Chile:
The Opposition Movementl
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Th* Opposition
The economic recessionegan in Chile inave impetus lo the most serious political challenge ibe Pinochet government bis (iced duringyear rule The opposition movement issod cuU across politieaJ ideoloccs. class Unea, and at*il is thereforeand has multiple leaders and vancc coals. As such, ii0 undergo further realignment! over ihe next several months ^
The Itadinc (roups in ihe oppoution movement are:
. Th: moil active coalition.Democratic Alliance, demands accelerated democratic transition to civilian rule and has avoided closeairemisi elements The Alliance's success items from the leader this of the Christian Dcinocmic Parij. Chae's most lUniTicaht oppoti-lion political iocce.
The traditionally fractureds is haw operated largely at the periphery of the present opposition movement Most faoions nominally affiliate wiih the Democratic Alliance, but one major group worksihc violence-prone left.
The Popular Democratic Move men l. which favori violent opposrtion.oalition of radical leftist group* led by the Corrwrwiisi Parly. It seeks greater letiiimacy-soailed success- through coopcraiwoihc Democratic Alliance
. Moatoups, luch as ihe Nalional Party, have ceased ciiticiring the regime tn rcipome io the government'i tentative political openin( but arc rebuilding long-dormani political organisation i
Given hisiorlcally high voterind lotKal
aivumptions.elieve most Cfc.leansuick return io miiil" rule
Indeed, the uncle unifying factor ia the fractured movement has been the consensus Ml favor of shortening Pinochets term. -hie. formally ends in
i
Some popular distrust of politicians persists from the chaotic Allende years, however, and hinders opposition efforis to rebuild popular support and channel anttgovcrnment sentiment. Opposition aunrreling and indeci-sivcneas have especially complicated the effort lo harness discontent among the middle class,h ihe greaiest opacity to pressure the
government and the military. Although ihe Christian Democrats and (he Communists have been relatively moie successful in capitaKring on links with labor and youth, no major opposition (roupell-developed base among the marginalpoor, tbe chronically unemployed, and shantyactive in the violent protcsit.Baj
Because oC these disagreements and organizational problems, webmall chance opposition forces willnifiedthe neat year. Even without significant progress towardhowever opposition groups could find themselves allessentially the tameaofof dialogue stalled,
dcmccraiice7fl?&rnrSicWout the chances for further progress. Many of them believe thai only by increasing prrssure on Pinochet can be be slopped from delaying the transition. Concern over losing credibility among their supporters wjllabo help move democratic leaders toward increased political action^H
Since3 coup. Chilean oppositionprimarily in Madrid. Mexico City, andobtained limited financial,and diplomatic backing from foreign governments, international groups, and political parlies:
West European and Latin American countries have voted for the continuation of the UN special rapporteur on Chilean human rights, mounted some trade and arms sales boycotts during, and sponsored anti-Pinochet resolutions in international forum*.
International labor confederations, the Christian Democraticand (he Socialist International have occasionally provided funds lo Chilean unions and political groups.
Most of the Chilean left's international financial backing and training Ii jvc come from the Sovicl Union and Cuba.H
Concrete assistance, tuck as fund, for opposition parlies or arm. for urrariiti, has not been sufficient to improve significantly iherospects for success. We believe, however. Ihai such support ii likely toIf political agitation in Chile grows. In such an atmosphere, ihe popgUr appeal and influence of ihe racUcal left could increase, even though
mitontrol of the ccposiilon movement
prSnoteviolence in order to undermine the democratic opening
Persistent socioeconomic ills, the fading of ihe dialogue, the opposition's gravitation toward renewed protests, and Pinochetardline proclivities leave considerable leeway Tor dangerous miscalculation and ovarreaction. On the basis of the pattern of event* of the past year, we eapeet that,ull during tbe traditionalnuner vacations, democratic leaders mqu beginningoderate level in March and ialens>fy-SM9S4 Because tbe eeOfiooucn the process of beingnd overshadowed byverts.bdkve the modest economic improvement likely ocil year will not seriously undercut the protests and could even prompt them to focus more Quickly and sharply on the question of Pinochet's tenure.
in.
