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Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative
CiA HISTORICAL REVIEWAS SANITIZED
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POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE CW HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
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CONTENTS
PREFACR
DISCUSSION
Poliiical Pressure. Aclive Measures -
PoloiiHal Soviel Miliiary Approaches
rcccsses and Timelines
Technical Responses
Land. Baled BaUittic Mimic
Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Systems
Cruise
Bomben
Conventional ABM System!
Directed Energy |Q
Space i
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTOR.CAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
PREFACE
Onresident Reagan calledomprehensiventensive effort loong-term research and development program to begin to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.
Though thc media have given considerable attention to lhe issue and have focused attention on exotic space-based beamso-called Star WarsPresident did not specifically mention any weapon concepts or basing:
Ballistic missile defense systems could be on air. ground, and submarine platforms as well as on satellites; high-energy lasers, particle beams, or microwave systems could become elementsational ballistic missile defense (BMD) system along withconventional-technology systems-It appears likely that any strategic defense scheme will Involve some combination of systemsayeredpace-based directed energy weapon may be used to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in their boost phase; ground-based or space-based lasers or conventional weapons may be used to destroy buses and reentry vehicles In midcourse; ground-based beam weapons, missile interceptors, and other weapons may be used to provide terminal defense.
In attempting to neutralize the development and deploymentallistic missile defense by the United States, the Soviets will be ableange of technical, diplomatic, military, political propaganda, and clandestine measures. Since this range is broad, and since the timeoears) of the proposed US BMD effort extends well beyond anyone's ability to make accurate forecasts, we can claim no precision in evaluating theourse of action. We have instead focused on general principles and constraints in the areas of politics, military doctrine, and Soviet research and development practices lhat will Influence their responseS BMD system. Subsequently, weariety of miliiary and technological options the Soviets could make at various times in the future. No attempt has been made to perform evaluations as to the relative advantages of one kind of system or device over another.
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SUMMARY
In ihe near lerm. we expect the Soviets to rely principally on apolitical and diplomatic effort first to force the United States to drop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or. failing that, to negotiate them away. There arc also certain limited military steps the Soviels could take initially for the purpose of improving theirposition and for preparing them for initial US deployment should it occur.
Over the long term, if the United States goes ahead with plans to develop and deploy its defensive system the Soviets willifferent set of problems. Assuming they know thc likely structure andof US defensive forces, they will look for effective technical countcrmcasurcs.
It appears that there willarge variety of possible measures the Soviets can choose from to preserve the viability of their ballistic missile forces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) can be upgraded with new boosters, decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures of these systems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basing schemes can be devised which make them less vulnerable to US missile warning and defensive weapon systems. These systems can also be hardened or modified to reduce their vulnerability to direclcd energy weapons.
The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularly manned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improvedaids and stealth technologies, toreater burden of the strategic offensive strike role and to exploit the weaknesses in US aircapabilities.
The Soviets can continue development and deployment of their own ballistic missile defense systems. The Moscow antiballistic missile system can be expanded and improved,ore widespread system deployed, with additional launchers, improved missile detection and tracking capabilities, and more capable interceptors. The Soviets can expand their ongoing efforts on directed energy weapons, weapons which also provide antisatellite capabilities which could be used against some space-based elementsS BMD system. In most of the directed energy weapons technologies, the Soviets are nowar with, or lead, the United States. They are likely to pursue these efforts
regardless of whether the United States sustains ils strategic defense initiative.
We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets willash program in reaction to US BMD developments, but rather will seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades the
. cddcvelop andve'a" defense They
wil look for solutions that are least disruptive to their way of doing
business and involve Ihe leas, possible change to their planned pro-grams. The Soviets are not likely toundamental shift inatcgic environment entailing reliance on strategic defenses by both sides.
The SovieU could choose to allocate the necessary RAD resources and could obtain some flexibility for new types of deploymenl by adiust ng other programs. They are likely to encounter technical and manufacturing problems in developing and deploying more advanced systems If .hey attempted to deploy new advanced systems not presently planned, while continuing their overall planned force mod-Mn'Mlioo, rignificant additional levels of spending would beis would place substantial additional pressures on the Soviet economy and confront the leadership with difficult policy cholces-
If. through some set of circumstances, thc Soviets were faced with actual or spending deploymentS system and had no effective military counter to it. we think there arc various possibilities for Soviet actions, rangmg from major arms conirol concessions, to threats of military action in other areas, to threatened attacks on space-based componentsS system, to sabotage against US facilities. In some
Vasiiveagainst the US defensive system, allhough we think that to be highly unlikely given the near certainty of thereby Initiating general wa. with .he United States.
