Created: 6/28/1983

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Military Reliability of the

Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact Allies

Nttional Intelligence Estimate

1 J



uwt in Ihe pre ton Hon <rf Ihli Ealnu't



The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

he CnrirdAgency, IhtiW.lia.nce Agency, ihe Notional Security Agency, and Ihe eWeSocnc. agon) rat ion a' lhe Department ol State.

Alto Participating:

The Assissara ChW ol SWf for,she Arm, The Director ol Novo!l ih.tont Chief ol Sloff.ence. Department ol th. Air Force The Director of IrtteEgencc, Heodayo-lefi.orp,



Evolution of tbe Warsaw

Tbe Hungarian dull

Tbe Czechoslovak

The Wartime

The robin

The Wanaw Pact at an

Transition to

Significance of NSWP Force* (or Pad

Soviet Control Measures in the Waraw

Pocuical Leadership

NSWP Military

Thc Political Control Apparatus in llie

The Security Police Apparatus

Mfflnur Factors

Command and Conirol of Warsaw Pact Forces

-^Situational Factors in NSWP Military



CircumsUnces of War Initiation

East European Expectations of Actions by the

Fortune! of


A. The Statute for the Wartime Command ol the Combined Armed

Forces of the Warsaw Pact snd Its Unified Wartime Command

It Significance of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Foxes for Pact

D. Key Inielligence Caps on Non-Soviet Warsaw Pad Reliability

C. Military Reliability Implications


The crisis in Poland has again focused Intelligence Community attention on thc issue of Warsaw Pact reliability. Two main prompt this inquiry. Over the past three decades, Soviet

jncrcasing reliance on their Warsaw Pact Alliesar with NATO. Opposition to Soviet dominance has repeatedly found indirect popular and. in some cases, political expression in Eastern Europe. In several instances Eastunrest was suppressed only by armed Soviet intervention. An important factor for NATO planning is an assessment of the Soviets' confidence that their Allies would comply with orders and thcof possible exploitable vulnerabilities in Pnct cohesion. Allhough this subject has been examined in open literature, no Community study has been issued

This Estimate examines the military reliability of the USSR's Warsaw Pact Allies in the event of major external crisis or war with NATO. It considers the roles of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armed forces in Soviet plans for wax and assesses thc various elements that could undermine or strengthen reliability of the NSWP forces. Annexes provide details on specific Soviet control measures, theof the NSWP Alliesuropean war. Implications for Western plannerselected list of NSWP vulnerabilities, and. finally, intelligence gaps.

This Estimate is hamperedhortage of data regarding Soviet perceptions and Intentions.

^little information about the Soviets' views of the reliability of their Alliesrisis. For the most part the perceptions of Soviet leaders described in the study are our judgments of their probable views, buttressed by observation! of their precautionary actions. Oilier judgments pertain to our own estimates of probable NSWP force behavior under various circumstances Available evidence reveals certain steps tbe Soviets have taken that would be used to control their Allies In time of war and may permit assessment of the TSrrtoablc effectiveness of these steps. This Estimate focuseseriod of crisis loading tip to and including the outbicak ol hostilities.


tap Snoot-

While political, economic, social, and situational factors all pUy important parts in determining the overall reliability of NSWP armed forces, this study focuses primarily on thc military aspects of the Question.

We believe the conclusions of this Estimate are valid for thc nest several years. Our confidence in this view reflects our assessment that NSWP military reliabilityroduct of factors that tend to be resistant to change. However, potentially destabilizing factors include changes within the leadership and the deepening economic rxoblems of many East European countries and their sociological consequences.

MiStory Reftobilily

Thb Erfiraaleiht concept ofrauiliur aaaauneet ofthe NSWP iimo) form would carry out Factu, iht period before or dariaiconfix* waa NATO. Tieheperception of that rrauhftty. We have Inert io make dear tn which centett theant loed

rurtorkallr. reliability huey variable tn ll* ierforraii.eeide nuweCommunW and DM-ComrnurUa.he product of such factonquipment, end perforroanc* on the bittlcf Icld. When ooe or more ofprove Inadequate la (he tear, varylne dorrera of noncompltance with orden.could mult An eitremeould I. theee oounlnei that havewith their silica or actually chanced UruebabiUry hat takenpassive rratftaoce (that la, failure lo obey orden or etnasobboce ofor aaal ddecnon to theand active reu*ance to

courarytaeouboCaie and rceffllb warfare)





We believe that Soviet orders to go Io war would be successfully transmitted from the Soviet General Staff lo non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) line units that would, in the main, obey these orders at least during the initial stagesonflict with NATO. However, wc abothat NSWP military reliability could be degradedtatic front, and substantially degraded by Warsaw Pact reverses. The Soviet Union is concerned about the military reliability of its Warsaw Pact Allies in lhe eventonflict with NATO and is apprehensive about initiatives NATO has already undertaken and might undertakerisis or war.

Soviet dependence on its Allies, especially in Central Europe, is so great as to make their participation crucial to Soviet success. The Soviet Union hasumber of actions, both political and military, to try to ensure the cooperation of its Allies, but the effectiveness of these actions is likely to depend on developments that thc Soviets cannot entirely control These Include the circumstances of outbreak of the conflict, possible NATO actions to try to induce East European defections, and the outcomes of initial engagements.

Priorinal decision to go to war, East European leaders, whose countries have the most to losear with NATO, arc likely to use whatever influence they have to attempt to moderate Soviet decisions. However, Soviet willingness to do whatever is necessary to ensurethe use of force against other Pactan accepted fact. Once the Soviets decide to ro to war. East European leaden are likely to tailor their actions with this in mind The general outlook and political dependency of NSWP leadership groups on lhe Soviets would abo probably result in most members of those elites assessing their interests during crises as congruent with the Soviets in most respects. However, thb might not be true of all members of these elites, and the behavior of lower levels of the miliiary and populaces in general would be less predictable. Their response would he dependent on their perceptions of the nature and cause of thc crisis, ihc perceivedfor their countries, and considerations affecting their personal interests.

Soviet control over the East EuropeanSovietin suchbe at its highest at the beginningar while East European forces are being mobilized and deployed or advancingonflict, particularly if there were Pact military setbacks, Soviet control over the East Europeans could erodeAlthough we do not have direct evidence of the eitent to which concern about East European reliability weighs in thc Soviets' planning, we judge that they see this factor as important.

Among tlie major factors affecting the military reliability of NSWP forces in time of crisis, or the initial phasesar with NATO, are the established Pact control mechanisms and the caliber of training and discipline. These factors are likely to ensure the reliable response of most Pact forces to initial orders of an alerting and mobilizing naturerisis and through tbe initial stagesonflict. Subsequently, military reliability could be degraded as hostilities progressed; this is especially likely in the event of significant Pact failures on the battlefield and appropriate Western measures aimed at disrupting Pact unity.

The Soviets have continued to introduce more extensive control measures such as thc recently introduced Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Statute, which legally centralizes military command and control in Soviel hands. Although we do not regard it as given that all the senior NSWP political and military authorities would willingly complyoviet effort to take their forces to war, Soviet control measures would serve to limit the capability of NSWP forces to ignore ^or countermand Pact alerting, mobilization, and deployment orders.


Wc believe that four principal situational factors could affect NSWP reliability:

Circumstances of outbreak: especially the degree to which the war could be portrayed as defensive.

Personal motivations and opportunities: individuals differ in attitudes and units in control and discipline; and opportunities to shirk or defect would vary greatly.

