-TCt
Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense in Leadership Continuity
Interagency Intelligence Memoraodurn Volume
CIA HISTORICAL REViEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
NlX
SOVIET WARTIME MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY
VOLUME
vailable ai ofctoUr 1UW wed in lheof this Meovnancf um.
CONTENTS
Page
PURPOSE AND
KEY
OVIET STRATEGY FOR WARTIME
A. Soviet Perceptions ol Nuclear
B Organizational
CHAPTER II. WARTIME MANAGEMENT
of World War
Organizations and
C Oisanizationi for lhe Transition to
USSR Defense
Second
USSR Civil
Military
Military
CHAPTER III. WARTIME MANAGEMENT
A Functions and
National
Territorial
Other Territorial
Emrban Facility
The Command Post
Concept of
CHAPTER IV. TYPES OF LEADERSHIP PROTECTION AND
RELOCATION
A Urban
Single-Purpose
Dual-Purpose
in
Paet
CHAPTER V. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET WARTIME
A Progress in Meetuig rterocslion Facility
National Level 1
Terntor.il Levels
B Survivability of Relocation
Camouflage. Concealment, and
Physical
Active
C. Communications
Ministry ol
Ministry ol
KGB Directorate of Government Communications
Other Ministries
D Exercises and
Oblasts and Subordinate dies and
Republics
General Staff and Mihlai*
E Siisceptibtbty to
CHAPTER VI. TRENDS AND
Annex A- Methodology lor Manpower
Annex B: Methodology for Estimating Waiilme leadership
ethodology for Vulncrabiltly Analysis of ShaUow-Buried
Flat-Roof
Annci D: Tabular W
Annex E- Alphabetical List of
t; !
Annex F: Selected isrHiograpliy W
Annex G-
TA81ES
1 Size of the Soviet Wartime
Soviet Wat Management Activities at Various Readiness
Soviet Leadership Relocation
4 Vulnerabihly of Structuiet at Representative Soviet Leadership
Helocalion
U-1 Estimated Full-Time Soviel Civil DefenseI
III 1 Civil Defense Roles lot Selected Support and Service
IIIinisterial Support of Civil Defense
iosected Requirements lot Wartime Relocation
Page
IIM. Sue of the Soviet Wartirrse
Ill-S. Estimated Wittlrne Staff Support Rcquirrments of Qvilian
oviet Wai Management Activities at Various Readiness
oviet Leadership Relocation Facilities
onstruction and Equipment Costs ol Selected Lcaderihip Facilities
in Urban
onstruction and Equipment Costs of Selected Soviet, Relocation
onstruction and Equipment Cost, of Identified Soviet leadership
Relocation Fadlitfes by
onstruction and Equipment Costs of Protected Soviel rtetocausoo
rogress In Meeting Relocation
ingle-Purpose Eaurban Command Posts Meeting Wartime
Requirements of Military
evere Damage Overpressure Required To Damage Representative
Soviet Leadership Relocation
allout Radialinn Protection Fartoi loi Personnel in Slructures at
Relocation
elocation Complexes. Moscow Area Date of Initial Const ruction
Compared to Distance From Moscow.. ,
ulnerability of Structures at Representative Soviet Leadership
Relocation
ws.
r
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
National intelligence issuances on Soviet civil defense haveihc objectives, scope, and pace of the program and its likelyin reducing damageuclearhile these estimates concludedarge percentage of the leadership wouldarge-scale US nuclear altack on lhe USSR, (hey did not address in detail the specific role of civil defense in Soviet plans tocontinuity of their leadership.
In this Memorandum we assess the Soviet civil defenseand measures for leadership protection and relocation as an integral partroader national command and control syslem. This national system would provide strategic direction of theater and intercontinental forces and for the defense of lhe USSR from nuclearWe have assessed the Soviets' progress in making the necessary preparations that would enable their management structure lo function according lo the USSR's strategy for nuclear war. In our analysis we have relied heavily on reporting from human sources who served in the system, as well as on evidence from other sources of actual relocation and command and control facilities and of operalional exercises in which these facilities have been used.
This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. It was drafted by the Defense Intelligence Agency with the participation offrom the Ceniral Intelligence Agency, lhe National Security Agency, lhe National Photographic Interpretation Center, lhe Office of the Assistanl Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Thiswas coordinated by the Interagency Working Croup on Soviet Civil Defense.
' See Inlriierncv Inielltaence MciDOfindom NlCnd Daftiwltmocotu. XhvrmhnInteragenci Iriicllrtfrtc?to
t loldcn Nl UM. Soviet Clcff Prime.Poet, and tfftaloeneii.J.
KEY JUDGMENTS
Thei liin their capabilities for global conflict is probably critically dependent on their assessment of tbe survivability and continuing effectiveness of their leadership during anduclear attack. To this end, the Soviels have been making therequired to facilitate tbe transition from peacetime to wartime and to give their leadership the potential for effective performanceuclear conflict These preparations are intended to provide for
Continuity of party, government, military, and economicat all levels.
Mobilization of human and material resources.
Support of military operations
Continuity of essential economic activity.
of postattack recovery operations The Soviets have made considerable progress in:
Delineating the wartime mananement system and theol Soviet leaders at all levels.
Preparing the civilian leadership toapid transition to their wartime roles through the use of special organizations that plan, train, and exercise during peacetime.
Providing their leadership with hardened urban command posts, exurban relocation facilities, and redundant, hardened commutiicattons (Relocation facilities are those exurbanpolls to which military and civilian leaders and their slalfs will relocate in wartime for the purpose of exercising command and management functions.)
Concept and Organization
The Soviet wartime management organization (seen pageould consist of:
-The National Command Authority and other national-level leaders who would direct the military, political, and economic activities of the nation
The leaders of iheilitary districts who would have the key role in wartime territorial administration, management ofoperations, and in providing continuing support of military operationsarge-scale nuclear attack.
The leaders oi those regional organizations responsible for vital services such as transportation, communications, and electric power
The leaders of lheoviet republics who would be responsible for supporting the war effort and maintaining the integrity of the multinational Soviet state. As shown in figurehe Soviet republics would not be in the chain of command from the National Command Authority to key territorial organizations.
The leaders of oblasts, the basic territorial elements, who would be responsible under military district supervision for directing rescue and recovery operations and for military support tasks.
The leaders in cities, rural areas, and at individual installations who would operate under oblast control
We estimateotalfficials (seen pageonstitute the leadership lhal would be responsible for the continuity and survival of the nationuclear war The key elements of Soviet leadership would be primarily those at the national, military district, republic, andndividuals, including0 full-time civil defense staff personnel.
The USSR Civil Defense organization is inlentJed to provide the wartime management systemommand structure staffed by military personnel wilh the professional eipertisc necessary for civilian leaders to carry outigned wartime roles- The legal basis for ihis largely mililary structure to perform its wartime mission would derive under Soviet statutes from declarationspecial period,"to martial law in World War II.
The Communist I'arty svould continue to function in wartime as it does in peacetime, with primary responsibility for lhe formulation and implementalion of policy Its parallel structure wilh the state adminis-tration facilitate* parly control of administrative functions. In wartime, party officials would also be present on the military councils of tbe military districts, tbe highest regional polilicomilttary authority in wartime
The Sovirts do not expect the entire national leadership to be destroyed in wartime. Should nalioiul-Ievel control be temporarily
2
Table 1
Size of the Soviet Wartime Leadership
regional orrja muttons
t abo*
brio* JS.OOO
favour
defense Matt
-
Tb* figureor the military dinner include! BOO officer* in their Onl defrnte compononti plus senior command personnelTbe total fijut* includes- His top national trailed but not military officers below tbt led of the Ministry ofeps for the* al mihlaty districts and in aril derrnxlso. Ihc total doci urn include civilian leader* atmstallaliOra.
interrupted, however, lhe military district would have ihc means and, we believe, the authority for decentralized operations. Moreover, the highly struclured. bureaucratic, and authoritarian nature of the Soviet syslem. which is widely perceived as hindering peacetime performance, would greatly facililale the management of the nation under the calaslrophic circumstances of nuclear war.
Transition lo Wartime
The Soviets believeuclear war would be preceded by aof international tension and probably conventional conflict.we concludedarge percentage nf the leadership on which the Soviets would rely for wartime management would probablyarge-scale US nuclear attack with as littleew hours' warning. Under these circumstances lhe Soviets are probably confident that they could make the transitioneacetimeartime management posture prioruclear attack on the USSR. That transition would be governed by changes in Soviet armed forces readiness levels. The corresponding changes in the Soviets' civil defense posture arc shown in table 2.
Relocation Facilities
During the past few years, we haveetterof Soviet wartime management concepts and have identified more relocation facilities for the higher levels of Soviet wartimemilitary district, and key regional organizations^"
Table 3
Soviet Leadership Relocation Facilities 1
Ruiuircmcmi
C
Ministry Ol
Aulhutily >efmic componcnti
in -
:f, M
dlt Key ictioni
orRaDiutiont .'iiC-cii-ii:
t'
t*0
((location wmpleni
Communi cartons Support. Communications support for the war management system is provided byh the Ministry ofand the Ministry of Defense, supplemented by the KGB. These ministries have jointly developed redundant communications networks, supporting facilities, and operational procedures that are aimed ai providing the national leadership with the means to maintain continuity of control over all activities in lhe Soviet homelanduclear altack. Other measures that lhe Soviets have taken to enhance the survivability and dependability of wartime communications include providing mobile signal support systems, constructing hardened reserve telephone exchanges in major cities, installing underground intercity cables to circumvent vulnerable urban areas, building bunkered cable switching points and network control centers, and developingregional communications control centers. Despite these efforts, the Soviets expect their communicalions Systems to suffer damageuclear attack and have made preparations for poststrike restoration of communications services.
I
Costs. We are unable lo estimate lhe tolal costs of Sovietfor wartime management One measure of the magnitude of the Soviet investment in their program i% the cost of relocation facilities
We calculate lhe total cost of construction and equipment at the single- and dual-purpose facilities we have identified to date to be at least) ruble* If tliese facilities were built in the United States, the cost would be some .US SS)
Using tliese calculations and the number of relocation facilities we believe have been constructed nationwide, we estimaic that the total cost of construction and equipment for relocation facilities since Ihe inception of the program inanges from atillion loillion rubles, depending on whether there arc one or Iwo facilillcs for each leadership entity. These costs would6 billion if tbe sites were duplicated in the United Stales. This estimate dors not include the costs of civil defense personnel, supporting communications networks, or hardened urban facilities Wc believe, therefore, that lhe overall cost of the program would be significantly greater lhan the atillion we have estimated for relocation sites alone.
Vulnerability. Despite the extent of their preparations, theof the Soviets' wartime management will depend heavily on the vulnerability of their leadership facilitiesS nuclear attack. Most of their urban and exurban facilities would be vulnerable to destruction if they could be located and were attacked by US weapons (secardened urbansts for the leadership have not been emphasized in our analysts because ihey would largely be vacated during the period prior lo nuclear attack. Titus, locating exurban command and control silos and supporting communicalions is key to the potenlial vulnerability of the Soviets' wartime management structure.
Achievementigh piobabilily ol severe structural damage lo almost all lypes of Soviel hardenrd underground exurban leadership facilities we have located would require multiple high-yield, accurale weapons. Deep underground facilities like those at Sharapovo and Chekhov near Moscow for lhe National Command Authority wouldifficult targeting problem (Tlie composition of lhe National Command Authority is shown inecent reassessment of
10
have
these sites indicates that they are harder, deeper, and much less vulnerable than previously estimated. For moreecade the
Sov,ets have been expanding and improving these sites, but concealed the extent of their activities}
J
Trends and Implications
We expect the Soviets will continue to improve the facilities .red to give the leadership the potential for effective performance
in wartime, Increasing both the number and hardness or fixed sites and improving communications support at all levels They will probably concentrate on further improvements in the capabilities ol military districts to integrate active and passive measures for defense against nuclear attack, to assure manpower and logistic support required by lhe war effort, and to direct poststrikc recovery operations The military district will remain the key clement of Soviet wartime territorial administration.
The Soviets may believe that deep underground structures such as those near Moscow will assure the survivability of the toppriority objective of their wartime management plans. We have not yet assessed the implicalions oferception by Soviet leaders. Nonetheless, their confidence in the effectiveness of their overall wartime management structure is almost certainly tempered by the belief lhat civilian as well as military leadership facilities would be high on the lisl of US targeting prioritiesuclear
[They would certainly assume that US capabilities would improve inThc future. Therefore, futurein Soviet wartime management preparations may include greater use of mobile command posts and communications equipment,for some of the top national leaders. We doubt, however, that the Soviets could carry out their wartime management plansarge-scale nuclear attack relying only on mobile facilities Wc therefore believe that they will continue to base their program around an extensive network of fixed, hardened facilities and lo engage in concealment practices that make many facilities difficult to detect.
Destruction of those leadership siles thai we have localed at therepublic, and military district levels, together wilh their related communications nodes, coulderious effect on the Soviet wartime management structure, particularly in the Moscow area.
J
In sum. the scope ol the USSK's progiam for leadership continuity in nuclear war and the investment il has received over the pastears indicate that the Soviets are serious in their efforts tourvivable and effective wartime management structure. This structure is intended to exercise control over whatever national assetsuclear attack.apability would be vital lo their plans for favorably concluding the war effort and for postwar recovery.
CHAPTER I
SOVIET STRATEGY FOR WARTIME MANAGEMENT
Soviet strategy for nuclear wai calh (or plans that will ensure the continuity ami survivability of the Soviet state and Its form of government. Thu strategy underlies Soviet efforts since World War II tonified management structure for eiereising control at national and territorial levelsonflict
A. Soviet Perceptions of Nodoar War
Soviet development of nuclear weapons anddelivery systems began under Stalin, but it was not until thehai theirfor Soviet militaiy strategy wcie openly discussed by militaryhe end of the decade, the main outlines of Soviet doctrine on nuclear war had emerged and were given eilensive treatment inand unclassified literature. Since then, debates have continued within the Soviet militaryon some aspects of this doctrine and itsto strategy, tactics, andut. on the whole, Soviet views on the objectives, origins, conduct, andof nuclear war have been generally consistent.
he Soviets believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses strategiccapabilities that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war with the Unilod States would be athat limit lie avoided if possible and that they do not regardonflict as inevitable. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on forceand deplovmenti when it serves their interests Nevertheless, they regard nuclear warontinuing Possibility and have reieeted mutual vulnerabilityesirable- or permanent basts for the US-Sovietrelationship They seek superior capabilities to fight anduclear war with the United States without bringing the vital activities of the statetandstill or threatening the survival of the Sovietenet in then strategic thinking Iwlds that the better prepared the USSR is lo light in various
contingencies, the more likelyhat potential enemies will benitiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions
beheve the Sovietsumberwar, theaterwar, inleiconiinental nuclear war, aodwar Regardless of how nuclear war develops,believe the conflict will possess severalthat will distinguish it Irom past warsinfluence the kinds of preparationsits conduct. For the Soviets, World War IIa scries of front operations in one theaterthe tempo of operations was dictated byof opposing forces to test, regroup, andmajor actions They believe the scope andcontemporary war will be sharply different ItUrge areas of the world and involveof operations, both continental andcombined-arms operations may beginwarning and would have lo proceed rapidlytheir objectives Manpower andwill be much higher because of modernFinally, nuclear weapons will be able todamage lo the Soviet population andConsequently, tho entire Soviet stateprepared to functionuclear environment-
E Organizational Concepts
the pastears, the Soviets haveorganizational structures that arc consistentview of nuclear war Organizational changesa nuclear conflict followed lhe shiftsstrategy and tactics resulting from tbenumbers and quality of nuclear weaponsboth the United States and USSR Conceptually,lor these changes as well as forand forces for nuclear warfare wereby the Soviets inndtoward satisfying these requirements was
tup Surer
uneven because of resourceesistance to changethe officer corps, and the continuing need In tnalch or offset US technological advance*.
lie Soviel concept ol tnainljiiiing the stability ol the homeland in unclear war evolved fiiim what lhe Soviet* described as the "revolution in military affairs" and is firmly anchored In the tradition and history of the USSll. In the early years of the Soviel regime, the chief purposesnified war management structure tveie lo ha rites* the economy In the war rffurl and to retain the loyally ol the population. The experiences of the USSR in World War II reinforced these themes jnd demonstrated the danger inherent in delaying the implementation of ihe necessary organizational changes in ihc nation's management stiucture until alter the inset of hostilities. Consequently. In the poslwai period plans were made for convertingindustrial production to meet wartime requite-mcnti. As the Soviets studied nuclear svar morehowever, they recognized their need for more compiehensive peacetime preparations. Thesewould provide for
Survival and continuity of the leadership bv protecting personnel and facilities against lhe effects of nuclear attack and by facilitating damage recovery operations
I>es'c!opmcnt of rapid and efficienl manpower and economic innbili/alion procedures, which could of fset the high rates of attrition expected in modern warfare.
Indoctrination of military and civilian personnel in the realities of nuclear warfare.
7 Soviet strategists and planners concluded thai lhe wartime management organization should meet sever-sihey concluded that it must be:
iabll'hcd in peai ctlme
with the organizations responsible for defending against nuclear attack, and capable of supporting the conduct of military operations at any level or phase of hostilities
uick transition to wartimesviihour requiring significant modilications of its peacetime organisation.
Kcsponsive lo cent tali zed direction, ycl have the capability foriMed operations ll nucleai destruclion should make it necessary
& These organisational criteria remain valid and are reflected in curienl witlings by the highest levels ol lhe Soviel military establishment2 the Chief of the General. Ogarkov nulcd lhatfor tlse transition from peace to war of both the armed forces and the national economyignificance of special statexpediting this transition requires "carefully planned measures in peacetime, the coordinaled actions ol local patty,and militarygarkov emphasized the need to coordinate mobilization of ihc armed foices. the economy, and civil defense as the majorfor preserving the defensive capability ol the USSR.'
y The Soviet war management system nosvnified command structure citending from the central leadership lo tlie aimed forces, lo all tcrriloiial and administrative levels of ihc USSH. and to the national economy The national-level control organs lhat the Soviet* have established, such as the Defense Council, correspond to organizationalof the World War II period. Theanagement organizations below the national level consist of the militaiy districts and lhe nationwide civil defense structure.
he military districts, organized on territorial lines, have traditionally served as the focus for vital military-civilian relationships Militaryramework that is essentia) for lhe tiansitloneacetimeaitime posture The Soviet civil defense organization for its part provide* the civilian political and economicommandhecipcrtisc for managing the country under the stress of nuclear conflict According to Soviet writings, in peacetime ihe civil defense organization is an "mtegial parttatewide system of defensive measures,ecognized component of the Soviet armed forces. Civil defense officials provide doctrinal and technical uniformity in training programs and supervise all other peacetime civil defenseBy placing the civil defense structure under the
'Omrtov.reomd 'w lit* IJirfinuBnc
I'XlinliiKl."Vr/irnixtfol. IflBZ.
control of the military districts during war. the Soviets believe they will achieve an effective, unified military-civilian organization for managing the country.
II. The present war management structure and procedures did not evolve smoolhly. Soviet military leaders probably hoped that the civil defenseKstablished byould be directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) ami Ihc military districts However,1 statute placed the Chief, USSR Civil Defense, directly under Ihe Council of Ministers rather than the MOD.it was not1 that MOD was formally given direct responsibility for civil defense, theof Defense did provide personnel and materiel support to civil defense and frequently assumedof civil defense operations in command postlse subordination of civil defense to the MOD was followed by changes in the functions of the
This Civil Drfernelassified iewilu cioaiI hi CentralfceCPSU and Council ol Ministers ci ih? USSH. dalod1
1 According lo the Socle: MlUla'v Enevcbvedio. because ul theiTutle1 it* SovKts kfhlevnl "iinilicd leadership ofined lotto and civil defensehe defwne of the miiii ihe country, one oi ihc mnsi important conditions (or euitinteeang irlitble detent* al th* Snvlet stale"
military districts designed to integrate civil defense (and later air defense) into planning for mobilization and wartime management of all the military and civilian resources within these districts. The changes at the military district level began In thep
3
rogiess toward ensuring tlie stability of the rear has nol been as spectacular as that displayed by the Soviets in their drvrloiimrnl and deployment of weapon systems Abo, the use of the term "civil defense'" by both Soviet and Western officials to refer to these extensive preparations hat tended to obscure their purpose as key elementsartimesystem. Soviet propaganda invariably refers to civil defease activities as "humanitarianowever. Soviet civil defense preparations encompass far more than humanitarian considerations The chapters that follow address the additional dimensions o( civilin Soviet concepts and plans lor wartime
III" laidml muted lor use by prnrminduts non the Soviel pubboitiim Vuvennyyrfunr IBM
CHAPTER II WARTIME MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Influence of World War II
1 The present Soviet wartime managementdisplays marked continuity with World War II oeeam radons designed to mobilize both military and civilian resources Although the Soviet* continue to emphasize the lessons of World War II. they stress lhat changes In warfare have occurred- Organizational forms andicci created during tbe war were highly im(Motivational Soviet awareness of the inadequacies of these wartime esperimcnts and of the "altered conditions of modem warfare" hasrimary impetus lor change. The Soviets frequently cite, howevei. the Slate Defense Committee (GKO)odel for wartime centralization of the political, military, and economic leadership. The wartimeof the Defense Council would probably cone-spond to that eiercised by the CKO during Worldimilarly, the present Soviet civil defense organization is heavily influenced by it predecessor, tbe Local Air Defense (MPVOX createdlthough the MI'VO underwent numerousprior to its redesignation as USSR Civil Defenset was very much under the control of the military at the national and mihtaryuring its formative years The wartime eiperienccs of the military districts and lhe city defense cornmiltees in mobilizing and organizing the populationbo influenced the scope ol responsibilities envisioned for lhe present military district commandersar
B. Peacetime Oraonizations and Functions
2 The party stale apparatus that manages the Sovt-et Union in peacetime consists of three interrelated hierarchies th* party, the government administration, and the ministerial system with subordinate eniiiin throughout the countryhole, they provide an integrated management structure ihal imposesdirection over all elements ol the military,and social life ol Ihe nation Some ol the
characteristics of this apparatus and Its management practices arc widely perceived as hindering theperformance of the Soviet Union, but these same characteristics and practices would greatly facilitate the management of the nation under the catastrophic circumstances of nuclear war.
3 Communist Party of the Soviet Unionentral to the Soviet system is the CPSU. whose monopoly of political power was formally recognized in7 Conslitulion. Organizationally, the CPSU parallels the state apparatus. Beginning with theand the Central Committee, there are party committees at each level of the terrilorial-administra-tivc structure. The party also hasin every military unit, government office,and school in the country. Party officials in this complementary structure are tasked lo ensure that goals set by the national leadership in the military, economic, and social spheres are met Their efforts arc enhanced by the nomenklatura system by which the CPSU controls the assignment of party officials to key government, military, and economic posts.
The party structure providesigh degree of redundancy in management personnel: Partyat all levels contain departments composed ol functional specialists who oversee correspondingof government, economic, and military organizations. These specialists are frequently rotated under the nomenklatura system to party-controlled management positions in the territorial or ministerial hieraichics Such party career patterns potentially broaden the pool of management expertise available In replace losses that would occuruclear conflict (See chapter III.urrentof the size of lhe wartime leadership.)
