PROSPECTS FOR US-CHINESE RELATIONS DURING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO CHINA

Created: 3/30/1984

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

PROSPECTS FOR US-CHINESE RELATIONS DURING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO CHINA

lm* IBM *u

und In tkm tatatarWfoo of tfau Exwte

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

Th* following intwhtgonc* organization* porfidpcrtvd In th* preparation of th* Ettimottt 'u

The Cfitrot MrUcmnc* Agancy,uiAosntv, rh*arty, end rh* hn*Bg*nc* oroontionon olui lirm* of Star*.

ftefcMfnlf*!; .

Th* AntthM Chfcrl of Staffrl of th* Army TH* DracMr of Novo!g*nt*,ofvy Th* Aitiitontln*rtl ol rh.Fort* Th* Dlrnsior ofMarin* Carp*

contents

KEY JUDGMENTS

DISCUSSION

Recti* Develoomecrj in US-Ottrveoe ReuOlcmi

Tbe United Statu in Chinaioreign Policy

What China Seab From the United Stairs and the Visit

Beijing'* Goab for Pteaidenl Reagani Vis*:

Expanded Trade and Technology

Bfaaniranc* on the Taiwan batue

Strata Issues

1

on US-Chineae Cooperation

DoineaUc and Intr^ttooal Public Opimon

Tbe Limit, oil Strategic Cooperation With the UnitedTensions With the Soviet Union

'ei

KEY JUDGMENTS

We believe (hat China will work to make theuccess In both substance and appearance. Beiiing's major earpecUrkiru will be in the econrrmicon prospects for trade and improvedIt will attempt to remedy the "substantive'* deficiencies that Premier Zhao petcefved in bis visit to the United Slates. Id particular, the Chinese want to gain (roster access to US technoicaxy and Invrntrnent capital to enable them to further their modernization programs. We doubt tbey will reciprocate for any US concessions.

Perhaps Beijing's primary objective in receiving the President will be toersonal relationship at the highest levels of the twotoense of continuity to relations with the United States. To achieve this, the Chinese axe likely to make certain that the visit has the appearance of significant accomplishment. They will Invest the visit with ceremonial pomp and lavish detail In order to convey aImpression to the American public.

Beijing probably believes that the President, in this electron year, would like to portray his trip to Chinalear success, thus giving China extra room to exploit it to their benefit, particularly by pressing forn the economic and technology areas. It may also presseneral Presidential affirmation of US willingness to consider the transfer of advo/sccd military technology.

Taiwan remains the one issue on which the relationship could founder. The Crilnese hope tbe United States will handle Its relations with Taiwanay that allows Beiiing to pursue broader objectives with the United States. Although Beiiing already has protested the announced level of US arms sales to Taiwan for fiscalhey may also press the issue vigorously during the visit- Given that recent growth of Chinese concern over possible support In the Unitedespecially la theTaiwan indepertdence, the President is likely to be pressed by the Chinese leaden for reassurances that the United States adheresne-China policy. Furthermore, they may specifically ask for an administration commitment to oppose any Congrcessions! actions In lupport ol Taiwan independence.

The Chinese are Ukely to erujage fn strategic discussions with the President somewhat broader in scope thin those undertaken during Zhao's visit, but the Chinese wit) attempt to avoidublic Image of collaboration with the Unitedhe Chinese leasdert will probably use tbeae talks toreater US role In Kampuchea andThe Chinese will reaffirm their Interest in stability on the Koreaui Peninsula and support the North Korean Interest in tripartite talks.

