ANDROPOV'S APPROACH TO KEY US-SOVIET ISSUES (NIE 11-9-83)

Created: 8/9/1983

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ANDROPOV'S APPROACH TO KEY US-SOVIET ISSUES

this estimate is issued by the director of central intelligence.

the national foreign intelligence board concurs.

The fomowing intelligence orgarutatrons participated in the preparation of the Estimate-.

Ihe Central InteKoenccht Defame InleAgence Agency, the Notiood Secwitv Agency.he intelligence organliotioti ol the Deportment of S'a".

Also Participating:

The Auiltont Chief of S'ofl (or he Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deportment ol the Novy The AuJifam Chief ol Staff. InteSgence. Deportment of the A* Force The Director of Intelligence, rtoocktjorleri, Morine Corpi

contents

Pan

SCOPE

EXECUTIVE

Domestic Sources ol Foreign Policy

Andropov* Autbonir Over Foreign

Andropov'! Foreign Policy

Impact ol Economic

Soviet Policy on Functional US-Soviet

MBFR. CSCE, and

Human

East-West

Soviet Policy on Regional Issues Significantly

Affecting US-Soviet

Eastern

Middle

Central America and the Caribbean

ern

Implication* and

Andropov's Assessment of the United

Overall

scope note

Taking as its point of departure, The Sovietto US Security Interests, this Estimate focuses on how the Andropov regime will attempt to maintain or improve the USSR's international positionis the United States over the next two years.

Since thehecontinuing to favorwith the United States on terms beneficial to Soviet interests-have relied more heavily on pressure tactics to influence and counter US policy. This shift from the tactics of thevidently was due both to an increasingly optimistic appraisal of the "worldofnd to an increasingly pessimistic appraisal of the direction of US policy.

The assertive policies of the late Brezhnev period have gained considerable bureaucratic momentum, and it will be easier politically for Andropov to continue the "forward" course set by Brezhnev than toetrenchment to defend and consolidate the foreign policy gains that have beenariety of factors, however, will influence the direction of policy: Andropov's own views and how much personal authority over foreign policy decisionmaking he is able to exert, how the leadership currently assesses the requirements of the domestic economy and the costs of an accelerated arms race, how the regime sees the mix of opportunities and problems confronting the USSR internationally, and how the regime currently assesses the US ability to concert, execute, and sustain competitive policies. This NIE addresses these questions and estimates their significance for US interests.

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SUMMARY

Moscow's basic approach to key US-Soviet issues has not changed substantially since the accession of Yuriy Andropov as General Secretary

19fZ SSR's relationship

w,ih the United States as fundamentally antagonistic provides the iramcwork within which any Soviet leader operates. But the comlny Io powerew Soviet leader canifference in the mix of Soviet tactics and the effectiveness with which they are carried out

Since taking office, Andropov has established considerableover foreign policy. Andropovs KGB (Committee for State Security) background has made him particularly aware of the need to maintain internal control and fight Western ideological penetration and has made him more familiar than other Soviet leaden with espionage and "active measures as instruments of policy. His extensive foreign affairs experience, allUnce with key Politburo members Ustinov and Gromyko and chairmanship of the Politburo and Defense Council probably allow him to dominate policy initiation and block any policy change he strongly opposes. Should he seek to effect major policy shifts, however, he could not do so without firstolitburo consensus.

Soviet behavior in the international arena since Andropovs accession has given-no indication of an inward turn on Moscow's part to the neglect ot its position in the international arena. Rather, Andropov hasigorous new style to the assertive policies of the Brezhnev period.

Since Andropovs accession the Soviets have continued pressuretact.esealing with the United States, made greater efforts to exacerbate divisions within the Western Alliance, and boldly competed for mfluence in the Third World. Although Soviet leaders areabout the implications of economic problems for their ability to sustain their ambitious military and foreign policies in the future, this concern is not likely to significantly affect Soviet foreignon key issues over the next two yean.

Overall, the evidence suggests that the Soviets will continue to press ahead on several fronts that are in contention:

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forcesndropov is or-

an all-out effort to derail NATO deployments

maintaining the appearance of negotiating flexibility while remaining intransigent in opposing US deployments andthe "peace" movement. The Soviets arc positioningto use NATO deploymentsustification forumber of new systems that they have been developing for some time and would have deployed in any event They are also likely to deploy more,ariant thereof, and ground -launched cruise missiles. After NATO deployments, Moscow will probably attempt to change the whole focus of the INF talks by offering to trade these systems for NATO INF systems, thus excluding their currently deployedrom

START. Soviet negotiators have made modest adjustments in their proposals, but Moscow has continued to insist on keeping intact its full force of heavyndissiles that are most threatening to the United States. They appear to believe that if they combine their present negotiating stance with vigorous public criticism of US proposals, the United States will modify its position. They do not seem to feel under time pressure and remain intent on improving all aspects of their strategic forces.

Trade. The Soviets are attempting to increase their economic self-sufficiency and to concentrate on purchasing Western technology and materials that will enhance their research and development program and manufacturing capability. They will probably continue the current policy of giving preference to non-US suppliers where possible- Although they haveew long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the United States requiring them loillionearper cent increase over the previoushey will hold purchases dose to the minimum required and continue to buy most of their grain from other countries.

Eastern Europe. Andropov has placed greater emphasis on CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) integration, economic austerity, and on political orthodoxy while increasing pressure on the USSR's Allies to increase defense spending Andropov is prepared to push harder than Brezhnev did for a

reorientation of East European economies to meet more of the USSR's needs. He will probably complement this economic policy with further efforts to restrict political autonomy.

Poland The Soviets appreciate that Polish leader Jaruzolski has given them most of what they wanted. But they have urged firmer repression of opposition elements and more rapidof the network of party-dominated institutions through which control of the population was exercised in pre-Solidarity days. Moscow will continue to pressure Poland to quicken the pace of "normalization."

Afghanistan. Andropov has given no indication that he is prepared to relinquish the new geopolitical position the Soviets have acquired there. Although he has used the UN-sponsored negotiations to blunt mternational criticism of Soviet aggression, he has continued the war and worked tooviet-style political structure. We eipect that the heart of Moscow's endeavors will continue to be the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan roughly along current lines, while using diplomacy and pressure on Pakistan and Iran to diminish outside support for the insurgents.

Middle East The primary objectives of the Soviets will remain to increase their influence and to stalemate US peacekeeping diplomacy from which they are excluded. The most important issue facing Andropov is the choiceoviet course of action in the event of Syrian-Israeli hostilities. Both the USSR and Syria may have believed earlier this year that they would benefit from limited conflict confined to Lebanon. The Soviets probably judge that confining military clashes to Lebanon would be difficult, particularly in view of the Soviet-mannedites and command and control facilities in Syria.the deepened Soviet commitment would make it more-difficult for Moscow to avoid becoming involved. Nevertheless, there has been little indication that it isignificant restraining influence on either Syria or the PLaO. To avoid having to make the critical decision ofourse of action in the event of Syrian-Israeli hostilities, Moscow seems to be relying on Israel's reluctance to engage Soviet units, on the US ability to restrain Israel, and on Syrian President Assad's desire to avoid all-out war.

S

Central America and the Caribbean Basin- The Soviets continue to upgrade Cuba's military capabilities; to work with Cuba in providing increased military support to Nicaragua; and in El Salvador towo-track approach of providing military assistance through surrogates while attempting to put the onus for tbe continuation of the war on the United States. The general approach of tbe USSR to Nicaragua and El Salvador has been to position itselfore assertive role in the region while avoiding irrevocable commitments andopen alternative strategies. US military power argues for caution on Moscow's part, but we believe that the opportunity to seriously damage US interests will cause the Soviets to continue their involvement in the region.

Southern Africa. No change in Moscow's essentially disruptive policy is in sight. The Soviets have concentrated on preventing any settlement in Namibia that is linked to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. To that end, they have applied pressure on Angolan President Dos Santos not to strikeeal and have increased their military assistance to him. They have -lso given Mozambique's President Macbel additional military assistance to increase his ability and incentive to continue opposing South Africa. If the internal security situation in Mozambique were to deteriorate to the point where the Machcl regime's survival were threatened, the introduction of Cuban troops would be a

Andropov lias attempted to take advantage of China's dissatisfaction with recent US policies. He has little inclination to meet China's majorwould jeopardize many of the Soviet strategic gains made in Asia during the Brezhnevhe will try to do enough to keep Chinese hopes and US fears alive.

Implications and Outlook

The Andropov regime believes the current US administration has embarkedroad counterattack intended to reverse the military and foreign policy gains the Soviets have made over the past decade and to reestablish US global predominance. In the view of Soviet leaders. Washington is attempting to achieve military superiority over the

USSR, lo undermine the Soviet economy, to destabilize the USSR and Eastern Europe politically, and to offer stronger resistance to Soviet encroachments in the Third World.

The Soviets -view the US attempt to strengthen its military capabilities as the most threatening aspect of the US administrah'ons's approach. The Soviets are determined toore vigorous US defense effort, but they arc concerned for the future and are probably particularly worried about the US potential for major technological breakthroughs.

Nevertheless, the Soviets still hope to mitigate the practicalof US policies:

The Soviets believe that the administration has not always executed its policies effectively, especially in dealing with Western Europe and China.

They believe that profound changes in the world "correlation of forces" since the US defeat in Vietnam have reduced US influence in the world and that this process has not yet run its course.

Despite concerns about the vigor of their own system, they believe that social and political problems in the United States and the Western Alliance will make it difficult for the United States to sustain competitive policies.

