Created: 10/1/1983

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The Soviet Economy at MidyearA Respitehe Economic Slowdown

The Soviet Economy at Mi yearA Reikis Ftohi thelowdown

The Soviet fccononty

Key Judgment!

u*Sir-emit' /til wai mii In ihlt ri/sii


A Respite

Che Economic Slowdown

After several yean of slow growth, the Soviet economy seems in the midst of an economic reboundn the basis of statistic! released by the Central Statistical Administration Tor the first seven months3 and assuming strong agricultural performance, we estimate that GNP will growo 4aboveerccnl rate of growth]2 ojd close IOcrccnt annual rate of growih implied bylan

All major sectors of the economy ore doing bcuee3 than

Agriculture isecovery from several years of little or no growth. The best grain harvest in five years is likely, and total farm output may be greater than the previous high

(irowih of industrial production is up and may beercent foi Ihc year. Although higher lhan growth rateshe past few years in industry, this figure largelyhort-term recovery from ihc performance litatherermanent upgrading of industrial efficiency.

Transportation bottlenecks cased somewhat in the first sis months3 compared with the same period7

Food supplies available IO the consumer were greater in the first six months) than in the same period last year. The USSRood chance ofecord high in per capita consumption of meal this year, but only if recent high levels of imports continue Supplies of nonfood consumer goods, however, continue toslowly.

-igher rale of growth of state capilal investment than planned in th: first sii months couldhange in resource allocation po'icy by the Andropov regime



tronger economic tlio-uig thu year could help Andropov politically, i: doei notigher rale of growth through the real of. Much of the improved economicin lectors such is agriculture andbecause of fs vet ableconditions, while monthly industrials alreadythe trend of the previous five yean. The major-.ty of factor*economic growth lirtce the lateincrements to ihc labor force, slowing growth of the capital stock, raw materials shortages, and transporutior.not go away ia this decade. Nor are Ihe systemic change* ihat could produce improvements in efficiency and productivity to offset these constraints likely to be made. Consequent [y. growth of GNP will likely averageercent per year for the decadehole, comparedercent fot. Swings in weather condition! could Itad to fluctuations around this ticnd; this year's-ercent GNP growihllc In point



Key Judgments

A Strong Showing in

Sflrtte Improvement

Sector: Mainly on Target

In Better Shape

ote Quality Foodi Available


Higher Than Plan

for the Neat Few Yean



USSR Production of Major Crops

USSR: Civilian Industrial Production

USSR: Production of Major Fuels

USSR: Change in Sales of Selected Products in Slate and Cooperative Enterprise!

USSR: Forciin Trad*

USSR: Hard Currency Merchandise Trade

USSR: Capital Investment Growih

USSR: Aggtegatc Factor Productivity Grwth


The Soncl I'.conomy alA Respire From Ihe Economic Slowdown

Soviei economic pciformancc hat nicked up Ihit year. Thit astcttmeni (I) ciiirruitt tnelent ofssesses Iht reasons for it, and Ol discusses whether higher economic growih ii likely i0 continue. The ettcitincsn alto analyses GeneralAndropov's tole in the upturn. The analyaia ii bated largely on recently relented industrialstatistics for January-July, half-yearly data for lomr other teciort of the economy, and preliminary ClAf Soviet agricultural output. *


A tubttamial recovery in agtlculiare appeari to be in the cards this yeai. Tola! mi farm output (defined at grott output lett feed, iretl. and watte) it expected to increate byercent, compared with ilighlly moteercent1 and almott no growth ia

otal prod-riol firm products (hit year

could beercenthe previous highater dncikmiiion ia weaihera.gram halvedwtlienitc'.y. the

best sinceI iroaad www The euiWoa. for other ntaiorseed, sugar beets. vegeiabSti. potatorv sad lottoaalto good, wtth production eiptcird i- eatecd lhc average of rcecal ycart (table I)


icWiufr rrOttmi tut inli'i1 'it 'ul lvli< ml ir.cti

'III 7

Ihli nifiifiill-Km piIiHr ill hflOui IWriwit Ol Ihi lt"*ITt*i* aaa till una twhrHWIIIvl ImC ili-hm

t ililllHnll'tlllli

isvmitvidi igviaiihaiai amii inl.

In the livestock sector, meat output from slate and collective farproduce about two-thirds of total Sonel meat productionecord level during lhc fin: fivenber of factors were at work'

Record harvest proesutownii of teeae forage crops lata fall inert!

