THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Created: 4/5/1984

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THE CHANGING SfNO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

ESTlAAAT Ore- falhwingJntmBigth

! IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS. organization participated in tho preparation of the

contents

Page

SCOPE 1

KEY 3

U

The Wary Thaw 11

The Chiiveae PmoecHve

The Major Issues Pretludirsg Siim-Soviet Improvement

Afghanistan

The Augmenting of Soviet Military Puwei Adlacent to China

The Central Hole of thetatu and

The American Factor

The Japanese

Variables, L'rtceiUintJes, and Possible Ahernalivc Outcomes

Variables and Uncertainties

Alternative

The Soviet

IS 18

is

18

19

S3

4

6 29

ANNEX C: Slno-Soviet Chronology. 36

SCOPE NOTE

;>For'almost two yean the USSR and China have beenrobingimproving their relations withtj.the' Ver^tirne that the Soviets have continued to develop and 'already formidable strategic and conventional military forces adlacent to China. These negotiating probes are not wholly new; they have oMurred before. But this time there has been some forward movement, at least oh secondary issues and political atmospherics This raises several .Questions for us:i

In what manner is the relationship between these two powers in

oces5 of change?

r^HOwSo Soviet rxmsulutions with China (it into the USSR's Ess*oyf-far are present Sine-Soviet consultations going to carry {Moscow and Boiling?

lUon to probable trends, what alternative outcomes are and what would be their likelihood?

ul k significance of the Sino-Soviel future for

ate addresses these questions, examining both the con-incentives for improvement In the Sino-Soviet relation-te abo explores the possible effect of certain variables, icators by which to measure changes in tbetherwise Indicated, tbe period of the Estimate ts three years

the complexity of issues discussed in this Estimate,n two versions: for broad readership, the complete text; the Key Judgments.

1

KEY JUDGMENTS

The present coruultatlom between the USSR ind China are unlikely to produce; major concessions on tbe part of cither, and the many issues that divide thern will largelyhange in theirIs nonetheless taking place. We believe this process will continue during thenext two lo threeby thi. Estimate.

esult largely of Soviet initiative and of an Increased Chinese responsiveness, Moscow and Beulng have reached numerous agreements over the past year or so on relatively minor economic and cultural questions. But the change taking place in their reUttoruhip does not so much involve their basic positions ot any "moving closer" to one another, as Itoderating of the intensity of conflict These two powers will almost certainly remain suspicious, wary antagonists, ctjntmumg to arm against each other and to criticise each other's aimsess hostile climate.

Many issues will continue to divide China and thewill continue to prevent cither from making maior coivomsions to the other. The principal such forces:

On both sides, historical enmity, suspicions, ideologicaland racist altitudes toward each other

The aemsitivlty of the Srio-Soviet issue in the inner politics of both Beijing andthe consequent need for their leaders not to become vulnerable to charge* of betraying vital national interests to the other power.

Chinese concerns about Soviet power over the coming decades; Soviet concerns about potential Chinese power over the coming century.

On the part of China. Beijing's continuing belief lliat the USSR retains expansionist ambitions, and that Moscow's long-term desire to expend Soviet presence and Influence around China'simed directly at isolating China and diminishing its influence in Asia.

The desire of China that the USSR make concessions on three major issues that is, that the USSR significantly reduce its

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-*wfcSjcral_

p

military power (nucleer and nonnuclear) In the eastern USSR and Morvgolia. cease its support for Vietnam'sof Kampuchea, and withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan

In the absence of any major Soviet concessions on these questions. Chinese reluctance to come to terms with Moscow on the Sino-Soviet border dispute.

Beijing's bitter experience with the high coats of close association with Moscow: remembrance of unacceptable past Soviet efforts to subvert tbe politics and armed forces of China and to subordinate China's national interests to those of the Soviet Union.

The fact that China's boat, Deng Xiaoping, was hixnaetf one of the foremost anti-Soviet officials indent if led with the split of these two Communisteneration ago. into rival Third Romei.

On tht part of theedrock, absolute refusal on the pari of Soviet leaden to halt Moscow's continuing buildup of military power adjacent to China, or to give up or markedly lessen the great military superiority the USSR enjoys over China

Moscow's reluctance to yield the geopolitical advantages it currently derives from its ties with Vietnam, especially the forward deployment of ships and aircraft, and the barrier these developments coristltute to Chinese tafhaence in Southeast Asia.

The fact that the buildup of Soviet military power in Asia serves many strategic and political purposes beyond those relating directly to China, and isortion of the Soviet global strategic buildup

Soviet tmwUUrigness to make the major concessions demanded by Beijing unless China tagruficamly reduces its relationship! with the United States or moves to settle the border dispute.

At the some Hmtr. certain other forces wilt tend toeduction of the intensity of Sino-SotJiet hostility The principal such forces:

the numerous changes in time, situation, and pejtonal-lly that have occurred since the Sino-Soviet splitenerationrender extreme hostility between Moscow and Beijing somewhat of an outmoded phenomenon, the product of certain circumstances of the time that now have less relevance.

The mere fact of reaching agreement on al least someissues In itself creates an environment for momenluin and the possibility erf further agreements-

On Ihe Soviet side, as Moscow't leaders perceive increajing strategic challenge from more forceful US policies and future US weapon systems andtrong wish on their part to lessen the possibility that Si no-Soviet hostilities might greatly complicate the USSR's basic security interests or its overall strategic objectives.

A basic desire to reduce the dangerwo-front war.

A strong desire to prevent close cooperation between China and the United States (andnd to that end to take advantage of known dissatisfactions on the part of Beiiing with itsconnection,

A desire to enhance the security of the USSR's eastern borders by means additional In military power.

concern about what the long-term political implications would be for China's economic modernization programs if outside assistance to those programs were to come only from the United States and the West

A sense In Moscow that the danger of Chinese adventurist actions against the Sovietof the original reasons fnr ihe bespnnings of the Soviet military buildup, years ago. on the SinoSovirtgreatly diminished.

The opportunity to take advantage of the rrsore businesslike attitudes and procedures that have come to mark Chinese politics and society since the death of Mao Zedong, in the process lessening some of the emotional content that Mao and Nlkltt Khrushchev personallv contributed to Sino-Sovict estrangement

On the Chinese side. Deng Xiaoping and his associates have determined that (a)reatest problems are those It facesast, poor LDC, (b) the process of national development in China will be so difficult lhat it willrolonged period of respite from outside pressures: (c) to theseeordering oforeign policies is needed, one that reduce* the level of tension with the USSH. and (d)eordering would not seriously risk jeopardizing the continuance either of strong US-led opposition to Soviet expansion tn the world, or of US and Western wtllinsrness to continue cooperating economically with China.

3

faa.Sati.t_

Associated with those decisions, almost certainly lowon the part of Beijing's leaders lhat the United States would come to Beijing's aid in the eventoviet attack on China

China's discovery during Its invasion of Vietnam0 that itormidable military antagonist on its southern border, and Beijing's consequent desire to reduce tbe pressures on China resulting from Its two-front confrontation wflh the USSR and Vietnam.

Views on the part of China's leadersodest Improvement of relations with the USSR serves to increase Beiflng's leverage on Washington.

A desire to diversify further the foreign sources of Input into China's modernization, and to take advantage of certainthat would derive from expanded economic andtkes with the USSR.

A view oo the part of Deng and his fellow pragmatists that less hostile relationships with the USSR will also signal that, in accepting some US economic and military assistance. Beijing does not uilcnd to embrace the United States too closely or completely refute all assistance from the USSR.

II should be stressed that present Stno-Sovutt talks areagainst the backgroundontinuing substantialof Soctet military strength adjacent tohasduring the Slno-Soviet consultations of the past two years.of all Soviet ground force personnel are nowChina, together with moreoviet aircraft,air personnel, greatly enhanced naval strength,orce, and considerable additional nuclearin the form of Backfire and Badger bombers, SLBMs,

r

principal Part restart of ihe buildup will be certain continuing marked asymmetries In Soviet and Chinese military forces the Chinese seriously lagging, qualitatively. In modern arms. Soviet ground and air forces generally rx-sitioned fairly close to Chinas rjtwders. Chinese forces deployed deeply behind those borders

Moscow's leaders see their military augmentation as insurance against Chinese military provocations along the border, and against the prospectignificantly enhanced Chinese nuclear threat to Ihe USSR

over the long term. They almost certainly also consider thatorces will continue to serve meanwhileeterrent to China from invading Vietnam once again, or from otherwise effectively crullenging Soviet interest! in Indochina. And, these forces will strengthen Moscow's negotiating handis the Chinese.

Thu ongoing Soviet augmentation will at the tame time continue to item from many causes beyond those directly relating to China and will continue to $eroe many broader Soviet Interests. That is, the augmentation of forces in the East also reflect! the USSR's plans to upgrade all of its forces, everywhere; its desire to strengthen Its capability towo-front war, in Europe and Asia; the felt need to compensate for dependent*ery long, vulnerable railroad to reinforce and resupply the isolated Soviet Far East; the traditional Soviet practicensuring, of massing more military strength than outside observers might think necessary; the Soviet effort to use Ihe military buildup as an instrument for political intimidation and further expansion of Influence in East Asia,esire to reinforce Sovietagainst the perspective of much-enhanced Western military capabilities in the Pacific.

ft should also be stressed that the Sino-Sovtetoiilateral matter, but will develop within the dynamic of triangular relationships with the United States. This dynamic willrucially important factor affecting the behavior of Moscow and Beijing toward the other. Each leadership will remain highly sensitive to Its perceptions of the US relationship wilh the rival Communist power, and especially to any development that either power might consider toajor discontinuity In US orientation or strategic priorities.

What developments appear most likely in the Stno-Sovietover the next two years or to?

Chances favor continuance of the process of markedlytrade relations and reaching agreements on other secondary issues uf economic and technological ties, cultural Interchanges, and the like, amidst continuing reflectionsoreless intensely hostile overall atmosphere. This may proceed to the point of including agreement on certain confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as mutual notification of troop exercises.

The two sides will upgrade the level of negotiatingThe Soviets will continue to press for broader ties with Bemng. in the belief that agreement on enough small steps willath for progress on major issues The Soviets will also seek

to Institutionalize the negotiating process. The Chinese will probably continue Io draw tbe line well short of (he most far-reaching Soviet proposals in the absence of major Soviet military* concessions.

While continuing to emphasize its maximum demands for Urge-scale Soviet force reductions in tbe Soviet Far East. Beijing would welcome even small concessions from the Soviets In their force deployments against China The Chinese wouldwelcome Soviet troop withdrawals from Mongolia

For their part, the Soviets will continue their forceIn the East. And, the Soviets will probably nol make more than token gestures to China over the next two to three years

Moscow will almost certainly continue to withhold major concessions regarding Its forces along Chinas border and in Mongolia until Belling has made more fundamental concessions than it has yet been willing to consider. There isodest chance that the Soviets willoken pullbaek ofivision or so from Mongolia during the next two to three years This would notaterial change of much coraasquence, but couldymbolic cortceaaion of some magnitude that might induce the Chinese to reciprocate in somethus perhaps encourage Moscow to make further concessions.

Even if thereoken Soviet military pullbaek from Mongolia, however, we doubt that the Chinese would make major concessions on the Issues of greatest concern toparticularly the borderSoviet force withdrawals had gone well beyond the token stage.

