Created: 12/1/1983

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The Sovietsarge centrally directed"program lo promotein general and genetic engineering to particular. Ai with many other industrializedbe Soviets' lootto genetic engineering for solutions lo problems in the defense bidiiiti^/agricolt.rt, and public health.

Wccji^ic.riissirr.ili.iitv between US and USSR genetic eibgineerirtg RftD programs atr^are-ter level of Soviet effort devoted to military applications If their programs have been successful theyignificant'threat,Ifi:ntcut'other respects. Soviet acbieve-mcnta will lend to be similar to those of the West.

Within theaext two to fivel^applications of Soviet genetic engineering that seem most iixdy are tbe export licensing of patented organisms.for the fermentation industry, the production of biologically"active substances for human medicine, and the creation of enhanced or unique CW/BW agents.; 3

Although the Soviets have been innovative in some of the scientific disciplines that form the foQndaUonTdl'.gcnctic engineering, their overall effort and level of contribution in rsasic research lags that of tbe United States and the West European nations. They are product oriented and can

be expected to continue emphasizing applications-oriented research.

ofwhat is

believed to be their national priorities, the traditional strengths of their scientific and technical establishment, and the current itate of the an.

The Soviets intend lo compete In international economic markets, most likely through sale of products or licensing of processes. Success in this area haa potential for improving the USSR's foreign exchange earnings position. However, they are not expected to match the Weal in the diversity of commercially useful applications.



The key lo IhecUc-engiiieering lechnoloay base development hai been the transfer of applicable technology from the Weal. They are striving for greater self-siifficiency, but dependence on foreign materials and processes will remain significant. The Internationa) network ofthat support*s extensive. Because of this, efforts to curtail US technology transfer would not rignificanily impede Soviet progress.



Sotict Genetic-Engineering CapabUltii

Genetic engineering is currently tbe roost publicized aspectide spectrum of new .biolechnicalthat are emerging from genetics, microbiology, and biocberniitry laboratories around the world,initiatives taffcn In the leading Institutions of the United States, Westerneing quickly exploited inedicine, chemical production, and bss been compared totechnology, atomic energy, and space travel in terms ofiti potential to bring about technological


certain types of experiments have remained on the forbidden list and art likely to remain so. For euro-pie, the creationecombinant baaed on DNAiphtheria causing bacteria aad DNAarmless bacteria capa bit of Irving an tbe human bin* ike migb result la the creationangerous pathogen Sact ttseir inception, tbe guidelines for US rDNA re* arch have been blading only on governmentork although they have servedodel for nemgoveroment-tpoeuVMed research in the United St.'tes and for guideline* adopted by other couniric*.

useful substances by micio-criiar.^ritsaj

Deoxyribonucleic acidhe Infcimjiion-carrying component of genetic material in the cells of all Irving things. As these cells grow, the information encoded in their DNA directs the biochemicalthat support life. When cells reproduce, copies of that DNA are passed to the next generation.DNA (iDN AJ, often called gene spiking,ethod by which genetic material can be Isolated, manipulated, and introduced into cells to bring about changes in their biochemical processes. One majorected to be the large-scaleof compounds previously available in only very small quantities. Recombinanthe process directly responsible for the production of human insulin and other medicallyenetically modified:

Tbe rDNA techniques for manipulating geneticwere pioneeredt that lime, the gene manipulation concept attracted considerable attention because of concerns about tbe potential for barm to humans and tbe environment.3 scientists from many countries met in Asiktmar. California tothe magnitude of the hazard and to establish basic safety measures and standards of laboratory practice for rDNA research. At first, the guidelines were quite restrictive and several categories ofwere prohibited. As practical experience with the techniques was gained, ibe guidelines wererevised to make them leas stringent. However,

Indication! of Soviel interest In rDNA were apparent in thes. They semi participants to As Jo mar and to subsequent meeting* having to do with tbe guideline* formulation processuriy A. Ovcbinnikov, one of the leading Soviel Wolechnolo-gistsice President ot* tbe Soviet Academy of Sciences, urged Use USSR's prominent molecular biologists to pave ihe way for Soviet geneticresearch.1 theere rnetbceJkauy collecting information and materials to broaden Iheir genetic-engirvetnng tech oology base. Westernhoaxed Soviel toco tots, aod students were sect lo tbe West for encoded pal-doctoral researchThese bands-on practical expericoce* together with an eitejYsrve program of Weater* equipment and materials purchase* by Use USSR resulted ia atransfer of rDNA technology Concurrently, Soviet-authored basic .DNA research reports were becoming more frequent In Soviel and international jour