A tsiitd wratcr and early tpting further bohuerrd feed lupplici and increased feeding cfricicncy.

Greater avzrlabiliiy ofroteiasoybean meal and single -cellalto enitcd lhc amount of product producednit of feed

With herd numbers at iceerd levelt. the stage isfor tubttantial growth in total meat production thii yea' after four ycart of ictsiive stagnation. Output cemld reachillion iom prtcrat aboverata prod-jclion teaches cue cur reel estimate, at leanialicai tout of grata arc imported, aad ample ttrppliei of loeagc crops arc available through the fan

Meanwhile, the Soviet food Pi or' tm continues to draw priorityecent decree rrviicd the incxnlives for orguni ration providing equipment, fcr-tiliict, and other suppliri and terviCci to farms. Its p: iinary pureoie it lo lie rewards of thctc organiia-uoni lo growth in output and piodwctivity on lhc faemi they serve. Heavier penalties arc presetibed 'or

delivery of low-Olialily or uanliabl* p'oductt at well

at for failure to complete work iaeh at machinery icpairimely fasluan TWireosni'ci that better cooperation bet-era farm and the servicedatriomiofit eiwiiil io achievina itx (Oiti of the foode decree docs not aher the deal ibbotdiniimrv onimtitions to ihe RAPOi end to the parent miniiiiylcec. Therefore management ptoblcnt ate likely lo corlinu e.


USSR: Cltllian [ncuiiiil Prod action

romen I

Alice K'Ciil> of tlcsd? decline, ihe (ronit of Industrial production appean headedilth;

(hit real. Indtittrialerceni hlf her in thet-en atottita) ihaa la1 (uetc 3J. Thit rate of increaiemitlcading.ll largclrecovery from Ike poor perforaaancc at lhc befi-jn.ifhai wan partly ceased by widetpicadoviijct iinumber cf planu. Ia fact, producnon of tcveril mayor induiirial producti tach

cement, limber, lulfuric acid, iron ore. and crude steel.dedlrong innlyto orexceeded the1 Icvelt inJ. Production of moilcommoditiea actually began to pick upcatonally adjusted basis Ino lhc overall contrast between the two years will not be soby yearend as tbe gap2) production levels narrowsc believe that

coo fiticnt

Table i

loo of Major Fuels



Call fr-rttan mwlf * "'ill

Ox AlMonmliril


in industrial production ihii year will beercent, compared withl-El average annual rate of growthercent.'

The rebound in industry probably owes much tointer and spring weaiherwhich permitted wmc rebuilding of fuel stocks. Most Important, better weather appears io have eased iransporiaiion difficulties, thus reliering bottlenecks generally. Other (actors thai may have contributed to improved industrial performance include recentto capacity, notably in steel and chemicals, and the much publicised discipline campaign that, with some houseeleaning in the managerial ranka. mav havepe-ii roe boon to productrvjty <

Monthly production of most industrial productsto the ti ii id ol the late five yens by April of ihli year. Particularly significant have been theto far this year In key industrial sectori.ferrous metals and chemicals. This reflectsercent increase in Output of steelcrccnt increase In production of mineral fcitiliicrs, anderceni rite in plasticsth the level of the sameear ago Ouipul of construction materials was also higher. Ccmcnim particular, reboundedercentcrccni drop in the first seven months

' Till. MUM* M- in0xitonn-iix''< -tailiir In Itnvarr 9 Itw nil xaiC- .iintuxrciu inpredutiHiB toi Hidi iur fell BdM


Civilianto Moscow's program of industrial modeercentomparedercent for the same period

Energy Sector; Mainly on Target

Performance in the energy sector ir. Ihc first seven months3 was on balance favorable. Oilincreased byercent duringJ compared with the first seven monthswcow most likely will meet or come dose to3 produciion goalillion tons (tec lablc 3)

Production of natural gas coniinued to adianccipid pace, growing by moreercent compared withbc USSR should have little difficulty in meeting3 production targetillion cubic meters. Pipclaying operations on the UrengoyUehgorod natural gas export pipeline have been completed, and enough compressor stations should be operaiional4 to handle Moicow'r new gas capon commitment! to Western Europe

Coal produciion probably will fall short of) targetillion loruand could fall below last year's level Ifill mark the cifhtti consecutivehich coal production has fmlcd to reach tht

(ajiliil-niwl ^

uIpui in ihe Soviets' largest coal-producing region (the Doeets bniin) it falling faster than Moscow anticipated, and production at many other haunt it stagnating. Even oi batim where output it increasing (tuch at EklbstlutV en pi niton hat been much leu lhan planned.