Nor is the USSR likely to give up Its control over tbe regime in Afghanistan, to abandon support for Vietnam's war effort in Kampuchea, or to surrender its military privileges at Cam Raoh Bay insince3 the Soviets have deployed Badger bombers.

Contingent developments thai could upset the above-estimated course of Stna-Soctet relations:

Major escalation of Vietnamese war efforts In Kampuchea or along Thailand's borders

North Korean reversion to incendiary policies.

Major Soviet efforts to destabilize Pakistan,

try Cm.si.

Vietnamese dashes with China, either along the border or in the South China Sea.

The adoption of major new policies on the part of post-Dcna or post-Che rtwnko leaderships.

Japanese move toward major rearmament. Possible alternative outcomes:

is an off chance that during the period of this Estimate the Slno-Sovlet relationship could takeuch more hostile character than the Estimate holds probable-.

This could occur because so many variables are present, many of them not fully within the control of the present leaderships In either Moscow or Beijing: the advent of new policies on the part of post-Deng or post-Chernenko leadership, initiatives taken by other governments (In Korea or Vietnam, forand so on.

It does not follow that US interests would necessarily benefit from the cominguch more frigid Sino-SovietThe effect on US interests would depend on the nature and Intensity of the estrangement between Moscow and Beijing: upoint, US Interests would clearly benefit from probable Increases In Chinese cooperation against SovietIn the world, in Chinese receptiveness to US advice and counsel,willingness to permit expanded levels of Western economic and technological presence within China. But. If Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the rx>int of actual or threatened large-scale hostilities, US diplomatic and security policymaking could be greatly complicated.

there is also an outsideless likely than thethe Sino-Soviet relationship coulduch closer one during the period of this Estimate than we now Judge likely:

might come to pass if no great disruptive contingencies should occur; If the Chinese should back away inthough not Incertain of their keyif agreements reachedumber of secondary issues should begin toomewhat greater momentum toward Siiio-Soviet rapprochement; or if for some reason Beijing's leaders should come to depreciate the value of China's relationships with the United States.

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T'ni fmul

- The coming of significantly closer relations between the USSR and China could seriously harm US interests; the warmer the Sine-Soviet relationship, the more damaging to US geopolitical concerns, defense policies, targeting, and alliance systems, to the role of Japan, and to numerous other key US interests.

Although the possibility cannot be excluded that alternative outcomes such as the above could occur In the Slno-Soviet relationship, we stress that the most likely outcome, by far. is that which this NIE has postulated: namely, that the level of hostility between Moscow and Beijing will decrease, that some additional agreements on secondary matters or possibly CBMs will be reached, that at most the USSR mayoken withdrawal ofivision or so from Mongolia, and that continuing basic differences between Moscow and Beijing will not permit any significantly greater degree of rapprochement between them to develop over the next two to three years

DISCUSSION

Wary; Thaw

Since the Intelligence Community lut addressed ihe subsect of Slno-Sovlalhe USSR and China have begun to moderate ihe level of hostility between them. Evidence indicates thai theirs li still,icutile and distrustful relationship,that Ihe most Important of the factors thai have preserved this animosity for more lhan two1 probably remain substantially unchanged over the not two to three yean. Incremental improvements heve occurred In seccndary aspects of the relationsblp,these will probably continue and grow Inover time. These Improvements will probably continue to haveodest effect on the central liucs that divide the twocertain developments discussed below.

Over the last three years, and particularly since Ihe fallmportant changes have occurred in the atmosphere of bilateral Sine-Soviet dealings.have been significantly reduced, particularly on the Soviel side. Exchanges of technical, sports, and cultural delegations have increased. Student exchanges have also been re Instituted for the first time In many years, althoughery smallin no wav even faintly approaching China's present studentwith iheine-Soviet dealing* on river navigation matters have become mora cooperative. Mutual trade was doubledoo tar art figure of0 million, the highest level since theseend4 trade protocol calls tor total Irade to increase lolso-local trade crossing points have been opened in the northeastern and northwestern sectors of the Si no-Soviet border, for the first lime since the. The Soviets have proposed and the Chinese have In principle accepted Soviet assistance In theover ihe next few yearso to four of the

hina* Hudrau In U* USSBtiaiosnd .ah0 In the We*

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leaden hot- that then* eoeauiutloru willnsure ih* tecum, ef the USSR'* eastern

ininmliw Sliio IIS nnd SliH>-Ji(nneic rp-

teaoeet to toy Urate* dlKuatfont, and1

Uaderi hop* that Ih* cenauhstloni will help China to manaaa the Sovielrokonaed period of twJuoad larMoe* caa facilitate Chiu* proveaa loward

border ten-on and the rak ot armed

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Gens kneraa*Ha raapacttv* deealagt tha United SUlea

l.triii trade, mien leetaWcal aaaaunca.

Interna* esiharal.ivarnl and othn ricWia

Without havingak*me*ln leverage for ulilnwt*gain* at ihe other't eipenaa

Thei lo.

Dramatis* imall ttepi toward Improved relation

Defer Ihe mar* difficult eratreac Maun

rfta Sorter* thirt/orioi

ImcrovemeriH In relation*oan! rtatemeot of principle*

.ti own security and gosh. The Chinese, foe their part. view their preterit dealings wilh Moscow against the backgroundong-terra buildup of foroei In the Soviet Par Eatt line* the start of the Breshncv regime, and of an ongoing Soviet effort to consolidate fwcoolli-leal advances In Afghainstan and Indochina. The Chinese interpret the Soviet buildup aa Intended lontimtdai* China and Japan, to faelhlate the Soviet tfrucgte to advance Soviet preterite tad lalhunce around Chiosratipaan. to ass the Soviet worldwide geopolitical contest with the United States, and to offset ihe growth of US military etrength in the western Pacific and the Improvement of US military cooperation with Japan. Thus, over the last few years China has taken the position lhal Soviet force deploy -tnenli along China's borders. Soviet moves Inand Soviet actions la Afghanistan are three key Issues where there mint be same movement onput before tubslanllal Slno-Sovletcan take place.

n the last year, at bilateral contacts haveeach tide has received cenflnrution that it ifaould not anticipate early prograu toward major concesswni Belling has found that the raroaoecf of incrrated trade snd conlacls hai not cauaed the Soviet Union to reduce lu threat to Chin ear sreurstv or to aha* those pohciet lhal undVrmUw China* irateresu around Hs periphery Moscow has found that. In the absence oft eonirderi radical and unpalatable Soviet coneto China. Belong wiU not abandon Ihe ate of irnraortaW ties with Ibe United States to contest SovtH policy and lo reinforce China'1 aecurity. Although both stdei apparently regard theregistered thus far asmerit certainly neitherl| reconciled In failure lo move the other

thus far on the issues of greater eooeern Esch msy retain residual hopes that the further development of the process of amehoratlon will event uerine it tbeeeks, -iihout sunenderlng the cocsces-stons the tipponent demands

Tha So-net Perspective

The attitude of Soviet landers toward China Is one efength eneoureaameiit. Moscow Is dearly iratlfied al the recent Irnnrovesnents In the bilateral atrnosphere and the trend towardpan nan of Slno-Soviet Uitercourte The Sovieti Initialed this current process Inhroughof public over lures, acting pariiy In response lo perceptionew opening created by tha emergence of heightened Slno-US friction In IfMI, as well si In respotiteetbacks Soviet fortunes had experiencedis thethe derailing of the SALT II agreement. NATO's two-track decision on Inlermedlate-range nuclear forcesnd sharply adverse world reections to the Swlet Invasion of Afghanistan As In previousof SI no-Soviet diplomatic explorations, dating backhe SovWtt have conaWently sought to broaden ibe scope of bilateral dealings as far at the Chinese "ill permlr. teahiag both lo create the prereq-uUles for the reetorailon of some Soviet ordluenc* in China and to encourage Belling to distance itself lunher from the Untied Stains Evidence Indicates that Soviet leeders thus hope lo erode the Ssno-US relationship or at leastore balanced Stoo-Sovset-US triangular. and to render more remote the contingency of Soviet Involvementoot war.

There Is some Indication that there hsve been differing views within the Soviet foreign pobcv estsb-lldiment In recent years, however, over theof Initialing Ihe kind of overtures Moscow began making lo Belling InIt is not clear bow significant any such differences have been. Because all the USSR's recent proposals to China ire long-estab-lished themes of Soviet policy that evade Beulng's requests for motor military eemcessttdna, however, they probably ore notf major controversy in Moscow But. should the Soviet leadership ever come to weigh seriously ibe edvtsebslliy of scene JoncaiMoni to Chine on Soviet troop dlepooaionv the degree of COPtreneeir would probably rise sharply

For Use moment, we behave tlkol there Ucorutderable tatlsfsetioneoow that themovement seen soseful Sovietregistered at Utile cost, ibe lint trust of more thanyean of sporadic efforts lo secure Chinese consent lo some Improvement In the reblionship without major Soviel roncrislons In idvance. Soviel leaden doubtless regard Chinese modification ofallitudes asnilateral tacit Chinese conoeulon.

S Beeatsse no ngniitcam Soviet coriceastons are set involved, continualof the streWgy now beingtoward China to attempt to ebaage Chinew poiicy Is graerslry approvrd us the Soviet knssSenhip. There appean to be sobd support In the Soviet elite for further efforts to expand trade and contacts along present lines, along with renewed attempts to penusde the Chinese lo accept bttateial Improvements in areas where ihey remain recalcitrant, particularly their consent lo top-level meetings The Soviet* will surely continue to press them hard for further substantive and symbolic movement, across the tpectium ofrelations, in order to bring the level of Slno-Soviet dealings closer to lhat cilttliig between the United States and China. Moscow end berime have agreed to double the level of their trade, and evidence indicates that Moscow would bke to be able to nUe ihe turnover soil further Acutely conscious ol the acceleration of Slno-Ansecican mutual minUtrrlal vusti3 aadew Preatdentlal vast lo China inhe Soviets chafe al the rcotTsetsons beting continues to impose on their own reciprocaleicharxtes with China, and seek to upgrade the level of contact. The Soviets would probably like toestoration of bilateral parly to-party contacts severed by Beijing insince they constitute an aspect cf Ihe relationship lhal tbe United Slates cf necessity could not match

n addition, there Is likely to be wide support in Soviet decisionmaking circle* foi concrete efforts to appeal to Chinese concerns thet seens to run counter to US policy. One loadingIs Chinese anxiety about the poselbtlllvevival cf JapaneseThe Soviets have already mode efforts te use thh Issue iirnsuccestf ully to dale)ehicle with wlssen to eheft Ssno-SovVI political cooperation against the United States, and iheyalmas! certainty repeat such efforts ta the future

I the same lime, however, available evvdence indicates thai Soviet leaden regard (he progress reached In SI no-Soviet talks to date as superficial. And. although the Soviets welcome Chinese criticisms of the United States and China'i abandonment of callsworld united front" sgalnit Ihe Soviet Union, author-ilatlve Soviet spokesmen have made It clear lhal they

t

see Chinesetill fundamentallyhostile to Soviet goali. and as aligned with the United Staleshe USSR In most Important respect i

the Question of how to dealIsensitive Issue tn Moscow.evidence suggests that two currents oton this matter eaist In tbe Soviet foreignOne, which appear* to be muchol ibe two, teems lo lavor more activeto conciliate China, possibly Includingregarding troop dispositions on the border.