Well-defined peacetime party organizations which manage the USSR are expected to continue to function in wartime During peacetime, senioi parly Icadeis al territorial levels arc responsible for lhe
I6a-
-lap Sat.ea
of policy goals in iheir respective area*urisdiction This practice has laid liveloi decentralized management during periodsI authorities may be unable toypical first secretary of the parly at the territorial level is likely to have had eitensive eipctie-ncc in working with government military and economic Of* gani/ationi He may also have held memberships in central party bodies, such us the Central Committee, and is usually well-informedide range of policy issues lhat transcend provincial interest.
Administration. The USSR is divided intonion republics whose boundaries, languages, and population nils arc the product of various historical influenceshe structure of each icpublic government resembles that of the USSR itself Below tbe union republic are tentorial administrative subdivisions that include autonomous republics (having government structures patterned after those of the union republics to which they arefollowed by kiays, oblasts. autonomous oblasts, nationalities, urban rayons, and rural. At levels below lhat of the republics, it is the chairman of the eaeeutiv* committee (Upotkom) ot the local Soviet (council) through whomauthority is exercised The size and makeup of the support structure of executive committees vary ac-routing to territorial level, population, and economic importance of the area.
organizational level al which basicfunctions are performed also varies. The number, types, and responsibilities of subordinate echelons arc-not uniformly distributed (rom republic to republic. Thev dilfer considerably depending on faclors such as tlie lire of the republic and the presence within the republic of ethnic minorities possessing their own politicalisions In smaller republics (such as tliose in the Baltic and the Caucasus) authority is eierciscd directly from the republic to cities and rural rayrspj Vox the remainder of the country, however,he oblast levelhat represents the principal
'Omrnllv. itiere are US aulonnraoni republiev kiavi, andlie USSIt. For uniformity Ihey will all he mli-ntd lo ai
in IIm Mernoaaadum1 ihrnnounced ihal a
no aulaa had Seen created na itae Labrt SSR. Hi eUaati* en* el Nave. Brcaaacoae awaaMrUoanl drtodacaalataon,p. ail .lev and a> forth) as el lUs
.aad")hfthai Ihe to* fraaM to. Ihr
l nbtrOi uiriltm would m<ere we to attempt tu include MtaMHrj lor'theOWmI
buildiug block of Soviet administration- While its responsibilities arc narrowly defined, the obihe lowesl managerial level where llie inleresls andof allmilitary, economic, andconverge
S Mimsterial Structure. Governmentand economic management are conductedthrough ministries, state committees, andentities at the national and republic levels Then managers form the all-union and union republic councils of ministers, the chairmen of which head the government apparatus of the USSR and those of its cunsillucnt republics. These ministerial organizations are responsible for functions such as planning,and pricing, and specific sectors such as defense, state security, public order, individual industries, health care, and transportation Their activities are coordinated by tbe respective national and republic councils of ministers acting under guidelinesby the CPSU Pohtbuio and implemented by appropriate departments of the Central Committee. Thne are three types of ministerial structure
All union ministries are those organizations with headquarters in Moscow which have noin the republics and manage their activities through subordinate offices at territorial levels ami through cnterpriiei under their dimctThe type and geographic distribution of organizations subordinate to the minlsliies may be widespread, including all tbe eotrrpoiee of an industry The subordinate elementi mayegional basis, as is the case with the military districts of the Ministry ol IVlense or the railroad administrations of the Ministry of Railways.
Union repuhtic ministries have headquarters In Moscow with counter parts at the republic level The republic counterpart ministry is subordinate both to tlie union republic ministry in Moscow and to the Council of Ministers of the republic Ministerial oiganlzatlons below the republic level and individual eniei prises, depending on their importance, may alio be responsible to theat both the national andeb
furpu bhe ministers have no counterpart al the national level. They ure responsible for functions such as road consti action and maintenance.
2
Uoion Administrative Dmsinns
"T
Iranspoii, communal services, socialand local Industry Thev operate ih.ough Inca) offices and cnlerptlses which in turn are subordinate lo both regional (Way or oblast) eiccullv* committees and republic ministries
9 High-priority and crntraliwd organiratiocs such pj the Ministry of MkM the various defense and defense lelaicd industries, rail-ays. and civj aviation, which have no ministerial counterparts at lo-er levers, ire likely to have an all-union status (see inset on6' On the other hand, many .mportanl functions, such as state security, internal affairs.
i.tlll
k.lUatan*
lb illrtjamianaad<*on ml -al ihoiiw tm HBBBan
communications, and othet sectors, (all under union republic minUtiws in Moscow, ami their centralapparatus is replicated al union lepublic and territorial levels
ll of the organiratiom siiboidinate lo natioiul-level ministriesole in wartime management of the government and the economy, including postal-tack recovery Fven those ministries found only at the republic level and al the lowest end of the peacetime pi.or.iy scale haves.bihlws lhat will assume considerable importance in nuclear war Foe example, eitemive preparations for decontamination involve (acihliea and services that would be provided through republic ministries responsible lor housing andalfairs Although lhe ministerial system is highly eentralirrd. the lephealiun of ministerial organizations
1-4
Mlniitvrul
and Stale Committee*.
/ MmMH Bulldtm/lMltnii
Mlolury of Aviation IrvaWity
Mmiatry of Geaeral Machine hVliiim
Muu.lt? ofMackine Hti.Minc
Mianuy of Deferae InAuun
M.muo off>
Miaiairy of Beexreaaa u,
Miiuatry of Radio Indwy
Miniilry of Machine
Miniilry of CommunicjiDooi toiiisuneni ledunry
Minlwry oflufuitty
ther Uathtm BMMiut
MWtllrt of Etatrieal fco-inenenl Indtuiry
MiaUtrt ofMib^ AwocaataM Eo.miprr**t. and
ad
MUWtfldme. for Lichl and Food hffaffaTJ
Howhcld Appliance. Minltliyaiw tool and Tool ttaildwa Indn.uy Miniilry of Tractor and Auirtultuialtcm* Minlitrv of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building MinUtry of CoeiUucuon. Road, and Municipal Machine
tor
Mn-ltry ofuuy of Po-er MaCfdMtaw Comim lor U* SocHj Agriculture
irdaltry/Erurty
Minialty of Oat tndniliy Miniitry of Petroleum Induitiy
< Olktr Induury
MaMUy of Medical ta*etlry MioaiuyerfCbeobeai bfkrfag
B. Ira
Mlnittry of Civil Aviation Miniilry of Maritime Fliet Mmltltyof tuulwayi
Ttlqtaph Aiok) of the Soviel Unice (TASSl
( '
aaatracueaaFar fate aad TranMilal Rafdoaa Mimtry of Gnukiw ofat luetaury
Fnierpeitet Mmtiiiy ofonitrtaeiaaa
k-al Ser-Hti
Mixitryoff Foroio
Slate Continue for Foreran Economic Kclauoni Suae Coximlii* fa SaeaceocJiftotocy Stale Cimiiv fee Maura) "onw
Stale Committee for Invention! andSum Committee for Standard!
Stale Committee tot Hydionxieoiulogy and Ennion mental Control
HrpnbUc Ministries and Stale Committees EcaMffffk
A- UWtiy
I. Etiiacth* IntwiryfEmfy
Mtntttry of Coal Industry MiaaUy of Feeroua Meuilorgj
Miaaury ofetallurgy
of htrafaun RrWf aadMuwr*of fore id EkcaifnauoaState Committee for the Surety of Pttrokaa Piodotu
Minniryof Airiculiitre
Ministry of Fiuit and Vegetable Industiy
MuiUtry of land Reclamation and Wain Resource!
Slate Committer lor Forcatit
3 Ckkc
Miaou, Of Full inda-uj Miaaltv of FcoJ
Minutry of Mineral Fertiliter MM! Ministry Ot Timber. Pulp ano Paper. Wood Processinc Industry
KCoaMrertUa
M-aauy of Contrast.**
M-nauo of CoaitnKto- of War,jnervrua
Miuwryoaauociaaa Mwm*
Minaney of InHillatiOO and Soeeiatort
Mialilry of Rural Connructioo
Statelor Cowtructioe. Afl-in (GoWioy)
Adminisltati't Strvlces
A
Ntuutiy of loatrmal Afuiri|MVIH CoowtHtM for Slate Secwity "i-
B. CeatraJ llannln
MinUtry of ftocurecinii
Suu CMiai'nPlaaaMc fOoipi.>;
ajel
Minis If rial Organizations (continued)
Services (continued) C. Fiaancc
Minis)iy of Finance Sine Back- (Ontbink)
II. Science/Education
Mmuliy of Rducation Ministry ctf Geology
Mmialry ot Higher and Secondary Specialised Education State Commit tw Tor Vocational ami Technical Educaiion Academy of Sciences
t. Public Sec.ieet
Ministry of ConununidUOni Ministry o( Culture Ministry of Health
Sine Committee for Cinema tosraphr (Oeeiino) Slate Committee for Labor and Social Problems Suie Committee for PuNUhdng Howes. Pr.ntlne Hants, sed
the .Book Trade Stale Committee for Television and Radio Brcadcaiiiitg
I Ol><r
MJnoirvnf ForeiEn Affairs
Minisiry of lustier
Central Suiinlcal Administration
Republic Ministerial Agencies'
Main Adoinistratios of the River Fleet
Ministry of Contumer Service*
Minislryof Cotton Cleaninc Indmiry
Ministry of Furniture and Wood Procesiuifi
Minisiry of Highway Construction and Maintenance
Ministry of Housing and Municipal Service*
Minisiry of Local Industry
Ministry of Moier Transport
Minisiry of Municipal Services
Ministry of Social Security
Siale Committee for tbe Protection o( Nature
Agency without ministerial status.
Representative listing only The numbers and types of republican nnniitrics.nd administrations vary from republicewbbe- The total number forepublicst.
republic and regional administrations could, howev-er,hift to more decentralizedif eircumstanocs require it.
collegium; also contribute toof the ministerial structure to provideredundancy and to decentralize theirin wartime. In each ministry, tho minister andbelongormal collegium charged byof Ministers with oversight of theand the resolution of policy questions.of collegia! decisionmaking permits leaderspersonal responsibility for peacetimefrom what we know of the functioningcolleglums, particularly in lheit is evident that the broad exposure ofto managerial issues outside their areacould enable them toiderresponsibilitiesrisis
C. Orgonizations for the Transition to Woa-time
Soviets attach great importance toapid transition from peace to war with
minimal disruption. Organizations exist within their peacetime structure that have special responsibilities for facilitating this transition. These include theCouncil and Ihe second directorates andin ministerial and territorial components that coordinate civil defense and economic mobilization measures. Also included are civil defense staffs,commissariats, and military districts.-
USSR Defense Council
f7 Soviet Constitution provides for the establishmentSSR Defense Council bv Ihe Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also confirms the Council's membership. The Council is now chaired by the General Secretary of the CPSU. who is also llie chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Although its existence was first made public. the Defense Council lias formally existed since at least the. It is believed that the Council's membership includes the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Defense, and other selected Politburo members whose special responsibilities would fall within the province
ol tiiiliiitul defense. In addition, ton military leaders and key defense industiial managers are probably involved in Defense Council activities as members or participants
The Defense Council serves as tbe Soviets' supreme decisionmaking organization for nationalpolicy. It is described in Soviel administrative law as responsible in peacetime for "coordination of the activities of the organs of slate administration concerned wilh defense ol the counlry" and for "determination of the basic direction of militaryin thehus, it makes peacetime policy decisions affecting doctrine and strategy,expenditures, weapons procurement, forceand Ihe entire range ol preparations necessary for lhe mobilization of lhe nation's resources for armed conflict. For example, in the1 statute establishing civil defense, it was stated that Ihe most important questions concerning Civil defense are "studied by Ihe USSR Defense Council."
Tlie Defense Council piobably operates through special groups or commissions, as well as through the existing ministerial structure under the Council of Ministers. Such groups would include the Military Industrial Commission with its responsibility forand development and production ol defense materiel andecond, unidentifiedthat was formed6 which probably deals with civil defense-related questions affecting other ministerial entities Tliese two commissions appear to be essential elemenls In the development andof an Integrated military-economic mobilization plan for which the Defense Council is responsible.
Second Deportments
Present at all management levels in the national economy are Second Departments responsible forplans for conversion to wartime operations with the necessary civil defense measures. Each sector of the economy and each enterprise has differing requirements lor protecting personnel and facilities, depending on the importance of their functions and the need to continue their operations In wartime.
Integration ol economic mobilization and civil defense planning begins at lhe ministerial level. Each
Secondt nl develops plant lor iheof theviiriimr operations andrequirementsuclear environment (based on research done by the Scientific Technicalof USSR Civil Defense) These measures range from shutdown nf some plants and Ihe development ol redundant production facilities to the creation of wartime command and rontioi facilities The physical preparations and emergency procedures thai are lo be undertaken are specified in an integrated plan lor wartime mobilization of each organization These plans are coordinated with territorial civil defense staffs through tbe th-rfs ol civil defense of the mints-try's enterprise* This process sermechnical channel for modifying plans The teititonal civil defease staffs have theesponsibility for civil defense planning
USSRefense
principal feature ol Soviet civil defenseis the direct involvement In peacetime oftrained military officers al all levels ofThe civil defense organization isin peacetime for;
Research inlo those aspects ol nuclear conflict (potential taiget areas, nucloar weapons employ-merit, and effects) that relate lo the stability of the government and economy
Developrneiit ol technical standards for the full range of protective measures, deuces, and(surface and undeigicmnd) designed for wartime use
Development and testing of training and indoc lunation programs for civil defense staffs,and formations down to individual
&taUishment of command, control, andfacilities and procedures (Including alert and warning systems) that arc compatible with those of the armed lorces.
Preparation, revision, and coordination of plans foi civil defense operations
Detent* Organisation andpolicy guidance on civil defense matterswith tlie Defense Council Coot dilution ol civil
uctlvilics wilh those of other components of the armed forces is the responsibility of the General Staff The USSH Civil Defense Staff, headed hy General of the Army Aleksandrrgani/ed to ptovide technical guidance and direction toeserrserMs in the same manner as other MOD stiff elements provide Rukiancr and direction to the branches ot the Soviet armed forces Thti similarityreflected in the organizational strueture ol the USSR Civil Defense Staff, which Includes political,foreign assistance, and combat trainingfn addition, the civil defense organization has specialized functions that are the responsibility of numbered directorates such ash (probably responsible fur supervision of civil defenseandh (probably responsible for engineer mg technical measures! An indication of theof USSR Civil Defense is the presence of at least 2f- general officers at USSR Qvil Defenseers Sec4hart of the otganlzatiorsal stiudute.
SO. At Ihe republic level, the chiefs of civil defense are the civilian chairmen of the republic councils of ministers Military chiefs of staff retain functional responsibility for civil defense and their staffTlse chiefs of staff are general offieen, many of whom are of tbe same ethnic origin as the majority ofopulation in the republic in which they serve The organizational structure of the republic civil defense staff (composed of both civilian and active-duty military personnel) is patterned on that of the USSR Civil Defense Staff
t levels below that of the republic, the civilian chairmen of executive committees aie chiefs of civil defense for their jurisdictions. At the oblast level and in many cities, the executive committees are assisted by civil defense staffs headed by active-duty military olttcers At lower levels, staffs can also be headed by reserve or retired military officers The civil defense staffs operate with the same authority as department* of regional and local soveinments Oblast Staffs are coiicspondingly smaller than thuwr at the republic level but follow similar organizational patterns In some eases, oblast civil defense staffs are metged with the civil defense staffs of cities, as In the case of Leningrad.
he CI'SU's authority over civil defense is exercised through the flrsl secretaries of its territorial committees and ihrough other party organizations. Within the civil defense structure, the partyfollows the pattern established by the MOD's Main Political Diicctoratc for other components of the aimed forces There are deputies for political affairs at each sod of the dvil defenseo. all military personnel in the civil defense organization who are party members must beith key party organlialmm
Communications for civil defense staffs at the national, republic, and oblast levels are maintained bv mililurv communications centers Personnel of these centeri have been included tn lhe totals of military civil defense personnel shown in tableSeeIII for further details on the civil defensesystem.)
At individual installations there are few active-duty military personnel among the many lull-lime employ em charged with civilspoil lilies We have had reports, however, of active duly officers serving ill civil defense positions at induslrloldescribed ai having "national importance."
Manpower. The number of full time civilpersonnel in peacetime is determined by the USSR Council of Ministers. As stipulated In1 statute, the three categories are
Active-duty military personnel and civilianof the Ministry of Defense assigned to territorial dvil defense staffs, command posts, civil defense Hoop units, communicationschemical laboratories, and educationalut ions
Civilian employees of councils of ministers or executive committees of local Soviets (oblast, city, and rayon) who may supplement MOD person nd in staffing tbe territorial or local dvil defense organizations, or at lower levels, may constitute the entire civil ddense staff
Civilian employees of ministerial and territorial organizations who serve as full-time civil defense personnel for Individual installations.
6 3SU 8a
l-i
5 oil rit
II-1
Estimated Full-Time Soviet Civil Defense Personnel
Cnirwte
Estimate
oigi-iuilotn
.TOO
and Wo*
cooapooeoii
dittrict hcidujatlfo
JO
W
defense troop untti
academy
ore. mi ration)
research insin lutes
inttitutioiu
and public orcaniiaiioni
CO;
adrmnb tra,
estimating numbers of MOD personnel assigned to civil defense, we have Ml aUetnpced to diiiingoiih between active-duty servicemen and civilian employees.
manpower estimates tcpccscnt an increaser those of1 Memorandum to Holders, which are ihowrt io parentheses. The Increases result from reanalytli of cutting date and acquisition of nc information.
Current estimates for full-time personnel in the civil defense structure are given in tabic IM. (Seeor the methodology used in arriving at these figures}
In the transition from peacetime lo wartime, lhe professional Qualifications of command and staff I'crsonnel responsible for civil defense are just as important as their numbers. Of the approximatelyeneral officers in the civil defense structure, the
carccrs of those for whom wc have biographic data reveal that the majority have had significantand staff experience at military district or equivalent levels. Their educational backgroundslhat these civil defense generals arcar with their peers in other elements of the armed forces in terms of advanced mililary education. Civil defense assignments do nol appear to have diminished career advancement for general and field-grade officers.
of World War II no longeramong the active-duty officers and reservein civil defense staff positions. Anof active-duty personnel arc graduates ofdefense academy, olher military schools, anddefense advanced officers courses. The qualityfield-grade officers is indicated by the numbercolonels at national and republicto general officer rank. Senior,al lower levels of the territorial civiland at individual installations continue toby reserve officers and officer retirees.in administrative law covering dualpay scales and pensions promulgatedSSR Civil Defense chief have encouragedand Tctirces to accept these positions.are particularly effective inofficers leaving active service tofinancial prospects by Wining civil defenseImprovemenls in the quality ofas well as other changes ioarticularly at the militaryhave contributedloser Integration ofand other elements of ihe Soviet warsystem.
/Ailitory Districts
ilitary districts in the Soviet Unionterritorial extension of Ihe Ministry of Defensea key echelon in the wartime managementThe main peacetime functions ol lheare supervising combai and political trainineunits and malting preparations forThe military district is also responsible foran extensive network of service andrat ions arid facilities through its chief of
11
n each military districtmniandcr (ot cavil defense wlio is inputrublr to lhe military district commander for allctivilli'i and control of miliUrv civil defense troops in the district. During lhe past decade wr have identified deputy oamrmrsdets for cinl defense inf theilitary districts The organization of the staff of the deputy commander for civil defense probably resembles that of the USSR Gvii Defense The civil defense directorates of the military drslncts develop and participate in Iraininc piograms. monitor tho readiness of territoiiul civil defense staffs,services and civilian formations in their districts, and conduct eaercises (often within ihe framework of more broadly based General Staff cscicisesj. The manner in which the mililary district will function in wartime is treated in the neit chapter
Military .Commissariats
italoviet plans lor theto wartime management is the need to balance the manpower requirements of the aimed forces with those of civil defense. The Soviets must make peaolittie picpaiaiions to ensure adequate manning of keyposts. These prepaiatsons must also ensure the availability ol molor vehicles and drivers on which civil defense would rely foi implementation of many ol its wmrtune plans The military commissariats are the key to resolving the ptoblems faced by Soviet civil defense in mobilizing manpower and othci dvllian resources.
ilitary commissariats are defined by theas organs ol local military administration and are found al all lovels of the territorial hierarchy.military commissariats are organized according to Soviet lenitorialadministiaiive subdivisions, they are lesponsiblc to the mililary district within which they are located. Their activities include supervising preinduction military training and inddlunation,callups for militaryand reserve training, and maintaining records on reservists and deferments. They also supcivive registration of national economic resources suitable for meeting the needs of theconduct partial or general mobilization, and allocate civilian technical equipment and transport.
c believe lhal during Ihe past decade the Soviets have done much lo ensure lhat rnobiliration of manpower and othet resources would take intothe needs of the civil defense structuresources have le.vcalcd growing cooperationcommissariats and civil defense staffs at keyls Indeed, there is mndence thaiion of consolidation of lhe functions of these organizations began us early as Iftro |^
Jlleporling from other sources in lhe same time frame offers further indication ofSoviet interest in this problem Administrative experiments were reportedly conducted in the Baltic MD In then which republic mililary commissariats arid their subordinate organizationsresponsibility for civil defense Theabsorbed the civil defense staffs, and deputy' commissars with special civil defense duties were appointed Below this level,taffs continued lo function in the sam- manner at their tegular offices. Marshal Ogarkov has also suggested closerbetween civil defense and military commissariats, bolh in public writings and in articles in the military
yt appeared that the question of consolidation of mililary commitsatiat and civilfunctions was still being deliberated as the Ceneral Staff sought the views of various military district commanders. Reportedly, alter consulting with their deputy ccriunanders for civd defense and others, thev responded negatively. Seme* oflaoers of the USSR Civil Defense Staff wcie also oiiposcd to lhe ptoposal. While the precise twrameters of the consolidation proposal and the icasons for the opposition are not
' For run-Kir. an arlreU eMitWd "Ourmm Same' IB toe
n" Iftsl liniR it Votennpav Znemyail ere nee heldlngrid in lite summer oftlerdcd* br tetnesenta lives uf ilvll defense ataffi. DQSAAFand military cceanuaartati uf Unanaiad nl! and eUast TV paacow uf tie. io pinaniUn.-hi anions. IwSuCinc
iiriiiMkin in laenMlucltori ailtil.it training euui>H
known, lhe negative reception could have been caused by
Ouealkocu of organizational rejporvobtlities.and personnel assignments, which inevitably occur In any major reorganization
Advene reactions from heads of government) at republic and oblast levels on whose cooperation military districts must rely to ensure effective support of Ihe civil defense program.
e believe, however, that some version of the cor-solidation plan will probably be adopted because of Maishal Ogarkov's consistent support for ihii coocept Outright rejection of the proposal would counter tbe long-term trends of integrating plans for mobilization
and dvil defense and ensuring maximum cooperation between the two organizations We cannot, however, prrdict the extent and form of this consolldalioii We eipect, however, based on the experiments in the Baltic republics, lhat this would have little noticeable impact on the territorial civil defense structure. As in the case of other war preparedness programs, the military commissariats would exercise behind-the-scenes control In sum, merging these twowould enhance the ability of the military district to manage mobilization and meet Its war management responsibilities'
DIA Defense Intelligence. ReportiiUarp CcmmUsorlari: Ofajaalufton andmore information on lhe
Sonet mHiuii eommluartai warm
fCS UfWf.00
CHAPTER III WARTIME MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
Although there are some gaps in our information on the Soviet wartime management structure,with regard to some component* of the central pohticomilitary apparatus, we are still able to assess the requirements of individual components forprotection and relocation facilities We willon those organizations concerned with the defense of the homeland and on programs to ensure the continuity of rear services activities and theeconomy. These functions are all vital tri the support of military operations. We also will address requirements for leadership protection of the head-Quartcrs of each of the branches nf the armed forces.
