Chile; The Issue of US Certifica
pauibuiiy thai ihe United States migtn certify Argentinaesumption of miliury tales and assistance while continuing to withhold certlfkation for ChUc initially prompted Chilean Presidentlaw fall lo take iteptnsprovc hb regime'* image on human rights mats. Pinochet continued to balk.r. at extraditing the persons iadieted byUS grand jury for the Uutter/MolTlt aaurdera la im, and taw has Impeded cerulstaiksm. FnuUr-tee! by hi* twerall lack o( progress at obtaining USPinochet in February^<ed Foreignhaekpedared on soma otheronetbe-baa. Ihe certification question remains important for Ckile'i isatioaal securityod thu keeps alive the chance that ftnoehet will coruider some adjustments on human rights and the pace of tralo civilian rule. However. In view of Pinochet', dear dcterminslion to live priority to internalorer iniernational* do nol eipoel
any major uattauonJJ
CertllVanen ecstssta aad BcaeflU To liftn oa US arm* sale* and military aa*iiLaaec to Chile, the Reagan adniabtretloa must certify to the US Congress thatas r. ifa sigaificaot progresscomptytag with interna liooallrprisvapie* of haman
I* not aiding aad abetliag iruernauonal lerrorWun
Ha* fullyrirginiuee those indictedS grand jary ia eonaeetkM with the Utdier/Mottil Borders ia Washiagion.
ta addition to the miliury benefit* thai would accruehile from certification, the regime'* iatcriuilooalperhapsim-provc
To achieve these benefits, Pinochet undertook at least Ihree initiatives during last fall:
He sought to improve Chile's human right* image bydiptomirie contact* and ihe
; his govcrrunent is adhering to in Umc-rtswaing the country to civilian rak in. In linetudy eonsbiDUooal
Santiago pubC-oxed the workigh-levelconvnussioa that nudied ihe problem of Chile's exiles and took under advbement the com-mission'i recommendations Tor the return ofxiles.
Chile courted Washington by supporting many US positions in2 UN General Assembly and in other iniernational andoreover, as the only South American nationarticipate with the United State* ia2 UNIT AS naval caercises. Chileost-Falkland* regional trendT
Cask: Chuff in MIR Tactics
Movement of ihe Revolutionary Left (MIR) remain* the meet violence-prone opposition group in Chile, but heavy personnel leases list month end the apparently growia$ cohesion of Cbile'i nonviolent itfiui political organ! utiom have caused MIRu nsrvalaaic iheir group', structure and laclic*.
"mibiary opera tioee, bat believe that it win" acale them back ia comlag maxhe group attcmpti to recover from ita reotat setbacks aad weighs the option of closer oooperaiion with the Chilean Commueiat Party (PCCHLJ
During March and April, ihe MIR tried to recapture public attention aad luppon by ilgnificamlyi the bombing of water, elecirical. lubway, and railroad facilities
I The MIR wai
leavtiy invoneo in rural activism during the Allende regime, and southern Chlle'l high unemployment and farm foreclosure rates make it an attractive area for MIR pj
The MIR's reccai setbacks aad its concerns over competition from the other leftist group* may have improved chance*loser alliancetheCoenmaanvi Party We bebeve that MIR leaders have been concerned for tome tins* that theimage and position la Chile are decbaiag and that other leftist groups ara drawing away actual or potential MIR supporters. Cooperation between the PCCH and lha MIR hai been blocked in the past by disagreement* over Ihese of violence, but the weakened state of (he MIR might make it more billing now to compromise on question* of strategy.
Based on tbe MIR', past history, we baneve its shift away from terrorist activity I* only temporary. The MIR'*icaragua. East I
provide more training and fundinghe group's military capability. While the rcbtuldusg process take*increasedrecruiting and infiltration of MIR members fromeipect sporadic bombings to continueOriginal document.