' ose

who lean to this position evidently argue that only through such concessions can the Soviet Union ertract major dividends from favorable tendencies In Beijing Certain of the USSR's academic specialists on China takea position These figures have drawnirom the Increased Chinese civility Indealings, from the disappearance of Chinesecharges against the Soviet Union, from the similarities between the Chinese and Soviet social jystemi and state structures, and from the reseiumeni shown by some Chinese leaders over what they regard as the subversive effect of Western influence. Suchhese figure* argue, bode well for future trends In Chinese foreign policy.

Spcrcl

leadership lhal are strongly stnciKious of Beijing'* intention, partlcularlv while Deng Xiaoping remains China'* boss. These views seem particularly strong in the Central Committee apparatus and among tbe Soviet military. These harder-line figures probably believe that recent Chinese conciliatory behaviorthe USSR has been driven In large pariesire to exert peessore on the United States for bilateral concessions within an overall framework of continued opposition to Soviet policy by both powers Those Soviet officials ire apparently vividly aware of tbe extent to which the USSR's interests and ambitions clash with China's in Asia, and of the fact that the United States and China continue to work in parallel to contest Soviet policies in Indochina andThey have remarked that recent Chinese invita-tkxis to the US Secretary of State, tbe Secretary of Defense, and the President to visit China are further confirmation of thesehese Soviet skeptics apparently interpret these Chinese invitations asof the strengtb of Bellimj'1 long-term Interest In accuiiltkm of American industrial technology relevant to China's defense against the Soviet Union. Tbey almost certainly doubt lhal the Chinese can beto abandon this relationship with the United States merelyesult of Improvements In China's trade and contacts with the USSR, although thev apparently see no harm In attempting to do to.

Tup

Although these tough altitude* J-lude all Soviet (onceMMfu lo China durlnaj the period of ihM Estimate, ihey inueit lhal any inch cnnceuion. aie lli-l> to be largely token or atmospheric in nature, In the abaenca of major change* Mi the Chlnete OWVv. or aturnover In ihe Soviet leadership lhal math!ilfervrw art of attitudes lo ihe fore' Representative] of aD tandenctea In Moscow, however, dc-jbties* hope lhal internalI acton la China or the United State*ultiplication of Si no-Amor loan frictions that will In turn pcoduce majorn China't po-tur* toward both mperpowers. And (here clearly appear* to be general agreement In the Soviet leader-ihlp thai the USSRetted interest In limiting Sino-US cooperttlon and, if possible. Ineterlorattcn of Washington-Beiii ng relations.

Wmof Andropov and the advent of Cbeenenko do rsrovide Moscow with an opportunity to make another effort to advance tbe Sino-Soviet dialogue. There have alreadyew such inn from ihe Sovieteiaraple. htntiore forthcoming rtand on the truest Ion of Chinasocialta" naluie But Chernenko hat bluntlyMoscow'* refusal to budge on the basic luues in dlipute: Afghanistan, Indochina, Soviet force strength adjacent to China. The early emphaMi of the new Soviet leadenhip haa been on continuity In policy, and tbere hu been no sign ihat Chernenko has made Improved relations withop priority Farther-more, the continued prominence of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Uatnov luggrwi that Mcecow wiH make tew. cf any. major departures on foreign policy Issue* at the outset under Chernenko Hit Uaderthlp I* likely to stick with ihe present course oformalliatlon of relations with China

The Chlnete Ptr spec five

IS. Although the initiative for Ihc recent bilateral imprcrvernenit has come from the Soviel Union, ihe important shifts In policy required to allow any inv txuvtroeoO to begin have come from China. As already noted, rnost of those ineaaaare* lhal have now been put Into effect had for many years been rarftoatn-caily prop coed by Mcecow and refected by Belling,ontinuing ceestral issue for the future Ii that many Important proposal* long on ihe Sovietsuch as requests for summit rneellngs and restoration of parlyhave not been accepted by China,

eaaiuas are StocnardIn Ihc section

rirwlnnlritpa'iartoh tt

he degree of movement thai has occurred in Slno-Sovlat bilateral relation* hat resulted in pan from gradual changes tn the thinking of Chinese waders about how much Improvement in these dealinap it compatible with China's defense cf in geeienbttcal interest! agamst the Soviet Union Thn escalation in Chinese altitudes beganas hahed by the Soviet Invasion ol Afghanistan, but has tetumed again1 We believe that ihi* pattern ol sporadic starting and Hopping In Chinese policy low aidwith the Soviet Union has been Influenced not only by security ind foreign policyut also by ibe Interplay of differing opinion* within the Chinese Leadership Such differences from time to tone teem to have affected Chlsteae lectio toward both the Soviet Union and tbe United States.

The moat recent modi fie* ti.vns in Chineseabout ibe Soviet Union have rmeiged at pariroader pattern of changes In the Chinese posture toward the world, carried out inciementally over ihe last three yean, aimed atereImage on the international scene Whileomidrrablr degree of cooperation wilh WashingtonMoscow. Belong has thus sought to blur the insrsreanon created In thehina almost totally tdentdird with the United States In polar opposlivon to Ihe Soviet Union To IhM end. China has repudiated the notiontrategic tlNaraie with ibe Untied Stales, ha* abandoned earlier callsworld united Iront" against ihe Soviet Union, and has tome what contracted the scope of Hs criticism of the USSR

Tlie Chinese have evidently decided to male these changes In their general posture tormle of reasons. Certain of these ahiftj were reflected in China's etptoratoey tails with Moscow9 Beijinglater influenced to increase somewhat tu distance from America12 became ihe rise of bilaiertl mfficullies tended to strengthen lorttsUndiot tlutrsticttm In Beotng about the willing nest ol the US government and public to take risks for China In the eventhinese crisis with the Soviel Union. Beijing's leaden ware apparently also Interested In using the proems of Sino-Soviet amelioration as an Instrument of leverage on the United Slates,In ihe two moat important areaa offriction: tbe US re'atiorship with Taiwaa. aad IS policy regarding the transfer of advannl industrial techncJcajy to China. Simultaneously. ihe Chinese apparently hoped lhal the result ing thifli inith the United Stale* wouldore appr.ate backdrop for Chinese efforts lo elicit Soviet

liOnccis "ii-

lS

FvIdc-nce indicates thai Beijing's traders found Chuii'i partial dltassoriatlon from Ibe United Slain convenient In other respects It enabled China to tc pa rite itself from identification with those USIn the Third World that Belling disapproves It also made il somewhat easier for Beijing lo court ponticnl actors hostile to the United States butfor Chinese Interests, and to strive to avoid isolation from Important sections of Wiotern public opinion opposed to certain specific American policies.

Al tbe sense Ume, however. China has been reminded by Soviet intransigence that, whatever the uncertainties in the Sino-US relationship, this relation-ship provideselcome margin of security. Because Belling hai continuedoviel threat to Chinese tecurity and undiminished Soviel opposition to Chinese Interests In Asia. It has also had an ongoing reason toay to compromise differences with Washington. China has therefore sought not to eliminate its strategic cooperation with tbe United Sutes against the USSR, but rather lo redefine that cooperation in terms that preserve Its advantages for China while giving Beijing greater flexibility and leverage In dealing with both powers.

In92 China opened talks with ihe USSRotor step inith the United States had assured it that ties with Washington hadhe visit of then Vice President Mocdole. and2 the conclusion of theugust communique on arms salesaiwan. It Is likely that the Chinese leaders felt that these actions, which stabilised relations with the United States, were important prercQuisttcs for the talks that were opened with the USSR shortly thereafter.

espite the improvement that has taken place in the atmosphere of Sin0-US relatione over Ihe pest year, we believe that China'will continue to disavow any Intention to loin Washingtonormal strategic reiatiorahip. Also, the Chinese will continue to soft-pedal attacks on Soviet policies in some areas of the world, and will continue to criticize US policies on occasion. And, additional new areas of Chinesewith the United Stales could emerge. Bui Beijing's leaders will also continue lo hold on lo the relationship with the United Stales as important to China's security and economic development, and SS the essential underpinning for tbeir exploratorywith Moscow.

he Chineseumber ol associatedfor lessening tbe level ol tensions with the USSR:

A desire to reduce tensions and relieve the pressure on China resulting from Ms two-front confrontation with the USSR and Vietnam.

A desire to put pressure on Vietnam. (Veilingwell aware of Hanoi's discomfiture over Siiso-Soviet contacts and negotiations, and ofs obvious anxiety si the possibility of Soviet betrayal of Vietnam's Interests to appease China. However remote Chinas leaden consider the likelihood ofurn In Soviet policy, ihev welcome ihe difllcultics the Issue has created for Vietnam, and they doubtless honeonse-auent exacerbation of Soviet-Vietnamese

The desire toalmer strategicthat willargin of safety for Chinese economic priorities, for despite China's military weaknesses its leaders are determined toeasured pace of militaryand to avoid hasty diversion of badly* needed resources from the civilian economy to the military sector.

A desire to further diversify Ihe foreign sources of Input into China's modernization. Beijing is not likely to cease relying primarily upon the capitalist indtistrlalired world for such inputs, despite Soviet hopes lo change thb priority. Bul Deng and his associates have apparently come to believe that eipanded importsimited use of expertise from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe canseful supplementary role In modernization. This view hai apparently been reinforced by the difficulties China basoves experienced In assimilating advanced Western or Japanese technology Evidenceihe Chinese have come to believe that some less advanced but easier lo assimilate Soviel middle-level technology should be given slarger role In modernization, andIn iceauipping some of the industrial plants built with Soviet help In. Evidence also indicates that Beijing's leaders remember put Soviet efforts to exploit Chinese economicfor political purposes, they areunlikely to allow themselves to be put inortion of dependence again. We believe thai with this consideration In mind they will place sharp limit* on Ibe number and activities of Soviet technical experts used In China to help In plant modernization.

belief on the part cf Bailing's leaders that China can make good ore of eiperided raw material Imports from the Soviet Union, and that the USSRonvenient outlet loraod other Chinese hah! industrial products that are surplus to Chinese export markets ebe-

16

T**axn.L

Chine'* leaden abo apparently Undihe fact that barter Irade with Ihe Soviet Union coruervc* hard currency

A Chinee* de-tire tooliticalIn tbe East European states and to eipend lawful economic rcUtion* withrocess that will be furtheredcoteil ol Chinese improvesssestt* wttb Mcecow

A Chin see bane if not tbeBeijing nui eventually obtain rruuor conccwlcni from Mokow tbat would reduce Soviet gropollti csl pressure around China's periphery.

u Available avldeoce indicates thai, after two yean of consultations with Moscow, Chine retains Utile expectation of receiving meaningful ennceuions regarding Indochina or Afghanistan fce the foreseeable future On the other hand, Chi new behavior suggests that some elements io Beijing's leadership nay iliB retain hones thai ooascestaons can eventually beregarding the Soviet force posture lo Ctana's north Such Chinese views haveeen encouraged by hints advanced by the Soviet Union Implying the pceatbtttrv of eventual unspecifiedregarding mililary deployment! The Chinese may also harbor hopes of obtaining *uch gains because they perceive the Soviet Union as heavily burdened by iti economic difficulties. Its military commitments In Afghanistan and Europe, and heightened Sovietwith ihe United States Finally, the Chinese may have bean led to hope thai the tougher USoward Moscow in recent yean would etihausee BeiUng's Uvsiaga over the USSR, and thereforeSoviet cossccsdorn

.ettUle all their reasons lo expand bilateral dealing* with the USSR, however, the Chinese have powerful reason* to maintain limits on their dealing* with (be USSR I

Perhaps meet Important, the need lo svoldthe Irnnreasloo in the USSR lhat (he Chinese leadership I* permanently reconciled lo th* status quo In East Aata. and as wining lo accept tbe Soviet prow nee In Southeast Asia andeesnlinu-log Soviet force buildup in Eaetith good relation*.

