Created: 9/1/1983

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Moscow's Tilt Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq


moscow's tilt toward baghdad: the ussr and the war between iran and iraq

nttlligtnri atmuneil

iicrxiic-loiih* tkr tiaiitiictturnip ltd

I uf lit:ohibai

.wiidttiditdihe, ef

'.mnmenis indrcnil du> be ii' 'm


ill Toward BagMad- The ussr and (fag War Between Iran and Irao '



USSR hu altered its policies toward Iran and Iraq in Baghdad'sthe pan yearalf. In2 Moscowajorlo improve ties willi Iraq, emphasidne closer militaryarms sales and deliveries.or example, the numberseaborne ariro

^hl The

ruca.iiui -isopporieuanegotialeu sciticmcnt of the war between Iran and Iraq. Relations have imprcrved to the point where Soviet and Iraqi leaden have recently made laudatory public statements about bilateral

the same period, Soviet-Iranian relations have steadily deteriorated to their lowest level since the Shah's reign. The most telling indicators of this decline are Tehran's recent abolition of theran's Communist party) and eapulsion erf Soviet efficsals from Irsnand Moscow's counter-expulsion of Iranian offieibls

Moscow's lilt loward Baghdadarked depaiturc from its policy of try-ing to maintain stable leiaitons with (he iwo while probing for better ties widi Iran Ai the outset of the war inhe Soviets thought they sawanoppor-unity to male somein Tehran. Their embargo of arms deliveries lo ben countries benefited Iran because irao. had been receiving considerably more aims. The Kremlin coupled thisenewed effort to tmprv'e political ties with Tehran. When ihe gambitno rewrote,"he em^rco bu! refused io condude any new armi deals

In ihe springowever, Moscow began to take steps that eventually amountedlear tire toward Baghdad. The Soviet movem various factors:

Iran's major battlefield victories in1 and the first half2 temporarily disadvantaged Iraq. The Soviets may have believed at that lime thai if ibey did not aid Baghdad. Iraq mic-hl decide It had no choic but to accelerate its turn toward Western Europe. China, and even ihe United States.

The USSR (eared that an Iranian victory would lead to the spread ofype of Islamic fundament alum near its southern border

riskoviet lilt toward Iraq would impel Iranurn back to-ard the United States teemed much lower In (he spring2 than it had earlier in the revolution. By that lime. Khomeini had crushed all major opposition, including the relatively pto-Western Bstlt-Sadr. and the regime's antt-Amcriean rhetoric was as shrill as ever.

Soviets had concluded thai the prc-ipecls for the Iranian revolution swinginghe left were becoming ilimmcr and lhat the outlook for -ood biklera! lies was poor. They apparently believed (hat ai long as Khomeini or his supporters remained in power Soviet influence would be minimal.


There are. however, some important constraints on the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations:

Mutual distruit between Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Moscow remains crest.

The Soviets do not want to "nugOniicprincipal ally in (he Middledeveloping looelationship with its archenemy. Iraq.

important, we believe ihe Kremlin, despite the de:erioraiion of its relations wiih the Khomeini regime, still considers Iran more important geopplilicaSy than Iraq and will want to avoid providing an opening for the United States in Tehran.

Although Ihe Soviet* are likely during theear to continue supplyingTrrlttBry bacWtig to Iraq,H altem-il toinrrrrlct-brcak in relations wiih Iran.

The course of ihe war willajor effeei on Soviet policies toward ihe two countries during the nextrolongation of the military stalemate -the moil likelypiobably would strain Moscow's relations wiihven further and lead to continued improvement in its tics with Iraq.

I Hejl! for In end IC Ihe war, even though they realize that cessation of the conflict would yield them liabilities at well aseaceful seitlcmem would:

the significance of oarie pniiie uritants in Soviei-lraniun telaweapons sales to Baghd.d.

Probably make Ihe Gulf states less nervovS about Iranian eapansioniim. which would decrease their need and willingnessooperate militarily with the United State..

Result io probably greater conlributions from Iran and liaghe struggle against Israel, thereby strengthening the pro-Soviet radical Arab states.

Possibly improve the prOspcCIsapprochement between Baghdad and Damascus

Tne potential liabilities (or the Kremlin from an end to the war, however, would be at least as significant:

Iraq, without aseed Tor weaponry, might accelerate its diversification of weapons suppliers and become less depeodeni on Moscow.