In in* past reardiverse opposition movementihe Pinochet government wiih ihepolllical chalkngc inyear rulesntiregime ekments initiated actmtLes asihe Usitact
saki morncniura only inrotests Steadily gamed popular backing and increased in vloknee.eak onugust7 peeplc were tilled Sinor then. pxsHM concetiioai. the iniita-ttMialogue -ilk the moderate oppouuonabtie acceptance ol oaattowed turmoil
ire ofd moderatedNevertheless. ih<remain* itnsc at ihe government and the opposition plan (orrounds in "hat is likely toontinuing political conictt Ai state arc Ihe length o( President Pinochet's termnd. -nh the option of seeing another eight-yearthe type of government that nil lolkr-JBBJ
The crippling rcccstion that sirock Chile in1ajor impetus (or the political unrealtChile's economyDP grcih pturnmoed (torncrceui inrose fromercentI soercenteal wages dropped, and hundreds of businesses failed Ihe regime't rc(asa) so adjust policies as ihe -or id economy deefcaed aad toiiialnsonfcty crunch induced by the dry.ag up of foreign credit aggravatedrt ajgaj
The economic crisis that launched the opposition nvnenxnlcoairibulo loose weight lo antig jvci -mem uniudes.ai been superseded to panohlical dyrjo* centenag on tbe call fordesno-crilk cocuing. Although there isease of impending popular rebellion, differentf Chilean soocty. especially ihc hard-hit loner djis. have been forced io male painful adrusimunis andpowded by pameipaiing in protesiv,.to
ws.attempted to I
But ihe <
movement Cuts across pohlical .drolag.eses. and age groups, and thus remaina an amorphous movement wlih multiple leadership and varied goali This paper jaalyiet the opposiiton's composition and bases of Kppon and csplores the dyumicsroups and between them and theithuror the neat year
Casupoaltlon and Nature of the Oe*oeflSoo MuxM
likely a* the pointful and Ihe democratic
During ihe taller half2 tabor uawns. snail business groups, farmers, and other sectors of Chilean society which had previously supported Pinochetso ciptess their dissatisfaction with theand its cumomk policies. Opposition polllical kaden. phased to sec cracks to than-.eifs base of support, began to organise to2 to eapioitiscontent Sinceumber of political and labor groups ranging from Ihe moderate right lo the (ar left have (ormed coalitions: at present, the.iiion of ihe multiparty fronts remains fluid. Wi
Theike their member organizations, have been hampered by philcoophkal differences. leader-Ship rivalries, gujgft iMcrssal dncipluM. HUdeouaic financing, aad tha governances ban on pony activities. The major diffkutly faring the opposition forces, however, has bee" iheir Inability to harnesshannel widespread anilgovernmoni sentiment B
Cmounts uf iw i
TVe National Development Project (PftODEM -as founded in1 by scrrsl aggreurvc Chiiman Dcmocrait. conservatives, and trade union-lits who believed their own organifations were too
ft Ml '"
a a
reluctant iDl.utkmxrx polioci Led bi Jotgc Lavandero. an ambiikmi member of (he Chriiuaa Democratic(PDCl.laicnKnt in) demandingsional cUcUonsmcr.ihi andre+nnlcic tranwuoncmocrac) *iihm twoheioa ot other more broad-based fronii.particular ihe Democratic Alienee. whichtome of ihe tamem coded PRODEN's influence in ihe oppoviioa movement. Although Lavinderoim public proAlc.Chrbiian Defnocrau have rettrkied theirparlicipiikM inmX PROOENincorporated in September into artoih cr promt coordinating ims the UnitedCoaaanand-headeddero bat infWeaced fr> kfint .