Chinese care not to gor ra inxpsvsvtng relations with Mcecow thai thtt might Jeopardise the gain* China receive* from it* existinghi ra with the United Stale* and other non-Onrununlst states. China's leaden wish lo be ablemply toa prod for corvceaalcniUlneenU.se to more forceful policies towardthey retain the option io greatly mtngihen tecumy cooperation with the United Sutes, and tbey abo rtrongrj* deurr io maintain US acquiescence In the flow ofuehnolcsgy to Chm* from ihe Untied States. Japan, and Wntcm Europe, and lo rnlargr thai flow into more sophisticated and srnsttlvr arru Evidence Indicates that Chinese leaden also wish to preserve the option lo purchase someued wee pom production technology Irosn the Wet, and particularly from the United Suies. believing lhal the creation ol expectation* of far-reaching crwrarso in Sino-Sovlel rctalloni could alarm ibe United Stales sufficienllv to endangertbeae benefits

Beijing's wsah not to be perceived by Third World hseden as meting closet to the USSR. Beiilng has found that Chinese actions newod In Ada as seeking to ptopttUtr Moscow can evoke negative reaction* from certain stiles, notably Japan and Thailand.

or all these reasons, we Mdae that, in the ef rruuor Sovietelling over the next two lo three yearsprobably continue lo resist Soviet psessnsre for bilateral Intptoverraentsype that would be likely to raise seriousogs elsewhere Chineae reaportse to Soviel overtures will therefore continue to be differentia led ir tome area* BeijWw will probably allow farther progress, while In other* Chine I* likely to continue to reject Soviet

In the first area. Beijing will probably consent lo some reciprocal "iiiti by Important government figures (without scanow lodging ibeir party sta-I'jsI as well as to continued espajuicn ai deahngs on (hose front* where improveraersts havebegun in the lad two years: rsoUblv. iiudeni erchangei. and muUiplication ofsports, and cultural contacts; and tradeagreement may be reachedive-year trade pact

- In the second area are these Soviet desires whose Mtisfaction Beijing will probably regard as not Justified bv Soviet conduct and at likely to be overly provocative lo the United States. For eiample, in the absence cf major Soviet conceo-uoro(wblcb ire themvl-ei unlikelyL BeUtng wiH probably not agree to ihe Sovietressed by Moscow ranee UTS.ormal ombreflaeatie underpinningew Sine-Soviet retatio/ishlp Belling aho isto agree during the period ol this Estimate to reciprocal visits by topleaders, and the

17

ous"

are Jew lhan even lhal iheill contentestoration of party relations.we do not believe ihat Belting will consent to any overture* frotn Moteon for concrete Sine-Soviel polilical cooperation against the United States.

The Major Issues PrecludingImprovemerit

he threeecord Hi oru thai Beijing has pceedajor improvemenl in therelallonship are thai the USSR significantly reduce its military power (nuclear and nonnuclear) adjacent to China, cease its support for Vlclnam'i occupation of Kampuchea, and withdraw its combat troop* from Afghanistan- These Issue* have different degrees of importance to Moscow and Beiflng; and it should be noted that. If pest Chinese negotiating patterns hold, Bci/ina's "preconditions'* often remainormal tense but ultimately give way somewhat in fact. The following ere the three primary issues, in order of inataiing Importance to the Slno-Soviet relationship.

barutton

ES, Evidence Indicates lhat ihe Chinese regard the Issue of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as ihe least Important of tbe threehe Chinese interpreted the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan In9 as alarming new evidence cfwillingness to use force to attain its gen Is. andignificant advance of the Soviet military presence in Asia,ew potential for eventual further advance cf Soviet Influence. In particular, China's leaders are ahnost certainly concerned that success for the USSR's "southward strategy in Afghanistan could endanger China's close ally Pakistan and the oil routes of the Persian Gulf to Important to tbe West Beijing oho sen tbe Soviet assertion of hegemony Inas, among other things, an extension of other Soviet efforts to encircle China geopolitlcally, and as part of an unending struggle lo counteract China's influence In Asia.

t the same time, however, tbe Chinese have not seen tbe Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, remote from China because of geography and terrain, as adding significantly to the Soviet military threat to China. Also because of Afghanistan's remoteness.tense cf ils vested Interest in the political orientation of this country has always been much weaker than Its view cf Its stake In Indochina. Finally. Bering has come to regard (he extended punitive war Moscow is waging In Afghanistanrotracted source cf Sovietpoint of politicala drain on Soviet resources,ossible constraint oo Soviet ability to take military initiatives elsewhere. Beijing'* leaders therefore sec the present situation as offering Important compensation forfailure to withdraw, and do not seem to be greatly concerned at the prospect of continued stalemate.

e judge that the Soviets are unlikely toefforts to consolidate control over Afghanistan. The Soviet leaders are unlikely lo rnodify their view of Ihe Importance cfriendlyower there that also servesridge potentially extending Soviet power and Influence significantly further In Sc-uthwest Asia. This view has probably been reinforced by the Soviet commitment there to preserve Soviet local domination In any case, tbe Soviet leaders almost certainly regard China's concerns as secondary concerning Afghanistan. If morenegative consequences of this policy areto modify Soviet behavior there, the Sovieti will certainly not do so lo appease China.

IndocWna

Beijing's leadersar graver view cf Soviet action* In Indochina, which they regard aswith China's security.be Soviet Union has provided economic, political, and military backing for Vietnam's efforts to consolidate Us domination over the IndochuiMe peninsula and lo exclude Chinese Influence from the region. The Soviet Union has abo servedizable deterrentajor Chinese imCTvention to hilt Vietnam's conquest cfChina has been compelled to rely Instead ooainpuchean insurgency that for five years has denied final victory lo Hanoi and Moscow. This insurgency has been nourished in part by Chinese weapons and supplies tunneled through Thailand: as well at by ihe diplomatic support cf Chins, the ASEAN countries, and the United States, and.by US security backing for Thailand against the threat cf Vietnamese reprisal. In return for the USSR's commitments lo Hanoi. Soviet influence has followed In the wake cf Vietnam into Kampuchea and Laos, and the Soviet Union hat obtained use cf Cam Ranh Bay to tupport growing air, naval, and intelligence capabilities on China's southeastern flank.

Available evidence suggests that, whileleaders do not regard the present Soviet position In Indochina as comparable with Afghanistan inthey surely regard itn importantgain registered at the expense of both the United States and China. They are well aware of Chinese

ie

over the two-front: military oonfronlation Beijing has been forced to acceptnd tbey doubtless consider that the Soviet deterrent factor hu humiliated Beijing by demomtrating Cblneie inability effecllvcly to coercean area ofChinese pretentions to dominant influence. Theyobobly regard their alliance with Vietnamource of augmented Soviet pressure on Chins which hu already paid dividends in tbe new Chineseto accept Soviet proposals for modest bilateral improvements Over snd above these considerations, Soviet leaden almost certainly see their growingpresence at Cam Banhajor advance that enhances Soviet capabilities to conduct and support naval and air opera liana In the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean

he Soviet relationship with Hanoi that yields this Soviet military presence is not without dictions and problems for bothvidence dearlythat the Soviets are sensitive to the costs of supporting Vietnam; and that the Vietnamese resent htoscow's attempt! to establish It* own independent tint wtth Hanoi'sao* and Kampuchea, and fear that the USSR might someday betray the Interests of Vietnam In favor of its huge neighbor. China. The demonstrated behavior of the USSR and Vietnam make* Il clear, however, that both parlies consider their relationship on balance tonott beneficial one.

ence, we believe it unlikely that thewill change their course in Kampuchea In any major way, or that signifies at change will take place in the Mceoow-Hand rcUttorishlp over the neat two to three years, or indeed perhapsuch longer period. The Soviet leaders are well acquainted with the intranitgence of the Vietnamese leadership, and almost certainly believe that only drastic Sovieton Hanoi might coriceivebly bring sufficient Vietnamese concessions lo satisfy Beijing, but that tbe attempted use of such pressure* would gravelythe Soviet relatlomhtp wilh Vietnam, the Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh. and Indeed Sovieln Southeast Asia. To run political risks of thii magnitude concerning Vietnam, the Soviet* would want commensurate gain* In advance from Beijing.

he Soviet* are unwilling to risk losing the bird in thepresent advantage* tnfor the uncertainties of hypothetical ChineseThey therefore have consistently refused to bargain with Belling on the subject of Indochina during their bilateral talks with the Chlrwse. They have on occasion gone so far as to attempt toASEANnehalf, intoopposition to the (all accompli In Kampuchea They have maintained Intact their deployments along China's northernhich eoredlute ccinspieu-ous threat* against the rKsHibihtyew Chinese military reaction tooperations lo China's south In sum. the inertia created by esistlrotpohtical advantage* la likely lo continue to dcrci oate Soviet policy in Indochina, and lo perpetuate Chinese resentment

ur confidence In lbs* conclusion has been further trxenaahewedthe Soviet depigmentf ninead-gee* including tome five configured aa bombers or oli-to-surface missileCam Ranh The Badgers apparently will remain under Soviet control and probably wll)ontinuous presence there, rotating periodically back to ihe USSR and being replaced byf ihe Badger* remain al Cam Ranh. the Chinese may surmise thai the Soviet Union hu extorted from Vietnam permission for this deployment as partial compensation for the Sov'et refusal lo betray Hanoi to conciliate Beijing. Chinese leaders almost certainly Interpret ihe advent of the Badger boos bees at fresh evidence that the Soviet Union is likely to remain iMrarstagenf on the Indochina issue

The Auojmentifttj ot Soviet JAaliioey Power

Adjo<enl to Ctwno

n view of tbe poor prospects for Sino-Soviet accommodation regarding Afghanistan or Indochina, the thirdQue it ion of whether the Soviel leader* will make major conceoiloni regarding force deployment policy Inlikely loreet influence on the evolution ol the Sino-Soviet relslion-shlp over ihe neat few yean We review In turn, below, the evidence of existing trends In Soviet and Chinese depioyvassta, the peesibtlllVn andof Sovietand the role of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in Soviet thinking on these marten

3ft Trend*oosVf DegwogsstenU amal Modern-Iialioa. The improvements noted la ihe Sino-Soviet rebtionsbip have taken place ta the face of astrengthening of ihe Soviet military position in the eastern USSR and the Pacific The pace ofbuildup hu upered off from that of thend: Mcecow now seems Intent on fulfill-ing lrngstandlng force modemltallon plans In the area, snagradlng iba capatrl title* of deployed units, and increasing logistic support Noneiheieis. one-fourth of

m

ill Soviet Croundow Maimed oppoairs China. Cround units In Ihe earners USSR and Monajolla devoted lo Ihe anti-Chine mission indudective dlvutom and an independent array corps. These units areby welllrcrall andirIhe oast year, while Sine-Soviet consulla-lions have been In progress, the Sovieli have added two motorlrad rifle divisions to their active forces,otorized rifle divisionank dlvl-iton. andighter-bomber regiment facing the Chinese. In addition, at least one air assault unit and an additional artlltery btlgstde are now being formed along the border with China. Meanwhile, ihe Soviets over the last year have also made costly Investments in military logistic capabilities In the Far East, and have begun construction tbereew garrison, rMorbably intended to house part of another pew division Weikely the Soviets wtll aha continue over the next few years an ongoing conatructlon program to eipand fortified tones In certain sectors of tbe Sino-Soviet border

he Soviet* have also continued slowly to strengthen their military position In Mongolia, dmpitr China's known sensitivity on ihii subject and repealed Chinese demands for reduction of these deployments. There the Soviets have constructed newir defense regimental complexes and radar Mat ions,older tanks wtth2ndtome of their artillery and armored perscecei carrier holding* In result, the Soviet army In Moesjo-ha. which ii In pcailWn to threaten the North China plain ind routes tohe moat combat-ready facing China andelatively high priority In the USSR's gradual motleinliation of Far East equipment.