The Soviets, consequently, are hopeful that "Reaganism" may eventually yield to what theyore "realistic" US policy. Theythat pressure from domestic commercial interests, theof the Vietnam syndrome, the erosion of political support for the administration's military programs, and the burgeoning of the nuclear freeze movement within tbe United States can take much of the sting out of the President's "anti-Soviet" policies.

Equally important, as the Soviets see it, is the extent to which they can profit from West European perceptions that their interests diverge from those of the United States. Despite the coming to power of conservative governments in several Western countries, theion of Western defense spending, and the partial economic recovery of the West, the Soviets probably still regard Western Europe and especially West Germany as vulnerable to Soviet pressures andThey doubt the United States will succeed inoordinated Western trade policy toward the USSR, and they believe

thai the Unitecl States acting alone has little leverage to affect Soviet economic choices. In sum, the Soviets probably expect domestic and foreign pressures to impede but not to reverse the US administration's policies.

This fall the major issue confronting the Soviets will be whether to limit US INF deploymentsompromise agreement or to rely on heavy pressure to undermine NATO resolve. We expect the Soviets to choose the latter course but to fail in their campaign to block deployments.

The Soviets will then have to decide how to implement their long-threatened countermeasurcs. Essentially, they will have to choose between actions thai can be portrayed by them as carrying out their threat withoutonfrontation or toullblown East-West crisis by highly provocative activities in Cuba. We expect the Soviets to choose the first course.

By4 the Soviets will be increasingly sensitive to the implications for them of the upcoming US Presidential election. They clearly would prefer to avoid actions that could boost President Reagan's reelection prospects. But at the same time they hope that the President willolitical need lo achieve concrete diplomatic lesults. with Moscow. In an interview in June, Gromyko reiterated the Soviet requirement that any summit address fundamental issues and added that the United States must change at least some of its policieseagan-Andropov meeting could take place. If the Soviets decided that domestic pressures had led the President toolitical need to display flexibility in dealing wiih Moscow and if the Soviets had reason to expect that they would consequently notummit emptyhand-ed, they might agreeeeting.

The Soviets increasingly sec4 US election as an important event in US-Soviet relations. The victoryresidential candidate, of either party, perceived by the Soviets to standtaunch anti-Soviel approach would reinforce their concern that the whole US political spectrum has shifted lo ibe right.

Regardless of the outcome,4 US Presidential election will not by itselfundamental change in Soviet foreign or military policy. Soviet behavior in the international arena will be affected by many other variables. These will include such factors as the nature of US relations with the NATO Allies, the stability of the Soviet position in Easlern Europe, and the slate of the US and Soviet economies. No

I f

how the Soviets interpret the international situation, aaccord on bilateral relations or geopolitical behavior would remain precluded by fundamentally divergent attitudes toward what constitutes desirable political or social change in the world order.

Although Andropov's poor health casts some doubt on his longevity and his ability to participate-fully in policy executionay-to-day basis, it should not affect the main lines of Soviet foreign policy. Even his incapacitation or death would not produce any immediate shift in overall Soviet strategy, although it could result in tactical changes in particular areas of policy and could affect policy implementation. In the longer term, the neat political succession couldatalystarger reorientationignificant segment of the leadership had come to question the general thrust of current policy. We do not believe that such pressure for an overall change of direction exists within the Soviet leadership at present

BmwnWHm Summary fa

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DISCUSSION

Soviet leaden conceive of the USSR'iwith tbe United Stales asThisased on kafxaVaricaJand geopolitical rivalry, governs Sovietthapes Soviet perceptions of US policiesSoviet Union,be motive force behindSoviet foreign policy of detente. Tbls policyreality the continual inn of the longstandingof "peaceful coexistence- and embodiesTbe first consists ia dealing with theindustrial rations on the basis of correctrelations, trade, and aid. Tbe secondof the continuation of the "internattonalstruggle'* against those nations thatIhe "weak bak" of unperUlism and we referthe Third World. Over the past decade, ihbhas yielded considerable benefits to ibegeneral Soviet approach sets tbe boundsany Soviet leadei operate* But theew Soviet leader canifferencemix of Soviet tactics and the effectivenessthey are carried on

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Behavior

Andropov's Authority Over Foreign Policy

taking over as Central Secretaryndropov has made considerableIn consolidating his position:

He has assumed.Pierhnev's pasta of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet andof the Defense Council and has been ly acknowledged ai "head" of the Politburo

lie has retained the support of Defense Minister Ustinov and First Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Groroyko. Secretary CbernenVo appears to have lost ground politically, as have several other old Brezhnev and Chernenko cranio al lower levels

Personnel changes thus far have solidified Andropov's control over the security apparatus, strengthened his hand in dealing with tbebureaucracy, and given him greaterover lower level party appointments.

He has astutely employed the political resources he enjoys: hb KCB (Committee lor Stalecoranecilon, reputation for "strong"and support from younger officials and technocrats

there continue to be majoron Andropov's power and hb freedomin foroUm policy:

health poses physical limitations to his ability lo provide vice-rout leadership and could Invite Dtesuccessaon factionalism

Andropov does not yeteliable Politburo majority and still has lo operateonsensua.

He probably does not enioy undivided support within the party apparatus.

His chief Politburo supporters. Ustinov and Cro-myko. are powers in their own right Without their support Andropov probably would not be able lo get Politburo assent for any major change in foreign policy.

military seems to have assumedin national security matters. As publiclyChief of Genera) Staff Ogaikov. tbeof US strategy places heavy emphasis onglobal, well-coordinated character.Ustinov does not come from the ranks ofmilitary, hb years as Defenseprior eapenence directing military researchand production activities have madesensitive to military concernithe Importance of military power as .a

actor underlying Soviet foreign policy and it would be highly unlikely for him to ignore military views to foreign policy planning

ndropov may find it easier to put his personal stamp on foreign than on domestic policy:

He has already established himself as chiefspokesman for foreign affairs.

His chairmanship of the Defense Council gives him great liiflurince over military programs and the military budget

He has had extensive foreign policy experience, which may Incline some of ha colleagues to let him Ukc the lead.

6 In sum, should Andropov seek lo effect any major foreign policy shifts, he could not do sowithout firstolitburo consensus for the change. He could, however, continue to exert a'strong personal Influence over policy Initiation as well as block any policy modification be strenuously exposed.

Andropov's Foreign Policy Out tool

ndropov brings to Soviet foreign policy aUi-tudea and attributes shaped bv lengthy experience in the KGB and in dealing with East EuropeanParties:

His sharp mind and intimate knowledge of most International Issues have gained him Ihe respect of foreign leaden he has met

At home, he has been responublc for maintaining Internal control and countering Westernpenetration.

His KGB background has made him morewith espionage and "active measures""than other Soviet lenders and probably more inclined to make use of these tools as Instruments of policy. Personnel changes Andropov has made In the Soviet propaganda apparatusajor Central Committee conference on upgradingpropaganda suggest increased emphasis on manipulating public opinion abroad.

' The Sanrl term 'arrive aaeuain" duUncutibc* itJJjrm* oea auom Ina cglpiiaai and rw ^rhrHflharerl ft inetwJri nunxjb-bn oi tarns media, imlamliw.ol facie* CamraoatB rartln and (rant onmrUaatfara. eUndeaMna radlobroadraailm. and some emnotnic aad military

8 Since Andropov's appointment as Generalthe Soviets have used unusually threatening Language against the United States and several pro-Western countries. Some of these attempts at intimlda-tion, viewed in isolation, could be seen essentially as situationally determined responses to particulardevelopments. But taken together (heyreater ectphasu on tough tactics.

Impact of Economic Imperatives

ambitious program of military buildupoutreach that Andropov inherited fromhas become increasingly difficult for thelo support Last year Soviet GNP grew2 percent (about half the growth rate) and midway Into theiroviet published data onand intelligence reporting haveclear that most of the important goals ofare well out of reach.

planning cycle forh Five-Yearnow under way. and by next year the newwill have to make painful derisions aboutallocation priorities

Although satisfying military requirementsthe first national priority, the Foodhas become increasingly Important. Over the past year, both before and after Andropov's accession, there have been instances Inmall number of defense-related plants have been told to deliver materials to the Foodas well as to defense consumers. There is no evidence that such adjustments have had an Impact on major Soviet military programs, but it does appear that defense industries are being scrutinized for more efficient use of resources.

Reduced investment growth has had anadverse effect on the economy, Impelling the leadership late last year to revise3 annual plan to increase Investment. Andropov's speeches suggest concern to boost investment growth.

drain of military spending on thehas probablyailer oflo tbe Sovietonly becauseslowdown threatens to weaken the industrial

base on which tbe growth ol military power Itself ultimately depends. But tbe leadership appearsover whether domestic economic consideration! shouldajor role in foreign and military policymaking.

Concern about the economy could be one factor affecting Soviet altitudes toward force redaction or arms control agreements If the Soviets becamethat such agreements were the only alternative to escalating military spend log sharply In the future. The Soviet! would prefer to avoid an unconstrained high technology arms race with tbe United Stales because It would require even larger allocations of resources for military programs. But the impact of any desire to divert resources from military spending would be offset by the relatively small amount the Soviets spend oti their strategic programs, and by the difficulty of transferring resources from strategicto civilian ones. Moreover, economic considerwould be secondary to Larger and morepolitical-military obfectlves.