CIR HvSTOmCRL-REVliV. PROGRAr.^
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discussion
Pressure
1 The Soviets tint already begun, ind willto try to prevent development ind eventual deployment of US defensivehich have in recent years been tbe nearly exclusive domain of lhe Soviet Union,ariety of political,diplomatic, and negotiating lactic* and active measures. They will attempt lo avoid any maiot disruption in their strategic planning by using these approaches to solve their problems and will work strenuously to put themselves in the best possible bargaining position. We can expect the SovieU lo:Mobilize Misting resourcesargeted peace offensive, aimed at exerting domes tie political pressure in the United Statos and NATOto fotio advanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) technologies completely, or at least lo postpone their development indefinitelywill make use of lhe peace movement. Ihe scientific cornmunity. and appeals to the defense and arms control concerns of NATO opinion leaders. As part of thc campaign, the Soviets will be Hfcely lo extol the virtues of the Annoallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and accuse the United States of undercutting its provisions.Utilize various international forums, especially those related to arms control interests, such as Ihe UN disarmament and space committees and the General Assembly, or the Conference on Diiar-minvent in Europe (CDE) which Is planned to begin inhey could offer publldy to make strategic arms reductions talks (START) concessions of Interest lo the United Stales In returnegotiated ban or limitations on BMD development Tbey might Judge that thender growing political pre*-sure toTART agreement and wouldoviet offer of Ihis rype. But Moscow would be very reluctant to offer the kind of offensive forces concessions lhe Uniled States is looking for. probably preferring to take its chances on thwarting US BMD plani by other means.
Continue Ibeir major aims conlrol campaign to ban all weapons from space ind to attempt to resume lalks with the Uniled Slates on limiting antisatellite (ASAT)ait spring,ndropov rciteraled1 Soviet proposalN trealy banning all weapons In space. The trealy svould prohibit acU thatdamage, disturb, or change the trajectory of any satellite belongingreaty member who was In compliance with the Ueaty's ban on weapons More recently. Andropovew initiative lo prohibit testing and deployment of space based weapons, eliminate elisting ASAT systems, and baa development of new AS AT systems Embodiedraft treaty submitted lo Ihe UN and more ambitious lhan1 effort, ihis new Soviet initiative reflectsover prospective changes in lhe military balance in space, especially with regard lo BMD. Soviet initiative* have been somewhat successful in stimulating worldwide concern about an arms race in space,
Demonstrate Soviet svtll and capability loto lhe US BMD initiative and attempt to keep pace wiih lhe United Slates In any BMD race; this could provide them with important bargaining leverage. One way the Soviets might do this Is to raise the Issue of ihe ABM Treaty. They have already claimed that we are in the process of breaking the ABM Trealy with ourbe Soviets may demand that we discuss this Issue sooner, rather than later. The Soviets could also make some overt references to their ability to deploy conventional ABMs In the nearoviel conventional ABM "breakout" would place the Uniled Statestrategic disadvantage in the near term. The Soviets thus might calculate lhat the threat of Immediate ABM breakout could be used to bring lhe United
Use ABM TreMy enl. tern ,heofctt.ABM .nlnnx II rise* not proMt* xtearcfa on ruer. KdinolofW
Statci lo lhe negotiating table on something clovet lo Moscow's Icrnu. Wbile Moscow mightegotiated revision ol lhe AHM Trealy, ihey would seek lo rule out deploymenl of advanced technology BMD 'ot the foreseeable future in any such agreement. At the least, such negotiatinguld buy them some time to develop Iheir own military icsponscS defensive syslem.
Active Measures
he Soviets consider active measures' an offen-sive instrument of foreign policy, designed specifically lo Influence the policies of other governments In favor of lhe USSR. The classicdisinformation, front organizations, friendship societies, and sobe used to disrupt relations between states arrayed against the USSR. The Uniied Slates is lhe primary target Academicians, journalists, and olher agenls of Influence have been used lo conduct political Influence operations.
3 We believe that the Soviets will employ measuies lo cope with tho President's BMD Initiative lhat could incl^d*
Attempts to cause dtvlsivencss and unrest among the US aDies by arguing that (he USn attempt to abandon Ihem and thai the United Stales is revertingFortress America" policy.
Attempts to force the adminblralion to withdraw or step down the BMD initiative by Irving lo convince thc American people lhatof the President's proposal would seriously curtail US social programs,
thai the United Stales la upsetting Ihe strategic balance and planninguclear war-wlnnlng capability, disrupting the peaceful coei-istence between East and West which has been so succcsilu! in maintaining peace since lhe end of
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World Wat II,ut new splial In lhe armi race.
ihteats of Soviel response. Including slaie-mcnU implying thai undefined counlermeasurrs are already under way.