Beijing clearly believes that Chinese interests are best served for the fcn-eaeeabJe future by productive and stable relations with the United States, but there are also equally clear constraint* on how far It is willing to permit those relations to develop. One such limit is ih need to be perceived by the rest of the world as not under US (or Soviet) influence. There are sharp limits on the extent to which China will cooperate with tbe United States on strategic issues. This is more thanactic to enable Beijing to show that it pursues anforeign policy It represents the 'salance that China is attempting to strike Id Its foreign policy as it moves somewhat closer to the United States but continue* to pursue other goals that at times conflict wtth US pohcie*

Beijing opened its dialogue with the United States io theotrategic counterweight to Soviet power. Thisasic consideration as Beijing formulates its policies toward the United States. China will use Its contacts with the Unitedthe President'sattempt to iirsdencore the commonality of US-Chinese security concerns regarding the Soviet involvement in Afghani-stan and Southeast Asia. Beijing may also hope to increase pressure on Moscow to make coivcessions on Issues of major security concern to China but does not appear optimisticreakthrough.

DISCUSSION

Dsvekomenh In US-Chi neve Reiol-om

hesurrounding US-Chinesemprovedver th* past veer. Ah hough Hill circumscribed bv differrnsoe*um-bei ofhese reUttons have passed through several difficult periods toew stability andTbeashs to China3 of the Secrctarir* of State. Commerce, and Defease, aa well as vu*tj io WashlDgton of fiveminister* during ihe sarne period, helped revitalise thee*and laid the groundwork for the eschange of vis)Is between President Reagan and Premier Zhao.

Z While far from complete, the process ofadv*need during ihe past year Largely because Beijing recognized that Its Interests ar* served better bv healthy Sino-US relations than bv continuedacrimonyppear* thai China made thlisometime In the spring oftbe Secretary of Stale's talkskd tfl which II hadumber of relatively minor irritantsay lhalikhngneu to allow retailors* to i

everal factors encouraged this shifthe Chines* realired thai the pee* eat *dmi nutrrnhlht well be returned lo office for another terml about the same time, the United State* eased controls on the transfer of techool-ogv to China. These two events appear to have convinced the Chinese leader* that It was bothand possible lo do business with ihe Reagan admtniatreuon The Chines* were alao cooceened lest spring thai Ihe adminasUaUoo was bcglrarslng toower priority to relations with China Belling may have believed lhat this waa at least In pan the resull of Ihc generally sour tone thai It bad given to relation*

n addition to thee* oalcuklSoos wee* Ihoaeto the USSR ut th* springV-dtng appeared dnaatiafved with the pace of bllateral talks with ih* USSR, and ll may have concluded lhal tbe arroarenl Impasse In Clilneaa- US relations had reduced

ncentive to reach agreerneots with China. Al ihe same rime. Chinese public rtaierneots stgtaasfted some content thai tbe USSR and the United States might ba movingnedcrate reduction In their bilateraltep lhat could weaken Chineae freedom of maneuver between the superpower*events, ln particular ihe KAL Incident,China that than wa* rao immediate proapacteduction In US-Soviet taaafons. Moreover, Beting

by tbe farm US poaittoo at INF talks

opposing regional sublimits that discriminated against the East Asian countries.

mproved relations wllh Washington aboattractive beoauat of China's reoognlnon that Soviel power around China's periphery continued to increase wtth the urjarjading of forces poised against Chinaun. rhe steady deplovrnenl ofn the East, the continued expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and steady eapanslon of the Soviet presence In Vietnam

6esult ofactors, China has misted somewhat Its criticism* of ihe Unitedith Ibe except lealeriod In late November aad early3lareup over CotigreasSona) actions reUling to Taiwan momentarily appeared lo Jeopardize the eichangeaRs between Zhao and the Preatdeat Brtjmg crutckly backed off trom Its implied threat* voiced by party Chairman HuIncancel Zhao's visit, but only after il received what it could regard as resjyuraoce* on US policy toward Taiwan

hinese domestic politics have alsoie in setting the tone of Bailing's itsponse* to US actions. Weowever, unable to determine what weight to give ihis factor. It appears, for instance, that residual opposition to Improved relations with Warislngton began to ernerge at tha time of ihe November flareup over Taiwan aod may have sharpened ihe Chineae response to US art sons by fusing itself wllh ihe current campasgn against spiritual pollution Al pteaeiN.we behave thai Dang is able to contain ihe

^SEufET

ind will probably continue lo be able to doover the comingn part becausegreement among Chinese leaders concerning the strategic importance of the relationship