A. Functions and Requirements Narionol Level
2 Fotiibvto and Central Committee CPSU- We believe the highest organ of dectwonmaking andin wartime wouldodified Defense Council whose members would be drawn from the highest levels of the party and government The strategic direction of Ihr. armed forces would be the responsibil-ily of the "Stavka" of the Supreme High Command (VCKJ. The Politburo would probably continue to function, but, because tnuoli of its membership would be on tlie Defense Council, we cannot determine what the separaliun of functions wuuld be between the Politburo and the Defense Council During World War II. the Politburo and the Central Committee continued lo meet periodically even though virtually all of the members of Ihese top party enllties were involved in the war effort and had assumed one or mote additional respoemUliltn. includingm lhe State Defense Commitiee.esult, key decisions were normally takenessions of the Politburo, the. Stale Defense Committee, and the Stavka. We are also uncertain about llie tuccise war-
time role of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its functional departments. This grouporce ofrofessional and staff personnel whose eapertrse would be vital to Politburo and Defense Council activities. Although lhe Central Committee possesses an eiurban reloration facility near Moscow, we do nol know which wartime functions will be carried mil thrre
ejemr Council or State Defense Committee (GKOI. Soviet writings continue to emphasize the role of the State Defense Committee in World War II We believeew version of the CKO would be formed, probably around the ens'ing Defensewith eipanded membership and whateverstaff com mil tee support might be required However, we do not believe that references lo the CKO imply that an entirely new organization would be orated The present Defense Council already has available Ihe legal basis and organizational resources needed lor deciding on and Implementing strategic puliclc* and plans during periods ol crises TheCouncil would be able to provide centralized leadership and stieamlined war managementpoor lo hostilities by planning in advance for utilization of the resources of the Main Operations Directorate uf the General Staff and eiistingon defense industries and civil defense, and by working through ley ministerial organizations.
4 At some point in the transition to wartimeIhe Defense Council would begin issuingin its own name in place of 'he present practice of having mini resolutions issued by the Central Committee CPSU and Council of Ministerslor making this transition and for its timing probably have already been established and linked to the readiness levels of the Soviet aimed forces. If the conflict did urn go as canceled, or if it became
a
-lop-Secret-"
Defense Council operations would almost certainly be modified as circumstances required In some circumstances authority could be docMilralized.
lavka of Ihe Supreme High Commands executive organ ol the Supreme High Command, the Stavka provides strategic direction of the armed lorces. The head of the Stavka would be both the Supreme Commander in Chief and also Chairman of the Defense Council. We are not certain which of Ihc nations senior political and military leaders would be included in the Stavka. Il could number some or all of the members of the peacetime Ministry of DefenseMinister ofthe Ihree first deputy ministers including the Chief of ihe General Slaff. lite chiefs of the five mililary services, the deputy ministers for rear services and civil defense, and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate. Decisions on the actual membership could be modified as the situation required. Included in the Supreme High Command structure and subordinate to the Slavka are the Ceneral Slaff and key directorates of the Ministry of Defense.
6 The principal source of slaff support for lhe Stavka would come from lite Main Operationsof the General Slaff. The Slavka wouldbe colocaled with the Main OperationsOther General Staff components with key wartime roles would operate from separate command posts. On the basis of our analysis of tlie functions of the General Staffie Ministry of Defense, we have judged which of tlieir subordinate elements would require command post facilities for operations in wartime (see figure
orce Headauartert. The headquarters of the five branches of the armed forces would require at least one major exurban command post and relocation facility. Within the headquarters of the individual branches, there arc specialized elements that would require additional exurban relocation facilities In
8 Hearhe chief of lhe armed forces rear services would almost certainlyember of the Slavka and be required to coordinate closely with the Defense Council arid party-stale components. Hear
services support to thcatei forces and control ol the extensive network of rear services units, depots,syslcms, and other facilities would beIrom central rear services command post facilities in the Moscow area. Given tbe scope of the rear set vices lesporoibi lilies, it is likely thatas the Central MilitaryDirectorate, Central Food Directorate, and Central Military Medicalwouldcommand posts. These facilities probably would be located in the Moscow area as part of the Overall General Staff command post network. We have no evidence to indicate whether these subordinatewould be colocated with the rear services chief or be separately housed in iheir own hardenedposts.escribes those tear services directorates whose wartime responsibilities willthem to be included in the command post
SSR Civil Defense. We believe that inlhe national headquaiters of USSR Civil Defense will (unction in the same manner as olher service components of the arrived (ours It will provide slaff support lo the Stavka and the General Staff and technical staff supervision to territorial civil delense organizations and the civil defense directorates of the military districts Operational command of civilorganizations in the field, like elements of lhe_ Soviet armed forces, would be exercised by the Stavka and the Ceneral Staff through Ihe commanders of military districts The Chief of USSR Civil Defense would probablyember of the Defense Council and ihc Stavka. Specialists in postattaek repair and recovery operations of ihc USSR Civil Defensewould probably be included in teams ofStaff representatives assigned lo individual military districts The USSR Civil Defense organization will require at least two exurban command posts in the Moscow area and may also need protected facilities in exurban areas for the computers of its centralinformation syslem We believe USSR Civil Delense will utilize ihis information syslem torepair and restoration requirements
reanisalions. In wartime, each all-union and union republic minister will ad as chief of civil defense of the ministry, assistedhief of
lll-2
- I
Minisiry ofStaff Componenis Requiring Wartime Relocation Facilities
(MiliUr;Command) nf th* Mhilitiy of DetViuc
tAt+Slto ol Ottam* [Cl; Airman cl Cotc^ rutJ
OepuVy tatvslcr Ol Oeten^e. CNtfl ofVice ChAirman ol
firrt Oep-ly Mioirtof ofommand* in Cluel
W.VN.r* IVI
Fiiil Deputy Mni,tfyelpiteUrt
Ontf. PoMicAl Qi-eciCfSk oraiv
l OfiMM andckf ih OW for Stultg*.
tfochti Force*
Dupiily MrnKfofidin ChiCl I*
er ot
Deputy Minitfrtn* Commander inCM Icr
Ajr Forcrs
niiler ol..ort
ftiH for
Orpuly Mister tfDelehi* to Ciwl Detent*
Ottaty Minister of Oefcnie And OW<*Man
Dwiy Mnattr cl Deivozej moor,Cq^nivii
Deputy MMtru> fc< Confrlfrttrtci *nd TfOcp Qilftftag
Deputy taritvier erf beMiw tor
Starr uf the
Soviel Armed Forres
Oepuh- Oimt of frnerai Slarl
Firit Deputy erf GenoraJ
OfMy Chief of feiior*l kr mt
Deputyflf
CftetofGeiLefti
CCfcTimuntCAUm
Slafl of
olDouBnatCn
Ol
Air Oieow re*ce*
MtWi S* Jlf OlNArtl -OKOfc
Si4*iD*ecte*Ate*
>orVJ
nd
antf
wce*
fqw
Antf
MiMary Air
rector Ales
tor
iil.onv
Him
Figure UI-2
Rear Services Component* Indudcd in General Slaff Commint Control, and Communication Syslem
Chief* Rear Services Armed Forces GNTVS)
Mililary
Medical
D-cctorate
M|,al
luel Supply DirectarMu
Cenlral food &upiny rvactorato
Central Midlary Transput tatwn Oircctorate
*noupply DvrtlcM*
rsovte
'Other lu-VCrimiomlicarityrmn reipenMiilflieiI nuiMin daw 'htIK* MVS
Theol certain ministries (primarily wppoil and service ministries) were initial-Iv specified in1efense Statute Eaam-ples of these ministries are contained in tablehe civil defense directives used in preparing tableave been modifiedut there is evidence that theof the ministfies for wartime management accord ttcncrallv with those assigned thrrri iirvder the original statute
n addition, we have evidence of waitimc plans for other service ministries and associated organiza-
tions lhatnot specifically ated in1 statute These include ihe State Co mm it tec forand Technical Supply, the Ministry of Power and ElectrtfieMMri. and TASS The wartime operations ol industrial ministries, including those responsible (or defense industries, ate determined by the production requirements ol their respective economicplaits Details are available on the plans and facilities of mine defense industries and the ministries responsible lor the electronics, automotive, chemical, coal, and construction mateiials industries
i
Table III-1
Citil Defense Roles for Selected Support and Sertice Ministries
Ministrymeasures foi the luoiccilon olaninult and pi ml lilt
Agriculture 1
Miniilry ufii lion
constant readiness of an transport and provide transport and aerul reconnaissance o! centers of destruction in accordance mh civil defense
of Communications
ilie dependable In net inning of means ofand Oiganiie their ceoiralired use See chapter IV
of.
fis supply system words reliably in wartime and wo-ide foi emergency reconstruction -oil ons minis
of Health'
imp elfeCI Civil defense measures for medical care under cnndiiions of nuclear -ar Creole reserves of medical sunpl.es and mcdicinc*.
of Internal Affair*
into effect measures for the preservation of order and security, for eilinguisaing Mntlaf. is linns, and for keeping trad o! losses among the population
o(ect
the reliability of the maritime transport systems and Iheir installation!
Committee for Material Reserves.
measures forof foodstuffs, fniage. and sources of -ater supply at subordinate bases and depots, disperse storage of State
foodslvffs and forage reserves. HespOroiWc for other area, as well.
Ihroagh its Eighth Directorate, allocates -aniine icQuirentcnu such as a
S;
Planning Committer. (Gosplan)
ihe assignment of urban areas lo civil defense categories in accordance wilh their admiaitiriilvc-pohileal, economic, sad delcnsnc significance; work out together -ilh MOD and USSR Cil Defense Basic data for carrying out measures to reduce losses from nuclearan of these te.pomitolrt.es mayi, the miltlary-economic depirimcnt of Gosplan. which -orka directly with lhe General Slaff on economic mobiliration problems. Also.urrently providing its regional informaiion centers down to oblast level with hardened undergtound tliucturcs for personnel and computer opera Unns (see figure
of Protuicinenl
dispersal ol gram stocks, their pioiectton against nuclear effects, and methods lor their deconiamini ion
a' Railways
lhe rehaBihiy of iSe rail iransport systems and their iMUllations
Cnmntiiice lor Telcviwin and Radio
lhe broadcasting ofefense lyognnB nod signals.
of Trade
food supplies, drinking water, and basic neeessilieshe pjpubtitt.
Minislty of Agriculture and Ihc Ministry of Health in their Civil defense modes in wartime will also function as the Service of Animal and Plan! Protection and Medical Scroce, respectively, of USSR Civil Defense. Each minnlee. iu addition tn his role as chief ol ovil defense of his own ministry, serves at ihe Chief Of Ihc service piuvlded By the Ministry and in thiscapsoiiy becomes responsible to the Chict. USSR Citil lyefense
ministries with wartimebeen directed by mint resolutions of theCPSU and the USSR Council ofestablish eaurban relocation facilities thatthem lo continue to function Party andbodies at lower levels also issueon these resolutions. Formplementoint resolutionthe RSFSR Ministry of the Food Industrya relocation facility alMoscow. Formulation of such Jointdirectives involves Soviet civil defenseset standards for such facilities. TheCommission, which provides (askingministries concerning defense andindustries, is also involved in thisurban relocation complexes will allow tbe
Supervise subordinate enterprises that continue to functionispersed or "special operatinghrough the period of threat up to the moment of actual attack.
Reallocate surviving personnel and equipmentanner that will permit continuing operations al reduced levelsuclear attack.
Provide technical guidance necessary for the repair and restoration of selected installations.
ministries possess more than onecommand post. In some cases these facilitiesin the Moscow area at distances ofofrom lhe capital. Other ministrieschosen to locate alternate facilities several
1 Tlie (cm "loxial oicntlntt mode oroiobyv irthtmi- wed In tbe Snvirii to characterize the iraruilicn elmil tervne (iiKanlutumi In weeiins arrtnccmenli lOnllii'il in llieii -uiiiiii" civil deleide pluu The termiicumiuncui in which economic enierprlau operate enlno-lhill lniti. Lndei thu ivitcrn, in nn-dulv shilt "ill remain it (fie urban insulUiior while off-duty shilu, tbe licilitv'ifon. ineiiei. fannliei "ill U1 (couiiedaiieiorhan duncriil me Mleded lor lheIn advance. Dunns ihe
tln;i<itth iltliuclear Itlld)
iliilli will iiiiinimite from the dupcrsil point to Iheni Italianml iciiiin NiMmallv. ttiere will lie ml Helen! (better inace at the mbin insiallition io accomrnodaie the on-duiv ibid
hundredom Moscow. It is also expected that some leaders and technical stall members of ministries in Moscow will lie assigned In wartime to subordinate otganirationi of lhe same ministryin the country, thus permitting decentralized functioning if this becomes necessary
Regardlesi of the relocation complex froministry operates in wartime. It retainsresponsibility for its special function and for the echelons subordinate to the ministry In peacetime. Distinct from technical responsibility, operationalto carry out civil defense plans is vested in military district and territorial civil defenseTechnical guidance mid direction fromarcn tlse civil defense operations plan of territorial civil defenseinistry horn administrative offices in Moscow to its relocation sites would he accomplished under the operational control of the civil defense staffs of Moscow city and oblast Relocation lo more distant points would involve Ihe civil defense staff in the area concerned
Mmii(rv of Internal Affaitt IMVDlpublic order (as opposed to slate security) is the responsibility of the union republic Ministry ofAffairs, which operates through the civil defense structure during wartime (see table IIM) At all territorial levels, the senior MVD official serves as the chief of the civil defense service of public order and in wartime would command the forces that make up the service. Tho service diaws on llie regular militia (local police forces) reinforced, as required, by localof the MVD internal troops, the civil defense
: formations of public order, and thevulunteeis In peacetime, MVD internal troops are directly subordinate to the main administration for internal troops of ihe USSR Ministry of Internal Mfairs. In wartime, however, control of these troops will be assumed by the VCK. which would make requisite elements available to military districts to support territorial civil defense services for public order Other elements lor which the Ministry of Internal Affair* is lesponsible are subordinated in peacetime to republic and territorial governmentIn wartime the MVD (irrllghtmgwould lorin the civil drlensr flrefighting seivices.
ihe .Uie auto inspectorate would be incorporated in lhe ci.il del erne material and technical supply servsce. and the functions of Ihe MVD inleinalontrol system would be closely linked in the opera iiom ol civil defense evacuation commissions
V USSR Ministry of Internal Allans in Mr* cow would require one or more eiurban command posh r
Other components of the MVD probably alsoheii own exurban command posts For funclions such as Ik- internal passport control system, exurbanCS would piobably include computerized central tiles
_jThis approach also would facilitate ihr MVD's tesponsibllity lor maintaining records oi cjsuahies among the civilian population nationwide
ommittee for Stole Security tKCB) Unlike the MVD. which would for the most pari operate within the framework of the civil defense structure, we believe the KGB would foOow peacetime practicm and function independentlr of republic and teintorul aut he it ses in dischargingies Fund ions of the KGB include intelligencening. internal security, and support functions related lo wai manage' ment Some of these functions are unique to the KGB. Others, such as communications, parallel those nf ministries. Our conclusions about how individual KCI1 components will function in wartime and ourol KGB relocation requirements ate bused on our understanding of how the organization operales In peacetime. The KGBighly centralized command structure from its Moscow headquarters down to departments at the lowest organizational level resembbng the management pattern of all-union ministries.
The First Main Directorate of lhe KGB collectsanalyzes foreign intelligence in the political. mihUry. rtonomic. and scientific areas W. believeFirst Main Directorate will require eiurban com mand and control facilities in addition to thoseii ,i, headquarters just mssde the Moscow Ring
The Second Main Directorate is charged with llie detection and suppression of Inreign espionage.
sabotage, and diversion within lhe USSR Thisalso deals wrth internal political dissent The directorate would probably extend its coverage of many of the same groups and individuab suspect in ixaccuine The Second Main Directorate shares i. spotiMoility for domestich ihe Filth Diiec-lorate of lhe KGB. which was established to control religious, literary, and ethnic dissent These director-ales may share wartime relocation facilities
he Thiid Directorate is responsible forand political security in theand in troop units of Ihe MVD and KGB(he headquarters of the Third Directoratelocated in the main KGB buildingsthis directorate would require dedicatedfacilities to accommodate the wartimeofstaff, li is probablesubordinatedirectoratesthe Third Directorate wouldposts and resocatioii facilities of thewith which they are associated
he lughth Mam Directoiate is responsible for internal KCB communications, military and civilsecurity, and for special comrnurucatkms support provided by its Directorate of Government Communications (UPS) lo the civilian and military leadership (see chapter V.ost ol its offices areewly constructed complex in the Kuntsevo area on Ihe outskiits of Moscow; however, liveheadquarters of UPS has remained in down-town Moscow I
Hwe believe lhal the Klghlh Main Directorate will require dedicatedfacilities.h Directorate, formerly part of the Eighth Main Directorate, is responsible for SIGINT collection operations which contribute tostrategic warning capabilities. Its hessdquarters is in Moscow, and it would also require dedicated leloca lion sites. Both the Eighth Mainh Directorates might utilize eiasting eiurban communications and intercept complexes
tt The Ninth Directorate provides protection to I'olilburo members and Central CommitteeThis involves normal bodyguard lunctwas.for the physical security of all premises and conveyances occupied by these leaders, and ensuring
the reliability ol all individuals employed ul any ,iipp"i[ capacity
is As olh Directorate was formed It absorbed responsibility lor physical security olgovernment installationsie Ninth Ditictot-ate. The eiacl delineation of the functions of these Iwo directorates is not known, but wartime operating conditions would clearly place increased demands on both ol them.h Directorate is reportedly responsible for the security of relocation facilities dedicated to the National Command Authority The Ninth andh Directorates operate in peacetimeewly Constructed complex in
[like other KGB organizations, ihe Ninthh TJircctorates would also require eturban command ptists. In addition, several detach-
'tilt, I'l^iir
security at rclocailon sites and mobile command posis for key leaders ^
he Main Directorate of Border Troops is ic* sponsible for the security of Soviet land, sea, and air frm-iiers. and has its peacetime ollices in the KGB
i r III MnSCOw 1" waitilne, tl CSi 1 tCi
wmi-ld comehe operational control of trie VCK .mil uoiilttailable to military districts lor publicuties .mil for assignment to theater forces Despite shifts in operational control, the Directorate "iiiiiiii rciiuiti responsible lor the admiiiiSlraiiOii nf kt.li In-.nici Ku.ird troops and would thus require .1
ll
Jilllt on si
nt of the KCR isf the Chairman anded on Dxerxhinskiy S'linri-lets contain' 'he oiici-aimnit
uI
tul (Lc siavka and General Siaff The inter-ml mi iiriis dirccWalcs are prescnlly colocated wilh
ihe KGB ccniial apparatus, ll is possible lhat tliese directoiales would also occupy the same relocation facilities as lhe KGB leadership. Furthermore, in wartime significant numbers of KGB officials from the central apparatus ami inlcinal security directorates might be posted lo subordinate KGB organizations in outlying areas where destruction caused by nuclear war could pose problems of political control
Territorial Levels
firtlitrvhe military district serves as the principal territorial component in lhe Soviet wartime management structure. Since World Wat II, ihe process for the transition of military districts from peacetime to wartime operations has undergonemodifications Soviet military planners Initiallythat control of field lorces located in military districts would be passed lo the wartime fronts Aftei field forces departed the military districts ivhcre they were garrisoned, military district command and ad-minislralivc structures would remain to continuemobilizaltun. training, and logistic: became appaient. however, that, if military districts svere to fulfill these responsibilitiesuclearonment. their capabilities to deal with unprecedented levels nf ties'.ruction in tear areas had to be impiosed.ssiimotion by MOD of full responsibility for civil defense1 signaled the beginning olililary district preparations lot US svar-
illlll r
ir; military districts assumed responsilnlitt fur civis defense operations inumber of iniprovcmvnts ss-crc made in civil defense'1 training Innovations svere introducedll-oIiLiM-lcrcl civil defense Struclure. andmade in integrant civil defense readingsUL ih'ise nf iIn- armed foices (see paragraphnrit nunc nl ol civil defense operationalew Ltatt'.sot: semulations specified responsibilitiesin-vui si mi minders and their staffs forulutis-i't lo'irilitiation wilh civil di'lemiinns, (xtiticularly with regard tonetioiiiitg nf tin-
' So-irsenv lutes the-creation olr moreji"!
Irani) From ilic fi-swcct o( bordei mllrtary Jin net. rin---
If iiiUiidlnalod lo Inchl Imni-ttir iHialiKi military operation!healci or rlircrtlv i" tin-
O-ibihI Staff in the absenceicli <ni'.sm.ml
I i
"local defense" elements of the garrisons' These measures reflected Browing awareness on the pari of Soviet planners that implementation of civil defense plansrisis could adversely affect deployment of military units from garrison areas and achievement of increased levels of readiness of the armed forces Soviet planners also came to appreciate the assistance civil defense formations could give armed fnrces units in coping with nuclear attacks on garrison areas, particularly in the initial stages of conflict.
2fi In the, however, the Soviet Cencnil Staff took several measures thai suggested that it wai
RtrreoTifcc USSRifQuiied loilit each inuilbiion Annie Gimi to civil delcnic al cl.ilUnt ocepiiirrd so ixi.ieet personnel Irom nuclr.ii effects, hmil damaai' id facltit>r> mil oiuimwnt. Jinl permitot tivoatlom through mead repair and recovery iim-iuiic*
still not satisfied with airangements for the transition of the military districts lo wartime status:
Plans were prepared for formal activation of "wartime military districts" responsible for di-reeling the wartime activities o( the district and for coordinating those activities with wartime fronts localed in the district area Trainingwere initiated to acquaint military district staffs with this new wartime structure and its functions.)