Potential Soviet Militory Approaches
he Soviets will position themselves to compete effectivelyew slrategic environment. They will probably seek lo
iheir efforts to obtain US and Western lechnology which may bear on the BMDand step up Iheir intelligence collection efforts on US plans and intentions
their Investment Inorces, and space programs This could force them into eiplicilly trading near-termcapabilities for future capabilities,on lha site of the Initial effort and the resources required.
Abo. they will possibly:
ia their program lhe earlyof lhe potential to match and counter US BMD, In order to Increase iheir bargaining leverage.
n area which we believe to be of greatin conditioning the Soviethai of economics They will be reluctant to divert scarce assetsi pensive technological efforts In response to US advanced BMD unless tbcy are convinced that such efforu are essential lo maintaining their security and polilical position and that they have identified potentially viable counters Such solutions are likely lo be expensive not only in terms of Soviet defense budgets, but more Important, if they involve major restructuring of iheir strategic offensive and defensivo forces. In the degree of disruption they would cause throughout the military forces and command and control structure In addition, (he Soviets areless likely lo go fot big. overall changes to then posture, because ihey have more to lose if they invest in ihe wrong strategy.
ver tbe longer term, the Soviets could choose lo allocate lhe resources necessary lo sustain research and developmentrge scale advanced stralegic de-
program. Thev could obtain some flexibility (or new types ot deployments by adjusting otherThe resource* devoted to strategic offensive and defensive programs male up onlyoercent of total military costs. Based on some recent ripen-encc. however,ikely to encounter technical and manufacturing problems thai are inherent In developing and deploying more advanced systems If ihey attempted to deploy new advanced systems not presently planned, while continuing their overall' planned moderniiation of strategic and generalforces, significant additional levels of spending would be required' This would place substantial additional pressures on the Soviet economy andIhe leadership wiih difficult policy choices.
he Soviets will Iry lo cope with deployment of US advanced technology BMD with the least possible change lo their planned programs. IfiStoiIcally, tlse Soviets have prccecded at their own pace to develop any necessary counter lo US sysiems and initiatives over the long term. They will look for solutions that are least disruptive to tbeir way of doingthose programs that arc already under way or ate consistent with present trends In their stralegic force posture This is not to say that large and expensive new programs would not be undertaken In response; rather in choosing among their options, the Soviets will prefer those which do notadical departure from established patterns of strategic behavior. Il is highly unlikely lhat thc Soviets willcrash" program In reaction to USut instead will seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades the United States will need lo develop and deploy its overall defense,
oscow wilt seek to maintain the effectiveness of it* strategic offensive forces as the primary means of maintaining its strategic position. Measure* consilient with this approach would Include proliferation of warheads and launchers, mobility and covertness for more of its strategic forces, and development of passive or defensive countermeasures. such as boost phase decoys and booster hardening- These measure* wouldontinuation of the current Soviet military approach.
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9 The Soviet* aie not likely lounda-mental slull in the strategic environment entailing greatly increased reliance on strategic defenses by both sides On the one hand, according lo Soviet military writings, onlytrategy thai emphasisesoperalions could the Soviets icfeievc theirin nuclear war On the olher hand, the Soviets insist thai defensive operations are an essential comntiable nuclear strategy. They see iheir offensive and defensive operations as closely coupled; by maintaining the initiative in offensive strikes, they can greatly reduce the burden boine by the defensive forces to attempt lo limit damage and guard their war-fighting capability. Wc have no reason to eipect any major alteiations in Soviet doctrine and strategy Innd beyond. They will not view stralegic force trends as requiring themeduce lhe offensive, counlerforce orientation of Ihcir itialegy in favor of some assured level of survivability, as wouldefense-dominated strategy.
ven if the Soviets tacitlyegime of defensive emphasis In response to US development programs, they would be reluctant to depend on defensive technologies over the long haul lo confer tbe strategic advantage they teek. Consistent with their dialectic approach, lhe SovieU would tend toutual shift to strategic defense*emporary phenomenon in thc ongoing superpower strategicand notermanent solution to strategic problems. Thus, Soviel miliiary planners would never slop working the problem of how to overcome US strategic defenses, and thev would probably eipect the United States lo behave similarly.
Soviet planners would rely heavily oo theof their responses to frustrate US defensiveIn tho offensive forces area, this would probably mean increased emphasis on cruise missiles and mannedof current major Soviet Ctevrkspcvents.
