Chile;
Rccorwl rue ling ihf Riehij
ihe widespread aniiga.ernn.cni agitation that beganhile last year, the right hat beeneuuu* by it> absence In the first such groundswcll >incc Pinochet seised powerhe itiiini .pearhcaded by organised labor, but the resurgent political parties quickly assumed the leadership they occupy todayarries, clustered around the Christian Democrats. Chile's largest politicalormed the Democratic Alliance The Alliance's refusal to work with the radical left led to the creationival opposition coalition, the Communist-controlled Popular Democratic Movement. Parties an the right, however, remained divided and disorganised, uncertain of their relationship to the military government and wary or the rupulur puliiH.il nsobdiration that iceincd to recall the turbulent Allcnde years |
Pinochet has reacted to tbe oprsasiiion with defiance tempered by minor corsccssarsns. We believe be is dctcimined to make as few changes as possible io0iion. which envisages gradual democr.iO-aiiow congressional elections9residenial contest1 Whether he can ride out Ihe political storm will in part depend on how effect.-el, the Alliance aad the Popular Mencmem can mobilise the oripoaiiion But it will also hinge on how much support the government can retain on the right. The) was dominated by ibe center and theay be the year when the civilian right | ey player oa Ike Chilean political stage.
Democrats by Dtfault
Before3 coup, the right was well organised, dynamic, and supported by uphird of the electorate. Although estrcmcly conservative on socioeconomic matters and devoutly gag| Mara Ml. the Chilean right was democratic and constitutionalist. Overtly antidemocratic, torpor..itsi. or authoritarian ideologies were ctumpeoncd by only small extremes I
uch news wereepresented withinPany. Chile's leading
The right, however.sufficiently radicalised by the struggle against Allcnde to abandon ita suppon for civilian supremacy and to back the military coup that
v. nn.ii.in ivcmocruts wno raiionaiisco meexpected that the milltaty, udcr un Initial crackdown, would return power to Ihe traditional center-right rolitiouni Pinochet, however, refused even tonharc power with the civilian right, and bmh the National Party and the Chri.tiun Democrat, were placed "in recess- by the government Indeed. Pinochet rcicctcd attempt* in. n;n a" pally,iliiary regime that suppressed all form* oT rmblK pm.ncal actmiy. Under the circumstances, only the most authoritarian rightist leader* participatedthe new government, aad most of these were drawn fromas Jaime Guiman'*had been poklicaUy insigaif*cant
system tuatcd in what Pinochet of despite ionic grui period was loo lo initiative. In view however,o I
In ourPinochet'* rcfaval to Mnctnsa an caTicisI pany or to eonfeet some sort ofyvicm to buttress hi* rule hailed the radicaliraiion of the Chilean right Excludedignificant role in the government, and in anylacking antradition, most rightist leader* had little alternative but to urge an eventual return to pluralistwithin the context of on electoral
or the right. This was precisely in0 Constitution,yearight generally supportedurrent domestic turmoil, certain that rigid adherence to
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timetable fordemocrali/alion it in ibe right'* bui interests. Thi* realization has. in ourpurrcd much of the eighteorganise iltelf am) loosen tie* wiib.ihc regime* not to be caught unprepared should Pinochet falter BJ
A IHsided Right
3 the right emerged from its dccadelong polilicul dormancy and began io rebuild parly structures. Unlike the Communists and Christian Democrats, however, conservative parties hadn maintained skeletal organiiationihis, combined wiih personal rivalries and divergent aiiiiudcv toward the military regime, has contribuicd lo eatensive fractional! rat ion on tbe right. There arc atozen self-proclaimed conservative parties in Chile, but only five have even the lean hope of emerging as significant political
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Chief Leader*/
NllUnil Aeiian Moxmnr tMASI fable Rinliiriiti.
Ziimi tlui Andrei.
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llufo Atnida
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Naltinml Aeiltm Mtnrniti" i> the only righiul parly that is not even denuxruiic by default. Although they have toned down their explicitlyand authoritarian Mulemcnli in icccniove mem leader* mil tpeak fondly of1st. aniipariy" models of society and raP against 'liberal capita Item" andheompused primarily of former hardlinegovernment supporters who opposed even minimal libera lira lion and vainly urged Pinochet to institutionalize his rule via an official puity The rruriunruscs] the regime's free markci economics,ute proicsiiumst iipprtucharger rote for ihe slate. aB
other rightist group from the military regime Priorutt uf it* leaden were other inoctive in politics or associated with the small Cremutliu iivdcninder Pinochet, these relatively young menuuiiorn of ccmsidcrabsc power Although iheir influencedeclined in recent months, iheycontrol many provincial Mutueulliv and ihe government-sponsored youth organization It* government connections and links with the still-flourishing Gremiafrsts may make ihe Union umerically the largest force on the Chilean right. Bui close indent if icauin wiih the regime will, in our view, limit the party's appciluM-Knuvhel era and may compel it to allykv, compromised rightist
The AuiiDMiif Vnliy Movrnurnf was organitcd iny elements of the old National Pari)
ihe leadership of the Independent Democratic Union, many National Unity leaders were politically significant players3 and owe relatively little to Pinochet. The parly also ravors more nationalist economic policies than ihe Independent Democratic Union. Party leaders have publicly stated that they want to form
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the nucleusrood ccnter-right force that "illider appeal than Ihe old National Puny Wc believe lhat Jurpu hope* toemocratic transition lhat will adjust the timetable* ofO Constiiuiion while accepting In legitimacy, thereby allowing him and the Movement to talte credit lor the peaceful dismantling of the dictator**-
The Naiimml Parly Rtortamziwt CummHiet compete* with the National Unity Movement for ihe loyalties ofiiiionitl 1'iirlylic group -Jiarci the conservative political ant! nationalist eeonomic view* of Jarpti'* movement, but i* more independent of ihe govcrnmcni. Much or ihe animosity between these two group* stems, in our view, from personal rivalries dating from theJ era and from discontent on the part of some Committee leaders over Pinochet's choice of Jnrpa last fall toialogue wiih tbe otitic*.