3
Closet in tee. ration of civil defense territorialinto the wartime military command structurewas accomplished^
Coordination between civil defense staffs and military commissariats at the oblast level was Strengthened
J
In peripheral areas of tlie USSR, command of assets belonging to the former PVO Stranv (Air Defense of the Hoenelaad) has passed loof military districts. Thu change would facilitate ah defense of the USSR with both tactical and former PVO air defenselthough we do not yet understand tlse full dimensions of this change, we believe air defense of the USSR is still controlled from Moscow through the air defense zonal headquarters as in the past In any case, this change should improve coordination of civil defense and air defense elements on matters such as warning and alert and pott strike damage reporting Local civilstaffs, services, and formations charged with mm tering and operating in affected areas aie trained lo make contributions to the irikc
lie effect of tltcse measures has been to enhance Soviet capabilities in ease tbe transition to wartime and tu limit disruption of the rearuclear war. The leriiturial management structure isSuited for centralized control from Moscow through General Staff communications channels. However, if damage from nuclear attacks should interrupt is control, the
military district would have the means and. wethe authority (or decentralized operations In wartime, the military council of the military district would in effecticrocosm of the combined poltticornilitary authority of similar bodies at national levels. Indeed, we would expect that the political member of the wartime military council al thedistrict level wouldenior paity official, possibly with Politburon addition, the ability of tbe military district to functionecentralized basis would be enhanced by the presence of Ceneral Staff representatives and specialist!
'e believe the wartime military districtwould operateommand post aturban facility and would probably designate an alternate command post. In addition, the wartime military district will require at least two more esurbari command posts, one to accommodate the deputy commander for civil defense, his staff, and probably represent alive* from the military dtslrtct'iDirectorate, to which militaryaie subordinate. The other would probably accommodate tear service components of the wartime military district.*
nionhe republics' wartime role reflects Soviet emphasis on incorporating existingcegariizatinrn into the warstructure The wartime mistiorn of union lepuUics include.
- Coping with the centrifugal tendencies anions national Hies that may arise Irom nuclear war.
1 The military nuncia if lhe mllwan ilMrkii in peacetime are
ooCetial kotfee parttacaiioaarMaanes a'
aaraa renabhc aad eafatf Ir-ehbel iW aaAtorr CVnrt an*anaa far Oaaaaai waul nun al gagajajt rcactrn In wartime, obtaa liin lecertaitn would coonoae to be rrsponubW In dlractinf obiut acnvltka Mdudia.peiarloM ot villainot ihe moblbxed did deltane cafmiiatlon The rp.ilinry council, on die other hind, "ill function at lhe military dirirlct command pnat. Ilk political member. iirubaUi wilh military rank, willenior panv ctilco! whu may or may nol ha tclectednra lha ti'ii arcrrtanes of parly nnnlunin an
are* ofal ihe miijar, diViai ThH fwmbw soutd
si waacea atwcfl We bebn* thaiaf ikei-f ii'iWwiafatary tjutet eoutlto lwitHipiw innHai.ipeelftc
-13
Directing both economic and social activities in the republic according io guklrlincs esJablishcd by national authorities
Providing for funding, slatting, and equipping the stalls,nd formations of civilal territorial level* (oblast, city, and rayon) and at individual installations.
n wartime, control of all territorial civilwill be exercised by the commanders of tbe militaiy district and their military councils rather than by the republic civil defense staffs. The tcnitorial limits of lheilitary districts in the USSR do not correspond to the boundaries of the union republics (with the sole eiception of the Besorussiin SSR1 Thus, operational control by tbe military districts is esercised direclly through the chiefs of civil defense of oblasls. The boundaries of oblast* In all republics coincide with boundaries of military districts All bul Iwo of the republics arc entirely contained within the boundaries of individual military districts (seeisplay of the geogiapriic lelattcrtships betweenand military districti)'
V RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR present special problems because there are several military districts located within the borders of these republics Tbe Soviets have handled thb problem by establishing civil defense organizations between the republic* and the oblast v. The RSFSR has created eight civil defense /ones whose headquarters are located in the same cities as the headquarters of the military districts. The houndaiies of these zones correspond lo the eight military districts in the RSFSR The Ukrainian SSR. which has three military districts within its borders, apparentlyonal system srmilsr lo that of the RSFSR
' Theoi the civil defame service (iluiUtl derives (nun Soviet military uuav inservicesenrralianl
ot nMrothe* iprcialiacdM allt 'he iiaMl 'orcesWf cm* al the clothnnalnratM
uawlrie eWii HUinr tcnSces, rm*Vrmw6 by etvil defame rialutr.dr Inlii-nl rapport Ininimdmaert created Irnif ibtur ministerial enlltiev *lrtv pcMrtime (unctions malth lint.mime reijiiirrnirrilipecific IMltWgM UbU III-SI
' lis tsssSSSSSSSsM -HSmt subaribiuu efafajts. mi-wan damns iki
OK cwio Of irlinr OlfMUalmm*
1Vj- in' MnW
trail ol |l* Bahi' MthlmMiene.Iliiongh iii* Uiliic republics ol lit Imams. Latvia, and taluna
epublic organizations wouldtensive eturban relocation facilities, even lliough in most cases military districts would eiercisc operalional control directly through oblast dvil defensergirtuity of the republic structure and its leadership In the poslwai period is considered vital by the Soviets. In addition, republic minlstties will retain technical re-sponsibilily for many economic and social functions Each republic civil defense staff would require at lecst two rrlocsttion facilities for its top party and stale leadership, one of which would be mannedby civil defense military personnel. In addition, we believe lhat each republic ministry wilh wartime responsibilities will require at least one relocation complc* lor its own use These ministries will be required to provide the resources fiom which the various civil defense services will be formed Tablehows support of civil defense services by selected minjstfie* and state commit Ice*.
blaMl and Lower Levels- Integration of the military and civilian aspects of war management is greatest at the oblast level Oblast party andleaders in their civil defense roles and assisted by Iheir civil defense staffs and services would direel dispersal, evacuation, and pint strike recovery ariivitics and ensure implementation of economic mobilization plans Through prearranged coordination with local garrisons and military commissariats, the oblast civil defense staff would beosition to respond rapidly to adjustments in plans ordered by the militaiyThe oblast civil defense staffs would haverepresentatives either ftom the military district or ftom the Ceneral Staff, depending on the strategic importance of the oblastseocc ot these ienre-sentative* would facilitate acquiring resources from locations outside llie oblast to augment local efforts. To meet these wartime responsibilities. oblast civilstaffs would each require at least one eiurban command post facility
he oblast civil defense staff exercises ilsthrough Ihe subordinate civil defense staffs of cities and rural rayons. In oblasls containing large cities with several city rayons, the oblasl civil defense staff would designate commanders of 'operational axes" These commanders would control both city and rural rayon civil defense stalls who deploy in sectors along lhe mules used for the dispersal of koy workers, evacuation of the ui ban population, and movement of
Territorial Limits of Union Republics and Military Districts in Ihe Soviet Union
and repair units lo damaged urban arras in (he poststnkc period Operational axes would abo Include the fall and road networks and hosting areas lor evacuees from urban areas (see figurehe civil defense staffs of cities, city rayons, and operational axei would require eaurban command posts Exurbun facilities used in exercises generally haveen permanent structures, and the command posts were Iniqunnlly shifted Sources familial wilh thesereported that in some instances command pusts of operational axes would be located in haidciied. protective stiuctoresX
Jsciico report the nmslruction of liaidenni shelteis at dispersal sites for
key workers. If so. these shellers could also serve aicommand posts for operational aitstheir staffs, and service chiefs
any individual installations and enterprises would eease operations in urban areas and would be evacuated to exurhan arras Evacuated civil defense formations from these installations would be under control of the local territorial staffs These formations would construct emergency protective stiuclures and support postatlack recovery operations Knleipuses whose industrial production or services are lodged lo be vital under Soviet economic moM nation plans would continue lo function under special operating conditions For wartime management ol thesecommand posts are provided al iheir urban location and at exurban dispersal lacilriics We believe
mod ol iheseave hardened shelters lor protection of the key work force on duly ai the It meuclear allaek. Urban command po&ti normally operate from these hardened shelters bui may abo be located In specially constructed undeiciound facilities. Manager) of the enterprises would receive guidance from ministerial representatives on territorial staffs in matters related to their economic rcobihiaison plans In wartime, command posts down to the enterprise level would facilitate decentralization of theof key lectors of tlie economy and theof goods and services This provides ministerial entitles with the capability lor decentralized lunction-Ing of key sectors in periods of great disruption.
Other Territorial Organ) rations
here are some territorially service oriented and subordinated to all-union or union republicgeographic areas of responsibility do not coincide with those of military districts, republics, or oblasts These key regional organizations are vita) lo the support ol military and civil defense operations with services such aspower, communications, and control of food and material reserves.
he responsible mlnbtiies have created regional organizations whose geographic areas of responsibility are dictated by the special operating needs of the mirtistry In wartime, the ministry heailo.uaiters in Moscow would provide direction through theregional organizations on technical problems associated with operations of subordinate enterprises. All of the mtcrmediate echelons would lequire theii own eiurban relocation facilities. Intermediateand their enterprises would be responsible both to their parent ministries and to the oblast civil defense staffs The oblast staff would try to ensure that reqinieracnts for services such as power, communica-tloris, transportation, and control of reserves, which are essential to the execution of theivil defense program, would be mot The enterprises wouldthe service using tlnir own trained civil defense formations supplemented by labor drawn from non-priority installations located in the same oblast
aving coordinated these plan* in peacetime, the military district isosition tn direct their
implementation and modification in wartimeof the location and geographir resraoruibihties of the organization providing the service. These overlap ping lines of authority and complex functionalare present throughout the Soviet peacetime and wartime management structure in both military and civilian organizations They reflect the prevalence of the Soviet management concept of dualDual subordination presents bureaucraticin peacetime, but might serve to enliaure the Soviets' wartime management structure The following are examples of suchrgjrii/atiorn
Railways. The Ministry of Railways opeiutes the Soviet railroad system througheogtaphic regions, eachegional railroadThese adminrtratiora arc furtherinto railroad operating divisions In some cases, tbe rail netsiven railroadmay extend over the territory of rnore than one military district and those of operatingover more than one oblait Despite this, by working through the railroad administrations and divisions, the Military Transumration Service of each military district would control all rail move mcnts within the district. Postattack repairby railroad civil defense foimathms under tlie direction of theil roadwould he coordinated with the oblast civil defense staffs In the area where tbe tailroad facilities are localed-
Com muni cations. The primary intercity radio relay aod cable lines are controlledhief directorate of the USSR Ministryetwork of regional centers The areas of responsibility of many of these regional centers coincide with military districts In these districts wartime militaiy communicationswould be determined by the military district chiof of signal troops Other wartime rom muni cat ions needs and postattack repairwould be coordinated through thedistrict's deputy commander for dvil de-Icnsc and subordinate oblast civil defense staffs (seeor additional details on oommu-nicalions support to tbe wartime management system) Where the geographic area of inponst-bllity of the regional center does not correspond
of (he militaiy district, establishingrequirements and conductingare more complex but manageable
Power, The Ministry of Power andmanages the power industry throughonsolidated power systems. Tbe heads of these
arc responsible for continuousof power to consumers Their areas ofdo not coincide, however, withof military' districts. TheSystem-South controls several energyassociations whose areas offour military districts. The individualproduction associations, which are part ofpower systems, control powerin more than one oblast but thesenormally containedingleThe production associations operatecommand and dispatching facilities.of the functions of energywith oilier civil defense operationsthrough the oblast civil defense staff.
Other Services. The USSR Ministry of theFleet also operates its subordinate steamship companies through intermediate organizations. Relocation facilities for the Black Sea and Baltic companies have been established near Odessa and Riga. Also, the Ministry of Civil Aviation operates its airports and aircralt through regional aviation administrations, not all of whichwilh mililary district or republic boundaries Similarly, both the State Committee for Material Reserves and Ihe State Committee for Material and Technical Supply have regional directorates.
Exurbcsn Facility Requirements
c have estimated the overall Sovietfor eiurban re local ion facilities to support the wartime management and command function we have described in thb chapter. We believe the actual requirements lot such facihties is within the range of our estimates of the minimum and maximum number of facilities lhat would be needed to accommodate national and territorial leaden (see) The minimum figures in the table ate based on one
Projected Requretnenls for Wartime Relocation Facilities
Msiimitm
Minimum
Command Authority
of Defense components
ministerial orzanlzationi
disiikis
regional orzaniuiioas
exurban relocation facility for those organizations down through the oblast level ttut wc believe perform wartime management functions. There is evidence that many elements have more than one relocation facility: therefore, the maximum figures in the lable assume two exurban facilities for each organization that probably would be relocated. We believe the Soviets have established at least one facility for each leadershipumber approximating ourof minimum requirements. (Seeetailed breakdown of these proiections)
B. Wartime Leadership
7 IIM, Soviel Civil Defense:Pace, and Effectiveness, ando Holders of the UM assessed the degree of protection thai could be afforded Soviet leaders in civil defense shelters. An estimate was made of the total numbet of leaders at all levels that the Soviets would probably want to protect The estimatearty, government, andofficials at national and republic0 at oblast, city, and city rayonanagers of "key Inst0 lull-tirne civil defense stafl personnel The estimateid not include the "top leadership" because the arrangements for their protection are not the responsibility of Ihc civil defense Organization. Our previous estimate did not include all the leadership cadres on which the Soviets would expect lo rely for wartime management.
io
ur latcsl estimateifferent locus ll includes all the industrial level leadership bul dim not include managen of individual erJrrprtses W( made an" oiga rotation count of huh level man agement personnel lhal would have an important role in wartime rnaiiigernen: In counting these key wartime management personnel, we used the distinction made bv the Soviets between leaders, specialists, and technical woikerv Wc now estimate thatfficials make up lhe leadership of those orgaiilriittiiut with iiniiorlant wartime responsibilities;
At the national, military district, and republic levels we counted0 officials This figure includes the top leadership al Ihe national level as well as lhe leadership at republic and military district levels, but esdudes otherleaders below tbe USSR Ministry of Defense
There are also0 oblast. city, and uiban rayon officials whose (unctions areby the Soviets as essential in waitimr.
We also include0 lull lime civil defense personnel.
We calculate that therefficials In other regional organizations of sei vice-telated ministries that do not conform to the existing Soviet military and pohtscal leititorial structure
reakdown of the wartime leadership groups.escribes the methodology used In arnving at these estimates
ur estimateoes not include all the leaden thai would be Involved in wartime manaxement. Omllled from our estimate are the manageis of key installations, partly because there is no consensus in the Intelligence Community as lo which Soviet enterprises sVtuld be considered key iristalUtions' We arewhether tlie Soviets regard them and their stalls as ley management personnel or operational cadres The directors of these Inslallalions would be supported by other manigemeot personnel such as the deputychief engineer, the bead of the party orgamration it the enterprise, and the civil defense chief
nstallations were selected lor use in7 IIMnsis ol the value ii theircompared "ilh otlm
iiulatUleni lo lie ante imluWitat lector, tanallalions selectedlliii
bails probably would eocmpood only in put to those lhat lhe Soviets consider eatenliil lo poaturtlc repair and recovery operations
Size of the Soviet Wartime Leadership
Naiioeul
districts
rcEioeul orgioiia lions
r ibo-e
0
iiyons
defense staff
U?0
'
Tfceor ibe military districtfficers in their cavil defense rnmpoacnu plti senior comma od personnelThe total fiaore iadodes the top national leaders but not military officers below the level of the Ministry of Defense, eicept for those at military districts sad in civil defense suffs Abo. tbe total does aoi include ctviliaa leaders al Individual insiallilions.
ur tevlsed estimates of the waitimr leadership do not include the essentia! support staff and service persotirtel who would accompany leaden to wartime relocation sites Therefore, wc haveeparate estimate of the peacetime support stjfls of key Soviet leaders and estimated the percentage of that number necessary that would be likely lo constitute their wartime staff requirements. Table.hows the wartime staff requirementsercentage ofstaff |
C. Wartime Operations
ll party and government organizations are included in Soviet planning for wartime operations. These plans call for common levels of readiness, compatible communications piocedurm. and the useariety of urban and exurban protective shelters and relocation facilities. Soviet leaders believe thai the eiurban facilities. particularly dual-purpose ones, would affordigh degree of protection and operational flexibility in copinguclear conflict and its aftermath.
Table 1II-5
Estimated Wartime Staff Support Requirements of Civilian Leaders
Peacetime Wartime Staff Staff Beqttiremer.lt iPtrxtv of" Piatittmt)
Ministry- and national government-Icvel end let
party Halt
uid rcpabtic
100
party naif
in
(oral twernrnent
parly
MHO
rayoa
government
(JJ)
piny
r
Tfcesc estimates represent scafTsupporl requirements ia additionbe leadership. Tbe ealimatea for tbe toveratnent hierarchy were derived7 data on adroinblratne pereoncei ia ontiooiL lembbc, oblut. and city agencies, adjtrsicd upward forbSecrumatcs lor ibe party agencies were lakea from Theolity Process Innpublished DIA study.
The Command Post Network
n developing the nationwide system for war managemenl, the Soviets have stressed the neednified command, control, and communicationsThis network Is designed to link territorial-administrative and ministerial components responsible for civil defense with military commands. Civilian wartime relocation facilities and procedures have been patterned after those of the armed forces to ensure compatibility ol the Iwo systems. One aspect of this (saltern is the network of command posts provided forleadership of all organizations in the war manage-
ment structure.'* Each territorial and ministerialof the management structure from the national level down to selected individual enterprises would operate both urban and exurban command posts.
he functions of the component determine Ihe number of its primary and alternate command posts, their size, the degree of protection offered against nuclear effects, as well as communications equipment, transport, and oilier support. (Seeorof the types of facilities currently in use as commandespite variations, the purpose of the command post network is to permit leadership cadres to exercise continuing control of the nation In all phases of conflict, including protracted war. At the highest levels of the national leadership andthe armed forces, increased emphasis is being placed on mobile command posts and relatedfacilities This trend is not yet as pronounced in subordinate territorial-administrative andorganizations We believe thewarstructure relies primarily on fixed command posts and will continue lo do so because we doubt that the Soviets would be able to carry out their wartime management plans using only mobile command posts.
Concept of Operations
evch of Readiness. Soviet transition to a. wartime management structure under which urban and exurban relocation facilities would be manned would be linked to changes In the readiness posture of thermed forces. The Soviets have defined four stages of combat readiness, and they loulinely exercise their command and control systems andforces to transit through these stages.eriod of increased tension, Soviet political leaders would have the means to control the tempo of force and civil defense preparations by selectively applying these readiness stages to various force elements.
" In Soviet usage, ihe ternu "control prat" (punli up'oitleniuu} and "command post" (fcomandnyy ptmif) refer lo special'vuled andalkie* al which com mm den and their nalli emciu omuoiver ibelr force* In Soviet writings, lhe leem "command post"eiaUy used in reference to ooeia-tional or combat dements Other entities such as rear lervirea component, military comnu&arlals, and mil defeaseie the mm "win niln manioc,ear eiptenloitt aie when used Inlcrchanrrabiy bv llie Sovieu la Uiii Mcmowidiini iKe teem "command post- hat been uied.
uring what the Soviets refer to as the threaten-ing iM-uod, which could1ew days or manv works, the armed forces would lint be brought lo increased combat readiness" This stage would be followed by "threat of-war readiness" duiing which more extensive preparations would be made including the dispersal of forces from theii peacetime garrisons When tlie level is raised to "full combathe forces deploy to operational posit mas and prepare lo execute wartime missions. The leadiness stages of civilian elements of the wartime manas^rnentwould generally parallel the pattern of readiness levels of tbe armed forces.
J
c are uncertain about the eaters) to which certain civil defense prcparataoea would be madeeclaration of what the Sovietspecial period. The declarationpecial period under Soviet statutes givei the wartime leadership, which would be largely military, authority over civilians and civilian activities that tbey would not have in the absence ofeclaration The concept of the special period originated in Soviet experiences In World War II In the war il was necessary for the Soviets totate of martial law In areas in which the military needed special powers to order compulsory civilian labor service, to confiscateand to establish special security regulations Many ol these same actions could be taken today after declarationpecial period. For example, thestatute on civil defense provides that, upon declarationpecial period. "USSR citizens who are not liable for military service or who have draft exemptions are enlisted for compulsoryn civil defense."
n peacetime certain kay national-level and territorial organizations continually man their urban command posts with duty staffs and communicators. This is true of military districts and civil defense staffs down to oblast levelseriod uf "increased combalhese duty staffs wouldrnerited Organizations that did notuty staff at exurban reserve command posts would send operations gmups as advance ionics to prepare the facilities lor
use. When "threat-of-war readiness" is achieved,command posts could already be fully activated and some or all ol the command functions would be transferred there The shift to eiurban command posts would be fully completed upon declaration of "full combat readiness"
rban command posts would be continually mannedhift basis, even after activation of eiurban command potts. Such groups would control essential activities (hat would continue in urban areas until warning is received of an enemy attack In progress or until the readiness levels are reduced. The essential urban activities wouk) Include.
Directing final phases of evacuation or dispersal of personnel, crillcal equipment, and materiel
Continuing operation of essential services and utilities such as electric power, communications, water supply, and heating
Conducting security patrols designed to control sabotage and looting
Continuing industrial production bv on-duty shifts at enterprises that have been designated to operate in place.
In the event of notification ol imminent nuclear attack, leaders and other key personnel of ministries would move to designated urban shelters andmind posts. Following tlie attack, they would be expected lo utilize surviving communicationsto report on poststrike conditions in the urban area and to coordinate emergency rescue and repair
Manning LfvaU. There it limited Information on the operational procedures for slaf ling primary and alternate command posts, and on bow leadeiship cadres and supporting staffs would be distributed among command posts at different stages of readiness These facilities include not only hardened,structures dedicated to the command and control (unction, but also protective structures for off-duly pmsonrxei and other staff The evidence available indicates, however, that the cadres at ex urbanposts would be sizable [
c
3
The peacetime staff of the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry reportedlyn the. Following reductions in personnel due to military callups, those officials and employees who would man the Ministry's relocation facilities would not. The relocationto be constructed by (he RSFSR Ministry of Food Industry was planned loinistry officials as well as families and support personnelotal.
The readiness levels Introduced by the Soviets and the measures undertaken In response to them provide Soviet leaders with flexibility in copingituation of increasing threat. If international tensions and the threatening period are prolonged, they canumber of civil defense and militaryduring the increased combat readiness stage without major interruptions of key sectors of the
economy. Tlvo Soviets undoubtedly recognizerolonged period of readiness would place strains on the production of essential goods and services They have endeavored lo minimize this problem bv limiting such activity to that necessary to support the war effort, sustain the population, and enhance postattaek recovery capabilities (we know that Soviet plans callajority of the economic Installations lo shut down andn any case, this posture would afford the Soviets considerable flexibility In crisis management ptioi to the onset ol nuclear attacks They would, of course, be much less certain about the circumstances that would existoststrike situation
he Soviets realize that conflicts usually do not proceed as anticipated In prewar planning Therefore, they are ptepaiing their leadership and their forces to dealange of nudear war contingenciesrotracted war. for example, Soviet plans lot exurban command posts wvth extensive living andcom modal sons would permit the wartime leadership to direct the armed forces, economic activity, and rescue and recovery operations over an extended period
CHAPTER IV
TYPES OF LEADERSHIP PROTECTION AND RELOCATION FACILITIES
The number ol leadership protection andfacilities the Soviets require is determined bv the function* that each management organization would perform in wartime. This also influences the degree of protection and the types of facilities provided
A. Urban Facilities
our analysis wc emphasize eiurbanrather than urban facilities because thewill try lo relocate most of their leadership inof war. The Soviets have not, however.need for protective facilities in urban areas suchdeep underground structurescommand posts. These urbancontinue to undergo expansion andintended to:
Provide management cadres with protection and command and control capabilities in the event of an altack with minimum warning.