Attiomrt. The ohm promiacal tad active orrowiic* coah'trtn. the Democratic AMiane* (ADi wai fanned in3 at the Alvlff'iiJwet repmcBtt tbe mowale ioa broad bit of ivpnon mkia iwar ahori ofingle optwi'.ioa front. Led'ninn DemocraticPrendemValdes. It include, thePatty, ihe cenlci kit Cbnv ilia Demoeraiic aad Social Democratic Panics, the
eftiti Radical Pariy. and factiom of thehe float eichidea Ike ierrorat_ Movement of ihe Revolmaeery Left (MIRL the0*Chile (PCChL and oOirr radieal lefllMhai advocate pjj
The imi'iji) reason for iheuccess ihvi far hat been the active involvement of the PDC.ost important opposition political force. The mijoriiy of the PDC supported Alienee's on iterut. In rcocimo, to military repression and ciiensive politico! dcrnobtlieaiton under mnoeh.ei.oiwcl.iy joined thei Although placed "in receii" by gmem-ment decreeT. the PDC haienonabl; tffccine organ mi tonal structThe death of former Prestdeni EdurdO Ftpt. left thetgme of Mffkkmh mediate internal eoofticii BJ
Under the PDC* leadeni*.Democrat* Alfcaace lavort dcctiO?oast itaticmblf toe- eonstitotion. legalization of poktieal pat)ore liberal economic potioraimm of cml liberiiet. aad the return oTciilcv AHhoagh AO leader nnd Chritiian Demoeraiic Prendeni Gabriel Valdes
initially "lied foroncentrate on more
I) mob.uting moutUy day* if proteat through thebe Alhaaee kadenSp prnturcd Pinochet RuocV-latowergio Jarpa.imitated talk* -ilh ibe AD Th* tup. however, forced Alliance meroben to nach tome contenMit on conirovinialeconcile dialogue wilh cominu-wg proteit demcottreiioai, avoid being victimised by Pinochet, and cafleet chargei of utltaul from Ihe lefi. Thane Htaim have led lo the current iiupenuon of lh* dialogue and may have ended it altogether jan.
Another aource of Brain wriMn the AD hat beenof lh* Ccunmumut Party, the MIR. andAlmeyda faction of the Socialiittome Alliance member* believe thit cooperwiih ihe CoramuniiU would itrcngthenmovemenl. we doubt thai lh* ChriitianwiQ .jrer to any fornul collaboration.leader* recognise that Pmochet'i moatuf their part, ever the yean haa beenthat they paved Ibe -ay lor Alhtode'aIfTO. Nevenhehua. vartoui touree* confirmAD hat coordinaied tome prutevl eetrrtlre*Communal* and teem* lo plin lo continue toIn lateroup of Chrlnianwith levoal Cormnunril Party leader* lofuture
leader.
np.-ctwoai of tuppon if tbe puny -ouidrmed revoluiioo. break it*tfcedvoeatiog violence.%
doubt that the Commumii* will accept thiithe more contervative elemenit of ihebe Mely lo eppxr in
SorrWiin The owen or to faction* of ihe Sottahuliketed Salvador Allende inbeenootinuOui tut* of ttax. Seme hate yarned the Demoeritiei to perilunateith Ihe govern ni'i -other* have oscillated bet-ecn the Alliance
ihe radical allied wiih the Social im have': foundingeadeftist eoau'iion'j
'
major group it lion.incellcnde atnly abort-lived unity. Moderates clashed'ith radicals until) coup drove most Socialists into eiile.
Ocr theean. Socialists inside and outside tbe country have attempted to vnite the -wn'toleni left but irlrtiloticil differences end ocsoaal nvilries have ledrepealed faiktrc. The oro-iag arwantarncc of the Chnuian Oemocrau and other centristmn groupsowever, forced thenoavtojeni left to define itl role and composition.
aSatjaaaaaaaaaaaanBaaVanBal Thuv
groata formed the Socialist Convergence aad Its moaned Ceanauf ice for Pearttcal Unity (CPUsobjectivelooordinated So-cialiit ptogram and work toward permanem reunifi-caiion of ihe party.