Th* Unitedn China'syd*nt" Foreign Policy

he recent improvement In Sino-US relations has taken place within the conteiteadjustment of Chinese foreign policy over the past three years. Described by Beijing ashis foreign policy has sought to accommodate conflicting desires and Interestsanner that gives Beiiing maximum flexibility and room for maneuver between theTbe main features of this policy have been efforts to ease tensions with the USSR, moves to improve Chinese standing in thr Third World, greater contacts with the Industrially advanced countries,edefinition of interests In dealing with the United the United Stales and th* USSR. Thus, for Instance, tn dealing with the USSR China has concluded that the Soviets' own economic, political, and militaryhave mad* th* threat of an immediate Soviet attack on China leasnabling China to perrmi tensions to eaae and to pursue auch aoah as increased trade China has also concluded thai tt can and should criticize US mternatsocial conduct in areas such a* ihe Midd> East and aoethwn Africa, both lo dbtaoos itself from the United States and to attempt to provide an outside source of support to thoa* groups that do not want chase aasociation with either Washington or Mc*cow

eaitna has followed this approach actively in Weatern Europe, where It publicly has opposed new missile deployments of both luperpowers.

n condemning both US and Sovieteijing has given moral support to ihe Euro-

readjustment waa causedumberincluding Beijing's uncertainty over UStoward Taiwan; concern over policies In thewhich Increased the cost to China ofwith the United States, anda Soviet desire to ease tensions with China.to share with the United Starrs thethat the Soviet Union represented Itsthreat, but ll was no longer seen asor desirable for China to be seen Infront" with the United Stairs againstthese tactical circumstances there was alsoChinese theoretical reassessment of theThis reassessment has been basedlow but progressive economicweakening of both the United States andIn relation lo the rest of the world Inview, over tbe long term this situationthe ability of the superpowers toworld scene and to control their respectivein turn, has led China to beheve Ihat overdecade and more there will beopportunities for other powers. Includingto seek gains and to assert their own interestsreference to th* United States and the USSR.

same perception has led tbe Chinesethat Ihey can maneuver more freely between

ne of the difficulties that Beijing has crested for itself has been that of structuring relations with thn United Statesanner compatible with its revisedn the internationalso-called Independent foreign policy. In recent years Chinese policy has sought toorkable balance between tbe strategic importance of Slno-US relations and China's ambitions to bo independent in the world. This has led to Inconsistencies in Chinese behavior and has accounted for some of the continuing tension In Slno-US relations. Currently, the Chinese leaders have moved toward closer relation* with the United States, without, however, muting their Independent foreign policy line. This has occurred in part because Chinaess Immediate, foroviet attack and alsoonsequence of lb perception that the United States Is no longer on the defensive to dealing with the USSR In the world.

What China Seeks From th* United States ond nVaVTsrt

Beijing's Goeas for President Raagon'i Visit

e believe that China will work to make tbeuccess In both substance and appearance. Beijing's major expectations will be in the economic

i

oo protpecli (or trad* tod Improved tcchnoloay trumfrn -he rr IIlitem tt to remedyubstarrtlv*'* deficiencies lhal Zhao perceived In hb visit lo the United Sit tea There tin will be treat er attempts to achieve breadth In political and itittegic dncatUoro. but the Chin are wiD avoidublic Imaae of collibceatlon with ihe Uniled States. In aclcbtson. Batting at almost certain to stsak reassur-ances that US supportne China pobcy bat not changed-