NATO initiatives: these might include declarations of support for abstaining East European countries, targeting policies, and battlefield tactics aimed at inducing neutralily or help lo NATO.


of wit; early successes on lite battlefield would probably be the most critical factor.

The Soviets probably perceive the military forces of the NSWP countries as reliable during initial hostilities, albeit in differing degrees and circumstances:

They probably regard Bulgaria as their most reliable Ally.

The East German regime is probably regarded as tbe next most reliable by the SovieU. Soviet confidence is certainly reinforced by the presence ofoviet divisions in the country.

Czechoslovakia isource of concern for the Soviets. Nevertheless, its population appears resignedontinued Soviet presence, and the regime remains politically reliable.

Hungary's reliability is more open to question, despite the presence of four Soviet divisions. Hungary's geographic and strategic position might allow its leaders to minimize direct engagement with NATO forces.

Poland haserennial problem for the USSR. Its key role in military operations and its location probably resultreat deal of concern by tbe Soviets. Because of widespread social unrest, disorganization of thc Polish Communist Party, and severe economic problems, there was an erosion of Soviet confidence in the near-term reliability of the Polish armed forces. While the extent of current Soviet confidence is in question, and the memory of receni strains will linger,indicates that confidence would be restored over time. Community opinion diverges on precisely when this would occur. Most agencies believe that Soviet confidence in Poland's ability to carry out its Warsaw Pact obligations is slowly improving and that the Polish armed forces would carry out initial Pact wartime orders. An alternative view holds that Soviet confidence in the Polish armed forces will not be restored until tlie party regains preeminence and Solidarity is noajor factor in Polish society.'

Romania is probably perceived by the Soviets as their least reliable ally, in pari because it has eschewed formal integration of its forces into the Pact command and control systems.

n Uf Jul CJiUf of Staff for tnttiUffir.'ni ol tk* Army


Without reasonable assurance of participation by most Pact forces, we believe Moscow is unlikely to initiate hostilities against NATO. Actions that might be taken by NATO to encourage East European noncompliance with Soviet ordersat could increase Soviet misgivings about NSWP reliability.



Figure I


Session of lhc Council of Ministers ef the Warsaw Treaty Member Slates,1


of ths Warsaw Pact

relationship of (he nun Soviet Wnuwcountries with theorced, andamoog Ibetnselves at tunes areand exploitative rather than cooperative.have historical territorial claims attains!more of their East European neighborswellof discriminating against ethnic minorities.


after the formation of thcgovernments of Eastern Europe in tike mid-the USSR signed bilateral defenseeach of them. No multilateral treaty linkedafter the West Ccrman armeduiiv. Hungary, Poland, Romania, andsigned the Warsaw

"Juntil theTjhe NSWP forces payed no important part in Soviet military plans. During (hose years the Pact primarily served political purposes, both as an international bargaining chip against NATOeans of inslitu-tiotulixing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe through its central policymaking body, the Political Consultative Oxnmittee. The Staff of the Combined Aimed Forces, invariably headedoviet Marshal, was established in Moscow, but in practice the NSWP forces remained under national control. Over the past three decades Moscow hu attempted to make the national NSWP aimed forces more responsive to orders from tbe Soviel General Staff through tbe Staff of the Combined Armed Forces.

all the NSWP countries except Bulgariabeen acts of resistance to Soviet dictates,varying times and in radically different ways.has successfully opposed Moscow'sline in some, but far from all. respects How-

' Albania cotnf nitlcioaUr*ei1 ilt iiwnbcilhlpff)

ever, allhough opposition to tbeidespread,ot universal


ruling cUtes, however, Iiave vested interests intlie status quo. Most military leaders and many of the party elite have been trained in and screened by ibe USSR and owe iheir positions to continued Soviel approval

Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria, and,esser extent, East Ccrmany tend to be more submissive to Soviet direction in economic, political, and social spheres than the other Warsaw Pact nations, allhough for very different reasons. Ciecboslovakia's submbsivenesafrom tbe repressive measures8 crisis and tbe subsequent dependency of the Czechoslovak Government on the Soviets.national interests have usually coincided with those of Russia for many centuries. On the whole Bulgaria has profited from the association, and many Bulgarians (particularly the elilr) still tend lo recognize Moscowrotector of their Interests. Recently, however, even some Bulgarians have shown signs of chafing at Soviet direction No ethnic or cultural ties bind East Germany to Moscow. On the contrary, East German leaders depend on the Soviets because of East Germany's rivalry with West Germany and the appeal of the West to many East Germans

Poland, Hungary, and Romania are lessto Moscow and have demonstrated thb Inways. Poland's sire, hbtory. and internal political dynamics have prevented Moscow from completely imposing its will. Hungary has been able to trade submiuiveriest in following Moscow's lead in foreign policy matters for greater domestic economic and social freedom. There are receni indications, however, thaimphasizing it* statusmall European state that can serveridge between East and Westound ol Soviet-Romanian media polemics in the springucharest has muted some of ils differences with Moscow andillingness to move closet no certain issues. In tbe past. Moscow haseasure of Romanian foreign

policy ir>dcpcf>dciv-c. in part because of Bucharest's domestic orthodoiy. These recent polemics,with the Soviets over the Conference oa Security and CoooFtstion in Europend Romania! continued limited parton in Pact ciercbesthe dif feiencesms in

ncruibly createdounterweight to NATO, the Warsaw Pact abo hai icrved to lesjtimiie Soviet interference in the affairs of its Allies and its military presence on their toil The fact that Soviet armedr the threat of it has been required to audi internal disorders undoubtedly contributes to their concern when assessing the overall reliability of their Allies. The reactions of NSWP military forces to internal Pact crises provide sometheir military leliability or uwelieUlity. These crises have given tlie Soviets the opportunity both to evaluate the loyalty of the forces lo lb*therefore Indirectly toto Iry to correct perceived defkiencies In Moscow's ability to control its Allies

Tha Hungarian Crisis

7 The Hungarian revolution6 was the first internal crisis lo test intra Pact mditary reliability. The Hungarian People's Army (HPA) wasignificant factor io the crisis. Many soldiers turned their weapons over to civilians,ew units actively resisted the Soviets. Most units stayed in their garrisons. At tbe sameewly constituted "Hungarian Officer Corps" assisted the Soviets in reestablishing control. Realizing that the restoration of order In Hungary wouldong-term process and that more control waPdesirable, in lhehc Soviets look measures to improve military reliability, which included:

promotion to key positions of Hungarian

officers who liad proved their

greater role for tho Hungarian Communist Party in shaping and controlling the new HPA.

Designation ol specilled Soviet officersthc Warsaw Pact as represenUlives of the Commander tn Chief of Warsaw Pad Forces

to national pride throughout the Pact, such as the reinstatement of distinctiveand military traditions.

to national sovereignty, such asof procedures for notifying NSWP slates aboul the movement ol" Soviet troops in iheir count ties

8 In, the Sovietsumber of otber steps to improve NSWP combat capabiutie* andtheir control measures.1 ibe Warsaw Pact established direct communications between the Soviet and NSWP General Staffs and held the first multinational exercises involving Soviet and NSWP troops Al lhe sameajor rnodecnizalioo of both ibe Soviet and NSWP military establishments abo began. Better and rnore sUrsdardixedsome built in Easterninto the NSWP Inventory to improve combat capability and logistic support It may have had the additional effect ofense of cohestveriejs within tlie Pact. Such measuresew Soviet emphasis on thc employment of NSWP forces in lhe event of war with NATO, relying most heavily on East Germany. Circhoslovs.ia. and Poland

n, clungcs in Soviet militaryincreased emphasis lo the NSWP forces.began to

war In Europe that mightTicginonventional phase, which increased the importance of Eastfoices This further adjustment of relying on forces in place in Eastern Europe potentially reduced the warning time given NATO by teiriforcemeot from the western USSR and also increased Ihe share of NSWP forces committed to the initial offensive against

The Cjechodo*c* Crisis

he Czechoslovak crisis8 tested NSWP resiiORStveness. and lhe outcome gave lhe Soviets reason foi guarded optimism regarding NSWPreliability for intta Pact purposes. On tbe one hand, there was the experience of Ctecrtosiovakresistancr- to Pad intervention together with the fact lhal part of Czechoslovakia's officer corpsinreform movement in thcn

tbe other hand, the national governments (except for Romania) ordered their troops (albeit in minor roles) to accompany thc Soviet intervention force.Czecho-slovak People's Army (CPA) followed its leaders'not to resist. Afterward, thc Soviets instituted limitations on Czechoslovak command and

Soviet officers were assigned control andpositions in all departments of theMinistry of Defense and in parts of the political apparatus.