The Sovieturrcnily promotated goal of the Gmmuoist Party of the Soviet Uakori (CPSU) Central Committee and the USSR Council ofhal "bsotechrK*ogy shouldurther deepening of theoretical

research and increase the scales of production and extend the range of preparations for medicine,andhe Soviets havethat the most immediately promising area in biotechnology is genetk engineering To further ihii goal, ihe Soviets established an Interagency Scientific Technical Council1 This Council, able to cross ministry and academy lines ofas charged with providing scacniifk leadership and tbe cooedi nation of derived indscHrial apcjicaiio-ii Car-renily. at leastnstitutes affiliatedroad range of academies and mieistries, have beenwith genetic-engineering-related researchOf noubtc interest are indications that tbe Soviets are stimulatingiruu-l ivengineering research by promoting capilsliitlcives and are intending to compete ia international economic ma

id eMentofmil

The Soviet military is contributing support to tbe development of ihb technology- Because thereroad range of potential militarily related genetic-engineering applications, tbe threat of technological surprise must be carefully assessed. Although military irnre>rvcment in basic research is apparent, attempts to determine the objectives and extent ofn this area are just beginnir

' racier! ration oforiet CcTselk-Englnccrlirg Effort

Growth endistorically,ew ci-ceptions, the Soviet scientific community bas not been noted for important contributions in biological and biomedical sciences. The Soviet genctic-engineeriag effort was started during thes and, as in other biolof ical sciences, reieareher* hove not been among thehe program wai first noted when several researcher*ew Soviet institutes began publishing recombinant DNA genetics articles in Soviet scientific journals. Initial experiments were fundamental in nature repeating published, successful work previously completed in tbe West. The early yean of genetic-engineering research ore best charac-teriietJ by sincere international cooperation between scientists. Without doubt, the free flow of information In the open literature and tbe direct communications process between scientists provided the impetus for existing programs in participating countries. TheCommunity was aware of Soviet visits to

US and European laboratories engaged in gtnettc-engineering research. Because of Iheir late entry in this technology, ihey benefitedrom the visits and other exchange* of informal i-

Soviet interest became meet evidenthen,eeting of owseoiUr bscJogiil* in Moscow, ibeeet prominent molecular btofogiiu and geneticists were urged to further their country'sgresa ia lha field. Their pctya^ea* ii marked by lhe subsequent Soviet expansion of institutes and person-nel involved in genetk-engineering research Much of their published research wai slillbusk: however. Ibeir studies were Increasingly targeted toward programs with application* potential. Soviet sludiea represent diverse efforts directed toward gene isolation orinsertion of rectsmbixtarsl-DNA containinginto boat cells, studying corsditions snd method* necessary for optional preduction of gene products, and recovering cell lines with eksired gene eafirta-sioas. Basle research will remain fundamental to new discoveries and Soviet succeuc* wiy be measured by the dedication of resources, and the serendipitous finding of useful genes with applications potential.

Coord, noiioA.1 lhe President of the Soviet Academy ofay P. Aleksandrcw. toadb Congress of the Soviet Communis: Party thai it was time toull-fledged ministry of biotechnology industryinistry bas not beenompromise, by joint resolution of the CPSU Centra! Committee and the USSR Council ofay have been ibe formation of an Inter-agency Scientific Technical Council. This Council, subordinate to tbe State Committee foe Science and Technology (GKNT) and the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, appears lo have been given broad rcaponii billts function it to organiie and stimulate biotechnology-re la ted research programs and lo coordinate prog ram-de rived applications wiih Soviet industry. The Council's specific responsibilities probably include; establishing research priorities,tasking, coordinating coUaboratirc effortsinstitutesvaluating research results.