Enhance the ability of the leadership to disperse to exurban sites rapidly,igh degree olsecurity and minimum risk of observation.
Provide protection and command and control facilities for operational elements oforganizations thai would remain in urban areas during and after an attack. These elements would be required lo direct essential activity, report damage estimates, and conduct postslrike recovery operations.
protective lacilities provided for thevary. For example, hardened structuresbuilt at or near the residences of manyAccordingource who worked ontwo shelters with extensive life supportwere constructed beneath an apartmentMoscow wiuae high-ranking CPSU officialsOther sources have confirmedbuilding houses high-level officials. The Soviets arc
also continuing to buildetached bunkers adjacent to important government
of these structures are probably linked by special tunnels to the subway systems
Subways continueigure importantly in Soviet civil defense planning generally and in plans to protect leadership cadres in particular. It is apparently Soviet policy loubway system for urban centers with populationsillion or more (see figurehe number of operating systems has increased from six to eighthree more are projected to begin operations byive more are under construction, and eight are in the planning stages,otal ofotentialine of the IS- -union republic capitals are covered by this list, as are the headquarters cities off theilitary districts. Our information confirms that thereear relationship between the subways, protective facilities for leadership in urban areas, and civil defenseConstruction and operation of facilitieswith the subways, referred to by the Soviets as "special installations,'* are the responsibility of the second department and civil defense staff of each individual subway administration. The subwaycoordinate their plans with USSR Civilterritorial civil defense staffs, and thethat would use the special facilities.
The subway systems and the special installations connected with them afford Soviet authorities the potential for covert movement between key points within urban areas and to exurban relocation sites, with minimum risk oformer employee
' These lleure* do not Include lhe three potent Ul Irun ivstems in VcJgoaijd. L'vov, end Vilnius not the system protected lor"fetch will beramubway. The ondercrouod portions ed these systems may hive some limited civil defense utility.
r
the Moscow subway reported lhalecial installations designated for leadership use were served by subway tracks that entered the facilities from the regular lilies The entrances had closures similar to those used to seal subway stations from main tunnels and Irom surface entrances These facilities would peimit the leadership to board tbe subway cars within theit alUt sons and to proceed from Moscow to tlie suburban areas, possiblyombination of subways and suburban commuter trains.
6 New, muhistoried detached bunkers, which are piobablv linked lo the Moscow subway system by special tunnels,
a?
Similar facilities are reported to eaisst in otherWe believe that aS cities with enstinc or protected subway systems will have these piotcclive arrange menlv
umber of sources have also reported that specially conslrucled underground rail lines Ciist that servo the top leadership These dedicated lines would enable key military and civilian leaders to move rapidly and securely (rum central Moscow lo eiurban command posts It has been reported that an undei-ground tall line links lhe Kremlin-Red Square area with the Chekhov-Sharapovu leadership relocation completes south of Moscow Similar lines also are repotted to connect central Moscow wilh the Air
figure IV-3
Soviet Cities Wilh Subway S
Forces Hesttfeuarters el Chctnoye and the VIP Iit Jities at Vmrkovo Airfield Q
Similar but less elaborate facilities can be found in smaller cities and in city rayons throughout the USSR
It Is almost certain, however, lhal Soviet prepara-liom lor leadership prolectloi) thiough Ihc use ol subways and associated facilities is much moreve than (lie preparations on which we liavc evidence Furthermore, there are urban command posis and protective underground structures in cities that do not currently possessetailed study of Odessa Oblast revealed that urban command posts exist for major party and government organizations in Odessa ll abo indicated that the oblast dvil defense staff would operate al least one permanently manned and probably one alternate urban command post bunker
B. Exurbon Facilities
n our analysis, we have emphasized facilities lhat serve Soviel command and managementresponsible for defense of tho homeland and the continuity and stability of the nation's activities Wc have categorized these facilities as single or dual purpose. The total number of such facilities we have identified are summarized in tablehe number of sites located representsmall percentage of the total eiurban leadership relocation sites which we believe exist, as discussed in chapter V
Control Complei, the CbcBhov National Cumtnand and Control Complex, and the Chaadayevkaerns Te Headquarters Cotnplei (see figuresnd
tV-S)
harapovo and Chekhov were constructed In the, bul have been undergoing modiiica-tioo, espanslon, and improvement since thehe deep undersiound lacilitles at these com-pleies for the National Command Authority wouldifficult targetingecent assess-merst of these sites indicates that ihey are harder, deeper, and much less vulnerable than previously estimated (see figure IV-tJ}.^
Facilities
Single-purpose facilities arc those that areto support wartime command (unctions only. They have military characteristics and are manned continuously in peacetime at levels that woulda rapid transitionartime posture- Although the characteristics of these facilities vary according to command level and function, they can be grouped Into three rough categories
Category I. This category is characterized by large, multibunkertd installations with extensivesupport facilities and accommodations forSome are also served by railroad spurs and helipads. Conunumcalloin support for these comples-es is provided by separate communications facilities to which the complexes are linked by underground cable, microwave radio relay, and mobile communieations equipment. At present, only three laeiiitlc fall within this category: the Sharapovn National Command and
Jtbe Soviets may consider these two Installations as one Interrelatedowever, we believe the facilities at Sharapovo arc probably for the wartime Defense Council and those at Chekhov for the Ceneral Staff. ConstrtKboo is also continuing on the compter, at Chaadayevka,ilometers from Moscow, which we believe is an alternate national command iadlily.
J Mobile facilities consisting of airborne and tram borne command posts have been developed for use by the top leadership to supplement these Luge, filed cocaptexealso possible that, to reduce tbe vulnerability of the National Command Authority, many of its command and support functions would be dispersed to or replicated at fiied facilities that we have not yet Identified, or at some of tlie category III facilities discussed below. (Seeoron the hardness of theseacilities.)
ategory It. Relocation facilities in thisare less elaborate than those in category I, although
IV-5Sew*
they siill offer eitemive relocationMost ai those in lhe Moscow ares were coixsfructcd in the early ln70s. Tliey are uniformly large installations with itiiiltistoricd* underground hunkers some of which are covered by surface buildings
ategory II facilities possess surface mod urn that are generally mililary in character andange of accommodations and support. They arelocated near water sou reel and some have recreational facilities Not all pnasess buried antennas, relying instead on htgh-capaclly inrcrcity cableand in some caws on mobile communications facilities for access to the Ceneral Staffnetworkof facilities in this category near Moscow aief^
"Jouv
cr facilities in this category, located ihrougrsoul the USSR, serve command posts and relocation facilities lor wartime military districts These have somewhat smaller surface support areas than tliosc near Moscow Examples aref^*"
JThg facilities serving military district headu.uarters invariably have buried aulennas and are near other hardened communications com isleaes.
t virtually all oi the sites in this second category, we haveontinuing process of upgrading eitsttng facilities andnew soilace buildings to provide additional living and working space. This may be partrend towaid providing protection for an increasingly larger pci-centagc of administrative headquarteia personnel at eiurban facilities This trend has long been esrident in llie rapansi.l lhe exurban facilities of the Strategir Hockel Forces and the Air Defense
is possible that there are deep, multilevel underground structures al othei cate-H'ifs I!
oregO'i. III. The facilities in this category arc markedly different from those, innd II
Allocated for the most part to high commands in theaters of mililary operations and lo lionts in thehases of the wai. ihey gcneiallyingle, often multistory, bunker; have minimal surface facilities, and are suppoited bv bulled as well as ain'veground antennas Construe!loci of this type of facibty began in thendeduced pace Examples ate P
JlTse support facilities al these sites are austere, anollieie arc relatively small numbers of surface working or living accommodations. As theater forces achieve their objectives in neighboringthe high commands would move forward,lacilities in this catcgoiy free foi use by various components of the military district, rear services, and other elements of the war management infrastructure Some of the installatiom we have included in this calcgoiy may have been modified or aie beingby the construction ol additional support facilities to serve the needs of military districts- They would then fall under category 11
Duol-Purpose Facilities
e have designated as dual purpose those exurban command and control facilities thai have peacetime functions different from their wartime -roles Tbey are of iwoene with abovegroond facilities only and those with both abovegroundand underground protective structures, either detached bunkers or basement shelters. Despite the importance of single-purpose facilities dual: pur pose facilities are more numerous and are used by all levels of Soviet IcadeishipV"
""trjual- purpose lacilities also rsrroominateie Teloca iron com plcim constructed for parly and ministerialat republic and oblast levels.
II The dual purposeot new Since the, Soviet civil defense planning has called for the use of dual-purp>rsr facilities in providing for wartime medical services, urban evacuation, dispersal of key personnel, and relocation of industries The idea is In reduce the economic burden of prescribed civil defense preparations by using existing lacilities and bv
r
planning any new construction loeneficial peacetime as well as wartime function.
ll such- facilities lhat we have identified for leadership use have been significantly upgraded from their original peacetime configuration tu fulfill their wartime roles. They all include communicationswith access to high-capacity intercity cables and fixed and mobile radio communications systems. In some instances, existing facilities have been retained and supplemented by additional structures lo satisfy their wartime role. In other cases obsolete structures have been razed and wholly new facilities built.
still other
cases, where peacetime facilities could not beto satisfy the planned wartime requirements, all new complexes were designed and built to performeacetimeartime role. Reports of modifications and newly constructed dual-purpose facilities for ministerial organizatioas at the national
that Ihis program, which began in the
is continuing. Other reporting confirms
that the program is alsn being applied al the republic and oblast levels.
ual-purpose exurban facilities have also been used to salisfy the wartime needs of elements of Ihe Ministry of Defense and the military commands For example.
^Another probabln command post for senior military authorities
a
duional dual-purpose facilities serving major organizalkms are localed elsewhere in the USSR. One source reported thatQ
to the source, the site operates in peacetime as aecrealional facility, but it contains underground structures with repeater station equipment, which
permit communications with all elements of the Soviet high-lien ucnev cable network.^
The
source slated that similar sites exist elsewhere in the USSR and were developed as parirogram to which Marshal Zakharov. Chief of the General Staff from4 toave special attention.
e have categorized dual-purpose exurbanaccording to their peacetime loles. The most numerous type of dual-purpose facilities are those that have rest, recreation, and health services as their peacetime function. Relocation facililies can also be found at educational institutions and researchin rural areas Sites wilh oilier types of peacetime functions have been adapted to meet wartimeneeds as well. Selection of facilities is limited bv the guidelines established by USSR Civil Defense, svhich include:
- I'roximity of likely targets
Hardness of underground and surface structures.
Availability of communications
Accessibility to transportation.
Redundant power sources.
Availability of water.
ecreational, and Health Facilities. Included in this group are rest homes, pioneer camps, and sanitoriums. often combinedingle complex. Because of their location in rural, generally wooded areas, proximity to water supplies, and the easyof their peacetime initallalions to wartime requirements, this category of dual-purpose facilities appears lo represent the preferred choice of leadership organization:
al-purpose relocation complexes
pre at rest, recreational, or health facilities, ivtiich in peacetime are under il'- direct control of the Ministry or itscomponents In some cases, minislries arc known to operate more than one dual-purpose facility for iclocalion purposes]
3
c
Mlniilortal oiganiaations al republic level also use rnt. recreational, and health facilities as relocation sites. Some of theseV
^Jaie probably Uilended for lhe use of mote than one ministry
( is not merely the suitability of the individual rest, recreational, and health facilities that causes .Soviet leaden to prefer them in establish inn relocation complexes The continuine expansion of lhe numbers and types of such facilities throughout Iheigh degree of flexibility In selecting sites that meet USSIt Civil Defense specifications The greatest growth in the number of these facilities (according to published Soviet statistics; began inime of increased emphasis by civil defense of ficiah on finding suitable relocation facilities for use by war management entities. This growth wasmotivated by considerations other than civilbut lhe need for relocation sites wasactor.00 the number ofest homes, and tourist bases remained constant at5 the number had almost tripled, and6 it quadrupled, with growth continuing0otal of0 During the0he number ofamps in rural areas increasedo an0 If we include the pioneer camps, the estimated total number of rest, recreation, and health (acilllirs in the USSR comes toleaily. not all ol these would be suitable or required as relocation sites.9
'Tbiifnuii'piolulih loo li couldoTS.0CO We
Iiwbi! and vprn Incalul* uliole) OQ ICS.
notation!I. andl refnrrncm ta facilitiei under
I. . i'.i r! . l.-o
iDciortrnvnlal roiilrnl narinalb mi|Jmiam otherclneallunof icfciiiiicea in Ciienii- inriliiinin llie carl) IWOc Tliii Ii
(SJcuiPfnieil in ini1 Can- <il ninmil Irvel (nllllel yaue
ickealion coinplciei are ii lactlinai ihry *iivr controlled MSc al
pallern in the have
ithin the rest, recreational, ami health group, it is the pioneer camp thai has appeared mostin reporting on planning of relocation sites. In the Moscowattern has developed whereby camps are initially upgraded to permit year-round use as relocation completes. This in turn has enabled orgamralioni using the sites to expand Iheir peacetime utility by operating the facilities as pioneer camps in lhe summer and as rest homes in the winter. There are several relocation complexes in the Moscow region lhat fit this pattern.^
as been reported lhat this be followed by RSFSR ministries at Moscow Oblast or contiguous oblasts Similar been observed elsewhere in the USSR
ducational Intlituliom in Rural Arena. This category ranks next to rest, recreational, and health facilities in lhe number of instances reported of relocation use and in the degree of flexibility they afford for adaptation to relocation requirements.8 the USSIt Ministry of Power and Electrification reportedly established its relocation compleaocationalV_
J CtMi reports indicated that adesignas adopted in tbe Ukrainian SSR to permit rural secondary schools to be constructed over under-ground command posts serving oblast civil defense staffs
fact lhat standard
designs have linen adopleoTin at least one republic and notedecond suggests that the practice of using educational facilities as relocation sites may be quite widespread
esearch Institutes Use of research institutes or esperimer.ial completes located in rural areas as relocation silei has been reported |
The USSR Ministry ol Tractor and Agricultural Machine Buildingelocation com pie nf"
^jwhile the USSH Minisiry of
Coal Indus!!
19
j[instances, resrardi
Institutes would not be acategory nfbe number ol research imliiutcs in rural areas is very small compared with the number of rest, recreational, health, and educationale view ofesearch institutes ittbordlnalc to industrial ministries in Moscow showed lhatf them weie in the city of Moscow and most ol the re murkier were tn Other large urlsan centers.
ther Dual-Putang emend. Somearrangements differ liom the patterns pieW-onsls described. Some examples:
-c
-r
j
Another variation on the dual purposefound at lhe republic level Isse ol several dual-purpose lacilitiesingle small town or In dusters of villages mpies ol this approach
J In some cases, nuriistciial organijatsocis plan lo occupy buildings in towns equipped with undorttround command postsf
j rcpMtedly
will utilize the offices ol the town's soviet executive committee; Us command post will be iindcmealli the local military commissariat. In more remote ateas revocation facilities aie probably not hardened
C. Costs
e arc unable to estimate the total costs ol Soviet wartime management preparations. However wc liavc estimated the COJts of construction and
equlpttlcnl Itit several types of urban and exurban leadership facihttes that wc have identified There are both pricing and met he logical uncertainties in tlie wslingSoviet lacilities and equipment. Thetclnre, cost estimates ol identified types of lacililics should be regarded as approximations. easure of the magnitude ol Soviet leadership preparations since, we have also calculated tlie construction and equipment costs of those eiuiban leadership facilities that we have identified as well as the costs implied by out estimate of ll* total number of eiurbaa leadeiship facilities Ihroughoul the USSR. Tliese Liter costreflect the additional uncertainly io ourof the total number of eiuiban leadership lacilities tuticriwide We have not ealcsilatcd any annual costs of exmban leadeiship fadlities. nor have wc estimated the total number or costs of uiban leadership facilities nationwide
m lineample ofites was selected as tepcescntative of bolh urban and exurban facilities and was subjectedetailed study.costs were calculated0 rubles based on vvist data takeneises of Soviet const ruction handbooks. Uncertainty in construct inn cost estimates is plus or minusercent Equipment costs were calculatedhare of construction costs based On Soviet data. These data revealed that equipmentforercent of (he. value of military housing and support facilities, and construction accounted forercent Storage, motor pools, and other above-giound support fac'.'ities at such sites were estimated toistribution ofercent for equipmenlercent for constructioo For bunkeredmost of which ire estimated to contain elaborate electronics and communications and otheris estimated that equipment costs are equal to at least the construction coil of the bunker in which the equipmentrtsl ailed
dentified Vrhan leadership I'acilitiet.of tlie coats of the representative sample of haidened urban leadership facilities arc summanred In table IVhe lout complexes were dmsen fiom among the loaderthip facilities in Moscow^"
Til
"Too See-
1
Table
Constructioniprncnr Costs of Selectedtiers hip Facilities in Urban
*
Hunker
VS i>
Ir.iekiii.ii if ii hmklinr. complei
:
.t.
il
(tf*V
W>
-
i.-ii .ir-
/
haiMint complei
n'tn
S>
I9T0 rubies1 dollars were used tai the ew estimatesh table.
' Tlie ccuipmem ai relocalion facilities -ai icQuircd ailimes andype irom sophislieatcd electronics systems tn ^tinclaril lupcon items luch as generators Therefore, tbe ruble tostiil in lhe dollar costs of CQuipment [ihe mtileildj raiio] vary widely
unleii mctifded in overall buildinf cost. Because nfotals do Ml add across
indicative of llir magnitude of Soviet eipendiiures on priii.'cilic facilities for the leadership in Muscosv
denti/icd Eiurban Relocation Facilities To arriveough apptOKimsstiH olift* tiructmi and ret moment for all eiurban facilities
dies* on the cost analysis oi each type ol esurbarTTacillly. lioth single and dual purpose, in Out icisti'senlative sample. We consideted llie entire cost of consliuctlon and equipment al dual-purposeas attributable to their wartimeummary of rise coals ol the J3 lacilities selected for our sample is
ableotal costs ol all ol live Idcnhlicd relocation facilities were calculatedor each facility, based on its similarity to one of the sample facilities The results of these calculations showed that the total cost was about0 rubles The same invesirncnt. il made in the United Stales, would1 dollats Tablellustrates the distribution of these rosis at each leadership echelon.
iuthan Leadership Facilities nationwide. Tor purposes of calculating the costs of conslruction and equipment ul eiurban leadership nalionwule. wc have assumed one eiurban facility lor each leadeiship element -the estimated minimum ol oil Sonet war lime relocation facility requirements as shown in lableAa discussed in chapter III. we believe at least one facility rants lor each leadershipMai ol overthough weot located all ofe have assumed that the lacilities til various leadeiship echelons wouldin type and cosl lo those we have identified at comparable echelons included In our representative sample On this basis we calculated that the minimum total costs of construction and equipment for eiurban leadership facilities nationwide incurred unceould amount toillion rubies orillion ifhe United States In fact, some organilalions such as military districts, certain iialioiial ministries, and some union republics arc known to have created more than one rrlocation lacilily Consequently, we believe the actual cosls, uf Soviet eiurban leadeiship facilities haveillion andillion rubles,on wliellier there are one or two farililiea lor each leadeiship entity, orillionillKsn il acquired in the United States Tablehcrws these costs lor the mi mmum
ute are several factors susuresting lhat the estimated costs of individual facilities are Ion It is probable lhat the total cost of equipment installed in bunkeis at some lacililics exceeded the cost ofi.jiiiiili: we estimated lhat the cost of
or the dual-purpose facility at^"
"Tiobeillion rubles, sis-ng our cniing ntetnot) A'aoviet emigre who pattK.paied in
- II* niinutated (rail aie lutedS ianhrui aiouivd ui fi-r
iitrpinK"n ifceuji.lo Ibr fnntiul
1 air il-iaii in lible IV 3
flifif.-J
Tabic IV-3
Construction and EfluiDmeol
of Selected Soiict Relocation Facilities
and bouitna
0
1
steal
7
J
<miUio*US t)
and haiuinz
l
2
i
atwns (bunkered)
B
inlllioa US If
-J
fntitltito US &}
*T
area
i
:
j
11
area
i
buildup
'
fmtflw* US j;
area
J
-
!
(million VS Si
1
rublu aad (ill doliait were uiede coal euirmici in tka taUi
a< icSxaiuaici wai awaited al vsnoui limn andype from lopaaailcalcd cleci'onK* lytuuni lo standard iwwi lienu such ai lenernon. TktreJore. ihe ruble emu compared to the dollar colli of equipment (Ihe rsbte-dctlar
ratiolow otinfraam* ai panrjelb* aqanalem of aaarlr W
million tooceni analyilt
a
'riicatei lhat hardeneii. underground tacit iueiaay to atath deeper fcwea ICO mtlaril aad raan
eaaoaoc lha*ad befaned tbaa.iaeac (cath<low
llxa-ic i/ rounding, total* do nol add ipmi
4_l
I7Q_
7 7
IJ.9
40
t-?f' ij
fable IV-4
Construction and Equipment Costs of Identified Soiiet Leadership Relocation Facilities by Echelon
Echelon
19
S
districts
regional or ganira lions
t(publics
iible is Secret.
IV-5
Construction and Equipinent Costs of Projected Soviet Relocation Facilities
Echelon
ubles
org!i'n/ati"ns
rer^bucs
-sisil inn. me minimum numbec projected. For man mum com. multiply all figures by
the planning and designelocation facilitythat thecost estimate for the entire complex (bothandncluding acommunications center, was 5The source was confident that the finalexceed this amount bul could not predictfigure. Another source who designedfor the USSR Ministry ol Health andlanned ministerial relocation site report-
ed that cust eslimates for Ordinary camps ranllhon rubles Modifications for wartime use would amountilium rubles The diflerenee between our estimate of the costs of these lypcs of dual-purpose facilities and the estimates pmvided by former Soviet construction specialists could amount to about 2rubles per facility This difference would increase oui total estimate because^""
3
Finally, relocation facilities alone do notull eiteiit of capital investment in leadership survival and continuity For this, urban sites wouldo bee believe, therefore, lhat the overall cost of the program would be slgiufleantly greater than the at leastillion we have estimated for relocation sites alone.*
nnual Coifs We are unable to estimate the annual construction and equipment costs lor Soviet leadership relocation facilities overyear life ol iheirur evidence does not permit us lo estimate the rate of annual new construction of relocation facilities. It is probable thai lhe pace of lhe program largely followed that for overall Soviet civil defense activities. II so, there has beenonstruction of leadership relocation facilities during the pastears than in the prior period The average annual construction and equipment costsby our protections of total leadership relocation facilities would range Iromillion
' The inaptitude of lhe urban cml factor can be wan bom lhe fiet that ih- three silo beloniing to llie KG8 and ona lo Ihe USSH Miamir of tlciiMi reflect an inieilinenlilium Iniehai tbeadam tiUtratlx kaagwiipi of cac* of the Btore tku ISO ISSfl aad BSFSH haoVnaap carafe* dnenbed la'mi least one haioVwed undrr-irmind urban laollty ol mme type. Thai does not. cd coune. tale Into conilileiBtlnn Nmilar uiban fadtiliei ebewheie In Ihr Sonet Union
' li alio ihouhl be ncced thai Ihew rilimates da not inclwleeociwiaiid aed
eoatralaw beanhe UW andlalinan nnrairdi and-
additional-
CHAPTER V
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET WARTIME MANAGEMENT
The Soviets' confidence in Ihelr capability to conduct nuclear war is probably critically dependent on their assessment of the survivability and continuity of their leadership at all lesds and the liability of supporting command, ccntrol. and communications facilities. Their confidence would also depend on their nidgments about the prospects for disrupting and destroying the ability of the United Slates and its Allies to command and operate their forces The Soviets, therefore, are continuing eitensive efforts to improveaspects of tlieontrol, andcapabilities of tlietr wartimeoc tore Their plans include the following
A well-defined wartime management
A clearly desiRnaled chain of authority and leadeiship responsibilities
FacUities and procedures to give leadershipandigh probability ofa large-scale nuclear attack.