Figure 2

USSR; Deviation of Railroad FreightFrom Recent Trend


pot (at Ion: In Dctter Shape

Railroadhich haveajor factor in the decline in induitrial growth in recent years, cased somewhat beginning inhemild weather eipericnccd so far (hit year in the Soviet Union, together with the (op-level attention given this sector by the Andropov regime, has resultedercent increase in rail freight turnover Inompared with the first Sri months2 (rail freight turnover fell byercentampaign to otlisi industrial enterprises and other shippers in the repaird freight cars alto was instituted and may have helpedownturn in growth In the second OUirictowever, tuggciit that the rail system is stilt In trouble (tee future J) Fieitht car shoelaces and tolling stock maintenance problems continue lo plague the system and may slow growth ia [he tccond half of ihe year and beyond.

Toe Consumer; Morr QutUl,Aiallabte

Food ttioitaget have eased this year, althoughto permit ictaaalion of Ihr informalfat scfcclcd food iitmi that hatibe USSR sincesut-

f collective farm marten and itau uoeci. for instsaec. have shown iitcrtascd supplies cf most food-st*IIi.( eitoning also saggrtti that in otaoy regions the food thoetagrtocc atIC flave becomet>t't

Recced vegetable and (run tiopi last year augmented by Ditpteecdcnted impoiit ol fieih fruit kept tupplics up ihiough last winter and thu tpring. Milk prod no-(lon in the socisliied tecloi inctciirdobuslercent during January-June tclative io ihe first halff the pickup continues, moil of the


IVlilf 1'irtu




decline in per capita coniuropiion uf milk in lhc lasl iwo years may be offset ihit ytat, lurihctrnoec. if meat peoduction) reachet It million toai and imponi approach latt ycart ncar-itcoic level, per capita intake would inciiatt Dyilogram)erceni over ihe high point of ihr

Meanwhile. Moscow ii having trouble ia providing jdciuif lutrflKt of nonfood toninmcr foods. Retail trade twtnewer In real tent greweseta* in the fieat sta nsonlhi) Comparedthe run half7he tow growih to retail sales, -tikis datesI. ren part the uaavailaaduy of some toodi because of piodutiion problem in lhc light and contumct ouriblet inrtuiirtct Theof irstiles. foi eiample. hat been hampctcd in recent yean by thonaget of tome varieties ofontile furlhet culblck in the sale of alcoholiccurrently conttiiuic nearly onc-fifth of Soviet retailay alto he icsponiiblc.

sales declinederceni last year Importsincreased iradc wiih Communist countries,

consumer Roods, which account for abouiwiih the LDCs accounted foe all the remaining

of iota! Soviei retail sales, also declinedn both capons andn real terms, we

mayahave fallen in the first sU monthi) astro.ih atercent for imports and

percent for exports.


The Soviei balance on merchandise trade mo-id0 million rublesl deficit in the first half172 billion ruWcsl surplus in the firti halfB. as imports grew athird of the rateercent,nominal lermi (lable i) Man ol the

'lie in IhC value Of OOlh export! and nnirtiU mulled

The USSR'i success2 in reducing the net outflow of merchandise to the Communist countries was retried, at least temporarily, in the firsi half) Eiparit to ihese countries rote byercent in real terms, while growth of real irnpont from Comniuniti countries slowed considerably In January-limeercent Thitreverial may subs.-It somewhat in the second half of the year. Wc believe


CM *

USSR: Hard Curicwey Mrrtbantllte Tride




opoii growth will ilo- a) the USSR holdi down deli'eim in Communist countries. Total import growth could pick op at ihc USSR preitit thcte coutiritt io tup up their deliveries

Th* USSfVi hard currency position 1 afier detcrrarai.r, Uiarpl,bilk change .rt tbc first hairhe an iill tulltaa hardHit* tracealco that of th*a real terms, exports to the developedby axcrccet. despite aihelct V. -

iporo Hfaau-j

Im Ecotvcurnc Coopoatwai aad I tap(OtCDlcovatiirs in the firit half ol 1WJbelo-illion bJB te.el of the fitil hall1 Because oil prtcct -trc downercent duringhe value of Oil titer ii loOECD countries mayeenercentin lite first half3 compared villi the fiist halfxport) of nortoil eornmoditirt made up for Ihc possible decline in the volvmc of oil export* and ippcar lo have increased substantially in both volume and value. On Ihe impoii tide. Ihe USSR wai WCOWM in holding down real import irowthpereent dtop in the volume of arim purchatei was mort than ofllti by inereand purchases of pipe, machinery, and touipmtnl andbvin oil for retale to Soviet euiromeri in the West

oattiaadn. on credit) backed by Wei telapioaabl) iocrcased somcabai asnchiairy and equipment for Ibe pipeline co-iwiuedibc ead of Jtaac. total net bard currency debt probably itood ai about the7 level of HOtilior, '

