it by Salvadoran forces.

M

22S. JBfhe then-Consul General now says he is positive that he would have instructed the junior Embassy officer he assigned to draft the cable to bring the cable to the Station's attention before it was sent. He also says that the computer program in use at that time onlyimited number of offices to be listed as havingable before it was sent. Thus, he says that it was theoretically possible that the Station had seen the cable but had not been included on the list of those that "cleared" the cable before its transmittal. The junior Embassy officer, however, says that it was standard procedure in subsequent years to show such cables in draft to the Station, but such coordination was not routine at the time of the Andrade parole cable. Further, he does not remember whether he "cleared" the Andrade parole request with the Station or not.

f^glhc. Ambassador to E! Salvador says that he assumed that there were meetings at the Embassy to discuss the formal parole request for Andrade that was sent to the'State Department by the Embassy inarticipants in such meetings, he beUeves, would have included the Legal Officer, the Consular Section and the Station. Neither the Ambassador nor the then-Consul General, however, recalls specific meetings that were held to consider the Andrade parole request cable. The Legal Officer recalls no such meetings but says that he too assumes the Consul General would have coordinated the parole request with the Station. The COS says he does not remember attending any meetings0 to discuss the Andrade parole nor does he recall seeing the cable that was sent to Washington requesting the parole for Andrade until he received the information copy after the cable had been transmitted from the Embassy. Neither does the DC OS recall being asked to coordinate on the cable before it was sent. No evidence has been found to indicate that such discussions between Embassy and Station officers took place0 concerning the parole request cable prior to its transmittal to the State Department.

^BThe. Ambassador and the Legal Officer now maintain that the Station encouraged them toarole for Andrade. The COS, insists, on the other hand, that the Station played no part and was not involved in the parole request inhe DCOS also insists the Station played no role in the parole request cable and states that the only role the Station played was to provide resettlement funding to Andrade's family. The DCOS also comments that there were third-country options, such as Mexico, that the Station could have pursued for Andrade's resettlement. The DCOS says that it is simply not true that the Station pressed the Embassy toarole to the United States for Andrade. No evidence to the contrary has been found in Station or Embassy records, records at CIA Headquarters, or in any records that have been made available from the State Department and DoJ. or from the records of interagency discussions on the issue at the time.

CIA correspondence on the parole issue hasthat aates from the end of March until the end of

On, the Station statedable to CLA Headquarters that Andrade was leaving for the United States on Juneesultarole in the public interest that had been arrangecTby the Embassy through State Department in coordination with. agencies. CIA Headquarters replied ono other issues raised in that cable but did not comment regarding the reported parole of Andrade.

ccordingGC memorandum, an OGC attorney discussed the Andrade parole with an officer in the State Department's Legal Advisor's Office. The State Department officer reportedly said that he had raised the issue with the State Department's El Salvador desk officer, who in tum said he had spoken (presumably by telephone) to the Embassy Legal Officer. The Embassy's Legal Officer reportedly had told the desk officer that the parole "was CIA'she OGC attorney pointed out that the original cable requesting the parole contradicted that assertion and indicated that the Legal Officer was responsible for the parole.

S Subsequently, onIA Headquartersable to the Station asking it to clarify its role in the Embassy's decision to pursue the parole. The cable also reportedtate Department officer had claimed CIA was responsible. The Station replied the same day, stating that the "Station played no role in influencing State's decision to authorize Andrade's humanitarian parole."

J^Onhe State Department alsoable to the Embassy inquiring about Andrade's parole. The cable mentioned that CIA Headquarters wanted to know the reason for and circumstances of Andrade's parole and specifically asked the Embassy, "Who initiated the request for Andrade's parole into. (name of individual andnd "With whom was the parole request coordinated prior to its transmittal (names of individuals andnesponse memorandum bearing the Legal Officer's typed name and identifying him as its drafter reported to State that he, the Legal Officer, had been

responsible for requesting the parole for Andrade. Further, the Legal Officer's memorandum only identified the Consular Section at the Embassy as having coordinated in advance on the Andrade parole request. The memorandum also stated that no representations or assurances had been made to Andrade or his family regarding the parole. The Legal Officer's memorandum made no mention of any role by the Station or its personnel concerning Andrade's parole and did not state that the Station, the COS, the DCOS, or any individual serving with the Station influenced, initiated, or was even aware of the parole request cable before its transmittal.

