IM - PROSPECTS FOR CHILE

Created: 9/2/1983

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DIRECTORATE OF 3

Prospects for Chile

Su-run dry

this paper assesses the implications ot theor themonthsroad-based opposition ssoMBtset in chile. that there is little prospectuick compromisegovernment end opposition that would heed offeptember. of three scenarios we envision betweentne end of the year, the two that do not involve abothtrong risk that presidentto alveeventuallg be renoved by CJseextreme left le likely toeripheral actor and catalyst inseeaarioe, mnlees major apposition elements discreditunsuccessful negotiations with pinochet or there isin which case radicals would be aole to improve in examining the fundamental stability; of the regime overyear or so, the paper concludes that only agreement endemocratic opening will avoid radical!rati on andwe judge that the military will eventually compel pinochetsuch an agreement or remove him in en effort to preserve

Background

A two-year economic recession and President Pinochet's reluctance to accelerate the const!tjtional timetable for returning Chile to civilian rule9 have dramatically eroded his popular support and spurred developmenttrong opposition movement this year. Moderate and broad-based political and labor coalitions have sponsored "days of nationalhich have gathered momentum each month since May and caused some moderates in Pinochet's cabinet and military junta to urge him to grant concessions. The Democratic Alliance -which includes conservative Republicans, centrist Christian and Social Democrats, and non-Marxist Radical and Socialistlatform onugust that called for political reforms, Pinochet's resignation,eturn to full civilian democracy withinonths.

Government and moderate opposition leaders recentlyialogue in hopes of reversing political polarization. Sergioonservative civilian diplomat appo-nted Interior Minister onugusthas met with opposition labor, human rights, and political leaders during the past three weeks. esult, the government has announced some limited but psychologically appealing concessions,ore positive atmosphere for dialogue and possible compromise. The assassination this week of the capital's military governor has not derailed negotiations. Because fundamental differences still exist, however, various opposition groups still planed at inducing the military to force major concessions from the President or to remove him--on several days surrounding the tenth anniversary of the military coup on

The perspectives of the key players in the coming weeks

ll-

-* The moderate opposition groups are faced with a

dilemma. They want to avoid extreme polarization, which

could deprive them of leadership of the opposition

movement, give the initiative to the radical left as

Strategies/Prospects for September

In September, Moderate opposition leader; probably will:

-- Continue efforts to control violence {believing that it only discredits them and provokes the military Intoarder line).

Try to make the protests more extensive (to increase pressure on the military and Pinochet for substantive concessions).

-- Attempt to maintain their unity by centering protestspecific set of demands (the Democratic Alliance platform).

-- Time the return of exiled Christian Democratic^ Zaldivar to maximize Its political Impact.

The government will probably continue negotiatingopposition figures to end the protests or, failingbuy time and attempt to splinter the opposition. At theconcern over communist plans to foment violenceresultignificant troop presence in the capitalscheduled protesteptember. Security react firmly to demonstrations by Communists and mayarrest leftist opposition

* the chance*compromise before 8the national day of protest are remote because

f Une*fie opposition's sense that it must capitalize on its momentum before Christm.is and the Southern

Hemisphere "summer" vacation,he opposition's belief that It

"omentumompromise that might be

eterminate? of Pinochet; and the military to maintain social order, and 51

radicals' efforts to impede dialogue by sparking violence.

Short-Hange Scenarios

He see three possible scenarios through the end of this

year. In what we regard as the most likely, there is no negotiated settlement of differences, and protests continue through Oecember at no greater level than thoseugust. Pinochet probably would offer some concessions on political party laws and congressional elections, but would drag out the processes In hopes of dividing the opposition. He would still face increasing pressure from both inside and outside the government to speed up the transition to civilian role. He would attempt to maintain his position by persuading conservatives and the military that he waseasonable effort to meet opposition demands. This argument would not be compelling in the face of further protests by moderates, efforts by leftist terrorists to radicalize the atmosphere, continuing economic stagnation, and rising International pressure. This probably will setrocess of building pressure within the military to replace Pinochet. At somey by December but more likelyochet would be removed bv the

The second most likely scenario is thatregardless of the magnitude of protests and whether Pinochetompromise settlement before the end of the year that satisfies the bulk of the opposition. This would require announcement of Immediate political liberalization, electionongress wellnd major changesurrent exile, civil liberty, and economic reactivation policies. This scenario would reduce internal and international pressures on the regime, maximize the meager chance for economic recovery over the next year, and satisfy the majority of moderate opponents. The

Any negotiated long-term transition to civilian rule would ultimately also have to deal with: ignified departure for Pinochet and timely presidential elections, such questions as the -disappeared" persons and the military's political role, and opposition promises to honor debt rescheduling agreements and free market economic principles. HH

radical left would stage violent activites In an attempt toovernment crackdown and undermine compromise. Ue do not believe the government would fall for this ploy. Eveneal compromise would demand of bothood faith effort and high levels of patience andties which neither side has demonstrated in abundance to date.