Both Czechoslovak Miliiary Districtwere placed under the control of Soviet officers.

Soviet officers sat in on all important meetings of the Czechoslovak Defense Council and other top military bodies.

Additionally, thc Czechoslovak Central Committee's Department for Military Affairs was reestablished In9 to ensure close party control of the military establishment. Thc militaryservice, which was subordinate to tbe Interior Ministry and not the Defense Ministry, alsoey role. Widespread purges of those Czechoslovak officers who Ivad not already resigned theirwere carried out90 officersoncommissioned officers were removed. Many moro left voluntarily.five years afler the invasion thc new chief of the party apparatus in the miliiary claimed that direct supervision of the CPA by the party had been fully restored.irect result of8 crisis, five Soviel divisions were stationed in Chechoslovakia. wrRjrcT'nonc had been before. Although this action might not contribute substantially to the reliability of Czechoslovak forcesATO war. it doestrong element of direct control over that country's stability.

The Wortime Statute

ince thc, the Warsaw Pact, under Soviet aegis, has evolved into an increasinglymilitary alliance- In Ihche Pact, except for Romania.tatute forCommand of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (seehis directive andprotocols, in effect, give the Soviet Genera) Stat I


The Polish Crisis

he next major test of Soviet control over Eastern Europe began in Poland in


Soviets probably draw mixed lessonsexperience of the past several years In Poland.hand. Urge elements of the Polish nationtheir rejection of the policies of the regime.of that regime restsarge extentpowei and the Implicit threat ol aThe Soviets had grave concerns aboutfrom the Polbfa Army if such an invasionOn the other hand, the Polishas expected by Its commanders andas required by its government. Sovietcan draw some satisfaction from thatbecause at one point soon after thcof martial law some regular armyassisted Ministry of Internal Affairstweaking strikes. The rank and file of thehowever, was not used in directrioters.


experiences bear only indirectly onof thc Pactholeeal or supposed

eitcirtal threat, but. on balance, it would appear the SovieU learned significant lessons Irom all three crises In the case of Hungary, the SovieU moved in quicklymall contingent ol troops that provedThey subsequently had to resort to massive fapfhe Czechoslovak and, in particular, the Polish crises the Soviets took more time for political maneuvering, and In the Polish case they clearly viewed Pact armed interventionast reaort. The three crises evolved from differentlthough the implicit threat to the Pact was evident in each case-lS. The history of repeated popular rebellion,the participation of dements of the NSWP military establishment* In several of these events, probably raises doubti in the Soviet leadership about Pact behaviorar with NATO. Tbe Soviets haverogressively more elaborate set ofand military command and control procedures Such measures have the additional benefit ofthe potential for Cast European military

The Wor sow Poet at on Alionce


n peacetime, the central policymaking body of thc Warsaw Pact is the Political Consultative Commit tec (PCO Delegate* to PCC meetings have included party First Secretaries, heads of governments, Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Defense, and General Staff Chiefs. Resolutions of the PCC form tbe political and legal basis for the activity of the working organisations ofjhej'act. These organizations indude the Commitoreign Ministers, the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Militaryechnical Commit-lee, and thc Combined Armed Forces Staff (CAE)

Staff. The Staff of Ihe CAP reportedly includes East European Deputy CW. of Staff and other officiab Reportedly, the CAP headquarters stall works on measures to prepare the Pact Armed Forces for war It plans training programs and exercises, stages meetings anderences, and makes recommendations about organizational and technical matters concerning the CAF. In wartime, as the control organ of Ihe Supreme High Command of the CAP. the Soviet General Staff performs planning for actual employment of Pact f

Transition lo Wor

A Soviet decision to move toward war with NATO would be made by the Politburo of theParty of the Soviet Union, probably on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Defense Coundl (the party Generaloviet Minister of Defense Ustinovember of the Politburo, but other Soviet military leaders. Including at least tbe Chid of the General Staff aad the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact CAF probably would also participate in the deliberations that would precede the Politburo's decision- The readiness and reliability ol the Warsaw Pact Allies would almost certainly be among the matters the Soviet Pditburo would discuss al this time.

The point in the decisionmaking process al which thc Soviets would begin discussions with their Pact Allies would depend Largely on the circumstances of war initiation

jibe SovietsATO attack This scenario would allow the least possible time for intrs-Pact coordination, consultation, and

The Committee of Defense Ministers is the highest military organ of tbe Alliance and is responii ble lor proposals and recooirriendations on Pactmaneis The Warsaw Pad Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff are members of this committee, as well as the Defense Ministers of the member countries Tbe Military Council, permanently chaired by thc Pact Commander in Chief, includes East European deputy commanders and the Pact Chid o(

"Jibe Soviet! presume some (inite "threatening period preceding thc inilialion of hostilities Consultations would have to occur between tlie Soviets and their Allies during this period, given tbe degree to which Soviet planning appears to defend on their Allies' combat, mobilization, and economic support

Soviets express doubts atioul thc possibilityolt

Figure 4

The Wirsa* Pad Alliance


IronialtM- allock bv cither side Thev daim thai lhc moil (deli dfiumstancc for warhe cH'iiUtliMi nl knflo regional crisis. Dunns this period Mtavrm ihIhIiI Iwpr to achieve its polilical objediwielieve, would strivr at Iimo u<ATO responsible fur lhc lhre.ilwji loraLknow that the standarH I'ai-ii*ilitaiy wont case Mtuatum

iiiirnidii h> commanders to lest ibeii organdmXnmu iinnVr lit.*possible situation II mav not. there-Inn* ivfled actual Soviet ot Pad perception* oli iinii.iliiHi tv st}

Mimtrd Uul NSWP officers do not brhrvf thatW'llhr intention ot capability to1n* timebelieve Ihe Soviet leadclnp

sharoi ihli view, although we have no hardon the perceptions of the Soviet leadership in this regard. Whatever the ctrru instances, tlie Soviets"on East Eufopean support wouldritical factor. Therefore, although theight walhheld from their Allies certain aspects of theirioro and perceptloiis of thc crisis.actions and decisions affecting the general operational preparation of the whole CAF ol the Pact could not be withheld without seriously upsetting what we assume to be standing war plans The Soviets, however, would also seek to ensure the tactical surprise and trstetrrlty of their attack by maintaining tight security over certain opeiational aspects of thru plans

Jthe Romanians rejected the Wartime Statute and the Polish General Staff expressed misgivings that the Statute would Infringe on Polish sovereignty. The mechanism represented by the Wartime Statute certainly provides for virtually automatic military response by NSWP units to orders initialed In