Perbapa Begrianarv objective In receiving tbe President wiD beettonal reiaryoriship at Ibe highest levels of thehis will be done In tbe expectation that the current adnusistra-tlon will probably be In offioebe Chinese appear anxious at that point toense of continuity to relations with the United States,great Importance to the establishment of good peisooal relationships between leaders. Deng probably has initiated this effort, horsing to leave to hita solid US-Chinese relationship at the political and personal levels To achieve that, the Chi near are likely to make certain thai the viail has the appearance of significant accomphxhaneast. They win tnvest the visit with ceremonial pomp and lavish ill tall toavorable impreaalon to the American public

frgeatW Trade mU Technology Troaa/V.atdont Ntaon'a visit to Chinahen the Chinese wanted to dlanata strategic concerns. Beiiing will probably attempt lo use the favorable atmosphere that ihey have generated this time mainly to press for progress in the eoooomic sphere- In particular, they want lo gain greater access to US technology and Investment capital as part of their effort to obtain from tba outride world the equipment and capital that will enable thetn to further their modcrnitatlon programs. Tbey hope ihat tbe United Stales will provide broad access to Ks nsoderoand to Its capital marsats to assut them to achieve this goal We doubt, however, that they willfor any such US caatsoaaaaoam China also looks to the United States to ccerttau* lo provide rpeCalurci education lo its future technicians and managed, there an currently0 Chi near studeasts in the United States, almost all of whom are In the area* of science and technology

ccra* to US trade and capitalmportant to China both intrinsically andeans of leverage to gain greater access to the technology and Investment capital of cither advanced countries Since China as determined to avoid the appearance of close association with any nrstle advanced country.the United States, rkstiog ropes to deal wtth all of the advanced cnosstrtes of the West and aho.imited degree, th* USSR. China, moreover. sees that good rr lat Kim wilh the United States wiD greatly ease access to the Japanese and the West Europeans Finally. Chin* also looks to the United States lo lead tbe way In easing COCOM restrict Ions on technology exports

IT. Belting probably believes thai the Pr*atd*nt. In this election year, would like to portray his trip to Chinakaar success, thus giving them extra room to exploit It to their benefit, particularly by pressing for ton eras* raw to the rcooomic and technology areas One lactic tbey might pursue, for example, would be to delay substantive gggasBasaoa* on ussreaofved current issues (for instance, the possibilities of nuclear,. or laa treaties) until tbe President arrives, hoping for last-minute US concessions to obtainon Important agreements during the tripthere will certainly be an element of pressure Inidies, this pressure will b* controlled by BeUIng'* current calculation thai its Intereat* are bast served by good relation* with the Uniled State* andlU gain more over tbe longer terra by raatialnt than by coriror4atioo.

ddition to poasbli seeking final agrcement oo atreaties, the Cntaaaa are llkafy lo pursue expanded economic relation* In other areas

They will certainly press for greater reUsation of US casntrois on access to advanced technology, perhapsith list. They are likely to die Ma tittles selectively on license applications and on allegedly kn* rates of approvab of Items contained In various lists sotonltted to theState* over the yean.

Thev will (Jao press for greater adm In lit ration support foryhat -ould make China eligible for corarawdonsl loans from th* United Scaiea

Tb*eaden will devote torn* Uaie during the visit to probing US thinking on Chinese membership In International financial

institutions Depending on progress already made in Ulki wiih officials of the Allan Devei-opmeol Bank and wllh IU rne*nben, China mav uat the visit idho United Stale* loora active stand on Chineae membership la ihc Bank, and it will maka clear hs wiBlraroen lo allow Taiwan to remain in Ihe Bank In some form. The visit of Treasury Secretary Recan to China in March willenier picture of Chineae Intentions in this area.

IB China is aboo rasas trade kansea. IUi led the Import of US agricultural twin in refutation for US hxiutilsoo* oncceaa to the US textile market, Beijing will press the President loets restriction! It will bold out protpecUevival of the growth In UShina, but wiD at lean implicrth- tie thia lo the need for the United Stale* lo curtail Ki restrictions on tho entry of Chinese goods n> th* US market ll Is possible tbat Beting will raise ihe Issue of its membership in GATT, and US will!nenca* io lupport Its membership.