Iraq would probably improve its relations wiih the United States.

ramatic improvementranian lies with Washington isa remote possibility. Moscow might worry lhat the absence of the unifying facior of ihe war could weaken ihe fundamentalist regime to the poini that more pragmatic clerics, who are not as averse to dealing with the United States, would sain ihe upper hand

But the Soviets have learned to live with ihe war and can continue to do so as long as neither sideecisive military advantage Although Moscow would significantly enhance its position in the Middle East if it became an honesi brokerettlement, ihe prospect, of lhat occurring are slim


Moscow's. Tile Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq

The USSR's primary aim in (be Persian Gulf rcclon since IW hai been to eaptialiae on (he windfall ii received from the elimination of US influence in Iran wilhoul jeopardizing ill shaky, though important, relationship wiih Iraq. The war between Iran and Iraq, which began in Septemberhasajor impedimeni (otbe aMorrtplbhraent of ihU objective.

We believe that ihe Soviet Union has seen the wa. at. on balance, detrimental to ill intcrcili. On Ihe one hand, the conflict hat increasedependence on Soviet and Halt European trade and transit routes, weakened the position of the anti-Soviet Saddam Hutayn. and boosted Soviet hard currency earnings from arms sales Nexriheless. the Soviets probably believe thai these benefits are outweighed by other factors. In particular. Mosro-'t shifting policy toward ihe war has angered both Iran and Iraq Only since spring m? has Baghdad's altitude softened It the Swell have begun to favor Iraq

Another of the wart liabilities it that it hasS military presence in the region lest Objectionable to the conservative Persian Cull Mates, who Icae

un.ioisi.iii a, the Soviets LVove often

lamented,r hat also benefited the Untied States and Israel by bleeding two aoti-US COunirie. and by diverting Atab and Iranian energies from Ihe confrontation with Zionism.

Although ihe USSR has maintained an official, pub he puiicineutrality ihroughout the war, atpoim. during (he conflic; it ha* leaned toward one

-ide or the other depending on ill evaluation of (he

fighting Upahowcer. tbe Soviets refrained fromecisive stance on the side of cither belligerent

T his paper jnjls *etMoscow abandonedevenhanded stance toward theolicy that clearis

favors Iraq. It briefly ciammct Soviet interests in each country and the policy Ihe Kremlin follo-cd during the rust yearalf of the war It also points out the factors ihat will limit Moscow's tilt towardimportant of which is Iran's georoliiical significance to (he USSR. Finally, the papee discusses different scenarios for ihe course of the war and bow Soviet interests and policies -ill be affected ia each.

Background: Soviet Policy Before

Moscow's relations -nh the Shah's regime2 -ere relatively friendly despite the Shah's dccp-scatcd anii-CoiTimuniim and suspicion of the USSR. Tiade cipauded rapidly in,ehran started purchaung Soviet arms

By ihe time uf the Shahs ousterhe Iraniaashad orderedillion worth of Sovietground force support equipment tScr table on1

Strains began to reappearrt-lranianwhen thetarted to use his

oil wealih to build Iran into the picddminam .lulilars powerhe Persian Gulf region (he Shahi strategyuch closer alliance with the United State, and interests ia ihe region Thus. Moscow, ilihnugh surprised by the Shah's rapid demise, welcomed ua mayor bto- to US iitflucitcc tn the area

The So-iets ctpended considerable effort afic the Shah fell in9 in an attempt to court the regimetc4luh Khomeiniamtc govern-mcnt't dcci.ion io allow the previcwtls illegal Tudt-h.

llrtin.'s Oummumtto opentt, openly andousii! of radicaland '

news presunubl. bolstered the Kiemlin't hupct.invasion o! Afghanistan in December Itl9.




bOUUCr. tevctclljxjiilll: theirint l' qui often lejimi im

So'resenceuluutedran's naturalpipeline lo the tSSR. and rvduccditmktr of So-ti lalnaaliran

Soviet-Iraqi relations-huh had eipnndcri dunrr, iivalf of the liio* utith the ticnlniruupciatna- aaa) iheofiiuamnm ofnear-

1*1 -jrviieodu'inclail feu tear.

t el

uf ihe decade I'je| oppntLd the Sostrl-CabanMI ihe Vli


w>an*iat. IMd>

i. Kant. kllh Ihe < 'iSK inMir-

t"in iu ci**iiiii >oniciaqi Cunimv' i< Pli nvcHikv* lvee *ear* eel


b>>hi rw>i

onilfial in fedm '-i .i


JUp IhnB-ar-w

M* No-ici

-i> of

id Si uenttMi

Sonet officialt have complained

heid not consuli he USS at the) "ere supposed lo according lo the Soviet-Iraqi in in. befoic invading.