jThe AUSA recalls that the OGC lawyer with whom he had been dealing called him ono discuss the parole. According to the AUSA, the OGC lawyer was upset that the parole had been granted. The AUSA says he had the feeling that "CLA hadast one, and [the Legal Officer) helped them dohe AUSA says he did not consider deporting Andrade because the AUSA felt "itIA operation and nothing could be done abouts indicated earlier, no evidence has been found to indicate that CIA had anything to do with the0 parole request.

0f AUSA further states his belief that the Legal Officer did what he did because heIA officer. All current and former CIA and State Department officers who have been asked about this allegation, mcluding the then-Ambassador to El Salvador, the COS and the Embassy's Legal Officer himself, deny that the Legal Officer worked for CIA. CIA records indicate that the Legal Officer had applied to the CIA for employment3 but was notosition. No evidence has been found to indicate that he had an employment relationship with the Agency at any time.

Issue: "In addition, whether or not any wrongdoing, negligence, orof procedures occurred in allowing known or suspectedperpetratorsiintellectual authors of the murders to enterin the United States, and if so by whom,"

U) No evidence has been found to indicate any wrongdoing, negligence, or breach of procedures on the part of any CIA officer regarding Andrade's parole or his continued residence in the United States.

Issue; "If suspected perpetratorsiintellectual authors of thein this country illegally, or without current authorization,being done to correct the situation?"

U) No information has been found in CIA records regarding this issue.

chronology: events relating to pedro antonio andrade martinez

June 26

StaOon Task Forte report notes "Mario Gonzalez"RTC member.

10

Border Patrol reports that Garcia said "Mario" was commander of several cells and was frequently mentioned by Ismaei Dimas, the leader of the Zona Rosa attack group.

15

General of the Communist Party of El Salvador identifies "Mario Gonzalez" as Chief of the Metropolitan Regional Committee of the PRTC, devisor of the plan for the Zona Rosa attack, and as saying. Marines in the Zona Rosa wouldood target.

19

says that "Mario" was involved in casing the Zona Rosa, was the overall chief of the operation and devised the operation after noticing that Marines visited the Zona Rosa often.

19

notes that "Mario" was the immediate PRTC supervisor of Ismaei Dimas; ordered lsmae! Dimas to undertake the Zona Rosa attack: and met the attack group at its rendezvous point but was not present at the attack. Ismarl Dimas reportedly said that "Mario" hadull description of where th* North American targets were.

JO

a press conference. Abraham Dimas says he knew in advance of the Zona Rosa attack and thatWalter" and his brother, Ismaei Dimas, were planning some action around.

17

PRTC finance officer reports that "Mario Gonzalez" left for Mexico in

17

Rodriguez reports that he hid weapons that "Mario" and Ismae) Dimas brought to his house and that weapons were retrieved three days before Ihe Zona Rosa attack.

31

San Salvador Station report basedalvadoran debriefing of PRTC member notes that "Mario Conzalez" was chief of the PRTC Metropolitan Front and "intellectual author" of the Zona Rosa attack.

PRTC Central Committee member provides information that the Zona Rosa attack was planned and executed by "Mario Gonzalez."

aptured and tells the National Police that heole in the Zona Rosa attack.

Andrade leads the Salvadoran military to the largest arms cache yet discovered in El Salvador.

eeting in Washington. OA's OGC and DoJ agree thai the Embassy's Legal Officer would debrief Andrade on the Zona Rosa attack,ersonnel would nol be present.

Headquarters advise* Station that CIA could notresponsible lor Andrade's entry into the US-

Orellana slates that PRTC leaders claimed .Andrade wa% operating on his own in the Zona Rosa attack, and Andradeeport about

it.

Station tells Headquarters Andrade is afraid of being released in El Salvador and that Legal Officer and Legal Attache1 are willing toarole for him.

Andrade asserts that Jose Manuel Melgar bore primary responsibility, names three dead men as taking part in the attack, and says he was unaware of the details of the attack.