J political consultations^ ^Imost certainly would have Intake place prior lo the implementation of the statutory mechanisms. Wc assume the Soviets would be the driving force in such discussion1^*


Significonce of NSWP Forces for Poet Plonning

SWP foices makearge proportion of lhe.opposite NATO's Central Region Nearly one-third of the active Warsaw Pact divisions opposing NATO are from NSWPlso, certain NSWP units undergo training to employweapons, and, according to Q

^he Soviets have procedures toweapons in wartime The detailsegree

forrrmie comnlew cbsenptlon tri NSWP (orce

conanbutUini lu tlx Wanes Par"

of Soviet confidence in the reliability of at least tht receiving units.

iechoslovak, East Cerman, and Polishcompose more than one-thinl of Ihedivisions available for use in theof Military Operationsnd,the scenario, could provide aboutercent ofechelonEast

Cerman. and soosetirnes Soviet, forces helpolish Front. Other East German divisions typically join the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and thc Soviet Northern Croup of Forces looviet-East German Fronl. Czechoslovakia's forces loin tho Soviet Central Croup of Forces stationed In Ihat country lo form lheoviet Front. AhhoughHungary, and Romania are clearly less crucialATO wu than tbeir Allies In theJ form important dementi for ground operations in the South western TVD against thestraits area. Greece. Austria, and Italy. Hungarian forces combine with the Soviet Southern Croup of Forces to form tint Soviet-Hungarian Fronl.against the Turkish straits are headed by Soviet forces from the Odessa and possibly Kiev Fronts with some Bulgarian forces. To secure their western flank, the remaining Bulgarian forcesalkan Front Romanian forces, if used at all. might form part of the Balkan Front or mightational front in the second echelon of the TVD.

Questions about the

Soviet view of Ciechoslovakla's reliability In thoof8 crisis and about the Polos' reliability


The Sovicfi coniinue lo urge their Allies to rrsodermie their military forces. Most NSWP countries have been reluctant lo accede to these Soviet demands, primarily (jj Jrkonomlc reasons, and have lagged behind tbe SovieU In modernization. This slower paced upgrading of NSWP forces could hamper ibeir ability lo operate with Sovicl forces. Thb difference furtherivergence of priorities between most NSWP leaderships and the Soviets

Of nearly equal Importance lo successfulof military operations against NATO are the lines of com monies lions (LOCs) and much of the Pact logistic support structure within NSWp countries. Even though the Soviets would no doubt commit some of their own forces, such as the Radioed Troops or Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) troops, lo protect these LOCs. without NSWP cooperation they would find continued logistic support Increasingly difficult.

Soviet Control Measures in the Warsaw Pact

The behavior of Moscow's Warsaw Pact Allies will be influencedariety of factors ranging from the vested interests of the political and military elites of thc East European countries lo the attitudes and loyalties of the noncommissioned officers and middle gradeo the motivation and control of thc armed forces, and lo the attitudes and behavior ol other groups In these nations Both NSWP leaden and the Soviets are highly sensitive lo thee factors and have taken nsVasuie* that affect their control.

Concern about NATOnotherunderlying Soviel control measures. Soviet writings reflect considerable apprehension aboutNATO has already undertaken and might undertakerbb or war One reflection of Moscow's altitude is the ismming of Western radio broadcasts lo Eastern Europe and lhe Soviel Union. Opposition by the Soviets to the use of Western language on jamming in the final document of lhe Madrid' meetings on CSCE highlights their continued concern (or the harmful effects of such broadcasts Thc Soviets clearly perceived Western broadcaststhe PolisxVvrDit as playingotentiallyPad vulnerability.

Polilical leadership

spile of the increasing tendency on thesome East European governments To assert aindependence, their foreign policies stillis Moscow (with the partialofheir elites generally benefitMoscow's wishes. The Warsaw Pact'sdefense arrangements give the East Europeansmeasure of security. For nationshas been replete with wan, Sovieta peaceful, albeit oppressed, respite.important, tbe Pact, under Soviet leadership, isof the "continuance of Communisteach of the Pact countries. Thus, onhegemony helps protect thc ruling clilesEurope against both foreign and

NSWP Militory leadership

Party leaderships regularly co-optof the military high command intothereby acquiring their military expertisethem access to the policymaking process.reports confirm that military leaderssuch positions are the most politically reliableto regime policies, and, likeested Interest in maintainingstatus. Any who arc assigned toin command, control, andscreened byIn Sovietstaffare monitored by the Sovietstheir continued reliability.

Ihe PoRticol Control Apparatus in the Militory

normal noncrbb conditions. NSWPcontrol organs generallyighconformity and obedience within theirPact media do sometimes reveal flagrantof poor training, corruption, lack ofimproper ideologicalalwaysspirit of exposing Ihe offenders and correctingTbe regulaiity of such discussions,with reports from defectors and othersources, leads us lo believe that Padare well aware of the potentialThc control system is structured so lhat

their troop* will at leaat get assembled to go into combal il ordered.

he Warsaw Pacl political control apparatus consists of the mam political adrmiustrations (MPA) of Ih* armed forces. The csWi of these MPAi hold rneVtSty rank and are part of lhe military command structure; however, their aare alsosubordinate lo tbe Communist Parly and report through party channels. These separate reporting channels provide the parly an alternate source of information for assessing thc status of the armed forces. Thc MPA structure, in most cases, parallels the military chain of cornrnand. with deputy commanders for political affairs aligned down to the company level Although these "rsolitical officers* areprimarily for troop indocliination, they share responsibibty with the military commander for any decline In the overall combat readiness of Ihe unit. In fact, by their influence over discipline, control over Indoctrination, authority In assignment nutters (they can recommend rcrjacement ol any personnelthe commandingnd their direct and separate chain of command, they have in mostisproportionately powerful position in thc military structure Although organizationally subordinate lo Ihc commander, they are rated by lhe nest higher political officer, not by tbe commander Therefore, while the political officer and the unit commanderommon interest that supports the control system within Pact military units, the politicalost force!igh decree of autonomy from tbe regular chain of command. Nevertheless, In combat, as well as peacetime, Ihe dual military and politicalhas elements of Irscredtcable tension, wlitJh sometimes disrupt an otherwise cooperative relatronshipr

has pointed to the pokrical officerotentiall miutarv unreliability under especially adverse cir-cumsiances More recently in Poland, however, the political officers have been reported as taking "Midline positions during the course ol thc crisis

roop Education. Military-patriotic education at the Itoop level consumes several hours each week of tho troop training schedule Poliiical education often botes lhe average conscript, and the Pact military

Dress regularly cites examples of ineffective political officers Even so. military-patriotic education comple menu and builds on the previous political training that all citiiem of Pact stales receive in school and at work.

olitical reliability is critical to advarscement in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact The enterprising conscript seeks membership in the Young Communist organization if he wants lo advance in rank,Srty membership cardirtual necessity for the officer who wants lo get ahead. For example, il is estimated Ihat slightly more lhanercent ot the officer corps of the Hungarian Army are members of the Communist Party. The role of the partv collective within each miblary unit is not well understood, but mandated participation is political work andthrough thc party chain of command probably reinforce tendencies toward reliability within thePact troops are evaluated partly on the basis of their "party mlndedness" Anyone deviating from thc parly line orack of commitment to party work In the militaryrave risk oi ieopardiiing both his military and subsequent civilian career

Ihe Security Polk* Apparatus

rucial element of control is contributed by security police officers who. although technicallymilitary rank and uniforms are. in most cases, representatives of the stale security apparatus Their purview eitends to ferreting out "ideologicala crime (hat is inierpieted very broadly In Ihe Communist leiioon. Given their limitedsuch officers would probably not be able to ensure controlnil as much as they could serve to identify and eliminate unreliable individuals

aramilitary Internal Security Troops In addition to military police, the civilian ministries of internal affairs maintain relatively large troop bodies tasked with providing Internal security against both domestic and eiternal enemies. ^

"Qthey are part of the "palace guard" of thc Communist regime, wouldey role In tbe event ol domeslic unreit. and would conduct rear-area security missions As in the case of Poland, these forces, rather tlian regular army troops, would be

primarily relied on to put down domesticspares thc regular aimed forces frominvolved in domestic crises, which mighta dccliiMttiH-'lhe morale and political reliabilityThese forces help ensure that regu-

lar mlbury force* are available to perform their combat role, despite domestic unreal withinarge number of Soviet security forces could be deployed to NSWP countries in time of war.