Tbe uium merchandise trade surplus could deterra-tatc in the tecond half of the year. Weotal capon growth may slow as the USSR holdt down deliieritt to Communist countries rcllecting the So*in policy of reducing the surplus in trade to Fitttrnil cxpom to the Wen will eontlnu* to inmate as growih of domestic productiont Total imports, on the other hand, may pick up if Cornrnuaiti counitiet are able to step up their deliver, let lirtporii from nan-Communist countries probablyill continue at about2 levelrobable reduction in grain purchases ii offset by cooiinicdin machinery and equipment imports *

Th* bird currency merchandise trade deficit) may bt ibghtly higher than tbe SI tuition1 at both tipotis and irrtpotlt stagnate AhtVMgl- deliver-Mieapon irsicmi io tac hard curreaey LDCs rmtawy -Ol fall below bra.kmm. net ouilayt on invokes, erod-ii ei ttadtd. and Other Uems probably anileiceed .be7 "Thus, tbe Sonet*uk to hold borro-mithrough tlvr ind Of the yra.

tavnimr-l: Hlgbtr Thaa Plan

State capital 1makes up abouiercent of lotalercent IaJcompareO with the flril halfhe acceleration in investment hat been made pwiible by increased availability of inveit-ment goodi -machinery and equipmeni Some of ihe growth in investment is jin the result of an increase in net imports of machinery and equipmeni1 thai are.nto Soviet industry Importt of1 perccaiJ If the pittem

tiab-iiKi to tcanavcioal boats meanwhile. O'opoed sligMly in trie firai quarter) and may not un changed muchibc leewtd quartet llrtu


1 USSR: Capita

!'iirili:-r'! CfOftttl


Slal4 ranlial

-j Hit till




or investment Is suuaintd foe ihe remainderrear, lotal inreiimcni growth could ueecdy higher than the rateiihe fin) two yean of1lanthe table above

Tbc lacrtiK ra roril ia>rtimcai targclcdae average ol leuercent perthe lowest In the pott-Wortd War II era Cooteciucnily. the goals for growth In GNP implied bylan depend on lubttaniial increatet in productivity. But the aitumplion thai higher productivity and acceptable ratei of tcormmtc groath are compatible with reduced growth in Invctlment hat been publicly challenged in the USSR for al lean two yean, notably by prominent eeonomini The gitt ol their argument it that capital equipment, particularlyit the principal instrument by whichrs raised Tht tharpin state capital investment growtk trturtag Ibe run in meotlrs of Ihn year couM mean thai iM. proponraii ef higher iavctt-mentmar be wisauagt is unlikely. Sowi greater itwctunciii can tig nifictotly Mimulatc prodwriivity withoutimprovements both ic the oual.ty and rati of machinery produced for inveitrnent and int criitria by which plant




If 10

Outlook for tbtFen Yean For Grontn

A stronger economic ihowing ihn year would help Andropov politically. However, thit year's anticipated pickup in GNP growih it not likely to be sur.aincd over the longer term. The probUmi thai haw. curbed growih since theot gone away; tome of them, in fact, are jut! now reaching peak severity. For example, tbc net increment to the working-age populationOObe lower lhanny time in the lasi two dcradrs (seedditions will continue to decline6 and then rise only slightly for the rest of the decade. Growih in the stock of reproducible fixed asicts (capita! nock) will alto decline during, assuming that capital investment cominucs to increase at the average annual rale of almost


percent rinercentyear through much ofite in inveslmenlear coupled with an expected overage annual rite in employment olercent and no change in land wouldite in combined labor, capital, and land inputs ofear In, compared with an average annual Increase of nearlypercent incntly.vrc eapecu for reasons explainedof land, labor, and capitalremains flat ur declines (at il hat forrowth of GNP would averageear through

We consider that GNP is in fact likely to increase at this rate. We do not rule out the possibility, however, of twings around this trend due lo fluctuations In weather. This yearete inrend growth muchercent would rcouirc one or more or the following unlikely developments:

good luck with Ihe weather. To help maintain growth al this year's highto sustain output at the higher levels being reached thisrequire steadilyweather, not just continuation of thii year's favorablerolonged period.