Despite Soviet reliance on Western technology in some importantesire lo eipand trade with the West is not likely to significantly inhibit Soviet foreign policy in the immediate future. Tbe Soviets already have access to most of the goods andthey need for development projects planned for ihe next two years, including the Siberian-Westpipeline. One important exception is expertise In Arctic offshore petroleum exploration and production operations. Soviet leaden are probably confident that only an inter national crisis of major proportions could disrupt deliveries from Western Europe

M. Noreed foe US grain constrain Soviet foreign policy optionsajor way over the neat two years, largely because Soviet dependence onuppliers has diminished substantially.ecision Ino limit grain imports, even al the risk of reducing tbe per capita availability of meat and dairy products in then the current trading year (which endseptember) tbe Soviets Itavc bought grain from Ihe United Stales only after exhausting all other sources, managing thus far to hold purchases toillion tons, only slightly more than ihe minimum required by the current lung-Term Agreementhe new US-Soviet

LTA probably guarantees the Soviets all the grain they intend to purchase from tbe United Stalesoilboo Ions!

The Polish example and US sanctions imposed after Uie Soviet invasioo of Afghanistan haveSoviet concern about potential dependency on Western goods, technology, and credits. This concern, combinedesire to hold down Soviet hard currency borrowing, has led Moscow to limit nonagn-cuhural imports from the West as well as grain purchases. This policy may continueurther decline of world oil prices would threaten to put the Sovietsew bard currency bind. Over the past year Soviet spokesmen have placed greater stress on autarkic goals, and the foreign trade plan3 suggests that Moscow intends lo reduce trade with the West this year byercent

The Soviets' desire to protect their bardposition Is causing Moscow to increase pressure on consumer-oriented East European regimes toower standard of bving on their populations. To boost energy sales to ibe West last year, ihe Soviets cut petroleum exports lo several East European countries byercent. The Soviets have alsoougher loan policy.

Andropov has publicly acknowledged limits to the amount of economic relief tbe USSR can offer Its Third World Allies. Moscow's niggardly economic assistance has long drawn criticism from hard-pressed LDC cbent states, roost recently from South Yemen and Ethiopia. Although Moscow is apparently uneasy about the political implications of ib clients expanding trade with the West, it is unwilling in many cases lo provide the economic support required lo prevent this The USSR has also pressured Its debtors, including arms buyers, to meet their obligations

IS. Nevertheless. Moscow last year made relatively large new economic aid commitments to Aneola. Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, and the cost of economic support to Cuba grew slightly from already high levels At the fame time, Soviet arms sales to Ihe Third World rebounded2 from Ihe ebbnd since Andropov's accession tbe USSR has continued io upgrade the quality of arm* deb verses outside the Bloc Although aims sales are driven in some cases by the Soviet hunger for hard currency, sales lo many

Third World countries are still an concessionary terms and are used largely as instruments for increasing political leverage

n sum, we believe that domestic economic difficulties are not currently constraining Sovietin the international arena in any major way. Although Soviet leaders are concerned about theof economic problems for their ability In the future lo sustain their ambitious military and foreign policies, thisot likely to significantly affect Soviet foreign decisionmaking on key issues over the neit Iwo yean.

Soviet Policy on Functional US-Soviet Issues INF I

nder Andropov the Soviets have remained steadfast In their detetmuuttion to stop NATOof ti.iermrviiate-range nuclear forces, but have adjusted their tactical approach to keep pace wiih events and Improved their public diplomacy. InAndropov publicly announced an offer the Soviets had already made privately under Brezhnev i0 reduce Sovietissues In Europe. the number the Soviets ascribe to Britain and Prance, Following rejection In April of President Reagan's proposal for an Interim accord. Andropov quickly came back in Mayroposal for making equality of warheads as well as delivery weapons the basis of an accord.

proposals have not changed the cry.USSR's position, which the Soviets havein four conditions; no US deployments,account French and Britisheilingthat would substantially reduce USaircraft in Europe; and non Ihe Far East Although theythat they might show increasedaircraft. Far Eastern systems, andFrench systems (some of which, they have hinted.

^cpuld be handled inhey have not spelled oul their alleged flexibilityegotiating proposal.

the Soviets have kept up their warningscountermeasures against Western Europe and

r the United Sato in case ofMoreIhey have continued the construction of newases in tbe Far East and continued theof weapon systems that they might choose to portray as coutUcrmeasures Andropov has placed his own stamp on Soviet policy by his shrewd behavior in meetings with foreign leaders, used "active measures" vigorously, and pushed the European "peace"and West European Communist parties and front organizations to make an all-out effort against NATO deployments In essence, the Soviet* have followed their own two-track policy of comb ining small changes in their own position withdesigned to influence West European governments directly and to increase popular pressures on NATO to make concessions to Soviet interests.

ookine Ahead. The Soviets will oontioue to engage thear of nerves In an effort to derail the NATO program this fall or.inimum, to make deployment as politically costly lo NATO as

possible:

They will continue to raise the specter of nuclear war and to warn about the dire consequences of NATO INF deployment.

They will claim ihe moves ihey have made in Ihe Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) rleraonstrate their good will and tleaihihty.

Although they will probably make some new negotiating proposal in Geneva, we do notthis proposal will allow US deployments, eveneduced level They will, however, continue to profess readiness to negotiate any "serious- proposal advanced by Washington and will argue on thb basis that progress In thetill possible if NATO deployment is postponed.

evertheless, the Soviets doubt that they will be able to block deployments al this stage and are probably deciding on how to react lo them. In the military sphere. Andropov has spcdfiedP the Soviets webd

their moratorium on the it aliening of new

n the Western USSR

Station new short-range weapon systems inEurope.

Increase the range of tactical weapon* flattened In tbe western USSR.

Take undefined Kept af lectins the security of the United States.

These steps appear to use NATO INFustification for moves that the USSR was planning lo make in any event: deployment ofndo Eastern Europe in place of use obsolescent FROGS and SCUfX implements in theorce, and posnbly tbe fielding of CLCMs (around-launched cruisein the western USSR

ike many other Soviet threats of couoterrneas-ures against tbe United States, Andropov kept his statement deliberately vague to avoid committing himself lo any future course he might not wanl lo take In the absence of further evidence, we believe that any Soviet action directed al US territory will not be intended torisis, although we cannot rule out the latter possibility.

e expect that after an appropriate show ol displeasure and an interruption of INF talks, the Soviets will resume negotiations Bui ihey mayerger of ihe INF and STARTace-saving device that would probably also improve their negoti ating position In any event, the Soviets will most bkefy claim that additional intermediate systems Ihey deploy (CLCMs or additional or modified) are countetmcasuies lo the US CLCMs and Pershing Ils In this way ihey will seek to protect their currentorce, focus the negotiations on ihe "newnd thereby attempt to achieve their own version of thexeto for the United States,it lor the USSR-START

oscow has steadfastly reiecled ihe US ap preach, claiming (hat It entails force structuredisadvantageous for tbe USSR. They have stated that live US proposab arc Intended Io force them to make rapid, expensive, large-scale, and unwarranted changes in iheir forces while leaving ihe United States free to modernize lis forces They have singled out for particular criticism the US proposaleparate ceilingeavy bombers which allows no freedom lo mix ballistic missiles and bombers. They have stated that they bad no intention of either counting tbe Backfireeavy bomber or building other bombers up to that sublimit. They have further claimed that this proposal showed the US inlent toombers, each equipped withir-bunched cruise missiles (Al-CMsl. thus giving the Unitedarheads on bombers alone and making nonsensical the US limitarheads on missiles.

own point of departure hasframework of the unratified SALT IIwith lower limits.raft treatyhe Soviets proposed that boththeir 1CBM (intercontinental ballisticSLBM (subnurlne-launched ballisticand heavy bombers In stagesevelAlthough they Initially claimed that theybe more specific until they knew the outcomeINF negotiations, in the last round ihey0 for MIRVed (mulUple independentlyreentry vehicle) systems. These proposab,still allow Moscow to keep the systems lhalthreatcnirvi io the Unitedb.most of iheirnd. As part of it. return to ibe SALTMoscow has also dropped demands, thatStates limit the deployment of Tridentequippedissiles and has givenStates the option ofbombers as pari ofIRVedIn another dbplay of procedural flexibility,last round of talks Moscow reversed itselftoorking group on confidence-be)measures. But it has remained adamant inUS attempts to restrict telemetry encryptionsthan was done In SALT II

the same time. In early February theflight-testing theew ICBMdevelopment in the. The SALTallowed each side to test only one newthe Soviets did last year with Ihelaimed that thectuallyhich Is permitted by the treaty^

tor 6w'

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c

The Soviets seem intent on deploying it. in particularcabile ICBM in the

SO. The Soviets areew tarce phased' array radarilometers inland In the east-central USSR andarge part of the USSR. This location and orientation raises compliancepertinent to the ABM Treaty. The new radar,imilar to or Identical with radars at other localptimized lor ballut ic missile early(BMEVV) andap io coverage. But It has the technical potential to provide target tracking data that could be used to support ABM deployments beyond the Moscow area. The Treaty prohibits (he deployrrsent of BMICW new radars that are not on the periphery of the USSR and oriented outward.

ooking Ahead. We eapect the USSR toto seek siiatcgic advantages through the arms control process and to weigh thb objective more heavily than any concerns about the cost of the arms race or its contribution lo global instability. The Sovietstrong desire lo curtail US programs because ol Iheir concern thai Ihe combination of such weapon systems as the. long-range cruise missiles, and Pershing II could outpace improvements lo Soviet strategic defenses and would threaten the conirol and suivivability of their silo-based ICBMs The key to Soviet tactics will be the degree lo which Soviet leaden believe ihe United Stales will gowith its planned programs.

or now the Soviets appear lo believe that il they combine their current rsegotiaiing stance with vigorous public criticism of US proposals, the United States will modify ill START position They will continue to point out thai their START position remains contingent on the outcome of INFe believe that inOctober) of STARTSoviets will stress thai their proposals entailanlly greater cuts than envisaged by SALT II and will reiterate the positions that have ihe effect ofiheir major strategic weapons programs Theare intent on Improving all aspects of their strategic forces, and ihey do not appear to feel under lime pressure in START.