Military Factors

Soviet Military Presence in the Warsaw Pact Hations. The Soviets have stationedaneuver divisions in NSWP countries, plus air and other forces, totaling more thanillion troops. In addition, they maintain senior military officers in each NSWP capital accredited as representatives of thc Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact to the NSWP ministries of defense. In some NSWP armies, these officers oversee the activities of the Soviet adviser* who are present at lower echelons of the national force. Where they are present, these advisers are tasked with repotting on the political reliability as well as combat readiness of the national forces to which Ihey are assigned.

F.lile Units. Contrasting with thc normaldivisions of the Pact, all these countries haveimited number of small elite units. They arc trained lor special missions behind NATO lines to conduct reconnaissance and surprise attacks on high-value targets. Tlmrough screening of personnel, high morale, and esprit de corps would tend to make them among thc most reliable of NSWP forces. In addition, other segments of some East European forces consider themselves highly trained, cohesive, andThese segments largely comprise such specially trained ixrrsonnel as airborne troops, naval infantry, and fighter pilots.

Pact ExCrciiea and Doctrine.fad annuallycries ofauo lei piece held exercises designed tocommand procedures. TheseP staffs Im working and lightingSoviet "latoij.'cis-iii-arms" Those staffsto Soviet organisation, doctrine, and war fight inc

strategies, which require relatively rigid adherenceprocedures and orders. The exercisesto reinforce perceptions of the Pactpotential Western aggression Finally,demonstrate Soviet military power,thc NSWP Allies of the limits of_

Command ond Control ot Warsaw Pact Forces

ommand and control of Warsaw Pad forces is maintained with great rigor by the Soviets. Although some eflort has been made toacade of coequal command authority by such devices as placing East European leaders in charge of some combined exeihe Pad's Commander In Chief and Chief of Staff have always been Soviet officers, and the Soviet General Staff would serve as the planning andcenter for the Pad forces in wartime. In fact, Hungarian leader Kadar recently told thc American Ambassador that there is overwhelming Sovietin East European defense matters. Hc all but admitted Ihat there arc no national command authorities in NSWP capitals that could interpose themselves in times of crisis between the SovietSlaff and the individual national staffs. Kadar said "thc Warsaw Allianceingles noted previously, the Soviets have tightened their control over their NSWP Allies (except Romania) under the Wartime Statute (see annex A) and its alerting net-woik.r


Situotionol Fociots in NSWP Military Reliability

In thc event ol crisis orumber of major situational factors would probably have someon the military reliability of NSWP countries Al. uf these factors arc variable within the context of thesituation. The following discussion of thcit iidn-tdual and collective contributions to Pact reliabil-its. is therefore speculative and scenario dependent.

Noiionol Considerations

The degree to which the Soviets could countT supportpecific situation varies among theseaior influence would be tliehc polciilial gains oi losses resulting from eoopciM-inc in Soviit imhlaiy actions as perceived by leader-

ship groups in each country. The possible conse-Quenccs of losing wouldrime factor forby NSWP leaderships Another importantwoujd be thc amount of damage likely to be Inflictedforces during the conflict. Given their geographic location, however, damagewould probably be high no matter what their choice

onflict with NATO, Soviet and NSWP leaders would claim to be defending themselves against aggression. Thus, the Polish and Czechoslovak people would be urged to defend themselves against West Germans and might find that argumentThe Hungarians might shareiew, butesser extent Also, the Bulgarians could takein the possible opportunity to recover lost territory from the Creeks and Turks. East Germanto such propaganda Is open to question because some sources have doubted the vigor with which East Germans could be expected to fight West Germans. There arc also national considerations that could act to reduce the desire of NSWP forces to engage in combat with NATO countries. Historical affinities might make Poles, Czechoslovaks, or Hungarians unwilling to fight Americans, the British, or the French, particularly if Western appeals in this regard were effectively

The Soviets have reason to feel differently about the potential reliability of each of their NSWP Allies. They probably recognize lire Bulgarian regime as Iheir meat reliable Ally. Bulgarian leaders have consistently supported Soviet policy and historically have liad the closest ties with the Soviet Union. Defector and emigre reporting places the Eastregime as the next most reliable In Sovietboth politically and militarily. Soviet confidence Is certainly reinforced by the presence ofoviet divisions in the country. Considering its history, Czechoslovakia mustource of concern for thc Soviets. Nevertheless, the regime was politicallyunder Antonin Novotny and remains so under Gustav Husak. The Czeclioslovak populace appears to be resigned to continued Soviet domination, reflected by the presence ol five Soviet divisions. Despite the presence ol four Soviet divisions in Hungary, ils reliability is sMorcropen to question. Hungary'sand strategic position might allow its leaders to

minimize direct engagement with NATO forces. Romania is probably perceived by the Soviets as militarily the least reliable ally. In addition to Soviet concern about Romanian foreign policy, Bucharest has failed to participate fully In Pact exercises, other than with small staff elements; and has rejected any formal integration of its forces Into the Pact command and control systems.

of two Soviet divisions in thePoland haserennial problem forand its political eruptions, sparked byover the years, havetrongof anti-Soviet sentiments. Poland's key roleoperations and Its location on the maincommunication to the West must,reat deal of concern by the Soviets.some of Ihis concern, however. Is thethe Polish armed forces as aassignedonfrontationaltheir dutieseliable manner duringcrisis. In part, the Polish military can behave acted lo restore domestic order to preventSoviet Intervention. The extent to whichsituation can be used to measure NSWP.Polish, reliability Is open to Question. Becausesocial unrest, disorganization of theParty, and severe economicwas an erosion of Soviet confidence in thereliability of the Polish armed forces. Whileof current Soviet confidence is in question,memory of recent strains will linger,that confidence would be restored overopinion diverges on precisely whenoccur. Most agencies believe that Sovietin Poland's ability lo carry out its Warsawis slowly improving and that theforces would carry out Initial PactAn alternative view holds that Sovietin the Polish armed forces will not bethe party regains preeminence andajor factor in Polish society.'

Personol Motivation

thc poliiical dependence of theselhe Soviets, many leaders are likely to assess their

' Thehuhe Auuiant Chief of Slaff foi lui'Uxeence. Oerotoienr of lhe Arm*.

interests as congruent wiih lhc Soviets' in most ic-spceU Their convictions as lifelong Communists and Iheir personal status. Indeed survival are li.rl. lo lead most of them to comply wiih Soviel directives.some might attempt to influence or Interpretirectives according to theli perception of their national interests. Also influencing East European perceptions is the constant threal posed by proximity to Ihe USSR.

lhe Soviet concept of fast-moving offensive operations couldtrong lever for ensuring tbe personal participation of individualar with NATO It would be to tbc Soviets' advantage to minimirc time for rellection or ciposure to anti-Soviet nationalistic senllinents amplified by Western psychological warfare. It would, however, be difficult to eliminate such exposure completely.

Unit cohesion and the respect of troops and Junior officers for their battlefield commanders are Important factors that the Soviet forces, like all other armies, have recognued Fact training and cloctrine emphasise unQuestioning obedience to orders and severe punishment for noncompliance. Rapid,movement to the west would confirm all that NSWP troops haw been taughl lo eipcct. and thus bolster iheir reliability. Stalcmitc or retreat could raise (ears about the superiority of Western weaponry, erode unit cohesion and cooperation, and exacerbate tensions within the Pact's high command.

of Wor Initiation

East European leaders know that their countries stand, to suffer greatlyar through thc destruction of much of their populations and economic infrastructures These concerns and possible differing views on how to resolve Ihe crisis could drive some leaders to offer alternative solutions or attempt to moderate Soviet positions through party, governmeni, and personal channels. Their likely goal in these efforts would be to influence Moscow lo reconsider Its Options short of wai.

It seems unlikelyentral European war would beginbolt from the blue" attack, without some degree of political warning and prewar mobilization on both sides. Soviet military strategists stale explicitly thatontingency is improbable,

although they emphasire the continuing possibilityATO surprise attack aa the basis (or high Pact readiness Nonetheless, the Soviets evidently believeeneral war would most likely result from thc expansionocal crisis, preceded by rising tensions lhat could last several weeks or longer. Such awhich lhe Soviets call the "threateningould allow the Soviets tunc to appraise and Influence popular attitudes, as well as those oi NSWP leaders, before implementing any decision lo initiate

horl period of crisis before hostilities begin would provide little time for political factorsNSWP reliability lo show any effect It would require the Soviets to implement Pact war plans and commit forces on short notice. Inituation the Soviets would also have little lime to mobilite their reserve forces deep within tbe Soviet Union, and they would thus have to rely primarily on forces (including NSWP forces) already stationed in Eastern Europe for the prosecution of Initial phases of the war. If the Soviets judgedegional crisisighfoe escalating to maior war. they would attempt to initiate at least partial Pact rjiobdrzatioo. perhaps by covert phases.^

Under this scenario, many NSWP units and individuals would probably be urrcertain, for athort period, as to lhe actual Sovietwhether the Pact was merely exercising. incMizing lo deter NATO from interferenceegional crisis, or actually girding for war. Contrasting with thc secrecy the SovieU might obtain by utilizing such covert procedures is tbe high potenlUl for confusion and disorganization caused by issuing last minutefor combal to already fielded unlu.

hould ihe crisis be prolonged. anti-Sovtel views and their Impact on militarythegain importance. Extensivecampaigns by both the Soviets and the NSWP countries would seek to suppress any anti-Soviet, antiwar tenltmcnts by depleting NATO as an aggressor whose bellicose intentions would be construed as an outrage to tbe national intereitj. of all Pact mem bets The many historical, cultural, and political differences among the NSWP countries could potentially weaken


reliability, end their Influence could grow ihioughoul (be prewar crisis. The Soviets are aware of these altitudes and would look lo tbe ruling elites ol Eastern Fuioea* (or support.

f the Soviets decided to rnitiair hostilities, they would probablyultifaceted program of propaganda and "active measures" both to bolster the East Europeans' confidence and to distract the West (The invasion of Afghanistan Incorporated active measures,request" for assistance, lo legitimize the Soviethould the Soviet-inspired measures prove ineffective and the NSWP populations petceive that there was inadequatefor war, opposition to conflict could beSuch opposition, however, would have lo develop early loajor Influence onDepending on thc circumstances, some NSWP leaders, groups, and individuals might worli to limit their countries' involvement in the war and to play asole as possible. Other, and probably smaller, groups might engage in active resistance to Soviet forces However, we would expect lhal the large number of Soviet troops moving through Eastern Europe toward the front would have an inhibiting effect on local populations. In any event, to lhe extent that Moscow exercises control over NSWP forces through thc Warsaw Pact in this scenario. NSWP leaders could find that large elements of their own armed forces were already alerted under combined Pact command Attempt* to subvert lhe systemby the Soviets probably would not be effective

Continued NSWP civil unrest has probably led Soviet military planners to consider eventualities that include massive defections within th* Pact. Prudent military planning would require setting up conlin gency plans Iu deal with such worst-case situations, but wc have not ul-served exercises of such contingencies.

Thc circumstances of war initiation wouldNSWP reliability insofar as the relative length of the preceding period of crisis allows for countervailing forces to gatherhort prebostdilies crisis would lend to afford the Soviets Ihe best chance for applying the controls inherent in tlieu statutory agreements wrlh their allies. Evenlonger threal" scenario, the Soviets could still withhold some infor-

mation Irom Iheir Allies in lhe interest of secrecy and security Both of these scenarios, however, deny the Soviets th* fullest degree of political preparedness and military and economic mobilization, the absence of which could seriously degrade operations We believe, therefore, that in general tlie Soviets' dependence on their Alliesull, coordinated attack will temper the degree of secrecy. The (actors influenciiig the Soviets in thb choice will undoubtedly be strongly dependent on the unfolding situation.

Eost European Expectations of Actions by thc USSR


considerable light on how wine East EuropeansSoviet thinking about the NSWP forces. They reportedly believe that transition to war would follow ooe of the following courses:

Thc Warsaw Pact Supreme High Command (SHC) of the CAF couldneHing of the national leaders and instruct themhreat existed and that they must act In accordance wiih lhe threat There was speculation Ihat this option would only be used if the entry into war arose outteadily growing crisis, where time wasritical factor

Another option,

would be for the essentially Soviel SHC simply to notify the member Hateshreat lo the Warsaw Pact existed and alert the CAF to lhe nature of the threat

that the Pact'sand lis associated protocols and directivesaccepted by thc member states in peacetime.time, there was ample opportunity toresistance to Soviet demands andexample of the Romanians, who resectedconcepts Romanian concerns overof national sovereignly, implicit In theirparallel similar concerns held elsewhere inbut never brought to the table. Given themost NSWP countries on the Soviet linesar with NATO, it is unlikely thecountenance failure lo cooperate by anyThe Sovicls have repeatedly demonstrated

their resolve to achieve compliance by whatever meansthe use of force against other Pact member* The NSWP leaden are lully aware of this and would most likely tailor their actions accordingly.

he Statute, as set up bv the Soviets,some East European military officialswholly inadequate provssiom for thc activeof the consultative organs of the Warsawin

Iteves that decisioiu normally taken by these organs in peacetime will be taken by tbe SHC in wartime. Thus, the Statuteentralized command for Ihe CAF that appears to these officials, as, inoviet command.

t is the conclusion of

'Ahat ihe Soviet-oanuoDedPad SHCdesired, could mobilize tbc NSWP memberpropel themar without tlieparticipation ol the NSWP politicalno clear statement Into prevent such activation as the result ofattack on thcUSSR fiom outsidesadersiup mightthe NSWP polilical leaden of its intentionhostilities untilignal to irrsplementhad been transmitted, so as not tosecurity of the Initial stages of mobilization.

thai Pad

norms call for CAF units to altain full combatfrom their normal peacetime readiness inours First-echelon units are expected to be ready lo initiate combat from (heir wartime assembly areasours of the initial signal to implement war plans (assuming the units start at thc normal peacetime readinesse note lhat these norms have not been achieved in practice by these forces. According to Pad doctrine,ignal to raise readiness status is received, particularly at the lower leveb ofCAF actions may be taken under the guise of exercise activity without an oven combat alert

reportedly refers to the authority exercised by thc Pact's SHC and to thc authortly exercised by the High Commands in the Theaters of Military Operations as having been derived from the decisions of thc states accoidiitg to some process not defined In tlie Statute.

^ The control system as described In this Estimate is considered pervasive In the Pad and certainly alfordsigh degree of oontrolhain of command that is virtually aD-Soviel by definition Civen the political and military conlrol measuiet within lhe NSWP and the general alignment of the NSWP leadership, we believe lhat the strong Soviet imposed control measures are likely lo beat least initially.

Fortunes of Wor

s In all wars, thc degree of success on Ihe luttlrfieid.ii Lkcly to be tbe most critical fador to the reliability of the armed forces engaged. Defeat or even stalemate could impair the icliabdity of many of tbc East European military forces Although this judgment cannot lie supported by sport fir. evidence, there ate historical precedents for allies changing sides when thc tides of war turn, including in Eastern Europe in World War II The penalties lhe Soviets could exact in an age of nuclear warfare, however, would be very high Prolonged combat, particularlytatic iniiii. would raise the qticslion among all segments of

thc NSWP forces ind populace about thc wisdom of participationrawn-out war ofo their countries.ight not bede. nor would it necessarily apply to ail tho forces of ooe particular country. However, tt wouldiiect effect on the combat effectiveness of some Pact units and could, over time, spread to other Pact forces,

hsci'.itton of the war to include NATO nuclear strikes against NSWP targets might have drastic effects on NSWP miliury reliability, but thb would depend on the combat situation. If NATO were lo direct ib nuclear fire so as to spare East European populations and combal units not cooperating wiih thewere to anisounce such antho Incentives of NSWP countries to be neutral could increase However, if NSWP leaders saw themselves as being on the winning side, the use of nuclearagainsi theirsimply Increase their determination lo take revenge against NATO. Id any event, there is no historical precedent or evidence for any projections of military or civilian reactions to nuclear warfare in Europe.

In tho event that the general Pact offensive collapsed and Fast European forces had to make major withdrawals, we believe Soviet control measures could be hard pressed to ensure NSWP reliability. Such an

eventuality would undermine any NSWP perception of thc SovieU as invtacible, probably disrupt Soviet command links, and present opportunities forwith orders and defection Alternatively. NSWP armed forces would fight more enthusiastically if they perceived the battletruggle to defend their homelands. Soviets plansapid and over whelming offensive no doubt are based, at least in pari, on the foartagnant front or retreat could have crucial debilitating effects on NSWP troops and perhaps iheir own as well NSWP soldiers will respond to the same stimuli that have affected soldiers throughout history. Given sufficient cohesion tocombat operations, continued reliability will be tied largely to the relative success of the forces involved

n conclusion, we believe that the Soviets" need for suppori by Ihc NSWPuch that they would notar against NATO until they were reasonably sure of lhe participation of most Pact forces. The primary factors affecting the Pact'sreliability during initial hostilities are itscontrol mechanisms and the status of ib training and discipline We believe these are likely to favor tbe reliability of th* Pact in the early stages of the conflict. Reliability thereafter could be progressively degraded by Pact failure on the baltlelield and appropriate NATO initiatives




Statute lor tho Wartime Comnund olArmed Forces (CAF) of tho Warawdrafted In accordanceovemberof the Political Consultativeof the Warsaw Pact. The draft was approvedCommittee of Defense Ministers (COM) ofPadt wasin the name of the Warsaw Padin0 by the signatures of tbeof the Communist Parties and tbeof the member states We haveas never been presented at aof Ihe PCC Baaed on8 PCCa set of unified readiness and alertpresentedhe Warsaw Pact member stales inof the Commander in Chief (CihC) ofin the fallbe Statute with ilsand directives established the militarysystems for tho centrallied command andthe military, economic, political, andof the Warsaw Pact member states inRomania, has been reported to be tbestale to steadfastly refuse to sign anyor CDM rcsoliitioru since Novemberhave dealt with tlte Statute.


to the terms of the WartimeStatute, the Supreme High Command (SHC)CAF will eiercisc total operational commandthrough lhe Soviet General Staff as itsover all Ihc armed forces and state resourcesWarsaw Pad member states lhat have beenlo Ihe CAF through Ihe appropriatetheicgaled thr authority whento assume effective control over all lhc national

forces and resources not specifically allocated to the CAF In Ihe theaters of military operations. Aof each Warsaw Pad member state with his respective working group would be attached to the SHC

8 The Statute reportedly states that fhe naming of the Supreme Commander In Chief of the CAF is determinedecision of the Warsaw Pad member slates Thb action was. In fad. accomplished by means of an associated protocol Leonid Breahnev was named Supreme Commanderhief Andropov probably has succeeded him in this position^

I rrsplernerrlatron

he Statute provides lhatignal from tbe SHC the Staff of the CAF will be dissolved and replaced with two thealer-level commands the High Command of the CAF in the Western Theater of Miliiary Operations, and tlie High Command of the CAF in the Southwestern Theater of Military


threebasic condllions under which the provisions of the Statute can be activated;

First, the wartime command oigans could be brought into being and the other terms of ibe Statute activatedecision of the Waraw Pad member states

ember stale could notify the CAF GnC thath aggression and has alerted Hi armed forces At this point the CAF GnC will notify the SHC and then the CAF members that the Unified Wartime Com mand System It being Implemented

Third, lhe SHC could simply notify the mcmbrr Haleshreat to tho Waiiaw Pact exists and alert the CAF according to the natuie of the threat

6 According to the provisions of the Statute, the ^flJC through the General Staff of the Soviel Armed Forces, can raise thc CAF to full combat readiness, which include* mobilization of the force* of lhe Warsaw Pact member states designated forto the CAF.

n receiving the signal from the SHC lo raise readiness levels, the high commands in the ibeateis will be created. Al the same lime the nalional forces and resources allocated to the CAF In the Theaters of Military Operations will be transferred lo Ihe high commands. The military and defense-related leaders In the NSWP member states are regularly drilled In these procedures

Significant Provisions

8 The Wartime Command Statute authorizes lheof the high command in the theater access to the political leadership organs of the member stales Preamble documents attached lo Ihe Statute are said lo state lhat control over the military, political, economic, and scientific resources of lhe member slates necessary to the prosecution of combatin each theater will reside solely in the high command of that iheater. Furthermore, the purpose of the Statute is to create the means for the centralized control of the combined forces of tbe member states to defend their national existence and the gains ofIn lhe event of the activation of the Wartime Command System, lhe SHC and the high commands in lhe theaters would therefore take effective control of lhe forces and assets of all the member states.




Contribution ol NSWP Armed Forces

Ll force* (or operations against NATO can best be described in terms of major grouping}

Cround. tsctieal sir. and air defense forces in Eastern Europe, the military districts of thc USSR opprattiend, possibly, in thc Moscow. Volga, and Ural Military Districts.

Naval forces of tbc Soviet Northern. Baltic, and Blacl Sea Fleets and the NSWP countries.

Most medium- and intermediate-range and some inter'continental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

act forces opposite NATO are predominantly Soviet, bul NSWPthose of Easl Cermany. Poland, andcritical lo execution of Soviet strategy for conflict in Europe Ofctive Warsaw Pact divisions opposing NATO,re from NSWP countries. In addition to these active divisions, the NSWP armies have nvabiiiiatioo divisions lhal can be activated in tlie event olThe NSWP-AUies also haveixed-wing combat aircraft in tactical air units andactical helicopters. In all, they constitute someercent ol Warsaw Pact combat aircraft In Eastern Europe. NSWP naval forces, particularly in tbe Baltic area, would also enhance Pact naval operations

he East European Pact countries also contribute lo Warsaw Pact nuclear delivery capabilities. Includ ing some HO fighler-bomberissileThere are aboutnown major munitions storage sues al Soviel installations in East Cermany. Poland. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Some


of these are believed to contain nuclear weapons Certain army and air force units in these countries undergo training to employ nuclear weapons^"

^Ihe SovieU

have procedures for transfer of nuclear weapons to ihese unlu in wartime

e believe lhe wartime roles of the Warsaw Pact armies and fronts would be highly dependent OO the specific situation lhat developed belorc the forces were committed.'

^capability andto lesuboidinate divisions and armies lo other formations depending on the situation Nevertheless, geographic constraints, the peacetime disposition of both Pact and NATO forces, and strategic trends

ood indication of tbe most likely manner in which Pact forces would be employed

The Northern Tier Notions of ihe Warsaw Poet

be Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces conslitule lhe most important NSWP cocrtribulion to Pact forces thai would be committed to battle in event of war wllh NATO. They make up more than one-third of the Pact ground division available for use in the Western Theater of Military Operationsf Ihective Pact divisions in place in the Northern Tier, Czechoslovakia. East Germany, and Polandhese countries alsoarge share of the combat aircraft available for use in tbe TVDmaller but still sizable share ol the general purpose naval forces

tV In the event of war. our understanding of Soviet military plans depicts Ihese forces being used in offensive operations. Pact planning for the Western

*lull ilistuuioi of SoiWl ctaiii tmd npihililiei fix loin* luM NIE IIvetmu NATO. uh)iy.Twif ol Wiiifttiiu,)NA TO

TVD envisions offcngvrj alone ihicc-lo-fiveea of advance in Central Einupc. {Seco cany out (lies* offensives, lite Pact probably would seek, at I'-jji emitially. to organize its first-echelon faeces into ihreeSoviet-Easl Cerman. the Polish, and the Czechoslovak-Sovieta smaller foice might be employed in extreme cirtum-rtances.

7.foico (possibly aug-

mented by some East Cerman and more recently some Soviet forces) wouldolish Front of about 15


"^however. Polish armies have been used as cipioitation forces in the central part of West Germany. This Q

foicwjloej not givelear picture of current Soviet plans. In any case, thc Polish Front commandis still belseved to be la Warsaw Pact plans

ast Geiminy's two armies typically join Soviet forces from the Croup of Soviet Forces Germany and the Northern Croup ot* Forces looviet-East German Front of aboutivisions.


vakia'sivision* would loin the five divisions o( the Soviet Central Group of Forces stationed In ihat country lo form Ihe Czechoslovak*Soviet Front

Tho Southern Tier Nations of lhe Warsaw Poet

ulgaria. Hungary, andSouthern Tier members of the Warsawin the past played less crucial roles in Soviet plans for war in Europe than their Allies in thc north, and their capabilities have been ccrreapondingly smaller. Their lesser status has reflected hisioricall* differing Soviet priorities in this legion. More recently, however, lhe Soviets, while improving iheir own forces in the region, have also pressed their Southern Tier Allies lo upgrade theiF-nrlhtary capabilities and assume more Important roles in war plans. In the eventar

with NATO, the Warsaw Pact probably wouldMs Initial ground operations in IheTVD on the Turkish straits and Austria, with eastern Turkey as thc nest most likely area of attack. in Hungarian divisions would combine with the four Soviet divisions of Ihc Southern Group of Forces to form the Soviet-Hungarian Front and Invade Austria to secure the southern flank of lhe Western TVD and possibly to Invade Italy or West Germany. Operations against the Turkish straits would be beaded by Soviet forces from the Odessa and possibly Kiev Fronts with some Bulgarian forces. To secure their western flank, the remaining Bulgarian forces wouldalkan Front. Romanian forces inight be included In the Balkan Front, or they riiightational Front in lhe TVD's second echelon, (Sec)

lines of Communications and logistic Svpporl

esides the importance of the NSWP countries, in th* conduct of miliiary operations against NATO, they aboritical role In managing andthe lines of com muni cat Mini (LOCs) and much of the Pact logistic support structure within theirMajor railroads and marshaling yards are on Polish and East German territory, and logistic facilities in Czechoslovakia would also be essential for Pact miliiary reinforcement and supply. In addition, oil pipelines lor resupply of Soviet forces run through these territories. In time of crisis or combat, the Soviets undoubtedly would commit some of their own forces, such as the Railroad Troops or Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) special troops, to protect Iheir LOC* Even so. without NSWP cooperation (such asrailroad workers) the Soviets would findlogistic support increasingly difficult If significant local ooposttion were to occur. Soviet managementuick, successful campaign would be severelyif not Impossible.

or logistic reasons, as well as lhe scale of then planned commitment lo combat, ihc failure of one or mote NSWP countries lo participatead miliiary operation involving their territory would abo senouslv impair or limit its scope We believe, therefore, lhal Ihe Soviets plan on lhe use of NSWP forces and secure LOCs through these territories touccessful war against NATO.




nature ol Pact reliability as shown inraises important implications. Thoughthe following is representative of such


ThU Estimate! assessment of Pact forces as Initially reliable refers to our belief that they would perform their initial combat missions as ordered This does not imply that all these forces maintain equal levels of combat effectiveness. Combat effectiveness would vary depending on many factors, of which only one would be reliability.

Penchants for secrecy and security might lead the Soviets to withhold certain information from their Allies concerning their plans for combat. Nevertheless, in nearly every scenario, the Soviets would necessarily be forced to alert, mobilize, and position large bodies of non Soviet Warsaw Pact troops to ensure the most mlhtarily effective operation. In addition, despite the rossibil.ty that the Soviets would attempt lo mobiliie covertly to keep their intentions unknown in the West and* unclear among Iheir Allies, some actions would haveaken that would clearly diffetenllate the processimple

preparations would Include, of course. Soviet as well as NSWP units. Without these prepaia lions, or with only Soviel units alert and ready for cotnbal. the Soviets face the prospect of initial ins hostilitiesood pan of Pact forces at best confused and al worst so seriously disorganized as to be enable to perform its misrUons

verall reliability is dependent largely on the fortunes of war once hostilities begin. Warsaw Pact forces, including the Soviets, could be susceptibleide range of NATO Initiatives. Includingoperations. For lliese Initiatives to be effective,

however, they would have lo be accompanied by NATO success on Ihe battlefield. Without suchthese initiatives would have impact oo some individuals and perhaps small units, but probably would not seriously affect overall reliability.

ecause of lhe traditional historical differences arnong the nations thai compose the Warsaw Pact, ihey should not be treatedomogeneous military entity. Under some circumstances, properlyplans and programs could eiploit already present tensions among Pact members

6 The following lis! Is representative of specific vulnerabilities lhat could affect lhe military reliability of NSWP forces:

Cultural, ethnic, religious, and nationalisticwithin and among tho Pad countries

I-oss of nationalnation

Resentment of Soviet domination.Overall economic hardship.

Desire for greater materia) benefits.

Fear of superior Western weaponry.

Desire foi more "democratic" freedoms

Absence of free media

Mendacity of Communist system

Unofficial peace rrsovementj

Conflicting loyalty of political officers

Tensions within the armed forces, resulting, for example, from harsh treatment of new conscripts and dislike of political officers

Frustrations of lifestyle under totalitarian




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