Despite such apparent agreement, however, ihe So-ciehti Sloeoot* coUHica at best. For eiample. the bloc isaniapant in the Democratic Alliance, boi several Socialisi facitens disputepout ions aad disclaim membership in ADpoint of friction has been the unsecceiafal sncmatt by seane SoenVu leader* loe Crw raunot Party included in ihe Alliance
Socialist efforts to reunify and work within the demo-erattC weissiiioa have hem Significant in eitifcuhngl Kan tctnporarily a* ancat force ana in strengthening democratic tendencies la
therovide the Sooialisu
ou-Pinoeheltieve. however, lhat it is mc*el (III fail to achieve effective unification, particulaily since many differences are unresolved and one of ihe largerAlmeydais loath to renounce its longstanding commitment to
iu Creafi. The exclusion of far left groups from the perily tea oiled SccialiM Party aad ftom Ihe Democratic Alliance led radola in September to form then- own pro Sonet frontPopalai Democratic Movement (MOP) composed of the Chilean Communist Party (PCChJ, ihe Almcyds faction of ihe Socialisi Pany. and other small lefitu ipt ii re(tonra The terrorist Movement of the Rco-Imioaary Left (MIRI has not ofTmaDy >sined the
The Communist Patiy. which wai foundeds the bast orgsnittd and most efftctrva radical leftist grasp in the MDP Although banned ind sct<rsr> repreascdhe party hat nsed its well-developed clandestine infrastructure to survivewell. The pany. which traditionally foOowt Moscow's line and "luchZoi generally eschewed armed sirvgik hi lavor of pc'-ni activity and coalition buiMmg andeading role ia forming the Allende Frontnder Allende. the Communist* moderated tome of their approaches and attempted to restrain tbe icrronst MIR organuatioa. After tee coup,meat leaden went ieio cede, where they began to promote armed struggle and close links with the Soviets. Those leaders who remained in Chile, on the olhcr band, concentrated on attempts to forge.Uianccsthe PDC and ihe Scestbsts. caav sitact clandestine political neis among stadcmi and labor, and punuc other nonriolcni activities that would not pro vole ihe government. PJJ
tl-jnary Ltfl ia Ihchc MIR has
rr-ol.eonjry line tha MIRradKahec Alleudcs Dorxuj end 3 coup, the imhtary concentrated on eliminating ihc MIR. reducing membership0ew hundred rallltanti. Nevertheless, ihe group continues to carry oot Uolaied terrorist atttvifcs aimed aiohlical Ktilemeni. JJ
Allhouih the MDPcoalition hat not formallyiu seals, we believe il*ll favoropposition lo the government Until this policy
h thelJeewraiic Alliance remains open.f some MOP leaden and accountseir ruiube tuppon of tone AD drmendi end theirhatcruiioo is daiincs from but notto thai of the Alliance
Labaf. Reflecting the iignifitanee of economicets in thef the proscu movement, two aujor labor coalitions were farmed during the springOorgaaitc the first national days of proteat and subsequent strike* On* of these, the National Worker* Command rCNTl.ront of tradefrom the Tne largest labor conledcrations orga-ruled by Copperworkeis Union Chief Rodolfo Seguel. The cffeciivencss of labor opposillonransport stiike In late June led ihe government toialogue wiih labor leaders concerning the esteniion of debt relief andto9 labor plan fjgfj
3 hltu
forcoaUuoBa to take over" leadership' of thelabor io.pt coniutac
mole, concentrating their efforts oa cconome. torial. and Ubor issue* I- raid-September, for raam
the AFL-CIO lapponed Union or DernocratK Workers (UDTj presented Interior Minister Jaipa with anoint petition dealing mainly with labor issues On the other hand, the Christian Democratic-led butLabora.cr tCNS) hat reieoed any daloguethe
laterior Minuter 'arpa it: righl party deii|ncd to supedri ihe tr
U Tie" Of hissoeica.lv high|ecent poll showing thatercent of those qaeiiionedeturn to civilian rule within two years, and logicale believe mostfavor the opposition'* call lor an accelerated uaasiiioaemocracy However, opposition groups have faced wgrnficani obstacles in aitamncag to tap and orgnn.ee int. i
OiKvwirw oa ikrThe economic crisis and the government's erratic res porno alio caused consider-able diaconicM amoni Pinochets prevloaily firm conservative backers, resulting in some movementfcrnutioa ofconservative coal no- No Maflle ambrcSUan Ike right emerged, bat tame rtcmcnu began to move beyond criiinwn of the regime's eexaiomic program to press for antranirtioa In2 variousbusiness, labor, and farm groups organ! red dem-oail rations urging economic policy readjustments When the government arrested several panicipanis aad temporinly cipeBcd oneare. the conatrvairve parties and press iateosined their criii-dimc-r. have backed the monthly days of protests, but many have continued to voice duencbantment and push for measures to erne-tio'aic economic and polilical tensions.