MBFR. CSCE, ond CDE

n MBFR. the new Eastern draft treaty tabled in Vienna in ihe last round features an extensive package of Associated Measures that Moscow can now cite lo argue thai it has made concessions In principle on sirscar all of the West's verification andproposals. Contrary to the Western approach, several key Eastern verification provisions would go into effect only after reductions had been completed. Tbe East has not budged on the data issue, which ihe West has insisted be settled before my reduction agreement The East would get around tbe problem by having the treatyostreduction common ceiling, but not specifying the size of tbe reductions lo be taken

t the CSCE review talks in Madrid tbe Soviets retreated somewhat from their earlier stand that the Spanish compromise proposal had to be accepted In tote. They finally agreed lo amendments thatinimal degree met Western concerns, particularly one catlingeeting on human contacts Moscow probably made these concessions because It realized thai the leal was still subject to various interventions and was nonbinding in any ease. At ihe same lime it wanted toesture lo the West Europeans, particularly tbe West Germans,eans ofpressures against NATO INF deployments The end of tbe Madrid conference paves the way for the signing ceremony In early September (when the INF talks also resume) and the opening of ihe Conference on Disarmament in Europereparatorywill begin in Helsinki in October and theitself in Stockholm in

ooking Ahead. CDE and MBFR clearlysubordinate to Ibe INF negotiations. Moscow will continue lo use any movement in these (wo major Eiy ocean forums to depict itself as forthcoming and sincere en arms conirol and to attempt to fuelto NATO's INF deployment. In MBFR. the East may haveumber of additional steps lo demonstrale its flexibility. For instance, it mightthe West's mandatory quota approach to on tile inspections as long as it could ensure lhal these inspections could not become Intrusive. Because CDE initially will deal strictly wiih conlidcnce-building measures. Moscow will probably use it primarily as a

own

platform to inert its devotion to peace and arms reductions. Tbe CDE preparatory meetings will roughly coincide with this lad's "'peace-in Western Europe and therefore lit nicely into Moscow's expected "peace offensive."

Human Rights

he Soviets' poor human rights record hasunder Andropov Repression of dissent, which grew somewhat harsher inontinues:

The regime has taken unusual measures to curtail contacts between Soviet citizens and Weaternen such as severing long-distance- direct-dialservice, issuing warnings to dissidents to cut off lies with Western newsmen andpotting scvcial dissidents on trial on charges of involvement In subversive activities of Western governments or emigre organizations. Increasing harassment of Western tourists and officials, and tightening up border controls

Andropov has advocated policies that would further restrict ihe rights of non-Russianand the tale of Jewish emigration has slowedrickle. New bureaucratic obstacles have been added lo the application process, there are reportsecision to hold emigration lo an absolute minimum, and an officially sponsored "anti-Zionist committee" has been set up.

Even in dealing with internationally knownthe Sovieis have declined the opportunity to reap good willelatively low cost

Sennets have, however, made twofinally released the US Embassythey accepted ihe Spanish compromise proposalMadrid CSCE talks. But we have no reasonthai ihe ScanJets will honor these newrights commit menu In practice any moredid the provisions In5 Helsinki accords.

Ahead. The Andropov regime islo change its human rights practices in any

fundamental way, because il fears loosening controls over the population could ultimately be politically destabiliring

shortages at home and unrest in Poland have made Soviet leaders edgy about the mood of the population.

Many Soviet officials believe thai Brezhnev's detente policies made this problem worse.contacts with tlie West provided many Soviet citizens with information about highof Irving in the West andem more dissatisfied with their lot Jewish emigration stirred up other religious and ethnic minorities who wanted to leave.

In an effort to revitalize the economy,robably planning to Impose austerity measures and harsher labor pobcies that will furthertension between the regime and the population. .

He may also anticipate that his policies toward Eastern Europe could produce some turbulence there, which could reinforce his determination to reassert the party's monopoly over Information and lo taolate the Soviet population to Use extent possible from news of the outside world

evertheless, we believe Andropov may find it Expedient to make some cosmetic changes that the Soviets would then publicize asfreer movement of people and Ideas'":

He could exKOurage an expansion of academic exchanges, outesire to gain greater access to Western scientific Information.

Andropov might stop lamming some Western radio stations

He might decide toew highly visible dissidents such as Shcharanskiy or even Sal harov.

ituation arose in which US Congressional approval of an arms control agreementto Soviet interests could be affected by Jewish emigration. Andropov would probably ease up a

Eost-Wcsl Trade

ndropov last spring implicitly cr it kited Brezhnev's trade policies, and he was probablyIn the regime't increased efforts toward ihe end of Brezhnev's life to protect the Soviet economy from further Western bade restrictions. Thb policy has been reinforced since his accession:

major theme of Andropov's unpublished speech al the Warsaw Pact summit in January

was Ihe vital Ira port* nee ol teducing ibeof CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries on Western technology and credits

The primary objectiveyear energy program Is said to be increased self-sufficiency In energy technology.

The USSR has returned to its previous practice of paying for grain mostly io cash while nuking greater efforts lo arrange com pomatum deab with Western firms. Indicating that the regime regards increased borrowing from tbe Wotenerally unacceptable way of dealing withhard currency problems

Some Soviets, however, have indicated that the USSR is still interested In certain types of imports from the United States if ihe price is right Soviet trade olticxab have continued to show interest in obtaining US equipment and technical assistance in exploiting offshore oil deposits They have been negotiating with US firms for the purchase of agricultural mac ninety and food-processing technology and have staled thai the regimes decision toigher priority to developing light industry and agricultural machinery would open up new opportunities for bilateral trade And these officiaU have attempted to keep open their channels of communication with the Americancommunity

Looking Ahead. Andropov's future policytrade with the West will be driven by several economic imperatives

A desiie to obtain from the West the technology and industrial materials that are essential lo high-priority areas of the economy.

Recognition of ibe need to import agricultural commodities in sufficient quantity lo prevent any precipitous decline in consumption.

The poor outlook for Soviet bard currency ei ports combined with unwillingness toteep rise in indebtedness to the West.

considerations will also affecttoward East-West trade:

Soviet leadership wishes to decrease the country's dependence on Western suppliers and

especially on ihe United States over tbe long term.

The Soviets want to demonstrate lo ihc United States thai any policy ol economic warfare would be doomed lo failure.

Moscow wants to give Westernreater stake in ecc*omie reunions with the USSR In hopes of enhancing Us ability to influence the political orientation of key NATO countries.

Andropov has Internal political reasons forautarkic goab, in view of the backlash among Soviet officials against Brezhnev's trade polxies when US sanctions were imposed.

over the next two yearsare likely to:

Concentrate" on purchases from the West of technology and materials that enhancerogram and the manufacture of important Industrial materials and equipment, especially In the energy, transportation, agriculturaland food Industry fields.

Give preference to non-US suppliers where possible

Hold down borrowing from the West, if need be Dy dipping into domestic energy supplies in an effort to raise hard currency oil exports to the West

Attempt lo stimulate Western competition over interest rates lo cut coats

Attempt lo widen differences within NATO over the utility of trade restrict kins and work lo increase West European participation in Soviet development projects

Hold purchases from the United States as close as possible toillion tons required by the LTA and assiduously court alternative grainwhile investing heavily in the Foodin hopes of moving toward greaterself-sufficiency In the years to come

Market Soviet manufactured goods motein Western Europe.

degree to which these measuresdepend In large part on whether world oilhigh enough to sustain hard currency earnings,

IB

whether Western economicigorous enough to increase West European demand (or Sovietand whether the Soviet and East European popula-tiora are docile enough to accept further deterioration in ihe standard of living. On balance, the slowf Soviet oil production together with weak oilikely to impede the USSR's efforts lo improve its hard currency balance of payments signifieantly. But (he Soviets appear to be headedetter-than-average grain crop tfus year and areood position to minimise grainodest increase inof machinery and equipment this year without an increase in total hard currencyossible.

Soviets are worried about their abilitywith US technology over tbe bog termUS efforts tooordinatedpolicy toward the USSR.dmposition ofin the absence of similar unctions appliedEuropean governments, would probablya marginal effect on the Soviet ecooomy.currently have no large project in the worksdependent on US technology. They are able toall foreign inputs criticalheir needs fortwo years from other Western sources. Thebelieve the Uniled States, acting infrom its Allies, has little leverage lo affectchoices. Ahhoush ihey would prefer lotrade wiih the Uniled Stales, they seewith Western Europeorethan they have in the past.

Soviet Policy on Recnorsal Issues Significonrly Affecting US-Soviet Relations

Eastern Europe

Andropovs actions to far haverterimnatioo loight ship in Eastern Europe. The Soviets have insisted that the doctrine ofcentralism- (that b, stronger Soviet control) be applied io Ihe ecoraomk arena, inc .eased the pressure on Iheir Warsaw Pact Allies to contribute more for force moderruatioo, and criticized ideclogicalin Eastern Europe. The policy objectivesthese moves are hardly new. but Andropov appears lo have pushed them with new Interisfty.

