(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND POLITICS IN THE THIRD WORLD: TH

Created: 1/1/1984

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Population, Resources', and Politics in the ThirdWorld: The Long View

d Intelligence Asscssoienl

Sgtitt

Population, Resources, and Politics in the Third World: The Long View ^

Key Judgments

Information oitu'uWr ai of Jl3 used in ibU report.

Resources, and Politics In the Third World: The Long

In this paper we expand upon several lines of research currently under way in the DI topeculative look at the Third World in thee examine how trends in population, ethnic composition, urbanization, resources, water, and food may impactelected number of cities, countries, and regions of interest to the United States. The momentum behind these trends iswill not be halted, and they are unlikely even to be seriously deflected during the next two decades. Their political impact is less certain, however, and present and future policy choices will have an effect in this area. Our approach in examining these trends is illustrative rather than exhaustive) |

Rapid population growth, in addition to having other harmful effects,to the encroachment of one nation upon the territory ofmigration, war, or colonization..The great and increasingin population density (relative to resources) between Mexico andStates, El Salvador and Honduras, Egypt and the rest of theand Vietnam and Kampuchea and Laos will give rise toproblems well before the end of the

A separate set of problems is created by uneven rates of population growth among different ethnic groupsountry. Where population growthiscrepancy between the relative size and the relative political strength of an ethnictate of tension is created. In Israel. Lebanon, and elsewhere, we see situations arising in which new majorities will demand greater power while old majorities now in minority positions will fight to retain their privileges. Rapid urbanization, though sometimes politically stabilizing, canariety of effects. Wc believe that theto divert population from Mexico City will be Mexico's most serious problem at the turn of the century; elsewhere the effects of urbanization could rangeoss of political power {Sao Paulo)evolt of theclass

regard to resources, technological change is steadily reducing the real value of such products as copper, tin. and sugar. Thoseas Zambia, Bolivia, anddepend on these and similarfor the bulk of their export earnings couldubstantial and continued reduction in living standards. Other resources, including water and food, will be in increasingly short supply in some areas of the world, and these shortages could lead to international and internal friction. Wc

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expect serious water-related disputes over the Colorado and the Rio Grande (United States andhe Jordan and the Litani (Israel and ilsnd the Nile (Ethiopia. Sudan, andt the same time, natural causes and human mistakes are creating: politicallyfood shortages in the Sahel and southern Africa. J

The deteriorating economic and demographic situation of most of the developing world in the0 will stimulate many Third World leaders io look for political systems that will allow ihem to control tbeirunhappy populations. We believe that most of these leaders will sec US-style democrat as incapable of dealing effectively with their national problems. Some leaders, even among those who have little sympathy for Marxist ideology, will turn to Communismroven method for creating an effective police state. Others will be atlractediu tbe more successfulstates of the Third World, such as Taiwan. South Korea. Singapore, and Mexico. On balance, we believe that the Soviets will find their best opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Middle East, probable Soviet losses may not translate into US gains. In Latin America, the rising economic cost of maintaining Cuba may limit the Soviet appetite for meddling. [

Population, Resources, and

Politics in the Third

World: The Long View

I Ih- Third World In iht0

The countries ol* the Third World ate often considered to be static areas where, despite superficialand meaningless wan, nothing really changes. If this description were ever true,oubtful, it is no longer true today Gradual but inexorable changes arc taking place, largely unnoticed, and by the0 many Third World countries will beumber of important ways. Moreover, some of tbe changes will have mayor implications for tbe security and wdl-being of the United Stales. In ibas study, we examine six areas of change as tney relate to Third World countries of particular importance to US interests. Although this study is basedolid foundation of past and ongoing DDI research, because of the extended time frame, its conclusions and projections are of necessity mote speculative lhan those of most Dl papers In cases of doubt,have decidedtudy the morepossible outcomes.

Population Crunth: Four Countries That Arc Outarosvlag Their Horde rs

Rapid population growth canumber of different effects, one of Ihe most important of which is the encroachment of one nation upon the territory of another through migration, war, or colonization. The juxtaposition of lightly populated lands (relative to Iheir economic resources) with countries whereis both large and rapidly increasing (andresources are limited) gives rise to migrant flows that, although they can be regulated bybribery, or force, cannot be completely stopped. We will consider four such cases: Mexico and the United Slates. El Salvador and Honduras, Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. Ind Vietnam andand Laos. J |

Mexico

We have made two projections for Mexicangrowth between now and thender our low projection,illion by the turn of the century; under the high projection, ll wouldillion. Mexican population thus would probably range bc-iweenercent andercent of the US population ai that time. Population densities would be betweenndeople per square kilometer, compared with roughlyeople per square kilometer in the Unitedecause of the age structure of the Mexican population, the effect of demographic growth on tbe laborsegment of the population most likely to consider entering the Unitedbe even greater. At leastillion, and possibly as many asillion, Mexicans will be in the labor force at tbe end of the century, roughly double the current number.

By tbe turn of the century, if the same percentage of the labor force chooses to migrate illegally to tbe United Stales, the annual flow would be wellillion. During the austerity yearillion Mexicans crossed the US border illegally, compared with annnually in other recent years Although ihe vast majority of these illegal migrants do not remain permanently in the Uniled States at present, this may be changing. As the mix of rural agricultural workers and urban factory and service workers changes in favor of tbethis isexpect the percentage of song-term migrants io increase, j |

1 In this paper, trade peculation dentine* lux acta used for teeof rcls'ive pocwlaijofl orranim in noiMoirjnore mcaniagfsl daraity bated on land area with icenc rcccttnic utility *ould be preferable, butot aiiiUNcdmImcmTo be eiact. oitrporMlaticn or uodefpopulation mui be defined in let ma of the state of economic devtSopmcalountry aad ihe economic utility ol iu land area, given existing technology In ibeae lerrm. even in the absence of precise density indciu.learoo LDCs are overiopulai-inand lihaly lo remain so lor the foreseeable

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Other Countries With Population Problems

Third World nations are overpopulated, and demographic pressures exacerbate economic and social problems, even if they do not yetirect threat to political stability.ewsuch as Brazil, have large sparsely settled areas that can accommodate great increases in people, and even in Brazil filling these areas would entail eco-

nomlc and ecological costs as well asew other countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, have small populations relative to their resources and low population growth rates; population expansion should notroblem for these nations] |

Two countries. Kenya and Syria, are projected to double their populations by theumber of other countries will double theirll of these nations will face serious population-driven problems well before that time. In Africa these countries include: Algeria. Benin, Botswana. Comoros. Djibouti, Egypt. Ghana. Ivory Coast, Liberia. Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mall, Mauritania. Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe. Sierra Leone, Somalia. Sudan. Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo. Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Asia they include: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran. Iran. Jordan. Kuwait. Maldives. Mongolia. Oman. Pakistan, Qatar. Saudi Arabia. South Yemen, and Vietnam. In Latin America they include- Belize. Bolivia. Dominican Republic. Ecuador, El Salvador,Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru. Si. Vincent, and Venezuela. Elsewhere, they include: Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa. Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. J

El Salvador,ersons per square kilomeier, is the most densely populated noninsular nation in the Western Hemisphere; itong border with Honduras, which, witheople per squareis tbe least densely populated country in Central America. Population pressures that ledalvadoran* to emigrate to Honduras between World War II and tbelso contributed to9 "Soccer War" between the two countries. Despite the current convergence of interest between the two conservative, anti-Communist governments, illegal migration continuesumber of border disputes remain unresolved]

The situation can only get worse in the future. By the end of the century. El Salvador's population,illion, will have grownillion, and tbe population density willersons per square kilometer. Honduras, although growing more rapidly, will stillensity of onlyersons per square kilometer. Birth conirol measures, even in ihe unlikely case that they were adoptedide scale, would do little to alleviate the problem between now and the end of the century. Land reform is also atartial answer; withercent of its small land area unsuitable for either cultivation or pasturage, there is no way that El Salvador can employ its expanding population in agriculture. Its once-promising industrial sector, largely destroyed by leftist violence that drove out foreign investment, is unlikely to revive soon, even if peace can be achieved. Indeed, tbe only circumstances that we foresee that could significantly alter the outlook for population increase would be the continuation of El Salvador's internal war at much higher levels of violence.!

next two decades, both the competitiveness and the eagerness of many of these countries will increase

Egypt

Egypt,opulationillion squeezedargely arid country where tenercent of the land is suitable for agriculture, has no place to go butnlike Mexico and Fl Salvador, however, Egypt haa not relied upon illegal migration or war but upon the legal export of labor. Egyptian office workers, teachers,nd Li borer* can be foundthe Middle East and in Wcnern Europe and North America as well2 aaercent of tbe laborabroad. The importance of these worker* to the economic viability of Egypt is even greater than their number would suggest; thethat these workers send home through3 pillion ina major source of foreign exchange.