The Kicmlio'i decoion in (ha caily dart of the war ta tut ofl direct aunt shipmentsoth iidci icflected nt opposition to ihe liaqi invation ai well at in el lot it io cui'y favc* in lian. Iiac) bore the brunt of (lit* decision bccauie it had been recciviad laastintial arnounttof Soviet arrnt. while Iran had been ictunc far let* from ihe ttarl. however. Moicow attempted to attenuate the nef alive effects of ibe arms embargo, abacb It never pub**'red. an both countries. Iiunail amount! of Sonet arms to filtieo tbeni in the lirst few months of theand alto pcimittcd. and probably encouraged,tuch a* lafaya. Stria NeuihM1Po tird-lofhem

Dcspilf lhn iil'mpl to ataflstn Hi impact I'mtSfirliil|, A

n December ITQlhat Saddam

i ihe arm* cuiofl C

bciiaial* cr nuain be Hie Mm-:

J stated ihai

iI i LOU Id it

I. ai ihi iirnc nmc.the idea ihaiay, werejpMrently villi the aim o>ikFriendship and

hSiria in early <Mobc de-teu>nhii bii-etn Dartase'Ds and

. "till li-ui

belief that tl In


ii.iihe "tngiaiefvl" IngiikiKin r_

a run ad Ihe am lime (Kit ihe Kremlin torn-tried Saddam "'defiant."

Pclups even mote important in Ike Soviet deciiionndertake iheie anu liaoi Slept was Moscow's appai cm perception of Iraq's> opptxtuait, to mitt someehran. The Sonets begannew effortoon the Khomeini reglr-e.or. Soviet Ambassadoi Vinogradov met withimr Vlmtlei Rajai and Speaker of the Majlis Rifsanjani on separate occasions in Oeiote- ind stressed Mos-COw'i interna in improving leltlnms Tehran,er.nut receptive, and the effott foundcied. '

RraisetuntiM of Pours'- Sprint

craary 1UI

ayor taciacal shift, the Se-nt. lifted ihe inm cmhorgn initl Rcmpimg Ihe embargo cleath Invored lint) because ii bought much more thanid from ihe USSR. We believe ihe Sovieit Jiweailt (tared thai eoniniui1 on of the emte ill arm* pwechlio from China and the Wen and co-Id mm Baghdad irrcvucabllfruni theeirrnbnQt) also influenced by worries about mem between Baghdad and moderate Arab-p- lhatiedmpiiwi- irlnofH wah Iraq, andwa fail are In nuke immediate bcasdwa* with llan

in |

f wear



During theoilhe.

b-in in* deli'crcd mn f

.ppjienily -cie bou|hi under contract*belutr

the "ii During Ihe it nle period linn Icspiii foe aim- levelled II

tvMilaty eeivipeneni latlotling null

i'i" ammo'ition. narks, and tpiic pans

rrnam In ihe

Lwiih Iran -ind

Vlilo "ae-rea wciaurn bat

latent, lot Momv- Both Baghdad

iiiaMi tiewrd ihr nurvc a- the

riglu.i|he Iriinijnunw lt,id gw.tJ

Meanwhile, ihe neemlinblsambi.akni aboui iha itiurse uf notliieil development-uMiel) applj-adednl of Prime

eir -bom Huhi- coniiaVrediei and ea#aaar of larn-eg Irak hat I .r. aed Ibt w'<m ih- utit taaae.shed aneih>utwr-i


twin ifwhe -uirirmi .ind

criinieMI llic


rfv>m| in


alKtripis lu ti't-nhi.iueir. rcgnrsp by Curve


Bui some Soviet, recognized Ihai ihe consolidation o' clerical control would noic(il Ihe USSRexample, lineinyo political com meot Aletitanili Bovin warned in an aiticle ia1 andoscow television program in July that ihee ma lid eleiiciwere becoming dominant in Tehranvirulently ami-Soviet '

Whatevctn had. however. Moscowto court the Khomeini regime When Iran's new President. Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister took office late in the summerhey, unlike many of their predecessors, did not speak out publicly againtt the Soviets. In addition, trade increased1 to slightly above pie revolutionary levels, the two

countries enchanted visits of various low-level dele (a

done, and Ambassador Vinogradov was granted a

number ol meeting* with iranian leaden, flits petit*!.