In accordance with Andropov's call forualitatively new level of economiche Soviets have increased tlielr efforts lo reorient East Euiopean economies lo meet more of the USSR's economic needs and political interests- Sinceaccession, ihe Soviets have continued Brezhnev's policies of:

changes in CEMA rules and givingattention lo the need to move away from cofisensus decSrioomaking and increase Sovici influence over the coordination of planning and production.

--Pushingreater division of labor, increase! country iperialiraiion. and more Joint enterprises to enmesh East European economies with the Soviet economy.

for "concrete steps" to change the CEMA Pricing system, which now tends to favor East European Interests, and refusing to adjust prices for Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe, which are rapidly approaching tbe world mailer level because of the decline In OPEC prices.

n addition, they have abo:

Calledniform CEMA food plan and an Increase In East European food and consumer goods deliveries to the USSR, some at the erpensc of hard currency sales lo the West

Criticized Use foreign borrowing practices of Hungary and Romania, including Ihe wisdom of Hungary's Joining tbe Internalional Monetary Fund (IMF*

Callededuction in CEMA imports of food and finished equipment from tbe West and for greater emphasis on importing turnkey factories to produce the actual goods and limit the impact of future Interruptions of trade.

Urged the development of an overall coordinated CEMA foreign trade plan, which would increase Soviet control over CEMA economic ties to the West.

Reduced credit lo the East Germans

Adopted more stringent lending practices in dealing wiih other CEMA countries.

Warned CEMA countries that further reductions in energy deliveries and other raw materials may be necessary.

Pressed ihe East Europeans to provide more aid for Cuba, Vietnam, ard other Soviet clients In Ihe Third World.

n rie military area, Andropov hai:

Pressed bb Warsaw Pad Allies to raise defense spending.

tudy be made of Use Warsaw Pact's, "mechanism ofnd called^ further perfection of political interaction" based on the Warsaw Pact organization.

ef

-to

Pressedf"

nified support for "count ermeasu res" la INF derjIoyrnenL

In the area of ideology. Andropov hasard line toward manifestations of lutionalbm in Eastern Europe that he construes as critical of Soviet dominance of the region Soviet media have criticized the Romanians for harbceing ^niisocaalbt" tendencies in the party. Even loyal Bulgaria has drawn fire for prorncJing nationalism rather than "proletarianAt the same time the Soviets haveoint East European demarche to China urging opposition to US imperialism

To justify hb efforts to tighten Soviet control over Eastern Eoaope,^

J Andropov reportedly spoke in alarmist tonesthe economic and military threat posed by the United States and Its Allies.

"JiSuch hyping of tbe Westernclearly serving Soviet interests In securing East Europeanthat Andropov has decidedime to push hard for greater Bloc cohesion.

hese wide-ranging step* have produced more than the usual amount of tension in Soviet-East European relations, with even staunch allies such as East Germany and Bulgaria resisting some ofnew pressures.

Conflict over economic issues at tbe April rneet-ing of CEMA secretariesostponement

of Ihe CEMA aummil the Soviets had been pudiing for.

- Controversy

J>ver Ihe Soviet effort to boost military spending P

^Moscow has apparentlya commitment from East Germany to improve its military capabilities, but Romania. Hungary, and perhaps others are still resisting.

The pnxpect of further Soviet nuclear deploy merits on East European territory has alsoThe declaration of the June meeting of Warsaw Pact leaden failed lothreatened "oounterrncasures" to INF de-ployinenl. The Romanians, who adamantlyto endorse such countenneasurcs. reportedly won the cautious support of some other stales.

Romanian andesser extent Polish media have engaged Soviet newspapers in openover ideological questions for ihe first lime in roars

Romanian media implicitly criticized Moscow for not providing more economic assistance, and the Romanian delegation at CSCE talks inendorsed Western amendments opposed by tbe USSR.

ooking Ahead. In dealing with EasternMoscow hat been pursuing for decades many of the objectives Andropov has endorsed.ossible that bureaucratic inertia will combine with resistance from East European regimes to prevent htm from making much more headway than Brezhnev rnade.he Soviet economic Jowdown. the ap plication of US sanctions after the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the increase In US military srasndtng. and Poland's de facto bankruptcy appear to have galva nixed the Soviets to do what they have long wanted to do:ie East Europeans to tighten their belts and reduce their dependence on Western imports,greater" share of the burden of the enormous combined Warsaw Pact military bill, and help out as well In problem areas of Ihe Soviet economy.

knows (batefoliating:situation throughout the region lullof an austerity program would aggravateof popular unrest in several EastHe may. nevertheless, be prepared tofar.

Andropov probably believes there is enough waste In the East European economics to impose some additional costs without cuttingsharplv.

He probably has considerable appreciation for tbe purely coercive power of the pobce insocial order, and be may consequently place less emphasis on substditing consumerism as an instrument of control.

He may hope that tbe introduction of some economic reforms Is Eastern Europe will better enable the economies of the area to adapt to a

tougher Soviet policy.

will attempt to limit the risks of austerityifferentiated approach to the Eastregimes. This Soviet policy could also help to keep them in line, by encouraging competition among litem for Soviet energy and other raw materials

will probably be inclined tobis economic policies toward Easternsome further restrictions on politicalprobably believes that any significantn religious expression and culturalcould combine with economic distress todisorder

Poland

Sovieis have not exempted Polanddrive for economic austerity and politicalin Eastern Europe. Last year Ihey providedany, hard currency assistance and reduced theirtrade surplus with Poland, altliough inthe Soviets decided to permit Poland aof goods produced in joint Polish Soviettlm past spring the Soviets expressedthe implication* for all of CEMA ofout its repayment to Western banks overperiod, thereby implying five deslrabibty ofrepayment schedule even at ihe cost oftightening by consumers. Soviet media havePolish authorities against rrunimizingounterrevolutionary" forces, and havequickening of the pace of 'normalization'" andrepression of opposition

The decision to permit the Pope'scould not have been made againsteter minedreflectedacceptance of Polish leaderapal visit that occurred without incident might give the Polishegree of legitimacy. Nor did Moscow oppose llie formal lifting; of martial lawimited amnesty because these measures were accompanied by repressive legislation designed lo ensure continued tight controls over the population

Looking Ahead. The Soviets appreciate that General Jaruzcbkl has given them most of what they wanted In Poland. They are not likely to unseat him unless they lose confidence In his loyalty or he pioves completely unable to maintain public order. If he does notajor miscalculation, they will continue to support him. and his area of tactical flexibility may gradually expand The Soviets will, however, continue to maintain contacts with alternatives in the Polish leadership and otherwise pleasure Jaruzclski to move more rapidly In rebuilding and strengthening the network ol party-dominated institutions through which control of the population was exercised before the process of Polish liberalisation began.

The Soviets will not necessarily oppose, but will be wary of. laruzeiski's eflorts to secure theof live Catholic Church. Although they would like Jaruiebki lo revoke the gains made by the Church during the Solidarity period, they would sec some advantagestate-to-state concordat with Rome that required no ccwessioru on the part of the Polish regime But they would probably strenuously oppose any establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican thategalization of the Chinch's role in Poland.

Afohor-ston

his accession. Andropov has accentedthe possibilityegotiated withdrawalforces from Afghanistan but reiteraled Soviet

determination to ma in tainpuppet government there. Soviet officials have continued to insist that the Maribt revolution fahat no settlement in to! vm*change of government is possible, and lhat Afghanistan'* place in the Soviet sphere offundamental fact" that all parties must recognize.

Soviet media coverage of Afghanistan since November has appeared to be preparing the homelandrolonged straggle rather than cither aormajor escalation aimed atuick milttarv victory. Militarily and politically tbe conflict has been stalemated during the past year, although the Soviets can point lo specific gains that may sustain ihe hope of prevailing in the longer run Politically, they have made no progress in exteoding the sway of Ihe Babrak Karma! government, and the recent Mojahadin defeat of an elite Soviet trained Afghan Army brigade confirms private Sovietthat the complete wbjugation of ihe guerrillas will take years. Soviet military logistics and housing construction in Afghanistan and the ttepped-up training of Afghans in the USSR strongly suggest the Soviets are preparingong stay.

While, continuing to prosecute the wai and working looviet-style political structn Afghan ill an. Andropov has used the UN-sponsored negotiations that began1 to blunt International Criticism of Soviet aggression and to press for direct negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would entail Pakistan's recognition of the Babrak Karmal government The Soviets have kept the(alls going, but ihey have demonstrated no serious interest In making compromises loolitical srttlemetit.r

_Jln the meantime, use Pakistanis continue lo support tbe Afghan rebels despite the fact Jhat the Soviets have reportedly increased subversive activities inside Pakistan.

ooking. Ahead. Andropov almost certainly does not intend to relinquish the new geopolitical position the Soviets have acquired in MghanBtan While refecting any political aetllcment that does not safeguard the Soviet position and guarantee angovernment in Kabul, the Soviets will continue to seek ways of reducing the political and military costs of their occupation. They will

Continue military operations against thetry to undermine their popular support, and exploit their disunity.,

Continue to support Babrak Karmal whilecontacts with potential alternative leaders both within the Khalq and Parcham factions.

Pursue negotiations with Pakistan both to keep up appearances and to motivate Pakistan to end support to the Insurgents.

Continue lo put heat on Pakistan's President Zia by covert assistance to Zla's politicalnd tribal Insurgents in Pakistan.