The Soviets are likely to attempt to develop means of neutraliilng or significanlly degrading US BMD by oi'-jiiine "weak Unks" in the system. Such an approach would be consistent with existing Soviet doctrine and practice. They are likely lo look for option* lo develop offensive countermeaiures totrategy of defense suppression. One possible outgrowth would be the adoption ol a
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of strikes against US defensive systems during the conventional phaseonflict with the United States, (pace-bated components would be particularly attractive taigets. They probably would not rely on defense suppression alone, but would combine ll with the kinds of steps outlined above to ensuie lhal enough of then offensive focces couldegraded but still operative US BMD system.
he Soviets will attempt lo develop (heir own advanced BMD, using ptogtams thev already have under way. even if the technology is somewhatto US systems (In some areas. luch as most of the directed energy weapons techncjoasea. lhe Soviets now arear with, or lead, the United States) This would provideasis for laler improving thc system, while also furthering their polilical goal of remaining competitive with US developments. They are likely to pursue these efforts regatdlcss of whether the Uniied States sustains Its stralegic defenseThe Soviets are not confident that, over Ihe long haul, they could match US technology if the United Stalesigh-level sustained effort, arid Ihey would be reluctant to be drawnechnological "race" wiih lhe United Stales. They would alwaysS breakthrough lo offensive technologies thai could Override Soviet defenses and US achievementuch better defensive system.
The Soviets will have to compensate for lhe threatened loss of their perceived strategic edge against the Uniied States. The US defense initiative probably cameurprise to Soviet planners, and they are probably notosition Io react quickly with major changes in their own stralegic plans and programs.
While Moscow will continue to look forlohilfons to the problems presented by USdefenses, the Soviets are not likely to view arms control as their only, or even their beat. hope. They may be economically pressed to carryull range of military lesponses.'but they are not likelyake major arms control concessions to the Uniied States strictlyeans of relief from any such economic stresses. The Soviets view arms control as but one of manydiplomatic, andto them in the pursuit of their strategic goals Soviet arms control policy Is well integrated Into their overall approach to the Uniied Stales and tlte rest
of lhe world, and they are not likely lo acquiesce in ig/cements which arc fundamentally inconsistent with their slrategic policies and plaits.
cl of circumstances arising at some fuluic lime in which:
The United Slates intended to deploy defenses lhat appeared highly effective against ballistic missiles as well as against cruise missiles and bombers.
The Soviets had notomparable defensive status
The United Stales had not greatly reduced Its offensive forces.
The SovieU had not achieved ibe offensiveiteeessary IO penetrate US defenses.
If this were to occur, which is highly unlikely, Moscow would be facedadical, and highly undesirable, shift In tbe balance of power. It is possible tbe Soviets would consider options such as thc following:
couldonceited last ditch effort to stop deployment through arms conirol Under the ciicuuistarKcs. lhe SovieU would beery unfavorable bargaining position. They would piobably have to offer major concessions In other negotiating arenas (for eiample, START or MBFRJ.
The SovieU could threaten lo undeitake military actions against US and allied intcresU in areas where lhe SovieU enjoy miliiary or political advanlageL
The SovieU, citing danger to ibeir supremecould threaten to attack space-basedof thc new US defensive system while they were stillighly vulnerable stage ofThey would certainly accompany any threat to altack by intense polilical action and propaganda portraying themselves ai theof world peace. If the US satellite system included nuclear devices I
Jlhen it Is possible thairopaganda campaign would enjoy some success.
b also possible, but very unlikely, that tliey would threaten to undertake military action or
sabotage icainst launch facilities o- criticalcontrol, ind corn muni catlemenls on US soil Since throats to atiack US territory wouldore serious risk ofar. the Sovieis would he correspondingly reluctant to raise the possibilitv.
inally, ii despite all elforts lo forestall and prevent deploymentS system, tha Soviets should be faced with an imminently operational, viable US strategic defense, while lacking effectiveomparable defense system of their own. tbey would need either torolonged period of clear strategic inferiority lo the United States or to take dramatic measures lo redress the situation Some possible measures include
their previous threats of an aitack against the US defensive system. If thisassive attack against sites in the United Stales, It would carry with it the near certainly of Initiating general war with the Uniled Stales. We ihink it highly unlikely the Soviets would lake such massive aciion. even under lheJust Outlined
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Attempting, covertly, to destroy important part* of the US system, using techniques like electronic warfare or directed energy ASAT weapons. The ability to conduct such operations covertly is possible, given the likely complexity of the space environment in the nert century.
Em placing nuclear or biological weapons in Western cities, and announcing thai ihey will be employed if thettacked.