%mtt ihe jsmiatam of the political opening in mid-Augast. manynd far-rigki dements have gravitated back toward the go-errwai These groups hare increasing It crmcitcd ihe crpposnioa for pramotiag violcm protesit and making anrcahuieemands At the Mm* lime, groups ranging from the oh) centcr-riglM National Partyhe fat-right Nationalists have responded to the opening by orgamring and formulating plant for transition I
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f.
t'
hance mxkt Hot protests Uiinto nttainabk goals, in conn ait to la-pa's energetic postal* lion of apohlical plan, appears lo have hail Ihc AD's image
Historically, ihc political panic alio hav* had strong tics toorganited labor. Theh< Socialist and Communist Pailk* inorwhich caeccdcd lhai of th* Christian Damociatt and moderntes^ided Alleudes election0) Pinochet baa deliberately uted th* go.ernnseni'1 authority to manipulate labor regulations and eonl.ol wages to try to breakhe belier ol -man leaden that tecum, offcialirominent2 un-I. During
of proton, the government hatfa and bmilcd concertonobfor itnke organic"
! ihme efforts, both moderate aud Iclt.siklrganieedurvey noted thatercent of newly elected union oTTKiali held ties to ihe CcemmiBini or varioui socialist groups, whik JS percent had Christian DernocratkInJ before the opposition movement
gathered
aboutercent aforjaruioJ libor vai Christian
Democrat oriented;inked to the Comrauniit, Soclaliil, and other leftist parties;erceni wat progmcrnmcnl: andercent -ai lnde-pendent |
The main youth groups in Chile iradiilonally ban been linked to the politicalor tome time. ih< progovernrnent Cremialistas haverowing youth movement, but, among lh* present oppositionhe Christian Democrats and the Communisu Have the only tigntficaat organircd routh groups gtoTJJgVg^nHgnaaaaaaaaaal <hc PDC youthhas stepped up recruit mi efforts andonded iuraHructnrc This group hut cninTiied
arc uncertain how to singe Km Some at andvea procobta new ham ai aa itkua wiih whom they can aegotialc Mow hi. locutightist aniccudinti. distrust nd thvi have refutedead talli wiihractice of allcrniiiag between cenclllaioiy ks and public cemure of the oppositionagainst Ihe backdrop of Pinochet's cm hardlineadded to thewhether ihc Interior Miniater at uooul acautiat.na or auemcuiag to he forcet oft balance and JiiifJeat
cppoHtm-oth democraik and nondemocratic. believe lhai pretenihik prov.de them the bett opportunity Ihey have had to hanen President Pinochet's departure At ihe tame urn* they realire that hit deiermtnaiion. pollti-cal acumen, and remainingthough eroded -powtr baa makeormidable adversary Few tf aay eppeutw- kadeii bel.cn he -vl at
The radical kfi. dominated primarily by tbe Cornmu-nin Party, is more unified in in view of the govern-meat. It recogn.iei ihc eahujajn of eoniendiag faciioat aad phihatophiet in theuthat th*ount for utile In cor. Iran to ekmentt of the oertmcratie oppoution. warn arc encouraged by ihe amciioratm influence ofin the administration, th*t diurutti ihe moderate, and comidert their actions to beTo date ihc radical left probably credits Jarpa with at kail temporarily sidetracking, the
matt rnob.liiat.oo elton. -Inchst hens he only way toeturn to civtkan i
mitnary backing Even then, they hive no doubii that he nouldomeback Thus, inw. tne opposi:an group* do not believe Pinochet Stemocratic opening in good faith, but is tiling dialogueelaying tjciic.BJJ
Diiitloat and I
The untie cotfyirigery diverse andi lament his been th* consensu! Mi fawtr of ihoricnmg Pinochet's lerm In uior reiost opposition groups. Ihit goal calls for a
11't- of mobilizing middle-class protest oeeak that tbe armed forces feel compelled to remove Pinochet Aio devise tactic* toarard tha cad. however, hive run conut'rntly a'outof diffenn vktwi on ihe use of violence, parochial iaicieats. and animot-itiet. ihe ichiSm between enlcd and domesticnd government .ovale measure* Oppouiion ck-rfKBit Kaie cooperated iaicrraittcntly. cocrdinttcd vcane acimeici. and cmaeacleflUlty carried oat parallelroad ripposHion from bat nol,-
A related quandary for democratic oppositionit ihe relalioothip between the dialogue and prcacut Tne tendcri rcabN lhat ihe mtuwi tacy have cttractcd to fa* from the gcrverammiirect result of protest activity, whichaintain oppcmlion leverage Continuing pro< mhonever. could jcoeardiet seawe moderate tarpon by mating Ike oppoulioa appear unwilling It, reciprocate governmeni conccwoai. -hicS ecaild help Pinochei justify renewed repression. Ai Ihe tame lime, il ihe dcfflocraiiC opposition cannc* conuol ihe protests, ii rant ibe nth of kaiag the iorliativt K>
-.oteitta
Reduced pananoaiion Mi the protcilt since Sapiembci hat only compounded tbe dilemma Deeply dmded orei whetherhe largelyamrrd demoniuaiiont and apparently coaniun)of declining public interest in aniigmeinmem activities iheercet opted out of national proteau in October Tart ma Med the Democratk AHeaace lo the embarrnttmcei of the poor tuenout and to ditatteciitc iitelf feom the violence, but il alto bol-uercd Ftnochei'i confidence.