Use military intimidation against Iran itto i"nce Tehran to restrict support lo the insurgents and to limit Insurgent use of Iranian territoryafehaven.

Although at some point Moscow may attempt to break the stalemate by massive reinforoemenl of its forces, we regard the likelihood of thb as low in tbe near term-Middle East

ndropov wasey figure in the Soviet decision last summer to build an integrated air defense network in Syria

Moscow's aid to Syria was in the most Immediateesponse to the Israeli thrashing of Syria's Soviet-equipped for cm in Lebanon. Yet strategically the Soviets have doubtless seen the conflict in Lebanon not onlyroblem but abo as an opportunity for improviiis their position in the Middle Eastong terra basis and frustrating US peace efforts In the region.

3 Since

Initialissile deployments^

Soviet involvement has further increased fj

^Although Soviel public statements haveto avoid specifying conctetely bow Moscow would react to an Israeli attack on Syrian territory.

tbeweaponry Moscow has installedtria, tbe Blowing numbers of Soviet military personnel (nowimited number Innd the expanding degree of Soviet control over Syrian air defense and Involvement in overallualitative change in Moscow's

Moscow responded to the May Israeli-Lebanon force evacuation agreement by attempting totensions between Israel and Syria, by raking queslioni about the legitimacy of the Cemayelthat negotiated the pact with Israel and possibly condoning Syria's efforts to foster the emergence of an opposition government in Lebanon, by encouraging disruptive behavior on Syria's part, by providing Assad with new dernonstrations of Soviet support, and by cooperating with Damascus to increase the Syrian military's level of readiness.

The Soviets have sought to complement their military support for Syriaiplomatic offensive designed to increase their influence throughout the Middle hast at the expense of the United Slates. Moscow has

approchement among Syria, lordan. and Iraq

Tilled back toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict and increased its military supplies to thai

country.

*Encouraged Syria to cut off aid to Iran and to open the pipeline to Iraq.

to use the disarray within iheo Increase Soviet influence In the organization I

to advance pro-Soviet elements in the South Yemen Government andajor agricultural aid program in an effort to ensure that Kasani not move too far toward the West

he Soviets have had some success in cultivating moderate Arab stales:

Egypt, beset by economic problems, determined loore rionaligned image, and In need of parts for Soviet-made militaryhas purchased Soviet spare parts and trucks andrade protocolultural agreement with Moscow.

Foreign Minister Saudi visit to Moscow this past winter as partroader Arab Leaguewas the first high-level Soviet-Saudi contact since

-C

Looking Ahead. The primary Soviet objectives will remain lo increase their influence in ihe region and to stalemate US peacemaking diplomacy from which Moscow is excluded. At the present juncture, this means frustrating Implementation of theay Pact and getting the multinational peacekeeping force with its US contingent out of Lebanon. Over the next two years, it means undermining tbe US proposal for, an overall Middle East srttletnent The overriding Soviet interest is not so much to bringenuine resolution of ihc Palestinian problem but rather to insinuate the USSR Into peacemaking diplomacyeans of expanding Its ability to influence events.

To this end the Soviets will Inlensify efforts loew consensus of Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, In.support of tlieir call for an international peace conference. The Sovietin Syria has made it easier for them to block US

efforts. The Soviets will try to convince other Arab state* that the only alternativetalemate Is an urlernalional conference with Soviet participation

The most Important issue facinghe choiceoviet course of action In the event of Syrian-Israeli hostibties- Both Moscow and Damascus may have believed earlier this year that they would benefit from limited conflict confined to Lebanon. Tensions in lebanon served to undermine tlvc Israeli-Lebanese agreement, justify tbe Soviet presence in Syria, and emphasize the need for Moscowinclusion in any settlement rsegociarions The Soviets, usprobably hoped that polarization of the situation in Lebanon would bolster Assad's determination lo remain aloof from US-sponsored talks

The Soviet* probably judge that confiningclashes to Lebanon would be difficult,In view of the Soviet-mannednd command and control facilities In Syria. We believeajor conflict betIsrael and Syria would lead to Syria's defeat, involve Soviet casualties, further set back the reputation of Soviet arms, and once again demonstrate Moscow's inability to defend its clients from Israeli attack

ia. Ahhough Moscow may not share our assessment of the likelihood of Syria's defeat, we believe thatmpressed with Israel's military capabilities andto encourage Syria to initiate orajor military coiillict. At the same* lime. Moscow has continued to signal the steadfastness of ils support for Syria, and there has been little indication thai the Soviets areignificant restrainingon Iheir ciierats:

conflict should come, the Soviets would still hope that the conflict would be confined to Lebanon They would hope that Ihey could avoid

' entering combat,

ihe Israelis conducted alrsirikes over Syria, the Soviets would almost certainly use their SA-Ss

To avoid having lo make tbe critical decision ofourse of action in the event of Syrian Israeli host ilitio. the Soviets are probably counting on Israeli, reluctance to engage Soviet units, on the US ability lo reatiain Israel, and on Assad's desire lo avoid an ali-oul war.

Central America and the Caribbean Basin

In ihe Caribbean Basin area the Soviets under Andropov have kept up iheir high level of military assistance to their chief client, Cuba, broadened their military aid for pro-Soviet regimes In Nicaragua and Grenada; and continued to support aid to thein El Salvador, which they expect eventually to deal the next major blow to US IrUeiests In the hemisphere. Although they have looked largely to Cuba to facilitate the delivery of arms toandSalvador, avoided irrevocable commitments, and kept open alternative strategies, the Soviets have positioned ibemselvesore assertive role in the

The Soviets have upgraded Cuba's military capabilities. This year Moscow has: '

Improved Cuba's early warning and airnetwork.

Improved Cuba's airlift capability.

Strengthened Cuba's modest amphibious assault capabibiy.

Enhanced Cuba's limited ability lo conductwarfare

In addition, the Soviets have expanded tbe Soviet military presence on the island fromoersonnelost of the increase probably has been in military advisers and inleUigence

^rather than in the Soviet combai unit

hardened structures, possibly forstorage, and increased vehicle storage space for Soviet forces In Cuba.

The Soviet decision to augment its mibtary presence In Cuba and to beef up Cuba's military capabilities was probably motivated primarily by ihe Soviet-Cuban rsartnership In Central America and ihe tense Sate of US-Cubanhe contingency preparations against any US attack on Cuba have reduced Cuba's vulnerability to actions the United Slates might take in response to the deplcn/rnerrt of Cuban milliaryin Nkarsajua.

r ,i

r

lUjrOe'

ine* Andropov's accesiioo. the Soviets and Cubans have stepped up their military support to the Sandinistas. Consistent with the luslorical pattern, tticie hasivision of tabor between the Soviets and Cubans in Nicaragua. The Cubans have provided the bulk of the in-country military personnel:

uban military and securityare now in Nicaragua.*

The general formerlyommand of Cuban forces in Ethiopia has reportedly been sent to Managua to oversee Cuban military activities In Nicaragua.

Cuban lecurity advisers probably exertinfluence within the Nlcaraguan Ministry of Interior.

Cuban MIG pilots have been oooducting unusual flight training that might be partontingen-

plan for deployment in Nicaragua.

Soviets have provided weaponry andsupport They have orchestrated, deliveries ofequipment from other Bloc countries as wellThere have beenonfirmed seaborneto Nicaragua from the Bloc thus faras compared toeliveries in all of lastfrom trucks and field kitchens to Miltanks, and artillery Moscow hasto Cuba for possible use by

the Soviets have refrained fromcommitting themselves to Nicaragua'smilitary support for Nicaragua hasgrown since Andropov's accession. Theequipment shipped directly from the USSRhas escalated this year, additionalreportedly have been sent to Managua toNicaraguan mleuigence. and the Sovieisequipment for two communications inter-

( cept fystems.

the Soviets have conducted aand diplomatic campaign to create an envi-

oa.Uw thU year

Hi-io. kmO0 combat troops lo Tncaraova. We havaeaal imed then premor. u*rar.vavM iuk uVHi Nki'iiualathat would Inhibit tbe United States from aiding ami Sandinnia forces and toolitical cover for Soviet actions:

In late April, word was reportedly passed lo Soviet propaganda organizations tolitz: aimed al mobihting West European publicagainst US "aggression" in Nicaragua.

On the diplomatic circuit, the Sovietsput out the word that they had noInterest In Central America or plans for involvement andpecial role for the United States In the region.

L

r

J

This public relations effort is consistent with Soviet propaganda techniques.

El Salvador tbe Soviets have continuedstrategy of providing military assistancewhile promoting negotiations to putfor continuation of ihe war on ihe United States.

. The pattern of arms deliveries to El Salvador suggests that the Cubans probably decided to increase the flow of arms in supportew offensive the guerrillas launched last fall From October to June has been the longest period of sustained guerrilla activity since ihe Insurgency began. During this period ihe Soviets have evidently increased their efforts lo give ihe Salvadoran Communistote prominent role tn ihemovement

In Central America and

The Soviets followed through with promptof supplies to Crciuda. promised when Moscow decided lost summerajorof aid, sent economic advisers, brought

Tup Oiuil

to Moscow foi military training foi the first time, and explored the possibility of naval access

Vietnam offered military aasbUncc to theCommunist Party for the first time, and the Soviets reportedly offered to facilitate shipment

Cuba has assisted in constructionajor airportearby military installation in Grenada.

ooking Ahead. Because Central America is not crucial to Moscow's essential strategic concerns and because the largely covert character of their aid makes it possible for the Soviets to change course without toooss ofonceivable that the Soviets may attempt to use the regionargaining chip in future talks with the United States. But we believe that, at least for the nearer term, the incentives for continued Soviet involvement outweigh the disincentives:

The Soviets doubtless see greater opportunities for seriously damaging US interests here than in other Third World areas.