In addition, the weight of the Soviet itrategjc nuclear threat directed against China Is coonnmog to grow even while the small-scale improvements in Sino-Soviet reJatJoatt raroctfd. The Soviets currentlyaunchers deployed atases Inplusdditionalaunchers in the central USSR that could hll targets In weaiernare constructing (iciHtlm at two more botesS-S0 launchers. It should be noted that the presentorce threatens China wilh morethan were on the older single- reentry-vehicle missiles that were directed against urgets In China before deployment of the SS-20

hut the Chinese face not only the presentorce and Sovielonsiderable array of Other Soviet nuclear weapon systems ai "till

. Bul wo luosas-that the great rnaunetty of ali

present Soviet atrstrgK targets in Asia are probably io China. although the Soviet nuclear ivstrnts are lleiible and could be shifted lo other targets. For then part, however, Bout rig's leaders are convinced thai China remain* the primary target of them variousdespite cowiderabJe Soviet effort* In dealing with Allan Mate* to obfuscate the purpese of theeavyerjlovment in Asia

he total number of aircraft atugned to Soviet units In the Forxpected to deehne slightly during the aest few years Nonet he ten. technological improwmenti In aircraft, ivioolcs, indemi will allow Ihe Suvieti toeir ability lo perform their ladgned missions while deptovtrig fewer aircraft to each regiment In ttraltanc aviation, the initial deployment of the new BUckjack bomber in theill highlighthe Blackjack, together wtth lorsriwstsd numbers ofcenbers,ormidable stsridoff air-launched cruue tsta-tile capability east of thehird Bock)ire regiment will further Increase strategic Hi ike options. In the tactical airey development will be the deployment uf lookdown/ihootdcwnheFi and Fulcrum. These aircraft will be faster and more mane-uverable. and will carry missiles suited for both dogflghting and iitgigaiininli beyond visualngammt nti Ground attack aircraft ore eipeeled lo be eawlpped with new longer range tactical air-to surf ace mis* Ilea This Improved deep strike capablhty will be complemented by the intro-dtaction of Frosrloot andelicoptersto supporting Soviet ground force* ilong Ibe Sine-Soviet border.

he Sown Pacific Fleet ho* ttgnlficswthin si re and-vet the past decade bymore modern submarines. iurl.eeamrjhib-ou* ships, and aircraft1 During the nest

lew |Mit the mtw Kirev-ckM cruiser (COM. Sovtw meooyy- and Udalov-eias* destroyer* (DDCaLtasa attach subenarlnea (SSNs) an cipeered lo be introduced Into Ihe Soviet ractfkhese unit! will provide latniftcanlly lia proved weapons and sen-son lot srstlauHaee attack, air defense, and antaxibme-itne warfare We believe the Soviel Pacilte Fleet will continue lo be ttrvictuied primarilyppose US navalrt boughill also devote attention andto courtier other potential threats tueh as those Irom some lapaneae or Chinese naval force* While the overall force level of the Soviet Pacific Reel will remain ebout the sarne. Its capability will increase with the Introduction of new classes of submarines, principal surface combatants, am phi Unandet* It

verall, erven these trends In Soviet force strength, the nature of the Sine* Soviet relersontbip over tbe neit few yean will be strongly influenced by the decisions the Soviet regime adopt! regarding force modernisation and deployment policy In Asia On bolh the nuclear end the conventionalowever, the momentum of aiming SovietImpetus for further incremental growth rathe* than either stagnation orunlikely to be overcome

orwearwMc*ibkv* SrrewgrA. Ihe Soviet* coolhlneee ground force* that are much Urge* lhan Soviet Par East ground force* in manpower, but much weaker In firepower, maneuver capability, and air ssapport, and (bj Chsnee* Mraletpc nuclear force*re still fairly small in Mse and rely upon cceiceaintent and mobility rather than numbers for their deterrent effect. In the four Chinese military rcgloni bordering on the USSR and, Mongolia, Ibe Chltsese now deploy someiin-force combat divisions, which are lamely stationedhundred miles and more back frotn the border. defensivelyio trade space for tune in the eventovset attack and to guardhe possibility ofSoviet assaults to overrun Belling or to cut off Northeast China Id tbe last four yuan, the Cranese hasv incirated their tanks, anrsceed perxersrselnd aircraft la the border retpoos by tomeercent, and they have formed new onus and i" rug the red their fortification* along probable Invasion toutea

IRBMs, as we

3TJ-I6 Intermediate-range

bombers, all of which can deliver nuclearto pert* of Soviet Asia'dition, th* Chinese In recent yean bare launched tbeir first nuclear-powered baits-tic mtssiW subenarine. intended to carry theLBM Iwhtch a* ttlU undergoing night teattlof this weapon ivMem as an additional element In the Chines* deterrent against thespectedinally, the Chinete have alto shown considerable sensitivity about iheir potential vu liver ability to Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons, and have conducted and publicised eaerrises that reckon with this contingency Th* Chinese have no deployed -repom comparable lo Soviet tactical'" lap an* ta IWiitwBty toad accurscy, ind they probablv believe tbat the Sorer* aredily inclineduch weapon* In the Far Cast than in Europe Overall, altbough the Chinese are making important improvement* in iheir deterrent ind war* fighting capabilities, ihey ore not clmlng the gap in relation to the growing and improving Snvlet forces lhat face them, on the contrary, they ate continuing to fall further behind

a Sure af SS-M* in Asse end ime believe the Sovset*l oat the existing fourivision* us Stbeilaotal of st* been each by theecause eacharries litre* reentryhe advent cf this IRBM capability in East Asia hat already significantly expanded nuclearagainst China With four divisions of tlx regl-mentt each, the Soviets wouldissilesarheads for an initial strike against Asian target! In addition, by ihe end cf the decade the Soviets may begin toew IRBM to replace thend may aho deploy ground-lunched cruue missises in the region.

4fteployments reflect long rang* Soviet strategic plans Tbeae are importantly influenced by the viable trertdt In Chinese weapons development and deployment policy, and by the prospects of increased US military strength tn ihe Far Last In. In both regards, ihe Soviet* wlB almost certainly take action In advance to guarantee undiminished force advantage* against worst-ease ev-eotualine*

he AraJeopov regime showed lhal. given naffl-cient strategic political gainsrope. It might be willing to contemplate curtailment of its plans formuch greateruildup, tins

ine cletcircrit'

eirect Ot Utese weapons, which can reach Moscow. Is

21

Tap-imu^

TVp+muti

characterize the Cbertienko regime'sell. During thenegotiations, ihe Soviet* offered not to tignsfero Asia If an irareemcnt acceptable lo the USSR mate rial bed. They lubse-Quently offered, tf such an agreement were adopted,all neweployment In East Asia through new com true lion to long as deployments in that region aimed at Soviet territory did not subsequentlyThese proposals reflect the great Importance to the Soviet Union of an advantageous INFand Implied willingness at the time to Irade off planned enlargement of iheir existing nuclearIn East Asia In order to prevent American deployments In Europe. Secondarily, those Sovietwere abo intended as gestures, to Japan aod Chins, calculated to place the onus for any further Sovietuildup In Siberia on US deployment policy In East Asia

he future of therogram ia Asia and the ultimate ibe of the total Soviet nuclear threat against China have thus been made partly dependent upon the prospects for INF agreement in Europe. In the svaka of the beginning of Western Intermediate-range nuclear deployments tnnd the Sovietleast for the timeINF negotiations, the Soviets ar* very unlikely soon to halteployment In Siberia. In the continued absence of an INF agreement, we believe that within the next two to three years tho Soviets will probably not stop furthereployments In Asia merely to conciliate Beijing and Tokyo

We believe there Is even less chance then this lhat Mcecow over this period will actually reduce ilseployments as the Chinese have demanded, either unilaterally ar as tho result of Slno-Soviet bargaiiutig The Soviet leaders are likely to belhal an acceptable nuclear arms agreement can be negotiated with Beijing In view of the enormous asymmetries in tbe bilateral balance of forces."

Tha iaine of fh* Croend Fore* Potftre*enl lo China. In principle, the Chinese demand the simple elimination of the Soviet capabilities that threaten them: thateduction of Ihe Soviet force structure In East Asia, back down to ibe level existing almost two decades ago Inday. The Chinese have privately Indicated that they would be

'ni tW caao wBS tfaatr mocMorium c* doeiaymnu in Europe, tht SovUti muld almost certainty Inlornret it-Mr ccoditKW-al of tar toHI AM in OmbvmfnU* EeoinUr Ic ton itvrra Ml at th* aval crcalod by ranmlWIie ol all conerudlcea tidied with much lest to start with, and tome leaden In Beijing may hopenilateral Soviet local pullbaek of tome losers may eventually be procured that wouldrocess of Soviet reductions thai might later beeneral Soviet pullbaek lo conciliate Belling eppean highlyreoaotu:

of orography. Soviel forces in the east-ernmoat lector of the border, which must defend large vulnerable cities end the Traits-Siberian Railroad near the frontier, have no defense-in-depth option aad thus are rieceaaarlty deployed much closet to the border than Chinese nsain-force -ni'i Cooorcjiwtvry any noto-natbry mutual puISbeck of Soviet andorces frtan the

b-erier must In feet bea unilateral

Soviet withdrawal unheal It It limited toborder guard force* at the frentier itself This is hkely to remain politically unacceptable to any set of Soviet leaders.

In the narrow Far East Military District sabent from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok, the rrtostpert of the Soviet Far East and the most heavily defended area ol its tire in the Soviet Union. Soviet forces have little room toor ipaceullbaek.

There ere tome points on (he borderullbaek could be construed as compromising Soviet border claims

urinernvcee. we believe lhal Moscow will net agree even to selected pullbecks of selected units In certain kxallriea The SovveU are highly rekoctaot to agree to unilateral cceetraints on their troop dispcet-tioo* end more broadly perceive theirigation ship wtth China oa Iwrselitiig them to continue strengthening their force dtspooittcee opposite China In recent yean, the Soviet* haveattern of activating al least one new divuion each year In the Far East from existing mobilisation, bases that hold the pre-positioned equipment lor such divisions. W* have identified additional mabtHaatk* rxaae* In the Far East that we believe tit* Soviets intend to convertInto active dtvutoni over the next few years, with the addition* entering active ualut at about the tame measured pace we have teen in ihe past. We tee little resuon lo believe lhal the Soviets have yet decided to alter thli long-term pattern ol behavior.

his Soviet pattern ol thinking has been most clearly shown In the Soviet Union's refusal. In lit talks thus far with Beijing, lo dltcvua changes in Soviet

mtlilary (WployrivMiU Inn principle, thae sector In which notice* bk Soviel concession* could be made lo China wlihout major Impact upon Ihe Sovietability to defend Itself against China. In Mongolia alone, the Sovietsatge buffer against China and could If necessary trade space for time. The token withdrawal ofoviet division or so from Mongolia northward to the Soviet-Mongolian border would not endanger any Soviet city, and would not espote any Soviet territory to Chinese allack Additionally, over the out veer and more, tbe Soviets have significantly upgraded the equipment andof Mongolia') own aimed foreea.03 the Soviets provided the Mongolians with enough additional equipment to upgrade their two editing brigades to motorized rifle divisions and form two tddiUotia! MRDs, altlsough all four arc at low jtrength.