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>iii'rF>r
The d'teive ideolofieal ecanpotition of the democratic ekmenli comributrt lo their mdrcii-eneii and tcnu out unity Kor eiample. old-line conserve tivei. only eecenily estranged from the Pinochet toreiaMM, vieheppcailmB arith nonvi oknii and Radical Pasty mem ben, who ter.ed ia the Allende government MM
, the appeal or tKV Ii| left. At the same time, hard bateamlog would strain .the unity of iheratic coalition by forcing il lo articulateific position* and iecone<le ilt membership's diipatate ggeggatu. On lh* other band, by attempting to abotl ot shr- hbenhaaiion. Pinochet would Tciuaciial*aadcrcui lh* efforts of aaoderaua. and itrtrtgibea the far lefi'i argument in fan- of armed
Jkr Miliiarr /fier.ihc traditional dnelpUne. and msulaniy of Ihe armed forces, opposi-lion fotcef eaanoi eieil much direct influence on Ihe
Jliaryin theback* the CeoatltutkonO and Pinochet's cminontien it PreUdenl. Mow officio tull ihiie Pinochet's dutitu and dnhhe of
Wethat Chileconomic prospect!rove4 We tipoct the IMF to acted* to Sauoco'i reewcit for leceur rneal reauru^uma. In-created public spendinglow recovery in copper prices shoe* set th* stageradual etumorn* reboundperocni Even with this growth rale, hosrever. unemptoym*nt will decline onlyercent and inflation will most likelybeyond JO percent. Under ihesc circumstance* the opposition will tiill be able to draw on substantial, economically driven public t
Despite this. Ihc high command hatflhiag-neat lo moderaie Knechci'i hardliBc instinct* and huudding commitment to liberal!ration. Tluib*bly Hemmed from concernlb* maiMludc of ant [government Kniimeni demaniiraied during the lummer montha and the fear that thermed force* might be caned upon to euell end disorder*efute' ban* Tbe large luruoul at la* arc-government rallyeptember doe* not leem to1 jruficani) altered ihc belief in military csrcki that the transition thould be accelerated.I
w* belamocr*tie exposition elcmceti are ailcmptini totrategy of protean that will maintain pretturc on the regime withoul prewoking tbemdiaary Ihe, hope.ontacts ia the military that canympathy for demxte liaison, cahn deep-seatedlean thai civilian rule would open the door to leftiit tubvenand allay concern* about potiiblc future "witch hunti" for miliiary human rightsTo date tbe demoeraiie opposition appear) to hit few inch channel! of commun-cation I
AnatjjBj Tag]chat, if politicaln grows, Io cujn support for eu-pemtiou forces will increase In varyingoth Weal and East European countries arc likely to slep up theiraid lo opposition panics and increase pressure on ihc Pinochet regime In international forums. Aby Pinochet wouldtronger reaction, in our view, perhaps in the form of ccrsaornk or arm* Its by scene European Communityeturn of *tiset with iurr*4tional connee--for rsample. Andres ZaUrrar. Pres-drai of the Christian Democrat*alaocr. hance the level of foreign backing. In addition, the irend in South Americaeturn to dernociatk government! could increase regional support. Bj|
We also expect that Moscow and Havana would be greatly tesnptedurge in protest activity and racucaliutmo of thee bel.et that Moscow may augment tuppori far the radical hrfletievet the Popular Democratic Movementopular eoalituyn In our view, the
Waiwvet to the MIR Ir^Wt>and
'he Roman CilMrt Church hsiapacity lo in important role in therospects (or luecett. With in moral authority,
frasirooti tirueture. andarti- coa-taeis-especially in theChurch caa effect the lew! of protests,onsenwi emoniad medaie an agreement wkhrareaactor in mobiliitactppon tor an cvrnaiiilayof popalar cirHiationa. |
ll ia moair. ihnt the Church wilt malauiei in fairly neuiral nance. Acchbiihop of Santiago Juan Fresno, the hey church official, ii cecitervative and crillcal of church in-rolvcmenl ia politics. Fresno hat been instrument: ia impfc-isti ornestangtbei diakauc He has recently become drwnraccd ewer ibe preaceett for dialectic, hutelieve be all eonlrauedvice, direct crilKtsm j| both tides equally, and Hand ready lo mediaic. Jfl