Results of the Salvadoran Special Investigative Unit's first polygraph examination of Andrade are inconclusive regarding his role in the attack.

Embassy reports that Andrade claims in four interviews with the Legal Officer and the FBI that he had no direct knowledge or involvement in Ihc attack but only tried tooctor and safe houses for contingency purposes.

SIU follow-on polygraph of Andrade concludes Andrade did not participate in or plan the attack.

Station officers meet with the Embassy's Consul General and Legal Officer to discuss the Andrade case. Cable to Headquarten requests action on Consul General questions regarding possibility of Andrade parole.

September 25

September 27

request* OA Headquarters permission to provide upn exchange for Andrade's intelligence and going public against the FMLN; state* that DoJ, Legal Attache, and Legal Officer are In agreementarole for Andrade.

. Attorney tells OGC he has no plans to prosecute Andrade but is not willing to grant immunity or allow him to be paroled into the United States.

Headquarters cable notifies Station that AUSA was unaware of humanitarian parole proposal and was not in favor of parole, andtaticn to seek Headquarters guidance before acting on Legal Officer's information.

2

October 5

November 3

November 2"

Headquarters authorizes San Salvador Station ioor assistance and resettlement of Andrade's family.

In Washington, CIA/OCC CIA/LA Division, State,he FBI. and the Embassy Legal Officer agree to the resettlement in the United States of Andrade's wife and children and that QA may debrief Andrade for intelligence. There is no interest in bringing Andrade to the United States, and State and DoJ would want assurances he was not involved In the attack.

A Salvadoran service0 to Andrade's wife, later reimbursed by the Station.

Srabon requests CLA HeadquartersW0 deposit to. bank account of Andrade's mother-in-law.

OGC and AUSA conclude Andrade was involved in planning the attack.

3 January 19

Januaryebruary 3

February 24

Station is advised of OGC and AUSA conclusions that Andrade was involved in planning the attack.

Station requests OA Headquarters authorization to proceed with debriefing and fulfillment of financial commitments to .Andrade's family.

OA Headquarters concurs in providing assistance lo the family.

OA Headquarters denies Station permission to debrief Andrade but welcomes any information Salvadorans might obtain from him.

StationO0 bank deposit for Andrade's family in the United States.

Match IB March 28

Aprilpril IS

Aprilune 26

June 27

Juneulyulyulyuly 9

August 1

Approximate date the National Police furnish Station with first0 reports based on Andrade debriefing*. -

Embassy requests parole for Andrade from State Department and INS. Station and OA Headquarters receive information copies after transmittal.

Stationhird deposit0 for Andrade's family.

Approximate date last report of National Police debriefing of Andrade is received by Station.

State telegram to the Embassy authorizes Andrade's parole.

Station notifies Headquarters that Andrade leaves for US. on

0 given to Andrade's wife by Salvadorans, later reimbursed by Station.

Probable date Andrade leaves El Salvador and enters United States. CIA's OGC discusses parole with AUSA.

Headquarters asks Station to clarify its role in parole request. Station replies it had no role in parole request.

States asks Embassy who requested the parole and with whom it was coordinated.

Embassy Legal Officer reports to State that he was responsible for the parole request, coordinated with the Consular Section and mentions no Station participation.

. and Sai.vadojmn.4ctio.vs is Resposseto the Murders

.Issue: "What specific action and or information the [CIA] nowmay have provided, regarding any reprisal for the Zonaterrorist

the day following the Zona Rosa attack,stated publicly that the United States would providegovernment with whatever assistance, mcludingnecessary to find and punish those responsible for the ZonaOnhe PresidentationalDirective directing the DCI to undertake anof improved intelligence collection and support inin order, among other things, to locateso they could be "neutralized by appropriate forces."

, the Stationable fromliaison officer serving at. Southern Command askingon the "Latest location, disposition and strength ofor command and control units operating in northernand Northern Usulistan province of El Salvador."noted that the "purpose of briefings is extremely closebut represents an initiative of [the Chairman of thehe Station responded that it had previouslylatest information on that subject.

vidence has been found to indicate CIA involvement in any use. armed forces for purposes of direct retaliation against the Zona Rosa killers, nor has any evidence been found in CIA records of any such actions. armed forces. Three CIA officers who were in El Salvador at the time remember that shortly after the Zona Rosaumor circulated at the Station that consideration was being given2 bombing attacks against the PRTC as punishment for the Zona RosaIA officer who had been assigned to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war and had occasion to call in such strikes there says it was possible that he had been the source of the rumor because he may have discussed

the possibility with others in the Station. Senior CIA officials who were in El Salvador at the time do not recallumor.