A. sharp and sustained increase in the Quantity and quality or capital inveslmenl. Given the stock or capital now in place, Ihe quantitative increase would have to be extremely Urge to markedly raise the growth rate of combined land, labor, and capital inputs above Ihcear increases projected above, particularly if qualitative changes arc slow to materialise. Thus, even if totalgrew at an annual rate of 6slate investment did in ihe first half ofihc resi of, combined inputs would grow at about

' rjiinilihi rur otiniai -tit intuitu! uirkiii per<hc mi at ihc deudr.ta tht cjplul tioex6eere<ni perrnliiwf ia ttiKni umil il Innt vtOi pvten bath uvuimrntu|)ul <wl ihr* vaatdit* time mil In-onmm n

mraiuic al ujwtil unci

'it miA-hovri. tHpiiit. jnrJ tint in mitif-cd uiineot Ste foctftl.crrc.ii. ltd SO (iciccnt. rctprctlvcly.itioniiii-ii.iliiiinn. Thue

i (crttacni the aittribmianwaao. aihcrlimitat witalculated cjpnilml lua tiex in IViO. ihrm-iti im cilnuuom. '.

1 able

USSR: Ag.rcgate

Produetliliy Growtb




at Iind.


ercent annually. Even if the leadership has boosted original investment targets, il is unlikelyt-[it'tent rait of increase In total inveslmenl would or could be sustained indefinitely, since it would (I) entail significant reductions in the growih of consumption or defease or toih,equite much more rapid growtb in ihc production of machinery and equipment than wc judge it feasible, bated On the capabilities of (he machine-building sector. for the rest of the decide.

everitl of the decline in productivity of land, labor, and capital combined ihat dates fromiih ibe growih of land, labor, and capilal comssentially limited toercent annually, productivitye to riie atear to- toannual growth But combined productivity of labor. Capital, and land has been decreasing forecade (see table Si

The likelihood that the Soviet! can recapture the productiviiy gains of theeems (mall, primarily because the Andropovdiscussedunlikely to lake lulfiocnil, bold and radical ticps. Neither dracuntm step)orce greater effortajor systemic overhaul necessary toew and higher growth trend it politically feasible




I (mi (ji lhc policies laid down br tin new leadeiihiii arc well willtln lhc bounds of llion; cttabliihcd during lhc Brcchnct years. Though lhc Secretary General hat been very cainclld ia acknowledging hit diitstitfac lion wiih lhc pci forf the ecenmny and hit encouraged -ice-rangingitcwtuon andon how to improve in cegamration andmoil cf Andtopov'i aiaictnemi and actons tuggest (hai he will cmphaiiac continuity or,oii, ilow and limited clianie '

Tin majoi new elcmeol of economic policy thii year ii lhc diaciplinc campaign, which Andropov introduced to pecvefil aad ptiniih corruption and violation of work rules, la theory, the canpatgn it aitned at tigbtcr discipline in management, tome atlcgidly eottapt or incompeicnt officiali Save tn fact been fired. To dale, however, it hat been directed mainly againtt btue-collat workers. Doih internal tccurlty forcei and militia learnt, for iniianCc, have been uttd lo fti laggards off ihe attcci and back on theccond phase in (he campaign began iAuguMecree wat pubt-ihcd icirodotiagofcall on and pay and ere: dnmiiial ijurj; Ubor-ers illegally abacnl from work ot intocicaicd on the

Job Thr tanclloni icon limited and mild, howcer

Workert who arc abacnl wiihoul Icavt will tote one

day of vacation for each day abtent. but ic-til vacation

lime may.not be rcdoced beloiiorking

Sittee vacation time for over tO perceni of Soviet

wijrkcrt ranget from I) teeye.

would generally tenc Vru than half of thete aarmal


ove that they hailedaioi ttep in ihe direction of economic change, the Soviett recenily announced an "economiceiperiment" to be inuo-duccd at five induitrial minitiritt4 aed de-ugncd to tiimulaie nfoejoetrvwy and technological innovation The major Icitaceiof Ihr rapcrimeni include Clotely linking earnings of ihe iwiiicipaiing enterprisesheir performance, living ihegreater autonomy in formulating plant and ditpoting of their earnings; and airnpllfylng andthe "succest Indicators" inrrfn'iaince ciiterial by which enterprises nre judgct