By thegypt'* population will number betweenndillion, and the labor force will have nearly doubled to aboutillion. The demand for Egyptian labor abroad, however, will probably have stagnated and may well have declined. The rapid ecorwrnic growth of tbe od-producing countries of the Middle East will haveince moderated and with it the need for Egyptian labor. Competition for those jobs that remain will be heavy. Pitman. India. Bangladesh. Lebanon. Jordan. Sudan, tbeouth Korea, ibcnd Thailand have all shown themselves capable oPcompeting with Egypt for the petroleum dollar. Wc eapect that, over tbe

' Al (bough Egypt i* eM of UM inOM litdutlriallicd of Arab tutca. Industry employs onlytint II poll ton of the labor fcrte. (u)

If, at the turn of the century, Egypt is no longer able toarge portion of its labor force, tbe effects will probably be fell both in Egypt and throughout the region. Given the relatively high level of education lad political awarcnou of tbe Egyptianincluding tbedccn ata, rir aa)m initiations, and general political instability are to be expected. An External mihiary adventure is also possible.rying need for arablearge population, and one of the belter military establishment! of the Arab world. Cairo might sec military conquestolution lo its problems or at leastiversion for its people.

Vietnam

Vietnam, like El Salvador,ensely populated countryong border with an area of much lighter population. Inietnam's population ofillion gaveensityersons per square kilometer. Laos,opulationillion,ensity of IS persons per square kilometer, while Kampuchea,opulationillion,ensity ofersons per square kilometer.uest for security, combined with ideological and historical factors, fueled the recent drive to tbe west, which resultedhinly veiled takeover of government in Laos and Kampuchea, areas of Kampuchea have for years been colonized by Vietnamese civilians. This movement, which was reversed during the Pol Pot years, has reemerged and noweople,F)

At the turn of the century, Vietnam is projected toopulation of betweenndillion, which could giveensity of as manyeople per square kilometer. Daring the period, tbe population of Kampuchea probably will have climbed toillionnd that of Laosillion

. Thus, from the standpoint of population pressure, Vietnam would continue to have strong incentives to maintain and expand tbe colonization of the rest of Indochina |

The danger lhat this situation poses for US interests is that what wasroblem of localizedcould evolveajor internationalGiven Vietnam's military superiority, it is unlikely that the people of Laos and Kampuchea could effectively oppose Vietnamese imperialism without the active aidajor power, almost certainly China. In the event of Chinese interventionargeno small-scale intervention would deterSoviet Union would be under pressure to give Vietnam whatever support wasto counter the Chinese effort. This could take the form of military operations on the Soviet-Chinese border. Although caution and good sense on the part of both China and tbe USSR may preserve the peace for years or decades, the situation is unlikely to irnprove. The pressures for Vietnamese colonization will grow in pace with the population. Itime bomb that cannot be defused.I

Population Composition: Three Countries Where Ethnic Change May Drire Politics

In addition to the problems created by rapidgrowth in general, thereeparate set of problems associated with uneven rates of population growth among different ethnic groupsingle country. In nondemocratic as well as democratic nations, the size of an ethnic group tends to determine iu political power.iscrepancy existsthe relative size and the relative political strengthtate of tension is created. New majorities demand greater power, while old rMjoritles now in minority positions fight to retain theirIn extreme situations, this can lead to partition, revolution, or genocide. We will consider threeLebanon, and Southethnic change could affect political stability. |

Israel

Israel, despite being the Jewish homeland, is amultircligious country. Israel properopulationittleillion, of which roughly

illion are Jews of American or Europeanillion are Jews cf African or Asian origin,illion are non-Jews. Anillion non-Jews live on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Outside of Israel and Israeli-occupied territory liveillion Palestinians. Almost all of these Palestinians consider Israeli-ccfltrollcd areas as home, and we estimatearge portion would return if given theithin Israel, the Jewish population is growingercent annually (with the non-Western Jewish population growing much more rapidly than the European-American Jewishnd the non-Jewish population is growingear. The Palestinianof tbe West Bank and Gaza is growing at annual

ratesercent respectively, while the.

rate for Palestinians elsewhere isercent.

By tbeccording to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, non-Jews will makef tbe population of Israel proper andercent of that part of the population under tbe age of IS. If the West Bank and Gaza were to be annexed, this figure would rise toercent, and in the early decades oft century the number of non-Jew* would exceed the number of Jews.ortion of the Palestinian Diaspora were aUowed toonly under the unlikely occurrence that anagreement is negotiated for the occupiedtrends would be accelerated. At tbe same time, within the Jewish community the non-Western population would greatly increase its majority j

Thus, no matter what policies are followed, Israel will look very different by tbe end of the century. Even if there is no incorporation of occupied territory,uarter of tbe Israelis will be non-Jewish and tbe remaining three-quarters will be heavily non-Western in origin. Under these circumstances, we believe that the close ties between Israel and Western nations and between Israelis and foreign Jews could be weakened, public and private aid could decrease, living standards could stagnate, and Israel could come more closely to resemble the typical country of the Middle East. On tbe other hand, if tbe West Bank and Gaza were annexed, Israel would cease either toewish slateemocracy I

Other Countries With Ethnic Problems

countries af Africa and Asiayriad of problems caused by tribal, ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions! In the majority of these countries, we expect problems to worsen over the next two decades. North-south conflicts in the Sudan: Somali irredentism in Ethiopia: the relationship between the Kikuyu and other groups in Kenya; the division o/ power among Hausa. Yoruba. and Ibo in Nigeria: the position of the Katangans in Zaire; and the Shona suppression of Ndebele in Zimbabwe areew of the ethnic situations that could cause seriousunrest in Africa well before the

In Asia, we see continuing dangers in Syria, where the ruling Alawitesmall minority of the population; tn Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, where targe numbers of foreign "guest workers" could press for increased political power and where ancient Persian-Arab. Shia-Sunni conflict could worsen: in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, where the Kurdish struggle refuses to die; in Pakistan, invaded by Pushtun refugees and divided among antagonistic Punjabi. Sindhi. and Baluch; in India, an "empire" where northern Indian. Hindi-speaking Hindus ore trying toast number of peoples of different eihnie. religious, and linguistic background; in Sri

Lanka, where Sinhalese-Tamil conflict couldlead India to intervene: and in the Philippines, where Moros continue their centuries-old battle against Christian central government.

In Ihe Western Hemisphere, by contrast, the ethnic situation is less dangerous. Indians are of political importance only in Mexico. Guatemala. Ecuador. Peru, and Bolivia. In Mexico and Bolivia, while the Indians remain an underclass, they have benefited from land reforms and other "tndtgenist" measures of the revolutions0 (Mexico)2ny dangers they may present wilt be at members of the peasantry, not as Indians. Despite the efforts of leftisi revolutionaries to enlist Guatemala's Indians, they remain politically cautious "riskivided by language and custom, and suspicious of each other. While the Indians of Peru and Ecuador have serious grievances,olitical factor will decrease as the non-Indian population grows. Black-white conflict in Brazil may Increase but is unlikely to become regime threatening. The same is true of black-Asian conflict in Guyana, Suriname, and some West Indian islands.

In no country have ethnic and religious divisionsore important role than io Lebanon. Indeed, the relative size of the various groups is of such great political sensitivity that tbe Lebanese Government has long refused toensus that could be used to justify changes in the allocation of power. The last official census was taken by the Frenchnd it is suspected by many Lebanese and foreign experts of overcounting the Christian population. By2 count.ercent of the population was Marooite Christian,ercent was other Christian.ercent was Sunni Muslim.ercent was Shia Muslim, and theercent was Druze. In the, when Lebanon was achieving self-rule and eventualthis population distribution was used to allocate political power; certain offices were reserved

for certainexample, the president had toaronite and tbe primeunniand in the Chamber of Deputies six Christian scats were established for every five non-Christian seats, (c)

This hard shell of gtrvernment structure has remained in place, while Its population base has radically changed.ccordingecent CIAthe Maronite population had fallen toercent and that of tbe other Christian sects toercent of the total. At the same time, the Shia population bad splraled toercent, while that of the Sunni had edged up toercent and that of the Druze had remainedercent. Refugees from

Israeli-held territory and later from Jordan swelled the Palestinian population from almost nothing to. Tbe resulting imbalance betweenand power has been the root cause of civil wars in,, and, while population changes that left Maronite muscle unequal to Maronite pretensions gave rise to three foreigntbe United Statesyriand Israel inprotect minorityinterests- Although they may strike up temporary alliances, no two of these groups have the same interests: Sunni do not get along with Shia. non-Maronite Christians have no lore for Maronites, Lebanese of all faiths resent Palestinians, and most other sects distrust the Druze. who are neithernor Muslim|

Tbe future ofLebanon continues toalmost certainly be one of continued ethnic and religious strife. By tbehecurrently tbe most deprived segment of tbe country, both politically and economically, with strong ties to radical Iran andmake up at leastercent of the population. This group will demand its share of power and then some and find itself in conflict not only with Christians, but also with Sunnis, who for their part will be increasingly resentful over their loss of primacy among Muslims. The Druze and the various Christian sects, faced with tbe relative declines of their populations, will tend even more than at present to isolate themselves in semitribal enclaves. The Palestinians, assuming that they have found no other home, will drift back into Lebanon in large numbers, as Syria may promoteove and there will be no central government powerful enough to Stop them. Like all other elements of thethey will be well armed. The Maronites. as ever playing upon their ambiguous heritage as Christian Arabs, will alternately call upon Arab states, Israel, and tbe West to protect their interests. Neighboring states, and perhaps major powers, may be tempted to intervene. Partition, absorption, and major war must be included among the possible scenarios!

South Africa

Although the already large black majority in South Africa will increase between now and thethnic changes within the white community could be

more important in driving political change. Tbeundemocratic situation at present, in whichercent of tbe population rules tbe remainingercent, will not be made appreciably less democratic when tbe white population drops toercent at the end of tbe century. Nor will white ability to dominate the black majority be seriously undermined by the small change in relative population sizes. Indeed, if the Colored and Indian populations were co-opted into atacit political alliance with whites, thosetake in the status quo in the0 would constituteercent of the totala marginal gain for the minority and its capacity to control tbe black majority.f

Other demographic changes, however, could modify this scenario. The proportion of Afrikaners in total white population is decliningesult of several factors: the Afrikaner birth rate is falling rapidly: intermarriage between Afrikaners andwhites is increasing, with English generallythe dominant language of the offspring; and most white immigrants are English speakers or soon become English speakers. In the past, Englishwith ties to tbe rest of the English-speaking world, have been more liberal in political and racial matters than tbe "coTncred" Afrikaners, who feel that they have no homeland other than Africa. At the same time, according to some authorities, tribal divisions within the black population are becoming lessUntil recently, for example, the Xhosa have been the backbone of the African National Congress and other violent revolutionary groups, while the Zulu and other tribes have tended to support nonviolentorganizations. Now, however, increasingly large segments of the black population of all tribal origins are reported to be supporting revolutionary movc-mcnis.r-

Thus, in ihebe majority of the privileged class could consist of relativelySouth Africanwhites, Col-orcds. and Indians. The conservative Afrikaners, thoughajority of the white population and still dominating the political process, would constitute

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onlyerceni of (his expanded privileged class. Meanwhile, Ihe black majority may bare become both more unified and more radical. In thesemany in the privileged class would be more disposed than ever before both to make far-reaching compromisescompromise shouldleave South Africa.] "|

Urbanization: Four Giles likely To Become Hot Spots

Recent empirical research indicates thai, al) other things being equal, rapid urbanization is politically stabilizing. Studies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia agree that ibe rural migrant to the city slums is almost always more contented and supportive of Ibe government than his cousin who remains in rural poverty. Although in general we agree with this characterization of the relationship betweenand stability, in ibis section we will examine fourCity, Sao Paulo. Cairo, andwhere "all other things" are not equal, and continued rapid urbanization could lead lo serious political unrest (sec

Mexico City

Urbanization, particularly tbe rapid growth of greater Mexico City, willajor political problem for the Mexican Governmenl well before the turn of the century. Greater Mexico City, wiih someillion people, has almost doubled its populationach dayigrants enter tbe area from the countryside or from other cities. Moreover, the flow appears to be increasing as other cities (such as Guadalajara and Monterrey) thai were once major poles of rural-urban migration have lost some of their attraction. If greater Mexico City were to continue growing at recent rates, tbe population would exceedillion0 andillion by theven if migration to lhe Mexico City area were to fall to the national urbanization rate, the area would still haveillion inhabitants at the turn of the century. Indeed, natural increaseanyfrom lheraise Ihe population to more thanillion by tbe1

All of these scenarios are impossible, given land and water constraints, tbe Valley of Mexico can only support someillion people. Thus, well before the end of the century the Mexican Governmenl must find some combination of carrots and slicks, noi only to slop migration to Mexico City, but also toart of Ibe native-born population out of the capital. This will be extremely difficult From pre-HMpaalc limes. Mexico City has been tbe nation's center of culture, excitement, good living, power, andEvery Mexican considers it his right to go to the capital to better himself, to escape past failures, or simply to be part of the action. No government has evererious attempt to restrict the Mexican citizen's freedom of movement; the extension ofBulborilarianism into this area would be without precedent (

Some experts believe that, as population presseson resources, the quality of life in Mexico Clly will decline to such an extent thai mare people will be trying to leave than to enicr tbe area. This seems doubtful. Despite the massive inflow of rural migrants to the squatter settlements around Mexico City,are becoming more equal in the city even as inequality grows in the nationhole. This means that, oa the average, one will still improve oneself ecooooiicalry by moving io the city. And mostbeat theindicate thai, when other factors are held constant, migrantsexico Ciiy advance faster and achieve higher stalus lhan native residents. Moreover, the glamour of the capital will remain for years if not decades after economic opportunities disappear and livingdeteriorate, f

Unless other poles of urban growth can beand ibis effort would take quantities of lime, money, and wisdom that Mexican governments may notonly solution is probably to expand the limits of greater Mexico City beyond the Valley of Mexico. Greatly increased tax ratesrackdown on squatter settlements in the federal district (both

StjgawT

cosily in political terms) could push even native-born residents beyond tbe valley. At the same time tbe creation of high-speed transportation links (costly in economic terms) couldreatly expanded area into the new, greater Mexico City. These solutions, partial at best, will only buy time, and theircould put severe strains on the political systemJ

Sao Paulo

The problems of urbanization in Brazil are less clear than those ofpart at least becausestatistics are less complete than their Mexicanonly slightly less disturbing.Sao Paulo, like Mexico City, has longavored destination for migrants from nearby rural areas as well as from distant parts of the country such as ibe poverty-siriken northeast. This seems to be changing. Incomplete statistics indicate tbat tbe rate of migration into tbe southeast has been falling for some time and that migration is steadily becoming lessactor in Paulino population growth.there appears torowing current of out-migration to Brazil's frontier stales. Nonetheless, net migration remains positive and the city's population, now more thanillion, continues to grow.j

Although most projections show Sao Paulo'scontinuing to expandercent or better through the rest of tbe century, we suspect tbat these projections are wrong. We believe that, by the0 or shortly thereafter, Sao Paulo and perhaps other parts of tbe industrial southeast will exhibit an absolute populationlike lhatby New York and other areas of the industrial northeast of the United States in. Our belief is based on several trends now in progress: foreign and domestic industry has begun to locate or relocate in areas of Braril where wages are lower, government incentives are greater, and unionization is lessgrowth of the frontier states is accelerating, drawing the ambitious both from Sao Paulo and from areas that once provided migrants to Sao Paulo: and the quality of life in Sao Paulo is decliningj

Evidence for this decline in the quality of life may be seenumber of fronts. Infant mortality rates in Sao Paulo, after having fallenoexceptionally gocd by Brazilian

ose steadily6hough varying from year to year, ihey remain well above levels of tbe. Real wages have fallen. For example, the cost of cassavataple of the Brazilian diet, in terms of hours worked,6 percent in Sao Paulo9withercent in the northeastern city of Recife. Other fragmentary statistics reveal increasing deficiencies in housing, potable water, nutrition, and education, as well as increasing crime. Most recently. Sao Paolo has been the siteumber of "hungern which supermarkets and food warehouses have been

If our scenario is correct and the city of Sao Paulo (and probably some other urban areas of thebegins to lose population around the turn of ibe century, the accompanying political strains could be considerable No major shift ia relative regional power is easy in countriea such si Brazil where regions are clearly defined and have conflictingIf. on the other hand. Sao Paulo continues to grow, urban services and the quality of life will almost certainly continue to fall. This too could lead to political frictioni and change, though probablyess basic nature.I

Cairo

In tbe opinion of some experts, Cairo is already on the edgeivic breakdown. It is the largest urban area in the Middle East and Africa,opulation that has grownillion7 to aboutillionveraller square kilometer, triple that of New York City. In some older ndghborboods, density reaches anersons per square kilometer.to one study, Cairo's urban infrastructure and public facilities are adequate to handleillionifth of tbe population. Thereousing shortage of closeillion units. Only about two-thirds of existing housing is connected to tbepublic water system. The public sewerage system, which docs not reach many sections of the city, is notorious for its breaks, which regularly flood some sections of Cairo. Public collection of solid waste b

Boat'

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The Problem of the Cities

growth projections for most of the largest cities in the LDCs are foreboding. While there is no certainty that this crowding and growing disfunction af urban structures will translate Into politicalat national levels, there are many reasons to believe that it will. Each cityeparate case, but there are several perspectives from which all must be examined^

First, there Is the magnitude af the problem.early estimates art already being revised downward, and the forecasts in this paper may also change, reasonable projections af current trends In migration and natural increase will producenumbers. Jakarta, for example, will hove to accommodate an additional population greater than Los Angeles or Chicago in Justhort years. Many would predict fen grraler numbers there and In Karachi, Bombay, Cairo, and other key cities.^

Next, the socioeconomic andstructural bases on which these numbers will be Imposed mu.il be considered. Given lhe extensive shanty housing, lack of sewer, waier, or electrical connections In large arras of Jakarta. Karachi. Lagos, andoubling in size wouldajority of citizens without basic services and in even more primitive and anarchic conditions lhan al present. In Karachi, for example, onlyercent of households reportedly have water and sewrrResearch sponsored by the World Bank inhowed many targe Third World cities already had more thanercent living in slums andsettlements. Because of the continuing high rates of in-migralion. conditions In many places have probably worsened, despllt local and VIS' programs in the field of water supply end sanitation^

Perhaps the most telling factors deciding whether rapid population growth translates Into politicalwill be the efficacy of metropolitanand ihe relationship of lhe city to the national

governmenl in budgetary, structural, and political terms. Most targe Third World cities, especially tht capitals,adre of trained professionals in city management and planning, but the bureaucratic,and political constraints within which they must function, added to the magnitude of the problem, make increasing failure of authorities to meetneeds almosl inevitable. Indeed, so long as entry restrictions are not imposed, metropolitanare further fated with ihe dilemma thai, if they improve conditions wilhin the city, more people willcomt. Even now. for example, refugees from civil strife In Bangladesh or rural conditions in eastern India see Calcutta much differently lhan better off Calcuttans do. If governments act firmly to restrict entry, force exit, and impose other distasteful measures to makeof which areagain, it may be at the expense of whatever democratic Institutions that remain, and could lead to civil disorder directed against the auihoriiies. At the present time, most of the Third World countries are placing great hope in voluntary measures such as regional planning that placemagnets well beyond the city proper and elsewhere within the country io attract migrants now moving into the largest cities. So far these efforts have had limited success in slowing growth^

Last, factors external to lhe city Itself enter into the equation. Many of the swollen LDC megacltlesin an era of rising commodity prices,somerevenues, and classic boomtownprevailed. Nobody cared so long as lhe future looked promising. They are now entering an era when the population growth momentum remains, but the ability of governments to finance basic services has deteriorated sharply, and lhe squalid realities and economic disparities of lift in cities that have grown too fast are apparent io oiV.Q

Secret*

inadequate. Street congestion, pollution, and public transportation deficiencies arc serious problems even by Third World standards.

These problems often interact with each other.water pressure disrupts waste water disposal. Leaking sewer and water lines interfere with electrical service. Electrical outages disrupt water pumping stations, sewerage facilities, and traffic lights.solid waste ooJIection contributes to blocked sewers and pipeline overflows Unpaved roads cause residents to use water to conirol dust, therebywater pressure. Construction work to repair onefrequently Interferes with otheras in tbe3 case wbea subway cormructioaater main in central Cairo.

By theairo's population will have doubled toillion (despite some reduction in internal migration to tbe city) and iu problems will have worsened. We do not foresee any likelyof economic prosperity and foreign assistance that would allow the Egyptian Government to keep up with Cairo's problems, much leu to solve them. Moreover, we expect the deterioration in the quality of life-hit herto most obvious in the poorer sections of theincreasingly affect ail iu inhabitants Traffic gridlocks, water and electricity outages,and health problems, flooding, overcrowding, and general frustration will be the lot of the middle classes and even ihc rich, as well at the poorj^

The political risks of ibis situation are obvious. Cairo, unlike many Third World capitals,iddle class city. According lo one scholar, almostercent of Cairencs rank in the middle class by Egyptian standards (sec figurehe typaealperhaps evesniveraityaspiresiddle class lifestyle During the next .two decades, the aspiring middle class, could be swelled by the return of many overseas workers and professionals who arc accustomed to high wages and (sometimes) superior living conditions in the Persian Gulfand elsewhere Both old residents and returnees will feel increasingly cheated. Itruism among studenu of political instability that, while ihc poor make riOts, the politically aware middle classes make revolutions/

Soweto

Tbe problems associated with rapid urbanization do not always hit entire urban areas; tbey canisproportionate effect on sectionsity, especially ghettos such as Johannesburg's Soweto. Johannesburg proper, South Africa's largest cityopulation of moreillion, dates only from tbe. According to official history, it was builtining camp in an area completely empty of native peopks.lt grew uprosperous, largely white city with parks, clean, well-planned streets, skyscrapers, and pleasant residential districU. It would appear to face no extraordinary urbanization problems between now and the turn of the century. Tbe same cannot be said for Johannesburg's black suburbs, the largest of which is Soweto (Southwestreater Soweto,opulationestimatedillion but believed by many experu to be much higher,opulation density at least twice that of Johannesburghole. And Sowelo's population is expected to double before theq

Although Soweto, being based on race rather lhan social class, has both rich and poor, it is mostly poor and, according to some statistics, getting poorer. In all areas of public service, transportation, bousing,health, education, and personal security, Soweto ranks far below Johannesburg.f the bouses in Soweto have indoor plumbing andoercent have electricity, for example, while living conditions In Johannesburg are equal or superior to those of Europe and North America. Despite recent infusions of government money,in Soweto will almost certainly worsen wiih the increase in population^

Wc cannot say for sure how Sowcto's urbanization problems will affect political stability, much will depend upon developmenu elsewhere in South Africa.ninimum, we would expect occasional outbreaks of frustration like the violent uprising and even more violent repression thai took place in Sowetoaximum, the0 might see Sowetoc facto independent city-slatetate of semihosti-lity with the rest of tbe country- Sowetans would still

^efet

Figure 2

Socioeconomic Classes in Cairo"

IncomeUS S

of hoovthe-ldi

UfeWdc

CO

Lets lhan 4J0

rich

Live in Die loom* or moil

Mat ownprivate cu.le vision, air conditionerofstablished professional, icnioi escculive.

oi businessman

Lorn nil

Live in wo rooms

Mai own radio, ga* stove, and oUck and -hii* television

Head of household ii Willed woitc

ThepMe

in one oi iwo foorntfew du.able good*

-lltad of houwhold mat be ten iiki lied, vtndoi. ce dental

The destttut'

in one room

no durable good*adio

ofhoustfcoidniKillrd ltd illiterate

A prt.net> IWaaced lurny cotdueiedint ward* of Calme reftacniatlx ol Catro'i rofuiatkaa pre-ldedelative elan pesiuor* aM tome. Tie Cairo (Otao linee iHflcrs oier STOO. Tie results of thU unci apply only to CairoiM ate te geaeialired to class conngarauan ie ubu Ego-in| lo the gnal ccAecatraiuK ia Cairo of pow.*oc*.

inviea. indnd(kai.il uiswn

ei

Johannesburgork, but white Soulh African authority would only be nominally exercised over Soweto. Inituation, any effective movement to assert South African control would probably jccjiiiriegeull-scale military attack.