. the group . 0 Constitution and has made only very vague proposals msome ol us timetables foei,/di
The Krpublleon Highi isefuge forNational Party militants, although it has attracted far fewer prominent coinervatisc politician* than either the Nationul Unity Movement or ihe Reorganising Committee, ll is Ihe only clear-cut right wing pom- to have joined the oprwition.ember of the Ocmocratie Alliance, il has repudiated0 Constitution, demanded Pinochet's resignation, and called Tor the electiononstituent assemblv. The Republican Right it important symbolically as evidence that Pinochet's once solid support on iherighi i* eroding, but we doubt that ihe pany hasoherent organi/aiton or muchrassroots
following, mm
Prospects for Unity
Wc believe thai the right willto overcome il* internal divisions before it can exert significant political influence. The formationightwing coalition comparable to the Democratic Alliance or the Populur Denwcratie Mtwcmcni wouldirst step. To be effective, however, some of the live major righlisi pen lies will have lo nserge. and thus reduce their numberaximum of two or three. Some effort* have already been made tn this direction.
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triy Seiialtir Iritneisvii Uuliscs attempted to bring the National Unity Movement and ihe Reorganizing Committee together, but the initiative foundered over personal rivalries and ihe question of independence from the lionet niifCnLHM
Nevertheless, wc capect thai the right will eventually pui most of it* differences aside androad Conservaiivc from flankedmaller, more radical grouping similar tou si-corpora list National Action Movement. With the exception of the National Action Movement, most of ihe rightwing panic* share i> common polilical ideology, and dispute* over the degree of governmcm intervention in
. Tne threat that
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much of iu for mer leftist bias, might broaden it* appeal to ihe right "ill'also induce the conservative* to stop squabbling. MMU
Furtrsctmore. the debate over the tight'* relationship to then our view, primarily tooted in divergent assessments of Pinochetlant and prospects. These probably "ill become clearer as the year advances, thereby diminishing this issue's divisivencss for conservative. Personal rivalries will be pethaps lite most difficult obstacle to overcome, but the Chilean right has done so in the past. During the, conservatives were split into three declining parties riven by pcrsonaltsi infighting.owever, they fused to form ihe Notional Parly, which quickly became Chile's sccond-largcst polilical force.
Outlook
The right has augmented its influence during Ihe past year, and we believe the trend will continue4 Nevertheless, ihe right does not yet have the strength to shape political developments. This power rests wiih the government and.esser extent, with the moderate and leftist opposition.^
The conservatives' precise role this year will hinge largely on which of three possible courses the protest movement lakes and on Pinochet's response:
/Wir MortmratSupport. If ihe current economic recovery continues and Pinochet makes some politkul concessions, the opposition's mobilising capacity could diminish. As the pressure on the governmeni subsided, most of the right probably would accept the regime's transition schedule. This, in turn, would strengthen Pinochet's political position and lend credibility to hit planradual return to democracy. The prospect of an orderly transition dominated by the right could induce moderates in the Democratic Alliance to reassess their adamant opposition to0 Constitution. Fear ofcxcltntonlowly emerging democratic polity could, in our view, prove stronger than their desire not to legitimize the "Pinochet system."
Grow but Remain Peaceful aid Moderate.
The opposition may quickly recover last year's momentum and go on to coordinate even rnoic massive protests andeneral strike. If the demon.tro lions and work stoppage* remain largely nonviolent and are clearly comrollcd by the Democratic Alliance (rather than the radical Popular Democraticc believe that the pressure on Pinochet will increase. In such circumstances, the right, mainly to avoid losing middkeias* support to the Christian Democrats, would uy to distance itself from an unpopular regime. Several of the rightist parties might even join the opposition. This process would be accelerated if. as the press bas spcculaied. Pinochet were to replace the relatively moderate Jarpaore hardline interior minister. These development* would deprive the government of all but oltrarighlisi civilian backing. They would also shift the center of gravily of the entire protest movement to themaking opposition activity even more a'traeiiw it- -he middknd further isolating the regime.
Grow Violeu and Radical. The collapse of the economic recovery and continued intra nsigence by Pinochet could permit ihe radical lefln greater influence en-er the opposition rnovement. More violent protests, serious polivkal polariiation, iind social conflict would ensue, The specterciurn to the chaotic days of the Allende regime would, in our view, begin to haunt the middle class and the right.esult, eonservalives probably would rally around the government and sever all cootscralion with the opposition. Although most rightistsontrolled transition and the reestablishf civilian rule, they are motivated more by fear of Marxism and social disorder than commitment to democracy
Original document.
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