It seem* likely that the Soviet leaden Intend to withhold concession* regarding their forces inuntil Belting has made more fundamental conens-sions than It has yet been willing to consider. We dooderate chance, however, that within thewo to three years the Soviet leaders will be willing to offer China some token concession regarding their force posture in Mongolia, In tbe hope ofa process ot mutual concessions thatreakthrough to major Soviet anaocal pullback of perhaps one or so of the USSR's five divisions now In Mongolia might beep If the Sov lets did makeithdrawal, tbb woulda symbolic concession of some significance. Il would not be too meaningful in military terms, bow-ever, since such units could be reintroduced Into Mongolia at any time. If the Soviets didivision or more, we judge that the Chinese would welcome the move and would wish to respondashion likely to encourage more such Soviet gestures Betting'* response, at least Initially, would also be likely to be largely symbolic In nature.

In the meantime. In Ibe absence of the kind of large-scale withdrawal* the Chinese are requesting at the asotnent (for the total bordert is probable

'Th* Ssvtatt Hitn lhal Usrv will not dUeuia their troops in

Munsolla bvcaaaaittrrthirdhe Chlaea* almat wtatnry rreaid tk*voccrlml amnion ol ihehe Serial I'nK* offset!vain contrail iht Mwaoilir iarlsi>r.

and aav MoneslUn imrnQOot abort rmlblr Sold uoop

dVawttt vrajldatallvcCr stinur cowdaratloa lor Mcacftaha Soitoliamw withdrawal! Id br eUwrwtaa aWrabl* We alto

balleiv thai Hattoa dot* net ntert fne dtvnlom in

Monittalo anfan* laa loyalty <a* ihr TmlentaloMonoj'a aftlnal Chlnaae attack.

that the Soviet Union will continue toince the, the Soviets have urnucccssfully offered the Chinese proposal*tonaggression pact and for in agreement on no first uoe of nuclearhe Soviet Union ID the last year ho* evioentlvumber of additional suggestions for confidence-building measures (CBMsV Although the Chinese will probably continue to regard most suchopr"als as essentially evasion* of China'* central concerns, they mav no longer reject all such suggestions out of hand, It Is possible thai China will come to see agreemeni with the Soviet Union on one or more selected CBMs, such ss mutual nottfica-tinn of troopasargiasi usefulness In helping to reduce tensions. Should any CBMi In fact be agreed upon during the next two to three years, it would probably not have an early Impact upon the hard issue* separating China and the USSR regarding the itatus of the border or the question of overall Soviet force dlipcNli-mi Agreement even on such superficial CBM measures, however, would give some impetus to the process of Improving Sino-Soviet dealings

The Centred Rote of the United State* ond Joponar item Factor

The Sino-Soviet future will notilateral affair, bul will develop as part of ibe broader dynamic of Sino-Soviet-US triangular relation* And theof the future relationships of the Soviet Union and China with the United States, whether Improvements or setbacks, will continue to be one of the most important (actors affecting the behavior of Moscow and Beijing toward each other. US policies toward the USSR and China will of coune not determine the conduct ofo Communist powers toward each other, but will certainly help condition lhal behavior, and on the margin could conceivably be decisive.

Both Moscow and Beijing remain highlyto their perception of the US relationship wilh tbe other. The Chinese have traditionallyhik tbe Soviet leadership has for many years been deeply concerned at tbe prospect of Slno-US security collaboration at Soviet expense. Sinee the first ntagm of Si no-American rapprochement in (he. Soviet Politburo members have wanted US leaders againstoviet cooperation with China, and have occasionally sought to entice the United Slates into commitment] Incompatible with ffood US relation* wilb Beijing At the fame time, the Scrvleti have for yean vainly taught lo better their posilkm in the triangle by improving relation! with Beijing, and

23

Io this i have rcpealedly sought lo reestablish

. IWith CWfWtr

odai avalUbie evklenc* dearly indicate* thai bolh Moscow and Beijing rr main concerned al (he pouibtlti. of sodden charters thai wouldthe pros: ret oi US ccJlvjior,th* other rVVinc wlule rmm'.;red by iha depth at" Soviet-USu

etainednlUii CCrlle-liS ibout theof luddan deali between the two superpowers, particuleity at rummtt meetings, lhat might have advene Implication* for Chinese Interests. Suchconcern* remain especially strong regarding INF issues The dominant current of Sown opsnkei. oo the other hand, has never ceased to believe that despite Sine-US dUtertrnces, the banc character of thebet-ean Beijing and WanSlnarton remains one of cooperation against Soviet policy That view has been slrengthened by many of the events34 thatarming of Slno-US relations, particularly ihe visits of ihe US Secretaries of Defense and State and Premier Zhao Ziyang, and the scheduled visiti of President Reagan and Defense Minister Zhang

SO China* policyilemma on these tcore* On the one hand. Bet lingeedtrong and continuing relationship with tbe United Steles lo cede* lo tupport Chinese economic and mlllliiy develop-rrtent and lo aatlst China In resitting ongoing Soviet geopolitical prassure in Asia On the other hand, the Chinese may srnae that tht* asaceUtkon with the United States,ormally tbsavewed,actor that lenders major Soviet eortceanuo* tonot

he pre-serrt slrained rdetionihlp betweenand Washington alto poses another dilemma of sorts for Beijing. In general. II welcome* US toughneas toward Moscow, both because ilres lhal United States inhibit Soviet eiparmoniWndit hope* that Chin* wiH derive additionalr both Moscow and Wasrarartooesult of marled Sovlet-USt the same time, theave Indicated that their own poaition could be greatly endangered if these terisiont were totoevere Soviet-US crisis. We fudge thai the Chinese leadership ha* no desire lo becomeInrttts if It arose over Mues remote from direct Chineae security concern* and that under those difficult drcumiiirxe* Beijing would endeavor to maintain Ohaa't neutrality tWta't leaden probably alto recognise thai ifrisis arose In an aree more directly relevant to China') securityttch as the Indochina area orwould face more difficult riskt and chokes

In Iheir posture toward the Soviet Union Morethe Chineaethai iheyetted interest la the continued ability of the United Slates and Western Europe to offset Sovset power and lhat Chinese vulnerabilityis lb* Soviet Union would be enormously Increased if that offset were greatly weakened

time, ihe Slno-Soviel relationshipmore responsive to advene change* in thewith either of the other (wo powersloot three yean, bilateral difficult tea withStore* have already, lo one degree oeboth Moscow and Beitsng to wtoh to beimprove relations with each other In Octobermonth before his death, Breihncv gave public

to thli motive in an addreu to military commanders, warning Soviet rrunhab that theof Soviel relation* with ibe United States hod given added importance to the possibility or improve-

mentb Meanwhile, the Oilrieae desire to test Soviet wiDinaneas to make corsceanoni bad been given impetusX by saw fnVtion* with the

United Stale* over tbe Question of the US relationship

with Taiwan.

desire for moderating Si no-Sovietnot synonymou* wiih ibe wuiingness of eilhertwo Communist power* to make (hefor far-reaching Improvement* In theirTlie baur conflicts of ir.tetesl arelo makemprobable lhal improvementill reach ihe pointawith harmful unpucatiorii for USnrti Nevertheless the readiness of the Sovietleaders to contemplate key cuocewioniotheractor that is influenced by Ihe stalerelationship with the United States. Bothand China will probably endeavor toimprove the negotiating process andealon which agreement can be reached Attime they will tack to ut* theirto gala lever*MM'heir doahaat* withState* Nonet beadical growth labetween th* United State* and either IheChin* might provoke one of them tomajor conceit lorn

Theodor

eeorsd very important citemal Influence on the direction thai Sinn-Sovietwilt take in the nest two to three teen will be thatpart Japans prueal *et of relelsorahir- with Uaahonglon. Belong, and Moscow eaarts hrverage on China, rnaforcing tbe conslderations that pull Beijing inward the United

Sum and thai Unpoat llniiU on Si no-SovietA major chaw In th* Chinese altitudeerious effect* on the SwSoviel-US Irtanrjia

hewith lapan have worsened over ihe pan decwde and are not likely to be reverted during Ihe pet tod of ihaa Eatimat* The Soviati are rracreaatngry eaetctacd el what ihey we to be growing US-Japanne aeevrlty cooperation, primarily because ot* 'he espectation that thii ceocorratton will augment US capabilities against the Soviet Union In Northeast Asia. The Soviets also appear lo be concerned about tbe long-term implication! ol ihe gradual but Heady buildup in Japanese conventional military forces. Moreover, deiptltct ihat the Slno US Japanese military cooperation Ihe Soviet Union feared in the lateu failed to melcrlallte In Ihe IWOs, Soviet military plsnnenortt-cate view ol Ihls pcosi-billly and conilder lapan as an enemy allied with the United States and China.

umber of year, the USSR'* tough,lo intimidate the Japanese haveant'. Soviet allttudri In Japan Thehave not altered (heir adamant resectionclaim to ihe small Islands that constituteTerritories, and they have continuedof these Island, begun8 andofthere. Mos-

cow! propensity to continue atrrrsp herring its large estssrlng military advarvtagsra In the vicinityou haseen given further impetus as aof Ihe September IMS nwrflight and downing of the Korean AH Line* plane Meanwhile, ihe growth of Sovieteploimentia* ilgnlfkantly helghiened lapaneet anilely A* noted earlier, during IftSS Japanese proteeti about these deploymenl* were echoed for Ihe first tune by China,

from ihe recent Japanese national elections, hoping thai Ihe result* will undermine Premier Naka-tonei efforts lo strengthen lapan'* military programs Thi* will aJanosf certainly serve to encourage Soviel leaden to continue gene-rally their petvlom pohcies toward lapan In the belief that politico] Ini Im id*tioo combined with economic Incentives wJl pay off for Mcocow over the long run inans up" altitudes In lapan Prospects for succmhil use of economic Inducement* are not good: reduced Japa.veie demand for natural resources combined with the cutoff in official credlls after the Afghanistan Invasion suggest lhal, with ihe possible eacvption of Sakhalin gas. large-scale Siberian resource drvrlopincivi ptosrets will not be initialed any time toon.