SO During the visa ih* Chlnaae may reaffirm their interest In US arms technology and military eichanges and praaaurther idailhai of US cootroks, but we be<W* that the buns of tbeae talks will continue to take place between military experts on the two shies and wtlh US manufacturers Tbey may prraaeneral Presidential affirmalion of US wUllngnesi to consider the transfer of advanced military Inchnology Beijing mav use theuat todate* for the vtatt to the United States ofinuter /hangtep tbat might give impetus to the transfer of military technology China is alao discussing arms purchasesumber of Wast European countries, and we believe that It hopes to diversify Ri source* of supply and lo avoid becoming closely asatscMlod aa an armsib any Western country, including the Urn led Stair,

n Use Taeicanaiwann .in the single Issue upon which thecould founder. Il Is tha one Issue on which the Chinese have required as*uranee* from the United States since the iraaltomhlp beganonttnia* aa such tor th* (eaeaneable future Al thetime, tba Chinos* hope the United Stalaa will handle Its relations with Taiwanay thai allows BrrtJIng lo pursue broader objective* wtth tb* Unitrd States.

Nonet lyeless. Ihe President will beirm statement oa Chinese policy toward Taiwan Thehe limiu of USor for aucbut tb* great la* porta nee of this Issue and itsepoll Ileal aensttivtly In China willengthyof Chinese views, probably by Deng hlmsell Although tbe Clunaar may rellerele general warnings coocernlng Taiwan, we believe that tbey wiH not make specificlay down ultimatums SubstanUvcty. Beijing will put rts strongest cmpoans on Ih* need lor palpablenet ions in arm* sale* to Taiwan They may revert lo earlier efforts to draw tbe UnUed States into prior consultations coocernlng the level of each year's aahr of arms to Taipei

The Chae.aaa have already proteated thelevel of US arm* sale* to Taiwan for fiscalhey may prraa ibe point more vigorously during ihc President's villi The strength of Beijing's statements during the vtaM will be based on ibnine arising US long-term intentions In ihis area, and tha Chinese will aark reassurance* from the FVeaideol that there wiDecline owe rime in lb* level* and quality of US arras sale* to Taipei

Civen the receol growth of Chlrseaa concern over pcaMble jupport In tha UnitedIn theTaiwan irsdepeodence thahaty lo beby tb* Qnneae leaders for reasuranora that tba Unllod Stalesne-Chinav. tbat it will not Iriject any role of officiality Into Us contacts wllh Taiwan, and thai it wiD. not ewourage those supporting Independence for Taiwan. Furthermore, they may specifically ask for an adnunaatrariop commitment to rjopose any Coaamrssto-nal actions tn support of Taiwan independence. They raay also strongly urge thai US officialsL-cusa-Ing In public the subject of Taiwan.

verall the Taiwan pretjeo of the Creasdenli1 be fmnfc bat tsfchabfy rsrasersrdrorauAonal. and wiO be aimed at haanhsg tbe record clear with both tb* United Stataa and the hardeners In Beijing. The latter need reaaaurano* thai Chineae tnlereats have been safeguarded. The Chinese will also attempt to dernonatrat* thai their poheses for reunlficatloa wttb Taiwan are reasonable They wSU probably repeat what Dengrivate Amerlcar delegation in February: Chinaorm ofwtlh Taiwan thai would* China

USN

of Sino-US CorMnercial Relations Nature of RcUdootkip

Value-

ftitCton US IJ

Pacific Po.boro

venture: Great Wall Hotel. Beiilng Joint venturer produces electronic

initiunsenu

IMS

-

wilh two iv-.viiii' In essence. Iho Chinesr have probably decided lhal iheyet let chance of favorably Influencing US pel idea onon ihe issue of arm*demonstrating "reatonaWenet*'* on the question of reuntf Icaiionthan by uttering threats Consequently, as during Zhao'i vutt. the Chlneae wil probably bach off from an initially hard line on Taiwan and tacitlyby tbe end of the visit that relations can contioue to improve as long as the United States lives up to the three communiques dealing with Taiwan

ir*regiehere likely to etsaage In strategic discussions with the rTeatdent aomewbatn scope than tboa* undertaken during Zhao's visit The Chinese leaders will probably use these talks toreater US role In Kampuchea and Afghanistan Beijing may be concerned that the MIA Issue might Induce the United Stales to ease Its pressure on Hanoi on Ihe Kampttcheen Lasuo. and thus the Chinese Iraders may press for more active and visible US support for the anti- Vietnamese coalition in Kampuchea The Chinese will reaffirm their itsierest in stability on the Korean Peninsula and support fot the North Korean Interest In tripartite talks China, however, almost certainly wiD continue to resist being drawn Into any talks, in the initial phase at least, and will continue to support tbe North Korean bargaining position ihat currently caUs for confederation and oppose* cross recognition.

