PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ

Created: 7/19/1983

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ROSPECTS FOR IRAQ

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

Tha hlbwrng inHlX9tr.1t. orgaiizothmrm preparation ol tha Htimaf-r

Tka Cantrd t'tilorH* kataty, (ht Oiftntt IHo^ona!

A^tncy, and ft*orocnliotioni of Ifn Dfpo-wwnti el Sxx> andy.

n* AiiiHsM CWvwIipMIht Army

O. OHw-or ot Nmelol th* Hary Th* Autttotfl StaH.Dc*HM^ CXf*i'o<ow

CONTENTS

KEY

DISCUSSION

MitoiiSHiallon

InWiStMocy

Irwi Likely; tconcctfc Imped of the Wla-

Etooomt Deteriorated1

Mete Reienuei

Dfilniihed Flnaclel AxliUoct

Retrenchment Ah red _

Sreiirn Ptmntial ReDrievc

PollltMl IiQBecl a! tbe Wei

WokHnoflbe Strength) of Ike PawbJ*ronpi.

Foreign PotiorSwt>

Rcirtlom With tbe

Th* United Suit*

Prenwcti r'or US

ABiPBlH Ir.a> Mi'iim

KEY JUDGMENTS

The war with Iran ia ihe almost angle preoccupation of ihe Saddara Husayn regime and is the principal determinant of Iraqi foreign and domestic policy. Saddam it lockedar of attrition, (he duration of which dependsegime In Tehran that espouse)verthroweligious duly. We do noi expect the warnd soon. TheImportanlly,given little indication that ihcy are willing toettlement lo the conflict.

We believe Saddam will remain In power for ihe two-year period of this Estimate, bul In our Judgment hii regime has become more brittle. It ii more narrowly based on family and tribal ties and moreon fear at an Instrument of control than ft was when the war began.

Iraq retains few concrete war alma beyond extricating itself with the least possible cost. Baghdad abandoned Its goal of destabilising the Khomeini regime early In the war. Itefensive military strategy, thereby forfeiting (be ability to control the ^wpc, direction, and duration of the conflict

Chancesecisive Iranian military victory during the period of this Estimate are remote. Iran's hut two offensives failed,ost of0 casualties. Iranian efforts have suffered from poorand coordination, inaccurate intelligence, and inadequate air support. Iraqi performance has improved because of more effective use of Intelligence, air power, and defensive doctrine.

Thereotential that Ihe war will escalateajor way to involve other Gulf states or even non-Gulf powers. We doubt, however, ibat such an escalation will occur during the Estimate period. Iraq's major military option to force dramatic change Is sustained airon Iranian oil facilities and tankers in the Persian Culf. Such anhowever, would not persuade Iran tocurrent objective- Sueb air attacks are more likely if Iraq believes Its policy of restraint is dearly leading to defeat and direct Involvement of tbe major powers Is needed lo force an end to the war.

1

Escalation bv Iran would probably lake the form of resumptiontrategy of all-out Invasion of Iraq, or attacks on lraq'l Gulf supporter* Both options become more, not leu, difficult with time. Iron's military capability will continue to decline in the absence off major weapon systems.

Iraq's economic condition will worsen as long as the war continues because it cannot export large amounts of oil Oil exports are at one-fifth the prewar levelillion barrels per day Iraq will be unable to increase oil exports substantially as long as its Gulf outlets and its pipeline through Syria remain closed. Foreign exchange assets are down to less thanillion,rewar lev-el ofillion. Direct assistance from the Culf states will be sufficient to allow Iraq to continue tbe war, but will fall short of Iraq's overall requirements.

Iraq will have to reduce imports sharply (his year. Tbe cuts will continue to impact most heavily on Iraq's plans for economicbut this year the consumer will also increasingly feel the effects.

Iraq abo will have to defer payments worth several billion dollars to its trading partners. Baghdad is negotiating with foreign contractors from several Western countries for delayed paymentside variety of civilian projects. Iraq also will press harder for financial concessions from its major arms suppliers. Most exporters probably will go along with Iraq's requests, because they can do little to force payment and they can expect their current help to enhance their postwar economic opportunities in Iraq.

As long as the war continues, Iraq's policies will be characterizedon confrontational stance on larger Middle Eastoncern not to alienate either superpower, and even heavier reliance on the forces of repression to cope with the uncertain domestic security situation. Saddam Husayn already has been forced by the war to moderate further Iraq's longstanding radical policies toward itsArab neighbors, and its strident opposition to Israel and the West.

Iraq also has stopped virtually all economic aid to leftist regimes and opposition movements. Iraq instead has sought to strengthen ties with its Persian Culf neighbors, whose financial and political support is critical against an Iran-Syria al lance. Syria is likely to remain deeply hostile to Iraq- It will continue to see cooperation with Iran as the best way to try to overthrow Saddam, and is likely to keep the Iraqi pipeline through Syria closed-

2

I ag

An Iraq that Is again nooning ol) will try to reassert its Influence in the region- This probably would resultoughening of its itance on many foreign policy issues important to the West, including the Palestinian question. Baghdad would probablyreater role in Arab Gulf security arrangements and. in time, within the GulfCouncil, from which It Is now excluded Iraqi leaden might revert to their prewar policy of opposing superpower involvement in the region, especially If theyharp increase In Iran's contacts withoutside powers However the war ends. Iraq's behavior will continue to be Influenced during (he next two yearsontinuing, sometimes violent, rivalry with Iran and Syria, andeed to maintain access to logistic and financial support from Its conservative Arab neighbors.

Although Iraqi-Soviet relations have run an uneven course in recent yean, they have improved since the springelations will remain proper, if not warm, as long as the war continues- IraqJeopardize the arms supply rektlonshtp with tbeprimary source of modern armorerious decline In Its military capability during. The Soviets have used this leverage, but with little success. In an attempt lorewar move by Iraq to more evenly balance its East-West diplomacy.

The protracted war and economic crisis In Iraq have prolonged Baghdad's dependence on Soviet aims, but the driftikely towhen the war ends. Moscow views Iran as the major geopolitical prize in tlie region, and may be(he opportunitysacrifice close ties with Iraq in order to expand Its influence in Tehran. The Soviets might welcome Saddam's removal as an opportunity to .expand their influence in Baghdad. They would, however, notundamentalist regime, which would lead to even less Soviet influence in Ihe Persian Cub*.

o evidence that Moscow has sufficient support within Iraq tooup. Nevertheless,action within the Iraqiprobably areportedly favors maintaining close ties with Moscow. Some elements of the military probably would support close ties, at least until reliable alternate military supply relationships have been established. The Sovietsarge mission In Iraq, including atilitaryconomic and technical advisers.

The postwar opportunity to expand US-Iraqi ties is likely to broaden II the current regime remains In power in Baghdad Iraq's

3

relations with the United State* have improved over the last few yean, and commercial tin have grown considerabry. Baghdad hai expressed growing interest in renewing high-level official contacts with the United States, and after the war probably will expand relations withThey will be reluctant to expand ties while the war continues to avoid appearingupplicant in need of US support.

Serious impediments to closer US ties with Iraq remain. Iraq is suspicious of US Intention in the Persian Gulf. It remains convinced that the United States is prolonging the war by allowing Israel to supply arms to Iran. US policy toward the Arab-Israeli issue and the Palestinianajor obstacle. Iraq, moreover, appears intent oosome links to the Palestinian terrorist groups Black June and IS May.

The currentikely to pursue policies more favorable to the United States than any successoruccessor legime would be anxious to establish lu legitimacy with other Arabs and would be heavily influenced by the current popular Arab attitudes toward the United States. The United States, in fact, might serveea pegoat for new leaden of the Ba'thist or Islamic fundamentalistajor upheaval particularly one in which Iranarge Influence, would resultegime that would oppose any US presence in the area and would pressure countries in the region to reduce ties to the United States.

Among the scenarios for removal of Saddam Husayn. other than an isolatedpalace coup" is most likely If the military orsituation deteriorates sharply. Saddam probably would beinitiallyollegia) party leadership, which would make few policy shifts. This leadership would soon come under great strain ai different players jockeyed for power. Increasing the risk of further political upheavals.