Although the Soviets cannot be absolutely certain bow the United States would respond to anyumber of further moves they might make, tlvey doubtless believe the USolicy in theikely to be constrained bv domestic political pressures.

The Soviets arc not eager to commit themselves to bankrolling any new client to the extent that they have Cuba and Vietnam. But they probably believe that even if they dotronger commitment to Nicaragua they can hold costs down because thatot bolatedas Cuba was Innd because itsnlyillion.

-The Soviets doubtless realize that funneling aid through Cuba has the disadvantage of making the recipients feel more beholden to Cuba than to the USSR, but they will still work hard to ensure the support of these redolent* Inforums.

realizes that while its influence overot unlimited, mutual Soviet and Cuban objectives, coupled with the more Important fact tliat Moscow controls the purse strings, provide the USSR with considerable leverage.

In Nicaraguaighly probable that the Soviets will cooperate with Castro in providingCuban military personnel and more weaponry il the insurgency does not wind down. They may also increase somewhat the number of Soviet advisers, training of Nicaraguans. and direct participation in arms deuverfes. The Soviets do not believe tbeare in Immediate danger of toppling, but the insurgents' ability to sustain their military operations In Nicaragua, the defection of the most popular Ssrdinbta leader, and the population's growingwith Use regime may liave raised ccmcerns In the minds of Soviet leaders about the Sandinistas' long-term prospects. The extent to which Soviet and especially Cuban personnel have been Integrated into the country's security and political apparatus indicates that they are digging in for an extended stay and are engaged not only in assisting military operations but inoviet- and Cuban-style political andstructure.

Currently. Soviet leaders probably believe it unlikely that an augmentation of Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua would in itself provoketo send US combat troops to the region:

They doubtless recognize that Sandinbta control of the government enables them to portray tneir assistance as aboveboaid aidegitimate government beset by US-inspired subversion.

Moscow may decide to associate itself publicly with parts of the Conladora group's diplomatic program to bringeduction of pressure on the Sandinistas from Honduras. The Soviets might Mpect thb to increase the credibility of their charges that the Unitedabotaging peacemaking efforts.

Bv infiltrating Cubans into the countryand at least initially furtively, the Soviets and Cubans hope to dilute adverse political reactions in Western Europe and to minimize the chancesorceful US response

Soviets may attempt touid pro quo from Soviet-supported clients in other regions by pressing (hem to volunteer for military duty in

Nicaragua, thus riving support for ihe Sandinb-Ui an mteroaijooal flavor. Reportedly, the PLO already hai persocnd training in Cuba forIn Central America.

y notormal commitment to defend Nicaragua, the Soviets have left themselves room to bach off if they change their assessment of the costs and benefits of assisting Nicaragua. They willcalibrate iheir actions In accordance not only with military requirements on the ground but also with their reading of likely reactions by Washington and other actors. L_

1

To maintain their leverage in Angola and lo give Dos Santos the wherewithal to pursue operations againstNational Union for Totalof Angola) insurgents and Soulhincursions more vigorously, the Soviets have increased, their direct militaryurface-to-air missiles and Ml It Hind helicopters)

Soviet assessment of the situation inmaytrategy ofarover the neat few months, while workingthe regime in Nicaragua and attempting lo

position the Salvadoran Communist Party for aroleuture Marxist regime In El Salvador-.

The Soviets recognize thai Ihe Insurgents In El Salvador have little popular support and cannotopular election.

They have reportedly concluded thai the current level of US military assistance is sufficient to preclude an undisputed military victory for ihe guerrillas

The Soviets reportedly are more optimistic about guerrilla prospects in El Salvador over the neat few years, in part because they probably feel confident that US dorriestic pressures willto hamper efforts by the US administration lo Increase US aid.

Southern Africa

policy toward southern Africa hasessentially disruptive. The Soviets under An-

^dropov have maintained their efforts to discredit US efforts to build political bridges lo the "frontline" states and lo sow further dissension between South Africa and its black African neighbors:

Soviets have remained intransigent against unking Cuban troop withdrawals from Angolaettlement in Namibia//

3

To give Mozambique's President Machel the ability and incentive to continue opposing South Africa and lo shore up the deteriorating internal security situation, the Soviets for the first time have suppliedndimited military air transportew trade agreement advantageous to Mozambique hai also

Tbe Soviets have continued to channel arms to the ANC (African National Congiess) Insurgents, who Have recently made greater use of urban lerrorism in South Africa.

Moscow has had some success in iu ef lorts lo improve relations with Zimbabwe PrimeMugabe fj

Qandour through eastern Europe Urn past rpnng heplans fee his first visit lo the USSRober

ooiing Ahtad. No change In Sovietregarding Namibia Is In sight. We believe thai if Dos Santos did appear ready lo agreeamlfalan setllementuban troop withdrawal,would greatly intensify lb pressuie on him and might evenoup attempt by more strongly pro-Soviet elements within his government

he Soviets will continue lo support Machel. Advances by tbe South Airicam-backed Inauigenti lhat thi eaten to topple hb regime would iMiease the likelihood of the Soviets encouraging Cuba to tend

troops to Mozambique. The Soviets, of course, are doubtless fully cognizant that the arrival of Cuban troops would not only riskar between South Africa and Mozambique that would be difficult to win but would also further strain Soviet relations withwvement of Cuban troops Into Mozambique, however, could have some compensa--tions from the Soviet perspective:

If the introduction of Cuban troopsouth African attack this would put Moscow in the position of defending black Africans against attack by white "imperialists."'

With heightened tensions between Mozambique and South Africa, other states in the region might be receptive to renewed Soviet militaryovertures.

The Introduction of Cuban troops would stiffen Pretoria's resistance to concessions in Namibia, thus scuttling the US-backed peace initiative.

China

The limited improvement in Sino-Sovietbegan before Brezhnev's death, when the Sennets evidently decided the souring of US-Chinese relations had created propitious circumstances for an overture to Beijing. Secretary Susiov's death may have eased the Pieces ofialogue. Andropov, who has been intimately involved forears in dealing with the China problem, probablyajor say in tbe Soviet decision to enter into the first round of talks in October. The dispatch of one of his personalas an emissary to China suggests that Andropov wants to keep alive the momentum for casing tensions further.

Asideeneral improvement inand the holdingecond round ofconcrete steps toward normalization sincehave been limited to the signing of some

^academic and technical exchange agreements, the conclusionrade agreement that may raisetrade to its highest level since theesumption of cross border trade in Central Asia,oviet decision to buy Chinese textiles barred from the US market by import quotas. There have been rumors of "basic agreement" to open consulates In Shanghai and Leningrad, denied by both parties. The Soviets and Chinese have agreed tohird round of talks In the fall. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa is to visit Beijing soon at the invitation of the Chinese Government rather than In his previous capacityuest of the Soviet ambassador..

Sovieta, however, have not yet takenmoves toward satisfying what theare preconditions for any significantwithdrawing from Afghanistan, endingfor Vietnam's military operations inreducing Soviet forces oppositein Mongolia:

Kapitsa, the leading Soviet Far East specialist, said in late May that no "give" on these issues was possiblt

Soviet media have rcalfirrncd Moscow's position on Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

Mongolia has expelled large numbers of Chineseaction that undoubtedly required Moscow's approval

The Soviets have continued to Increase active military units in the Far East and to provide them with more modern equipment

Consequently, there has been no movement on the major issues.

Lookine Ahead. The Soviet leadership sees Chinaower with vast ambitions thatundamental and implacable threat to tbe USSR over the long term. They fear that, although technological backwardness currently constrains China'sthe Chinese in time will ally with the United States and Japan, combining their human and material resources with imported technical-industrialThe Soviets have no expectation that the Chinese are interestedermanent rapprochement alom; the lines of their alliance In.

The Soviets consequently have little inclination to satisfy China's major demands, which wouldmany of the strategic gains they made in Asia during the Brezhnev years:

Vietnam's economic dependence on the USSR, any strong Soviet pressure brought to bear

on Vietnam to come to terms with China ova Kampuchea would probably endanger Soviet access to Vietnam's base [aciUties, which the Soviets use not only to block Chinese advances but also to counter US military capabilities. Moscow's concern that ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries arewilling to cooperate with the United Slates on security issues strengthen* Soviet interest inSoviet naval and air presence in East Asia.

China's insistence in March for Ibe first lime thai Soviet force reductions include the removal ofrom Asia may have stiffened Soviet oppositionny significant force reduction Soviet military leaders, including Ustinov, have taken an especially hard line toward China over the years, and they may have dug in their heels when ihe Chinese Introduced this new position

The Soviets are highly unlikely to take actions thai could thi eaten their domination offor the sake of conjectural and possibly Insubstantial future advantages In gaininggoodwill

oscow, nevertheless,trong desire lo check the erosion of ill strategic position in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle, and the Soviets may believe thai China's dissatisfaction with current US policiesthem an opportunity to do so without makinaAccordingly, the Soviets probably intend towo-track approach. They will improve their militarysia while working to isolate China diplomatically in Asia. But they will probably aboumber of small steps designed lo bringimited rapprochement with China and thereby to increase Washington's reluctance lo help China modernize Its economy and its military These steps are likely to include

urther expansion of ties including commercial agreements on terms beneficial to China

Suggesting conf Idence-building rneasuies, such as advance notification of military exercises along the border and acceptance of observers alncises.

public support for Vietnam anddirect Si no-Vietnamese talks.