Ihe poiemial impact ofn and ibe tower deny are unpredictable but poientially dismpttveon|usndin| reputation at an opponent of authoritarian nil* and an implaea bk foe of Pinochet |ivet hint tome capacity to catalyse pretest acte has beta tikai. ho-oer. uace rerinat in1 Ihe bwerlto nay not necessarily lotto- frenvoi arasdenticca Atin Laiia America Chdceaver clergyccxationally promoted pail real and tocial action and to-netirriei confrontation, leiardless of the wishes of the
Qfpotiiiem tj'-'itfai Utllf. Any progress toward the formationroad ooetotition front drawn from the ceaier rtiht to the far kft weald improvefoe the anti-Pinochet encwerneni Under preteni circuanwasces. tbii teemi .alikdy Tbe Piaoehet te-gustr has at leane|aiacd enoughtv nc irinxiioa iMue* lo dene wed(es bciwtca
opposition group*.]
gajjajjclc menls of .iM&OCtaiHt woe Blreao,loggerheads over the Interior Minister's recent pro-posal for parliamentary elections
f the fii left would mott likely be jeopardised by real progresiransition. We c'pect that the internal conflict over armed struggle -nit) intensify, ai more moderate Communis!became increasingly fearful ofloded from any political arrangement and more radical members prcavased violence to undermine tbe traosl-
ffeaV Vminimal trader r- The emergence of One or two charismatic opposition figures around whom moil Opposition forces could rally -outd sigr.ifie.amiythe ooposhions prospects by centralisingplanning and improving chances for resolution est policy disputes. Mm aspirants toale come from the rants of the Christian Democratic Party.HJ
Gabriel Vsleks, party president, is ihe most prominenl exposition leader ai present, but his arroganceic rated many in his own pany. and his leftist leanings have aroused ihe suspicion! of centrist and cunservaiive Opposition groups. Andres Zaldrvar. on ihe other hand,tronger possibilitylayole because of his moderate polilical beliefs, his internaiional reputation, and the military's favorable view of him. When Zaldivar returned from esile inome observers expected htm toVildes immediately for leadership of the PDC. Rather than risk splitting the parly, however, we believe Zaldivar is -ailing until the political picture clears and PDC modoaies. other AO politicians, and the public at large become discouraged with Values.ndeeo.t^ad PRODENhas lutional recc^mtiahiKl^probaWy regarded by most rrsodeiate opposition figures s> loo impetuous
Ihe right mtghi be Sergioharismatic Gtemialisia leader who was interior Minister under 'Pinochet8^
None or the most prominent labor leaders have tolTiciently beoad appeal to rally labor forces, muchroadfollowing. Moreover, they preferiintain their mdepeodence from the polilical panics, labor's emphasis on sooal. economic and labor issues rather than on political concerns further removes them from serious eonsideraiion tajaj-
Expeatic* of Domtnic S'pperi. At noted, in tbe long lerm. the opposition's hope for success depends on mobiliiing the support of the middle Class because middle-class sentimentreater impaei on ihe military than thai of any other group. Government coocesiMtis. mkldlociivs fear ofy at the fringes ofprobably simple weariness with the protest effort have reduced middle-class support fee opposition activities. Failure to te-verso thh process will deal oppositionerious blow.To some estent this depends on ihe democratic oppositions ability lo pull iiseir together, bin. even If this occurs, ihe government would retain some capability io fray ihe edges of ihe opposition's middle-class base through potiticat concessions and spending measures lo alleviate unemployment. jbg
The oppmttionability lo control and cipond Us bate among youth dements is pioblemalic and may depend on the willingness of ihe preseni leadershipore aggressive stance or on the emergence of new leaders. gSgVggg^gggggggl
little confidence among youth activists, who may be tempted to splinter off and organise their own
mem. Indeed.BLlsMLHMM0
ulh leaders recentlyouth
alliance composed primarily of ceolnsi andelements dedicatedushing forward with the transition mm
other major polilical leaders are either loo far to the left, too far to the right, or loo old lo rallybroad front of opposition forces. One possible occplion on
The radical left's traditional aeltvism. on ihe other hand, is likely lo attract increasing youth support.