however, turned out lo be the calm before the slur m

Moscow Changes Course: March Through1

In our ;ne lift trig of the amis embargo in1 wasamage-limiting; mrnvc bylis previous policy, which had been mote favorable io lean, failed to produce benefits for theehran and further damaged iheir 6Head, poor staidingghdad Ending the embargo, howevei. slowedot reverse the dcicriueati'iii in Sovjes- liarji lies. |ortly because the Sonets oantin-ucd to court Kbomcini. It was not until the spring of ivn* that the Kremlin began to tnjsc rromol-cy


cquidi>tance between the belligerents to onepanlinnete laions with

clear cupiioii forjttii inp-in mimnt.ii-ilf*

The most important indicator of the Sovi1Baghdad "as the-1

major new aim* contract- -the filil since bclore lit.-

war bejar C

3 bc-ieii Mart" and tunc, the Sovietsvisit*fti,ni the tract Depute Trade Ministeri' ol Industry and from Deputy Prime Minister

f irtg the same rerod.umbel


ofuropean officii It and (be Chief Of ihe Soviet Foreign Miniiuy'i Nor Han Depati-meal, Oleghighest leveliiit Baghdad Uncc before the war

In lale May Moscow began praising Iraq's publicly rio end Ihe war. Moscow Radio, foe example,eoadeailin Arabic on II June, welcomed Saddam'* announcement ihal Irao. would withdraw iu iroopi from all Iranian lerritory.callingpositive wo" lhat could lead lo "ending ihe bloody conflict il soon atheupportedacii-inspired UN Security Council rciotuiion onuly eailint for an inuivediite cease-fire and withdrawal of loeccioundaries Soviei media commentary on Ihe major Iranian tiffcn-live at Bacrah that beganirst lime in ihe war thai Iranian forces crossed intoimplicitly critical of Tehran and supportive of

/ran. Moscow's frustration with Ihe Khomeinifailure lo rctpond lo in continual ovciiurci for closer iclationi and with Tehtan'srecurrent anti-Soviri gesturet was an important factor in theto tilld Iraq Th< Soviet! began to voice these fruit rations publicly at about ihe same lime this tilt toward Iraq wasn^nl.2 iVoivJo published an author native aiticle by its senior Third World com menu lor. Pavel DemChei'ko.

tiuod ia mil delail htawrsw*!iranian poiiCf toward ihe USSR. Heme he nko charged

lhat there were "eitrrme right" lac dons, opposed to impeoving Soviet-1lanma iclationi. operating around ihe AyatoHah He alto warned Ihsi cntxitm of the

Siwiei pretence in Afghanistan was "futile" and lhat Moscow would isot withdrawoops until outside uiierviniton "including intervtniion fiom li.iman



cltbiiatc warning lo Iran lo cease ill ttrooier invotmnent in behalf of Afghan iaiuegcnls.

Soric mediat renin ol Iranian repression ofeh also begaa to nsetraie Soch eorngaaims, eoan

anon at broadcasts of iW National Voire of Iran

iN'VOit the Bi ISoriei 'ado nation pwr-poniag to bebegin ippeariag more frequently in official Soviet media

,srjn .inVancut factor* accouaied for

Ihit clear tilt lOwiid i In oui

Ihe molt compelling wat Moscow's concern over the thill in the war's military balance toward Iran. The shift nas occurringime whenio with Iran were fraying

Slalcmenls byadieateari a/ anictori. Irani ianrvclsive stung of

n the baitlefuld begianiag ini*ll asadc tbt tharai of caarts. la

Oai yadgroem. liar kiemlo yahabl' ihuwgla aa liaa. aa defeat ofaw-Iron :aa

regime in Baghdid would ham!io*iel

influence in Irao ltd strengthened ihe Khomeini

ie(.me.vea lets sasefptiMe to Soswi

laribdt ot want to see an

anii-<Hiviri itanim itpmriljnue lanjtmuii raigb: potentially attrati adhcrmisaimingthe

unl) million Mu-lims. .pr-ml h. iii fluent.*

bei.-nd Iranian harden^

eader- alto probably iciredhrejiened

Irai) wnuhj acteliiate its turn luw.ird Ihs "hi. Arab- tf Mv-Cuu.l no:

come io tts .i Rag In! id might e. en appcjl

ihaiahearly1 ihemial Commiiiee

lud> ih.itued

"into- intended ilvi


Sarin Reassessment of the leanitn Revolution

ariiele in.ihe CfSU journal Kommunisthr} issue bul probably written befort Afaylandmark in Ihe Sovirts' reassess-mem of Ihr Iranian revolution. Ii criticized ihe Iranian clerics'consolidation of power in the jvmm"1egative turning pcint in iheJ he author. Roiiista*eputy chief Of ihe CPSU Central Committee'sOcponmem and one of ihe USSR's senior expeii on ihr Third World, slated that ihe uiumph of the fundamentalist eleries marked ihr end of the rr.olul.ons "genuinely profile'*o-

lure end ihr beginning of an "illusory"auest for an

Islomir "thirdetween tapilalism and

The aruelr staled thai ihe9 revolution was "bourgeonf* ihr right kindeadership, tould hose been turned in an "anii-lupiialisi" nhet is. pto-Soneii direction, tlnforiu-nalely. lamented Ulyenmskiy. the complete triumph

of Ihe Shltte clergy timed the revolution'stendrntHS. I* Ms

The more the new organization's power wtrA in specifically Islamic featurti fro whUh ihe ruling clergy paid paramount alleniionl Strengthened, ike more rapidly the foundations of the revatuliomruly people's anti-imperialist and democraticeroded...

Perhaps engaging tn wishful thinking. Ul.onoMkiy claimed thai ike clrrgys polieiei were intensifying the dais struggle in Iran and suggested lhal Sharp turnarounds in ihe future" were always possible. He admitted, however, lhal ihe left wing forces in Iran

were in disarray.

The article, whick had loW outhoeiio-rion- ro nut in Kommunist.etieaaliietian and or ike sameonfirmation of ike negotiie shift in the Soviets'tic- of Khomeini's Iron.

htd no mier.ii ir. seeingnvade Irao. Il" ihe Soleis beiie.rif this, they mi(hi have feaied thai Washington, to prevent an Iranian victory, -mm iiu steps thai might boon US influence in Baghdad. This anion could have leftci Iotaimr when ill relation* wiih Tehran were dctcrio


The How the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in june inflicted upon So-in interest* and crcdibiluy in thest also may have coniributcd to Moscow'sinwardhe Soviets may have thai, if tliey did not increase suppori to Baghdad, it would appear to the Arab world that Motcow ml failing all

its Arab partners

All of this was occurringime -hen Moscow concluded that the Iranian revolution was swin|ing lo the right and that, at long at Khomeini or his supporters remained in power, So*iet influence in Iran would remain minimal The Soviets had come tu ihU

condition bys evidencedhe CPSU journal in July tseeby Ihcir increasingly frani media eiiiicisma nt i- Sovietindi-

cates thai this public aueiarneni waa *lu> "sir'v

held Me noted

: j] Iranian opposition to Ihe Soviet Union was deep ano strong. Tke Soviets also reeogniatd thai leftist forces remaining in Iran were no match for the clerical regime c jiiated lhat the Soviets believed the Iranian leffCat to weak and disunited that, even if the Khomeini regime collapsed, the left probably would be unable to seine power.

The Soviets apparently concluded, moreover, thaihaticd of the United Slatei was still mong

7 ihe Soviets heiteved Iran would remain hostile to the United

Suteiong lime. Although ihe Soviets probablyauryotential tmptovemenc ia (Jet -iih ihe Untied Suits, they evidently thoughtoviet lilt toward Iraq would not produce anmove by Tehran baci toward ibe United States.

Since Basrak latcntifteation of Ihe Tall The improvement in the USSR't ties wiih Iraq and deterioration in ill relations wiih Iran havesince Iranian forces tint creased into Iraq ai Basrah inL

far. While maintaining an official stance of neutrality, Moscow has become itscceaiingly ail real both publicly and privately of Iran's refusal loa negotiated settlement. The Soviets in2 again rated for an Irarp-inspired UN Security Council resolution callingease-fire. iraniMinistry offtcialsC


Ihe Soviets also have begun to confront the Iranians on the war more dircctlv ind authoritatively In' prt-

-ate. ti_ ..

Gromyko received Ihe Iranian and Iraqi envoy* to


Gromylo Stated in no uncertain mens to the Iranian Charge Ihe USSR's desire for a

uaick end to Ihe "it *

Tbe Iranians have rcipoitdcd wiih haulier public" of Moscow's Mince on the war. The regime-tponsarcd Tehran newt pa per fuiWai blasted the Soviets in laic December for allo-me Iraq lo use Soviet-made missiles In an attack on Dciful.riday prayer service in January. Speaker of the

iljln fc i'i1 iceaicd the "Western and

Lasteia" of rarovidiag arms thai allow ro coot mate the war. Ayaicalah MctUm: was even enoribe Friday prayer tenieei in Cham

onebruary, -hen he claimed Ihai Men.o- had

f (on ia aisiiintg outhich had 'caused ihe deaths of our dear youthsSajbsce)ucm Iraqi mniik attacki on Dcaful and othct Iranian cities in April and May brought shaio condemnation! of Moscow by (he clerical leaden.