.Iniiiiula of

Molecular Ganei*

Atemrif of Sttrmtt


eTIJIiiaBtapitpaiail (LcaHiaf**)

Inilinil* ofPiwon Bxniiiihian

. InnreMtn

Suit Un1<ariltr bii Uoiirrtity

. ImmuM of CSHmiiuy.iee*nki


coordinating the training of partidpatihg scion-lists.2 Tallinn Plasmids Symposium was spoiisorcd by Ibis Council. Because the Soviet genetic-engineering effort transcends so many ministries and scientific academies, it is certain that tbe total pro-[ram is centrally orchestratedigh national level.

Belter knowledge of official policies and regulations governing Soviet genetic engineering research would benefit US intelligence analysts in determining Soviel research objective* and likely success potential.Soviet officials publicly claim adherence to


Soviet Applied Research Efforts

Mtocciil ktcMag af

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of nipMKateoe. lymbeliepenicrfes. ind

other wtainw lhal tain

f osi do clot up Oil tpaia. rerideal oil in una

t forth).

DoxSoixoessi of unilMtic liuuU. interferon, somatotropin ind MhosciWc huagn ptoie.ns

PieduciioB of Hril ccei protein ind iHlwerwdm foeNBryafl

Production of (codfood additives, iniyrna for taluiirwl


Research Of lumini-ofelems. tcrcd.iir) diseases, ind


Production of bioloikjlhr actnaor eunph. sleep-


freshet* fed sfcssusaiuscni.

Devetocmeru of bacterial fernstasaiwa mtchimi'ns.

Baetcriil prodweion of unlito acidi.

confidence does not

international guidelines and safety standards that have been established for genetic engineenngwc believe that the Soviets will follow only those guidelines and safety measures thai will serve iheir purpose. We do not assume that they will follow set restrictions on pathogenic (disease-causing)research. Because of lhe USSR's apparentin international marketing of products andthey will probably rapeci foreign patent rights In their export trade. However, this confidence extend to products for internal co

Sowitl Applied Beseareh. The Soviets are clearly committed to applied research. They look to genetic engineering for solutions to probkms ranging from agriculture and industry to public health. Applies-lions-directed research (tables seen in agriculture, medicine, pharmaceutical and chemical industries.

and biodciradilion. Other applied research efforts, not yet identified, are also likely. Success in applied genetic engineering is dependent upon the discovery or identification of gene coding for biologically active products. In the West, initial rDNA successes have occurred leading' to the production of human Wood proteins, endogenous hormones, and the identification of specific synthetic antigens vital to superior vaccine development. Fundamental discoveries in this field arc most often labor intensive, and this methodology has often served the USSR scientific community well. We believe that most of the Soviet talent andwill be directed at applied research built upon basic discoveries published by workers elsewhere. This kind of "follow the leaden" activity can not be dismissed as inconsequential; significant progress in the practical application of other'sxpected If tbe necessary resources are provide

The Soviets have also ret mcnt of in "oil eating" micro-organism and are known to be involved in programs applicable to the microbiological leaching of scarce metals from ores and to medicine. Soviet emphasis on applied research was evident2 symposium held in Tallinn, where representatives fromoviet institutespapers on piasmid research. The ability to incorporate recombinant DNA into piasmid vectors is

Bccavte of tbe USSR's erienUlioB toward applied research, it is unlikely thai the current Soviel momeo-lam ia geaetic engineering, and other baoiceh oologies, could sustain itself without anticipated, tiiacty. and sigaifkant successes. Since Soviel research bfunded through various ministries, the totality of financial risk belong* to ibe government.research ii highly speculaiive and coitly. Despite Ibe widely publkired intemaiionsl eipectnlionsbiotechnology in general, we can expect ihe Sovkis toonservative approach to risk ia ting Thisajor reason that we believe ibe Soviets will eiploit arvailabse Western-developed, "off the shelf" genetic-engineering technology whenever possible. Pea bap* to decrease its financial risk and lo stimulate prodacsiviiy, the Soviet Government bto have pasted regulation*J to provide for capilalbt-likc trtcenlives]

an approachhange in I. The benefits probably would outweigh tbe risks of basic research, and commercial successes would drive new programs and expectations. The potential effects of such Incentives on scicntifjj ductivity^even in the USSR, are self-eviden1