Survivable, reliable communications networks
Fxeicises and training programs Inr koyand oiganl rat Ions at all levels of Ihc wartime management structure
2 The USSR has an eitensive cavil defense indoctri-nation and training program While there isapathy displayed by many to mandatory dvil defense training, the general public nunerheless is well indoctrinated In civil defense planning, and we believe ihc -ublic would respond to directions oluclear crisis Olhei lactois bearing on the derail effectiveness of Soviet wartime management, as discussed in this chaster, are the numbers of leadership curtarnaisd and control facilities available, their vulnerability to the effectsuclear attack, the extent ol supporting communications, and the level of training ol-Soviet leaders and key' ir 'li- i. i l-:ii--i1
A. Progress in Meeting Relocation Facility Requirements
3 The potential effectiveness of the USSR'smanas^ment structure would depend heavily on the extent to which the Soviets have completed planned preparations for the relocation and protectionie leadership!"
3
A For previous IIMs on Soviet civil defense, we conducted complex computer simulations of large scale US nuclear attacks on the USSR to assess the effects ol differing degrees of civil defense prepaia-tions Wc concluded that with as littleew hours" warning the tTiajority of Soviet leadersevels would probablyrge-scale US nuclearf_
D
ills conclusion has been substantiated bv our iiKresuing knowledge of Ihe Soviet wartime manage rrscni system We have also identified many more relocation facilities during tbe past few years We estimate, as discussed below, that the Soviets have established relocation lacilities for their leadership at all level,
3
Noiionol level
ti Sational Command Authority Facilities The Naliunal Command Authorityill probablytoly primarily on the laigc deep underground
Table V. 1
Progiess in Medina Relocation Requirements
EKiauiedMmimvm Esnmawd Ma.inwr
_ in ire
hitwa: Command Awhceiiy 1
Natioijl mmiitfiiil or filiation!
Militiry
Kty iegion.il
Obtain
Vorti.jocincd relocation cccnpMiei
eomplc.es at Sharapovo and Chekhov and the mulii-bunker, rail-served comple. at Chaadayevta in the Volga Military District. There ate other facilities thai could supplement these siles:
7 The number ol large exurban relocation sitesMoscow Oblarf and the tiegrec ol protectionsuggest that at least core elements ofleadership will attempt i0 continue ton V f-.
dement* will move to more distant complexes.l aim probably hold true for lhe individual miliary
ot the NCA and higher echelons of the MOD each fo.ee headquarter, j, tho believed lo have relocation sites outnde the immediate Moscow
8 USSR Civil^and control complexes have been associated with the headquarters of USSR avil Defense
3
3
9 Internal Security Organizations. The Commitfor State Security (KCB) is known to have had plans in effect sinceo relocate to alternate sltci In the Moscow Oblastf_
i "in
ur evidence that all national-level ministerial organ! ration. have or plan to have at least one relocat.ou compleM constructed lo conform with technical spec, ficaisons issued by list USSK Civil Defense Staff
Territorial level*
12 Military Districts.^
c
Since the formalization of Ihc wartime mililary district structure, wc believe specific relocation facilities will be permanently assigned to those districts. However, all of the facilities in the table form part of the Ceneral Staff network, and could be allocaied as the evolving military situation required.
he military districts would probably make use of dual-purpose facilities as well
supplemented by various types of dual-purposefor republic-level ministerial organizations. Some of the dual-purpose sites would be occupied by more than one organization, while others appear to have been developed by individual ministries for their exclusive use Human sources have repotted onrelocation sites inepublics. In addition,est and recreation sites have been reported to be associated with republic-level ministerial organizations and could potentially be used as relocation facilities. The evidence leads us to believe lhat allf the Soviet republics have eiurban command posts.
he relocation practices of remiWic-lcvelorganizations suggest that directives concerning relocation Preparations have been exlcnstvdywilh heavy reliance on the exploitation of dual-purpose fadlities. Some of these exurbansites have hardened fadlities to reduce their vulnerability to the prompt effects of nuclear dctona-tions^ptbers rely on their remote location for[_
believe lhal tbe military districtsmet the minimum requirements foroicould meet them as wartime[__
believe every mililary district headquarters has multiple relocation facilities io accommodate the mililary districtami ils civil defense and rear services
Single-purpose exurbanreported to serve the leadershipfj"
evidence indicates that these sites
btain. ["
exurban command posts for their civil defense are
Tocalcd in ot near small towns, usually rayon centers Some sites possess hardened, underground structures over which schools, clubs, or other relatively large buildings common lo rural areas have been built. Olhers use available surface structures for relocation and command post facilities, relying on their distance Irom potential targets for protection.
c arc less certain aboul Ihe Soviets" progress in providing hardened eiurban relocation facilities for oblast leaders than wc arc about their progress at higher levels Nevertheless, wc believe tbe Soviets have probablyelocation facility for each oblast. As in the case ol other elements of the warsyslem. however, the decree of protectionand lhe types of facilities available at each site will vary, depending on the importance uf the oblastf then exlensivc use of dual-purpose sites.
l
to
locale
,hrf
aniuitiont. Al dhcujwd inbutr TnC,dC'V
Tk ,P1 Mos'ment are the organizations responsible fur trampo,-
unified po-er system^
, cannot be
for these regional orgamrations. However,common conc^ntl
rahvr, and economic slructure of the USSR. and we believe ihal ensuring
z rih wraJiow
have plans and preparation, for reloca.ionfrom vulnerable target area.
B. Sumvob*ty of Retocotion
ommand
2,t'ibeble. Under Sovret drlllanning, leadership
some in-
Pmthtarv and civilian leaden. Mobile facilities have been used primarily for lop Wl leaders
Comouflooe, Conce^bnenr, ond
PhYsico! VylwobAty
unker /Vaign, The structural design of hard-encd undc.groond structure, found at Sovietcontrol, and communications facilities has been standardccent years. Such bunkers are of the ih .roof typeorulructed of precast concretede, and roof elements. Monolithic
action is obtainedlding steel reinfoi cement between elements The roof resistance is increasedeinforced concrete slab ovei the precast roofBunkers may be ful'y buncd with soil backfill making them flush wilh normal surface grade or they may be onl> partially buriedod berm. In eitherinimumeters of soil cover is placed over the roof. Soil conditions, water tables, land contours, and other factor* permitting, lhe Soviels appear to prefer fully buried structures. Whenover at grade level ihey can be readily masted by formal gardens, vehicle parks, athletic fields, or by surface; buildit-.gtver allortion of the
se US criterion for severe damage lo lial-roof bnnlftrs is- ol the roof* which would preclude use of the bunker fur any purpose. The highrequired to achieve ill percent probability of severe strucluul damage tn underground bunkers (seeililm, nirf.-ic buildings COn-
siriicted above them Therefore, abovegroundarc not considered in our assessments of the vulnerability of the bunkersthem An improved analytical method has been developed for calculating the dynamic response to overpressure of shallow-buried struclures like most Soviet hardened bunkers,arge number of Soviet protective underground Structures have recently been reanalyzed using this method.esult, our calculations of therequired lo achieve severe damage arc higher than those published in7 NM. It should be rccosni/ed. however, that significant
uncertaintiesin all ihese analyses (See aiinet IIescription ol the methodology used in our calculations.)
2'i.Facilities. We have assessed tlx vulnerability of bunkers al three lypw. of single-purpose relocation facilities desciilied in chapter V: national leadership complcses (including deep under poundilitary complete'; with bunkers, and single bunkci installations. Bunkers iniendcd for
the um" of the highest levels of leadership arc the hardest (secl) Bunkers al other single purpose facilities were assessed lo have similar hirjnrii levels Ficept for"national level cornplcics like Chrfcbm and Sliarapovo. we found no significant italislit.ul relation-ship between the device ol hardness ol bunker* andnctions or ot famutiocul level of inlemled users The hardened facilities were constructed al different times and perhaps lo dilferenl kpecilicatiaris. and there are uncertainties in our dala on the structural fealuret of lhe facilities as well as on their intended users
eassessment of (he siles at Chekhov and Sharapovo indicates that thev are harder, deeper, and much less vulnerable than previously estimated For moreecade the Soviets have been rifsandiag and improving these sites, but have concealed the exlent of their activities^
3
In addition to providing blast protection. bun-Lets at single-purpose facilities also provide protection against thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, and fallout radiation We did not assess the degree of protection the bunkers would afford agairai these effects It Is assumed that other elemenls, such as cnlrancesvays mid ventilation equipment, aie as hard as lhe structure itself.
Dual Purpose Facilities. The characteristics of dual-purpose facilities intended for waitimecontrol, and communications at eiurbanvaty considerably. For the purpose of assessing their physical vulryer ability, bow-ever, we have divided them into two general categories:
The first group consists of those complexes with identilied single- or muki-storied flat-roofbunkers and extensive surface structures associated with the peacetime function of the facility. The bunkers al these sites are primarily of the detached variety, although some areor partially covered bv surface modules Among those examined fiom tins first group
second group consists of complexes svhich lack underground bunkers. Although ihey have eitcnstve surface features similar in manyto Ihose in the first group, some of these complexes have basement-type sheltersnf this group ate
The protection that would be afforded by the aboveground installations al both types olcomplexes would be comparable to lhat provided by reinforced concrete structures of standard design The basement.type shelters svould provide somosvhat more protection, while the underground bunkers al these facilities are assessed to have hardness values comparable to those of the single purpose facilities.ummanret our assessments of the hardness of lhe bunkers, basement shelters, and aboveground installaiions at dual-puipose complexes.
Ai notedere does not appear loositive correlation between lhe degree ol protection at dual purpose relocation facilities and the functions or level of organiration thev are interided to serve However, there does appear to be some correlation between the periods of construction of dual purpose relocation facilities and tbe nature of the hardened structures provided
^theie appear to have been thiee partially overlapping periods with quite distinct patterns of construction. Tlie first began in the, with constructioneak in the, and ended3 The second beganith peak consttuction in the, and ended inhe third period began in thehis phase is continuing, althoughmay have peakedhe const ruction of de-lached. underground bunkers occurred in the first and second periodi. wilh slightly more in the first The construction ol surface buildings over allortion
-
Fallout Radiation Protection Factor for Personnel in Structures at Relocation Facilities
Structure Type
Factor
toe open
building
concrete reinforced buikfiat
bcnieri and shclien
cwnpleies for iop naticaval leaden
cl tlie underground bunkeri occurredhe second period Hardened basement shekelbegan primarily in the latter part of the second period and lias continued lo the piesent
lo Radiation From Fallout If a
Soviet relocation facility were not directly attacked, the principal risk to lhe personnel at the command postrom fallout. We have considered protection factors for each type of structure at icloca-tion facilities (seehe protection factor (PF) Is the ratio of the dose rate of radiation outside of the structure to the dose rate inside the structure
actual protection that would bein structures at relocation facilitieson the physical parameters of thedistance of the facility liom targets beingnuclear weapons, and on such factors as theheigh) of weapon burst, number of nuclearand weather conditions Wc assume,under the most likely attack scenario, personnelsites would be located prior to the attack in
. thaw slructures that woukl afford the greatestOther analyses (including those in Iheto Holdcn ol7 IIM) Indicale lhatIn structures at relocation facilities with PF* ofr above would probably be able lo continue to function in their wartime management rolearge-scale US nuclear attack, assuming lhe facilities wt-ie not destroyed
V-74
correlation between UK distance of sites from Moscow
and Ihc iwiioddurinK which they were cO:.Mruclcd. Fur example A
J
imilarly.distance of relocation siirs from pattern. ]_
tnence ol any consistent patterns wilh iiion of relocation facilities is undoubted-latitude often livenarni ill 1in cationev For reasons ol convenience ministries have preferred to meet tlseit lultcmi'tits by using rest, recrealioti.ilrcadi under tlielr control (see, manv ministries, particularly those in -Kion. olitaiiK'ii approval to use prelcrred itome deviatum from USSKhef uniform plan-iTf* fi ai-eouii's for rbe stalulorvll-V) riHiuirniii relocation sitri lo be located al least ISU Lincuw ll is too early lo mder
llOSI VlftOIOuO. tlllS 1 Will llC
however, as tii.li.-il almic. afterol lhe slatutOiybad lolanned site in favor nf One mure distant from an urban target area
SSHDefense guidelines specify the de giee of iwoicction recjuired al each facility based on Its proximity to potentialource^
^reported lhat design ers were notifiedprolcctivc coefficient."by civil defense authorities, that was based on the risk of fallout to lhe locality In which the facility was to be constructed The protective coefficient issimilarhe protection factors wc have calculated intiliring slatidard tables, (his coefficient was translated into appropriate strengths and thick -rscssesb Whenever the coefficient was greaterpecified level, special ventilation and filtering devices were required in basement-type shelters.measures, such as sandbag and brick-wall ladiation screens, were included in t'sc plans for construction Apparently, these coefficients were regularly reviewed by civil defense slafls
Active Defense
as well as passive defense wouldsurvivability of Soviet leaders responsible forWc have reviewed ongoing andimprovrmetils in Soviet air and ballistic(BMD) systems that could protectarras and ley relocation facilities, in both ihc.region and elsewhere in tho USSR
am Area. The Soviets have constructed
Rlltnlorv bunkers wilhin the mainHitm lload and new bunkers ate under .in r1
buiifei instruct ion is also cvidembcyoitil the llmr ili.sd Fie example, the State Committee lor Tekevi sumItadm Hi oadca sling begants
emergency wartime broadcasting center
it.viade and ccetstiucoon of other
cmrlhMicontrol, and communications cot"
pli-si ii.iitiuuc it numerous sites in the Moscow ttfJastall uf these facilities aie withinliiiK Itxnl with inure than half betweentsme ILraiU I'liv marnntv aie localed wilhiniwinadiant These areas contain iheerti andust demote deployed airbe I'SMttti.ni. ballistic missile defensesl Moscow and are current b brine
upgraded, apparently withinils of IheimIv While these defenses could nol significantly reduce damage lo Moscowarge-scale US attack. Ihey might be effective In preferentiallykey leadership facilities
oscow is protected by lhe full range ofsurface-to-air missile (SAM) systems Medium- to high attitude SAM coverage is provided by thends well as the obsolescenthich encircles Moscow in two defensive ringsow-altitude defense was piovidcd by thehich protected only the western approaches to the city. Since then, the new aU altitude1 beingaround Moscow (see, providing belter protection against the threat from US bombers and Cruise missiles Allew ol tbe known relocation bunkers would be within the area ofof these new defenses Deployments of SA-lOs al other Soviet cities will not be as dense as those aiound Moscow but will substantially contribute to localMoscow's defenses abo are buttressedumber of fighter-interceptor regiments
he Soviets almost certainly expect lhatfacilities in the Moscow area would be attacked by US ballistic missiles Present ballistic missileand any future defenses deployed under ABM Tieaiy limits could be easily overcomearge-scale US ballistic missile attack on Moscow. Nevertheless, if tloviets were able to execute an effective, well-coordinated first strike on US ICBMs. the number of highly accurate warheads necessary lo attack lhe leadership fadhlies would be reduced Under these circumstances the Soviets' ABM defenses could assume greater Importance In protecting the national-level leadership
he improvements now under way at Moscow appear to be designed towo-layer defensive system, increasing the number of launchers to the maximumermitted by the Treaty. In addition to increasing lhe number of available interceptors, the new silos will provide some degree of protection to ihr launchers Irom nuclear weapon effects. The Soviets' objectives for their ballistic missile defense program art now,inimum, to improve their ABM defenses at Moscow, to provide options for widespread ABM defenses in ihe lWsOv anddvance the USSR's ABM technologyedge agatusl an uncertain future
ther Area* af the USSR. Tlie military district has become the focal point for the management of peacetime and wailime activities to provide for the continuity and stability of the rear The Soviets have made provisions fnr air defense of the cities that arc military district headquarters ami their environs. Moreover, under0 reorga rural ion of Soviet air and air defense foices, strategic air defenses in most peripheral areas were combined with their tactical counterparts and were placed under military district cummand Overall, wc project major improvements in Soviet air defense weapons and command and control during
allistic missile defenses might be extended beyond Moscow- under some circumstances. II the ABM Treaty were abrogated by either party, we believe the Soviets couldidespread AIIM deployment tn protect key targets in the USSR. It Is possible that command and control facilities for the wartime management structure, particularlydistrict facilities, would receive high priority foi ballistic missile defense- Abo. tbe Soviets areadvanced tactical SAM system that could be capable of intercepting some types of ballistic missile reentry vehicles
C. Communications Support
ommunications support is the iointof the Minisiry of Communications (MOC) and the Ministry of Defense (MODI Thesehave evolved over the pastean along with changes in the wartime management structure Under1 Civil Defense Statute the "orgamrationarning and com mu meat ions system'* was definedmain task" with primary responsibility given lo the MOC assisted by tlie MOP Working together, thesedeveloped redundant networks, supportingand operational procedures, which were aimed at providing the national leadership wilh continuity ol control over all activities in the Soviet homeland following aattack As the role of lhe MOD and the military districts supporting the wartime management structure expanded, increased relianceas placed on the mm nut neat ions networks normally available to the General Staff, supplemented by coin-mu meat ions of the KCB Directorate of Government Communications (UPS) Despite this shift in emphasis,
HJM MOC and other -urn inc. that operate (hell own communications systems continue to have important iMpocisbiliiW for providing ro-mmur-iicat>oris support to the wartime leadership
Ministry of Communications
i"1 Civil IXrfense Statute directed the USSR MOC to
"Develophat ensure thefunctioning of the means of communication, warning, and radiobroadcasting of the country in peacetime and during the 'special period.'
"Provide Civil Defense in peacetime and during the 'special period' with communications; during the 'special period' organize centralized use of all state and departmental means of
"'Provide theation of warning and com* mimical ions services in republics, bays. oblasts, towns, and rayons, and effect the management and supervision of their activities."
o implement these directives, the USSR Minis ter of Communications, in his role as Chief of Civil Defense of MOC and principal communicationsof the Soviet Government, followed the standard civil defense management pattern bv creating second departments (to Integrate the wartime functions of the ministry with civil defense plans) and civil defense staffs at the all-union and territorial levels of the ministerial structure Similar actions were taken in the republic ministries of cornmunicatiors At oblast levels and below, departments and sections ofprovided the manpower and equipment for the communications services and formations of thecivil defense staffs
oncern for the survivability and dependability of communications in wartime resulted in tlie adop lion of several corrective measures beginning in the, and improve merits continue lo be made Some of those measures grow outrtsadcr MOC programmprove, and automale its enm-nion-user service Tliese measures includedhardened reserve telcprione eiclurures in major cities {some of which arc colocated with underground urban command posts for tcrtilurial civil defense
nstalling underground intercity cables to circumvent vulnerable urban areas, and building bunkered cable switching points and network control enters. Most important, the MOC developed plans forutomated regional communications controlsuch asp
Sources who served in lhe MOC have expressed Ffie view lhat iheom mun (cations regions served by these centers were intended to provide militaryeommindeis with the capability to managesystems in their area ondecentralized basis if necessaryuclear altack. Although wartime considerations were presumably not tbe sole motivation fur adopting this regional arrangement, ihey probablyajor factor in the decision The MOD and all elements of the party, stale, and national economy would depend heavily on the systems of the Ministry of (ommuiucations in wartime
SO The Soviets eipect their communicationsto sulfcr damageuclear attack, despite their efforts ai hardening urider-pound cablePoststrike restoration of rommumeatiOnsconstitutes an important function of the civil defense elements of lhe MOC at all levels For the most part, tlie civil defense elements of oblast and lower level MOC orgamrations are responsible for lepairing damage to secondary networks. Personnel would be dtawn from lhe appropriate departments and would use standard-issue MOC equipment in their eniergettcy repair work Similar patterns would be followedose regional communicationsunder the MOC that arc responsible for intercity networks. However, cavil defense components ofcornmu meal sorts organizations would beby dedicated, subordinate field stationswartime reserves of cables, mobile radio relay units, and mobile repeater stations. These stations are staffed by full tune personnel responsible fora wattime capability to repair importantcable lines damageduclear attack.of ihr Ministry of Communications regularly conduct eseinves simulaling these repair artinise-t
ll elements of the war management structure rely heavily on the common carrier communications lacililiei prnvioVd by ihe MOC The leadership at
mXtjp
relocation llles would probably be able to access common carrier undeigtound cables for their communications ncoth and to supplement thesecarrier systems with fined and mobile radio systems. According to human sources, ministerialpost facilities rely heavdy on buried cablet. Analyses ol imagery of these complexes confirm this practice
n its role as the "communicationsf rlvil defense, the MOCigh-frequency (UF) radio network2 parsdkling the mainline common carrier systems and linkingelements in oblasl centers with republic MOCs and with Moscow. This network also links oblast stations with civil defense communicationsin citiei and rural areas The nctwoik employs both fixed and mobile HF stations, and is Intended to handle hisyVptiority communications traffic on civil defense matters and to replace damaged common enrtier links,i
vided assistance directly to USSR Civil Defense in Moscow, bul assistance from the Ministry of Defensr to republic and local civil defense staffs was channeled through the military districts Communicationsfor this civil defense structure was providededicated military ladio communications network first detected9 This military involvement in civil defense would facilitate the later incorporation of civil defense into the MOD.