Oeare FritiioM, Will, In* The USSR't relations with Iran have Ireeomc increasinglyi a

host of other malteii in additionhe war The

Khomeini regime, at it hadllowed Afghan refugeesarcho-ki Embassy ia Tehran on ihe ii1 aanivenaiy of the Soviet

They lorend baircd ihe Sc-neii the Emttaiiy'i front gate motco- filed an

ii' protest, ban in*rr- Miami, nabiietyihe aiiael en the Cmbassy

i.t waiy the USSR's occupation of Muslim Afghanistan

Tnc Soviets have lhown incicaiinf, concern overaid lo the Afghan Iniurgrnli and arc now pobtidygjity cmieiiing the Khomeinir ihe ittu-f


iin tialcmcnti were dearly over drama need (or effect.omri

o* this score are genuine

Motco*socrici of Iranianrc*ctirkt and*hiraif Soviet aoiViiict


L .

1jk iMtlftK k>Mnvth ito^-tw. kitejft mi ofo t

fin jof Itii

<n TvtftK GfrtCfititter

trnrxrluc b) ifer K: -fo^rntrvccileferflt of

ihe KG6 moko*n officialn<j

failed, thin fjM untuCKrjor their relea&c. In ljt<iarturi actd other Tudtfc, "eonlrlted" oo Irifliftn tclfvuion to bcinc jfcniv of the USSR, tftlctti uponjj

regime.i* ihe tovtrftmeat diiu.Wtd

* umiiififn tftljofkaf TThLrhrt* eiprlktjlio hjlf iKrj ipidciiiploini'v-lo*au .

O lit*fcitfjivv

iof iiim * Tkti munii

itif kitfrti- t io if off lua

utall) andcltcf thatibcmorr tolra*>iJftith

jtrp. iff |*tf lat*i'*tli


iomiko. however* in hittofli* of lh* Svjrfcmf Soviet in fl^idhiolrcitft'i.i-heid 'firtOttd IA klAd tortf'Ifinu- -fit

-ii- 14

thafit,tM*iih Ii an

Both :pvbh< fhetone hat irftated ihii. Grutr.*

ho. durinr ihr tame midccth in vh.chf'tit tl-crdX *SSH

l-fiked bff In iri carl) July


ihxlW am caotrcic

o*t. an* ia>*

f Sonet M

r 1


Hat AndropovJfritnee?

wot Hill at the helm xehen f'i Savittl dttldtd tn the tprlng ofIO aim their poller inward lion and hag. However, stndrape-i't lilt lo

the iop of ihr Soviet ponyt around ihe tame limr. Although sve do not know ad role In thli changepolity, ai KGB chiefolitburo membee. he

undvubirdlia lay la the matter The fait ihcl Milai puflufd it even more

'-tt'ttthat Me tupponed-

Theeo-traot till, together with other lnfo* that Andropov may be mort

IO lupport Iraq and lets tonvitved of Oppor-

or ihr Sonen la Iran than wmi Breihnrr And'Opov hoi not pubil'li exp't'neJ hit wrsvj on

Iron, hui 1'veiltn trimmentaiiir Alek.ondr ffrivin

tif hit adviieei. hoiiiiit of the

eltrleal retime. Further mort. we know c-

3the KGB. while Andropovnj.ow regard for theoUtiial

proipeeli in Iran and wot deeply tonteratd bp both aatiSorln and allegedly pea-US jenttmemt the eferteoi ttodershii

There It tome tvldtntt that Ihe Iraoli belttvr Antlm-

poo hailiftrtnet The I'oai delegation that

vinlref Mo ico' In Dettmbtr mul

, with ihe impmuoa

iw 1II rawer* mtoee irmnpotbelit lo

hagthan wai Breihnrv'i The thief of tbe

US Intertill Section in Baghdad notedbrvar, IBS,ootate mate limilar eemoiki to Weuerneet

additionilitary supply activity. Ihcc hit been *oine icgiortc ihai Soviet military advisers have

beer mrwvn fwe-rMmr.omb" i

Ihea. alsoiaq byn reopen tlx Imiji pipeline ihai crosses


late March hov-ever.