Resources Supportimg SotUt rDNA Programs*


scaled dcpcridirig on tbe prominence of the institute, the minbtry irrvoWed, and the priority of assigned research programs, festern visitors have deseribed some of ihe more promlneni instltuies as show places lavished with Weslera-acquired high-technology

Bask aad applied genetic engineering and related research are carried out ia at least TO msiimtes and universities acrosi the USSR. Some inititutes lo have specific, contributory tasks, such a* eruyin. preparation, whereas others carryoreive and broadly based molecular genetics rescartl program. The more sophblicated researchertcrully carried out Inand older insiltulca withexpertise In contributing scientific disciplines such as biochemistry, rnkrobsology, enrymology. and classical genetics Exceptionsew rel*lively recent icssiitutci beaded by dynamic, reputablewho have been able toucleas of competenthe pariicipBiiag research facilities are subordinateumber of Sovietand scicnilfie acidemia including the Academy ofhe Academy of Medicalhe Academy of Agricultural Sciences, ihclndusiry, the Minbtry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministries of Educaiion in the variousSovitt federated and autonomous republicsspectrum of aiTilbtton* would teem ^MxerWHgeoui. evenighly structured society However, ia the USSR, funding through separate ministries, each with some selfish.motives, mayfertilize healthy competlti

Many Soviet researchers, who have gainedla genetic-engineering publications and who have acquired resronsibility at their researchreceived training in the West during ihehe Soviets seal gifted scseatbts and students io Uboratories and Bcuvcrtiiyhe West, including the United Sutra. This 'hands-on" iraiaing helped the startup of Soviet research efforts in this field imrnenselyJ

engineering pvblRatsoni. il appears lhal training is being carried outrobable Soviei advantage has been its strength in biochemistry and the ability to focus piomiiini Individuals Into iu train ing prog ran

irticalarly uicmctj inaivMuat ly at the pott-dctctoral kvcl, are sent to the technically advanced Soviet laboratories for extensive training ranging from months lo several yean. These krtdivid-nab then form the nuclei of newly csUUishcdgroups- Tsvia crocus can efTecirvtly broaden iheir scientific basewe believe that theserevels of skill will leave Soviet researchersto obsolescence because cm! ui senaryhave been so characteristic ia genetic engineering At tbe basic science level. Sovietbiologists arc, generally, fewer In number and or lesser quality than their Western counterparts. Some Soviet researchers are, however, as technicallyand innovative as lhe rnore progressive Western scientists. Overall, tbe USSR's ihin base of research-en with recombinant DNA expertise will continue toajor factor contributing to ita techno logical lag when compared with simitar Western efton

Soviet genetic -engineering Laboratories continue to be hampered by major dependence upon Wealcro-prodaced ecruipencet. instrurDeatauoo. reagents,aad numerous other critical items The effects ban been moat pronounced on initliuies withresearch programs. Improvements io the accruisi-tion and dissemination of necessary materiel have been only gradual. The Soviets have recognized this problem toatt-bmiting factor and are roving toward greater idf -sufficiency. The threat oftransfer curtailments has alsosotmtifig factor. The mcUgcaous re peon system for supplying the needs of thru genetic engineering tabesratories is still poorly dcvclcrped. The phenomenon seen in the West with many small companies, each producing oneew specialty items, has no counterpart in the USSR. In tbe near term, the Sovieti at beat wiU be able to provide their own btologicali (enzymes,strains, and plasirUds) and generalised equipmeni and materials (centrifuges, mtcroacoves, plastic ware, disposables, rsdscasotopes, gels, and resigft-lechixaogy insirumentation and seam* items needed in small cmanlitiea will coalinoe to be imported, ll ta simply more economical to purchase lhan to produce

these items. Tbe Soviets recogriira that tbe need for self-sufficiency in this regard Is not compelling. The international network of suppliers Is to extensive that even major efforts to curtail technologyould only impede Soviet research programs^hp^pj

