31 JANUARY 1984 QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD RE: CENTRAL AMERICA

Created: 1/31/1984

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of legislative liaison

.Mr. Thotus K. aser, StaffSelect Committee on Intelligent* House of Representatives.

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Dear Ton:

Enclosed are the questions and answers to the4 briefing. The transcript Is still being reviewed and will be returned to you within the next few days.

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A??POVED jfels RELEASE

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Responses to HPSCI Questions oE4

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Chief, Latin America;Division

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SUBJECT! 4 HPSCI Questions for the Record Re: Central America

QUESTION 1: Pleaseurrent inventory of the air and naval assets of the FDN, ARDE, and the Miskitos. Identify whether these assets were provided by the CIA or obtained from other sources.

ANSWER: The current inventory of FDN, Nisura, and ARDE air and maritime assets is as follows:

INVENTORY

SUPPORT

. Army UH-1H

. ArmyBailment)Baron

7 lost and will sooneplacement.

SUPPORT

"Zodlak Rubberaotors

Several Pangos (small native fishing canoes)

one

QUESTION 1: Pleaseurrent inventory ofand naval assets of the PDN, ARDE, and thewhether these assets were provided by the CIAfrost other sources.

ANSWER: (Continued)

ARDE INVENTORY

AIRCRAFT

'Hughes

BOATS

'Zodiak rubber boat 4

Sport

"Purchased

SECRET

type boats Several

1

SECRET,

SUBJECT: 4 HPSCI Questions for the Record Re: Central America

QUESTION 5:

ashington Post article of4 statedt "Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary guerrillas battered in their most recent offensive and discouraged by worsening diplomatic climate have given up last Autumn's hopes of seizing the slice of territory early this year, senior rebel officials said in recent interviews. Instead of announcing major gains this month, as it hoped, the main guerrilla group is struggling to solve supply problems and trying to establish closer ties with other major groups battling Nicaragua's left-wing Sandinista government". Other news reports havearge number of rebels have returned to Honduras.

The Commit too would appreciate an overall assessment on the status of the anti-Sandinlsta forces to include their disposition, logistic situation, ability to put pressure on

the Sand.inista|

rxney nugnu

"tne DDI and tne uixj nave airrenny ighlighting of differences would be appreciated.

OUESTION 6: In testimony before the Committee on 21

r. Casey stated, "Our policy,ave said it very clearly here, the FDN policy has been not to target economic objectives in the waySalyadpran guerrillas do, to destroy economic assets and to bring general pressure on the populace and on the government. The FDN has been very careful not to antagonize the citizens of Nicaragua by hitting economic targets for the sake of hitting economic targets. However, whon economic targets are military related, they have targeted and that policy has not changed."

ANSWER: The statement made by Director Casey in testimony presented before this Committee on represents the view of both the DOO and DDI. The insurgents' primary objective is to attack militarily related economic targets. On occasion, however, they target state-owned economic facilities in order to cause general disruptions in their areas of operation and to divert Sandlnlsta military attention, thus detracting from the PSLN war effort. We believe that the insurgency has inflicted relatively little damage on Nicaragua's economy. We ostimate thathe resistance forces causedillion in direct and indirect damage to the economy which equals only one percent of the GDP. Raids on POL storage facilities are designed to interrupt the transportation of military vehicles such as helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, armored personnel carriers and tanks, and have caused onlyillion in damages and destroyed fuel. Successful raids such as the.assault on Corinto haveirect bearing on the Sandlnlsta military since their fuel consumption requirements have increased due to the Soviet Union and Cuba's major effort to improve the FSLN's military mobility which is highly mechanized and dependent on diesel fuel stocks. Finally, It should be noted that the strategy of the Nicaraguan resistance forces of attacking oiln-the relatively little damage inflicted on Nicaragua's vital agriculturalontrasts markedly with the aims and successes of the guerrillas in neighboring El Salvador.