Resources: Three Countries Whose Main Products May Have No Future

Although in tbe very longbeyond the yearsupply of certain resources may present critical problems, such shortages are unlikely during

12

the next two decades. Indeed, lhe problem is likely lo be one of overabundance and falling real prices. In ibis section, we examine threeBolivia, andprincipallin, andbe worth much less at the turn of the century than they are today J

Zambia and Copper

The days of rapid growth io copper demand are gone, and prospects for even modest increases to the0 seem poor. While substitution, conservation, and recycling limii demand, output continues to increase.esult, the real price of copper has fallenbouterceni of what it wasny marked increase in copper demand is most unlikely to come from the mature economics of the West, whereand conservation are farthest advanced and basic infasiruciure is largely complete. The LDC economies, which provided most of the increase In demand for copperre now stagnating and tbe chances that they will return to the robust growth rates ofre slim. While favorable combinations of circumstances willcause rises in the real price of copper in some fortunate years, the trend will continueBy theon of copper will buy much fewer goods and services than today) |

A number of countries, such as Chile and Zaire, arc suffering and will continue to suffer from the decline in the copper market, but no country stands io lose as much as Zambia. Zambia depends upon copper forercent of its export earnings, compared wiiherceni for Chile andercent for Zaire. Moreover, unlike Chile, where some diversification of exports is taking place and lhe share of copper io total exports has fallen sharply, Zambia seems unableeduce itscopper export earnings fall, total export earnings lendallike amount. This is due in large pari to the fact thai the market for Zambia's second most important export, cobalt, is little belter lhan ihai for copper.^

Zambia has the reputation for being one of the more orderly and pro-Western states of southern Africa; because of Ihe decline in copper, it is unlikely to retain lhal reputation at the turn of lhe century.hird World country such as Zambia, wiih strong and

independent trade unions and al least somewhat meaningfululer needsat least the promise ofstay in power.onvincing promise of prosperity cannot beit will be more and more difficult io makeromise as lhe cenlury comes lo aleader cither falls or stays in power throughless democratic means, often with Ihe help of an outside power such as the Soviei Union. Zambia already appears to have taken the first steps along ihis

path."

Bolivia and Tin

Of all the metals, tin has been the hardest hit by substitution and conservation. Over Ihe past two decades, growth In tin usage has averaged lessear, and in tbe United Stales, the world's largest consumer of lin, consumplion has actually fallen by abouterceni since ibe. Aluminum, plastics, and other materials have made substantial advances in tin's majorMoreover, even where tin is still used in canning, the amount needed bas declined because of advances in electrolytic tinplaiing. These factors have signifi-canily cul the growth jn lin demand, and wc expect this trend to intensify as other countries incorporate ihcse

technologies]

Bolivia, which depends upon tin forf its export earnings, will be harder hii lhan most major producers. It is the highest cost producer because its tin is mined by expensive underground methods as opposed to the surface methods used by other maior prcduccrs. Moreover, ihe ouilook for iu olher major export, natural gas, which currently provides anothererceni of export earnings, is cloudedumber of factors. Even if reserves are sufficient to allow expansion of natural gas exports to counteract the effect of declining linsomething lhal bas noi beenincreased exports would require costly additions io pipelines and facilities, as well as increases inand/or Brazilian demand |

Other Countries Thrrairntd With Loss of Commodity Markets

In tht years to come. Western demand for basic raw materials is likely to bt dampened boih bychangeovement to more service-oriented economies. The Impaci of these changes is likely to be strongest in regions lhat remain heavily dependentew basic raw materials. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the percentage ofin which three or fewer commodities account for more than half of total exports increased[fromercent0 toercent^

Liberia and Mauritania, which depend on iron ore for roughly ihree-fiflhi of their total export earnings, could be among ihe hardest hit of Sub-Saharan countries. This threat stemslowdown in the intensity of sieel usage In ihe developed Wisi and from an increast In recycling and substitution Al present,uarter of all sitel in theWest ir recycled. Competition from othersuch as compiiillrs, graphites, and plastics Is intensifying, and this will also limit demand growth for iron ore in the years ahtad.^

Even in regions where exports are less concentrated, individual countries will find themselves in for rough sledding Countries that depend heavily on tht sale of natural fibers for export earnings, for txamplt. will continue to lose market shores lo synthetic materials. Bangladesh, where Jute accounts for more thanercent of export earnings, and Upper Voita and the Yemen Arab Rrpublic. where cotton supplies more than two-fifths of export revenues, will face rapidly declining markets as synthetics gain momentum. Manmade fibers, which representedercent of total world fiber output in, now account forercent of ihr market. In iht Untied Stales, synthtlies holdercent of tht overall lextilt marktt. As olhtr countries approach tht US level of synthetics use. prospects for natural fibers will further deteriorate

ecline in (be irnponance of the mining sector and its powerful unions is as likely to bode well as ill for politicalather, the principal impact oo US interests will probably resultreat increase ia the production and export of cocaine. Bolivian groups, often with the help of governmenl officials, already produce almost half of the coca paste that eventually reaches the US market in refined form. The possibilities for expansion are virtually unlimited; the cost of producing coca paste in Bolivia is probably somewhat less than in Peru and certainly less than in Colombia, the other main producers. If. as seems possible, cocaine becomes Bolivia's only viablefor tinoreign exchange earner, many Bolivians who have heretofore abstained from the trade may be forced to adopt it. The nation's small middle class and its politically powerful military could feel that it is the only way to maintain "civilized" living standards J

Cuha and Sugar

Exceptew years of maior crop failures, world sugar production has consistently outpacedsince World War II, and the value of sugar in real terms has trended downward. Areas such as Western Europe that were once net importers are now substantial exporters, and sugar stocks have risen to aboutercent of global consumption. Overhanging stocks and falling prices have not lededuction in outputariety of reasons:

Exporters, especially from "one crop" nations,to maintain total export earnings byproduction to offset falling prices.

Governments encourage production with subsidies to protect farm incomes and minimize imports.

- Major consuming nations, including tbe USSR and the United Slates, pay prices well above those of the world market to selected LDC producers.

Sugarcane will produceumber of years before replanting is necessary.

The shift from cane to other crops is often difficult and expensive,

Factories built to refine sugar cannot be used for other purposes.^

decline in export earnings is unlikely toreat impact cither on political stability or on the living conditions of the nation's rural Indianare already abysmal. (Indeed, over the long

St*ttt

markets will probably be no better in thethey were in the past. No major producer(he developed or developing world iito cut back production, and mostarc encouraging an cipansion ot*exporting countries are making elaborateincrease exports, importing countries arcprograms for self-sufficiency. At the samecapita sugar consumption in the developedis falling because of changes in diet anduse of sugar substitutes in soft drinksfood products. Although total consumptionThird World is still increasing, tbe rate offall steadily between now and the end ofas the LDCs continue to follow the lead ofnations in adopting sugar substitutes.)

No country is as dependent upon sugar as Cuba. Cuba generally producesillionillion tons each year and exports all butons. Typically, earnings from sugar account for betweenndercent of total export earnings. Havana has not been able either lo break ils dependence on sugar or to make effective use of its comparative advantage in tha product Castro's attempts toihe economy have been almost complete failures, while his spasmodic attempts io greatly expandillion ton" effort inonly failed to reach theit targets but also disrupted other economic activity and lowered public moralcf

If. as seems likely. Cuba is unable to diversify Its exports over the next twothe outlook for other Cuban products such as nickel, tobacco, and fish is notpolitical outcomes -ire possible By thereatly expanded world sugar production, combined with limited growth in world consumption, will have lowered real prices on tbe world market and reduced possibilities for Cuban sales to new buyers. Toarked decline in ihe Cuban standard of living in this situation, the USSR would have io increase substantially both the price subsidy and the amount of sugar purchased. If the Soviet Union is willing to carry this burden, any post-Castro government would be very reluctant to snove oui of ihe Soviet orbit. If. on the other hand, the USSR cannot or will not continue to subsidize the Cuban economy at ever higher costs, the Soviet-Cuban link would be progressively weakened. Under

these circumstances (and assuming that the USSR docs noi occupy the islandost-Castro government could be tempted ioadical change in foreign policy if ii were assured of adequate economic benefits elsewhere!

Water: Three AreasandRiser Systems

In and areas of the world, including parts of the US west, water has longource of conflict. Today, the quantity and quality of water available have become an international issue. During the next two decades, at poruUiion pressures increase, demand for water for agriculture, industry, and humanwill aho increase, and water-related conflicts will almost certainly intensify. In ihis section, we examine three regions where lhe sharing of water couldan overriding political problem: United Stales-Mexico. Syria-Lebanon-Jordan-Israel,hiopia-Sudan-Egypt!

Called Si.it> Mexico

Two rivers lhe Rio Grande and tbeof iia) importance to vast areas of both Mexico and ihe Uniled States. This fact liesentury of both friction and cooperation, magnanimous gestures and petty foot-dragging, demagogy andThe principal bones of contention are: lerritory, water supply, and pollution. Territorial issues arisehange in Ihe courseisxr leaves US land and population on the Mexican side of Ihe river or vice versa. Water supply issues arise when Mexico claims thai US farms, industries, and population are using more than their "fair" share of the yoini supply. Pollution issues arise when usage in one country affects waier punty in the other. All of these issues have been repeatedly "solved"enet of treaties beginningt is safe to predict ihai all will have lo be "solved" again in the future underdemographic, and ecological conditions lhat will make achievement of even partial solutions much more difficult lhan in tbe past

u.

lead lo

The territory problem i* perhaps the most soluble. According to the moat recentiver chances its channel and sbifu not more6 acresnhabitant! from one tide of the river to the other, the country from which the tract is separated has the right to restore the river to iu original channel within three years. Ifot performed, sovereignty passes to the other country with tbe original country receiving later compensation of an equal area elsewhere on the river If the separated tracts exceed the area or populationthe two nations will jointly restore the river. In practice, (he difficulties of finding equal areas elsewhere on the river and the expenses of rechanneltng the river will probably lead lo more frictions and additional treaties.!

Most future problems are likely lo arise in theof water supply and water quality. Mexicocertain lo consider present supplylargely on past usage, inadequate asindustry, and agriculture expand inrcarion. The issue of ground water, whichbyill become increasinglySalinity problems, especially in thealready caused serious disputes, notemporary solution would requireof very expensive projects in thethat would almost exclusively bcncfiipollution is an issue thai cuts bothSewage from Mexican cities affectsin many border areas. The New River,which rises in Mexico and flowsImperial Valley it to badly pollutedhealth officials have predicted epidemics.huge costs of the measures required toand pollution and lhe financial constraintsMexico and lhe United Siaies. theselikely lo worsen

In lheater conflicts will almost certainly reinforce whatever oiher differences may existMexico and the United Slates. Despite efforu by both Washington and Mexico Ciiy, It has proved almost impossible to depoliiscire the water issue. Politically powerful local interests on both tides of the border thai have been directly hurt by water problems often see polities ration of tbe issue as tbe only means to move the foreign policy esublishmcrus of tbeir

Other Rinrr Syitemu Thai Cemld Become Focuses ef Conflict

Aside from the three coses we examine in the body of the paper, we do not believe that water disputes will become maior sources of friction in the absence af other causes of conflict. There are.ew troublesome situations that should be watched. The

use of the waters of the Riversystem for irritation, navigation, and power generation has longource o/ dispute between Argentina and Brazil. As Brazil continues to build dams on the upper part of the system to supply its growing power needs and In so doing exerts an Increasing hegemony overAires could come to feel lhat Us Interests are seriously threatened. Another South American "water"dispute that is likely lo continue to cause International problems is Bolivia's demand for an outlet to the sea Elsewhere in ihe world, we would not be surprised to see continuing conflict between Bangladesh and India over the Ganges. Disputes are also likely among

Turkey. Syria, and Iraa over water usage andquestions related to the Euphrates River system

respective governments Moreover, as past experience has shown, presumed threats to the health andof masses of people in either country arc by their naiurc emotion laden and easy to dramatize.

Syrla-Lcba non-Jordan-Israel

The four countries tied together by the Jordan River systemangle of historicalroclivity forutual hatred, and. noi least, water.esult, water rights have been lhe subject of endless disputes thai have even led io military strikes and threaU of strikes on each other's water facilities. Syria and Lebanon, which conirol moat of lheof the Jordan, attempted to cut water supplies to their enemies in Israel for political reasons but were thwarted by Israeli airsinkes. Israel uses tbe lion's share of Jordan's waters and has long wanted to divert

Ihe waters of Lebanon's Litani for its own use. Jordan and Israel, though complaining heatedly about each other's water consumption and practices, begrudging-l> accept the duty to share wnlcgj

We doubt, howrer. tbat this atandoff will continue over tbe Deal two decades. Israels nu'Iitary victories on the Golan Heights and ia Lebanon have gives it conirolthe Litani and most of the northern tributaries of the Jordan. Its demand for water is projected to grow by at least JO percent between now and the turn of the century. There are only two ways tbat Israel can obtain all the additional water it believes it needs: by constructing extremely expensive facilities for dotaliniration, reclamation of waste water, and the like, or by taking water that is now used by Lebanon orel Aviv is proud of its technically very efficient use of water and regards its neighbors as being wasteful of this resource. Some

Israelis appear to believe that this more efficient usage gives Israel the right to water now being "wasted" by tbe Arabs and are pushing Tel Aviv to take the second course Given the eipeme andof the first course and the economicthai Israel faces, wc believe that tbeto take the second course could eventually prove irresistible. Indeed, it has already taken this course with regard io much ground water formerly controlled by West Bank Arabs.

By thef not long before, the water problem will begin to affect US interests. (Indeed, the United Slates already finds itself in thepositron of go-between in Israeli-Jordanian waterordanian demand for water has already grown beyond available supplies, and Lebanon plans to use all its resources when the security situation permits. Although these two nations could obtain some additional water through the construction of dams and other facilities and the use of more efficient methods,be constrainedfrom making the huge investments required to greatly increase supplies. In this situation, unless foreign donors arc willing to finance extensive water projects in one or more of the nations, any advances

1 Sfriaaatkiacf jordan inbmimifund lurr-iiglit iwihrrn legem further impingingr both jordan ond uiacl ind fsrther compl lea ling

the problem j

by Israel are likely to be made at the direct expense of its neighbors. All of the countries involved may well request US or Arab aid. Wc believe, however, thai ibc richer Arab countries would be very reluctant to finance projects tbat could be seen as condoning an increased share of water for Israel. If USotpcrhapt even if itresources would give Israel additional incentive to maintain its occupation of (or to rcoccupy) foreign territory |

FJ hiopla-Sudaa-Egv pt

Ilruism that Egypt and,esser extent, Sudan owe their exbtence to the Nile. Thehe basis of agriculture in both countries and supplies nearly all of the household and industrial water needs of Egypt and more than half of those of Sudan. Although tbe two countries have peacefully shared Nik watereries of agreementsequirements arc growing and both countries must either find new sources of water or sharply improve theirof existing resources. Egypt's gross water requirements, for example, are expected lo rise betweenndercent by theiven the already intensive use of the waters of Ihe lower Nile, any attempt to meet these needs fully would require lhal Cairo not only take unilateralmanagement of drainage water, higher water charges, and introduction of better irrigationabo join with Khartoumumber of very expensivedams. and reservoirs -to shift unused waler from the swamps of southern Sudan to the thirsty north.[

The water supplies of both Egypt and Sudanhreat from Ethiopia, which controls ihe headwaters of the rivers lhat together provide aboutercent of the Nile's total annual Dow Ethiopia has not participated in any Nile water-sharingand has gone on record to alTirm tbe right of any riparianhe absenceormal international agreement, lo unilaterally develop the water resources within iu boundaries. Although at present Ethiopia uses relatively little Nile water and does not have the technical or financial resources to undertake the types of projects that would divert major amounts of water.

Syttt

could al some point in lhe future receive powerful help from the Soviet Union. Ethiopiauasi-Marxist ally of the USSR and an enemy of Sudan and Egypt; it it certainly conceivable that Moscow might be tempted to reward Addis Ababa for lis friendship and punish Cairo and Khaitoum for their rejection. ThU would be all the more tempting because Moscow could portray the projectumanitarian effort toeedy country develop the means to feed ils masscsi

The waters of the Nile arc so essential to Egyptian life that we have no doubt that Cairo would be willing to go to war to protect its righls In this area. In ihe worst of cases, Soviet citizens or even Soviet troops could becomedevelopment that could also draw in the United States.ifferent set ofCairo might see itself obliged to intervene militarily in Sudan if Khartoumevolt in those southern areas where joint water projects were under const ruction.I

food: Tno Regions Where Food Couldajor Political Factor

In sharp contrast to other areas of the developing world, where food supplies are increasing, per capita food production in Sub-Sahuran Africa has fallen by more thanercent fromverage; caloric intake is well below nutritional requirements and is getting worse. This reflects not only persistent climatic problems and technological and management failures, but also the highest population growth rate foe any region of the Third World. Food shortages and rising prices, sihicb have already sparked political turrnoil from Liberia to Madagascar, will almost certainly worsen over the neat iwo decades In this section we consider two very diffcrem regions of theSahcl and southernwe expeci food problems toolitical impactj j

Tbe Sahel

In no pari of Africa has the food problem hit as hard as in lhe Sahel, an area thai includes Cape Verde. Chad, The Gambia. Muli, Mauritania, Niger,and Upper Voliu. Most of these nations rank among Africa's poorest in terms of nutrition,per capita income, and other indicators of social

and economic well-being. The northern pans ofMall, Niger, and Chad are desert, with little or no agricultural or pastoral potential. The southern parts of these countries and much of Senegal and Upper Voliacmlarid savannah suitable mostly for pastorage. The Gambia, small areas of southern Senegal and Upper Volta, and the extreme south of Chad constitute the only pan of tbe Saheleasonably favorable climate for such crops as millet, sorghum, corn, cassava, peanuts, and cotton In no country is moreuarter of the land suitable for cultivation: in most countries it is well underereeat J |

The situation is rapidly worsening. From thehiough the, ihe arearought thut many climatologists believe is partong-term fundamental shift that will render much of the region uninhabitable by the turn of the century. Since the end of the six-year, Sahel-wide drought, smaller areas of the region have been hit by severe droughts of snorter duration. In effect, according to some authorities, the Sahara bas been encroaching upon the savannah and the savannah upon lheareaate of severalear At Ihe same time, tbe number of people the land must support is rapidly increasing. The total population of the eight7 milliont projected to reachillion in thepercent increase.^

The worsening food-population problem is almost certain to affect political stability and US interests As northern pattoralists move south tore said to have diedingle year during the drought of tbe earlyherds will speed the desertification of the savannah through overgrazing. Food imports, already high in most of the area, will have to riseime when ihe countries will be increasingly hard pressed to produce lhe agriculturaland cot ion-needed to pay for them. Requests for musiive food aid from lhe West ate likely. Moreover, as theethnic, religious, and cultural makeup is often different from lhat of the

The Food Situation Elsewhere in ihe Third World

Beyond the Sub-Saharan region. Third World food availability increased dramatically0t the beginning of this period, less thanercent of theountries surveyed met the World Health Organisation's recommended minimum per capita rrquirememay and only six nations consumed significantly0han this minimum.0 more than SO percent of these countries surpassed the minimum and nearly half consumed morealories per person per day. Nonetheless, the average dally caloricin these countries remains lessercent of the minimum, well belowercent average enjoyed by lhe industrial market countries. Q

Projections of food availability to the end of the century are unavailable. If present trends continue, ihe average level of dally per capita calorieamong these countries could exceed therequirementubstantial margin However, recent World Bank figures indicate that, in spile af strong growth in agricultural production, the average index of per capita food productionas lower inf the surveysuch nations as Egypt, Iraq. Jamaica. Jordan. Peru, andIt was. Rapidgrowth, coupled with increased consumption, is outpacing the growth in food production.^-

The estimates for minimum caloric needs ina nation as aThe distribution of food to allthe affordability of sufficient quantities ofmeet the requirements of poorer segments ofare likely to be highly uneven.levels of caloric consumption are abovethe recommended minimum, all of lheworld will need to increase either foodfood imports by substantial margins if they erethe needs of the

south, both intrastate and interstate conflict become probable, in this situation, radical Libyans or others may be tempted to step in and "help" one or another party.!-

Southern Africa

The countries of southernLesotho, Madagascar. Malawi, Mozambique. Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, andbetter off in almost every respect than those of the Sahel. Life expectancy, infant mortality rates,levels, per capita incomes, and educationare relatively good within the African context, though considerable differences exist among the states. Areas of these countries are considered among the most suitable in Africa for production of beef, rice, sorghum, corn, millet, tobacco, tea. and sugar. Commercial farming is advanced in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia. Malawi. Mozambique, and Swaziland. Moreover, unlike much of Africa, nonag-ricultural activities such as mining in many of the countries and manufacturing in Zimbabwe are well developed. Urbanization is also relatively high, with one southern African country. Zambia, having the highest rate of all of black Africaj

Now,umber ofand external, natural andcombining to create serious food problems. Only two countries. Malawi and Zimbabwe, remain self-sufficient in food, and the outlook even for these two is not promising. The other countries are increasingly dependent on food importsemihostile Republic of South Africa. The reasons for this situation are many. Civil war. guerrilla activity, and South African military operations are disrupting agriculture in most of the larger states. The departure of the Portuguese from Mozambique and tbe ambiguous status of the large, white-owned farms in Zimbabwe arc bringing about serious management problems and some decapitaliza-tion of agriculture. State management of formerly private commerical farms in Madagascar and Mozambique has resultedharp fall inTraditional communal grating in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland has led to considerabledamage. Governments in mineral-exporting states such as Zambia and Botswana have neglected agricultural investment. Virtually all countries in the area have discouraged farm output by attempting to hold down food prices for their large urbanAgricultural infrastructure has been allowed to

-

breeding stock has been killed, anddiseases long under control are making acomeback. In addition to all this, occasional droughts greatly worsen the situation of all countries and force even self-sufficient Zimbabwe and Malawi to import food}

We do not expect the situation in most southern African countries to improve over tbe nut two decades. Although most of southern Africa's foodthose of theman made, this docs not greatly improve the outlook for their solution. White expertise and agricultural capital are not likely to pour back into the area. Tribal and ideological conflicts are likely to continue to take their toll of farms and farmers. South Africa probably will continue to make troubleelective basis Scarce funds will continue to be spent to pacify volatile urban populations and interest groups, rather than toagriculture. And the area's population will soar byercent,6 million, by the turn of theew countries, through an extraordinary combination of good luck and wise policy, may do well, but southern Africahole is almost certain to be worse off in the0 than it is today.j

We expect Ihis to affect US interests in two ways. First, the United States and other Western countries will be pressed to supply food aid and very possibly to finance major water and agricultural protects.umber of what are now independent nations are likely toarge measure of their sovereignty to South Africa. Most of the food lhat these countries will require in increasing quantities will cither be produced in South Africa or be imported through Souih African ports. Likewise, most of thethey minerals, tobacco, orthese countries must sell to buy iheir food will go either to or through South Africa Such economicncompatible with political independence{

Implications for the United Slates

tbe United Slates. US interests in the Third World will depend not only on what happens in lhat area, but also on developments at home, in ihe Communist world, and among the developed nations of the West. Unforeseeable changes in leadership, technology, and ecology anywhere in Ihe world could have an impact on what the United States needs from and can give to the various developing nations. Some things, however, can be said. In thb section, we pointew places where the various trends that wc have discussed may reinforce or counteract each other in ways thai could affect US interests. We also make some very tentative predictioni about the overall political climate of the Third World in Iher

Pulling It All Together

to overcrowded

ttcs.1-

The US relationship with Mexico may encompass the most important complex of problems thai the US Government wilt face in the0 The Mexican Gorernmenis need to divert population from greater Mexico City, by force if necessary, will impact upon migrant flows across the USwill already be sharply up for demographicwell as upon political stability in the US backyard. At tbe same time, water and pollution problems along ihe border could exacerbate bilateral relations whileunwanted migrants both to overcrowded Mexico City and into Ihe United Stat

The moat important US allies in the Middle East may beuch worse position both economically and politically than they arc today. Egypt, beset wiih destabilizing population and urbanization pressures, may push outward in military adventures or succumb to revolution Water-related problems with Sudan or. more likely. Ethiopia could easily become the pretext for war. Israel, increasingly less Western and very possibly leas democratic, could be in ethnic and religious turmoil as relative populations change. It will almost certainly be in conflict with other US friends such as Jordan and Lebanon over the waters of the Jordan and the Litani. Lebanon, for il* part, may no longer exist as an independent

examination of trends in the Third World through the0 has been of necessityrather than exhaustive. Thus, we are in no position to spell out in great detail the implications for

US neighbors and friends elsewhere may be in no bciicr shape. Demographic differences are likely to overcome political and ideological similarities and drive El Salvador and Honduras into conflict and possibly war. The resulting refugee flows would add to Mexico's complex of probkms as well as swell the influx across the US border. Other states of the Western Hemisphere, of which Bol.viaood example, may see their raw material exports become increasinglyumber of African nations such as Zambia may beimilar situation.p |

The Republic of South Africa and its neighbors will be subjectariety of conflicting currents. Demo-grapbK change within the white and blackmay make the white (or ratherroup more liberal and the black group more radical. An English-speaking white-Colored-Indian coalition may be more disposed either to ccenpromise or to fight than the old Boer-controlled minority. while the black majority would be more disposed to fight than to coexist. Black townships such as Soweto could become flashpoints. At the same time, white South Africa would beuch more advantageous position with regard to neighboring Mack nations, which will be increasingly dependent upon Pretoria for food and trade links. Tbe declining real value of copper will make Zambia doubly vulnerable.

Problems and opportunities will also arise in the Communist "Third World. Post-Castro Cuba,upon sugar saleshronically depressed world market might well be willing to auction off itsloyalty to whichever superpower is ready and able to support an economic basket case On the other side of the world, overpopulated Vietnam will probably be expanding into underpopulated Laos andperhaps bringing ihe Soviet Union and China to the brink of war!-

The Political Climate in the Year WOO

The political dimate in the Third World in tbe0 may make tbe preservation and propagation of democracy in that area even'more difficult than il is today. Although many Third World leaders and peoples will continue to admire the US politicalespecially the US economy and standard ofdanger is that they will see it not only

as impossible to achieve but also as counterproductive with respect to solving their most pressingand economic"

Compared with the Western democracies and the Communist states, most countries of the Third World have extremely weak governments Typically iheir leaders, even tbesr most brutal dictators, have little effective power. Their legislature* and judiciaries have even less. Tbe typical presKJeni muit spend all hi* energy trying to stay on top of an uneasy coalition of interest groups; be has no time to advance the cause of ihe nation, even if he has the wisdom and dcnire to do so. He muit bribe with opportunities or with unaffordable arms not only generals, bul also colonels and even NCOs. Religiousribal chiefs, students, landowners, local capitalists, union bosses, the urban mob, police deathhe IMF,orwporations, the press, and representatives of foreign power* may have an effective veto over presi-dennal action. And these arc the government'* *up-portcriin tbe mountains,in the university, perhaps ideological opponcnti within ihe president's own parly want noi only to bring down the ruler, bul to destroy the stale itselfQ

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that few Third World leaders have opted for democracy. They apparently believe that political and economic power are already too diffused for effectiveand lhat to diffuse it Mill more would be to invite anarchy. As the century comeslose and many countrica begin to suffer increasingresource, and economic pressure* of the types thathave described in this paper, we suspect that leaders will be even more reluctant to consider any experiment that might further undermine theirshaky control over the political process

Some leaders may well be tempted by the Communist system. In most cases, this will not be because they have failed to notice the injustice* and failures of Communal states throughout the world. Thesewho opt for Communism "with their ey may not even have much sympathy for Marxist

ideology What ihey will be seeking in Communism iseawen method ol* controlling iheir own people, for allowing decisions io be enforced, for avoiding anar-chy in Ihe face of insurmounuble economic proWerra Unlike Third World idealists of an earlier era who were attractedommunism."these hard-beaded leaders will not be looking for Utopia but rather for an effective police statej

Other Third World leaders, especially those who cannot stomach totalitarianism in any form, may be attracted to ihe more successful authoritarianAl present, these include Mexico. Taiwan. South Korea, Singapore, andew others. By theome of these may have fallen by Ihe wayside. The Mexican system may not be able to stand up lo the complex of problems we have outlined in this paper. Taiwan may fall under the shadow of China. Souih Korea could come apart because of its still sloppy succession mechanism. Based on their past record, however, most of these states will still be around and doing well in Third World terms These countries, unlike the Communist states, promiseprogress, considerable diversity,arge measure of personal freedom. And. unlike such Third World rjcrnocracses and "failed" authoritarian slates at Venezuela and Argentina, they also promise the high degree of public discipline required to enforce unpopular but necessary- economic measures over an extended period of time]

bodyguards. East German intelligence advisers, and Communist-style neighborhood security organisations with Third World leaders who may have Italic deep identification with Communist ideotogy. The negative side of this for the USSR is lhat Commumst troops.

wherever they go. Countries such as Egypt lhat hare once had large numbers of Scwiet personnel within their borders are unlikey io again flirt wiih the Soviets once they have broken free-1 |

On balance, we think ibai the Soviets will find their best opporiuniiies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Wc believe that many African countries will be drawn to lhe USSR for Ihe following reasons:

Unlike in Asia and Latin America, there are no outstanding "successful authoritarian" stales in Ihe region lo serve as alternate rnodels.

US association with Soulh Africa will continue to alienate black Africans.

Conditions in some countries will have deteriorated too far to be turned around with reasonable

amounu of economic asd (the West's strength!

leaders will see police-state measures (the Soviet strength) as their best chance to maintain control.

In lhe event that ihe Angolan Communist regime were decisively defeated by UNespite massive Soviet and Cuban support, the Communist attraction for Sub-Saharan leaders would be considerably lessened. F"

for US-Soviet Competition

i :

Although the situation in the Third World in the0 will present advantages and disadvantages for both the Soviet Union and the United States, internal developments and policy mistakes could limit eilher country's ability to make use of the advantages presented. In this section, wc will examine these advantages and disadvantages, the opporiuniiies for meddling, and some possible outcomes. We do noi, however, have room in ihis paperxamine all the factors lhat couldole in Ihe actual outcomes

As we mentioned ia the previous section, many Third World leaders will look to tbe Communist model of police stateeans of controlling their populaiionseteriorating economic and demographicWe are already seeing lhe popularity of Cuban

In lhe Middle East, ihe Soviets may lose ground. Iraq, and very possibly Syria and South Yemen, may go the way of Egypl as ihe Soviei presence becomes more onerous and other sources of military aid become available. The passing of Khomeini and possibly Qadhnfi will probably lead lo regimes in Iran and Libya that are more open to Western influence; we doubt that either country would move inio the Soviei camp in the absence of Soviet military action The USSR's losses will not translate inio unequivocal gains for the United States Our strongest friends in theEgypl, Saudi Arabia. Jordan, andall be weaker than today and some

Searet

may be distancing themselves from the Unitedn South Asia, therelim possibility that tbe Soviets could make major gains in either India or Pakistan; much will depend on the results of the fighting in Afghanistan]

In Latin America, the USSR probably will be able to maintain its position in Cuba -and perhaps in Nicaragua, if that is not decided in the next year orlong as it is willing to pay the increasing economic price. Thereood chance that the economic costs will prove so great as to limit the Soviet appetite for extensive meddling in thiiThe Soviets will, of course, take anything tbat falls into their lap, but little ii likely to. We believe that most Latin American states will be more attracted by the "successful authoritarian" model than by the Communist model Most of thesevilli try toistance from the United Sutes si well, and conflicti will be frequent. The US democratic model may bo seen as increasingly leas relevant to Latin needs, with democracies such as Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Ricaore authoritarian cast. At the same time, in many countries the domestic privatea riecesury base for US-Mylcsec its position greatly eroded by belter financed stateand multinational corporations as an indirect result of conditions set by the international banking community.|

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