0 US rDNA Rrtemre* Effmrn. Soviet research capability io genetic engineering haslagged that of the United States. Overall, the Soviet research effort, particularly in appliedIs quaniatitcly and qualitatively Inferior to that of the United Slates. The Soviet's rapid catp phase during thes has now placed then at least two years behind the United States We believe thli tread may continue indefinitelyMeal of lhe fundamental duvcovcries and key husovatiorts intechnology and methodology will occur in the United Suits, Western Europe,The USSR is not eipectcd to match leweatln the quantity of twrnmeicially useful apphcations.research aad rapid advancement, however, may occur in areas given special emphasis Tha impact of Soviet commercial application and foreign licensing of processes on international trade will be medcrate at best la the intermediate term (five toost of the Soviei effort will probably be directed at solving Internal economic problems and providingfor Internal use. Since their safety and efficacy standards are probably less restrictive, tbe Soviets may be able to bring genetically engineered btcdogi-ca Is aad pharmaceuticals on line sooner thanWestern efforu. Boca use of the lechrscaogy and er-aineeririf challenges irrvcjrvrd with rDNAtoate-limiting factor will be their ability lo scale up for mass production. Sovietearn bill ties will most likely depend heavily on foreign technology transfer. Projections In this area have been characteristically outpaced by actual

In the United States, research talent has flowed from numerous public and privately funded universities Into ever increasing small genetic engineeringand, more recently, into major corporations. The incentives for personal and corporate financial gain

Thereroad range of potential defensive mili tary applkationt. Among these are vaccines agains( militarily Important diseases; superior chemical anil dotes. CflW detection systems; recovery from ore strategic metals such as uranium; nonfeeuil fuelbiosynthesis of specialized lubricants, and production of special-purpose compoundi tuch as plastics, pare chemicals, and friction-reducingOffensive military applications of geneticmight include ihe devcsoptncai of unique (difficultetect, identify, and treai) antipersonnel CBW agents and toiins. Similar agents could be developed against crops, livestock, and militaryThe development and eaptoilalion of Sovietcapabilities would seriously threaten theState*

The Soviet military sector has access lo thenecessaryursue military goals- Further, il can influence priorities, direct and fund iu own rDNA research, and sponsor research in noomilitaryInstitutes. Military interests are most likely repre-senied on the Interagency Scientific and Technical

correct, it would mean that (he Sovietstable, actosolizable, seemingly benign BW agent capable ofnique toxin.!

There arc other research papers which have appeared in open scientific publicaiioni lhal. while appearing to represent legitimate research interests, also havemilitary potential.

Transferene conferring antibiotic resistance from E. Coll to the causltive agent of cholera.

Synthesis and clotting of an artificial geneleep-inducing peptide. This research was carried out at the Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry in Moscow, one of the premier molecular genetics

irch establishmer

In addition to this pepticic.

are studying others that arc capable of varied effects such as inducing fear, exaggerated emotionaland lethal nervous system impairment.

Development of degrading bacteria

Development of "oil-eating" bacteria to lubricants or to attack fuel depots.

Soviet rDNAsemenl

The key to the Soviet developmentcchnoiogy base in genetic engineering was. and still is. the transfer of technology from the West. The USSR is years ahead of where it would have been without foreign technology. Since the. ihe Soviet* have expanded their rDNA technology base byplanning, training, and retraining talented scientist* at home and abroad, developing research facilities, rrsethodically collecting information, and acquiring necessary equipment and materiel in ihe West. The US-USSR Microbiology Exchange >ro-gram duringacilitated rapport bem.-en scientists snd provided the Soviets the knowledge needed toora lories, establish researchand train scknUsts. Alihoughapplied research is lhe priority, lhe Soviets realize lhe need for devel. oping andtrong basic researchThe state of.lheir technology base could not have been accomplished without decisiveness and adequate fundi

Factors Affecting Soaiii Technology Bast Dereloo-meoi. Genetic-engineering technology is dynamic and Soviet scientists cannot be expectedorkacuum. Tbe traditional Soviet organizationalisolates researchers from each other and from the ultimate product and which routinelyresearch goals from most bench scientists-hinders progress. For example. In the developmeni of engineered micro-organisms for the exlraction offrom ores, molecular biologists would haveork closely with mineralogists and geologists The Soviets appear to be effectively coordinating applied research with their industries through the auspices of the Interagency Scientific and Technical Council or other coordinating agencies. Soviet researchers need tobecause no institutes arc self-sufficient in necessary materiel. Wesicrn research collaboration in this field is decreasing because of proprietary