Agency officer who was asked toBo2 bombing attacks would have been appropriate inbecause insurgent bases were almost always closeareas and any such attacks would have involvedcasualties. The Charge ad Interim believes the possibilityuse2 strikes was mentionedeeting betweenenvoy and President Duarte. However, the twoparticipants in this meeting deny that the usementioned. These two surviving participants disagree aswas proposed to Duarte at the meeting in termsut there is consensus among the three participantsexpressed the view that no. action was necessary.

, the Station reported tothat it would like to "concentrate its resourceslife difficult for [the Mardoqueo Cruz urbanthis regard, the Station planned to coordinate locally in supportarmed forces military operations in the majorof Cerros de San Pedro.

The nature of the Station's support was amplified on Junehen it notedable to Headquarters that the PRTC Task Force had as one of its objectives the development of an all-source intelligence assessment of the PRTC. This would serve as the basis for major El Salvadoran armed forces' military operations targeted against PRTC field headquarters, tiairung camps and logistical

Force use^lnataata was indu<

requested aerialuspected PRTC base camps for Task ied in an intelligence packageNl-Salvadoran Air Force team working in support of Salvadoran military operations.

CLA disseminated an intelligence report toonegarding the initial results ofeffort. According to this report, the Salvadoran Aira PRTC camp in the Cerro Malarara area to bring backand documents in "the continuing search forfor the Zona Rosahe base camp hadof PRTC documents, prisoner interrogation

overhead photographv.

On, the Station disseminatedreport, this time concerning three fire fights thaton the preceding day between the Salvadoransforces-probably the PRTC. The PRTC Task Forceescribed the location of four potential PRTCupon aerial photography. TheRTC Task Forcethat the Salvadoran Air Force planned an attack on apost that day. By, the Station had reportedthat it had received intelligence reports that therelocating its base camps due to increased SalvadoranAccording to this report, the PRTC considered this

trategic withdrawal in the face of increased Salvadoran military pressure it perceived as having been generated by "the assassination. military citizens in the Zonan terms of direct impact on those responsible for the Zona Rosa attack, the Station later received intelligence reports indicating that Ismael Dimas and "Waiter" had diedesult of Salvadoran Air Force bombingRTC camp in

By, DCI Casey was informing Chairman David Durenberger of the SSCIetter that the joint PRTC Task Force hadignificant dividend. The attachment to the DCI's letter noted that one of the objectives of the PRTC Task Force was to provide the Salvadorans with positive intelligence to enable the Salvadoran military to conduct operations against the PRTC.

InLA assessment concluded that the Salvadoran campaign against the PRTC had led to increased rebel casualties. Increased Salvadoran Army pressure during the summer5 had reportedly forced the PRTC to relocate from several of its traditionalIA assessment provided to CIA in8 concluded that "the PRTC infrastructure had been virtually obliterated byn part because of the Zona RosaIA analytical paper also noted in9 that the Mardoqueo Cruz urban commandos were deactivated after the Zona Rosa attack due to the pressure by the Salvadorans.

last assessment of the Salvadoran retaliationhas been identified in CIA recordsomment thatmadeoreign policy Deputies Committee options paper forinccording to the paper,

After the Zona Rosa, CAJIT [Central America Joint Intelligence Team] was tasked to provide targeting information on the perpetrating facdon, the PRTC. The Government of El Salvador was then pressured to react to the provided intelligence packages anderies of crippling blows to the PRTC.he FMLN has not direcdy. personnel, primarily because of the price they were made to pay.