S5.r
t republic and oblast levels, civil defense communications centers are staffed by militaryr-eisonnel from these centers would be drawn upon to man communications facilities at republic and oblast exurban relocation complexes, f*
The MOC would play an important role in advising civil defense officials and the population of
emergency alerts, including impending attacks The MOC components at all levels would use the full range of communications available, which have already been tested, to relay warning informationrom higher echelons or from territorial civil defenseThe communications means would include lhe local telcphoeie systems. radio stations, and wireCommunications arrangements also have been made that permit selected officials to receive civil defense warnings or Instructions without alerlinsj the general pcxxUatioo
Miniilry of Defense
1 statute lhat subordinated USSR Civil Di-feme to tlie Council ol Minister* called on tlie MOD Inhe implementation nf civilmeasures Among the items MOD was to provide for in its budgetmilitary personnel assigned to civil defense communication* cenleri Tbe MOD pro-
defensewould be supportedime by the full range of military communications nets available to thfr Soviet Ceneial Staff, the military districts, and other compo-rsenii of the armed forces As the General Staff works to improve ptoceduies for controlling the functions of the wartime mililary districts, provision* will be made under which civil defense opera lion* would be even more closely integrated wilh the military command and 'i,
ri'>
he military civil defense units have their own organic com mu meal ions elements Theprocedures used by ihese troops have always conformed io those of other ground forces units, enabling the military districts to coordinate their operations with those of ground forces units
KGB Directorate of Government Communieoliorw (UPS)
he Directorate of Governmentprovides lhe lop Soviet leadership wilhto communicate with all militarydown to army level and with keyoblast officials. These communicationsfixed and mobile, lamely parallel but areof MOD and MOO systems, and theythe leadership to bypass normal militarychains ol command. The KCBnetwork would probably also supportoblast civil defense officials. The Eighthof the KCB of the Armenian SSR was reporteda communications station al thepost ol the republic's civil defense staff.operated independently of otherthe site There is abo evidencewas allocated during the construction of acommand post In the Siberian Militarylo an element of the KCB. prohalilv forof lhe KCB Directorate ol Government
Other Ministries
n addition lo the national telecommunicalions system operated by the MOC, the militarynetworks, and the KCB UPS. there are com-mumcat:ystems designed to meet tbe special needt of the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry ol Maritime Fleet, und the Mlnlstiv of Power andSoviet Law require! thai these cotnmunica lionsconform to the regulations and technical standards established by tho Minisliy ofIn wartime the MOC would assume control of ihese ministerial communications systems
ach ministry would ulilire its communications network in waitlmc in accordance with thn civil
defense and mobilization plans developed by the second department ol that ministry For ciample.the Ministn ol Railroads,oidchief of communications is responsible fur providing communications support to the railroad's civil defense components io wartime The railroad communication) service would provide maintenance and emergency repair of communications at stations and depots and along railroad rights-of-way. and would install, operate, and service communications equipment at rnllioad urban and exurban command posts
^Tlicse ministiles have abo followed lhe MOC practice ol creating dedicated units, which arc responsible for the operation and maintenance of all emergency communication! systems These unitsin civil defense exercises and are rcs'^onsible foi maintaining stockpiles ol reserve communications equipment, fixed and mobile
D. Exercises and Training
be ability of the Soviet war management
structure to ensure the survival of the Soviet system and recovery of the economic infrastructure depends on its ability to implement several highly complea measures under conditions ol extreme stress.must activate dispersal and evacuation plans without interfering with military mobilization or force depigment, and without Inhibiting the continuing functioning of the logistics base supporting military operations If nuclear strikes occur, the wartimemust then direct rescue, damage-limitation, and repair operations to restore priority economic activity One of the prerequisites for carrying out these wartime tasks is the training and exercising of leadership elements and kay organisations to enable (heir wartime management io maintain control under increasingly complex conllict situations
InstOiol'Oni
ntegrated exercises at the installation level test lite Ii .iilership's ability tu conduct the full range nf civil defense operations from dispersal and evacuation to poslslrikc rescue and repair They involve very huge numbers of peisonnel nnd provide the baifc skills
required foi effective actionisaster. Various intelligence sources indicate (hit installationresemble those (Inscribed in open literature. Wc have no basis foi lodging the effectiveness of installation exercise* telalive to Soviet civil defense standards and requirements However, tlie fact thai lhe exercises occur increases tbe prospects lhat the installation's civil defense plans would be carried ouirisis.
Oblasls and Subordinate Cities and Rayons
The Sovieli give greatest nnphiW* to eirrciset (citing lhe ability of command elements to Integrate and direct the operationsumber of installations and civil defense organizations Tbey regard these c> erases as critical lo the polentialf the wartime management structure.
Integrated exercises involving severalare controlled by oily, city rayon, and rural rayon civil defense staffs These staffs primarily monitor Ihe peacetime preparations and exercise activities of in-stalbtiuns, but may also conduct parallel command post exercises as part of the training of their own personnel
several territorial organuationsin exercisesare controlled by the oblast civil defense staff.chiefs, and the chiefs of the lelevar.taxes. In the course of lhe training year, thedefense stall also conducts command post(CPXs) involving only its own command,communications support personnel Theoperate from both hardened urbanand from riurban relocation sites inmulllrayon exercises as well as CPXs.
pen literature rd torts training exercise* al the oblast level only indirectly, because of Soviet mililary security practices Very few emigre sources have participated in civil defense activities at the oblast level, therefore, human source repotting on oblast eiercises has been relatively limited We were able to Iraec tlie development of oblasl level exercises over si'vcral years in the Odessa Oblast. however, based on the reports of several sources who had parltctpatrd in ihem The pattern of exercises and training was as
in the preceding paragraphs Q
Reports of exercises in other oblasts6 to Ihepresent confirm the information from Ihlessa on (he nature of civil defense cxeicises and their timing
Republic*
esponsibility for establishing training andschedules and monitoring performance ofcity, rayon, and insulin.vil defenseions during the training year rests in the lirst instance with republic civil defense staffs These yearlyschedules prescribe the types of training activity lhat is to be conducted and designale the participants. One such schedule approved2 by lhe republic stall for an oblast of the RSFSR included such things as command post exercises, integrated rayon eiercises. specialized tactical eiercises for vanous services tt all organizational levels, and assembly points lor chiefs of city and rayon civil defense staffs. The RSFSR Civil Drlensc Staff reportedly controlled exercises lovolving iii- evacuation, via motor transport, of essential per
rom an industrial enterprisearge city to
the territory of an adsoining oblast8 in the Ukrainianhrec-oblast exetctse was heldthe evacuation and dispersal of moreeople ftomource aho described an integrated exercise held3late (aim northwest of Odessa that involvedfvacuees ftom an urban areaaint area The exercise was controlled bv military personnel equipped with mobile radio vans Exercises on this scale are probably not uncommon
Generol Stallor, District*
o9 Kxeicise actlvily at oblast levels and below does not fully meet Soviet needs lor the development of an integrated war management structure unless the milt laiy dislricta are involved. Militaiy districtn ob-Iast level civil defense eiercises began in lhe early ItfliOs and probably increased in lhe catly
cih'c In opera tin*mulatcd oucleai environment Wc believe Ihii experience improves Soviet prospects lot ileailh ihc ii..nv cnnlingi ii< icsuclear csynflict
Suseeptibthty to Attack
he wartime effectiveness of IhcI managementwc-uld ultimately depend on whether it could be targeted andully attacked This would requite, among other things, the existenceompreheniive and precise targei irstelligencc ibia base on key leadership relocation facilities nt national and territorial levelscp..is our assessment of tlie damage expectancy of US weapons against Soviet relocation facilities
genee over lhe past three years Signilicant shortfalls still exist in the data base lor both lhe urban and exurban command posts assigned to each leadership echelon The prt-ctse location of admioasiialiveand their associated uiban command posts has yet to be determined for Ihc majority ofThis iv especially true lor those in urban centers located in areas closed lo foreigners The most critical problem for target intelligence, howe-ver. remains the data base shortfall for the exuiban facilities of the Soviet war management structure Significant progress has been made over the past two years in theof signature data and rescaich methodologies for locating these targets andthem with their intended wartime occupants However, ibis improve-
i Jon y
Soviet wai management system offers the leadership great flexibility in implementing the in-creased combat readiness stage of preparations of the military forces, state apparatus, and economy wilh minimum organizational disruption. Even at the threat of war stage of readiness, leaders can dispeise and key sectors of (he economy can continue operating without complete disruption, leaders can maintain control of their operations through urban command posts while they are relocating to exurban facilities. This transition could occur under conditions ofsecurity which would minimize tbe risk of disclosure of civil defense preparations to UScollection. Consequently, it is likely thatfor the transitionartime management posture would be activated by the Soviets welluclear attack became imminent.
Under lhe Soviets' war management concept, Soviet leadership entities at the national level aie able to delegate decisionmaking authority to theirechelons. This delegation could include endowing selected leaders of subordinate territorial andentities with additional special authority. Another, more likely procedure would be to dispatch senior representatives of national-level entities to therelocation facilities of subordinateorm of distributed centralization. This could involve the assignment of Politburo-rankto the military councils of militaryimilar practice could be followed by the military district staffs as well. In regard to subordinate oblasts. Such decentralization would enhance command and management capabilities during wartime whenwilh llie central leadership might be Interrupted The integrated, redundant communica-
tions systems that exist, linking relocation facilities at all levels, would probably be adequate to support decentralization of decisionmaking
nder wartime conditions. Soviet leaden, par-tkvlarlv at the higher levels, will make increased use of mobile command post systems to supplement (ixed facilities However, current Soviet mobile systems are limited wilh respect to personnel capacity,endurance, and data storage and processingTherefore,ikely that the Soviets will continue lo rely primarily on fixed sites for their wartime command and control requirements
he Soviets may not expect their warsystem to be subjectedull, undegraded attack by US strategic forces although they almost certainly plan against that contingency. Theof their wartime inanSROmont system would be enhanced through the attrition of US nuclear forces in the eventoviet first strike and bv the operations of active defenses Al present, US land-based fCBM and long-range cruise missile forces are the principal threat to the hardened facilities of the Soviet war managementoviet preemptive counter-force attack against US offensive forces and related command, control, and communication* systems could severely degrade US potential to attack these facilities Following the initial perioduclear war, tbe Soviets probably expect sxsceesuve attacks fromelements of the US Strategic forces Consequently^ they emphasize assuring the endurance of theirmanagement systemeriod ofnuclear war. primarily through the hardening, redundancy, arid dispersal of facilities and thelor the decentralization of control
CHAPTER VI
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
Wc believe (be Soviets will continue to make steady improvements in the programs ond systems that aim at achieving survivable command and control for the forces. Ihe party and state apparatus, and key sectors of the economy. We do not anticipate any dramatic changes in either the pace or direction of the effort. We foresee;
construction, expansion, aodof urban and exurban command post facilities.
- Growing reliance on dual-purpose facilities.
Continuing development ol specialized transpor-lation systems to facilitate relocation.
Increasing numbers of mobile command post systems available lo key national and territorial leaders, although the Soviets will continue to base their programetwork of fixed,shelters.
Improving military district capabilities toactive and passive measures for defense against nuclear attack and assure manpower and logistic support lequircd by the war effort.
Continuing upgrade of communications support for both urban and eiurban facilities through hardenirm. increased system redundancy, and improved capacities to effect emergencyand restore service.
he scope of Ihe Soviets' program to provide for leadership continuity in nuclear war and thewith which they have pursued it overean reinforce* our previous judgments that they areto assure the continuityaitimcstructure capable of exercising control over those national assets thatuclear attack and to utilize those assets for recovery and war support operations This Soviet program is an integral pari of their overall war-lighting capabilities
lie Soviets may lielicvc that deep underground structuies such as those near Moscow will assure the survivability of Die toppriorityof their wartime management plans Wc have not yet assessed the implications oferception by Soviel leaders Nonetheless, their confidence in the effectiveness of their overall wartime management structure is almost certainly tempered by the belief that civilian as well as military leadership facilities would be high on the list of US targeting prioritiesuclear conflict,
n They would
certainly assume that US capabilities would improve in the future Therefore, future improvements in Soviet wartime management preparations may include greater use of mobile command posts and commuruea-liora equipment, especially for some of the topleaders. We doubt, however, that the Soviets could carry out their wartime management plansarge-scale nuclear attack reiving only on mobile facilities We therefore believe they will continue to base their program around an extensive network of fixed, hardened facilities and to engage inpractices that make many difficult to detect.
4 Previously, we concludedarge percentage of the leadership on which the Soviels would rely for wartime management would probablyarge-scale US nuclear at luck with as Utileew hours' ^warning W'e have no reason to alter this judgment.
I However, destruction of those leadership sites thaTwc havethe national, republic, and militaiy districtwith theircommunications nodes coulderious effect on the Soviet wartime management structure,in the Moscow area
ANNEX A
METHODOtOGY FOR MANPOWER ESTIMATE (FuH-Time Soviel Civil Defense Personnel)
stimates
I The number ol lull-time civil defense workers in staff organizations at oblast. city, and rayon levels was estimated0 in7 IIM and in1 Memorandum to Holders. That figure was broken down as follows
IM
The oblast estimates were arrived atthe number of slots reportedly authorized foe the Magadan Oblast Civil Defense Staff as ofthe number of oblasls. krays, and autonomous lepublics at thatoial ofevenly between military and Civilian personnel The figuies lor city and rayon staffing wan based on extrapolations from human souice reports. Subsequent analysis of the original report on Magadan Oblast indicates that the total number of military and civilian penomie) al oblast. city, and rayon levels was underestimated This analysis also clarified Soviet practices telative to the allocation of fun-timewithin civil defense organisations
B. Currentond Below
eexamination of the original report of2 reve.sW thai, whereas the lable of organization of the Magadan Oblast Civil Defense organization authorizedersons, apparently from MOD mils, there wcte alsoersons assigned lo oblast civil defense duties from tlie Magadan Oblasl Soviet- This is coiuincti! with the provisions of1 Civil De 'disc Statute, whereby civil defense positions are filled
by employees of the Ministry of Defense, councils ol minisiets. and executive committees of Soviet workers' deputies. Tlie MOD positions are filled by active-duty servicemen and MOD civilian employees. Thecommittee positions are filled by civilianof republic councils of ministers and local Sovirli The toial number of civil defense positions svas based on the size of the population. Magadan Oblast. because itopulation of, was authorizedOD slots andivilian slots,otalull-time positions1
4 The use of population figuresasis for estabhshing civil defense staffing patterns conlormi lo standatd civil defense practice In other situations. Forpopulation is an important cons-deration in determining the civil defense category toity belongs. Given this practice, it is evident that the lolal number of full-time oblast staff positions cannot be obtained simply by multiplying theositions for Magadan Oblastirst, the omission of theon-MOD positions distorted the results Second.Oblasl has the smallest population ol any oblasl in the RSFSR Therefore, it would be more lealistlc to estimate the number of full-time position* in civil defense organizations at oblast levels and below bv relating stalling positions to population ratios For example, usingOD positions allocated to an oblastopulation of. we
' n*ew* b> lSsgssslia OUast la1 RSSMI uleintoaial Dl>Ulmr tV WW USSR AitinlntfraUve-lVrmocia! Divisionsvnluihat Uw lien olht ItTJ vtgnrt oblatii -ah potHiUinm MNIIndicated thaiaemlive commit-pmiimutoo nunin aUoievel ul XOOOOnmr,be ksxsssssssssft Snr*jOVinm) l Oi liom SSV.isa^irn-
ilinl ihce uvhirnl by uiili ti-Ooiluli
-
I.,
alratio of one position lonhabitants Tlie ratio ol executive committee positions would3 Combined, tlie ratio ol positions to inhabitants would be IThus, if we uie the total population of tlie0 million) and apply these ratios,arrive at the20 Council of MiniUet positions,.
5 If we apply the same ratios to an ulilast such as larningrnd. weotalull-time civil defense2xecutiveA human source has stated that lhe combined Leningrad oblastclty civil defense sUffotal of
ivil defense workers Considering that Leningrad Oblast hasities of oblast subordinalion (of whichave populations ranging0
andural rayons for which it has to provide civil
defense staffs, theeems leasonable (or
the entire "blast
C Republic-Level Estimoles
G Tho figures for republic civil defense staffsin7 Memorandum were arrived atthose reported for the Armeniannion republicsotalivilians) This method (ailed toconsideration differences in population inrepublics While the same ratios lhalin connection with oblast staffs and belowapplied to republic staff tables of organization,serin logical that republics withreater number of subordinateterritorial and installation staffs toArmenian SSRopulationivil defense staffilitarycivilian personnel There are seven otherpopulations rangeMoldavian SSR) which couldbe allocated about the same number ofOthei republics would have large staffs, with(population) having theCivil defense staff Some indication thatsizeepublic determine* ihestalfing pattern is evident in
general colonels a* chiefs of slafl foi the RSFSR und
the Ukrainian SSR civil defenseenet-al lieutenant forck SSR (third largest in popuUtionX while the remainder are staffed by genet al maiors Thus, to estimate the total number of positions at republic civil defense stalls, we multiplyllocated to lhe Armenian SSR by the eight republics of comparable populationotaltaffs for the Georgian. Azerbaijan, and Belo-russian SSR* would follow population patterns and approximately double Ihe size of their civil defense staffsotalzbek and Kazakh SSRs each would have; the Ukrainian. and thehe lepubhc
D. National-Level Estimate
77 1IMotalilitary and civilian personnel al Ihe USSR Civil Defense Staff headquarters I
loor space at tho head-quarteis has increased frometers5 to0 square meters0 litis translatesapacity of. using criteria based on analysis of national-level (tailing patterns
It is believed
that the best estimate for current stalfing of USSR Civil Defense Staff.
8 In7 IIM tbe civil defense academywas estimated
lof*tiidenis^
"jasof0 the total number of studentslie size ofcuity was not estimated. Wc beheve it to be at least
ioo |T
J3;n* civil defense advanced olficcrt training couisc* near Khimki, in the northwestern environs of Moscow, were reported tootal enrollment ofhere were ISO staff peisrwinel ofere officers. Thus,or civil defense academies al lhe nationalvel would comet Balashikha plus ataculty members at both Balashikha and Khimki (lhe student body alomposedr earn officers and Soviellatter are covered in tin? estimate* for personnel of civil defense orgamrations elsewhere) This brings the total
""ft firor
E. Military District Estimates
7 NM put the number of personnel engaged lull time in civil ilefeose work at the mtlitar* district level. This was based on tlie previous estimateo which SO was added to allow lor the presence of civilian employees.6 estimate was based on reporting (rom thehich gave the strength of civil defense departments in militaryashat IIM recogntred that, as military district responsibilities 'or civil defense increased (which indeed happened aftereorganiza-tionl the number of personnel also would expand That this occurred may be seen1 report describing the civil defense entity of the "Western Air Defense District (ADD) Headquarters, responsible for the three Balticupplemeiilary reports indicate that the civil defense entity ascribed by the source to the Western ADD was actually the Civil Defense Directoiate of the Baltic Militaryhn component was headedenera) rr.ajoe who was designated Deputy Commander for Civil Defense During field inspections made by this officer, be was attendedtaff of an estimatedolonels and lieutenant colonels, each of whompecific civil defense function, ranging Irom supeivision of civil defense troops to direction of individual civil defense services and their formations. These staff officers were assisted by approximatelyunior officers Civen the fact that some portion of the officer strength of the military district's civil defense director-ale would have remained al military districtand that support and service petsortnet must be added to tbe officer strength, we would estimate the current strength of each directorate tohis does not seem excessive given lhe factnion republic tlie size of Armeniaeiiorted civil defense staff. The tout estimate for theilitary districts would. of whichould be classified as key leaders.
F. Numbers of Active-Duty Servicemen Venus MOD Civilians
he exact ratio of active-duty sentcctnen io
MOD civilian employees serving In MOD positions al
' Fitfihc* oMdiitnMie* WlkiM.br loud aa ihe laa that ib>
eneral ol tbe Army Khilaguroy aif llie WeiicriiDelenw DUIrlel In Int. Ceaetnl Knetaciiro pwJsswtaaaaaaJei af It* BahicS*Llari PbtiX at Ihe li-i'
national, republic, oblast. and other territorialnown, nor is the figure known for military dislrtcts. Il certainly varies with the level of the territorial organization. The ratioilitaryivilian personnel on republic staffs would probably be duplicated in large oblast staffs or in cases in which oblast and city staffs have been combined. At lower levels, the ralio would be reverted and. in the case of rural rayons, we see almost no active-duty servicemen.
G. Republic Communications Centors
7 IIM estimated that therective-duty servicemen involved in civil defenseactivity. This figure was derivedeport which stated that there wereersonsto the communications center of the Armenian SSfl Civil Defense Staff. Subsequent reporting from human sources on the communications centers of other republics indicates thai tbe numbers vary ForIhe center at thn Uthuanian SSR hasersons; the Utviannd the Estonian SSR.he Soviet republics in the Baltic and Transcaucasusare all in the lower tango of population size. The Ukrainian SSKommunications unit ofenonrarJommiinimtions ttaining unite are not sure about the RSFSR; its military cominu- -meat ions center needs may be served by Ihe national' level component. In any case,ossible lhat thereinimum peacetime table of organizationepublic-level communications center to serve the urban administrative headquarters, urban command post, and exurban relocation facilitieshour basis (all centers as well as other civil defense troop units will be sharply augmented in wartime through lesrrvist asslgnmentX If we useersons perunit as that base and allow for fluctuations arising from republic size and local considerations, there wouldinimumersonnel for all republics.
H. Oblast Communications Centors
7 IIM did not include oblast communi-cations cenlcrs in its estimates of8 report describes lhe manning and equipment tables of the common .cations center of lhe Sverdlovsk Oblast Civil Defense Stall. The number
ol offtceis, warrant officers, aiu) enlisted men wai put at -tl Because of its site, the Sverdlovsk Oblast Civil Defense Staff mayaiKcr communications cmirimaller oblast Additionally, thereinimum site necessary to maintain communications service. Thus we wouldigure ofo theblasts with populationsillion, yieldotalheould be accordedcenter* with at leastositions,otal. The total staffing al ohlast-level communications centers would.
J. Military Civil Defense Units
ased on recent analysis of the civil defense militaiy units, we estimate that the current peacetime manpower for thedentified units tshis is an increasever the total published in1 Memorandum to Holders This increase results from an improved understanding of theof the units rather than an actual incicase in manpower at these units
i0r
National Communications Center
7 estimates for communfcationsdid nol include personnel at the national level. According lo human source reporting, thereentral Communications Center of the USSB Civil Defense Staff
ersonnel would be required for the Central Commuriicatioris Center
ased on the foregoing, the total number of military communications center personnel at. andevels would
' Thu figure dm nol include the cotnmunicalioiuenerally of uUtoon me, which ire oaaaittc lo the military civil defense uriiti located in th* viclnlly ol mUor Soviet cities Atich unit!been identifiedombinedof0 In -irlimc. iheie unit, will increase to divisionand iheir manpuwer will number
K. Full-Time Civil Defense Personnel at Individual Innovations
7 IIM estimated the total number of full time civil defense personnel at factories, scientific-research insiitutev educational irtstituiioni (urdverst-ttes. technical and secondaryooperative and public organizations, housing administrations, and public utilities tofere military personnel assigned as dvil defense instructors at educational institutions The remalndei were civil-lam whose positions arc ratablished and funded by the civil defense elements of lhe ministries.andto which these installations are subordinate There is no basis lor changing this estimate.