(ernalionaiiy anons and se-

Western scientificvailable lo ihc USSR and mow are translated bj ihc Ministry of Inter ma-lion Centers Organit ratification within the Soviet system leads to slow ihe information diffusion process, Hecjuse. this science is so dynamic, the ministry must improve efforts to disseminate the io format ion lo all participating Soviet scientistsimelyestinforms lion flow could rapidly isolate their scientistsnd limit their cipanding lechDOlogy basef

The censorship of Soviet publications and security restrictions during personal interactions wiih foreign scientists threatens the international credibility of Soviet scienitsts. Because foreign scientific meetings and official exchangesuch higheracquisition payoff than published research, the Soviets can be expected to expand tbeir; foreign travel programaintain

A problem with Ihe Soviet system thai often results in long technological lag is Its conservative avoid-risk approach Incentive* for developmental work are often too small lo compensate for ihe risksew technologyonsequence, there is oflen an aversionew technical solutions andontinual infusion of governmenl funds will be rseces-sary lo expaad ihc technology base, lo achieve some neededelf wfTtoency. and to c. he rDNA technology lag wiih the West If the reported incenirve program for applieduccessful and ihey are able to gain hard currency through commercial capon* of consumer products ami foreign licensing, ihe Soviets would be less corservative in financing (he expansion of iheir rDNA technology base, la the meantime, we espect them to concentrate their resources and focus priorities towards adapting existing technology and continuously upgrading their capabililii

equipment and insirumcnlilion have resulted inIn the application process. The impact has been most severe on lesser research programs, which ate more dependent on Soviel and Eastern-Bloc made goods. The nei effectilution ol the diversity of the technology base. Another major problemhe status of production capabilities. In related fields, like pharmaceutical production and Urge-scale fer> mentation, the Soviets have limited capabilityoor record or aceeenplishsncat. There, iheyditTsculues with production scale-up and quality control. Wcimilar trend in ihe moreengineering aspcAs of osait-prodncirig recombinant DNA products Genetically altered risicro-organbm* arc oflen unpredictable and require careful monitoring during production Scaling-up from laboratory quantities to thousands of liters used in industrial production involves sophisticatedtechnology and instrumentation. Given adequate priority ihe Soviets will probably solve these and other bioengincciing problems. Wc believe lhat futuretechnology transfer will be hcaviiy directed toward developing indigenous Induiiriil-scale productionFurther, the Soviets can purchase (heequipment, if not complete production lim ibe international biotechnology markc

Technology Transfer

Ckar-uter mfAciMiitt. Tbe USSR Is methodically collecting applicable inforrnation aod miieriel lo broaden itsn giraccring technology base. Methods include commercial port ha sea. scientificexploitation of published literature, attendance al International meetings, diversions, mb-repreicnifllion of end users, and ctar

USSR has sufficient, high-quality researchers and cooperation between institutes lo be productive in thb rapidly advancingajorheir present biccnginecring capability and iheir dependency on foreign equipmcni and efforts and difficulties inpurity of chemical reagents, cnxymes, and specifi-cations and tolerances of specialized laboratory

Soviel workers have access lo ihe esiensive Western open literature, where descriptions of researchtechnical irmovetioas, and melhodi are freely published. In addition to the ready availability of needed materiel, scientists have exchanged livingcultures and recombinant DNA vectors such as plasmids and phages. The availability of "gene libraries- his simplified the Soviet's basic research effort. In support of the Soviet acquisition process, individual agencies and even institutes havebeen permittedypass the cumbersome staterations that manage foreign importation and have been allowed to deal directly with US and other suppliers. Additionally, there has been an extensive

infer of in for mat Ion through exchanges involving et scientists and students and short private visits, on-Soviet Warsaw Pact visits have also increased, nd there Is evidence of cooper it sort between tbe

ts and Eastern Bloc countries in the collection nd dissemination of informition gleaned from those sits. This "hands-on" traJitsag Is an exceptionally relive method of technology irsnsfe

any Western comparuea arc eceeerating with the USSR's bid toound genetic engineering technology base including production capabilities. Numerous West era scientific aad industrial firms arc tering into cooperative agreements with the Soviets to provide sophisticated Western equipment applies-

to gene tk-engineering pursuits. Several companies are said to be providing seminars and training by scientific and technical experts on location in the Soviel Union. Instructlodi include the use of actual equipment. The purpose appears to be to encourage the Soviets to farther purchase and use newlyequipment. The effect Is lhat the Sovieis are not only obtaining high technology but arc also learning to use it. Wc believe lhal acquired Westernhas been largely responsible for the status of tbe Soviet's genetic engineering technology base and (be rapid expansion of their bask and applied research capab;hi