CLaiming to have built the ultimate destructivedoomsday" device-
rocesses ond Timelines
here are several features of Soviet weapons development practice that will be Important Intbe ipeed with which ibey can respond lo US defense Initiatives:
reater degree than In lhc United States, applied "research" is distinct from wrepons "de-vclopment" However, applied research can. and
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WC have found thai one result of lhc Sovieti' development practices is thai ihcv need consider iblc lime lo introduce technological changesorce. Thc necessary lime is, of course, dependent on lhe degree to which the changes represent new tech-oologies oi only different applications of old ones Wheihcr modifications lo csisling systems or com-ulctoly new designs are involved Isrucial factor. In general
Minor rnodif leal Ions lo eiisting ivstems lake aboul five years loorce.
Major modifications take eight toean.
New systems based on editing or only rnodeiatc-ly advanced technology lake aroundears from initial requirements lo deployment.
Systems based on new or significantly advanced technology, which requires substantial research before design inception, can lakeor more years.
Systems which lhe Soviels lerm "new inrequire lengthy research programsweapon system development and can lake upward ofean toieldable
' system.
n the last Iwo cases, the factor of technology transfer can be particularly important, since fl enables the SovieU Io piggyback on much more efficient Western research andesign pioicctsooner than if ihey had to depend on iheir own rather sluggish research establishment.
ing For ihese reasons, we believe il very likely lhat ihey will try to retain ICBM and SLBM systems in at least thc near term and tnidlerm by employingflies lhat will enhance the missiles*in lhe face of US defensive systems Due lo iheir strong and experienced designslhal ihey will be able lo implement modifications to existing missiles quite soon {five loollowed by more effective systems further in the future.
boosters, decoys.
n lhe nearhe Soviets could seek to increase the survivability of their ICBMs or Iheof weapons surviving by:
Deploying larger numbers and penetralion aids
Continuing or quickening lhe present trend to solid-propellant missiles, which tend to beless vulnerable to continuous-wave (CW) laser damageand have higher acceleration than liquid- ptopellani ICBMs.
Further fractional lug (increasing the number of reentry vehicles) systems currently deployed or in development
Responses
lond-bosedissile Systems
he Soviets havo invested enormous monetary and human resources in creating thc ballistic missile component of their strategic attack forces. They now possess four major design bureaus that develop Ihese types of weapons and have several new and Improved intercontinental ballistic roissiles (ICBMs) andballistic missiles (SLBMs) InIn addition, (heir military has structured their strategic war plans around ballistic missiles, and priies lhe miliiary advantages inherent in ballisticthc ability lo strike decisive blows quickly and accu-lalelv over great distances,inimum of warn-
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n thchc Soviets coold undertake more radical measures lo harden present types of missiles. Toward live end of ibe period, ihey could begin to deploy new missiles which have been designededuce the effectiveness of US defensive measures as the Soviets understood ihem In the middle to:
New guidance systems lhat would allowrolling airframes could probably betested, and installed in editing missiles toward lhe beginning of lhe period. Continuous roll Is estimated lo be two lo three times as effective as oscillatory role in Increasing CW laser burnlhrough limes.
Abo fn the first half of thb period, current missile types could bo modified with an ablative coating to further protect against CW laserStudies indicate that for missiles of theIS.ontinuously rolling airframehin ablative coaling willrease burnlhrough limesactor of aboutver tbe preseni systems.
ossible lhat some degreeaycould bo incorporated with an ablau'voon the poslboost vehiclehus [educing vulnerabilitywell as olher lasers.
Other laser hardening measures, such as acould be installed.
First-generation boost phase decoys could be deployed.
Measures to reduce or liter tbe infrared (IR) signatures of booster plumes would also be possible.
I'HVs lhal dispense RVs carrier ihan al
present could be put on olsllngew missiles appearing Inoear lime frame might incorporale lhe following features:
High acceleration boosters lhal burn outilometers, thus eliminating boost-phase vul-neiabihtyay and neutral particle beam weapons "
Airframes designed to minimize vulnerability to ipol healing from CW lasers and impulsive loads from pulsed, lasers,
Multiple high-acceleration PBVs lo minimize RV dispensing limes and proliferate PDV targets.
Maneuvering RVs to reduce accuracycaused by early, rapid RV dispensing.
- PBVs designed lo dispense many decoys per RV.
n lhe far term,5 onward, the Sovierj will be able not only to refine responsive measures taken earlier, but also will have had lime to perform research and envelopment on radically new concepts and to deploy those which prove out:
Highly fracllonaled, hardened, high-acceleration ICBM) could be developed as evolutionary fol-low-orts lo first-generation responses of the.
Further development of boost-phase decoys and signature rcductlon/alicfation techniques could make early characterization ef an altack and weapon targeting very difficult.
New means of launching RVs, such as rallguns aod other electromagnetic devices, couldboosters entirely.
Nuclear rockets could be used In boosters capable of depressed (height lessm) Irar v. perhaps very fast (greater ihan circular velocity) atlacks.
Missiles could be put in high Earth or solar orbit to be dcorbiled on enemy targets.
bambothInertxutnl paniclebv puuee through thoc.
7
Sea-Based Bolislic Mlilj Systems
anyI lie mealies to make lhed-
I-idl. to defensive
would be applicable ai well to the strategic SLUM lo.ee
Ablativef thc airframes andolling airframes would be possible by the end ol the century, ai would initial measures to reduce or mask visible, infrared, and radar signatures of boost on, PBVs, and IWs By the end of tlie midterm, new SLBMi designed specifically against currentlyUS defensive systems could be in test or Ihe catly stages of deployment. These. like the ICBMs of thai time, could incorporate airframes designed lovulnerability to CW and pulsed laserhigh-acceleration boosters, and multiple PBVs lhat could rapidly dispense RVs and decoys- Advanced signature reduction techniques for boosters and IWi could also become available al this lime.
LBMs do possess peculiarities that both restrict possibilities for some responsive measures that are available to ICRMs and. conversely, offer some unique opportunities:
Bv the early years of the neat century, lhc SovieU could design, develop, and deploy depressed trajectory SLBMs that would not eait the Earth'l atmosphere and would have very short times ofif laurrchedm from their targets. The facl lhat such systems never leave the atmosphere would stress the capabilities of the defensive systems even moreay and neutral particle beam weapons would be of Utile use againsi them. Moreover, such SLBMs would, by necessity for their own survival In flight, employ hardening measures which would abo be effective against CW lasers. In addition to attacking time-urgent counlerforce and counter-value targets, these weapons would be very useful for attacking ground-based compooenU of the US BMD system,ommand, conlrol. and communications elemenU andmissile launch Site*.
Boost-phase decoys would be more difficult lo develop and might not be worth the space tbey
would lakeubmarine (Bui decovs could be launched from cooperative surface vessels.)
A submarine-mounted electromagnetic BV launcher is probablyractical prospect for lhe neat quarterentury. Thus,ballistic systems will continue lo depend on icckct engines (perhaps nuclear In the far term) for accelerating ihcir payload.
Cruise Missiles
If ihc Uniled Statesallistic misille defense, an obvious way for the Soviets lo try lo defeat it Ii lo place greater emphasis on nonballlitlc strategic offensive sysiems. One of these is long-range cruise missiles, which remain in thc atmosphere and are susceptible to further reduction of their IR. visible, and radar signatures, which are already small In addition to attacking the target seu formerly allotted to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles could be potent defense suppression weapons. Using combinations of speed, stealth, and launch points near Ihe United States, they could attack ground based elements of the US BMD system, clearing the wayubsequent ballistic missile atuck.
A major disadvantage of cruise missiles Is, of course, that if they can be detected, ihey can be brought under attack by fairly conventional allsystems This, however, might not be seenompletely negative point by lhe Soviets, since the enormous cipense needed to provide lhe United Stales with an effective air defense syslem would mean lhat Ihese resources would not be available for other programs. In lhe longer term, visible and IR space-based lasers of the sort tlut might be incorporated In the endoatmosphcrlc boost-phase segmentnited Slates BMD system would also be effective weapon* against cruise missiles, again assuming.they could be located. In thc near term, submerged-launchedof two Soviet long-range cruise missiles now under test. If deployed on submarines off thc coast of the United States, could provide anMD system.
bo by the, initial steps to apply stealth technology to cruise missiles could be taken by Ihen all probability. Ihese would uke the form of modifications to missiles already in design or teat. Tbe SovieU abo may choose to develop subsonic Intercontinental cruise missile* Their llow speed
be offset br the Soviets'lo launch them surreptitiously dom lbc USSR and. inntdicim, by ibe use of Health technology.
By lhe end oT thehe Soviets piobably could develop and start to deploy supersonic and hypeisonic cruise missiles that would use stealth technology and speed lo penetrate air defense systems. Submarine-launched cruise missile* with speed* in lhe range ofould arrive at (heir laigcls In lhe same lime period as ICBMs launched from ibe USSR. They would be difficult to detect because of theii site, small IR signature, and small tadar cross section. Using terminal guidance, these systems could havebeloweters. Such missiles could perform many of the mission* now assigned to ballistic missile*.
In tho far term, the Soviets will be able to apply many advanced technologies lo cruise missile design, if they now elect to begin work on them Examples would be:
Cruise missiles with an Intercontinental subsonic cruise phase and supersonic or hypeisonicattack phase.
Cruise missiles with very long (several days) pseattack loiter times.
Multlmode cruise missiles capable of operating, for example. In submerged, aerodynamic, and ballistic rcgiines.
Intercontinental cruise missiles. US studies during thendemonstrated the feasibility of nuclear ram let propubionow-altitude, supersonic cruise missile, and open literature of thcemonstrated USSR understanding of theprinciple* Involved.issile would be Urge by modem US standardseter* inut wouldreater payload capability, range, and ability to deploy advanced defensive electronics than present small cruise missiles.
Bomber*
elatively lone hill In which Ihe Soviets produced no new bomber for Iritereoollrieiilalhey have begunew aircraft, the
Blackjack, which is cleaily intended to be capable of Intercontinental attack It is expected thai Ihis bomber and its future variant* will remain operational well Into thc nest century. Inew variant of lhe Bear bomber capable of carrying strategic cruise tniuilcs 'o intercontinental rangesike cruise missiles, bombers are largelyloay Users and panicle-beamui are susceptible lo conventional airand space-based lasers lhal operate In the visible and IR regions ol the spectrum
In the near lerm:
e eipect tbe Soviets to deploy lhe Blackjack and to perfect ill usearrier of cruise mlisilrs and gravity bombs to intercontinental ranges Various penetration aids, principally electronic warfare equipment, will be installed and upgraded.ossible lhal the Soviets couldarge aircraft, perhaps theo serveruise missiie carrier in addition to the new Bear variant.
n the;
Defense suppression weapons such as the US short-range attack missile could also be available for use on the Blackjack and possible stealth bomber in tbe early part of the midterm.
The principal developoveni expected is theol Health technology lo minryed aircraft. This mayanned bomber.
Some degree of hardening against ground- and space-based laser weapons could be Incorporated on aircraft
n tbe (ru terra
Hypersonic aircraft are possible. These could Irtcarporate stealth technology, considerable hardening against laser weapons, and extensive counter measures against conventionalsysiems.
Nuclear propulsion 'or aircraft could beThis would give greatly eatended ranges without the need for refueling and might make indirect, high-speed, low-altitude approachesarget practical
seenn
Ce-nvenlionol ABM Systems
he SovieU have, an olcnsivc programn conventional ABM systems lhat dalea back lohe urogram ihey arc correnilv pursuingdevelopmenl o( components which are suitable for use in an extensive deployment lo protect key miliiary. industrial, and uiban population centers. These componenUarge. Quasiable engagement radar, an erdcotrnospheric interceptor,issile guidance tadar. Additionally, they are impioving the Moscow ABM system by makingwo-layered system, increasing the number of Inler-ccplofs, andarge, phased-array engagement radar. In addition, large, phased-array radars lo upgrade their ballistic missile detection and tracking capabilities are under constiuction. Civen their already extensive research and upgradewe do not believe lhat the SovieU* Initial responseS BMD effort would involve any major alterations lo their own conventional BMDAt most, the SovieU might position uSemsclvcs to be belter able lo break outonventional BMD deploymenl through aceeleiation of Iheial timelines for construction and deployment. If the ABM Treaty were lo be abrogated by ellher side, we believe Ihe SovieU would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments lo strengthen their defense at Moscow and cover key targeU In lhe USSR, and to extend protection lo key taigcls cast of tlie Urals. Such widespread defenses could be in place by thar
In tho midterm, lhc SovieU could choose toore capable exeat mospheric interceptor, perhapsoming capability, mullfple warheads,ensor capable of discriminating RVi from chaff and decoys. Also, lor endoalmoiphaic or knr-altiiude engagement lhe SovieU could develop lhe capability to discriminate RVs from precision decoys. Supporting systems, such as mote powerful computerseliable wideband communications system, would be needed and could be developed and deployed by the end of lhe century.
In Ihe long term, the SovieU couldariety of improvements to conveotlonal ABMsuch as multiple-warhead interceptors, dual mode exoaimospheric/endoatmospheric Interceptors,
mobile tauncheis. and so on. Some of thesewould probably eventually occur evenSrogram. These Include generalin lhe capabilities of interceptors indrogram mighl cause lhe SovieU lo accelcr-ale Ihc pace of theseul need not alter iheir fundamental nature
Directed Energy Syslcmi
be Soviet Union hasarge, mililary-sponsored. high-energy laser weapon program sincene of tbc primary motivations for this effort is probably the development of ballistic missile defense weapons Our best evidence in ihis areaajor program to develop the technology necessaryround-based laser weapon foiballistic missile defense Soviet research also hasroject lopace-based laser weapon, probably for ASAT applications initially, but we believe that the more difficult BMD mission is also
of interest to ihem. The result of these longstanding and well-funded programs is that the Soviets are now
ar wllh, or lead, the Uniied States in most of the
directed energy weapons technologies,
"Tthere is good evidence that in thehe SovieU wete giving serious thought to both explosive and noitciplosivc nuclear power sources for lasers of an unknown type, ln any event. Soviet sdenlisU are certainly capable ofon this kind of work and will undoubtedly do so now that there arc reports of successful US tests and public discussion ofay lasers as potential BMD weapons.
hc SovieU are known to be aware of the potential of radiofrcquency (RK1 weapons, which would damage the electronics of target systems with intense fluxes of microwaves. They arc world leaders in the development of certain types of high-power microwave generalors applicable to RF weapons, and also cihibtt great talent and creativity in constructing pulsed power systems that could drive such weapons. The utility of RF devices In the present context, except perhaps as antisaldlite or air defensenclear to us, and wc aregly uncertain of lhe likelihood lhal lhe SovieU will choose to develop
foi HMD. II tney should do so. they areliong poniion to match or exceed any advances made In the Uniied Slates oc elsewhere.
is good evidence ol SovietHAD projects on particle beam weaponswork here Is in an earlier stage and onsmaller scale than that in lasers Sovietweapon research might eventually haveor BMD applications, bul Ihe achievement ofsystem for such uses would be alears In the future DIA believes that asystem, io tended lo disrupt the electronicsmissiles and requiting significantly lessprobably be developed and deployed in
directed energy programs alreadyinternal Soviet advocates, and supportwill be enhanced bv aggressive US pursuitenergy weapons. We can eapect lhe Sovietsoi expand their laser BMD efforts. In parthedge against technical and stralegicor expended Soviet effort onBMD weapons would provide them withofounterpart Soviet defenseany future US developmenl and preservebalance, or to serve as leverage innegotiations to limll or curb such weapons.
esidesomponentMD system. Soviel directed energy weapons could also be used lo negate or destroy space-based elementsS BMD system, since most laser weapons designed for BMD functions are even better ASAT weapons. High-energy lasers in orbit conceivably could have eventualin an sir defense role and be used for attacking unhardened large Is on Earth
e believe thereigh probabilityoviet prototype high-energy laser ASAT weapon will be lested In low orbit by lhcpace-based laser ofegawatt class could be lested In thet tlte earliest, bul prototype testing l( more likely to occur in tha. If testing proves successful, an initial operational low-allitude system consistingew satellite weapons, each having an ASAT range In the hundreds of kilometers, could be available by the.
hereoderate-to-high likelihood (hat the development of tow-octMl space-based lasers, coupledeavy.|lft launch capability, will result In testing of laser ASAT weapons in geosynchronous orbit by lhe, allhough CIAowlo operational deployment b> theIA believes that, while deployment of aSpace-based lasei would probably uke place after deploymentow-altitude system, there is achance of deploymenteosynchronous space-based laser by the. Space-based weapons for ballistic missile defense will require greateradvances than those needed for an ASAT mission. Thus, the Soviels are unlikely lorototype space-based laser BMD system until at least lhc, or an operational system unlil after thehere is also some possibility
1 could be
ready for operational use by ihe end of the midterm.
n the long lerm. the Soviets will have had time lo perfect shorter wavelength devices such as the free-electron and eitimrr taseis These have severalover weapons operating In lhe infrared,belter coupling ol the laser radiation lo the target, and ability toote Intense flux on lhe' targetiven diameter of output optics. In addition, most of Ihese can be designed to operate with nuclear power sources, thus obviating lhe need lo carry great amounts of fuel into orbit Also In the far term, Soviet stork on particle beam weapons couldorkable space-based weapon for BMD or ASAT use.
Space Systems
he Soviet space program is unlikely io change markedly in response lo tho US BMD initiative, Tlie program Is well fundedumber of short-range and mid range goab that are not likely to change However, lheffort could shift more toward developing components for ballistic missile defense sod antisatellite use if the United States emphaslres space-based BMD, probably al the expense of the manned-Space and communications satellite programs which have recently accounted for larger shares of Soviet space costs.
t present, we estimate thatew military and ch-il space systems will be tesled. and most of
fC-ftfT-
will be deployed, hi lhc neilears. These new programs will result in improvements across the board in enisling capabilities; in addition, the new space translation system (shuttle) and an associatedIass heavy lift launch vehicle willewto tho manned and unmanned Soviet programs. These new vehicles will be ava.lablc in Ihe late iSfiOs
and will allow the Soviets for Ihe first lime to put payloadsulograms into low Earth orbit. The Soviet space program will have an Increasing manned component: their shuttle, space tug. and space slalfons will be used to conduct techno!-ogy-orienlcd research and development in space,ASAT and perhaps HMD system development
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