in S'liati had tcfusei*



advice and in-iianec

iutiw iiiiv tlhii^ihi


^ has reported that Sosiei imliiir) o'liccrt outlined tactical plant lor Iraq during the April lOftt battle atone the|


^ bat claimed that So-icilying iiaep. alttsough ne: on

ii-iiiririaisunec or CiKiiblt ruiiiion. over Iranian teriiHigh mineeir ii-pOrt. have beenand ac doubt thaiCtualls lighting

e thinVmy have increased its

advisory effort




jo!0 Ibf Soillll.Hik rnr-1

Some impoiiam conn rums will limit the improve-meat in Soviet-Iraqi rt'iiiont Fjist. great mutual distrust Mill miii betweenand Saddam The Sonets have not 'or gottenlocution ol Irani Ceenmuniits in !and hu continuing iijr-i

tesl'tCtiOrct oat CPI activityliaq cf

out somees rtponed thai Saddam reseated son* CPI nsttnbcn front tail in laie springsources claim the restatequid pro qeo lor the April ironHill doet nor op*'ale openlv in Iraq. A) recently aiune. Saddam poMlely condemned the CFI. Moscow alio riVnains wary of BashJud'smilitaiy. economic, and political contact! with China and Western rjowert

Saddam apparently Hill deeply rrtcnit Moscnv's arms embargo early in theis sentiment is never far from the tur'ace in hii public stulcments on icHtiont with theiontinues in these ilflemeili toehisute Motto- on vnioul iisues An article in lb* Balh Parlyaper in oiid-Avfust tr-ktired the LSbR'tolicy,on-

Cl rejoindern liaui cinamei re mnde:

Second the So. .ft hax io :

r with Bt| hdad on

Ihey will ivotd amPrevdeM

Mud. Ibeir moti important illy in the MlddV fill

ind o--ig >upfu>lti of Ii . byii arthceni Saddamof courte.u would like tnand Dautaieui mend

pressed the

Iraq and Syria would

end'their mutual hostility, bul he wasott as la how this would be iccomphiheil At noted earlier, there are uncoHlrrned thai Mnscnw hat un-sufccsifully sought Syrian igrreiiiem to reopen the Iraqi pipeline

In asking Damascus lo modern* in policy toward Iraq, the Kremlin It htcly lo argue tholhung* would fosler Arab unity and lure Iraq back into the radical Arab fold. Iheappaiem failure lo push Syria morell* toxicthe value they put on then tiet aith Dimiicat

Thud, and tnouoscow inll

Iraq- die* ao other nratnti thane LSSK and Iranarder of moreM rw.ics landborder. Afghanistan The Kh-jr-e

miiultnt aalii. giuwmg

ties io ladwial Ihiid World ttginxioviet imcrcil) Moscow will want to be careful not io till so fur toward Baghdadomiicet some Iranian leaders io rethink iheir husiilit) mwnd iheStates

,us ol


Musejtw. beliord Iran would remain hostile i" the Unitedung unit. Iran's improving liesi Ruinrv and 11 'i .ipeieir to be giving Vloseo" iccondonetii official, for ctamplt. eip'rnrd isincei


ebmor, IVU an Iran Itturning to Wcfleia technology and Ihaiu heart oriented toward uksystem Tin it apparently leadingthink that belter iMa wiih Washington coulda tcoior ProWa editor, for ettmpte.of alleged US encouragement olmilitary talc* lo

ia June The tameilitaryiin Iran hat beea appcoriait moreonet scholarly and media article*ample, claimed onJane thai Iht United Stain it providing Iran armaria Uriel


Ifikt Sialtmiu Camiimuei. The course of" ihe war willajor effcel on Soviet policy inward Iran and iiao over the ncit year

The Soviet! sent Safronehuk. Chief of ihe Foreigniddle Eaii Departmeoi. to Tehranpril. He it one ol the highest level Soviei officials toIraniineeirw.rvoloiion The Iranian- V

fOtnie nn vitn. OeipncOcn cpitodt ana emulsion ofhere have been tome addiiiooil imallat the resumption of Aerofloi Dightt toihe Soviet* and Iranunt are not interestedotal break in

Motcow altorll limited amount* al miliiart rovinmcni in Iran


a.hun mm.iitin.r, mo.iuiicni Ironi countries such Bulgaria. 1'ol.nid, uncKVcclimloii-Vn ulnstni cc'iainKi