Octpitc the importance ihe regime npptan io have attacked io ii. lhc (iperimeni tecnti ngruficantis highlg hung howand slow ccceaaaok change is likely inhr USSR Tint, the eiperiment it lo be tesiiiclcdnumber of enterprise! Second, the decree ciiabllihing ihe ei-pericvent and ivibiequem diseustioitt have made clear that il is not intended to weaken central direction nf the economy bul only to give crtlcipriiei more leeway lu tain efficiency in Irn piemen ling centrallyplant And. third, the innovaiiont thewill introduce are in fact vir.iiioni ofprarttcct ot of otherf loatg ltinthng

For eiample. allowing enterpriiestc savings achieved through greaicr efficiencyiitc workers" earnings appeaia to be essentiallycontinuation of thehchtkino capetimenl introduced many yean ago. Furthermore, ihcfaci (hat enterpritct participating In lhc eiperiment neat year will have ia arrvest some fundi at theirvojetti they initiate to improve (cchncUgy doci not teem toa major npaaiton cf eatcrpritc ughtihave long been entitledmt or" (heir earnings for capital eapendiiurei they themtelves decide on The rent uclui ini of lilt tucersi indict to: tyticm called foi in the decree outlining thealso proniitct nothing esteriiially new. The number of largel! the ptnioptt-re cnierpriset must cxcei ii to br 'educed, the iwri Ic meeting these is'gcta are to fee more syutmeiitallt eakwlited by ihe central avincmes. and sales based on rortiraciual Obligaiiont will become the prime intern iadicator. But the Sovictt have been playing mutical chairs with pciformancc indicators lineroOi. The measures of managerial perlcemance slwayi ate in pariand managers Icara to work tlx syttem in wiyi thai benefit them bui lhatcounter to the objectives ofin

Furibo (aptriineattK-ccngrtayor tureenceimg of senior party otTrcali

ugust. General See-etar, AddlOpO" ciprcsicd

diseonient with iht pace ai whith the economy ii


and the current Ink of vigor In the search lot solutions io tit problems, lit underscored the necessity lot chanio in planning, management, and incentives before Ihe tttn o( Iht not five-year plan. Andropov urciscd. howevet. thai changes thould be undertaken carefully and only after "unhuriied"of large-scale citxtimtnti.hai olkeitneatorct att not likely to be very bo* *

Oae of the moat intcrriting pleat for reform that haa surfaced it containedaper recently written by memben cf the Siberian section of (he Academy of Sciences and delivered in Aprilymposium Ot|>niied by the Academy olhe report pilots la centralised planning and esceitlvcat the main eausct of the recent slowdown in economic growih Atcotdini to the ten,

Tkr drtptnmi af lettanol. h'on/h. and economica Ihr rcoaomr af ihr USSK moil tlrarly itntft tora Aal rfce eerhUri af ctntrrltitd admiMnraiirt aVrt>*tv- ol "te ttano-my and to ihr it, tuny al matt fit .it af

ttfutaiorifbalantm afwhich art aiioclaitdiht dftlopmrnt af market relations.

The paper is critical of bureaucracy andthat hinder) mcanlnifal chinie. butb suggestion that lhc role of ministriesand (heir personnel cut. nocoiicrriearc made. huMhertnore, theand idcai in ihe paper ate evidently notby high-level Soviet policymakrri Forchief Biybako" ouWit? attacked (heonly at out of line with itedtitho mvi batsatocewcai Citcwuioii

ia (he Soviet prcii hai been maittd by nui'i Or femes of central Manning and iciecuen of reliance on automatic Icvcri

1-niloiiui*ntiotidiim (innii-hiai Abel Ain'-in. "tni Iaiiiii* niiinn tt ihe USSR! eeonomie and nTit>i'i fnwmin* 10

'I'M fer tlmon1

On balance, neither the discipline enmpaign nor ceorefcum will have much impact on economic pctformancc deling the remainder of thcjlth Tivc-Yen Plan period. The fact thai Andropov has moved to canuouily alnce atsunvag power meant thai eco-rscouc icfomi Itccicauoui ittue ia ihe USSR. Moreover, the improved economic performance) may even reduce the pressure for economic change, al least In the short run. Any changct lhat are introduced, therefore, are likely to br ilow In coming and of limited spplicattor

Original document.

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