Foe At part.conomic lie* with lapan orv by far the mostas wilh any country hs the capitalist Ir*duK rallied world, and aho dwarf Ct-.ins'i trade wtth the Soviet Union This leading Japaneseunt Ing China's rvarjarrmmtiofi rs therefore the second naoat impoitarM bulwark of Bel-ling's relationship with the Want, afiei its btoader ecawiectlons with the United Slate* Because of the strength of Japanese- American ties, the Sino-Japanese relationship reinforce* other Chinese incentives to maintain China'* US connection*

Although moat aspects of the Si no-Japanese relationship remain fairly healthy. In some area* ihe relationship hot somewhat crvwed over the post twohina bos become leas outspoken In support of the Japanese-American security uUtionihtp. and more reserved about moat bauet relating to lapanese defense efforts against the Soviet Union, tad Bruin* has made sporadic strident attacks on what the Chineseprofes* to areising danger of taiunese mi'itarism. China Mill supports lapanese claims against tbe Soviet Union cornea rung the Northern Territories, though kess vociferously, and. after years ofalmost eiclusivelv on cultivation of the ruling Japaneseeijing hu reopened tie* to the Socialist opposition, ato local antinueWor weapons movements

The Chinese leaden are well aware of Japan's military weakness, and probably do notrave or Imminent danger of lapanese militarism. And their-talent concerns on this mailer, while real, are at rseesent (or outweighed by iheir *ente of the ertosmou* ecencmic contribution China receives from itswith Itpan The Soviet Union ardenlly seeks to reverse this Chinese sense of p*ies, io alarm China about Japan and the Jirainese alliance arth ihe United States, and ro use thi* alarmethcV 'or huso-Soviet poblhrsl cooperationbe Untied Stales. The USSR hu little hope of success In this effort unless fairly radical change* occur on the Japanese icene-

m

Voriebkn. Ur<ertalrwiet, ond Pomble Ahcrnativn

OutCOmtl

he centre! judemseaa of xhu EMiraHt have been bated on ihe betfetf thai ibe broad ttructure ofa)lain trill more or teat continue We believe il bkery that rncet aipecti of iha*ll eorabnue In general, thnuah there la aufflrient uncertainty-arrant (lagging thethecertain development!.

Vor oblei and UrvcertoarnS*.

iabillnr ofend atavewcon fe/icv-making. At noted millet, the Sovieli appear to believeture change* In Chlnete or US leadenhtm could caiate Beijing to inclineuch more tubatan-llal Sino-Soviet rapprochement then now uterni proba-He. Soviet leaden are likely lo hope thai anting dbsgreementj within ihe Chlnete elite will eventually growmportant io brim about chanted priori net and foreign poltclet In Belli rtg They proba-bfy bate thii hope not on evidence thailktrly to happen, but primarily on ihe long record of ChJneae political leadenhip imiabil.t, Soviet leaden doubt Leu harborhat aentlment rnore favorable lo the USSR and more boat lie to the United Sutet may errwrge In ktederthlp rank, of the Cawneaeberatioei Army (PLAj The Sennet* appear to lodge thai toene of the iharpett criticism* of Deng Xiaopingi "Americanave itsued from tome old guard PLA rlrclei. ind tbey make ipedal effort* lo appeal lolhltj

ftnantg Rocn-va

Avawable evidence I* thin on the Question of eMier-enev*in China'* Wadrr ahtp concernlna optimum oohcies toward ike VU* aad ihe Utward States at ban loa* bean dear thai there it no coherent, recatgtaaabte lactam that ta 'pmSmtet" aa tweak Certainitaee* aaaf c1 papa "at ever tha team havetsUyeat ta mob armaanwal svmparherlc Chuwae heater* And, In the last two rear* or to *eea* of tba* krader* apparently ham been akaepry erUieal of whit they ccaUder an unrewarding and itnneirr Ui poUev on Ihe pari of Bttalae. Alminimum th* SnviaU ham been rlo lueh flguro*

Such hope! atamong Soviet leader*hanged political tcene In Belling might leadet* cordial Chinese relationship with the United Slates are doubt lea* buttressed by ihe fact of Deng Xiaoping'* advancingwill be SO yean old tinsof tbe advent of leader* who, unlike Deng, have not been personaoci*ied in ihr pes* wilh ttronglyHt attitude* Eve* now within Cam* them areof resiitanoe te Deng*vet. and Indication thaiome liesllanre lo accepting partyHu Yaobana: at Dengi putative fuccestor Hence there mav be Kmse raped* lion in Moscoweriod of uncertainty and ihe absencetrong juccessot lo Deng, at In tat Initially, might strengthen eilttlng tmlstancit within China'* leadenhip to any itgnlfleant Mia logic or economic mode rrtizat ion coop-erallon with the United States Thatuccenson lituanon would neceamrilv rvdound to Moscow'sis by no meant certain, however, whatever the Soviet eipectatlon. inasmuch a* raew Chi nut leaden wil seek to avoid having their political ansbttion* damaged by becoming vulnerable to partisan dcervestie charges thai they ore "eotl" on China'* enemy, the USSR.hey did when Mao died, the Soviet* can be espected lo use teach an creation lo advance ptopotab lor movement In the reUtforiship.

ConHnuily of Preieef Ckinese PoUev in Ihe Border Dispute The border Istue has beento date because the adamant negotiating potiiion of China has hewn Interwoven with it* much broader politkal itrrtggle agtintl the Soviet Union, and becauseeaden have maintained tbji an instrument of political warfare againat Moscow. Il I* unlikely thai Beiang wiB give up tbit position during the neat two to three year* Nei ertrattest. we bebeve that if China did yield on ihn question and began lo moveorder settlement more acceptable lo thehe chance of reciprocal major Soviet wncessaon* over the long run would be enhanced. Sino-Soviet relation* would theneriod ol much greater fluidity, and the pout bi lit le* for further mutualwould grow.

ondniiflii'i"ern cue Aran Renatancr

to Virrnaim. Cof military resistance toin Kampuchea would alter many of ihe term* of iht present political equation la East am Under these cucuruits races, the chances would grow thai theASEAN eontensm regatdlasf policy towardwould dnaapalr. and ihat the Untied Stale* would come under contarWable pressure irom tome ASEAN Maim lo Win them In findingformula with which to come lo termi with Vietnameae domination of Indochina Any Mich situation would "inflict wilh

Iht sino-soviar so'dv dispute

in ihe

background

played down by both sides durtr itotk

seen by the chi owe aalocal point ol wroiup prtrmrtiad by the russian jimptre and tbe soviet union aaal rot china now toted by chineseumen ol politicalaint so-iet union, lo demorutrale the ussr! "great-power rirsretnonltt" renoencletefusal to admit past ir.iuitlei*

rleeartted by soviet!ondamentaj threat to the security of thalr eastern border end the meat important ilnxle buateral issue tn content tan with the chinese. the immediate precipitin! of the soviet military buildup opposite clara. seen by soviets asalse karue and potentially only ihe first "bill" chinese intend to priueot lor return ol territory historically acqulrnd at china's i

points al itiuo

dispute cenlersh-century treatimprecisely for tome sectors, and subrect lo diffei-ent intrenretailoni by which rvasta acquiredillion square kilometer* ol territory in central asia and the amur river bran

chinese have hatedo accept the boursoary laid down by the cad treaties as lone at moscow concedes they areut demand return of certain soviet -occupied terrilorlet they claim were not even granted by ihese treaties. th* area* in dispute0 square kilometers of land hi ibe pamirs, tome islands in the amur and unurl riven in the far east, and mvetal small tracts depleted differently on eachaps

teeiicj

both itdei ubled torn* eoneewlons at inound ol border talksnd soviet, eventuallyew more eceseraavmt at second round, whkh began tn0 and continued intermittentlyhe nest nine yean.

chi nose demanded that soviets admit certain areas are inecognize isveaultv of old treaties, acres to an unconditional return oi "illegally"arrttoey. and withdraw iheir forces from all dltpuied arras reixilne settlement of china's claim*

soviets refuse to admit old treaties are "unequal" or lo withditw their fcece* from "dltputed areet" (almost all of which are noa* in theirut havevilbngncB toew survey of the boundarynd continue toesumption of border talks.

current prospedi

resumption of border tails unlikely at present, but the two sides maintain regular contact on matters related to dispute at deputy foreign mlnfctttr talks and.esser eittnt. through the sirx-soviet border river navigationnmtafco.

situation along border remains quiet at ihe moment, with both sides forgoing aggressive patrolling 'here boundary is in dispute. neither side, however. slmws slantilhrsgnest to yield on key points most notably, ownmhtp of heiiiasi islandihe confluence of ihe amur and lawn riven, tdjnimna the soviet citv'arovti ind the tisru-slbctlan rallrced.

of the important prone of the american rdallonshlp. and could create the possibility of further changes in ihe chinese posture toward the united states and tho soviet union it is unlikely that hanoi will in fact find it potiible toairly complete end to kimpuchean resistance in ibe next two to threeut it li clear that th? stability of both the sine-us reutlonship and the firmness of the chinese positionis ibe ussr will to some degree continue to be contingent upon theof the present military stalemate in indochina and the preservation of si no-us cooperation against soviet policy in indochina

iawiilir erf fohllc. andin (he ussr. the initial statements and actions of tbe chernenko regimeesire to protect ordertlivest in the succession and continuity in the ussr's dealings with china.ndhe beat ofsuddenly depart from the scene, leaving hb colleague*ew succession problem on their hands. there is no indication at this time that any of the likelyihe younger ones such as romanov orout of step with the ussr's kmgestabbshed china policy. if. however, in ihe course of leadershipignificant segment of the leadership came to question the general thrust of current policy, different ideas about soviet foreign relations might ultimately ensue. relations with chine could be one of the major foreign policy issues urider rennew dining this period, particularly if

m

a

Involvednew let of leaden who had no role in Ihe bitter exchange! of. II Isthat the situation could produceuch more conciliatory approachignificant toughening of the USSR's policy toward China Slno-Sovletcould, in fact, become very fluid if the Soviet leadership turnover should coincide withftw leadership in China.

nrgtertvsrJors of Stability In the Korean Pen-insula. Beijing's Interest in maintaining good relations with the United States conflicts to some degree with its interest Inlose relationship withBecause of Its geographic position. North Korea hot always been of great Importance to China, and over the last two years Belling has taken vigorous Initiatives to strengthen this relationship and tothe edge that Chinese influence has In P'yong-yang over that of the USSR. In anticipation of ihe corning political succession lo Kiln ll-song, the Chinese have in fact reluctantly acknowledged the special status of Kim's designated heir, his son Kim Chong-il

efjlng, aware tbat Its relationship withcould become hostage of North Korea's asplra-Itdns to dominate the south, has Indicated lo both Washington and Seoul It* desire to maintain stability in the Korean Peninsula. Since China cannot control P'vongyong'i actions, however. Itilemma. Tlie North Korean regime, apparently concerned that time is working to strengthen the relative economic and international position of Ihe Republic of Korea, lias taken an Incnsadngly militant line over the past year, one that indtsdes rrisjOr terrorist initiatives against South Korea's leaders and stabilityhowever, Pyongyang has Initiated an opening to the Unitedholdtalksormat peace treaty, removal of USnd confederation of the two Koreas; Beijing's leaden support such talks but eld not wish Chins to become directly Involved. China's support for this proposal reflects Its desire to reduce instabllliv along it* borders, and to remain the prime aUv/suriporter of North Korea. Those contradictory policies on the part of P'yongyang ore not atypical of North Korea's behavior. Thus, while progresseaceful solution is not expected soon, we mayamoderation tn P'tongyang's pattern of violence. Should North Korea revert to an Incendiary policy on the peninsula, this would complicaterelationships with the United States and possibly work to Moscow's advantage by heightening Soviet opportunities lo compete with China for influence in P'yongyang. At the same Ume, however, Moscow-might perceive North Korean radicalism as, risking a

le controi-station between Soviet and US military forces in ihe Korein area

It it likely 'Jul no war will break out in Korea during the period of this Estimate, and that both Ihe USSR and China will continue lo insulate theirwith Washington from P'yortgyang's policy toward the south NeverUvelcn, the possibilities for accident and miscalculation in the peninitil* areand could grow, particularly in ihe event of sn upsurge in Internal Instability In South Korea.