L/Jofti Data, equipment, and materiel associated wiih geretk engineer tag research and iu applications have been subject to some US export restrict ions as part of the overall red wet ion ia the level ef trade between the United Sutes aad USSR. This US effort was reported to have slowed (be pace of their research and acquisition efforts In response, ihc Soviets have initialed measures to increase their self-snilTidcncy and to lessen their former dependency on USAlthough Soviet scientists prefer US-made equipment and supplies, access to USot critical to the survival of Soviel research programs or their technology base development. Everythingis aval la Wei

countries. Onlycoocerted measure by allresearch partidpallns; countries,


would not supcSrTsucn^rmeasure^riTesT offensive miUtarvinientJdns could be clearlyThe net' effectingular US would be the loss of an economic market

Anticipated. Series Trends. The Soviets rxreaive ge nclic engineering as an emerging technology with broad economic as well as military implications. Because of their lag behind the West, they accept fact that most of their own rDNA programs will continue to rely on materiel and ideas supplied by others. To this end, tbey will continue to eipand their network of foreign suppliers. They will exploit the foreign open literature and encourage their scientists io maintain communication with international leade in the biotcchno'ogy field. Collection effortsGB and GRU can be expected to focus onof an ever increasing level of US and Western proprietary rDNA research andcaMnriova-tions that are not licensed

The extent and success of Soviei efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in this technology will be largely influenced by technology transfer policies adopted by the Uniled States and other cooperating nations. In the absence of trade restrictions, tbe Soviets are expected to .limitroducing common items for everyday use. They prefer to purchase abroad sophisticated instrumental ion and equipment and low-volume items becauseimply more expedient to purchase than produce. Related bidengi-ncering skilb will continue to lag, and the Soviets will attempt to acquire foreign production technology. Similar patterns of Soviet reliance have been observed in lhe inilial RAD phases of other highly technical endeavors such as fine chemicals production,computers, and pharmaceuticalIf Ihey are confronted with effective Western technology transfer restrictions, which we believe unlikely, they will slow their research andriority on acquiring necessary self-sufficiency. The ef feci would be that ihey would further fall behind the West in the near and intermediate term (two tohe Soviets probably would noteir

Anarysb of Sorte) Sue iraa Potpplicable Technical Eadearees. Credible Soviet spokesmen have publicly indicated that enterprises judged important lo Ibe USSR, such as crop-plant productivity, livestock breeding. diagnosis ofimpairments, prevention of infectious diseases, and obtaining biologically active substances, are all likely to benefit from genetic engineering. Actual Soviei achicvcrrsculs will be influenced by Iheirbase development and central directives, which sitach priorities to the various national sector* foe whkh genetic engineering could be expected lo have

an Impact. These Include agriculture, energy, ine chemical Induilry. lhe Soviet military, and thebiomedical field. Military requirements,necdi, ihe need Tor export, earnings, and the desire for mtenvntronal scientific tecognltion together trill these priorities J

Commrreint Implications. Although the Soviets clearly want domestic benefit from tha tcchstctogy,lso believe that they intend to eapaod into ibe international commercial market. Likely near-term candidate* for export are commodity chemical* and further licensing cf industrial fermentation product* and processes Farther successes will depend on their ability to engineer organisms with new or enhanced mobilities. We believe that the Soviet* have these capabilities and that they can be moderatelyeconomic competitors. However, they will not be able to match lhe West in diversity of marketableoviei advantage may be their ability to direct attention aad focus resources at specific pro jecu with high-payoff potential Tha could resultore rapid devclciposcaial phase ia prod act evolution Farther, lha government's ability to stabilise aad cooirol long-term prices would facilitate foreignentry. To be successful, tbe Soviet* will have to improve their marketing techniques, guaranteeand attain required quality-control sut Tbe last two are potential rate-limiting factoi