CONCLUSIONS

kjCIA Information About the Perpetrators. CLA riles contain information about the Zona Rosa perpetrators and accomplices. Information in CIA files, mostly based upon the statements of co-conspirators, indicates that Andrade was not present during the Zona Rosa attack but was involved in the planning and directed those who undertook the operation. The only person who can be considered knowledgeable of the events in question and states that Andrade was not involved in planning the attack is Andrade himself. He casts the blame on dead men and claims he was kept ignorant of the details of the operation. Separate reviews by the AUSA and CIA's OGC concluded that Andrade was culpable to some degree in the attack. Their conclusions contradict results of the two polygraph examinations administered by the SIU and the judgment of the Embassy Legal Officer that Andrade was not involved in planning for the attack.

LVs Role in and Priority of the Zonanvestigation. The Station exerted its best effortsithin the scope of its mission, to help identify and apprehend the perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack. Their pursuit became the Station's highest priority. The COS drove the Station to perform this mission and applied extensive pressure on the Salvadorans until there were results. Station personnel who were involved at that time deserve credit for their efforts.

IA's Action Against the Perpetrators. The Station performed properly in aiding the Salvadoran apprehension of Garcia, Rivas and Abraham Dimas. The Station polygraph of Rivas was lawful, properly approved in advance, conducted in adherence to regulation, and was within the scope of the Station's mission.

H^Efforts of the Salvadoran Government in the Zona Rosa Investigation. The Salvadorans demonstrated aggressive efforts to identify and incarcerate the perpetrators. While the Salvadoran services' bureaucratic structure and rivalries sometimes

interfered, there appears to haveenuine intent to succeed in this regard. There was great interest in the case at the highest levels of the Salvadoran Government, including President Duarte. This interest was translated into steps to resolve internal Salvadoran problems and remove obstacles to the pursuit of the investigation.

alvadoran military actions did severe damage to the PRTC as an entity, reduced its effective number of combatants by about half and appears to have resulted in the deaths of at least two of the known perpetrators of the Zona Rosa attack.

P CIA's Relationship With tin Perpetrators. tation coordinated fully with CIA Headquarters, and CIA Headquarters coordinated fully with other appropriate agencies-State Department, DoJ andproviding financial relocation assistance to Andrade's family. The Station complied with the directions it had been given by CIA Headquarters not to meet directly with Andrade or to question him concerning the Zona Rosa attack. In fact, no evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA personnel ever met with him directly for any purpose, even when, early on in his debriefings by the Salvadorans, Headquarters had granted permission for the Station to do so.

I urpose of providing funds to Andrade's family through the Salvadorangain his cooperation in furnishingproper and fully within the scope of the Station's mission. In this regard, the Station properly coordinated with and obtained authorization from CIA Headquarters. CIA Headquarters, in turn, acted properly by discussing the payments with State and DoJ, neither of which raised objections to this action.

IA's Role in Andrade's Parole. Immediately after Andrade's capture, OGC became the lead CIA element in dealing with the case and coordinating with other agencies, especially with DoJ and the AUSA. The degree of Andrade's culpability in the Zona Rosa attackey element in many of the CIA's decisions. However, the Station was not advised of the conclusion that had been reached in this regard until about six months after Andrade's

capture, subsequent to many interagency meetings and several important decisions by the Station and Headquarters. n

ased on Andrade's request and the desire of the Consul General for guidance in the matter, San Salvador Station raised the questionarole for Andrade with Embassy officials and CIA Headquarters soon after his captureubsequendy, however, the Station appears to have treated this aspect of Andrade's case as the responsibility of the Embassy. OGC noted in9 that the CIA's interestarole had been "put ono evidence has been found to indicate that the Station played any role in, or was consulted in advance concerning, the parole request for Andrade inhe Legal Officer did not refer to any Station involvement in the parole process when he replied directlyormal inquiry from State Department that specificallyIA inquiry into circumstances of Andrade's parole, and the Station specifically denied at the time that itart in the parole

P Reprisal for the Zona Rosa Attack. No evidence has been found to indicate the CIA implemented, supported, or became aware of. reprisal for the Zona Rosa attack, including use of its own paramilitary mechanisms or any agents it controlled or directed. CIA intelligence may have been used by DoD for operational planning and CIA did, as part of. Government's reaction to the attack, provide intelligence to the El Salvadoran armed forces to use in operational planning for attacks on the PRTC.

A. R. Cinquegrana

CONCUR:

Frederick P.

Inspector General

Original document.

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