THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY AND TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THE THIRD WORLD (GI 84-10

Created: 4/1/1984

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The Soviet Military

Advisory and Training Program

for The Third World

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The Soviet Military

Advisory and Training Program

for The Third World

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared

of Globalontributionffice of Imagery Analysis. It wash ihe Direccoraie of Operations.

Comment* and queries are welcome und may be

directed to thc Chief.

The Soviei Military

Advisory and Training Program

for thc Third World i

Into/malio* available as ofnrd In ihis retort.

the, (he Soviet miliiary advisory and training program for less developed countries has expanded rapidly. This growth has resulted both from increased demand by LDCs for services and from aggressive Sovici efforts to market them. Record arms deliveries, mainlyiddle Eastern and African clients and including advanced weapons, diove much of the expansion. Increased security and intelligence assistance tokey vehicle for penetrating LDC establishments- provided farther impetus to the program.esult, the estimated number of Sovici advisers and technicians abroad has more than tripled during the past decade toDC military irainees were sent to Ihe USSR

advisory and training effort is an integral purl of the Soviet military assistance programhich includes the provision ofeconstruction services. SMAP complements other Soviet efforts in the Thirdaid aod activeat gaining influence, or at least denying Ihe United Stales and other Western countries significant inroads, especially in strategic regions such ns the Middle East. To these ends the Soviets have sent experts abroad and provided training in the USSR in an attemptain access to ports and other facilities, sway military procurement decisions, recruit LDCand evenecipient's political alignment

Moscow's success has been greatest in leftist states facing crisis situations. Mozambique's armed forces, for example, were esubiished on the Soviet model largely by Soviet advisers, and Moscow gained access to Ethiopian miliiary facilities in then return for large-scale assisianee. Soviet success in garnering influence also is reflected in the existence of high-ranking. Soviet-trained officials tn important, policymaking positions in LDC militarythe key political institution in these countries. Alumni of the Soviet program include ministers of defense and similarly influential officials, mainly in leftist regimes such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Syria.

Thc USSR has been less successful in gaining influence with non-Marxist developing countries such as Jordan and Peru, which are especially wary of Moscow's motivations Moreover, many LDC governments, irrespective of ideological orientation, arc dissatisfied wiih the quality of the Soviet training and technical support provided to them. ,

Regardless of thc influence Moscow reaps from lhe program, ihe USSR has realized increasing financial benefits. We estimate that Soviet hard currency earnings from the training and technical services program for tbe period93 were0 million, more than twice the amount earned during thc previous five years.

We believe that thc Soviet advisory and training program for LDCs will continue lo expand. Moscow is committed to achieving long-term gains inolicy that considers setbacks as short-term deviations from thc inevitable. Continuing arms deliveries, especially of advanced-in part spurred by compel mor. from the Wes: l provide much of thc rationaleigher level of assistance by Soviet personnel.cfowth of the Soviet program probably will slow for various political and. in some cases, financial reasons)

Support Activities: Thc Prognm

(he LDCi

thc USSR

Development

Cs- Expanded Presence and Function*

Training In the USSR: Diverse Courses and Clients

Hard Currency Receipts

Aucum>

Gains Outweigh Costs

Estimated Composition of Military and Related Experts in3

Estimated Hard Currency Earnings From Military Technical Service* to

Gio.ih o< !hfService!

Military Installations Used To Train LDC Personnel

>

BLANK PAGE

Tha Soviet Military

Advisory and Training Program

for the Third World

of ihe USSR's major goals is to expand ill presence and influence in Ihe Third Work) to tbc detriment of Weuern interests To Ihii end. the Soviets haveariety of aciiviiies,brood-based military assiitance; limited economic aid: and active measures such as exploitation of front organisations, disinformation, and penetration of local media Tbe military advisory and training programey dement of tbe Soviei military assistance effort, which also include! ibe proviuon of arms andprojects in LDCs.

Since the, the number of Soviet military advisers, technicians, and instructors in tne LDCs and tbe scope of miliury training offered to Third Work! personnel io tbc USSR has expanded significantly.30 Sonet military personneltroops) were stationed in LDCs as diverse as Peru, Tanzania, and Syria, and unrainees from ihe Thirdof ihem from lhcEast, North Africa, and Southto the USSR for military trainingoth are recordhe program provides an excellent opponu-nity for Ihe USSR to increase its presence in keyresence that Moscow uses lo expand its influence over Ihe long run. During the past decade the program also has earned substantial amounts of hard currency, although Moscow recently his offered more concessionary repayment terms to some clients

Miliury Suppori Activities: The Program

InCi. Moscow dispatches several categories of

experts tc^LDCs.

Advnrrs. almost always military or KGB officers, are assigned to LDC staff units, line commands (al

foviet miliuiyin LDO ind lhc nambci ofoi io It* USSR irt den*e& fron--arieiy ot

(tpcddcrfflucrxy ol 1MB mice-

OutSw-wi inroad pnOMf an aw*tfcu "> i Mica iMorepkir

Sarin Miliiary Assistance Decisionmaking

The Soviet military advisory and training program is pan of Moscow's military assistance effort, which also provided some SS0 billion worth of miliiary materiel and construction to the Third World over the lastears. Policy decisions regarding Soviet assistance are mode in the Politburo in the context of overall foreign and economic policy and areby the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Operating throughh Main Directorate, the General Staff:

Reviews the requirements of specific governments and insurgent groups

Oversees contract negotiations and materiel deliveries.

Chooses and supervises Soviei personnel posted abroad

Trains 'and somelimes helps select) the foreign nationals sent to the USSR

Underh Main Directorate, the ChiefDirectorate is responsible for the provision to LDCs of miliiary hardware and advisers and other specialists and for training in the USSR, and the Chief Technical Directorate handles Sovietabroad. These directorates are nominallyto the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, but in fact implement orders ofh Main Directotaie.

times at the company level orndOccasionally, as in Syria, they have been assigned to operational combat units

Technicians are Sonet enlistedleuofficer* andasvembk.and repair weapons and nontcthal equipment (such as communicationsrganize LDCsupport, and construct military facilities

Instructors (rain officers and Hoops in ihc operation and maintenance of equipment, military theory, and security and intelligence operation! Politicala bo provide ideological indoctrination

Support personnel include driver/mechanics,learns, logistics experts, interpreters, and

The Soviet complement inCs usuallypersonnel from each of Ihese categorieso( each group is based oa the volumeof recent weapons deliveries and. toextent, the expertise of indigenousthe nature of threais against the client. Themore Soviets sent to Ethiopia during thein conjunction with theSomalia, for example, vere aboutamong advisers, technicians, andThis support,

which accompanied arms deliveries of more than Sreflected the requirement to mobilize aSoviet client rapidlyrisis. Byindicates that the bulk

Ofoviet experts in Libya1 were technicians sent to assemble, test, and maintain Qadhafi't growing inventory of advanced arms,aircraft, ufnks, and air defense weapons. Tbe absence of large numbers of advisers probably is attributable to Qadhaft's desire to minimize Soviet involvement in mililary decision making.

In ihr USSR. Much of thc military training is provided in the USSR, where LDC officers and enlisted men arcide variety of both basic and advanced instruction. This training focuses on weapons maintenance and operation, tactics, logistics, and. increasingly, security and intelligence.in tltc USSR complements the services performed by Soviet experts in LDCs.or example. Joidanun enlisted men and office's were trained in ibe USSR on the newly deliveredir defense system, and Soviet adviscis were providing training on these weapons in Jordan, according to press and attache reporting. In some cases, trainees are sen to the USSR for more advanced courses after receiving rudimenlarv instruction it home Aboutfficers from Uolswana received annor maintenancein this wayI C

Figure Z

USSR; Military and Security/Intelligence Personnel in

tnSub-Sihir.in .Africa

Tfi SouthMiddle Eats

Eiliiuud nuiu-ilmtiumn oi mm.

I. "lud'l HMCrl

Soviet policy stipulates that training be geared closely to (he capability of specific student groups, C

J. Thus, many courses provide for ihe btsK instruction ofhudimentary ed asharp contrast lo most Western programs All levels of Soviet trainingemphasize rigid adherence to prescribedfor both operations and maintenance.

3 Unlike much Western training, thc Soviets discourage individualeven by fighict pilots, who probably have lhe gieatett need for such flexibility

Figure 3

USSR: Comparison of Mililary Deliveries and Military Presence in

Now change in tea lei

USSt; MMtKTOO

Billion US S

WU MllHioP.

MI'

- li 76 "HUD II B

iitMf iiwi> r* an*uMn imsoi

DevdopmenU

Expttfik ExpanMand Functions. The USSR has become increasingly active ina variety of advisory and technical services and instruction in LDCs during the past0 Soviet advisors, technicians, andmore thanerccnl aboveosted to aboutDCs3his increase has been driven largely by the growing volume and sophistication of Soviei military deliveries to LDCs (figureecurity/intelligencewhich the Soviets increasingly havefurther impetus to the growth, ai dad tbe Soviets' general willingness to provide services and financial arrangements generally more favorable than those offered by the West. Tbe Soviet contingent was largest by far in Syria, which accounted for aboutercent of all Soviets in LDCsarge groups also were in Libya. Ethiopia. Angola.raq, and thc Yemeni. Smaller numbers were postedountries such as Mozambique. Algeria. India, Peru, and Nicaragua. /

Of ibc various types of Soviet advisers, the number of security/intelligence personnel has grown mostIndeed,3 an estimatedercent of the Soviet military experts in LDCs wereoperativeshis growth reflects the efforts of most radical regimes toconsolidategainsleast asattempts to lake advantage of an excellent means of penetrating LDCs

3 indicate (hat KGB and GRU (military intelligence) operatives have been sent to LDCs as politically diverse as Zambia. Syria, and Nicaragua to-

Ior rcorganJrc security/intelligence unitsProvide intelligence instruction and overseecollection against the LDCs adversaries.

1ale that (here aleoviei Ulil.laiy JOVilen in Afthanbtanaddition in theSovietnlike the role played by Sovkti in mow otherthese

M control of ibe Affun orfinitaiiooi to whiCS they are miened

Table 1

Estimated Composition

MiDtary and Related Experts

3

Function

OIBI

Army

10

fo-.f

defease

staff*

iuraie funciionsl cticpxy. although soasciimes-.thin armt or lir force ublet of orfialmion.

articular service.

1 Includes Chief IntellitcfMe DircGlorataiGRUtandCornmiitee for Sum Securii*(KCB|t

Conduct surveillance of foreigners.

Monitor the activities of other Soviets

The presence of Soviet security and intelligencein LDCs provides Moscow the opportunity to gather intelligence on the host country Intelligence operativeseen dispatched as members ofassistance contingents to recruit LDC officers as in-placc agents of Moscow. Some ofoviets posted to Mozambiqueor example, recruited officers in thc high command to sow discord, with the object of having anti-Soviet officers purged^" fc

Some three-fourths of Soviet miliiary andpersonnel abroad provide technical and advisory Support and instruction to LDC armed forces. The number of Soviets assigned to spec die LDC military serm.es dependsarge extent on (he sire and sophistication of weapons deliveries. In most LDO the army is much larger than thc other armed services and absorbs ihc bulk of materiel imports, in lerms of both value and quantity. An estimaied JO percent of the Soviet military experts abroadere assigned to armies icc as many as to any oiher

service Air forces and air defense units,smaller, together accounted for anotherof the Soviet military presence abroad,share thai mainly reflect* theof most Third World clients to operateeven moderately sophisticated weapons.cases, (his Urge share is attributable loof aircraft repair facilities0 Peruvian-SovietTew Sovici

officers and enlisted men are assigned to LDC navies, almost always the smallest LDC miliury service. Other Soviets are assigned to construction projects or LDC general staffs or provide support such astranslation

Soviet technicians abroad, especially enlisted men. arc highly specialized C- . .

3 This is especially true of aircraft support personnel, for example, ground maintenance experts assigned to Iraqi fighter squadrons8 were assigned to separate sections concerned with engines, fuselages, communications, electrical equipment,and egress and life support systems, accordingormer Iraqi miliiary officer Similarly, miliury or civilian technicians from state production enterprises are scnl on short tours of duly to LDCs lo oversee delivery and testing of specific weapons. C

Soviet officers sent to LDCs typically function as advisers to the various servicesa lesseracademic instructors. In recent years these officers ha*e.

Reorganized aa entire army (North Yemen

Assisted in the formulation of combat1 C

Served us political advisers to line units and stuffs {in Ethiopia in the. C

Planned and executed staff exercises and naming sessions and esubluhed mining curricula in(Mozambique

Occasionally provided operational support in asnuaiion (Soviets manurface-to-airin Syria.

Soviet advisers, in contrast to technicians andtypically are assigned positions affordingopportunities to gain influence. OftenLDC staffs, advisers are better situated to affectpolitical alignments and policies thancontingents of specialized technicians, whoimplement mililary programs. For example,lhat chief advisers

assigned to Syria maintained direct, daily con iaa with iheir counterparts concerning tactical, technical, and logistic aspects of mililaryaccess to the Syrian decisionmaking apparatus.

Military Training in the USSR; Diftrse CourtitSince iheoscow has providedvariety of military and related instructionUSSR to studentsrowing numberTraining remains focused on theand repair of weapons systems andmilitary planning, largely because ofhigh levels of arms deliveries to LDCs.deliveries of new types ofor newwill lead toof trainees at least several months beforeis received. Officers from Grenada,thc Army Chief of StaffMinisters ofprovidedtraining in the USSR before armored

A prime Soviet motivation for encouragine trainingUSSR is to propagandize frequentlyLDC personnel in an environment conduciveMoscow's interests. Regardless of therank of the trainee, his country of origio, orcontent of specific courses, heavy dosesand ideological indoctrination almostintegral parts of Soviet instruction.intense efforts apparently are aimed atofficers, often key power brokers inexample, reported

that1 the Soviets concentrated on training high-level Mozambique officers to the exclusion of lower ranking officers and enlisted men

Security and intelligence trainees repoiiedtyheavy doses of political traininga reflection of Moscow's judgment that theyopportunities for penetration.rom North Yemen were subjected to suchSanaeluctant Soviet diemal political indoctrination amonginfluential LDC trainees apparently are aimeda base of support for pro-Sovietefforts occur in cases involving recipientsa wide range of ideological persuasions,those from Peru, which has only av^th Moscow. L.

Anhirds of all LDC militarytrainees sent to thc USSR ininstruction oa ground weapons, fighterand at: defensemostitems supplied by Moscow. At Ihc samethat security/intel-

ligence instruction by both the KGB and GRU in the USSR has expanded most rapidly during thc but five years, coinciding with the surge in the number of such expeiis sent to LDCs

The number of LDC military trainees sent lo the USSR has varied from year to year, despite Moscow's expanded curricula. Anersonnel departed from LDCs for tbe USSR inrecord level following sharp declines in thepecialized training has always been concentrated in the USSR because of the lack of facilities and other support in LDCs to accommodate training onweapons, in security/intelligence, and for staff officers.

The bulk of Third World trainees in thc USSR are government sponsored,umber of insurgent and irredentist groups also receive training there Reports

that several

hundred of the Third World trainee

4

persons

USSR: Miliury and Related Trainees From

SI 'ilii

Saul,

NumBti ol

*.su:

LtZJ Sub-Sahartfl AfricaMMIdle Eafl

>int4i ^ JiitK wobiMy

HgiufcinUTnd lionihiiKm ibut. he->ec> B'tvinii ktw iiuimi'tiiw.

* Dili rtKI&iili Alii.

3 in leccnt yean were Palestinians andinsurgents:

Si mi, one of the more radical Palestinianwas scheduled to sendto the USSR, beginningtprobably were given conventional

Aboulimbabwe insurgents received pilot and other aircraft instruction in thc USSR8 and independence0 C

^ Since then, howeicr, nohave been observed

USSR, which supported the faoon thaij>pposed Prime Minister Mugabe during the civil war.

We suspect the number of insurgent trainees is larger than reporled. Data on all types oi military Irainecs in thc USSR, based primarily onC

J from LDCs. are sketchy in the case of insurgent and other isonjovernmeiiial groups,to mask such training further restrict ourto the data.

open sources indicate that

Moscow provides training at:

Miliiary and higher military schools, which offer theoretical and practical instruction, mainly for officers.

Academies, which typically give advanced training.

Special institutes, which ordinarily provide brief courses on specific subjects, such as weapons firing.

Autonomous facilities, where LDC enlisted men arc taught operational und technical

State manufacturing facilities, such as tank plants in Kiev and Zhitomir

Sovici policy stipulates that training be geared to the "cultural level" of students,^

rainees from more advanced LDCs,Syria, ostensibly receive instruction similar toSoviet students, while Angolans. Northand others are taughtore basicumber of "core" courses,training for curricula longer than one weapons opera-

tors and technicians and ptioi candidates uke thc same basic mathematics and physics

Courses for pilots and weapons tecacicuns usually are thc most comprehensive:

Some Syrians undergoing training as Scud rocket technicians have remained in the USSR as long as four

ltdites studyen'- C

r i

conlrasi, tactical and operational courses on spe-cifie weapons arc of shorter duration:

A Held artillery course for South Yemeni officers coveredonihs

Radar refresher training often takes less than a

Surging Hard Currencyne of Mcncow's motivations for providing adnsoiy aad trainingce io LDCs is financial Moscow increasingly has attempted to generate hard currency earnings from <he program, although Soviei terms remaincompared wuh those of Western suppliers This policy was adopted after) Arab-Israeli war. when key Soviet clients indOlc East and North

Table

USSR: Estimated Hard Currency Earnings From Mililary Technical Services

-hich;

Anfola

V,

IS

13

3

10

10

Thelloc* no. cf eaniacf. louedtd to .be nearest SI million, refleeu ihe aiiumpiion ihai poymeni is recerred is lhe write yeai a* seoicei performed

Tbe declinemainlyalvicr. of ibe So. pretence in Alfem, possiblymuch pester. If Syria did not reimburse Moscow in bard csirency for SoHei admen C

Mat earnine* could have fallen lo

lew lhan SiOO nullnn

' Iraq mayei some of Syria's obligation* before tbe Iran-Iraq -ir began in

realized large increases in oil revenues. Most of thc LDCs now obligated to pay for Soviet assistance arc oil producers, and Moscow sometimes demands reimbursement from less affluent clients,

t the same time, the Sovieis have been willing to provide services on more concessionary terms than previously to some clients in difTiculi circumstances. Inor example, Syria no longer was required lo pay the "full cost" of Soviet^advisers. C

We estimate, on the basis of incomplete reportingmall number of clients, that hard currency obligations of LDCs for technical services totaled more0 million inthan twice the amount incurred during the previous five years'Some three-fourths ofotal

Hard cmrencylie batedraCc reponed chargei per rerxpienl. applied to all LDC* required lo reimbur.tta scrvteei icadcrcd. Thc eti.mateipayment i, received in Ihe tame .car services mreHunon ofequnmicnt (to! reuntiuiicnicnt be madeurrtsiLDCi.umctiitici are in mean

probably came from payments for Soviets posted to LDCs. since Moscow absorbs most of the costs of training in lhe USSR, C-

ariety of sources suggest thatLibya constituted roughly one-third of theAlgeria, Angola. Iraq, and Syria made upthe remainderindicates

thai Peru reimburses Moscow boih for tbe servicestechnicians and for the costs ofpolicy of maintaining relations on abasis. India traditionally has paid foras well, although in rupees rather thanlongstanding concessionary -

only recent formal Soviet financial concessions for training may have involved Nicaragua, which has also received some Soviet-supplied hardwarerantdeparture from Moscow's usual practice.

Sovict hard currency earnings from trainingservice* are especially favorable whenin light of the salaries and otherwith the program. VVe believe suchmuch lower than receipts, and, moreall expenses are payable in softpay for technicians and advisers, most ofdeposited inlo an accouni in the USSR, is paidwhile foreign-dutya SO-paid in local (soft)the local costs Moscow occasionally subsidizes,all recipients are responsiblesoft currency expenditures

Soviet charges for services apparently vary among paying clients, and they can vary over lime to the same recipient. Open source reporting, for example, indicates lhat Libya generally pays higher rates for comparable services provided by Soviet advisers and experts than do other LDCs. This circumstancethat Moscow tries to maximize earnings when ever possible, assuming its primary goal of gaining influence is not impaired.

Ai Asacsscaent: Cains Outweigh Costs

Tbe large-scale expansion of the Soviet advisory and training program since theeflects mutual, practical benefits lo Moscow and its clients, although both sides hate not fully realized their aims. To the extent lhat ihe expanded Soviet presence abroad and stepped-up training in the USSR have been at the expense of Western interests. Moscow has realized its goal of denying or reducing non-CommunistIn someamong ideologically compatible, heavily dependentMoscow his been able to translate an active program into true gains in influence. Improvements in Moscow'sattributable to Ihe training program often arc manifestedpro-Soviet alumni assume positions of key responsibility in Iheir government. Most of them serve in radical regimes:

Col Henrique "Uo" Cairena of Angola, anmember of ihe Dos Santos regime, is ihe presidential adviser on defense affairs, and recently was appointed chief of the Air Force. He received training in tbe USSR from9 untilnd has worked closely with Soviet advisers in Angola.

. Gen. Mustafa Talas is Syrian Minister of Defense.alas became tbe first non-Soviet tooctorate in miliiary mailers from the Soviei Supreme Institute for Miliiary Studies. He reportedly views his Soviet training positively and has been involved in negotiations with lhc Soviets concerning military supplies and other mailers.

tikie-Sclassie Wogdrcss Is secretary general of Ethiopia's Piovisional Military Administrative Council Fikre-Selassre. one of the most influential and pro-Soviet members of tbe regime, had nine months of political indoctrination in the USSR. He previously received pilot training in tbe United Stales.

Several high-ranking North Yemenis now orin poaitiOBS of authority have been trained in the USSR. They include the chief of thc general staff of Ihe armed forces (Li Col. Abdullah Hussein al Hishini. ibe deputy chief of staff for (raining (Ltubsin al Ul.it.i, aod the deputy director of the Central Organization for National Security (Col. Abdallah ShaUmishy These and other key Northin (he Army and Air Force-each received several years of unspecified training, and Sha la mash and al ULafi are known to advocate pro-Soviet positions.

Similarly, high-ranking Sovici military advisers in LDCs arc often at or near the power center because the miliury is the leading political force of many-Third World nations

Soviets in North Yemen0 successfullyPresident Salih lo install pro-Sovioi officers at the highest levels of thc armed

Mozambique's armed force* were largely created, organized, and trained by :hc Soviets after Independence

I urge-scale Soviet assistance to Ethiopia in response to7 Somali invasion helped Moscow acquire increasing access to cons and airfields, according to open sources.

Soviet cultivation of LDCs through advisory support and training also has fostered links to Moscow by giving arms transfer efforts additional impetus.of LDC technicians on Soviet hardware ofteneavy dependence onto the exclusion of other suppliers because of thediversification presents. Continued armsin turn,eed for additional assistance from Soviet personnel, especially as increasinglyweapons are provided. Gains in Sovietand ihc impact on arms sales have beenby thc growing hard currency earnings realized by Moscow

Most recipients view Soviet advisory services and training as essential elements of military assistance and some have complimented Soviet efforts. For example

Air Force pilots being trained to operate ncV aircrafi9 felt "genuinely helped" by Soviet instructors.

X

- Jordanian trainees sent to the USSR in lateof theissile instruction they

undergoing security training in the USSR in2 reported that Soviei instructors were highly competent and motivated

Moscow has nonetheless failed to realize gainsproportionate to growth in the Sovietabroad and expanded (raining in theclients, regardless of their politicaldistrust Moscow and question its truefor providing assistance The Soviei positionfor example, suffered2 whenattempted lo persuade BaghdadIndian weapons technicians wilh Sovietappatently believed thai the resumptionscale arms accords thatfollowingafter ihc Iran-Iraq warfor an expanded presenceheavily dependent on Moscow'sfrequently attempted to reduce Ihe numberpersonnel during Ihc past decade.

^ Fear of undue Soviet infiacncc-illusirated by efforts by the head of thc Soviet

program to increase his training responsibilities

reportedlyajor iciiion for this stance.

Occasionally, disillusionment with Soviet training hasole in Moscow's failure to reestablish influence in an LDC. Egyptian President Mubarak, who attended two bomber schoolsommand and staff school in ihe USSR in lhe, has severely criticized Soviet goals and motivations in Ihe Third World, according to open sources-'

orking level, substantive deficiencies andheavy handedness are reflected in complaints from clientsariety of circumstances:

Zambia complained1 that the Soviets were unnecessarily complicating assembly of variousofurface-to-air missiles^

Iraq in3 considered replacing3 instructors with Egyptians because of thc Soviets' refusal to divulge exact aircraftexample of the customary Sovietwith secrecy- C

Ethiopian Air Force technicians (some previously trained by the Uniled States) have faulted poor substantive presentations, prosclyiization efforts, and ihe superior attitude of instructors in the USSR.

Most clients have tried to maintain iheir autonomy while maximizing the improvement incapabilities afforded by Soviet assisiancc. The most independent recipients have been those which conduct military supply relationsommercial basis. India, for example, has never allowed moreew hundred Soviet military personnel tnof them technicians rather thanreceiving

- *nim (minimt crMK-mjn*C* fe* diffcicfti rriiani inOidlaser MR

someillion worth of materiel since theMoreover. India,

like some other recipients of Sonet assistance, has developed its own training programs partly toSoviciractice Moscow tries to discourage

Soviet Wrliamchauung historically has emphasized thc long term, viewing setbacks largely as events posing future opportunities Moscow's commitment io this perspectiveatso in arms transfcis. the main tangible determinant of thc scope of Ihc advisory and trainingcontinued growth in the program. Tbc requirement foradvisers and training probably will be most actlie in countries facing crisis situations. Thepercentse Soviet military presence in Syriaersonsor eiamplc. accompanied delivery of more advanced weapons.

The growth of Moscow's program could,stowed by political and other constraints. Fearprovoking the United Stales, for example,lhc USSR to limit the Soviet presence inC

that tbe

Soviets wereeneral reduction in (heir program because of manpower shor(agcs in thc USSR.eterioration in Soviet relations with specific clients and the financial burden of providing support to some nonpaying LDO could lead to selectively reduced assistance.

BLANK PAGE

Appendix A

USSR: Growth of Ihe

Technical Services

USSR: Estimated Military and Related Personnel io

mi

mi

Total

North Africa

7SU

6W

6)0

650

6CO

Algeria Libya"

_ it.aas )MW imzT

77S

130

110

760

po asoo <ooo sjoo

U00 oa

Other

10

IaWO OO

IJ7Q WSO

3.IT0_ S

900

10

10

10

10

300

160

150

Mali

IS

15

45

170

180

ISO

I .TOO OO

no

ISO

Mozambique

25

200

210

675

500

J30

HQ

SCO

LOCO

ISO

10

2*0

120

iw

140

120

Olhei

665

775

4S5

500

as

Li tin An'trK*

15

1M

150

110

ISO

165

140

Niearar.ua

ISO ICO

41

110

Peru

20

33

10

100

I 50

t iO

1)0

100

ISO

Middk Put

125

Iran

iso

7S

120

NA

Iraq

UM_ OQ

W *M0 J3S

i.ceo

N'otth Yi

170

120

..5

U5

ISO

123

300

120

Sooth Yemen

215

235

)i0

US

500

500

Syria

0

700

700

2tS

190

OO

South AUa

77S

700

690

5

QQ _lO00

A'jtu niitao

*25

150

J50

J50

-.too

25

:/xo>

India

100

150

; so

ISC

1*5

ISO

5

H use

10

OrJur

Minimum numbei present for at lean one month

J There weren est imio.iel troops preient in

Tabic

USSR:LDC Trainees Departing for

and RrUted

Africa

Africa

A

Mid

J

210

50

'5

IS

NA

M A

mania

ISO

aad Soaih African insurgents

America

jno

in

CO

ni

as

from EI Sal'idor,nd Honduras

taw

Yemen Sou IE Yemen

1 io

<A

r ' "l

MO

:>h

1

100

500

NA

55

200

si man irredentists

*.

Asia

DO

SO

Me

;:;

55

10

Miimsum Dumber, rouoded to Ihe nearestenons.

Appendix B

tiSSR: Miliiary Installations Used To Train LDC Personnel

Printed

i- .

torcaa

AfVM^MaUaVbtaf .

magma Batho Arateiy

wcsies

Veenta

aad aha. loand vatucta opcraUat.

Angola. India.

H,gSer Amllei, CtssnaaaadScaWol

and loUctn'ni ind operations

Taaaaaia

com mandril cuunc. infantry iiciicn. gueiirlla irilning

7imbab>ean NMurnaa*i. oiher African si*tea. Palettmiana

Hither Airborne Co nana ad School

iniruciwn

Ethiopia. Tanil

IMteM

ir mniik<SAM| deptormeni aod operailuiu

tinipecried Arab states

and antiaircraft miliary deceoimeni and maintenance

Mia. Iraq. Jordan. NUaragua. South Yemen

HiiSary Engineeringe.'tnv

engineering and opcinoao. radar

ksssaasti, Mali. Taaaa.ua

Ken*

Higher Mdfeuy AvaMa

aad kaanaanwf p'otnft. amicMBL iad radar uaaaakg

Jaaugeau. Algem. Ut*s, Syria. Ira* Seanl. Yenven. Alghaamaa.

irfield

clot Hair-ng

Srna, Other anapcoficd African and Atab stales

Military An field

and Ti.mnon pirn, -capons, techaieil training

enher Arab Hales. Bea.n. c'thmc-a.HU. Mil,.

School

Mighi

and MlieopH. pilot mining; technical trainiag

Libya. Soalh Yemen. Tnnrania. Uganda

Airbase

training

East, Per*

H^her Military Ami Ion Engi veering School

(-lot naming, aircraft engine myinltnam.-t. faf nuct

Ethiopia. Libia. Tanunia

Acrorlot School

andot uiNhag

aaah

c

USSR: Miliiaryallon* Used To Train LDC Personnel (continued)

Ia lion/Locn lioa

Provided

Represented

Sea Higher

School (Sevastopol)

sod navigation

Higher Naval School (Baku)

line officer training

Ethiopia. Guinea. Libya

Nail School (Leningrad)

and navigation

South Yemen

training

Higher Naval Engineering School

engineering

Guinea. Ethiopia

training

Yemen

boai initriiciion

Guinea. IJbn

Higher Ertgrnear-ing School of Ihe Engineer Troops

oak/own

Higher School of Railroad Troop* aad Military

support

Yemen

Higher Miliury Engineering School of Signals

operations

Soath Yemen

Higher Miliury Aulonwh* Engineering School

anknown

unit

Higher Military Command School of Signal.

Tama nil

Logistics School

unknown

Miliury Academy (Moscow)

giound forces training

Angola, Mounttaicjue

USSR: MiliaryUsed

To Tribi LDC Penoood (eoadmwd)

Rrpreaewed""

Academy of Amend

comeuaocn

Academy of da Gtrml Suff

Academyhe Rear Services and Tram port [Leniiiftailj

Artillery Aside toy (leninjtrad)

unknown

Enineering Academy (Mono*)

othor materiel, conurectlon eocinoorini

Medical Academy (Moaco-,

South Yemen

Autoj <Leiusa>ad) CoMiruciiea School (ScmieropoOadharf mm

pecif .akan*

Yemen AApMa

tH*BW

Africa

iSctaal (Moaco*)

aaweaMM and repair" <'

Ptilrty toed eaduarrelyrain forttr-en

'Not ftxmalty part of pound forco.flea troupad under

- Aniot acbool. -bet. lifted mibury>bopronded

t thoi "

Original document.

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