We expect Soviet agriculture to receivettention Dependency on foreign grain, unreliable crop output, marginally productive agricultural areas, and lease*lant pests are preeminent domestic concerns Qenctic engineering often potentiallo all of these concerns. The application of rDNA technique* to plant cells is currently at infancy worldwide. Plant genetics at the molecular level ia poorly understood, but sceneeing made. Altering specific genetic trait* for environmentalexample, beat and coldof soil quality and pH. snd protection against crop peats and diseases are thoughte achievable Increasing plant yield involves numerous complei generic coda; maior successes are not anticipated0ear* or more. Long lag periods areof new developments in crop productivity. The

Soviets can enter this aspect of thefield on the ground floor, as they havtexpertise in plant biochemistry, plant physiology, and plant genetics. Breakthroughs in livestockfacilitated by development ofrotein supplements, enzymes, new antibiotics, and superior Inst animal diseases, will occur during the

vaccinesagainst mosfl

High success potential is expected in lhe area of biomedical ippl seat torts, particularly public healiThis area is currently receiving worldwide stlcni.on. We expect the Soviets not only to exploit the W< HI research lead in this area but also io develop original useful medicalhe emphasis will be on superioriocs and biologically active proteins, such a* insulin, interferon, bcerriooes. sad enrymcs. Some success ia these areas has already been achieved, farther success is imminent j

We expect the energy and chemical industries to benefit from genetic-engineering technology Soviet interest ii evident in commodity chemicals, large-scale fermentation, microbial leaching of metals from ores, biodegrndaikm. and pollution control. Thefor developing biological catalyst* for the chemwal industry exists. Although the Sovietbase shown an interest in genetscengineer-ing approaches to synthetic fud development and enhanced petroleum recovery, wc do not eipeciappl icsi sons toear-term Soviet research pnority The Soviets have oil and also export large quantities of gai. They have invested heavily in conventional recovery methods, but will continue to research genet to-engineering application* In energy production primarily lo avoid icchnolorjical si and to protect their long-term cxpori positlon|

Military Implications. Because the Soviet military has substantial mnuence and technical resources, iheir interest in geneiic-engineering applications will directly affect national objectives and priorities. We believe the military will exploit Soviet researchThe spectrum of potential defensive and



Special Analysis

USGR: Gonolic Engineering

The USSR is promoting gcneiree mod by wh'Ch oonet* matcMi can bomenipuiaied. entt mtroducoainto ecHl (oa/ferUoscowitresearch m

/mmec-afcrecn.ioWoy. and /hey areeveilmbht /necnanrsm to acqt/rVe me mcva advancedme WearascrvW-an


Tne progress of Soviet genetic engineering has been made postiblo In pail by the .equlaMlon ol Western laboratory equipment nnd expertise US export restrictions on genetic engineering-related dnta, equipment, and materials reportedly have slowed research, but the Soviets have resorted to clandestine acqolutlon when legal means nova been denied them. Moreover. Moscow Is no- eule lo purchase these resources Iromforeign subsidiaries ol US companh

Thare are lower moloculor biologists In the USSn than In the Woat. By concentrating on baaic sciences, however, the Soviets havo maatered existing technology. They are capable ol Innovntlve

' >ment In areas to which Ihey give

h andriftvclosr


Oasic and applied gone-tic engineering and related research are carried out at more thanoviet faculties. The more complex rosearch Is generally conducted by Instltulea with long established nxportiarj In biochemistry, iruymology, endew recently established inalltutea also are invotvodB

1kb VIAIMlim

Committee w


These research facilities are subordlnaia to the Acedemy of Sciences, the Ministry of Health, the Microbiological Industry, tho Ministry of Defense, or universities throughout Ihe country. An Interagency Scientific and Techrilcal Counci subordinate to the Council of Mlnlatera and the party Central CqmmKte* was established1 to organize and direct Iho research!


USSR- Genetically Englneerad Biological Warfare


The USSR's biological warfare program Is attemptlnadevelop agents whose characterlsllcs would not be Identifiable using current Western technology, thus complicating ond possibly^treatment of Infected troops and cMII


Original document.

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