A-7
ANNEX B
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING WARTIME LEADERSHIP STRENGTH
In developing, our estimates ol the number of ley leaders at national and icpublic levels, wc have relied Ix'avlly un data that reflect tlie peacetime activities of these entities because we believe they can shiftas management posture with only minorin structure or function. Separate estimatesgenerated for national-level leaders and senior cadres ol s'anous organizations Estimates for the top party staff (Central Committee Secretariat apparat) were derived by counting the party secretaries, the chiefs and four deputy chiefs ofepartments, andersonal aides. Senior cadre estimates for the Central Committee apparat included the chiefs and deputy chiefs of each of anstimates for the top leaders of the Council ol Ministersincluded the premier, 1st deput* premier, eight deputy premiers,epartment chiefs, llie chief of the Affairs Directorate, and seven aides Senior cadres included two additional deputy chiefs and two senior levicweis from each ofepartments
imilar strategy was used to avsen theleadership. With the exception ol certain selected ministries such as the Ministry ofnd the KCB. the lop leadersey wartime mission include the minister, all deputy ministers, and the chiefs and three deputy chiefs of all line chief directorates Sensor cadres ofiriivtrv were calculated to include four department and four deputy department chiefs of chief directorates, plus lhe chiefs, two deputy chiefs, and two key department chiefs of all identified functional components (that is, chief directorate for planning, supply, personnel, training, and so on) Top leaders for ministries and slate committee* of less significance lor wartimeinclude the ministers, deputy ministers, plui chiefs and one deputy chief of each line element
' Ihe, callmale oVi run inctudVd roniiol. imli toa> lhe cwanda ih*
(oeiei bilai* hrtdouanni irtrl
Senior cadres of such ministries include two additional deputy chiefs of line components phisnd depuly chiefs of functional components Functional and line components for each ministry were identified with Ihe aid ot lhe CIA Direcrory of Soviet Official* yalional Or dun iml ions.he2 telephone directory (which lists subcomponents of selectedpecialized Soviet monograph* on individual ministries and state commltlees, and trade journals. Because the lop MOD and KCB leadership is of crucial importance foe the prosecution ofinei organizational breakdown was used for their IsvoThe total estimate for leadership al the national level7
or the republiclightly different strategy was used. The five largestRSFSIl. Ukiainian. Belorussian. Kazakh, and Uzbek-were estimated individually. For the RSFSR, separate estimates for top leaders and sensor cadres were generatedanner analogous to lhat used lor national-level ministries. These data yield an estimateop leadersensor cadres Estimates for the four remaining republics were generated by identifying each union republic and republic ministry and developing estimates for each based on theRSFSR minisiry. adjusted downward for lhe population size of each republic Estimates for the lop party and government personnel for each republic wcie derived from organizational data provided in the CIA Directory of Soviet Official.nd republic capital telephone books This method yielded the following estimates:
Leaders
Cadres
,
Eslimalci for the remainingepublics were derived bv generating an estimateypical small republic (Kirgiz) and multiplyinglie estimate* generat-cd for Kirgi*or lhe top leadersor the senior cadres. Tlie total republic level leadership
Oblasts
liaveifferent approach for oblast and lower levels because we have better informatiori on the wartime operations of Ihese echelons. Alteran appropriate mi* of party and government leaders for each entity, we have used the civil defense services as the best base for estimating the remainder of the leadership al these levels These services, mandated by USSR Civil Defense, would each perform vital funclions. hence Iheir chiefs are clearly key leaders.
wartime oblast party and government leader-ship (not including full-time civil defense personnel) was calculated separately for oblasts with populationsillion,illion, and lessillion For llie largest oblasts, the leadership isofa.ty leaders (five secretaries, and the chiels and dcpuly chiefs ofepartments) andocal government managers (the chairmen, four deputy chairmen, and the secretaries of oblastthe chiefs, deputy chiefs, and two department heads ofivil defensewo elements not included in the foregoing are senior KCB officlab (the chief, two deputy chiefs, and eight seniorlus the head and deputy head of the oblast planning commission This amountsfficials per oblast.ulfficials. For oblasts with populationscaled-down version ol this staffing pattern was used The leadership estimate for these oblasts consists olarty leaders,ocal government leaders (civil defense service chiefs and deputynd eight lop KCB officials These figures add up toersonnel for each oblast,otal2 officials. There areblasts with populationsillion. The leadership estimate for each isarts leaders,d foui KCll officials! yieldingotalfficials. The total for all Myoblasts
1 Keoiuttufeographic location or other .xmi'iimil Ec KCi! Iieadounricri
"1 f'n-.l ' 'l . .
c) .uiiioimrTiK dWellv mhcitiniw to Mown* headquar-
lei.(rcludcd in thii cilimilc
Cities
ities in the Soviet' In most casesare subordinaied directly io oblastestimating their wartime leadership cadres, wethe first and second secretaries of thecommittees and one department head oras well as the chairmen ol lhe city(also chiefs of civillsothe chiefs and deputies of the secondchiefs and one deputy of each ofervices, and (lie four most senior officialsKCB.ity in this category would haveleaders,otal8 for tlie
ities in the Soviet0 inhabitants. Most of these citiesrayon centers. While in cerlain respects theyas critical as cities with larger populations,have been given specific wartimeand alsoool on ivhich oblastslo replace casualties at higher levels. Inlhe number of key leaders, we counted thesecond secretaries of the city partychairmen of the executive committees (chiefsdelensc) and one deputy chairman, theivil defense services, aod lw0 seniorThis group ofeaders extrapolates to-for all cities in ihis category. This estimaleinclude the leadership ofural rayonsUSSR.
Cily Rayons
or each of Iheily rayons in the Soviet Union, we counted as key leaders the first and second secretaries of the rayon parly committeeshe chairman of the rayon executive com-millce (chief of civil defense) and his first deputy, the chiefs and deputy chiefs of theivil delenscnd the two senior KGB officials in Ihe rayon Wilhey leaden for each city rayon, the lofal lor the USSR
w tt*USSB-naTwWiiru
rice Temiooal iM^^n, o/ rHe Union FtepoWtci. ihereiiicinibordmilc dinwdv toubllcs Iray*l okivcs fdbiricitj" Tlie popoliiiooi ol Ihc.w
tencnllv0 Current pjAnumber
ues -iihr create;
'
Key Regional Orgoniialioni
9 Leaders whom wc believe deserve specialare Ihosc responsible loi managing lhe regional componeiils of service industries which arc vital in wartime but do not fil existing Soviet tcrriiorial-administrative divisions. Three critical examples are the railroads, the electric power industry, and the intercity cable system of the USSR Ministry of Communications:
There areegional railroadin the USSn toperating divisions arehe leadership of an administration would include the chief andchief plusey department heads.divisions include chiefs and deputy chiefs plus the heads of six key departments. Thus the total for the railroad system would
Coble System: There are approximatelyceional administrations of intercity cable and radio relay systems in the USSR under which there arcetwork control cenlers Each regional administration hasey officials including the chief, the head of the second department, and the heads of other majorand services. At each network conlrol center, key officials would include lite chief and chief engineer The total number of leaders in Ihe intercity communication system would.
Power Industry: Therendependent regional energy systems or energy production associations in the USSR. There areey officials at each axsociaUon. including the chiefs and heads of secondThe total for the USSR.
number ol oper.Hiv, divisions per >dministratleo vaiici "ccurdinx to (he Mographlc Hie. of ihe Individual administration.
or these three regional entities, the toialol key officials Is. Eleven additional entities with similar organizational structures were examined' The total for allerritorial entities identified as crucial to wartime management.
Tolol Wortimc Leadership Strength
ataotal leadership estimate (exclusive of the full-time civil defense leadership)his figure is fairly consistent with that generated through an alternate method.0 Soviet census provides figures for top leaders of gov-ernmcnt agencies, party organizations, and theircomponents The data (projectedere used lo derive an estimate ofeaders down to and including urban and rural rayon level If we exclude lhe management personnelural rayons, the leadership estimate would be reduced to. Given the fact thai our count excluded lop leaders in lower level organizations not directly involved in wartime management, this alternated yields an estimate quite compatible with the organization approach.
his estimate of wartime leadership strength does not include all staff and service support personnel icquircd by ihesc officials for the accomplishment of their war management duties. In most cases, tliese additional personnel will be colocated with thein lhe various protective facilities provided for all levels of Soviet administration Therefore, thisof the size of the wartime leadership docs not reveal lhe occupancy levels of wartime command posts and relocation facilities.
' Nt* Slate Committor, lo. Material andTtehnicaiSupply. RSFSR Mhu-fe.otor Tiainport. Ministry ofitlon. Ministry of Coal lauvwrr, Ministry ol Coristtucbon, Miainrv of Cas Iitdnsiiy Ministry -nl fnduilrlal Construction. Mlniiirr ol Mailt loin Heel. Mlnlsliv ofFleet. Ministry of Petroled Industry, mil Mi-ilslrylimit Construction.
ANNEX C
METHODOLOGY FOR VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF SHALLOW-BURIED FLAT-ROOF BUNKERS
Vulnerability Analysis Methodriginally developed bv the Umveisily ol Illinois for DIA to analyze dy namit ally loaded structures, is based on an idealized dasto plastic, singlesyslem. The method, which hu been publishedNewmarlcumber ofequues three structural parameters, the natural periodield resJstaiyce (OlJ. and ductility ratiohe duclilily ratio (the ratio of the maximum deflection of un element to its yield deflection) has Iradiliotially been used to describe the degree of damagetructure subjectedlast loading.imilar computerized method, was used by DIA lo analyze the vulnerability of flat-roof bunkers untils revised6 '
An improvement in6 was the inclusion of mplanc forces, which arc developed in lhe roof slabs ol buried structuresesult of the lateral sod load on the exterior walk during the passageoil Stress wave.
7 the US Army Engineer WalerwaysSlalionontract with the Defense Nuclear Agency, underlook an experimental and analytical program to verify the vulnerability assessments of shallow-buried flal-ioof structures' The experimental progiam consisted of static Laboratory-testsoot reinforced concrete models, and FOAM high etplosive simulationEST) field tests
Ma-XSSSSSsi. Hone* arrfiwi.n,I. Illol nUt. SWsnbei ItXS*.
N U. *vaJCExi No Vlli -ol IT. Part I.
1.Wanarr. Air Fernet alumni. AISWC-tiMM. University of Illinois. Oeoamber IO0Z
J. D. W.all.. Nr-marl,iirU lot Hi-wiion.ol Illmou, IS lane IDrfl.
| V.ulwvHhl*ofUiHooIrd iltuciu-n. BeportIt)AMnd ti. USA
pe.tnww Stance. Italrnln ISMt
oot rciiilocced concrete models Periodic dala reports were Issued on the test program, and an Initial analytical method developed by WES under this progiam was publishedorking draft report in' the method was revised in' The final version of the computer code used in the bunker analyses herein, tlie Analysis of Shallow-Buried Flat-Roof Sltucturesas received from WES in2
he test progiam demonstrated lhal earlier methods had underestimated the hardness ol the.se structures. The primary improvements In VSBSto an Increase in the predicted collapseof bunkers) Involved both the loading and resist ance (unctions, as noted below:
looeVsg
Arching,esult of soil structure interact ion
Parabolic load distribution on bunker roof Resistance Function
(nplane forces In roof slab.
Tensile membrane mode
deflection of reinforced concrete beam and slab elements
These improvement, are illustrated inad Kates an escrraentniform load and an elasto-plastic resistance function as used in previous analysesllustrates (be modified parabolic loading and the improved membrane resin ance function, note that the inplane force increases the
hallowfl-mr lUillool^ MtbCiind.eport. USA Waieroayi Ktueilnwil Station, Mr imw
S A. VuJnn-dMuv ofllwtW flat Wedortint Dials fUpoil.Uiioo. Jim ISgl
ABULAR DATA
Leadership Relocation Requirenicnls
Sftiie mi
Re^.ircrw
Possible Miiim.nl
kflt
M iii-iiini
m zm
,
Rear Scmcei Social troop)
16
. 0
ommand (VGKl plui General SlifT
and Bilktiaf arTrcops
(KGBHURI
CeelrilJIdOouarleri
16
2
upermani Directorate
OrK^iration/Mobitiuiloo Directorate
Mam ImeJIiicnce Directorate
Direclcvate Scccnd Main Directorate Third Directorate
> 2
Directorate Mmiiiry of Defense fA-lli
*
Vj:-, ISili Directorate
>
Mam Directorate
?
Directorateh Mrin Dirociotate
Main Direcioraic
?
Main Directoraie
}
Miniiten Presidium
piul Slltl
"
7
Archive Directorate
2
of Agriculture)
Aulo Tractor Directorate
2
Directorate for Military
2
Irutitulioni
olAnaiKiii IruSuiiry
Political Directorate
2
Directorate
ofChemicillnduiiry
Pcrtnnnrl Directorate
j
Koclrl and Ariillcry Director ale
_
try of Chemical and PrtroJevni
Machmr Building IA-UI
of Civil AviaiinnI
l Industry (URj
Civil Defense Stiff
.
of Communication!t
4
ol Commun-cationi)
.1
Airrcci
of Construction
Ml.flK>(
bun md Tranibiil.al Region(AU)
2
continued)
leadership Relocation Requirements
Poisibte
Maihnum
Pom He
Maiinsum
of Construction of Heavy Industry)
2
of bard Reclamation and 1 awr Reiourcfi(tJ-P)
of Consirueiion Materiali)
2
1 tryof Machine) 1 2
CoMiruction of Petroleum ird Gas industry Enterprises)
2
nimal Husbandry and Fodder
of Coos trod ion. Road, sod Municipal Machine Building)
2
IA-U)
Mi-niryofMachineBuildiniforUght 1
of Culture)
i , a j l
J
>
Food IndustryeaseholdI
of Detente Industry) Minisiry of Education)
I- 7
of Machine Toot and Tool 1 uiVSin. InduitrvlA-Ui
ofeal Equipment Industry)
2
Maniime Fleet) 1 inistry of Mul and DiilV 1 2
initio of Electronics Industry ;r. it;
:
'liMiaii/ ^* ieitii|
)
) I 2
MinMiiyofMediumMachineBuildine i
fcrroui Metallurgy)
:
of Finance (UR)
2
of Fnh loduslry fU-R)
1 rod uciio")
of Food Industry)
2
of Foreign)
2
of Nonfcrroul Meullurgy 1
Foreign Trade)
:
of Fruit and Vegetable Industry)
Petroleum Indusuy 2
fA.Ut
Gas Industry)
of Petroleum Refining and 1 2
Rl
Minoiry of Po-er and Elecirificalico 1 U-Rl
of General Machine Building)
2
>
of Geology) Mmmry of Health IU-R)
l l
I A-Ul
of Heavy and Tramped
2
ef) I 2
of Radio Industry IA-UI 1 2
of Higher and Secondary
.1 Ll K|
2
1 '
of Induilriil Construe! innI
1
of Rura', ComtruCiwn) 1 mmry of Shipbuilding; InduMry 1 2
of Installation and Spec ill
Cc-it ruction WotV (UR)
2
1 2
of Instrument Making. Automation touiimient. and Control Syiie.-ns)
2
tnduitry)
M.una) of Trader and Agricutlural 1 ai*me Building)
of Internal Affairs (MVPHU-R)
2
of Trade lO-R) iimnryof traiwporl Construction 1 2
of tuiiicc)
1
07
continued)
Leadership Relocation Requiremenls
ckc.it i.
1
ReOUilCITKDII
Possible Mailmu
Com mi <ke (o, Cinema lograpay
for Civil Const, iiciion and Architecturej
Committee forajrs|
forI
Committee for Hydro-incKoroloc) and Knvironrricnfal Control)
Committee for Inventions aod)
Committee for Labor and Socul Problem. Ill-H|
Committee foi Material Reserve.
Ll
Committee for Materialchnical SupplyUR)
C.lir-iiTnce,i
Commiuet for PuWiibine House*.and ihc Book trade)
Committee far Science and Tcchnolajy
Committee foi Supply of Petroleum Products lU-R)
Commnicc for Supply ofor Atjiiculture
Comm.lice (or Television am! Hadio ft'of dealing (ti-Rl
for Unliiatioii of
Momlc)
CofTimlitee tor Vocational and
-'Ik..,
for Superior, of Safe *oikinandum- and foi
1.
me per iiuntstrv with
rammiiicc of Peoplei Com ml (ti.R)
Minimum projcciinns baaed onnnt
,eyitcoisiMiue*st ,ki rrpublic Ci.il OclCnae slaff
Rc local Ion
,
Mmimum Poujbie
Mam Adtninistration of the MkrocWkiiical Industry
1
Adnunisuaiioa for SafcpurdUy-St.tr Seciets in the Pkh
lUSSR Xiv^ ft>*sft.
aaa tuatoaeenCVOfov,e' Uok,n
of Scicncei
l^irlcu
Military Disuiei
l*cuiaii Milium
Miliury Dniricl
Asian Military District
Miiiia.yD.ii-xi
Military District
Mililary thUrkl
ilriei
CaucasusUn<c
Miblary District
"i "
'
District
ranscBueaim Military Dillrie.
Military Oiitriet
"
Mihlary Diiuici
iiriizt
S-.i
AeTrh^iinc*
1 "MlJdH OOP*.
Brtoruttiin SSR
?x
^fi
"ir
D 3
Jap tmrnwrf
ELECTEO BIBLIOGRAPHY
Intelligence Council
National Intelligence8 82
Sorrier CapabtlllUs for Stralegic53
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Nl UMCsoil Defense: Obfec-
lives. Pace, and Effectiveness,7
Memorandum to Holders of NlanwaY
mi
orrier Bad Movment:Control, and2
The
Transition From Peace to War al lhe Military Dis-trielfOblasttudy of CivU Defense Com-mand Entities.2
Minis-
try of the Coal Industry Oral Defense Program: Emphasis on Command and Control,1
c
InleUictenco Agency
Research Paper SOVoviet Measures To Reduce the Vulnerability of lhe Economy in Nuclear War.3
Jnuitery Research Paperl00Oi. War Survival Measures of Soviet Industries.2
Defense IntelKcjeneo Agency Doleine InlolliijeiKa Reports:
0SSR: Wartime Management end
Relocation 1'iactices tn the Union Bepuhlics,9
AO-BPT
ability of Soviel Civilian2
Mill
UryOrganizationp2
3
DIA Approval,
DIAIAPPRWartime
Management Relocation Facilities for Economic Ministnes.0
Hems in DIA Weekly Intelligence Summary/
USSR National Oil Defense HeaoWteii Facili-lies More Than Double in Five0 September
"USSR; Media Develop Wartime Operations
"USSR Soviet Maritime Fleet Ministry Uses Dual-Purpose Relocation Sues for Wartime Mi nice merit.1
Heodcnxsrtocs. US Air Force
Intelligence Assessement
Clntf Defense Headquarters: Organization and13
LOSSARY
Defensemade up of selected civilian peisoctnet al itutaUalioos "ho are organized and trained in peacetime lor civil defense The minion of these formation! is to prepare for protection of workers prior to attack, to reduceto plants and equipment, and to engage in emer-ecnev lescue and repair work following an attack. Each formation ispecific task such as first aid, evacuation, communications, nr decontamination.
CommandSovietommand posl"unlf) and "controlpunkr ujnavlrnlua) both icier to specially equipped facllilies at which comitundcfs and managers eiercisecontrol over subordinate units Command posterier ally used in reference lo combined aims units, while control post is used by rear un vices, civil defense staffs, military commlssarials, and other organizations. However, tbe Soviets often use these terms inter-chanceablv
Defenseby the CPSU General Secretary and composed of lhe most senior Politburo members, the Defense Council serves as the Soviets* supreme decisionmaking orgamutton for national security policy. It is described in Soviet administrative lawesponsible in peaccliinr for "coordination of the achvities of the organs of state administration concerned with defense of tbe country andetermination of the basic diiection of military development in tliel makes peacetime policy decisions affect ins: Soviet military doctrine anil stiatc-gv. defense espendltures. sveaponi procurement, lor re Structure, and the entire range of preparation! rteccs-sary for the wartime risobiliiatiori of lhe nation's resources lis decisions probably receive lhe pro founa endowment of the Politburo at large The Council also would provideeisinp and stream-lined wartime management during the periodprior to the outbreak of hostilities Allcr lhe
outbreak of hostilities, the Defense Council'sWaff support, and functions would probably cipartd toiodern-day equivalent of the State Defense Committee (CKO) of World War II.
Dual-l'urvosethat,of their use in peacetime, have been modified for use as coenmand posts for the wartime leadership The majority ol these are test homes, sanitoriums, pioneer camiM, and recreation facilities.
GKO {Stale Defense CommitThe World Warredecessor of the wartime Defense Council All power was concentrated in the GKO. chaired by Stalin, which was leiponsible for di recline lhe entire national war effort During World War II Ihe GKO made major decisions on the conduct of the war and generally supervised the wartime economy
Integratedinvolving all of an installations civil defense lormutions. or mote than one installation These operations teal lhe full range of civd defense activities, from dispersal and evacuation to poststiike rescue and repair.
of the national economyfactories, ediscaticmal institutions, collective farms, communal services such as utilities and hospitals, and Othei such.
Mililaru Civil Defensecivil defense regiments and independent battalions thatart of the Soviet armed forces Their mission is to reestablish communications, reconnutter and mark contaminated zones perform decontamliialion.blocked transportation routes, and participate withr mat torn in tmtiessney rescue work
Militaryadministrative entities organized according to Soviet territorial and admi tint rat Ive subdivisions. They supervise prcinduc-lion and reserve mililary training, maintain registers of militaiy reservists, conduct annual callupv identify local resources for potential military use. and imple-ment mobilization
National Commandilrictnnol be drawn between the US notionational (Command Authority and Soviet stialejtic leadership in wartime Thehe CPSU Politburo, the wartime Detente Council, and tbe Supreme High Command The Defense Council, which may serve as the supreme authorityrisis, will expand into the senior organ of national Icadenhip in wartime.
by which the CPSUthe assignment of party officials to keymilitaiy, and economic posts.
Operational Aoiganirations cieated by oblast civil defense staffs for cities with several city rayons. They are designed to coordinate the civil defense operations of city and rural rayons in sectors located along principal transportation routes
Pioneerfacilities of theParty's Pioneer youth programyear-olds
Protractedprolonged conflict continuing afler the major exchanges ol nuclear weapons. Al though the Soviets do not dearly define protracted conflict in terms of length, ihey generally describe It to include conventional and nuclear combat citend ing for several weeks or months sulisoQiient to lhe ma)or eicHaruzes
HearElements of theimed force* which provide support lo all components and contio! an extensive network of logistic units, depots, transportation systems, aod other facilities
Relocationexurban command posts to which the military and civilian leaders and their staffs will relocate in wartime lor the purpose of exercising command and management functions. He location facilities can be either single or dual purpose
Single Purpoie Facititiei--Those facilities lhat are designed and constructed to support warlimefunctions only.
Specialdvil statutes provide fnr tlie declarationpecial period that gives the wartime military leadership special authority over civilians Authority granted to the militaiy during the special period may include the power to orderilian labor service, to confiscate property, and to establish special security regulations
Stacka of the Supreme Highlhe
executive organ of the Supreme High Command, the Stavka provides strategic direction to the Soviet armed forces duiing wartime Although we are uncertain of the exact composition of Ihe Stavka during war, lis head would be both the Supreme Commander In Chief and the Chaltman of the Defense Council. Subordinate to the Stavka and part of the Supreme High Command are the General Stall and the key directorates of the Ministry of Defense.
C-2
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Original document.
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