Aoowtaace of New SinoSoviet Conflict in Soulh and Southeait Asia. Any Sino-Sovict progreu toward greater rapprochement could be unset by various possible crueo to China's south

The emergence of new Chinese hostilities wiih Vietnamerious scale,esult of cither major Vietnamese military conflict withor of Viet names* cladves with Ihe Chinese to the Soulh China Sea. The Uller rscasirjility is highlighted by ihe correcting claims to oilrights In the Gulf of Tonkin, by recent actions by the Chinese to strengthen theirposition in thend by ihe growing boldness and scope of Chinese navel and air deployments in the area. Both the overall Soviet relationthlp with Vietnam and the enhanced Soviet military rwesence at Cam Ranh create the possibility thati no Vietnamese dash could spread to involve the Soviets.

Substantial escalation of Vietnam's militaryIn Kampuchea and along Ihe borden of Thailand. The many cceBtrainls on Hanoi'sresources, concern over possible US andreactions, and Soviet lack ofmake such actions by Vietnam improbablethe period of this Estimate. There issome rvraaibilityuch greater Viet* nemeee military involvement In Kampuchea could arise from escalating border clashes with Thailand Should these occur, the resulting crisis might well ureal or reverse any movementgreater Slno- Soviet rapprochement.

A major new effort by the USSR to advance its geopolitical position In South or Southwest Asia, particularly if done at the expense of Pakistan. The Chinese would of course be greedyat any overt Soviet military threat to Pakistan arising out of lhat country's role in opening Soviet dforts to subdue Afghanistan. Beijing would be equally concerned, however.

make slant Ilea nt prog-hiUw Pakistan and/or ndli io kiln In the elfort. hard to block any relation! with eitheriheli effort! to ^ork loinlly lo undermine been psrUcularly successful, 'Pakistanuclear Gandhi becameforeign threat" ia her continued political

slat us ciuo in realignment ofrientationea Any such effort, be regarded In Belling Chinese interests. Wc fragthly in tbe In Pakistan to make possibility duringhal over the longer ow. Hence the Soviet! between cspinning neworetheir relationship lets optuch Pakistan, the prea-relatloni with BeUIng learlyand-defirute casualty.

Maior Now Crtse. Invasions or Involve-East or South-reverse any move-to Slno-Soviot would cause BeUIng to from the Sovietthe light of subsequent or crises, Soviet reactions would proba-Inltlally. In ihe event toward some new version Europe, some repeat Similar Chinese behav-tli the event ihe Soviets W'osteen forces, whether such cote the Chinese clear of Involvement, In the troubled waters unlikely to try to solve IU or domestic, by going to etor

almost certainly fear Ihat although iheir military forces could do China grievous harm, resort to such action might well divert Soviet attention from Moscow! principal antagonist, the United States, while possibly bogging tbe USSR down in war with China.

Alternative Outcomes

Is an off chance that during the periodEstimate tbe Sino-Soviet relationship could Ukemuch more hostile character than ihU Eitlmato

This could occur because so many variables are present, marry of them not fully within the control of the present leaderships In citheror Beijing: the advent of new policies on the port of post-Deng or post-ChernenkotUirves ta ken by other gcrvernasents (forIn Korea ornd to on.

It does not follow that US interests would ritjces-sarily benefit from the cominguch more [rigid Sino-Soviet relationship The effect oo US Interests would depend on the nature andof the estrangement between Moscow and Belling: upoint. US Interests would clearly benefit from probable increases In Chineseagainst Soviet policies In the world, In Chinese receptlveness to US advice and counselwillingness to permitlevels of Western economic and technological presence within China. But. if Sino-Sovietdeteriorated to the point of actual orlarge-Kale hoMibtkos, US diplomatic and security policymaking could be greatly com oh-caled.

lso on outsideless likely than tbethecoulduch closer oneperiod of ibis Estimate than we now judge likely:

inlght cotne to pais if oo great disruptive conllngrmcles should occur, if the Chinese ihould back away Innot Incertain of their keyf agreements reachedumber of secondary Issues should begin toomewhat greater momentum toward ihe Sino-Sovietor if for some reason Beijing's leaders should come to depreciate the value of China's relationships with tbe United Slates

coming of significantly closer relations bc-the USSR and China could seriously harm

29

Totrteaasg.

USth*the Slno-Sovietihr morelo'detente policial. Uriel lug. allianceihe role of Japan, and narnerous other.Merest*

lthough the poarlbuity cannotluded lhal alternative outcome! such aa the above could occur in Ihe Slnc-SovVel relationship,* that the moat likely chiloom* by far. it lhat which thla NIE bat postulated namely, thai Ihe level of Imtlillly between Moteow and Belling will decrease, thai tomeagreement! on lecondary mat ten or putaibl. CBMi will be reached, that al most ihe USSR mayoken wHhdrawal of Sovset troops from Monaa-eia. and that continuing basic differences betMoscow andwill not permit any Bgoliicanlly greater degree of rapprochement between them to develop over the neat two to three years.

ft**

INO-SOVIETi

0

02

3

6 April-December 1W6

77

8

8

8

Cipmimii- regime established in Beiiine

SovieU negotiate Treaty of Friendship, Alliaocc and Mutual Assistance and other agreement- veith the new regime. In one agreement. USSR prom lies to surrender control of Chinete Eastern Railway aod evacuate Dai ren (now Luda) end Port ArthurIce-free naval port* on the Yellow Sea-bv the end

Start of Korean War.

Deadline for Soviet evacuation of Dalren and Port Arthur suspended because of the Korean War.

Stalin dies.

Poal-Stalln Soviet leadership agree* to evacuate Dairen and Port Arthur.

Khrushchev,h Soviet Party (CPSU) Congress, delivers1 speech" criticizing Stalin, setting in motion East European attempts to reduce Soviet control.

Chinese article in April Irapilduy corrects Sovietlded" appraisal of Stadia Chineae applaud Soviet promise to correct "errors'" in Intra-Bkx relations but seek to define limits of tolerable diversity within the Bloc.

Secret agreementuutance lo defensehas USSR promising to help China develop nuclear weapons.

Mao. at Bloc conference in Moscow. rwrsUcIySoviets as Bloc leaders, but privately presses Soviet for herder line on foreign policy.

Sovietsong-range lubmarlne radio in Chinaoint fleet to be dominated by USSR and to use Chinese pom Chinese refuse.

Chinese communes are formally unveiled, andng Implies It has found"Croatfull Communism.

Chinese, during Taiwan Strait crisis, find Soviet support to be too little and loo late

a

8

9

9

at Slat CPSU Congress. Indirectly attacks principles of Chinese commune system. CPSU declares that war can be eliminated while capitalism remains.

Soviels refuse to give "sample atomic bomb" toearing up"7 military aid agreement

Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehual returns from visit to Moscow, challcngei Mao's economic and military policies with allegedurged

Khrushchev visits United States, and Soviettakes moderate line toward US. Chinese begin indirect criticism of Soviet detente brie.

0

er

launch massive press attack on Soviet line, and Soviets organiie unsuccessful counterattackloc gathering at Bucharest-

Sovleti withdraw oconomlc and lechnical advisers from China, including those concerned witheffort.

Soviets, al World Communist Conference infall In alt-out effort to force Chinese to acknowledge CPSU's authority.

Enlal walk* outd CPSU Congress and goes home early after public and private arguments with Khrushchev.

2

in Xinjiang Province among minorityallegedly encouraged by Soviets, leads to mass flight Into USSB. Central Asian borders reinforced on both stales. Sovielere closed by Chinese.

Soviet backdown over Cuban missile crisis bring* violent Chinese attacks on Sovietoviels organiie count era Hacks at East European party

3

publicly challenges Soviet right to Far East-em territories once belonging lo China.

Chinese announce their "general lino" for the International Communis! movement to repUce"generalino-Soviet party talk* Infall. Polemics hit aD-iime high.

4

4

Firil

of SIno-Soviet border negotiations

Khrushchev ousted from Soviet leadership First Chinese atomic explosion

Zhou Enlil In Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders

36

tibmil.

59

6

6

9

96

2

2

46

7

88

8

heapa force buildup opposite Chine. Kotygln In Beijing, holds uUu with Mao Breihnev-Denes Xiaopingucharest.

Soviel Treaty ot Ftlswfahlp Ceoperation. andAwlalance with Mongolia

Chinese refute Invitationd CPSU Congies* in Moscow

Cultural Revolution at iu keaghl In Chtna.

Border <bahes at levetal spots alona Sine-So.lei border, bul especially on ihe Unwrl River in the Far East.

Soviet war of nerve, against China, with "threat, that USSR rtrtght bunch nuclear strike*ascent ad-need wesypo

Kosygln-Zhou meeting al tbe airpcet In Besitng

Flnt round of new border talk* (sessions held .nlerm.tiently through

Soviets and Chinese leel each other out oo rwgotia-ilona

Slno-US "ring-Pongr. KbaiogerChina.

US lummlt meeting* In Belling and MoscowSlno-US Shanghai CcnnmunlQue and USwith the USSR.

US-Sovlel tsjrntnil Inhinese propose Sine-Soviet nonaggieaslon Dae*.

US-Soviet sumbnsvottok.

Mao dies. Soviet overture to post Mao lesadershtp

Sino-Soviet aerrenvtet on navigation around Xeu-uat bland.Khsbaro.sk on LWi Rtver. facilitates border river aavlgatior. talks, stalemated

Soviel*m statement on relation*,by Chlnete In March

Breihnev and Ustinov visit force* in Far East. (New Mage In Soviet Far East buildup beginseading lo now Far East theater command by eod of Ihe year.)

Communiit coup In Afghanistan

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: ;99 .

AprltlW)

Gcwlwr ^lffifc'-'

treaty with "smihea*trionvv' clause.

Soviet- lion truly with Vietnam, following further rapid deterloratvon in Sino-Vtammese relations.

Vietnam attacks and overruns (UmpucrSea; US and China complete normalization of cUpioenstsc rda-Itcaw Deng visits US.

China Invades Vietnam toeeeoo":occupation of Kampuchea unaffecteddeploy two additional dJvUlons Into Mongolia and begin to expend their military presence In Vietnam

Chinese announce intent to abrogate Sino-Sovtet treaty, but pecpose political talks,

Soviet-US summit in Vienne.

Slno-Soviet coHtical talks in Moscow.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Chinese postpone political talks indefinitely. Sirso-Sovset treaty expires.

Bterhnev,h CPSU Congiess. prooosesmeasures (CBMs) for the Far East.

Soviets propose resumption of border tali* Chinese silent

USSR and China begin gradual camion ofacademic and sporb ejchsnges, etc.

Brezhnev speech in Tashkent expresses desire for improved relations with China.

First round of Slno-Soviet consulutions held In iseijing,

Brezhnev dies; Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Huang meet at funeral in Meacejw; Andropov be-comes General SecreUry.

Second round of Sloo-Sovlet rxrisulutlons held in Mcacow.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kapltsa in Belling,ccond channel for talks oo "international Issues."

Third round of Sino-Soviet consulutions held in Beijing-

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