ihc udicil left his belief conucu thansectors smooj youths in Ihe poo* uiben area* and islo Improve them- The (overnment retains some influence on ihe youth front as well. This ia largely confined to university troupe established by the righlwinghich are uell-Ofgam tedH^afaSHJ
l_abOf temaini another difTrcult area for (he lion, because, as noted earlier, the govern meni bty retains mote leverage over labor than over any other sector, Despite this, we expect tension* among workers to remain high, because we believe the rate of economic iccovcry will be modest at best over tbe neilerious economic setback or cvjdccce o* govitnment responsibility in the murder of labor official Jimcncr2 couldaulyxing effect on ihc labor movement. For the most pari, however, wc believe that labor leaders will continue to allow politicians to lake tbe tmilaiivcJBf
Oerlook
Curreni circumstances miliiate against ihe formationnified opposition from in (he ittOfl term. At Is dear, however, ihe opposition doe* not onmpleiely control its own destiny. Past etperieace shows that political crises in developing countries oftenomentum thai overrides Ihe inadequacie* of entlre-gime forces In Chile, government actions, tbe pace of economic recovery, public attitude, and other factors outside ihe opposition's control willajor im act on oppmilia'ifThus, evenficant pfogfe'sstouafd'umTieaiion. opposition groups could find theWelva ill marching inthe same dirccilc* because of Ihc force of cventsJJH
We believe thst diiectiOei is litcly to lead inneatingly
lOwjrd COnff0ntati.nl. I
the cijlosiie stalled, democratic eppoiilion Icad-er* are peuimistic about the chance* for further progiraa. Many of ihem believe that only by increase ing presiurc on Pinochet can he be slopped from
delaying the transition and undercutting Jarpa'i posi-lion. Concern over losing credibility among iheir supporters will also help move democratic leader* toward increased political action. Some are already undying methods lo increase such action at ihe. municipal level, In addition, we believe the radical left will continueromote violence ia ordernsure thai the dialogue doc* not succeed. Thus, oncetbe pattern of tbe pastapeet that,ull during the traditional Chilean summer vacation* after the New Year, the piotesu are likely to beginoderate level in March and intensify byB|
Renewed political activity will probably find aaudience among Chilean* As iefleeted in the earlier mentioned poll, the opening, although limited to date, hasesire in the general pooulaee. for steady progress toward restoration of civilian rule, an impulse that Pinochet almost certainly will tty lo retard. Nevertheless, we belies* thai, byore oonfroomttoral approach, Ihe oppositioncan capitalize oa ihe public preference for democ-reiiuiion io force more concessions from Pinochet during the net! year. Moreover, wc espect ibal the democratic transition ia Argentina willersist-cnt Impact In Chile WW
We cipevi (he potential for radtcillutiort truj polar-iulionemain relatively high. Despite (he capccied modal economic upturn, socioeconomic lib willolitical tensions, particularly in tbe poorIn addition, the fading of the dialogue, the opposition's likely gravitation toward renewed protests not year, and Pinochet's hardline proclivities leave considerable leeway for dangerous miscalculation and oveireection. In such an atmosphere. Ihe popular appeal and Influence of the radical left would grow, even though we doubt it would be able to tela* control of the opposition movement. The radical left'ssmall site and Its discredited performarrce during ihc Allende years stilluong hold on public attitude*
damns
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