The third most likely scenariohat protests in September or thereafter are more massive and violent than those in August, and Oarpa Is unable toegotiated settlement. This would substantially increase the pressure inside and outside the government for Pinochet to make major concessions, leading In one of two directions. First, Pinochet mightarsh crackdown to restore public order and preserve national security. He would appeal to the military and nervous Chileans who remember the chaos under Allende and fearight occur againransition proceeds too rapidly. He would point out that he had Initially met reasonable demands and made an honest errort to compromise, but that to deliver the country Immediately to thethe Christian Democrats whom the military distrusts--would be to pave the way for Marxists to come to power again. The probability of heightened radical activity during this period would help Pinochet's case and buyittle time, but onlyhe very short term. eeks, increased repression would engender immense internal and international criticism, and moderate groups within the military Probably jjould eventually rally the armed forces to remove him.

Even 1f, in the event of violent and massive protests between now and Oecember, Pinochet did not revert to repressive tactics, the military would continue to debate the best course of action The Chilean armed forces are highly disciplined and unified and, although they take time toonsensus, would probably act together and would insist that Pinochet make-substantial concessions. Tense months wouldusc. pposition leaders sought to wring as much from theHovernment possible. If Pinochet refused and Insisted on keeping the presidency, the officers would agree to remove him and install anotheronservative civilian,likely--a

moderate opposition leader. They would legalize parties and schedule elections well He do not believe the military would splinter over the issue, but If they did the country would experience chaos and rapid economic deterioration.

The strategy of the Marxist left varles--pr1marily in degreeunder the three scenarios, with Its likely role that of a

AliliA' ke those of some far rlghilS 5eto sabotage compromise. The left also would seek further to radicalize the protest movement and/or seize some degree of leadership. Significant l"me^^f

lit to try to take advantage of the mainstream

Chr!stian Democrats and otherh%!yr, *If?ri thP *t arns length as long Sarxist n ?'n theomentum. Blocking the arxist minority from assuming powererhaps the only common

Shaned by theciviliannd the liiii6hey wou,dSet to!hi- - In the short tm* the "feme left would be

J, aorovcPosition significantly only if principal opposition elements were discredited by appearing too flexible in early negotiations with Pinochet thatail or here were complete disorder and extreme poltWLJ.on! Under

these conditions, elements of the left might be able to become formal partners in the opposition coalition, and radical demands formore extreme solutions could gain wider acceptance

Range Stability

With civilian political processes sidelined for years the fundamental strength and stability of the Chileanystem has depended on three elements:

the capability of the armed forces to determire the political direction by force.

the national consensuseturn to the chaos of Marxistw

-- the success of the government's economic program.

The severe economic downturn eliminated one of these supports. Over the next year or so, Pinochet's actions could undermine the other two factors for"stabi11ty, unless he agrees

ivilian rule. Resistance to democratization will fuel continued opposition protests and

further polarization, increasing the pressure on military

unity. At the same time, society will become more radicalized

Because the Chilean military recognizes this, we believe it

will not allow Pinochet's potential intransigence to jeopardize

its unity or place the nation's stability at risk ArneS

leader, will Instead rally together and press m'to grant ?he

reforms necessary to reverse splraling political pd^aMatidtfHi'

ilitary will repllci hi. withTlr^vUfW'^

oooositfoS tilll* Vorder while

ruU -IiJli fKrto democratic

ovlr'thl nUt llir"Iratmosphere

eare d0 "Ot expect co lapse of the politicaleftist takeover, or civil war.

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External Factors That Could Affect the Scenarios

-- An Increase In tension In the Beagle Channel dispute with Argentina would help Pinochet by diverting public attention and rallying the populace against the foreign threat.

-- The release of Information linking the government to the murder or coverup of the assassination of labor leader Tucapel Jimenez2 would increase antigovernment protests.

-- Any significant deterioration in Pinochet's health couldower scramblehe military, since he has notuccessor from among his constituency.

-- Any dramatic Increasexternal (primarily

Soviet/Cuban) support for Comraunlst or terrorist activities In Chile couldovernment crackdown. ^LmfM

Original document.

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