IT It is peaotble that theeaders will also advise the United Stales to tab*to reduce tensions with tb* USSR. For instance, tb* Chines* may cite the concrete advantage In an early. cement thai would reduce or at least freezeeploymenti In the East Beijing's concern over the oon*equences of the growth of US military power was itrlkinglyMi con versa lions that Deng and Zhao aavarately held In4rivate US deleaarioo. Botfa leaden revealed concern over what ihe Utntcd Scares may do with the mihtarv strength llo head the United States at least partially reaponstble for the aggravation oftension In recent vearv In tb* aam* txaiversa-tions. Deng stated his concernora active US policy will not be in China's Intereati and, Incould lead lb* United Sates to look lo Taiwan as an urnlnkabte aircrafthat is.trateglc asset that tbe United State, would be unwilling to abandon Zhao, moreover, revealed extreme Chinese seroitiviiy to the im plica tsctt of US dominance In the US-Chlneae ralarlcruhlp and underscored Boiling's continuing noed lo be respected and to be perceived as an equal In relation* with the United State* Wc bettev* that this is intended lo stane! Chinese concern that the United States -ill be held responsible by large parts of world opinion for any further worsening of the International atmosphere and thai China would find it increasingly difltcult to be seen cooperating with tbe United States under these circumstances

hao's wilLngneas to discuss Sino-Sovietduring hit visit to Washington In4 and China's announcement of these ducuslorutriking departure from recent Chinee? practice- W* believe that Bemng did this lo signal ditpleastur* withontinued buildup around China's periphery. Moscow'i tactics in tbe bilateral lalks. ruchailure to make basicnd lo pressure the Soviets to begin to meet Chinese demands in these talks The est rot to which China will he willing to consult, and lo be teen consulting, with ua O* *mwasglc Issue* during th* vtsst wiil beart by the state of Stno Soviet retailor* and particularly by the leaurts of the fourth round of Sino-Soviet talks In March.

e doubt that there will be anythingreakthrough In Slno-Sovlet relations prior to the PreaSdaot's visit, and thus th* Chinese lenders will probably give theairly eaSezaflv* account of thaw difference* with th* USSR.laoours* will ba intended in part to reassure the United Staua. At the same time, however, If Slno-Sovlet relation! are discussed, Belling may again announce this factto prod the Soviets aad to try to demonstrate that the fliiiimngh degree of maneuverability -ithln th* strategic triangle The Chiram may tooeesrwsd wsluogneas to discuss Soviet affairs wtth the United States as an laceratr* for the United Stum to be more Icelheotning on bilateral US-Chinese Issues

ComtroJrrls on US-Chirseta Cooperation

eUUsg dearly believe* thatnteratU are beat served for th* foreseeable future byand slabs* resatbooa with the Unitedut tbere are aho ecraaly cktar constraints on howilling to permitabttona to develop One such

SfrJBET

U Its need to be percr-ivnd by tbe reit of the world as not under US (or Soviet} Influence.ts very practical need to keep tension* wllh the Soviet Unionanageable level

Oc*rmtk and brracrKsticrsd Public Op-vion

wul be highly conscious of theincluding the Soviets, who will boit handle, theisit Much ofwill be determined by this factor. Tbolimits on tba substance of the la Ik* andthe pssbiic tharacnrintSon of tho President's

VVe believe that Darsg and hb colleagues are conscious of the need to detrtonstrate clearly and repeatedly lo opt>nslng domestic leaders/sip elements the benefit* lhal China derives frotn raUOons with the United States and tbat tbey want to be seen as vigilantly peotactlng Chineaeon seratBve isaues sacfa as Taiwan. Thb, weiH rsssststm to irnpoae hrnJts on Ihe dcAsaoptneest of tie* between China and tb* United State* and often mains theof almost any stgnlflcantogthy and arduous taak.