Intensifying professions of Interestolitical settlement in Afghanis'in

with China the possibility ofparty-to-party contacts.

f measures such as these do not prove sufficient to keep Chinese interest in continuing negotiations alive, the Soviets could undertake the followingmeasures:

Do some bargaining on specif ic territorialsuch as ihe border on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.

Agree to modest troop cuts In Mongolia infor China's agreement too nag -grcasion treaty with Mongolia

Negotiate small mutual force reductions along the Slno-Soviet border, in exchangeonag-gression treaty between Moscow and Peking.

.Portray to the Chineseajor concession any decision lo limitn ihe Far East even thoughecision would be based on their own strategic interests

In sum, (he Soviets are prepared lo make some token concessions lo China but none that will affect their strategic position in Asia

Implications ond Outlook

AnoVopov's Assessment of the United States

he Andropov regime believes the current US administration has embarkedroad counterattack to reverse the military and foreign policy gains tbe Soviets have made over the past decade and to reestablish US global predominance.

tbe Soviet peine of view, (he mostaspect of the US administration's approach is tbe attempt to alter the balance of military power by accelerating US defense spending to strengthen US military capabilities The Soviets are probably cool idem of (heir abilityore vigorous US defense effort over the short

IMWfrW-

because of tbe advanced stage ofrograms and tbe fact that many of the US systems under consideration will not be deployed until the. But they are concerned for the future and are probably particularly worried about the US potential for major technological breakthrouglts.

The Soviets doubt that the US administration has any genuine interest io agreements that would inhibit major US strategic programs. They see US arms control proposals essentially as political rear-guard actions intended to reduce domestic and West European criticism of themilitary programs.

The Soviets believe the US administration is actively trying to undermine the Soviet economy, both by upplng the ante In military srxnding and over time byoncerted Western policy of economic denial against the USSR.

The Soviets also believe that the USharbors ambitions to politically destabilize Ihe USSR and its East European Allies through such measures as the "democratization"

Finally, the Soviets condemn what they see as the US administration's policy of resistingore determined fashion further Sovietin the Third World.

he Soviets see little prospect that tbe current US administration will change its policy toward tbe USSR of its own volition. At the outset of theterm, many Soviet officiab were hopeful that he would turn out to be "another Nixon" who. despite his conservative background, wouldigh priority onodus vivendi with the USSR. They now appear to believe, however, that the Reaganis dominated by "extremists" driven to agreater degree than previous administrations byrather than pragmatism, less inclined to insulate arms control or East-West economic dealings from the broader context of bilateral relations, and generally less willing to acquiesce to the Soviets in thearena. Nor do the Soviets see conflicts within the administration that could produce greater flexibility in US policy in the immediate future

Despite tills negative assessment of the basic thrust of the current administration's policies, the Soviets are probably less alarmed about the practical consequences of these policies than they sometimes profess to be. This Is partly because the Soviets believe that the administration has not -always executed its policies effectively, especially in dealing with Western Europe. The Soviets reportedly also believe theUS administration's handling of Chinaarming of relations between Moscow and Beijing. More important Soviet leaden probably still believe "Reaga nisei" will eventually yieldore "reahs-tic" US potter.

The Soviets do not anticipate an early return to the dimate of the. They recognize the unlikelihood that any US adnunistration today would accept the notion that crsgagjng the USSR In dialogue and expanding bilateral economic relations couldsignificant liberalizing change in the USSR or mitigate the Soviet leadership's fundamental hostility toward the West. They probably tee the development of increased American skepticism about the rewards of detenteecular trend predating Presidentelection and transcending the particularof any single US administration.

they probably believe thatchanges In the world "correlation ofreduced US Influence In the world, lhathas not yet run ita course, and that overrun social and political problems in theand the Western Alliance win make itthe United States to sustain competitivethis reason, despite their concerns about thetheir own system, ihey may tee the US"confrontational" stance as anattempt lo recoup ihe ground lit

n fact the Soviets believe that pressures on the US administration from domestic critics can take much of the sting out of ihe President's "anti-Soviet"

policies:

The Soviets believe the President is particularly vulnerable lo pressure from commercial interests, which they credit with forcing termination of the grain embargo

Gn.il"*

believe ibe Vietnam syndrome has placed limitations on the President's sbihty to maneuver in Central America and elsewhere in Uie Third World.

They probably believe that political support lor the administration's military programs is eroding

The nuclear freeze movement in the United States hasleasant surprise for the Soviets

as important, as the Soviets see it, itto which they can profit from Westthat their interests diverge from those ofhighlighted by the pipelineThe Soviets are cognizant that tbe electionof comervabve governments In severalcountries, the reinvigoration of Westernand the partial economic recovery of thestrengthen the Western Alliance Onat least In their long range planning,still regard Western Europe andGermany as vulnerable to Soviet pressuresThey know that West Cennanyby its desire to improve intra-GermanThey also see thai the foreign policymaior West German parties has dissipated, thatof the West German electorate hasa neutralist position, and that public opinionolivet Western countries Is moving In theThey hope that these trends willUS-West European economic competition tonew strains on the Alliance.

Soviets also see the availability of CubaCom mo nisi proxies and inteimediaries as aasset in international competition. The proxyminimizes the level of direct Sovietwhile achieving Soviet aims and protectingimage of 'socialist solidarity" with theregimes and irisurgencies They also count onsuch as Syria lo support Iheir efforts toin various regions of the world

sum, the Soviets probably expectforeign pressures to Impede but not lo reverseadministration's pobcies.

Overall Strategy

Soviet leaden continue to seeStates as the major impediment to theof Iheir global ambitions, the objective ofand irifhaencing US behavior will remain central lo tlicir foreign policy strategy They would prefer to sower the cost of technological competition and the risk of geopolitical conlioutation by reaching bilateral agreements with Washington, but only on terms that would notuither expansion of Soviet power and influence.

t least for now, the Soviets are likely to on pressure tactics rather than on direct overt urea toialogue with tbe United Slates. Moscow will:

Seek to demonstrate its determination end abilitymprove its military caps Mines,

lrrtensify efforts to split the United States from Us allies, perhaps by emphaslring areas of particular Interest to Westas MBFR or the Conference for Disarmament In Europe

Work to isolate the US administration within the United States by appeals to Congress, thecommunity, and broader public opinion

Show at least enough flexibility in dealing with China to keep US fearsi no-Soviet rap-prcrchemenl alive.

Continue to challenge US Interests in the Third World.

n the next two years, thereumber of branch points at which Ihe Soviets will have to decide whether to continue their current policy or to change one or more of Its elements. In the immediate future the main issue affecting US-Soviet relations will be INF. making this fdl an important testing period In US-Soviet relations The Soviets will have lo decide if they wish to limit US deployments through aagreement or to attempt lo exert heavy pressure toATO resolve We expect the Soviets to choose tbe latier course.'

f. as we expect, the Soviet campaign fails aid NATO deployment proceeds on schedule, the Soviets will have lo decide how to Implement their long-threatened counternieasurcs Essentially, the Soviets will have to choose between actions thai can be

3

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portrayed by them as carrying out their threat withoutonfrontation (for example, highlydeployments ofn Eastern Europe,ofEM forces -in the USSR. SLCM-CQuipped submarines dose to USr they couldullblown East-West crisis by highly provocative activities in Cuba. Wc expect the Soviets to choose the first course.

y4 the Soviets will be increasingly sensitive to the implications for them of the upcoming US Presidential election- They clearly would prefer to avoid actions that could boost President Reagan's reelection prospects. But at the same time they hope that.the President willolitical need to achieve concrete results with Moscow. Cromykos lunereiterated the Soviet requirement that anyaddress fundamental issues and added that the-United States must change at least some of its policieseagan-Andropov meeting could take place. If the Soviets decided that domestic pressures had led the President todltical need to displayand to achieve concrete "results" in dealing with Moscow, and If the Soviets had reason to expect that they would consequently notummit empty-handed, they might agreeeeting.

The Soviets increasingly see4 USas an Important event in US-Soviet relations. The victoryresidential candidate, of either party, perceived by the Soviets to standtaunch anti-Soviet approach would reinforce their concern that the whole US political spectrum has shifted to the right.

Regardless of the outcome,4 USelection will not by itself occasion achange in Soviet foreign or military policy. Soviet behavior in the International arena will be affected by many other variables. These would Indude suchat the nature of US relations with the NATO Allies, the stability of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, and the state of the US and Soviet eccmomks No matter how the Soviets Interpret the internationalomprehensive accord on bilateralor geopolitical behavior would remain precluded by fundamentally divergent altitudes toward what constitutes desirable political or social change In tbe world order.

n sum, Soviet behavior in the international arena since Andropov's accession has given noof an Inward turn on Moscow's part to the neglect of its position in the baternatiooal arena. Rather, he hasigorous new style to the assertive policies of the Brezhnev period.

lthough Andropov's poor health casts some doubt on his longevity and hb ability to participate fully in policy executionay-to-day basis, il should not affect the main lines of Soviet foreign polio, Even hb incapacitation or death would not any immediate shift in overall Soviet strategy, although it could result in tactical changes Inareas of policy and could affect policyIn the longer term, the next political succession couldatalystarger reorlenutionignificant segment of tlie leadership had come lo question ihe general ihrust of current pdicy. We do not believe that such pressure for an overall change of direction exists within the Soviet leadership at present.

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