A proVingalion of the stalemate on Ihe battlefield is Ihe nail likelyayar iraaiaa brrat-throagh it nowery tint pom hi lit; Tehran's fundamental disadvantage!ateriel have become Obvious as the Incus have stabiliicd the front and

bolstered thear drcrtificaticns Chancel art

almosi as stiea that Iran and lion will settle the war at

the nrgmiatmg table. Dcipttr Iraqi declaredto lettle the war peacefully and growingofran. Khonw-ai's hat'rd of Saddam impeti him io aiccpt nothing lets than the Iraqi

leaatu'i awaier fceiyk to

ar nf attrition coupled with increased sabver-tion. hoping thereby ia erode Iraqi morale, further iti^i- Iraq', economy and (lentually bring about the overthrow of Saddan

Alinoaatt iheM not -eieomc the war and

hsve priuMcntl) called foi the ccmiTiei't end. both publicly and privately, they have learned to livend Caa continue lo do to indefinitely ai long at

nciibei sale ga.nt amihary advantage The

Sflv*is do nui -io wrttr off cithei Iran or Iiuq. Foi at lean the nen year, howoei. Moscow, while robibls aiiempting to tiat>Lien ataneaa certain to continueotaci more lavo.abk to Baghdad At lorg at Khomeini and

hit supporters remainpower, (ho Sonets stand tittle chance of increasing their influence in Inn. The Soviets .have already improved their editions with liarhdad and mar believe that their aimi valet "til increase Iraqi dependence on the USSR andtranslate into Soviet leveiage

II ike Waellhouch the Soviets consistently have called lor an end to the war, tbey probably would vie* its cessationailed blctsiiif.

The Soviets probably would welcome an endayor and unpredictable war on their border that could redound to the United States* benefit. Asettlement would:

Reduce the significance of one of Ihe prime irriiants in Soviet- Iranian reMoscow's weapons sales to Baghdad.

Probubls make the Fenian Gulf slates lets ncrVous about Iranian einansionitm. which would decrease their need and willingnessooperate milita'il<

wiih Ihe Lmled Statea.

Result in probab'i greater contributions from Iran and (rac lo the struggle against Israel,enithening the pro-Soviet radical Arab 'laics

Possibly improve ihe prospectsapprochement bctw-ecn Baghdad and Damascus

An end in the war. bouever. would atsn canyliabilities for the Kremlin:

Iraq,eed for weaponry, might accelerate its dnerstficaiion of weapon, supplier) and become lot dependent on Moscow Saddam might thenreer handesume hit effort inraq fium the USSR.

Iraq would prrreubls improve ils relations wiih the

United States. Saddam, lor example, has stated publicly that full diplomatic relations will beas soon as the war ends.

lisn mightreer hand lo increase its aidhin insurgcait.

The Soviets thinl it unlikely lhat peace negeeTiitkmi time


. senior Soviet'.

on Soviet televisionuly that thereo end lo the war yet in sight "

Moscow, howeier. is likely to probe Iran's position to see if the cutis of continued ttalcmair might rigree to acgotiatioat and potsibl) to Stnie;Although Iranian satpseiorri of ihe USSRonet role of honcu kroner unhkety. it -oaM be the mm damaging Kenano from ihe US point ofoSe for the USSR in medial on- akin lo Ihailayed lit- rrn India and Pakistan at Tashkentubstantial boost so ill objective olajor plaser in the Middle Fast, not to mention to ils standing with both Iran and Iraq.

Moscow wilt ny so ensure ihai pro-Sevtct Thud World nates rather than US frrendv such as Turkey and Pakistan ntai central rote Ms an ancdusiion Earl) in ihe war. lor ciample. the So-tenediation ef'o't ol the Nivsaligntd Mtncmcnt led bs Cuba.

The1'ac anoni

onet efforts io improvelies wtii both Iraa and Iraq, prohibit through

arms sales, nuAortuc dealt, and imrratcd pobMal

contactsiVe's to woik

through both du.livT-.atK mean, and active awaturcs

io Iry tu sunn- Iran's hoslilit) towaid the Lmted Slates and luigniFtcanl upturn ia IS* Iraqi relations

liamaticimpiitveitient in Iranian tits withemote possibility. Moscow might worry that the absence ol tbe unifying factor ofr could weaken the present fundamentalist regime. Moscow may be concerned that in these circuntstances more pragmatic defies, who an- not as aserx- to dealing with the Unitedould gtiin the ttprer hand.

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