AFGHANISTAN IN MARCH (DELETED)

Created: 4/19/1983

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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ere were increasingly frequent mdahar and Kabul, particularly in

(Jandahar-Gha

post within Qandahar reports ofbushes between" Gha^nt. Travelers and visitors to Qandahar reporte city and the province arc the scene of increased Mujahadeen activity despite the concentration of Soviet forces in the area, fl

Kabul: Kabul City in March saw

nighttime skirmishes were routine. Onarch.Ariano Airlines and an official with close ties to Babrak Karmal, It is not clear, however, whether _he was assassinatedor slain for some other reason.

m^insurgent attacks on power linc> have continued-To cause froqucint blackouts aid periodics in Kabul radio transnissions. Because dicsel fuel supplies are short, the city remained dependent on liaited power generated by the gas turbine atharkhl. fffl

of Kabul.

several days ofogos ,1

the Slioaali region, heavy fighting took place over ly March and began with aerial and tank bombardment

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Economic Devon

The energy shortage affected not only Kabul but idled (Jandahar's fruit and cotton processing^ac}^oriej_ondimilar effect in Ghazni

weakeningAfghanistan's linited

dornor.iicraffic capacity. U[

There was also strong evidenceeorientation in Afghan trading

the Afghani over the winter ITroppod mora thanercent in relation to hard currencies, more and more Communist bloc goods began appearing in Kabul shops. The shift in Afghan commerce toward theountries can bo expected to accelerate to the extont that Eastern Europeans can be induced to accept payment other than hard currency foi their goods. In addition, the suspension of flights by the state-controlled Ariana Airlines to Western Europe will create difficulty in bringing Western goods to Kabul by air. ecline in agricultural production in some key areas is increasing the dopendonce of urban areas, particularly Kabul, on Soviet staple commodities such as wheat and sugar,|

Internal Political Doveloprnents

Accordingreports, the regime media event of the

monthtaged press conference by captured French doctor Pbillippe Augoyarde. He testified that he had seen no evidence of Soviet/DRA use of CW but asserted that US, Chinese, and Egyptian instructors were

training the insurgents in CW uso.

feud, between the Khalq andm factionse PDPAMarch.

faction strengthened its hand with several high-level appointments of staunch Parchaois, including the new Minister of Education.

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Intcrnattonal Political Dcvclopaonts UN Mediation Effort

Wall, the son-in-law of King Zahir Shah, has implied thatwould consider returning to Afghanistan as the head of atroop withdrawal.

Wali also plansSaudi funds and to sound out Pakistani authorities on amovement headed by tho

Pakistan: Pol icy Toward Insurannts

tho Zia regime does not want the Afghan insurgentnite. 'Islamabad is conccrnodnited resistance would be strong enough to make demands on the Government of Pakistan. It night also

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negotiate with the Soviets independently of Pakistan and couldfor an independent

e Moscow has an interest in

Bi'iaontinuing Afghanistan crisis to justify his martial Tavrocimc and to maintain the support and assistance Pakistan is receiving from tho Vest. Ve boliovo that Pakistan will continue to pay lip servicenited insurge.'i keeping the insurgents disunited.

I ran : olicy

Recent WosPakistanieport that Irsr. "i

treatment of its Afghan immigrant and refugee population is still aixed. Iran aUows the Peshawar fundamentalist parties toofficesumbtr of cities, including Tehran and Qom, and does not harry Afghan immigrants who catno to work during theconomic boom. Ilowcvor. Iran still placo* travel restriction on the Afghan refugees who arrived after the AprilCooswunist coup and forbids them to hold

0 Afghan Sunnis have been herdedinto three camps where they are, behind barbed wire and under military guard. ^

Iran's restrictions on the Afghan refugees probably arise from fear of economic competition, drug smuggling, and general lawlessness, and

from tho belief that Afghans who bocome integrated into Iranian Ufa will be less inclined to roturn to Afghanistan to fight. Iran may have singled out tho Sunnis for particularly close surveillance because it has greater control over Shia Afghans, who rocolvo etost of their aid

from Iran.

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Original document.

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