A broader coup involving the military is lest likely during tho period of this Estimate. Pervasive security inhibit* extended plotting and the security services would have to be co-opted Saddam has reduced the political role of military officers, and the army, In any case, is preoccupied at tbe front Given the secretiveness of the Iraqi system, however, we are unlikely to have advance knowledge of serious plotting.

A general popularhe least likely prospect. Despite an upsurge in terrorist activity in Baghdad, opposition elements appear too weak and dborganlwd tooordinated threat lo Saddam They

hflv 1groups -re manipulated

fay foreign backer, who have con/lfctioa goah to Iraq.

"ufly,n'sJremovBj could mher In au extended .period of totebttfe to Baghdad Hi, successors probably could not maintain Saddamof tight control and any post-Saddamhnofl certain to fall into factional fighting. Onlyuccession of weak

supported hrtwt^Yto. coming to power. Even to tha, ct

responsive todirectives over the long run.

8 b

MBit

discussion

Iiiq it trappedtalemaied war thai tua lu flrancUlarrlcti economic growth,i resourcei. and limit, lu poliuial cpiicw ii Match fa an aid to tbe war remain* frustrated bv Tebran'f declaredto con-lima until Ptefcdent Saddam Hwavn fell) (ram power or nm to bumiliittai termi fa peace.

aghdad haa few military options. Ilia fttfeXed fitly in tbe war the ability to control tbe scope and dumUo of tba eoufllct It cennu retain tba froliatne wltbaut etcakrJnt the fighting and. In the proccra, decicuun tbe already iHm chencaojtleal scUlemcN. Coweciuteitly. it meet Hxefycontinue todetract wir punctuated bya*cc.a] air raldi or mUalle ettacii again*od fidhrtu end population cental but abo with the poarHrilUy ol- < attsea* on Iranian shipping

Mittory Situation

1 Despite IB Xrttcslc predicament, the bcSlcal mlhlary ntoiUon bu Improved luhatantiaHy for Iraq over the pot you. Since Iranian iroopa renplmdc.hr tneiWadi forces have repJerd or cootalncd live Iranian offensives.f iDcranpetenl ten lor Iraqi commaedcra foiW.ni the Xhorra ir-jhthr defeat, Improved tactical plarsamt,reataof Ir.oi troopi to fight In celerae of their own territory have accounted fa the to-proved [erforoinee.

1 Wilh new commander,ore tanglhtche irani Army'i adnataan over tbe Itanium In rumor and erUlletv hare begun toore Important role, (beeran has more mobileetter orf.nlred logistic system, and elabo-rrate defirulve fartflcations along tbe border The Iraqi, also haw benefited from Imonxed Iritelhsenoe. espcdallr lianal intercept cacuWBty. Iraqi cooiraand-en almost alwayt have forteoowledge of Innlan mows

S. The AH Force hai sufficient aircraft andio ecaure air inprrrlorUv over the decimated

Table 1

II

o

Iraq, Statu of

dlvuloo'

MrrfwUM kf.mv

jl.too

Ml

nm

h-btairwuibmmwt awtm miansc em)

al>A* dilm fata

knew)

slttrsn aimer)Aa**mm w; i! in

nanl cohioumi miwlf

wwrt hulttf tksjini

i ulmilloe*ec

iu-tdrill)lt aline)

' Shuctrr inad.

Iranian Air Force. In recent bottles, the AirIncludingorerole.

Iron's Strategy

ftmthrow remain. Iran'* primaryaim. Iran ibo will work for ha rrpWmcnl bv an Iskmic regime. Secondary objectives includeomplete Irani withdrawal from occupiedterritory, obtaining aiatle npanlions, bavin Iraq tondeenred as the auroaor, andeel exilra.

o achieve IU soars and maintain miliary pret-rure on Iraq. Uw hai launched major itmind offer.-

terv fewonliaurd (allure* ind meuaUAt raaraaian, however, haveetwaa fo mUa ikalave*aa caarJy of emitn otwi Iran loliUi. uid etcccaxul prcauic on IraqBBl nthopular bttiltili it librae ovci iiaalUa Tat IreoUni probably are convinced that,aa of altrWicc their adraataae in manpowa) andebUUr io Daman anbac cf atl aaperU raawix bj Iraqaulj gaaimto Beaajaanlrr Can tabhtb tbe acaWha Hot,e Iraq. bat km dependableodem weaponetae l> Quantity, and tho IraqiIn Ihn anai ,K- over UntaL

A unit, o* inriOon crobabir wtl bebv leaa-eaaed laaliaaii U> aba aadal (beed nam la ao aiaraaptIraqi martialnail banddSaeseau withanii to Tehran(arid ol ImoriK bwnlMnsi in Baghdad llilian alUct co tha tmdquailm of AirAddltiornl bomblnD an) pcaaUyaaaaaat aaaaaal Iraq' affkaah arahaa. atkaaapa lo weaken lertlaa taacetltearb.and even twktVand prraonnel ceutf become anteti ol

> Iran can maintain aatamnue preuure on liaq by keeofei tbaardraqi ahlppaaat TVa lorce* Iraqah* oa 'oaa aaal ceaUr rraaapeiWaia roaaai UVnathcwBw no1 minna Idpommi* Ta+oan will provide Syria nearlylttoe. worth il ml cm coniearioauiy terra* duitrq> mean- thai lac Iraqi oil piprlinalo reinalra ckeed Irec baa out rloard by Mbotea* Irani >J

TaUal feUnaled Wa, Loaaci

. J

prncrndcuita

j-ju

lpeinrcvrbelira; leaatauTiarkav

ran wta caaaaaTeaatwt in mtiean Mniacwluffnaitc (anpiUin loBaa'dsd andulf wpponro Iranphi oo the (tan oJ waah Call aovrinn.enti uoctsnlulltblrr of ccnliutuilon with Iran. Tahianoapm rakUcauSaArabia, lha Lrurd Arab taaioaaa, aaal XawaJL aad tkat* allorta ara Uaolr lo coaaaoe. Tatirao aha ll trrtaq a> aaa lha partition cauaed by ibf damaardjba r.ull lo turn both populain lha GuM oountriatIraq, aa lar wllh only

troq'l Llhaly Ratponaa

aahdadi aaal ll to convince Trhranhe <nr mtlllarily and lhat ranllm*Doc ol oba war.at laaWcaat mrtm, la not ta baa'i lawn it. Iraqeortw lha aaauor pewaai daai tka war anal ba Kcccvd and lhal ootatda pamaa nvod workeaar-hnc. (Saa

IS. To achieve ihrtr undi. Baahoad mup. favonin achieving tangible military iuccu while

ni(l^ hart*liMOon luiiien lixcea'

Aaua* oar danaqast oUaaalaa at Apr a. Iraq wat lasatrm inaaaatltaat beritlort captured by th* IraMani to prevent Trhraii (romUtny Iraqi around force* sowam. am notaoc* larao-aralof then own bacauae this would Incraaie Iraqi caiualllai ajve Iran >ha opportijiUly tooecaaalul oWeede. aadaS*aa atw IraManalaoapbla aral-dat'fea* ollraaaaaiiirianii' aiwaaal wbach ta raty aaa-aara

raqlo Iranian offentvel and

tanorHt attack! ioUd* Iran by atriair* Iranian oil InilatltllDni clllo, and civilian laraeti wiih iur!iiaarfata ouiilo andair aiiacka tofor

BtaMid brn*MI> to bounlnwimm

ital can Salarlandtjaara ana a

fbrwknl wiafirr noatabr. bit ot* MWraia H

In il* ewnBnal nor Ins naulaBV to at

HIM *MS nuHirdrt il-m

mit*IttkinabMo*cwuaui* wn uiinn itc Iranu Wirt. iSrav ol maud mB nnin tow ewanai on loa'i tMfdr aibmnyM nM lanr Iro it tnd lb

^

a 8

Iran thai coolinalng tha war tt oourMrrpruduciWa Atihwugh lurh attacks Ufeastbtn ihee ol raid-ham tn Trillin, Baghdad is llhaly to roMinue tbrra (Mil Tent anoKfttr irraarrst la faaoMelloea

raq -Ul eatdaam mheapdae danarn ol tne wer. palUcvlarlt to cl.ha rrstrafa of ihe Calfjod outstdt powers b> attacking Ughtl) dt-landed. Ina Important oil tanteti tn tbe northern Culf. Sock Bitatii are one of the fewait Iraq can hull Iran and counter the unprerMon that only [ran .mn Initiate military action In addition to billing liaiilan ofoil irratelbBoai In tba taanhavn Calf. Iraq haa warned that the lame prUottaanatalbamrrwi wOl beapanew Itraat reauaia work oa ihe prsra

Ii Iraq Ii ademption lo Increase in tapabdttrttach lianlan trapping throogliovii the Culf. France hu airred to loan Iraq lit* Super Eiendaid aircraft armed -ul: Kaoctt aarliihlp mlssllea. iu ba deliveredearhr fall In addllton, Iraq laportedly ll having aonia of the Frenchifhiorl hai oo urdrr modified to carry the Eaoca* Iraq haa aged Super Freion hrbcopmi armed erU the Kaorctbit rat at tba raoribeto Cedf. MMn of At Sanaa ECeodard aircraft, ia parUtilar. would make feasible Irani elleeks against twipplag near If as far

miitli atin).

he Iraqi Air Force already Mi thl capability to sertouily dlirupt Iranian oil eiportl To beIlajhdad wnii have to carry outt artiKharlt broad were ibarisk raaaalaraMShoaU tbey drc.de lo eanaad thetr rataTaBttu age In* Iranianbo Calf, lie Iraq* could rbooat frera raven) caiifch (areata Tbe>ttempt ta darupt actlnlyneynt. the only Iraanailhead, or destroy pumpingB| Kheik In addition. Iraqie launched aaalnM Kherhllii belt Jriindcdvulnerable oil lankrn cn rwaUrom KUark.

IT hvauiaed air it'jiu are mor* likely if Iraq brjon Ha notary oflearS laadlai to

Crfcat and dirrel iaiat of tbe BiVr poneti k

tccdeC to fere* an end so the war. Attack) aaaiiiet Khaik and Ml tankers probably would prompt Iran toa vulvar of all-out Invanon of Iraq, or attacks on Iraqi Cull lupporlen Iraq'i Arabat certalnlv will do aa much ai> boil lei Iraq and discourage auch deiperaic- moves

IS fntqwUlrwabaeioiuMtlnthicamntUravlevd of fighting for tba two-nor pirlad of thu Estimatelbatanlla' adaetata in mililary

cqaccent lo Ibeniri ul tlie war uulm Tehran

canmply bat for kraa araourrti of rnadern weapons comparable Is thoae alrtadi ia Iraq- Proa-pecrj forririaprtwec areould rec/eare Teataa ao Iraarawe rwhtUtre i) II rail argb VMabaaaaa. aaVraorrar.ana Iraq ant haveuardefeneration in Iroop aoraie muittoa from war we*linear aa wat aatactical nrors leadinan Iranlaa bauleflaid

inally, (hejeeoccupalkin with tbe Iranian threat might he alteredeterlocatloa of uxurlty In Iraqi nteWr cllleeor in iheunllkrfy eventajor reaurienca ol Kurduh dluAnt Krerarlh la tht north. These events would be likely to force baahdad to withdrawoom Iroas tbewhich latdoubtedly would -aikcn nulllary

CcorsoyHJ

SO Tbe cr-ucal weaaon In Iran't arrenal has been

Ha abalUi Mini ilamaaa Iraq's b*

rraln IU oU ciport lermlnali ia lie Cult With oil eiporu al ane-fdth tht prewar level of Sind the flow of Culf llate aidear trickle by ihe andliihil.il was forrrd .iHuiil. to abandon IU reenrnnk deiriopnwnl prniiam. Il aim hadownynioature 11

till. Ihe total Irnport bul lor IM was aboutbiOioa. nearly tha aaaae aa tbe yawl brfort Sustained Import uernand leflretrd awgadadi rraa-raataaeet to limit tht war effort cnopktc prsorty prraecta andaadyof coc-surraer aooci Iraq was ipending an ealnaMdiillcai per monlh In direct emit for tht war derma,Thu mm Included eaperdllurai for mlburr equlpmeat, fuel, and all aar related tomtruction.

Mcre ftavonua Snor'foh]

il Iraq will earn rirn ksi fcrrlin eichange tba year lhan IIraq cut III oil price In

Intj: Oil tipom and Revenue!

yetaboutrealign It with the new OPEC benchmark. Aia reault. oil etpcct revenue which account) (or virtually all of Iraq'i earnings, will roach only0 billion, compered4 billionZ Every ll-per-barrel cut Iraq ti forced to auk* force* tbe retime to rut mpandltvrea bv an additional IBM million or to find that much additional financial aninance from abroad.

raq cannot lubtUntaaBy Increase tta own oil rparte, although other Arab producer) cau stool, oil toucairan At local as Iran provide) Syria with oil. Damawoj haa link incentive to reopen the Iraqi oil pipefcae (capacity Lt ml) thii year. Syria It likely lo continue raining prtwure flora both the Soviet* and the moderate Arab) to reopenThe planned eipanaion of the Turfaah pipeline capacityraqi only opartnot be eeenrJeted4 Although Baghdad and Riyadh have agreed In principlehne acrou Saudi Arabia to tbe Bad Sea, the line hi unlikely to be completedf at all (See figure a)

St liaq win" not be able to fall back on Iu foreign eichauge rowves3idat (See figureeaeivea have plunged to hat lhan IS btlhon fromulaWn before tbe war. (veJafcttng the sqvxcn- (is ready cash, Iraq baa beta uqutdattng inter oat-ear nine aaacU prior to their matuitl*.

DaaJniuW Rnontfel Aitolonca

S3.believe the Calf Hatrt-Saudl Arabia,Qatar, and the UAE-wiU provld* wffWmt, direct aid to Iraq ino prevent the colhtuH of Iraq* reiuUnce to Iran due to financialTho Cuif countriei faea financial dlffkuhtei ol than own beeauie of the loft oil market Saudi Arabia, the lamest benefactor, forWil eUell havedip Into retervu tbli year no natter what aid il evcntaaUy ttvaa Iraq.

C j. Direct Gulf aad, however, will probably be Im Aaao far tha year Saudi Arable, Kuwait, and the (ME have provided Iraq with aboutean and additional Iraqi belt lightening; will be ntcowry.

ST. Seed! Arabia and other Culf ekbes wlD conUaue to anderwiiW Iraqi amu purchatet Tbemillion the Saudii have alto3armarked for French and Egypiaui amu purchara Riyadh ear an had paid for Iraqi purchaser of Egypbin rnllilary hardware worth0 mllllee, accord-traj to reliable tcurec* Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman,

ntn eawnt, alio havo funded Egyptian aad West European arms rain

U. To atajment their monetary aid to Baghdad, the CuB Katet-prtnctpally Saudi Arabia-aim will ma-

"oWa**

FLfurt4

oreteawit

Ira* I

Table 3

-i

aa

aa

aa

M0

lis

-li

-aa

11id ii 11

las

eiporflIraqi brliiJf. Saudi Arabiafir hu dativearrel) pec day to Iraqi riailonvnra durto* Aprillum. Wearl* all ihb oil haa bran delivered to lor-ii. and India India mala* pa.mmo InSII which. In barn. crcdJbi pun- hue account

It difficult for ant tnutfrtee to -ell naortaaauataaa ofraq darlaai ihe rat of tht rawaeitaeaarneat-lr.^ asda. Cdt*mares aad *fl aalea, pnaeaiy .SI not arced ih* preview leW ol US bilco In IBM

ary af Iraq') creditwoetbtraM aid aa irahihr, to win Ihe war. Weatern bank) ara uo'ilrlr to lend Iraq luUtireii: amount, durtnxTh* BOO mO-Hon Baahdad received la Aprileal reapoea* lo Hi requati for aid; only three) of thtnrtfripatlna bank) aeiencnMab.

i. AKaod

llh few otlwr economicraq> forcedcut Import* iharplvSea uU**

ad (IS baataa I

Ino* befp fromill laB ahcat cf thcae requiiercenU, Iraq will be forced to draw down rearm* ajam that rear by ai motherillion.

h* war effort will ooMiaue to receive top priority duriiii the term of that Eetimete liaq nroU-bty will eoWinue lo itgn new contract) ihii rearit military requirement).

nduary and the coosurnar will bear ih* brunt of the Import ledacttoni Impnrli of raamdattiirtd

9 2

goods willraq ctcnplrtei ei Ultra crojnu and postpones meat new ccmtruciion proSccU. Earl* 1SS3 trade data lor aome of Irag'i key supptMn indicate thai imperii of heavy indniirtal machlneiy. 'eating and cooling eqdtpmeiit, and Meal are vvel off hut year'i pace. Coniunift good) Import) from Japan.tcand-largatt trading partner, were down aSO percent during Jan-aary-April (rem ihc ume period lait year. Purchase) of paaengrr candropped ihirply-

raq cannot riant!teanUv Iran import! of focd-atofft; lt> tgrlccluirni icclor dco noi rmvide nearly enough focd (or lelf-iufilc'ancv. Iraq mu.it Import rooghly S3 percent of lo total grain nerdi

Seeklfq -'manmI Reprieve

raq probably will be able to defer payment! worth Kieril billion dollar) to Ha trading pnrtnr-ri thit year lo heap cover lit foreign eiehinae shortfall. Baghdad already hat arranged credit ternu (ot foodo antral countries Iwuidlng Canada. Atav traba, and the Unitedlio negotiating with foreign contractors (icon tooral Wciiern countries, ihe meat IroportaM beinf Japan, West Cermeny. Fiance, and die Untied Kingdom, for delayed pay-nteettide variety cf civilian projects now under way. Necetiillom cur reedy arcecausecldlna out for mora la^xwbCr cretift tarmt on ht debts, iDcmdlnq an estimated IIillion that Iraq will owe for wort on West German lnd,ntrlilno, aka> requires many flmun contracts to ef In the* own ft gondii package)rcrcquultc (or new ordtri

Iraq abo Mil pteo harder for financial cancel' atSaa from ill malar arms suppUen. Baghdad already has arranged to0 million worth of crude oil annualy io help finance meat of Its IS btlbon arms debt to France. Iraq abo has reached an agreement to meet3 financial obligation to tbe USSR for mlbiary hardware with Saudi Arabian c4 worth aboctbill tot

Most exporters probably will go along withtqueata for deferred payments and more coc-ciutcnary tarma In anten of eventual imiiiine-mcni in Iraqi economic tltoitton. and becauaa they can do talk to force paymeai. They, no doubt, expect their heap now to enhance their outness cppartunitlei in Iraq after tho war.

Political linpocl of lha War

f 'ho >'r_

3ft Saddam baa been political, weakened by the ccnfllcl with ban. Ha la laekadar ol altrttioa. the darahon of whit* dapeudiegime lhat rrgoidi his defeatttlgloa duty. Economic development hai com*irtual hall, and the demand) (or necrU*lcal on the part of th* population will grow mora onetoua Iraqi ablUly to *iplcn It* primary murce efleaKaa lo lharesin**

be lay politiaal com forhat he ha* had Id aaaaaaw aaltraiW raapoaatauatv far lha war aaaaaal lb*and aattaary katdaaahap. He haa loaicaiaj atoden anrreVi is Ej :wn ixndj aad eecrfined dicliliaatahlajmail tana if al ef aassjaaajaa, prc-babl. ahaavamvaan la th* Iraqi ten*f both tba adatary and ember,ai hirr tusE'mrdnmeitale cenirol but they probabliMulled in bawd debt) *nd furtber laurowrd tbe baa* of thoseolr

addam will b* blamed alaj loi the- collipae of Iraq's key foroian policyauw of Ihe war. Ihehai Ml bath Baghdad') near-term liopei o(ore dominant poiUicn la ihe Arab ootidesult cf ihe openlia prowdad by EaypTi oatraceein after the lignlng ol Ihel accords, and In tha Pectlan Culftiutt of Iraa'irion. Iraq ti mot* dooeeKUeil on Its ociahbon ta the CuK. aad

U

-SKifi

rawreveragealowcd because ol the increased Importance ol Ihr Sovleti as

or praatblt lo prnfact .hrlin OW COOtladdam Maura Bat In oar lucaanvrnat.aac brittle regime lhan three yarn ago. mot* iiirro-.li bued on family and Tlkrlti tribal Ian and nor* rrihrM on fear aa an Inurtunent ol (Otiliol Although hj maintain, tight control ovar the (oxrnmenl and parly and hb oppartftoa ii weak andtried ha remain! vulnerable lo ariloui drtarlora-Uun In ihr rwononot or ihe Miliary ratualtan Hp atfl be Iwrlhar wnaiened If be bccomei lb) prrsoral focus ol btaaar by ihe uar-weary roaatkae*

Srrarujg* of the lagur*

Ji No cejcnililon arcup or allgnmeni. in our etrl-maton. hai enough srHly or strrnil'i lo unreal Saddam llusavn. TKe numerous *tlle opponenU ait weak, disnrgantied. and manipulated by Bovernnieiili op-poied lo Iran Drrrraatrcally, ihedemcc stratrd (utwJdrrrable reatUeary during the repealed Iranian military issauhi* Uorrovrc. Iraqi obmraarm aeevra. service one ol ibt brarat aad treat nihkwihe MsrMat Eaat- domiraUti wtth reftttnam. Ctven ihe tcinrfu of ibe Iraqi lyawrn, how*vj.are unlikely lo ba forewarned ol lervnn plotting

addameD-deaer-ed rrpulailon-n year, when Iraqg co ihe haltlefteld. he quickly moved lo curb oppcwUon within lit piv*rnmem and tbe Ba'th Parly In Janee raaied ihe Ba'lb Parly Regionalh knalnti and icalrd down (he refer* Reioiutian-ary Coraaaaad CauociJ. rrnrncatag aaraaalrri olBahi and olhtea who hod voiced erttlebra of Irani conduci of the war

addam eomlrmed th* purge-olllclib removed fiom oflict- in (arte Isal their parly credential! In December, and al heatri allrailtr olriecuted. repcrtedly fcr unompMeena Th* death erf Bear in Orlohei rrmovrd the major ralMaq pnlm foe ihoae ib (he MadevrnatP CQvpcard la UAhm. and no othrt faeeaa ha* laaaaad] from (he party or oauVtaryqnilxam rival

IS. Military revolt aaamsl Soudana-llkely under ihe pceaeot circumstances. Although re-pnriina ia llnut.rl. there do not appear lo b* significant mntalr problnui In the military. The Army remains preoccupiedhe war. and nomaicc niUltiri unlti outfit ol ihr HtpubHiaa Guard are lUOonad la Baihdad Saddam uaea forced tcrtrreneou aadIreaaatri lo rrrvew officer, from aaieMag Uoad-based raqaiaW Iraud* (he mattery After the faD of nitiaaraaaaV. Saddam -aa ah- to defeat (be mft-ttrv's growkag anger al pohlieal Irrearfareect by re-moetna Ee'th Party aiajoiMtaa wffhan the military who -are held rraptcBhie for th*he rratrn* also provider the military wilh nut iai benefit! and LiUvlia't

addam dot* not vet appear to be the main urge! of public dlwtaaacttoa despite tndkatlons lhal alrradi fragSt public morale continue! loerudr Moat of tbe popabr* reportedly atlll buunr lroNan Intraral aaan far the auiarrnaled coalhet and bahev laay ranratirthn the face of iha eataeial Ireal Saddamr oi an elaborate lalitarahly eaB. and auhet fraqutnr prabbc appaaranf a* ureaaa an aetaraibie leadei. Tht Iraqi leadership, moreover, itrrbabfy reimanucl lhalucev mr wouid face ihe lame eccnccnc clfflrultln. and ike! not k* ii-removalikely war to and the war II Saddim became the fucui of diwilfc bVim* for the war, or If prnaarlul rlemenU Ib ihe Iraqi kadenblp bafatvod hli removal nould pacify Iran. hU taaWml woekl be arrloialy weahrntd.

Scanorioi

addam be reex-ed. the rarotara af HCcewcG nuahi dodoo la weral wan Any axcta-lor leaiava from th* Ba'th Parly or military would Come under Immerhate prtiiure from the war. Evenetime, which could end the COnllKU probably would he plained by fathonal laflahtlna

4B. Aiiattlwalaou. Thetltfrat loauiai nation. He haa aurvived meral lurk anarki In Ihe peat Kit frrovree public anpeaiancea incrraw (be rtakicceaatd aBaei. Saddam has aaat of awaiauri ihaae puned from powee. warn ea-Baravli law* iwrra to aat aaaaaatL and dearruMledof ihe daruptioni caaard by th* war

4hV Palace Coup. Th* danqtroup by tome of the current tadenhip would nrow if lite military or uvurity lilvalion were io djettrtorata to the point that ihey Indeed tltelr own iurvl>al wai In daiatr,If

15

1

:

served that Saddam was about lo wiry out -preemptive purge la iba wake of aa unfavorable sHtVemrrtt with Iran. Iho political threath* hadeots nol nam arveir enough to mikeoveb* near luture, end key leaden probably j'*lie (hit they remain mote secure "ilhn

idlfrfon Ceotrmnoab Either of the scerwr* lotouldeiull tn coalition of senior

fltUTM in the regime Aiming Siddami most powerful

I It-ilctisnti are Vice CLairmin oi the RCC leal Ibrahim and Deputy Prime Miruiler Toht Yasin(See

bul Ibrahim wouldjccldit- to VKceed lo the prr-adency, although health problem arc ha apparent preferenceubordume role make him an unlikely candidate to assume full power. He at widely reiprcted, making him aa attractive brid far behind-ihc-iccnn powertiime ic^jliii who hat held aeveetl semllivr Ibrahimevout Muillrn who bu had< wlih WcsUrrars.

Ramadan,alHlcll arid ambjioushe aroccut meal powerful mm In ihe toienv meat aad laeinoM likely figure lo replace Saddam. He hai bolt: heavily involved In both foreign and dead' tie pofey anden hostile lo the Soviet! than Saddam.trengthened by hit nommul command of the People! Army, tbe UO.OOQ-ison Ba'th Party paramilitary force. Ramadan,npopular with the Tlkrlti clan and dutrtoted by the regu"oi military. He would face ooaildenble opcoii-tfen to httearning power, and rataht. tbere-foie, (refer Initially to tiy to eacrcile power from behind the scenes.

jddiin'i own Tlkrlti elan would continue lo play in Important role in any collegia! government,ey domical* lb* Ba'th Parly and arethioughoul tho mililary and security teritcri Baitm Ibrahim al-TlkiBl. the bead of the Molhi-baraL and Adoan Khayrallih. the Mini Her of Defense, aluttg with icniui Tikriti cifkeri aujand their lupprjrvm from Other key Sunni clam, initially would bo mrai Influential. Koorign Minister Tarlq nut IrKreulngly Influential under Saddam, mightieiul tola. Bulhrblian, and lie uouhl have diffieu'tvimielf a> tlx leaderunni dominated aovemmenr. Shia olficlau like Nairn

Had dad, Lvad of th* National Aarembly, uonkt beugh prof fie to rcaisure the Shia population

coOegaal leaderifaap probably would net make major changes lo foreign poficy. Tbe leaden* lint priority -mild be coruolidaiiiii power and eilrlalliq Iraq fma tbc war. We would eipect them lo cunilmr close relations with mode-rile and Cull Arabs. Tbey could mike overtures lo Syila ard Libya to Iry to redoce their support for Iran, bul or* urattety to move far In lab direction. They would keep re la Horn with Moscow cccrect. io entire sufficient arms supplies, bat like Sj'i:un lluuyr. (hen new lnde;ihue doubts aboui Motcow'i re'ability at aa ally.

lthough ihe initial transfer of powerollective leadenhlp might be reblively smooth, ibe coaUtloa would be under grrai stain, and Jockeying (or power woukl be Intense because of the absenceominant figure to arbitrate dltpulct We canraot predict who won Id ultanolely feite power, but given the cooi^torlal backgrounds of ihe current leader-ship and Iraqi poll" teat hbtory, the struggle probably would bi violent The breakdown of collegia! rule would tndermlae Iraqi ability tooherent foreign policy, disrupting Baghdidi trend toward alignment with moderate Arabs and rimer pnlilnu) and rcoionilc tin with the West.

M An unrestrained interna) pone; struggle aoald weaken ibe central government ud accentuate the serious intarlao and ethnic division! in Iraqialile at the lop likely would ushereriod ofsimilar to th* turbulent eta between ihe loll of thei. In IWB andtivjliumion ofcnlmrde. the pcosilKlliyroader coup probably* Invching ihea general uprising again! the Ba'th leadership rnai* netred by traditional opimlifoti eleoiiHiU incicusct wbsUHlilly.

rooder Gocemoioul Coup. Should publlc cenfiderae in the regime deteriorate sulatintiaKveiull of mililary or economic setbacks and ihetv form prove unable to maintainraider group ol inM-TikrtU element! in Ihe party, supported by Ibe fUIuary. might be lemptrd lo nunr ugiliut Sarldsru ind the ruling elite. PerviUi* uxuritv makes lucb cure plulling difficult, however, and leyparty, and security figures wrnskj have to be co-opted

'.7

holesale change In leedeiihUl wmld probably meancontinuation ol Bath Party rule al Vraat tanporartly That resulting Iraderihlp might be pha-*d. howa-rer. by rivalry bttwten party and mill tary aWillar lo that ca* tb*addamraparaat (or Iraqiat the aa*aid *JJ harva aa cuke paaaar wtth Tehranegime, naoecenat, mightotor* lo poltcira leal ercoanmodtaina to US microtif ih Mlalrat control blame Ir*Qi turreni dltlicul-tiei on III abandonment of revolutionary Reoli

Ott. Canaralerious ehalwna* loim* Irom ounada the mrrani power ftructure la tha lean hkely proapect tn the term of thai Estimate,oeaapa* of tbe military andarrurlii 'iircnenatva vtttecy by ban Tbe toabUUr of thai faaar

. OCPCa

arty. Svran-iupprered Iraqihend th* Utqi Communiit Partycooperate evce on the moatb ot idn ihe ihapeuccaaaor govcrmnent albwi tb* regime to deal with each threat ilngjy. Moreover, each of thannlyjlated by foremanIran, Syria, andhave competing totli In Iraq

U The rarotpacta for an ceipcalhor,hat fatLra.iv changed ibe compoSLon and pollctn of theiooed aaaeanr aabataMUaV n* oka Iraqi Cnb*am> to aeaaitJiw ef oaaa Inmario, the Shia Daw* Party. Ktvfied mllKaHhr by Iran and eapouUbgab-hahanani of an lilamK Republic on th* Iranian modei would ippaar to be tbe atncetiPttltimately tOMlit power,

Oppoil'lon Oetupi

awo. Iraq') Sbtaimake up ioni<eicent ol tn* pcpulailen ird repertory aioutMceri ol ihr.anki of the armed force* Oa* flgur* tV) The lergcit and moat influential Shia dbaulent group. Daw*,probably hai no tareew themaud aBaaahati- It rtevevea ftiiartil aad. erma. aafebarrv. and ualnlrt frqen Iran la late IBM Dawa formed annder Iranian mntroL

M. Appeals by Shia diwidrnti to moll appear lu have had littler unpad on the Iraqi populace. Tfib rugguli lhat lha Iraqi Covorranenl and Internal arcu-

My servittt wuuld have to beuanu liuniginlirda Shia revolt could develop Inuntici. kaMHt, lha proilmKy of Iranian military aippon tnd tbe kan propsetica af Shia* In th* rahatrd rasas of the Iraqi aalhlary wwkj aaaaafamatb baoat Da**'i caancei of aaeoeav

ew*-bind acvcrnroml wouldadically anti-US foreign policy. It would probably aailat Iraa in lubiartlng tha Sunni Arab reglmei In the CuaT and In Jordan. It would align wah Syria and libra aa the Arab-litaaU dispute, probably piruuai both ta be evaa aaore artaaaantly annbaaetl Saiam rivalry blliaea aa Iraqi Sana faaaaaaaaatalat aawera-ment aad lha rtgMtu tnikei ho-over The Iraqi StM gctrnrwontHn-eDle In Tehran and Iranian leaden hivegreedon-trol the rnovacnanL

laWaavIatttorteal Oprtoalnfoa. Tb* Syrian luppcrt uveralroupi of farmer trial paV'-cnns aad mutan off icondpmmiUghdad The Sytaaaa wnaH laaaat Saddamrrpaared byh Partr ooLllcnnabtary offteor whom they could (nfhonor or even controlon not favor the aaubltahinantll ii rtaime In Iraq and probably would work again ilegtme.

The Si'anwppcrtcdappuMUiiirMp*-bmd ed by farmwi Iraqi CmmlltW aaO*-eenr taaadr tka uialri aad no rap*aabeowaglb Party and ihe preaeM rahog eBa by tbean-mfcta Tneti onlya almibe to take ovaiaihtary coup ai Ih* praam power atracturr unrivrlad and before tha Dawa eouJd move.

A fxnemmani run bv lb* Syrian tupponed aahaa would ba .ulntrabk and omtabkt airmeacf la* aiweiarga ptricaal faltailea aa Iraqrtvaaan* etaaa to laantinaati.oi rrnenel wouldard bra on tb* AmVlareehIri be aoww-whai mare antl-USthe rceaem icglmr, ami mightore hoatll* *uMtNin toward Saudi Arabia and tbe CuU i

ba Kairata and Coaurumuta. Kurdtyh dlatt-dence will pi obaUy remain moreinnerhreat to tbe Iraqi regime for ihe ncal two yean. There haincdettppnlllooby Kurdlah rebeb atlmulated by Iranian prcddini. but ibey haveew thousand arced inpportert The two maiorXurunh Decsocrailc Parly

4

and (he htnetic Union ol ICuidlttiiwremain at oddi

with trraAotiitf. mostly ovar tlvalty karJaUltla) :

letstl support.

he null 'real Communistplit mo competing fictloni wilh mfoy ol Hi leadership In est* Parly oravn) laaide Iraq It lion Jed primarily B) KurdlfUn. where te-ereJ hundred guerrilla! orpeinr in vmall groups The* here c* lb tabid knh wtth torac Kurdi hot howr felled to Or.rVap lie. to Daw* Tha Inigrtiieanonl aa caw how boeean heoaoow and Baarvwffl act aaat an oraauiei oriiun co eh* ComarniDitu

Regional Inwlicarlort* Iraqi Foreign cy

efore iho war, Iraq utcd III oil wealth and

greater political nlf-Mllflileivre loarger role in

Arab and nmaligned pobitci. Iteadingof radkal politic* and il aipandrd Ib topport for lh- PaWiraatn and orhel lefUK reWutioramnd ngUMi ll had begun lo develop rioter braaodrrraW Arab itaaaa, deapKt gharp arJeeaVglrnJ ciffereocea, tolh* agpeararKe af Pan Ami unity RrMtaac* wtrh Syria aa Arab hi hai ameauk, ho- ever, asd Iraq hrbbayd to raciac* Iran as :he hey praUcior of lh* Calf

TO The war haa forced Baghdad to moderate maa> of ib mora antagonistic peiaiaa toward ta ronaenatlv* Arab arlgUrori and IUopposition lo taraelarad lb* Wgtt. To gain needed financial and political Hipporl from the Culf, Baghdad has hadatndta. temporarily Ha long term goal tat radtcallilng ihe pollliul clmate in the regxw and lo dependon regime* lhal Iraq iradl'lonally hai viewed ai rcadlcojJV

Iraq appears ao hews (toapad vtrtaallv oBraornx aid to leftla ri>mtt eaad saicaraTdil giraifjggabhad aooajht a* caatrvuar briar* Haa war. With me military bed down bt th* war. Iraq hai been unable lo threaten either baaal or Syria. Iraq bat the ee^artuni-ty to 'irucef th* Norwlnuvee Mqvemea when Iranian threats forced lh* cancelation oi the seventh Nonallgned SumnU In Baghdad In

After the war Iraq will quickly try lo reassert IU claim to leadership lo th* logical, which will Increase lew iota wilh Egypt and Saudi Arabia If the war ends on terms eveneiufectorv to Iraq,-ill claim to have Vopped tbe spread olundamentaliim RtVatsam with modgrote Arabs probably will btrccne more problematic ai the seed for financial support dltranUfaes Should the aat end durtng the porlod of thS Estlmaliay lhal alhlwi Iraq to loereast rril exports, pr earuro on the regimeontderibly.

ne troublesome bau* itlllraqi disputed border *Hh Kuwait Iraq his delayed settling lh* itauc Ihrraughoul th* war, andikely lo irei territorial con real omong termthe conflict,ocrrairt lh* Haa of Its nary. Kuwait hai already refined Iraqi rtaaaii IB dropulad territory, procoouag irataad lo bau* irerltory ao Iraqoeatn ff aaafhdaafi acoroawruraaatiatlii CagUalOshes

i* Iraq wul aargghea ata rketorlcal rtanc* on rneat foreign poticv gguoa nam aria* t* lh* West ft will bav* more cieeetueatv lo gla*efiilt regimes and eoomltlun movements and wiltarder Lie on the Arab-issue II will aho lobby foregional secocWy anaiwjireiiu for the Peraan Culf ihat aarfcid* Iran, and aencrally oppose overt luprrpower Involvement In the area

raq wW stUI be lacedusill* Syriaso II will not risk alMnilini those enururlesII mart depend etomimkallv andSaudi Arabia. Kuwait, and Jordan.uejulj

probably give lor dan aaanunie in any (ulurc conTiet with lararl II -til aire mri lo red are Its military cenecalene* on the Sawiat. and wiltWerOern ecocrcnicraqi pealwar rvearaatraetlaa and

t kmg ai th* war ccntinoev w* eipeet the Saudi tolo back Saddam with legale support and (Inancsal aid (albaat lew than he waoU) Tbey regard Saddam oa the teller evil and hove already imeited heavily Iraor* than Ul billion In loam and graiti) in hli regimea ewiinaiwulghl lo mvolutloraiv Iran They need tu preirrvo Iraqecurity buffer to Iran

20

TT-JOii

7T. The Saudis ond when would leer anyn retime n) lUthdid because ol Ri prHcWbuht reason. They believe Saddam's downfall Mould weaken Iraq'i ability to rttnt Iranian military mature, mcouraan Iran to punue III aim) more aggimiivily eiewhew In the Gull, orciullew'i tn Baghdad Inimical to their intvresti.

hia teed! or takeover In Iraq wouldfrighten them. The Bahraina and Kuwaitis, acdeaver extent tb* Saudis, would (ear unreal amont thaa* on tltable Shia populations. Faced wflh the poaatbillly of Iran and Into.n concert to iprtad rtvcaalton, tbe Saudi) and other Cult Arab) woa'd mk private, arri perhuii even public UaUt< amn ct US rupporl. They also procohty would try to appease Iran

7B_ If Saddam'i successors worked to check Iranian ambitions in the Cult, the Saudu would be supportive. Riyadhnthance to ead tbe war on terms tbttojgh balanoe of power between Iran and Iraq

SO Tb* war bat bad tome fortuitous consequences fee Guif states. It has drained the Mrength and re-wuicii uf two larger neighbor] win hive oflen bullied them. The war opened the way for creation of the Cull Cooperation Council The decline of Iraqi oil production at tba onset of the slump in tbe oil market wai welcome Boding the war would lead to the reeotarcanc* of Iraqaim ofJ ei peeler and almost certainly would cut into the Cuii states' share of tbe ctl market and pat additional downward pressure oo oil mice* In addition, Iran would pren them to help pay war reparations.

Tha BoOica Statai

yria is deeply batttk to th* current realm* In Bighdid. convinced that Saddam it bean on ovor-tbsuwiai tb* name of Pieasdeni Hafut at-Asaad. Anad believea thai Iraq actively supports the Muslimyria, and accosts tha liaqls of amli-ing tha ant (regime uprlHng In Hamah fn FebruaryIn return. Syria hi! nnported various Iraqi opposition groups and haa alrengthened IU ties with ban

s long atattoo of Saddam and Assad survive. Syrian-Iraqikety to continue. Tbe mutual fear and luspiccn al the two regimes Is rtpmrdly itinloritd by an Intense prnonal haired bttween Ih* two Iraderv Th* Iraqi ptpellw* through Slria probably will remain eland, and Syria will continue cooperating wtth tha liaalau, In order lo overthrow Saddam. Tht conlmutmj hostility also meifii that Itaq almost ctttalnlv will irovtde little or no miliary halp to DemeJ.ua ha tba eventajor daahael dueinaj th* term of litis Em male

yriaWutsdaneaattntlso rttwo* Saddeaw ia Jaahdid.t artaatad rvdweed bewtthy Syria preaaabhr wemldag>aarty flttturtt ef aopport. aura as tat nipniiq af eh* ctlad bath Inol daacw-oxn of daaw tin Wrka.w/rwarh ban Start* aa theontlln* Arab Male eppcatog Itraal would be lately toraq's diplomatic aad military cooper*-ttt Iraq and Syria, however, art refSnaal cutaprtllori for nfhenre. and eont ttrtiag ajoab and intaeerU would make my Syrian-Iraqi rtpprahtaneni short lived

ealm* war* to replace Saddam Husayn. Aaaadr >hat Shia fund*-manlallali would addtrlght lo the effort by tbe Muslim Brollwrhood in Syria to topple htm rreaideni Assad would ibo mov* away from Iran, and pcoilbly improv* his urn with both Saudi Arabia and Jordan to counter the Ftints*nwntalin ihiaat

K Libya haa lltll* eblhty to influence cvaoU In Imq. datpteadhafi. antipathy lo-ward Saddam Hnam aad has aanaa of ravoraiioiarvht Khomalrt ragim* Libya provide! Kurdish wpoattMnlats wttb wall amounts ef am. feeds, and tramlatf. aaal has aba de*ut; fundi to Iraqi rrtatioua eeapoarnon arc-ap* Ubv* would eppcae the eraattaa of an Warn*raq uadcruenr* of Iranenlstiaa of leftist! lank Sfcaa. aad dtwdowl ruW milBan offkm. wVh whom librador

SB Reattlons between Iraq and Algeria hsv* been

ul nM iImurrent Alawtan Ifudentlp

would moat likelyeutral ponticn tn respecachanae cf laadarahlp an Baghdad and would remam withng loetlhtmcnt to tha Iran-Iraq war. Algerian laden, concarriod mar ih*l lilamic fundamental Ion at home, would be greatly troubled if lilamic fundvineiitallHi cam* to power In Iraq, but wad do lltll* to influence evinti in Baghdad.

" 0 0

Rtlotiom With tht Suetepoweti

war bat net slgnlJlcaotly alteredwith the Soviet Union or iht United Stilts-prolonged Iraq's dependence cm the Sonettnni, and mar deepen lhat depecdeocc if tbeon. KelalMaa with the United Statuand art hlely to continue to doiwayt to ktoaan iht Iraqi-Sovlw linkremain, howtver, In the way of eloieBathdad and Washington.

Tha Soviaii

rekbora have tun an unevenrecenthe too countriesriendcooperttttw treatyeading topurchaaa of Soviet weapons andeconomic protects In Iraq. Relationi beginin thehen Mctcow wtibheldBaghdad's crackdown on the Kurdswhan Baghdad wpprcocd the CPInd btfan to uae Iu expanding oilreduce Iraqi dependence on Soviet armi andruderie and develop !ii economy withP.e'attani pum metedhfoiecwembargoed arm shtpmersi at the outbreakwar with Im. aid they remained poor thrash

mi.

W Soviet-Iraqi rebtlona hov* improvedbe two count riei negotiatedarmi deab In April and Inbow publicly dttctlbe their rcaltaahlp tnterrra. The

^-havo been more supportive poMtscally ol the Iraqi positionettlrineot of the war lince Iranian forcer croaied Into Iraq inZ The USSR haa bached Iraqi*Implied UN Sacartly Council letolutloni calling fee an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal ef leecei to prewar boundaries

oscow's more cooperative attitude stems from fti wbh to reverie Ireot turn toward the Writ, its despair of any thort-trrm cairn in Iran, and Its fear that Irani counter!ovation of Iraq anient tuected In cilabl idling aliUmic fundamentaiiM retime near ihc USSB'i southern border From Moscow's penpec-tlvv, the rlti. that. Soviet tilt towaid Iraq would open tbe way lor reejtablishmeiit of US influence in Iran arxrned much knar to the spaing1 than it hod tn the early daya of the revolution. Khomeuu had ctuihed all major cppctllkm. and the rcglmci anil-American rhetoric was ai ihrill ai ever. Theo concluded, according lo an aulhorltativ* article In tht CPSU Party joareat Lnhat th* ore* peel) for the Iranian revolution twinging to the left wtr* declining.spatently Judged lhatont ai Khcnteini lived. Sovlti influence in Iran would be minimal.

he Sonet-Iraqi rapprochement prohablr will continuehe neil two yean If the war drug) on.

BapSdid. despite it) iriulitlSlfy weapon)cannot affordoopardlie IB access to Soviet armi. Moscow, inants to preserve Hi ihar* of Ih* lucrative Iraqi arm market and reverie, or at leastBaghdad'! shift toward alternativeaction within tbe Iraqiala rocs mxiitUieng clwe tka with Moncow. end some dements of ibe military probably would nipport such ties, it lean until reliable alternate military suppV relationships baae been solid-ified. Tbe Soviets presumably have some inftoeocc through tbelr targe minion In Iraq, whkb includes atilitaryconomic and technical advisers.

M Certainowever,eturn bo Ibe close tehulocnhip lhal rutted al the time of tbe ngmrtg of the Friendship Treaty in the. First, mutual diitnnt between Moscow and Saddam remiiia high. Moreover, tht Soviets will hove to ueigh the effectsull rietrocnewwot with BeahoWd on their ties with Syria. They will want to avoidSl'lan PreUdVrt Anadi reajmt, tbttr moat Important ally In tha Middle Easttrongof Iran, by dewlupiirt toohUionsbip with Syria) mhenemy. Saddam Husayn. Mostdnpit* ibeoor date of Soviet-Iranian relationi. we bcrtev* MJscorr itiD coniWan Inn mor* Important iceopolstlcally than Iraq, if for no other reason than that the USSR and Iranorder of moreoscow wilt want lobe careful not to tilt so lar toward Baghdad that It convinces tome Iranian lenders la rethink their hoatjlr pounce toward tbe United States.

he Sovleti prtbibtv would prefer lo seeremoved, ai Iocm ai ibey were confident thit he would not be replaced bv an lianian-deniineted Shi*

Ti

addampli replaced by hli rhlef deputies, chancel at theyiharr hli distort ol Ihr SoMM although ihr. trehab. -oJJ rot allow Ibta to Maw Iraqi paatrribt USSR Uos-oow ooigafa irapaUatrfferingeaders better eredSl term* oa araai par:haan aadod.an.ed wrapono. tad poaubly IMelEiaefte* and sscarlty soprani la help maintain lhan In power.