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QUESTION 7i Can the Contrasand armed and in their present numbers -Sandinista control of the country, either

not, what can the continuation of this insurgency accomplish?

Does this programikely end point in the foreseeable future?

ANSWER: As presently supplied and armed and in their present numbers, the insurgencyerious political and paramilitary threat to the Sandinista regime. However, the insurgent forces do not have the heavy weapons needed to defeat the EPS mainline units in the

The credibility of this

insurgencymtiry rnreat to the FSLN has, we believe, increased over the last yearesult of successful sabotage and air attacks, defections from the Sandinista ranks, and increased popular support due to continuing Sandinista repression. The very workers, peasants, and small landholders the Sandinista revolution was supposed to represent are now fighting against the FSLN.

The military pressure being levied by the resistance forces has caused the initiation of long-sought diplomatic initiatives, such as the Contadora group proposals, the call for early elections, and the recent moves by European and Latin American countries to pressure Nicaragua to fulfill its commitments to pluralism and basic human rights.

SUBJECT: 4 HPSCI Questions for the Record Re: Central America

QUESTION 8: What, if anything, have Contra groups -particularly theone to disrupt the coffee harvest?

-what does such -disruption accomplish?

ANSWER: The insurgents have not specifically attempted to disrupt the coffee harvest, while they have occasionally attacked targets of opportunity such as state-owned coffee warehouses, their overall impact on the coffee harvest has been minimal. The Sandinistas have stated publicly that despite insurgent activity, they have harvestedercent of the coffee crop.

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SUBJECT: 4 HPSCI Questions Be: Central America

According to the incident reports which you provide the Cornmitteeonthly basis, in the Contras claim that theyicaraguan droops -andwhlle-incurringilled-in-action and onlyounded. Por the month of December, the Contras claimed that theyandinista soldiers and.

the

Do you casualties

that their reporting is accurate inflicted on Nicaraguan forces?

to

ANSWER: Due to the nature of guerrilla warfare, there are no corroborated casualty counts available from Nicaraguan resistance forces. Under the category of EPS casualties, two separate claims are carried. We estimate that FDN and ARDE claims of BPS casualties are overstatedinimum of twenty percent, while Sandinista claims of their losses do not include wounded.

SEC

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SUBJECT: 4 HPSCI Questions for the Record Re: Central America

Another effort is presently underway to unite the FDN and ARDE, along with the Miskitos,ingle Contra directorate. The effort is described as "Convergence." What-would-be the advantage-gained by uniting these groups?

What is the likelihood that this latest attempt will be successful?

ANSWER: Convergence would have the desired effect of increasing and concentrating political pressure on the Sandinista regime. Additionally, it would result in coordination of paramilitary operations and would greatly simplify logistics support, while all insurgent groups realize unity is inevitable and desirable, efforts to achieve this objective are being thwarted by their unwillingness to compromise their individual equities. Despite these frustrations, we will continue to do our utmost to effect unity among all resistance forces, recognizing that convergence can only be achieved by the Nicaraguans themselves. At this juncture, it is difficult to predict the likelihood of success.

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SUBJECT! 4 HPSCI Questions for the Record Re: Central America Funding

QUESTION li Roughly one-half of the FYunding available for this program has been expended to date. When will you run out of money?

Will you ask for more money?

If so, how much will you neod and how will you propose to obtain it?

ANSWER: At the current rate of expenditures, we anticipate running out of money byay. illion will be required for the remainder of the fiscal year, we plan to obtain those additional funds via appropriate congressional funding mechanisms.

SUBJECT: 4 HPSCI Questions for the Record Re: Central America Funding

QUESTION 2: What have you told the Contra groups about funding in the coming months?

they expect that there willeview-of -this

program soon which will determine whether it should continue?

How specifically are you responding

Are there viable alternative funding sources to which the Contras can look. aid is ended or significantly restricted?

ANSWER: The Nicaraguan insurgents are well aware of the funding restrictions imposed by Congress and realize that this program is under continuous review. I-

mere are no viable alternative funding

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