Ths UrnHs on Sfrotwoac Cooper eMoo With the Unrkad SSota*

Tbe Chineae, during Zhao's visit lo WasmrsgToo io January IWl. went further than they bad tn recarnt high-level vttlo lo the United Statea to highlight areas of agreement with tbe United Statea Nontf heleat, tbey have kept up private and public ctlitcisrns of US policies bs varioua area* of th* world, and they continue to label tb* United Stalaa apower. Thus there are sharp Droits on the osteal to which China wiD cooperate with (ba United States on strategic Issue*nore lhanactic to enable Beijing to above that It pursues an "iradepend-eoT forsstgn policy. It rapraaants tba balance thai China bto strike tn to foreign policy as it moves scenewbat carats* to tba United States but continues to pursue ether goab tbat al tirnea coefbet -Uh US policies

UnoVrserine ties* connsctiar USBoiling haa publicly atated tbat It wilt nota strategic partnership wtth Iha United States. China will keep Us distance from the United Stales on selected world issues, will oppose some USendedounter tb* USSR, and will not ervgage In such acUvitle* as leant pusneang. Nonetheless. China doe* tacitly cooperate wttb the United Statea on Mlechrd strategic btuas of Mint concern. It will conltn-ue to do ao while attempting to maintain wide options in dealing with the USSR and the Third World

Cnrttoieano. Tension* With tha Sovieti

t The Soviet threat ha* alwaysey (actorinrse calrabBona rektlng to the United States Brians opened its dialogue with the United State* In Ibe early* totrategico Soviet power, and thbaste consideration as Beijing lormulates Its pofaclns toward tha United Stateaqually ryjcavJous, however, of the need not to overly alarm tb* Soviets about th* pcaslbai-ityS-Chinesedirected agilrat th* USSB. Tl.ls has Udaref oil. balanced approach in which China seeks to hold Mcaoow al bay by strengthenlng ties with the Unitedut not to Ihe point thai Moscow would be rmwiDlDg to pursue scane rataurlon ef teeason* with BeOina

SSakebjective hi raoant years ha* horn to rnaintabidistance but noteach cf tbe superpowers and lo conduct relations wllh each that are nealher "not noreijing's desire to main tain ategree of evetiiurdednesa ba Its contact* with the United States and tbe USSBr*or*rtratedUv by thef Vice Premie* Wan Li al Artdrtsrsov'stlcip*tion to tbe fourth round cfth the Soviet) tat Moscow to March, and the Chineae invluilcei to Pint Deputy Premier Arkhlpov lo visit China Id May.

hina wul ssaa to contacts with the United Stales aapndally tb* IWdaat'tattempt to underscore the ctenmorvahcy of USOdrseae aecuritv coocerns rrsssrdrng tb* Soviet involvement to Afghani-Stan and Southeast Asia Beijing may also hope lo increase pressure on Mcecow to make coTvoeaM.itis on karuea of rnaior arcurity concern to China but does not appear optimistichrough At the aarss* time China will aJao contlnu* to take steps toastons wttb Moscow, hefrevlng that an eipanded diaicaruc wtth tb* USSRo demonstrate that China punue* an independent foreign policy.

ScoJTET^

DISSEMINATION NOTK*

THb drxisntajwot dkmmwtoaH* by IS. Drnctant* ofUttnm of th.rncttrtoi rifhcW hnh. thbor th*

Thb abcumt^flw, bnoMtrovwi by Itwataffwfth oppflcobl* wcwllymr iWwtmil to nw^ncloruni ol I

Ihb Juuaiiu.il .lliiiialnioW^few. Af it*ofIh*o th* fenmslnaWb* requeued of tht rfrtobt It In tt^dohc* wh*2

iilii>aipornWy hum tfcennab urvJonvfWd.

Safe,

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA