Director of Central Intelligence David D. Grles
National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics
an, nationalgence Council
ay Meeting of National Border Interdiction System Coordinating Board
Murphy reported that he had vlsiteC three of the six regional Centers of the NBIS, and would visit the remaining three next week. He also introduced the staff that will support the coordinating board. (For our purposes, we should continue to work
Customs will supply the chief of the New York NBIS Center and Coast Guard will supply the deputy chief. The same holds for Chicago andPaso. In Miami, New York, and Long Beach, the situation is reversed, with Coast Guard supplying the chief and Customs the deputy. The chief isanager in the usual sense; Murphy said he should De thought of as the Vice President's coordinator on the scene,set up the South Florida task force, is the
Inside each center there will be an operational information group, bringing together surface, air, and Intelligence elements and having an intelligence coordinator. hartypical operational information group lists under intelligence CIA, DEA, FBI, INR, DIA, and USCG. It is expected that these agencies wilt supply watch standers to monitor Incoming intelligencehour basis. (After theeterminedas not expected to supply manpowerto the Centers.)
Murphyack of coordination between operational and intelligence elements as the heart of his problem. Good Intelligence was lacking, and what little was available was not collated and provided to operational elements. Intelligence elements did not task operational elements to fill information gaps. as sliding lower in myas relieved to hear him say that he was not describ-ing the kind of Intelligence that CIA collected. Tne missing intelligence was tactical intelligence, and the
missing collating function was an EPIC-type function. He compared this to the Sixth Fleet collecting tactical Intelligence for analysis by shore-based military analysts and instant relay to fleet comnanders for their use.
Five of the six HBIS centers'will launch major air and sea surveillance exercises in June. Host of these involve the use of, helicopters and Coast Guard cutters. In the past such coordinated efforts have only been undertaken in South Florida.
It was recognized that the military lacked the resources to maintain full coveragell regions. Ultimately, military resources would have to be dedicated to the NB1S; at the outset they would be borrowed.
7. Vice President Bush wiltublic statement on IS June describing MBIS developments.
B. Comment: It is obvious where Murphy is coning from. He needs
forward it to law enforcement agencies for their use. Although this is easy, enough for us to understand, it was not at all clear to some of the law enforceawnt community represented at the table.
9. This raises the question of what CIA can do to help without giving the appearance of participating in law enforcement activities. After the meeting. Murphy asked that we give serious thought to how we can contribute to rhe intelligence function of theS centers. aid that perhaps we _could pro.vjdg^guidance-jnd know-how, -Lather .than personnel. Hb asked that we study it and get back.
operational apoearanee o
a ui hts, and report daily to the.US without giving the
This said,here any reason why we cannot train others on how to do the_sjuae_thingZ_ For example, two or "three experienced DOT analysts "couldenter anduidance document reconnending how the Center should handle intelligence. Tne document should also establish formats for
12. OCG should examine any proposal we make to the viceffice. If you generally agree with the aboveill contact then andreliminary reading. We willroad paper trail confirming that provision of guidance and know-how, to law enforcement agencies is permitted unde^our Executive Orders. intelligence to be analyzed ii
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