Th* Urarwd Statai

rliiififii beiween (hn United Statci and Iraq ban: Improved over the but few yean at Ihe United Stale) hu sought to eapiialire on Iraqi dtilrr Io reduce Hi economic and military dependence oa the Soviet Union and to esploU Western teefcrmkajy to develop IU economy. The United Stales has nut hod formal diplomatic reaUtoos atrfa Baghdad,7 Arab-Israeli war. Iraq not only severed diplomatic rektlons with Washington bul luspradcd oil shipments to the United States as part of7 Arab Ot) embargo ondeneral lioyoott of US [ixwi. which rerntlnod In effect

ommercial ties have grown steadilynd US firms haveide variety of coegracU for protects, primarily In the oil sector.1 tbe lraqst further expwded opportunities for US businesses In Iraq by allowing participation tn the annual Baghdad Inirrnaticcal Trade Fair. Iraqlarge noontides of American agriculturalandrowing appetite for sophtilkaied minimi goods and technology- US firmsotorhe reconstruction ofndustry after the war.

aql offlciih, including Saddam Husayn. have mad* pcailfve public stotemenu about rdaHosi with tlie United States in recent tears They sssert that Iraq had Intended to rccsUbhih full tela Barn with the United Suit* but had to delayove when the war with Iran began. Iraq views reeataUtshmonl of diplomatic rotationsay of bakedng Its relations with the two rtipexpowers. as well as enhancing its nonallgned cr edentlab

erious im pediments remain to the devehjp-menl of close ties, Th* major long-term obstacles are US policy toward Israel and Iraqi links to Palestinian groups Involved in international terrorism. Iraq cento view US support for Israel as inimical to Arab interna. Iraqi more recent ttatrtnerttt co ihe Pilatlnitn queittonngnesi toilled Mttlemenl that Ii icceptibW to the rales-llnlim Thli would mean abandonment of Iraqi. tredltloeuJ resectloaisl position,oo soon to determine if tbtlemporary Iraqi need to play to lis ratoderni* Arab lupretteu In ihe waruridarrwola! change In outlook. Iraq abo Is susrnctoui of US InumiKmi tn the Persian Culf, and senior Iraqi officialsto charge thai the United Sl.li ii I'ofceiglng the war by allowing Iran access to Western arm. It Is abo leniiliv* to lianas charges thai It hasS "looL"

raqi officials have repeatedly denied that they srrppori such lerrorlst groups oiay and Abu hhdhtli Black lane, while mi tiring that Iraq must provide eld and support for any "dlicotced'* Palest In-lass. Ahbosgh Abu Nidhal probably ii now operating out of Syria, the Iraqis are suspected of havingud in it lids on Kuwaiti dlpkvnab kit year by Black June- Iraq's stated position probably em be eordirrraed only by absence of Involvement Inn ei tended period :

Prospecti for US mfUnca

S links io Iraq will probably mcrease despite the constraints. If the current regime In Boghead remain* in power. Saddam Hutavn probably will tee it in lili interests toore balanced relationship ullh the two lupcirxn-eiL Western and US advantages over Communis! statei in the fields of technology and economic rekticni *UI assume more Importance when the war etttji and the Iraa' rrsumr 'eios.es IU drive to develop Mi econcenk power.

ICO. France, however, will coollmsr to be Iraqi roalor economic and pcallleal link to tht West. France is Iraqi inajce tupt-her of Weatern arms andconomicraq. France hu alio been the

Western muer publicly lo IU Sport Iraqar

with Iron, French official) have ttitcd flatly that Parts will not allow Iraq io be defeated

he current regime It likely to pursue poiltsei more favorable lo (he Untied Suiot than wry wcrestot regime. The Unitedikely to came In for banner trraDnent from new leaderi either ol lh*

i

ANNEX EQUIPPING IRAQ'S MILITARY

th hatratteen inventory ol weapons and cthrt mllitoiv pgutcacrJ to continue to was*-ar aaakai ban dartna the penod tt* iba fatMaate.ver aspcabers' luspenasan el apon pent eWUvofttl or iillure to hoajor contract would dear ad* tint dioaucai Although Iraq hat ihor-cuahly dlvrrilfitdtoutoea of arms. Hi air and aroundrimarily on Soviet madeduring at hat ihe nasi mtal scan

t Tha effeenvenew al Iraq's aroed forces against Iran dtrwndl latanty on their abfiity to maintain numerical ondupremacy In wr-apom and equipment Coiuequratli. Daahdad will ooritinu* lo arch ranlroatiideof acpeetea-uv aad etX be aaapiilual thatIrrafMave-mon In iwlMton buiiaw ban and the Wealnat thai wprrioriiy.

3 Until theiaq had relied almoil oclunely on Ihr USSrt for Hiililary aqiraanaaal Ccawmad abeai! dependetwenujk-

ofm aircraftpm Sine* the war besom Iraq haa concludedaQre Us rarwith the Soeleta Iraq aad the IVsft early thu year tuncluded en ariu deal for OA advanced hUG-ll (tslUors andI links For Ihr period erfh* Iraqi ground forces all reagrefa aaBacet taaipbtah1 iiaUpif atb Sovirt-atib weaponry The Asr Fen* <rM have acquiredrench combat aircraftut more lhan three-fouilhi uf Iraqi combel aircraft will nlll be of Sorter renin Iraq'i continued dependence on Soviet rempply of additional military eqwpeaeni spare parti, aid rnuMron* wi reaaam Vtoacawi aaaar are* of

ig. - ItChd*

r [UiNjii bran tormi drea with WoBert Furoce. prims/Uj France. (See figure I) The So-let deciiion to eotUrao aiim detlvenei to Iraq during ihe first monlla of the aar icceleralad Iraqi contract! with ihe Wert.

Sax* taa laaiii'a of ihe war. fa*rhaad has cctKtuSrd deab worth aanust to billion with France for Maaaa Fl fighters. Roland uirfeee-to-air*i. mh*'propelledantlihlp mlidles. and etrctron-Ic ecaiivmrnl Italian laas havel boo tad includether around

re . - v

DKor new murcc iJ arms Belling nA Baghdad hue

iIfned coiHiacu foe fiahter aircraft, tiili and arill-lerr IMalina moredhan. Chi neararUruarrly attractive becauseo Sarin equipment alraady lamSHar lo the mlbtary.

3 For al of Its arw drab -ah Chose aad theiaa>dad mi: looii to lh* lASH ai iu primary source

W.

"SrXMV

OtSSEMtNAHOH NOIICi

I. Tha rtocararrt -otby th. ftrtclorani ofha copyfor th* irilormoron andof th.and <Awowo-Kno- boat. Aoo^tonol oorantrolon mar bo ovthoclinJ b, lh*ll

vwilhtapKhri dtpoctrantii

o. Director ofend Itataoreh. lor lh. Oe^joMmtnt of St*!*

b.aro* lnt.Ho.CK. Acanty, for at*l th* Saceorary ol Cuhmw

ondordioton crl Ho jokrlo( Stoft t. ANhrontl(orx IM Dvjonmav of lh* Amyl-tCir t* Novo"orortrmni ol th* NovyitUtor* Chlof Ol SioM,or lh* Otcortiaau of th* Ar Fore*

offorMoon* Cora*

Swr.lorv (or Dafara* Proororm, litl rJinnjv

Oir*clor. PBI. for lh* IVd*rol tvrra,ntlooaoi

.

0 th.<orSrcwfly. ft. IM Drycrhrwii of

Dafwry Director for taaBoanc*- othor Qaportintnt or

rfwu'Wtl "toy b. rettliad.oMhOywl by burning fa CKioidOnc* wi*

lo-eoi. or iiWnM to tn* Clrmrcroni

1 Wham 1W1 oocunora Iih*e<*M>x*.xm at on* ye*r. Alrr*ha period, thentroyK or rmrrwd to tht tcrararttaa. optnty. or rrert-fiiton ifio.ld b* raqueyiad of m*oancy to rttotn llctordanc* withP/J,m* 1PM.

lin* tri* dtanmontuwc1raw th*ndonllid

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA