Created: 3/6/1984

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Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear

National lr.idligr-ricc fclimatc

olomcudgmentsSun mi iin

r ]



Moim.Ooa*i the KtWr.uon of Out EiHrnMo




Tho following inlelligence organizations participated in the preparation of thc Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, lhe Defense Inlelligence Agency, tho National Security Agency, ond lhe Intelligence organization* ol Ihe Deportments of State and Energy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Stall tor InteUigence. Oepartment of the Army Ihe Director of Nova! Intelligence, Deportmenl ol lhe Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Ihe Director of IntcOiQence. Headquarters, Marine Corps








lumbers and Cruise


Defensive Missiles and



C Soviet Slrategic Policies and

D. Fuiure Strategic

Slrategic Offensive

Quantitative for Soviet Stiateglc Offensive

Stralegic Defensive

E Operations of Soviet Strategic Forces in a

Preparations and Training of Nuclear Forces for

Scenario for Operation of Soviel Slrategic Forces in a

Impact of Future Systems on Soviel

F. Trends in Soviet Capacities To Perform Stralegic

Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery

NeuUaUiing Enemy Command. Control and Communications.

Warning Capabilities, and Other Support

Capabilities for Cornprchensivc Stralegic

Survivability of Soviet Strategic Offensive

Protecting the USSR With Strategic






This8 summarizes ihu latesl developments and projects future trends in Soviet weapons and supporting systems for strategic nuclear conflict. Offensive aitack force levels are projected, along with our estimates of iho effects of factors influencing future Soviel policies and force developments, including the presence or absence of arms control constraints. Thc Estimate does not contain comparisons of present and future Soviet and US forces or measures of the destructive potential of the forces remaining to the two sidesirst strike. The war-fighting capabilities of Soviet strategic forces cannot be conveyed by simplified sialic and dynamic comparisons of Soviet and US offensiveoint net assessment of US and Soviet strategic forces was recently published under the direction of lhe Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

arts, lieve


In this NIE we are focusing on the USSR's strategy, pi operations, and capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict as we belies Soviet leaders perceive them. We have emphasized Soviet views on the origin and natureS-Soviet nuclear conflict and how thc Soviets would plan to operate and employ their forces during (lie various phases ofar. There are. of course, major uncertainties about how well the USSR's present or future forces would be able touclear iflicl according to Soviet slratcgy

In evaluating their eapabililies lo accomplish strategic missions, the Soviets differ from us in terms of the operational factors theyhe analytic techniques thev use, and their criteria for success. In this Estimate we have assessed trends in Soviet capabilities in terms familiar to US policymakers and analysts, although these assessments do not necessarily correspond lo those the Soviets would make We do not know how the Sovieis specifically would evaluate their capabilities, and we have limited information pertaining Io how they measure their ability to accomplish strategic missions.

This year we areisting of Key Intelligence Caps (Annex A)ibliography (Annex B) Of particular use in the preparation of this Estimate werehe Soviet Space Program, androspects for Soviet Military Technology

and Research and Development.

- Tap

Thb Estimate is in three volumes;

ontains key judgments alsoutummary of Soviet programs and capabilities believed to be of greatest interest to policymakers and defense planners.

Volume ll contains:

recent developments.

of the Soviets' strategic doctrine and objectives, including their views on the probable origin and natureS-Soviet nuclear conflict.

Descriptions of Soviet programs for the development and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive forces and supporting systems.

Protections of future Soviet strategic forces.

Descriptions of Soviet command, control, and communications capabilities and of indications and warning capabilities, and discussion of the peacetime posture of Soviet strategic forces.

Discussion of Soviet concepts and plans for the operations of strategic forces during the several phaseslobal conflict.

Trends in the USSR's capabilities to carry out some missions of strategic forces in nuclear conflict.

ontains tables with detailed force projections and weapon characteristics.



We have Incorporated new intelligence information and have refined or changed some of our important judgments for this years

Our judgments concerning characteristics and deployment of certain Soviet offensive programs are becoming more firm, largelyesult of new and continued flight-testing and construction of bases and launchers:

Thc Soviets now have flight-tested theirmall-size solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fromiloobile launcher. Wc expect mobile deployment to begin in56 and maybe some silo deploymenthcedium-size ICBM Is continuing flight-testing; we expect deployment to begin in silos innd flight-testingail-mobile version lo begin in4e have also reevaluated the fulure of thendorce; while we expect continued deployment of heavyype, wc are uncertain about the future of theype missile. (Paragraph 3)

Sovieis have also begun flight-testingew subma-rine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMX theiquid-propellant missile with multiple independently target-able reentry vehiclesfollow-on to the MIRVede expect it will begin deployment6 on new, significantlylass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinesfirst such SSBN was launched inParagraph 3)

Sovicls arc preparing Io deploy their new long-range cruise missiles: the air-launchedALCM) will be deployed4 on newombers; some sea-launchedSLCMs) will be deployednd the ground-launchedCI.CM) will probably be deployed5 They are also flight-testing theew, land-atlack cruise missile, with

deployment expected to begin56 on submarines

dedicated lo carry Ihis SLCM. (Paragraph 4)


This year we have added in (huorce projection that assumes continued netcotiations and adherence to numerical force-level constraints of thenterim Agreement and the unratified SALT II Treaty0 We continue to include quantitative measures of Soviet forces configured to conform to tbe US and Soviet arms control proposals, and we compare them with our projections of forces reflecting expansion in the absence of arms control constraints. The Soviets could expand their forces well beyond arms-control-limiled forces, with increases inattack forces fromeployed warheads at present to00 deployed warheads by thc)

We have reevaluated our estimates and there are no* differing agency views of the yields and accuracies of thendCBMs, which lead to differing agency views of Soviet capabilities for attacking US Minuteman silos. All agencies have agreed to carry out further needed work on this key issue.

Wc have expanded our judgments on how the Soviets will operate their strategic forces in. The Soviets will continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initial strikes, while withholding most or ali of the mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes. ALCMs will give Soviet intercontinentaltandoff attack capability and SLCMs will add to thc Navy's capabilities against theater largcls. as well as those in thc United States.)

Imve reevaluated our judgments aboul Soviet efforts to develop nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) detection capabilities. We do not believe thereealistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy inystem that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operating in llie open ocean. Thereow-to-moderate probability that the Soviets could deploy in thcn ASW remote detection system that would operate with some effectiveness if enemy nuclear-poweredsubmarines (SSNs) approached ASW barriers near Soviet SSBN bastions.)

have included new judgments on Soviet direeled-energy capabilities Thereood chance the Soviets willrolotype high-energy space-based laser antisalellite (ASAT) weapon by theimited deployment of an airborne laser is possible bv lhe.

> Sow*.

Wc continue to include antiballistic missile (ABM) judgments lo reflect those inoviet Ballistic Missile Defense. The Soviets are steadily improving their ability to eiercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses in.)

We haveetter understanding of Soviel wartime management concepts and have identified more relocationfor the higher levels of Soviet wartime management,deep underground facilities for the lop


The Soviets continue their vigorous efforts to enhance their capability for strategic nuclear war. Using their extensive military research, development, and production base, they continue to develop, improve, and deploy offensive and defensive weapons of virtually every type, and to improve their war planning and the command, control, and communications capabilities of their strategic forces. The Sovietforce of theillignificantly different character. Its major features will include.

An improved first-strike capability against hardened targets through continued deployment of ballistic missile systems with increasingly better accuracy.

Significantly greater survivability, including more warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missilesnd deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missileshe latter will improve the Soviets' capabilities to use reloadhe largest element of their force capability, however, will continue to be ICBMs in potentially vulnerable silos.

Major improvements in the aerodynamic element of the force through deployment of manned bombers with much better capabilities and long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

Significantly enhanced capability to maintain command,and communications connectivity to all forces,

Enlianced operational flexibility and forcenability.

air defense capability against low-altitude targets. In addition the Soviets could:

Expand their forces well beyond arms-control-limited forces, with increases in intercontinental attack forces fromeployed warheads at present to00 deployed warheads.

idespread antiballistic missile (ABM) defense andirected-energy capability against satellites and possibly against ballistic missiles.

' far on dllrtntit uttw. w* pagt IS ol Kit Ivdgmmii ond vfogioohl .Summary.



Tap Cuu

We estimate? that the Soviets will replace most of the weapons in theit strategic offensive forces with new or modernized weapons by thcCBMs will continue to be the key element of iheir intercontinental strike forces. Their fuiure force structure will include:

An ICBM force composed mostly of: heavy silo-based liquid-propellanl SShich will have been modernized to be more accurate and have more throw weight potential; medium-size solid-propellanteployed in silos and probably on rail-mobile launchers; and smaller solid-propellanteployed mostly on road-mobile launchers, but some may be deployed in silos. Wc have no current evidence for modernizedclass missiles, and we arc uncertain as lo the future of this system. We believe that il will be replaced bv improvednhere is an alternative view that it will be modernized and retained in the force.*

An SLBM force composed moslly of:n Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballisticsubmarinesnd long-range liquid-propeitantnlass SSBNs. These missiles will bea greater extent than thc missiles in the currentmultiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

A bomber force composed of: Blackjacks; Bear H's with air-launched cruise missilesome older bombers; and some new aircraft types beginning deployment.

A new long-range, land-attack cruise missile force composed of:ndea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on submarines;LCMs on bombers; andnd probably^ jGLCMs on ground launchers.

An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) force composed of modernized

We believe that in thehe Soviets will be deploying orimproved versions of most of these weapons


If Soviel strategic force deployments were to expand beyond arms control constraints, we project thai the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would increase byercent fromt the endesulting in0issile warlieads by tireoviel ICBM nnd SLBM warheads, if constrained by the Soviet proposal at lhe strategic

' Tht hokUr pi lhahtttlentr iMdhrttft Attn**.

-*op Swrcf-

reducliori talksould Increase by about one-third over current deployments. Soviet ICBM and SLBM warheads, if constrained by thc US START proposal, would deciease by about one-third from current deployments Although the number of Soviel bombers in our predictions, increases only slightly, the number of bomber weapons increasesin theecause of the large payload of bombs and ALCMs on theomber, and ALCMs on Bear H's. We expect the Soviets to deployong-rangecruise missiles of all types over the nextears. Many of these bomber weapons andndwould, however, be allocated for theater, and not intercontinental, attack. Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces will continue lo be the primaryof lhe intercontinental attack forces

We estimate that the Sovieis will significantly improve theof their strategic defensive forces over the nextears. Weumber of new types of weapons to be introduced and many of lhe older systems to be retired, but we do not predict lhe same massiveof defensive weapons lhal we project for the offensive weapons. Potential future developments in strategic defenses could be of great significance to thc perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the strategic balance. Wc aro particularly concerned about thc growing Soviet potential for widespread deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles well beyond the limits of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty using ABM systems currently in development The Soviets' air defenses are undergoing significant changes, and they will have improvingto threaten current types of bombers al low altitude and,esser extent, cruise missiles There is an alternative view that this Estimate substantially understates the capability of lhe Soviet air defense system to defend key target areas against low-altitude penetrators This view is presented in more detail in the Summary and in volumeccording to another alternative view, the Soviet Union will not have the capability in this decade to deploy strategic defenses thai would significantly affcel the US-Soviet nuclear relalionship '

We see under way significant developments for thc Soviet strategic defenses of:

When completed,6he improved Moscow ABM system will probably consist ofilo-launched Caloshandilo-launched^ ^interceptors.

The Soviets continue construction of large phased-array radars that, to varying degrees, could provide ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and battle managementixlh such radar was delected under construction3 near Krasnoyarsk.

he tole


-*op iveroo-


Sovicls continue lo deploy thenew nll-allltude strategicale slower than we had previously forecast. They arc also developing some newfor use bynits that will increase their mobility. ,

- The Soviets are continuing the development of theystem, which can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and some tactical ballistic missiles. While it is premature to iudge its actual capabilities, this system could alsoapability against some strategic ballistic missiie reentry(RVs).

expect Initial deployment4 of thendf the Flanker, probably with enhanced lookdown/ shootdown capabilities, and initial deployment4 of the Soviets* Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.

Thc Soviets are in the process of upgrading and expanding the ballistic missiie defenses at Moscow within thc limits of the ABM Treaty, and are actively engaged in ABM research and dewebpment programs. We haverojection for the new deployments around Moscow, under thc assumption that the current launcher limits of the ABM Treaty continue to be observed for the nextears. The available evidence docs not indicate with any certainty whether thc Soviets arc making preparations for deployments beyond the limits of theABM launchers alit does show they are steadily improving their ability to exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses in. If the Treaty wereby either the United States or the USSR, wc believe the Soviets would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen their defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of lhe Urals. Widespread defenses could be in place by lher.

Wc iudge thai, in evaluating the technical performance of the ABM systems they could deployore widespread defense, the Soviets probably would not have high confidence in how well these systems would performarge-scale, undegraded US missiie attack, especially in they improved US forces. However, the Soviets would probably view their ballistic missile defenses as having considerable value in reducing thc impactegraded US retaliatory aitack if the USSR sijcceeded in carryingell-coordinated, effective initial strike. Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even if US evaluations indicated they could lie overcome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties



about the potential effectivenessS strike Another view is that the Soviets,idespread deployment, would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to enhance their confidonce in thr? survival of high-value targets, even in thc eventull-scale US attack.1

The Soviets will continue to pursue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies as potential solutions lo the vexing problems of countering US SSBNs and defending their own SSBNs against US altack submarines. We are concerned about the energetic Soviet effort loapability to remotely sense submarine-generated effects. In the last year we have improved our understanding of the nature of the overall Soviet effort^

]]There remain important uncertainties about the full extent and direction of the Soviet program.

Thc Soviets havetrong active sonar technology andariety of modern systems that support point defense, area denial, and SSBN protection but do not provide open-ocean surveillance capability. They still lack effective means to locate US SSBNs at sea Thev lackong-range submarine detection capabililyufficient number of short-range systems to search potential US SSBN patrol areas effectively. They probably are unable, moreover, toS SSBN on patrol for moreew hours even if Ihey delect one.

The Soviets may have the technology in hand to deploy an airborne remote sensortorototype spaccbornclimited ASW capabilities before lhe. We believe that systems that could result from present efforts would have thc most impact on protecting Soviet SSBN bastions againsi encroaching US nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) operatinR at shallow depths. Even if remote sensors work only in favorable waters, tbe Soviets may decide to continue sensor developmenl, begin developmentetection system, and eventually deployystem in order lo defend their SSBNs from Western attack submarines. Soviet nonacoustic ASW detection systems that could be deployed within the nexlears are unlikely to pose any significant threat lo US SSBNs on patrol:

An operational space-based remote sensing system could not be available in less ihanears from lhe slarl of engineering development. This constraint is imposed by Soviel design practices, as demonstrated by numerous developmentThe wide range of continuum experimentation,suggests that the Soviels have not yetensor for engineering development

* Tht fivlilti ol Anht Olitnoi. De-lmtrt,


lop Sectcl

- In view of tlie opCTationtil consideratioiis mentioned, the difficulties in exploiting the basic phenomena, and tlie major advances required in high-speed computing and in sensor and signal-processing technologies, we do not believe there isealistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy inystem that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operating in the open ocean.

ow-to-moderate probability that the Soviets could deploy in thcn ASW remote detection system that would operate with some effectiveness if enemy SSNsASW barriers near Soviei SSBN bastions.

Dirccted-energy weapons potentially could be developed for anti-satellite (ASAT) applications, air defense, battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile defensef tlie three types of directed-energy technologies with potential weaponlaser, particle beam, andis strongest that the Soviets are pursuing development of high-energy laser weapons:

There are two facilitiesoviet test center that arc assessed lo have high-energy lasers and thai have the potential to function as ASAT weapons.

We are concerned about thc magnitude of the Soviet effort in ground-based lasers. There are many unknowns concerning the feasibility and practicality of ground-based laser weapons for ballistic missile defense. Nevertheless, duringe expect the Soviels to test the feasibility of ground-based BMD lasers, using one of their high-energy laser facilities.round-based laser proves feasible and practical inrototype could be tested in. An initial operational capabilily, however, would not be achieved until afler thef the Sovicisisky course ofthis system without building such afew such systems could be operational by the.

The Soviets "could deploy ground-based high-energy laserfor strategic air defense in the. They probably will deploy taclical battlefield lasers lo complement mobile surface to-air missile (SAM) batteries in the.

The Soviets continue to develop an airborne laser, withtesting likely to beginear or Iwo. Its application is

unclear to us. Limited deployment is possible by the.



Tbi- Bunt

- We believe thereigh-percent chance)rototype high-energy space based laser ASAT weapon will be lested in lo* orbit by lhe. The psychological effect of lhe first testpace-based lasereapon-related mode would be greater than the actual military significance ofeapon in its initial application.

llhough space-based weapons (or ballistic missile defense may prove to be feasibleechnical standpoint, such weapons would require significant technological advances In view of the technological requirernenls. we do not expect (he Soviels torototype space-based laser BMD System until ut least ther an operational system until alter the0

The Soviets are expending resources on technologies of critical importance to the development of particle beam weapons (PBWs) The technical requirements forystem,precise pointing and tracking, are severe, and it is unlikely thai Ihe Soviets couldrototype space-based PBW to destroy hard targets like missile RVs before the end of the century, or any earlier5 for an ASAT weapon.

Thereoderale likelihood thai,he USSR willround-based rudiofrequency weapon potentially capable of physically damaging satellites.

Training of Soviet forceslobal nuclear conflict is increasingly broad in scope and complex in the operaUonal factors taken inlo account The Soviets recognize that numerous complications andwould affect planned operations,n the unprece-dentcdly difficult nuclear environment. Thc inherent uncertainties of warfare cannol be eliminated bv training for fighting under various conditions, but thc Soviets believe lhat their ability lo continue to operate effectively in adverse situations would be enha:

The Soviels apparently believeaior nuclear conflict, if it occurred, would be likely lo arise outATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict precededolitical crisis period that could last several weeks or longer. We believe ihey would anticipate aphase as lastingew days to as long as several weeks. Thesee little likelihood that the United Stales wouldurprise nuclear attackormal peacetime posture; we believe It is unlikely that the Soviels would mount such an attack themselves. Key objectives of the Soviets in the conventional phase would be to weaken thc enemy's theater-based and sea-based nuclear capability, while protect ing their own nuclear force.


The Soviets, in our judgment, are unlikely to initiate nuclear conflictimited scale, with small-scale use confined to the immediate combal zone, because they would probably see it as being to

, . "vuiu yiuuauiysla

heir advantage instead io keep the conflict at the conventional level Moreover, they would see the use of nuclear weapons on any scale assubstantia ly increasmg the risks of escalation to strategic nuclear war. We beheve however, that the likelihood of Soviet initiation of nuclear strikes would increase if Soviet conventional forces were facedajor defeatATO counteroffensive into Eastern Europe.

We believe they would see an initial localized use of nuclear weapons as probably being the last realistic opportunity lo avoid large-scale nuclear war. Once large-scale use of nuclear weapons in themminen' cscalalion t0 intercontinental nuclear war

l^dAS 'llCe-scale nuclear conflict increased, Soviet leaders would face the difficult decision of whether to seize lhe initiative and stnke, as would be consistent with their general military

t^ized aver,ing

Tl'fre what

the Sov,ets would actually doarticular set of circumstances

mTciraVatSarCm 'rinal lmpera,ivc t0 moum massive Preemptive

They would be more likely to seize the initiative by launching intercominenta nuclear strikes if the war had already reached the level of small-scale battlefield nuclear use. than if it was still al the conventional level.

We believe they wouldoordinated theater and intercontinental strike if rhcre hadarge-scale theater nuclear strike against the western USSR.

If they acquired convincing evidenceS intercontinental slnke were imminent, they would try to preempt. While we are unable to judge what information would be sufficientlylo cause Soviet leaders loassive preemptive attack wc believe that they would be more likely to act on lhc basis of ambiguous indications and inconclusive evidence of US strike intentionsattlefield nuclear conflict were under way thanrisisonventional conflict.

For reasons such as lack of convincing evidence from their strategic warning systems or fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly initiating mlerconlinenlal nuclear war, the Soviels might notreemptive strike

We believe (he Soviets place considerable emphasis on assessing their strategic offensive capabilities under conditions in which the United States launched the initial major strike. These would include scenarios in which thev were able to launch varying portions of their forces on tactical warning, as well as tlie most stressfulwhich they failed to launch on tactical warning and had toell-coordinated US counlerforce aitack. For llie Soviets, these scenarios would be the most critical in an evaluation of their capabilities-Soviet offensive objectives in carrying out large-scale nuclearregardless of which side initiated thebe to neutralize US and Allied military operations and capabilities- Instrikes the Soviets would seek lo destroy US-based nuclear forces and to disrupt and destroy lhe supporting infrastructure and conlrol systems for these forces as well as the National Command Authority. They would attempt to isolate lite United States from lhe theater campaign by attacking its power projection capabilities. They probably would also attempt to reduce US military power in the long term by anacking other non nuclear forces, US military-industrialand governmental control facilities, although the extent of thc attack on these targets in the initial strikes could vary, depending on lhe circumstances. Limiting lhc initial strikes to only command, control, and communications targets, or toortion of US strategic forces such as ICBM silos, would not be consistent svith the available evidence.

The Soviets probably have plans to reconstitute some surviving general purpose and strategic forces and to occupy substantial areas of Western Europe, while neutralizing the ability of US and Allied nuclear forces to interfere wiih these objectives. They prepare for combat operations that could extend weeksie initial nuclear phase. The Soviets would clearly prefer to accomplish their objectives quickly, but recognize thai lhe later phases could lie protracted, given tho difficulty and complexity of conducting operalions following massive nuclear strikes.

We believe the structure and operalions of Soviet strategic forces will be markedly different bv

A mixed force of mobile and stlo-based system* will enable the Soviet planner ofo continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initialhile withholding most or all of Ihe mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes. Thcof mobile ICBMs will also lead to improved capabilities for ICBM reload, and we expect reload practices for thco he simitar to those for theccording tooviet requirement for additional warheads would be better mcl by deployment of additional missiles on launchers; it is by no means clear that reload and refire


-tee-SecMA f

operations during nuclear war would be less problematic for mobile launchers titan for

introduction of cruise missiles will enhance Sovietcapabilities. ALCMs will give Soviet intercontinentaltandoff attack capability. SLCMs will add to the Navy's capabilities against theater targets, as well as those in the United States.

improve their capabilily to defend against attacks bybombers and cruise missiles, we believe lhe Soviets will alter air defense command operations procedures andimproved communications equipment and data systems in order to belter integrate the operations of their new air defense fighters. Mainstay AWACS aircraft, and SAM systems.

We do not know how the Soviets would assess Iheir prospects for prevailinglobal nuclear conflict. Sizable forces on both sides would survive massive nuclear strikes. The Sovicis have enough hard-target-capable ICBM reentry vehicles today to attack all US missile silos and launch control centersell-executed first strike. In our projections of the growth and modernization of Sovicl ICBM forces, the USSK will have substantially larger numbers of hard-target-capable RVs in the future The projected improvements in Soviet ICBM accuracy, in conjunction with the expected warhead yields and improvements in weapon system reliabilities, willubstantial increase in the destructive potential of future Soviet ICBMs. Wc note, however, that our preliminary estimate of thc yield of thendicates it will have less hard-target capability than was predicted last year.

This year, alternative estimates of currentndeapons accuracies and yields (described in lhe Summary and volume II) lead to differing views of Soviet capabilities for attacking US Minuteman silos:

According to one view, the Soviels currcnlly would plan to launch two (possibly three)rarheads at each US Minuteman silo This view holds that the accuracies and yields are suchwo-on-one atlack would resultest estimate damage expectancy of aboutoercent with today's systems, althoughonsiderable uncertainty range.'

Accordingecond view, continuing reanalysis of accuracies and yields of thenduggests thai lhe Soviels'


capability to achieve their desired damage expectancy is

somewhat lower than previouslyuring the next year, we will he carrying out additional needed analysis on this key issue, including, in particular, further analysis of the accuracies and yields of these Soviet ICBMs.

By thehe Soviet ICBM force is protected to have hard-targei ICBM RVs In sufficient numbers and with enough capabilities to achieve its targeting goalsamage expectancy of overercent) byingle RV to each target. We do not know the number of additional weapons lhe Soviets would allocate to compensate for detectable launch and in-flight failures or losses to enemy counteraction. We believe that they will still be concerned that the US fCBM force would launch alortion of its missiles while under attack.

Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft In flight, or land-mobile missiles, particularly those beyond thc range of tacticalsystems.

Soviet mobile missiles, SSBNs patrolling in waters near lhe USSR,arge part of thc silo-based ICBM force wouldS nuclear attack. Wc believe the Sovieis can bunch ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning and control sysiems are undegraded. However, wiih t'ie increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos during the period of this Estimate, as thc accuracy of US weapons improves, thc Soviets will be faced with more difficult problems in assuring adequate retaliatory capabilities in their critical planning scenario in which they are struck first We believe the Soviets* efforts to expand the capabilities of their command and control network and SLUM force, and lo develop mobile ICBMs. reflect their concerns about maintaining the capability to fulfill the missions of ihcir strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the Soviets are well aware of their inability to prevent massive damage to the USSR with their strategic defenses even with lhe improvements taking place in these forces. Thev also recognize that US strategic defenses cannot prevent massive damage.

During the past few years, we haveetterof Soviet wartime management concepts and have identified more relocation facilities for the higher levels of Soviet wartimemiliiary district, and key regional organizations.^

recent reassessment of deep

ThthUht Uep-tlo I'lr-ni- lot IfleBlfener Centralnta


underground facilities for tlie National Command Authority at Shara-povo arid Chekhov indicates that thev are harder, deeper, and much less vulnerable than previously estimated. For moreecade the Soviets have been expanding and itnproviiiR these sites, but have concealed the extent of their aclivilics.L


Soviets may believe that deep underground structures such as those near Moscow will assure thc survivability of the toppriority objective of their wartime management plans.

We believe thai the Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying the ability of the United Slates and its Allies to command and to operate their forces. Although US attacks could destroy many known fixed command, control, and communications facilities, many elements of the political leadership and military commands piobably would survive, and redundancy in Soviet strategic communications would prevent loss of any one channel fiom disabling lhe overall system. We believe the Soviets would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied strategic command, control, and communications to prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet strategic defenses, and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources lo reconstitute forces.

The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their military forces for thc possibility of having touclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. They have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operationsuclear war. thereby improving their ability to deal with thc manyofonflict, and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR. There is an alternative view that wishes lo emphasize that the Sovieis have not resolved many of the critical problems bearing on the conduct of nuclear war, such as the nature of initiation of conflict, escalation within thc theater, and protracted nuclear this view, the Soviets recognize that nuclear war is so destructive, and its course so uncertain, that they could not expect an outcome that was "favorable" in any meaningful sense.*

The evidence that we have on how the Soviets would plan touccessful miliiary campaign provides insight into how they would seek touclear war on ihcirneulralizing the abilily of US intercontinental and thealer nuclear forces to interfere wiih Soviet capabilities Io prevailonflict in Eurasia.

* I'hi holder ol (Allis the Director. Bureau ol laullitrnet and tlneareli. Derailment ol Stall.



Thc Soviets continue Iheir vigorous cf foils to enhance Iheii capability for stiatesuc nuclear war Using theii extensive military icscarch. developmrnt. and production base, they coniinue to develop, Im-Drove, and deploy offensive and defensive weapons of virtually every type, and to improve their searand the command, eontiol, and communications capabilities of their strategic forces. The Sovielforces of theillignificantly different character. Major features will include:

An Improved first-strike capability againsttargets through continued deployment ol ballistic missile systems wiih increasingly better accuracy.

Significantly greater survivability, including more warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMsX and deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missilesUK-latter will improve the Soviets' capabilities to use reload missiles1 The largest element of their force capability, however, will continue lo be ICBMs in potentially vulnerable silos

Major improvements in lhe aerodynamicol ihe force through deployment of manned bombers wiih much better capabilitiet and long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

Significantly enhanced capability to maintain command, conirol, and communicationsto all forces

Enhanced operational flexibility and force suslalnahility.

Enhanceddefense capabilitylow-attitude targets

In addition the .Soviets could:

tneir forces well beyond arms-control limited forces, with increases in intercontinentalees fiomeployedal present to00 deplored warheads

Fa an allnnau wru. Mm parajnaiJt 7t

idespread antiballistic missile (ABM) defense andircctcd-cnergy capability aealnst satellites and possibly againsi ballistic

A. Offensive Force Developments

2 We estimate that the Soviels will replace most of lhe weapons In Iheir strategic offensive forces wiih new or modernized weapons by thehese weapons are now being deployed, are in flight-testing, or are in preflight development, and wc believe we have identified most of them. In many cases, however, we may notood knowledge of Iheir characteristics

Ballistic Missiles

ew systems that willajor part of tbe Soviet ballistic missile force ofre now be inn lested or deployed:

TheLBM became operationalhis solid neopellant missile, armed withindependently targctable reentry vehicles* carried on the Typhoon nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Two Tvphoor^SSlsNs have been launched so far

The Soviets continue Ihe flight-listing of Iwo new solid propellant ICBMs. The MIRVediotic similar in sue lo Peacekeepers going io be deployed in silos, probablyinhemaller missile similar in siae lo Minuteman andingle reentry vehicle (RVJ. ii going to bo deployedoad-mobile system beginning In56 and ntuv be deployed In some5 These missiles are expectedto replace and assume the missions of the eiisting Soviet medium and light ICBMs. with the possible erception of thc

Soviets began nightew SLBM. Ihe3arge




liquid-propellant S[ I'M thai will6 oa new. significantlylaufirst such SSBN was launched in

We also have ideniilied evidence of olher develop men! program! (or ballistic missile* trial could be deployed In thend:

A follow on to ihc heavyCBM. wiih improved accuracy and improved range or throw weight capability ll piohnbly will begin flight-testing in5 and replace the currenteginning in7 An ahernalive view hold* lhalissile would more likely be flight-tested In0 and deployedutedith improved accuracy will be tested soon and would be deployed beginning in'

le llleltnre AreecF. endth,ChUf ofSta<f.r^.itnrn, o) 'hr Ali Font

A rail-mobile version ol thehatwill begin Ilight-testing45

A follow-on to thentermediate- rinsemissilerobably bated on thcooster, with Improved accuracy andthrow weight It probably will begin flight-testing

On the hniis of pan trends and limited evidence, we piotect improved veiilons of thend SS-NXill be llight-tcstod in the, and they potentially will have increated throw weight and Improved accuracy. In addition, wc protect, without ipecilic evidence but on the basis of our knowledge ol Soviet wcaponi development practices, thai improved venions of ihcS,ollow-on. andollow-on will be deployed beginning in then alternative view holds that improvr-



lo lhcill probably be developed and ^deployed during ibe period of thi* Eilimale. Thb view

""fcroiects anIaa missile lo be developed (or deployment in the

Bombers and Cruise Missiles

y thche SovieU willignificantly different bomber forceong-range. Land-attack: cruUe missile force

They will deploy4 their tint long-range, land-attack, air-launched cruise missile (ALCMX the. This rnissile has an estimated rangem, file* at low altitude und subsonic speeds, and could have an accuracyeters

The5 is going to bo deployedew version of the Bear bomber, thehe Bear H'l are being newly manufactured, and we have identifiedroduced through the end of

Soviets continue (light-testing theirintercontinental bomber, theA. The Blackjack,:similar in appearanceUSBint probably willand ALCMs. Byost ofBear and Bison bombers will have

Soviets will also deployea-launched cruise missile (SLCMX theith characteristics simitar to those of thehean be deployed on several types of submarines Likely candidates for SS-NXeployment areII-ctas* nuclear -powered "Hack submarinehelasslau SSNs. andasa SSN reconfiguredlass SSBN.

ground launched cruise missilehe SSOXimilar in characteristic* lo lhend Ihcs probably going lo5

' ThtUr/mteAgency.

3We Whw* therehance oi token deployment ofT

response" to US irilermcdiaie-rariBc nuclear force (INF) deploy-

The Soviets are night-testing another type of long-ranae. land-attack cruise mlssiJe.Q


first deployed onlnssguided-missile submarinelasswill be deployed laterew classwc have not yet identified-probably begin56LCM vrrrsiorifbegin deployment5 orThe Soviets continue toewon the Candid transport airframe.willultipurpose roledefensive, and naval forces at well asstrategic bomber force. They willCandid tankers in

We peoicct. on thc basis of our understanding of tlse Soviets' developmental process, that they will (light-test and deploy improvedmore accurate and harder to detect Iniheir new cruise missiles in thend, and will continue to improve and modernize their bomber force.

efensive Force Developments

5 Wc estimate that lhe SovieU will significantly improve tlie capabilities of Iheir strategic defensive forces over thc neatears. Wcumber of new types of weapons to be introduced and many of the older systems to be retired, but we do not predict the same massive replacement of defensive weapons lhal wc protect (or lhe offensive weapons We have detected llie deployment or (light-lcsting of most of ihese defensive systems


Tlie Soviels areixth lame pftsied-airay radar in the east-central USSR near Kiasnovarik. It is very similar lo the radars at Pechoraaki that lhc Soviets have declared lo bo for ballUlic missile early naming,dentical lo tbe large phased -array radar under const ructioc at Sarysbagaa- Unlike1 at Pechora and Uyikl. the one nearoi on tbe periphery of the USSR and Is not oriented outward (see figurehe Soviets have Stated that the ladar near Krasnoyarsk Is ipeaslly designedintended to track objects In outer space and not for

ballistic nucule early warningconclude, however.

lhal lhe Kiasmyarsk radar it designed and Intended lo have capabilities for balllitlc missile del.-cllon and

Hacking, similar to the. lance radars, and is

not intended primarily for space Hacking.

Tbe Soviets are continuing development efforts that give them the poteniial for widespread ABM deployments during tlie period of this Estimate

- The Soviets continue to deploy lhenew all altitude strategic airate slower ihan we had previously forecast. Wc Iiave detectedites deployed or underThey aie also developing some nr*

vehicles for use bvnits that will increase their mobility.

The Soviets are continuing the developmentactical surface-to-air missile (SAM)*sysiem. theystem, wllh two dilferent types of missiles This system can engage conventional aircraft, cruise missiles, and some tacticalmissiles Deploymenl will probably begin Ineriod Whileremature to iu dge ils actual capabilities, this system could alioapability against some strategic ballistic missile RVs.

The Soviets continue to develop aboutypes of air defense early warning and ground-controlled Intercept radars, which will have tow-elUtude capability, resistance to jamming, and capability In operate on diverse frequencies.

Defensive Aircraft

c also observe continuing developments to improve (he fighter-interceptor capability of Soviet air


Soviets will begin deploying the4 and lhe Flanker4hese aircraft will have enhanced loobdown/shoot-down capabilities over currently deployedand will be equipped with their-to-air missile

Sovietso begin deployment4 ol their Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft

Directed-Energy Systems

Soviels are continuing developments insystems that will allow ihem to deploy some limited capability by thend have nl Iter systems in lesting. This could enhance tlie Soviet air defense, antisatellite, and ballistic missile defenses innd beyond. (Sec paragraphor details)

C. Soviel Strategic Policies ond Doctrine

concept of its relationship wiih the Unitedundamentally adversarial Thisbased un ideological antagonism nnd geopolitical rivalry governs Soviel behavior and aho shapes Soviet perceptions of US policies loward Moscow. Its most

-res 4'm-frtii-

Figure 4

F-slimaied Arimuihai CoveraBe of BallisfJc Missile Delecfion and TracWnc Radars


phaseo-anayruei construction i Hen House 'adi'Sog House and Cat Moose 'Jdstidji


-Top-Semi -

dramatic manifest*lion is growing Soviet military power and capabilities. Thesee cutting edee c! the USSR's persistent efforts lo extend its global presence and influence at the eipense of the United States and the West Soviet leadeis view strategic arms policy in the contestersistent, long-term struggle betwo world systems of socialism andin whichMoscow Indestined ultimately tu triumph. From their viewpoint, progress in this struggle is measured by favorable shifts in the overall "correlation ofeconomic, social, and miliiary. They seek through strategic and olher military progiams toshilling lhc military component of thcof forces in favor of the USSR and its allies- They recogniie that militaryheir principal foreign policy asset and thai continued high levels of defense investments are necessary to sustain and expandglobal role.

hc Soviets believe that In tbe present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possessesnuclear capabilities thai could devastate the other aftei absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have slated that nuclear war with the United States wouldatastrophe that must be avoided If possible and Lhat they do not regardonflict as inevitable. They have been willing lo negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when il serves their interests. Nevertheless, ihey regard nuclear warontinuing possibility and have resectedesirable or permanent basis lor lhe US-Soviet strategic relationship. They seek superiorlo fight anduclear war with the United States, and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing inenet in their stiategic thinking holds that Ihe better ptnpared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more likelyhai potential enemies will be deterred from initiating attacks on llie Soviet Union and its allies and wdl be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military act long

he changing of the leadership in Moscow is unlikely to have any adverse effect on thein the USSR's stralegic forces- Nee do we believe that domestic economic difficulties will bear significantly on the she and composition of lulure Soviet strategic forces because of the high priority the Soviets place on such forces. Most likely thev will deploy most, if not all, of the offensive and defensive

weapons we have identified in the previoui sections, with the possible eiecption of some of the directed-energy weapons, in order lo increase the overall effectiveness ol their strategic forces They view their current strategic position as supporting the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the continuedof Soviet power and influence abroad The Soviets understand the poliiical importance of world pcrcep-lions of their miliiary power, and Soviet leaders have long stressed lhe contribution of stralegic forces lo the USSR's superpower status. We believe ihey areto prevent anya result of thc US strategic modernization efforts oi those of their other potentialthe military gains llie USSR has made over the past ilecade.

D. Future Stroiegic Forces

Our quantitative projections of Soviet strategic forces in the neit three years are based brgely on evidence of ongoing programs During thbprimarily because of lhe Soviets' military planning and acQuistlioiiis unlikely that ihey would significantly alter planned deployments. Over the longer term, however, we beheve ihey have annumber of options in deciding oo lhe sire, mix, and characteristics of their strategic nuclear forces and supporting systems. Our quantitativefor five toears from now are based on evidence retarding these options, as well as curof Soviet priorities, as noted earlier

Fundamental lo the option! the Soviets have for the composition of their futureheir vigorous military research and development and production base. Their research efforts, coupled with technology acquired from the West, have provided them with suffielenl advances in military technologies to enable them lo develop increasingly sophisticated weapons and supporting interns Toe pace and the overall quality ol the Soviets* future weapons programs will dependarge degree on iheir ability to develop and exploit new technologies, including those acquired from tha West

Strategic Olfensivo Forces

ur projections of Soviet strategic attack forces over the nextears represent broad tiendi and should not be considered precise forecasts Our force protections are drawnarge body ol evidence



Soviet weapon development programs and data on Soviet testing, production, and deployment practices. This year we have projected five alternative strategic offensive forces.orce based on the assumption lhat, while no formal arms control agreements arc concluded, negotiations continue, and the Soviets choose not to expand Iheir forces beyond thc quantitative limits set bynd SALT IIheir strategic fotces. however, areimproved by replacement of older systems with newer ones. The force is modernizedace reasonably consistent with that of thc lastears. Two force options,ndhow our estimates of the direction, scope, and pace of expansion that Soviet forces could take In the absence of any arms control constraints The Soviet proposals at thearms reduction talks (START) and at tlie INF negotiations are represented in Force A, and thc US START and fNF proposals in Force 5.

ur projections indicate that, throughout the projection period, ICBMs will be the largest element of the Soviet strategic offensive forces forattack.hows thc mix of warheads in lhe current Sovicl force and,n Forcec

believe the following will be major features of any3 Soviet force:

silo-based ICBMs, butoad- and rail-mobile ICBMs. ,

Probably no significant change in the number of SS-losut thc current missiles will be replaced with ones having increased accuracy and greater potential throw weight.

There are uncertainties about Soviet plans to improve theCBM and retain il in thc force in. Wc believe it likely that the Soviets will begin lo phase outn thcnd. beginning in the, replace them with anollow-on. There is an alternative view that the Soviets will flight-test modernizednd retain this system In their forces, rather than replace it wllh theollow-on.'

Increased capability to reload and refire with mobile ICBM launchers.*

' The hctdei ol lhaht BWiWt. Defeiue Intelligence Agency

' For on alitmnw Htu, tee



improved SLBM force consisting largely ofOs andiih subtUntially more RVi than today and with tome possibly having terminal guidance for accuracy toard-target capability

--Deploymenl of aboulbckjacks and aboutoear II bombers

ong range land-atliick cruise missiles deployed on aircraft, submarines, and land-based launchers.

In addition, we eipect Soviet deploymentRBM launchen. most of them equipped with thoollow-on missile,

ll of the protections assume that the Soviets do not lake detectable actions Inconsistent with the tenm of thenterim Agreement and key provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty, at least throughll thc forces are thus nearly identical56owever, the proiections diverge, reflecting evidence that the Soviets have an expanded number of options in deciding the sue, mix. and characteristics of their nuclear forces and support ing systems and In tailoring their forces to specific arms conirol environments.

orce I. This force is based on thc assumption that, while no formal arms control agreements are concluded, negotiations continue, and the Soviels choose not lo expand their fotces beyond thelimits set bynd SALTlevels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles IRVed missiles, SSBNs. andllhough the strategic forces are substantially improved bv repbccmenl of older systems with newer ones We cannotudgment as to the likelihood lhal, In Ihe absencoormal offensive arms conirol agreement, the Soviets would develop force* along the lines of Forces compared with expanding their forces along lhe line* ofrhelhat would affect ihese options include the likelihood ol continuing arms control negotiations and (he overall state of tlie US-Soviet reblionship. This force assumes, wiih no formal agreeirieril reached, some expansion beyond ihese limits in lhc, as the Soviets retain older MIRVed missile systems rather than voluntarily retiring them There is an alternative view thai it is unlikely thc Soviets would

maintain iheir force growth within these arms control constraints for such an eitended peitud of limeagreements In effect *

orcehis forceteady upgrade of the strategic attack forces SALT numerical limits aie noi exceeded throughfter which the Soviets begin lo eipand beyond arms conirolDeployment rales are consistent withevidence on ongoing and new programs and with recent trends in deploymenl rates and force composi-uon.

orcen generul, this forceigher Level of effort thann the areas of production, deploymenl, and, in some cases,achievement The differences between this force andeflect our uncertainties about Ihe technological choices and liiprovcmcnl* that Ihe Soviets might make, their potentiallevels for some new systems, and the Soviets' own evaluation of iheir potential offensivesaximum effort, and Is not the upper bound for either technological orpotential, but wouldubstantially greater commitment of resources than Force 2

ooitt START and INF. This forceon our understanding of tho Soviet STARTpositions Because there are alternativeseveral key issues, we have had lo be selectivethe criteria for tlte forces. Wc assumeproposal would allow the deployment ofmusiies they are now testing and thistheir deployment.

S START and INF. Ourthis foice assume that Ihe United States andnegotiateTART and an INFon tbe US negotiating positions Ais lhat the Soviets adhere to the SALTSALT II numerical limitations untilthen begin to reduce iheir forces to meet thelimils of lhe US proposab. Tho US zeroproposal would require destruction of allIRBMs and long-range CLCMs withinThe US START proposal would requireof Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces For

TV heMni of ihuore ike Dveeiv. Defeat* lnietUtet'e AflfrMW,e IXreriaeNavalOevarl-unl ol Ihe Nsm*

-Tap Sowar


purposes ol ihcsc projections we assumed that required reductions would have hi be complctecl3

Ouonlitative Indexes lor Soviet Strategic Ollensive Forces

eptoued ICBM* end SLBMs. Figure 6the trends in the numlier of deployed Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs that result from our various force projections The trends projected do not showgrowth in thc numbers of Ihese the largest growth, aboutercent, duearger number of mobile ICBM launchers andof more silo-based ICBMs. The significant change ins not in launchers but In reentry vehicles {See) Thc Soviet STARTreflected in Forceeduces these launchers from Ihe current total by aboutercent, while the

US START proposal reduces them by aboutct-cent

he projected aggregate throw weight of the missile force is shown inhe throw weight3 increases in,yndercent over that of the current force. This increase is due lo the number of missiles and lhe improved technological perforrnance wein ihe various Soviet missile developmentTlse Soviet proposal, as represented by Forceould resultpcrcent decrease in throw weight. The US START proposal, as represented by Forceould reduce the throw weight by aboutercent, because of the decreased number of missiles and the constraints on the number of medium and heavy ICBM.

hows lhe numbers of RVs on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs (Including online and

Figure 6

Deployed Soviel ICBMs and33


lntribni. differing net. in jwipipM Hit.







Tap tiwrt

Figure 7

Throw Weight of Deployed

Soviet ICBMs andJ3

launchen)' Forces I,how large increases in the number of RVs over lhet the endrom aa low aso as highercent Thesegreater in percentace than the Increase infrom the deployment of larger numbers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and from the increased numbers of BVj on some of these missiles. The Soviet proposal, as in Forceould result in an increase of about one-third over Ihe current force. The US START proposal, as in Forceould reduce tho number of such warheads toone-third less than in the current force. Also shown inre the protected num-bers of ballistic missile RVs-almost all on ICBMs-

e boramd

n bwsrhanhal ai. boraso.wUy mull, bul Iih* on be iWiom Trr-cally.ercentM IIM lo.oc i, oJ(|

UlliniU ol online and offline weapons

capable of destroying hardhe trends are similar to those for total RV, The number of highly JurvivableSLBMi and mofaile ICBMs-is eipected to increaseercent for Soviet forces not constrained by arms control and increase byercent under the START proposals It slmuld be noted that Soviet slio-based missiles will continue to carry the majority of ballistic missile warheads, except under the US START proposal.

ombers. The Soviet bomber force ispected lo change much in overall sire; new bombers wb as theill enter the force as older

sr ol gsfe EaUauSt,aaMbu ittnt Outejaagagln hwdrred lo .lihil.nJ aa

lystam idi.bilii, and Ihr rlfccli ol niemr irtiVE defense* are not

toniiilntnl in llie nlcnliiinn



bomben such aj the Bison are phased out Ai shown in figureowever, there willubstantia! increase in the number of weapons carried by the new Black jack A. the Bear II. and the Backfire (Other strategic boml>ers. of lesser range, are not shown) Tlie largest increase,ercent, is inhe in creases are due mostly to the AI .CM-carryingof thend Bear H. Both START lorces show increases ofercent in these weapons It is also important to note that, because some aircraft of the strategic bomber forceaior theater attack role, many of these weapons would be allocated for theater, and notaitack. ICBMs and SLBMs will continue to be thc primary dements of the intercontinental attack forces.

rimehe Soviets are projected to begin deploying long-range land-attack cruise missiles on aircraft and submarines4 and on ground

launcheri5 As shown ine protect that, in Forces. andruise missile deployments would reach levels ofmostly ALCMs) bv thche Soviet proposals ban CLCMs ami SLCMs entirely, while" under thc US START and INF proposals, with only CLCMs limited, the numbers in our projection would ba.

S-JOi and CLCMi- Figurehows our pfujrctions for the total number of Soviet land-based INF missiles and warheads deployed in the SovietIhc European area as well as thc Fur East. The number of deployedaunchers Is protected lo increaseevel. similar to. or somewhat higher lhan, the number ofndauncher; cunentlv deployed. We expectLCMs would be deployed. The number of warheads, those on deployed missiles as well as those on refire mtulles. Is eipected to increase

Figure 9

Deployed Wjrticad* on Selected Soviet33



v 1 ciitmilcd


1 hi J

tit >


h v4 m .mm .if. i. pw aae Hmtmfp




Figure 10

Deployed Soviet long-Range Land-Attack Ctuive



i-di li law. i

lair *

(Savin STAHT. INf praphih)




over today's warhead totals, by lhe.


Soviet* intend to reloadiome ICBM laurschenjpr refito operationi According i0 an alternative

he indusiori of ICBM refire in Soviel war plans' We know that the USSR prc-Juces more ICBMi lhan needed for deployment inlauncheri. In (he course of deployment,ICBMs are manufactured for use in crew-Irainlng launches and as maintenance spares Some, of these reserve missiles could be available for refiie(_

FA* hoUU, ol ihu oKwUihtuna* ol ImloOtttnto enrf

the number of reserve

ICBMs available^

viet misEle productionhowever, appears large enough to supportlevels beyond one rrussile per launcher plus those for testing, maintenancend training An alternative view holds that there is no evidence lohange in the judgment from lasl year's IJlimaie. that the Sovietseserve force lhat Includes ICBMs produced as maintenance sparci and as training missiles and that also contains additional ICBMs produced as refire missile* "


Thtl ihu trtuAe tXrrrfw. fWrw Inu<ll#*t4 Areiwy



vidence indicates the Soviets plan to usemissiles lor refire fromaunchers^

Jwe believe the number ol reserve missiles available for refire today probably amountsercent of live number oleployed

Strategic Defensive Forces

he Soviets will continue to modernize and expand their strategic defensive forces during thc coming decade. Much of the effort will be devoted to

countering low-altitude penetrating aerodynamicand standoff weapon carriers and to defenses againsi be Ihll ic missile iv-stems

allitlie Missile Dejtnte. Thc,SovieU are in thc process of upgrading and expanding Ihr ballistic missile defenses at Moscow within the launcher limits of the AHM Treaty, and are actively engaged in ABM research and development programs We haverotection for the new deployments around Moscow, under the assumption lhat the current launcher limits of the ABM Treaty continue lo be observed for the neatears. We havo also described, in volume II, four deployment options for ballistic missile defenses thai represent different paths the Soviets could follow, beyond the current limits of the ABM Treaty The available evidence docs not indicate with anywhether the Sovieis are making preparations for deployments beyond the limits of theABM launchers atit does show thev are steadily improving their ability to eiercise options for dcploi rr.cnt of widespread ballistic missile defenses inf the Treatyabrogated by diher thc United Stales or the USSR, we believe Ihe Sovieis would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to Strengthen iheir defenses at Moscow and cover key targe's in lhe weslern USSR, and lo eitend protection to key targets east of the Ural* Widespread defenses couldlace by tirer, as shown In figure

e fudge that, in evaluating the technical performance of the ABM sysiems ihey could deployore widespread defense, the Soviets probably would not have high confidence in how well ihese systems would performarge scale, unde-giadcd US missile attack, especially iu they Improved US foices However, the Soviets would probably view iheir ballistic missile defenses ai having considerable value In reducing Ihe impactegrad ed US retaliatory attack if the USSR succeeded in carryingell-coordinated, effective? initial strike Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even If USindicated thev could be overcome by anforce, would complicate US attack planning and create ma roe uncertainties about thcS strike. Another view is ihat the Soviets,idespread deployment, would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to chance their


Figure 12

Potential Soviet ABM Deployment: Nationwide Defense of Key Target Areas'




n6 lit


*HPl If tl t

- AviAflihiiImmu Tmii llniu tniil HIS Don no ntitKiiitHwtl it- tmmn dun

ItfnXWOl bLittlriBC

fill. I



ipalfttfl'n;nil 9 in!

confidence in llie survival of high-value targets, even in the eventull-scale US altack."

hereumber of situations involving ABM Treaty revisions, abrogation, or withdrawal initiated bv the United States or thecould result in Soviet deployment of ABMs beyond current

" The hota'ei of ihunr Direrefenie Inielligeiiee Aeencu

Treaty limits Al present, the Soviets apparently value thc ABM Treaty for both political and militaryihey are probably concernedajor US commitment to lelltslic missile defense. We do notoviet initiative to revise, abrogate, orfrom the ABM Trealy within the nexl severalecision by lhe Soviets on whetlier toidespread ABM system would be based primarily on thc answerrucial question: Will (lie USSRufficiently threatening slrategic situation in thend beyond against which an expanded ABM defense based on Soviet systems now In testing and development wouldignificant difference? If thc answer is yes, the Soviets would probably make thc commitments necessary lo deploy such defensestlie economic and political costs. But. because their answer probably would not be clear-cut. other important factors could influence their decisionnondeployment

Thewo-trackcontrolilitarylo funher its stralegic goals has achieved limits on US delivery vehicles and constrained US defense, while permitting expansion ol Soviet offensive lorces.

Under Ihe Treaty lhe USSR has ABM defenses to protect critical targets in lhe Moscow area while the United Stales has chosen not to deploy ABMs

The Soviets apparently see lhe Treaty as having slowed US ABM research and developmenl. while thev moved ahead with their own

n balance, we believe therealrly low, but rieverlheless significant, chance (abouthat lhe Soviets will abrogate the Trealy and deploy ABMs in aicess of Treaty limits Ine believe Ihey would see the miliiary advantages ot the defenses they could deploy as being outweighed by the disadvantages riled above, especially of energizing the United States and perhaps ils Alliesapid and sustained growth in overall military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, that could lead to an erosion inf Soviet gains achieved in

n alternative view notes that Soviet benefits from the Trealy. under current and protected(ai outweigh lhe poteniial gainsesult, the likelihood of abrogation is considered in this view to he veryercent or

Isss) liit current condition! change surntanlially The holder of thb view caution),thai lhe Sovietsceivationidesptcad ABM system lo fill lhe serious cap in theii defenses, and Ihcreigher probability ofeployment in. Moieover. they have thc capability to completeeployment Iuew years, as illustrated In"

nother alternative view holds lhat Ihe Soviets are unlikely to abrogate the ABM Trealy during, because (he conditions that led to Sovietof thethc perception of lhe potential for US technological and manufacturing eapabililies to outstrip Ihose of thepertain; thc political costs of abrogation, particularly inEurope, wouldurther restraining factor; and. finally, the Soviets wiU not have the capability to deploy during this decade ABM defenses thai could significantly alter thc US-Soviet strategic nuclear

nother view holds that the crucial question for Soviet leaders is whether deployment of AIIMs is required to attain Soviet strategic objectivesto this view, the following factors should be given greater weight in induing Soviet motivationsidespread ABM defense Sovielrequirements for damage-limiting capability have always provided the motivation to deploy ABMs both al Moscow and elsewhere Now.esult of advances bv the USSR In ABM techrsology. the USSR's counierfofce advantage over the United States, and US plans to deploy survivablc and liard-larget capable ballistic missiles, tlie Soviets may no lonjtei deem II necessary to restrain themselves from further ABM deployment. They have taken essentially all the steps necessary lo prepareecision lo deploy and liave demon tinted confidence in their current ABMbv deploying the new ABM system at Moscow The Sovieis may be eipecled to accompany any widespread ABM deployments with ancampaign lo manipulate Western attitudes and actions and to inhibit energizing thc United Stales and its Allies intoapid growth in miliiary

- TV UieW ol it*. Onwnvu of Ihtf ihuht Dtmtor. hire* ol reJeAeinv*

ondrvonmrnl ol Halt.

capabilitiei. The holder of this view believes il Is not possible with current intelligence data lo evaluate and Quantify with confidence the ealenl lo which variow factors would influence lhe SovieU to abandon oi retain Ihe ABM Treaty. However, In'view of thc preparations the SovieU have made and the fact that the motivations discussed above wrongly influence Soviet deenionmaking, the main teat may have under-staled llie piospeel for widespread ABM deploy

idespread Soviet ABM deployment by thcrould give the USSR an important Initial advantage over the United States in this area. We have major uncertainties about howoviet ABM system would function, and lhe degree ol protection lhat future ABM deploymcnu would alford thc USSR. Despite our uncertainties about its potential effectiveness,eployment would have an important effect on thc perceptions, and perhaps the reality, of the US-Soviet strategic nuclearAccording to an alternative view, the Soviet Union wilt not have Ihe capability in this decade to deploy ABM defenses that wouldffect thc US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship."

ooief Forces for Air Defense. Ourfor Soviet air defense forces are contained in volume Ul and described in volume II. chapter IV Although these projections contain differing views off some specific weapon systems, the thrust of the projections ts lhal the Soviets will have deployed significant number* of weapons with low-altilude air defense eapabililies. These weaponsthendAMs. ihe Foshound. Fulcrum, and Flanker aircraft, aod the Mainstay AWACS aircrafl. Deployment of small numbois of ground-based high-energy Users for strategic airis projected to begin In the.

Tht holder ol ihuhtefense initilttetue


Thr holder of ihlx iW li iht IXtttior. Baitsu of hltlllgence unit Heiea'eh. Dtinnmeni of Siaie.


Wc x* lhe possibility of additional dcvelopcoenli by the early to.ew airframe lor AWACS. deploymenlew long-rangeand Improvedapabilities against small radar-cross-sention vehicles such as cruise missiles. War/art. The Soviets have been faced with Ihe threat from US SSBNs and SSNs for almosiears The need to counter Western SSBNs and prnteel their own SSBNs has motivated thc Soviets' vigorous pursuitn acoustic and nonacoustic ASW Tbcy havetrong active sonar technology andariety of modern systems that support point defense, area deni al. and SSBN protection but do not provide open-ocean surveillance capability They still bear effective rmans to locate US SSBNs at aea They lackong range submarine detection capabilityuffi cient number of short-range systems lo searchUS SSBN patrol areas effectively. They probably arc unable, moreover, toS SSBN on patrol for moreew hours even if ihey detect coe.

he Soviets will continue to pursue vigorously all ASW technologies as potential solutions to lhe vexing problems of countering US SSBNs andtheir own SSUNs against US attack submarines. We arc concerned about thc energetic Soviet effort toapability to remotely sense submarine gcneraied effects from aircraft or spacecraft. In the last year we lave improved our urtderstanding of tl* nature of the overall Soviet effortf"

remain important uncertainties about the fulTe>tent and direction of tin: Soviet program

The Soviets have been conducting ASW research wiih airborne nonacoustic sensors since

^Sorne of thb effort is directed toward future *tvace-based ASWoviet tests have increasingly emphauicd space-based sense* development, and both aiihornc and sraccborne dala collect nm supporl the development of basic phenomenolog-ieal models and submarine delcclabllitv assess-

meats The evidence indicates the Soviets are still in the applied research phase, including Ihe development and testing of subsystemsand have not yel begun developmentemote detection system for ASW!


"^the Soviets have conducted brge-scale eipcrimcnii involving airborne and space-borne remote sensors, surface combatants, occau-rcscaich ships, and target submarines.


jJMost of Ihis activity has occurred near the Soviet Pacific coast in an area that favors signaland detection. Even if airborne or ipaceborne remote sertsort work only in favorablehe Soviets may decide to continue sensor development, begin developmentetection system, anddeployystem in order lo defend their SSBNs fiom Western attack submarines. At this stage In their development. Soviet remote sensors would belo high false-alarm rates under the best of conditions and probably would not work when ocean conditions deteriorate ia these areas It -J! be difficuli for the Soviets to achieve sensor and signal-processingnecessary to overcome the unfavorable signal-io-noMe ratio and high false-alarm rates. In any case. US SSBNs as ihey operate loday are not endangered by the remote sensors cuirently being tested bv the Soviets. The Soviets may have the technology in hand to deploy an aiiborne remote sensortorototype ipacebornelimited ASW capabilitiesthee believe that systems thai could rctuli from present efforts would have the mosl Impact on protecting Soviet SSBN bastions againsi encroaching US SSNs operating at shallow depths.

oviet nonacoustic ASW detection systems that could be deployed within the nextears are unlikely to pose any significant threat lo US SSBNs on patrol

An operational .pace based remote sensingcould not be available in less thanears

(torn the start ol engineering deveioprnent. Thb constraint is Imposed by Soviet leslgnemonstrated hy numerout develop.iw.ntThe wide langc of continuing capciiiMert tation, howovet. suggest* that the Soviets have not yetensor for engineering development

view of the operations! considerations men-lloned. the difficultieslotting the basic Phenomena, and tbe major advances required in high-speed computing and in senior and signal-Piocessing technologies, wc do not believe Iheieealistic possibility that the Soviets will be able to deploy inystem that could reliably monitor US SSBNs operating in the open ocean.

n moderate probability that lhe Soviets could deploy in then ASW remote detection system that would operate wtth some effectiveness if enemy SSNs approached ASW barriets near Soviet SSBN bastions.

nergv Weapons, Dlrected-eneigy weapons potentially could be developed for(ASAT) applications, air defense, battlefield use. and. ia the longer term, ballistic mimic defense (BMD) Of the three types of dirccted-energywitb potential weaponlaser, particle beam, andis strongest lhat the Soviets aie pursuing development of high-enetgy laser weapons. Wetheyrogram to develop laser weapons, although thc full scope, concepts of weaponand status are not clear. The Soviets have the expertise, manpower, and resources to develop those directed-energy weapon and miliury support systems that prove to be (eastbio:

There are two facilities at Saryshagan that are assessed to have high-energy lasers and that have thc potential in function as ASAT weaponi

There are many unknowns concerning lhe feost-btlily and practieahty of ground-based laser wear*om. however, fee ballistic mioale defense Wc do not know, foe cample, how ihe Soviet, would handle llie problems ol heavy cloud covei prevalent in many areas of the USSR containing

facilities lhe Soviets want lo protect Ncverthe-leu. we arc concerned about the magnitude of the Soviel effort in groundlasers. It would be comitfcnl with Soviet philosophy andtoeapon svslcrii even If its capability were limited under some conditions There are large uncertainties in any estimate of whenoviet laser weapon could beWe eipect the Soviets to lest duringhe feasibility of ground based lasers for ballistic missile defense, using one of their high-energy laser facilities at Saryshaganround-based laser proves feasible and practical inrototype could be tested in. An initial operational capability, however, would noi be achieved until after thef the Sovieisisky course ofIhis system without building afew such systems could be operational by the carly-lo-

The Soviets arclgh-encigy laser weapon for strategic air defense lhat could be deployedround-based version In lhcnd possiblyaval version in thehe Soviets will probably deploy tactical battlefield lasers to complement mobile SAM batteries in the. these systems will be of low power and probably primarily intended lo cause electro-optical damage.

Thc Sovieti conlinuc to develop an airborne laser, wiih airborne testing likely to beginear or two Limited deployment Is possible by tbc. The missions aie difficult to determine, but could include ASAT. protection ol high-value airborne facilities, and ciuisedefense

Soviet researchroject to develop laser weapons lor use inpace-based, high-energy laser weapon offers options not available with ground- or air-based systems Space-based bser weapons might be employedariety of missions. pMentially ioduding ASAT. BMD.and ground target engagements. As an ASATpace-based later would have significant advantages over tlie convenlionalASAT interceptor in thai II would have

Jtap taaaa*.

muhishot and long-range capabilities. Il would alio be likely Iureater capacily lo overcomedefensive measures, such as mirwuvrnrm and decoy deployment We espect lo wc laser wcajon componeuls leslcd on manned spacecraft; however, unmannedseem belief suited as platforms fordirected-energy weapon*

belseveigh-percent chance)rototype high-energy space-based laser ASAT weapon will be tested In low orbit by the. The psycrsologJcal effect of the first testpace-based lasereapon-related mode would be greater Ihan thc actual military significance ofeapon in Its initial application. Developmentpace-based User for antisatellite application isdifficult, and we arc uncertain as to lhe approach the Soviets would lake One candidate for ii prototype for which there is someevidence wouldegawatt-class laser

space-based weapons for ballisticdefense may prove lo be feasibleechnical standpoint, such weapons wouldsignificant technolceacal advance* in large-aperture mirrofi, multiasegawatt powershort-wavelength lasers, and pointing and tracking accuracies Also, system integration wouldomplex undertaking, and the battle management aspects wouldormidable technical and operational challenge They would also require very large space boosters having perhapsimes the capacity of those now in use. We expect the Soviets to have such boosters in tht. In view of tbe technological requirements, we do not espect Ihem torototype space-based laser BMD system until at least ther an operational system unlil after the

The Soviets are expending resources onof critical importance lo the developmenl of particle beam weapons (I'lIWi) We have Utile evidence, however, of Soviet achievement in ihis area Since thehe Soviel. haveesearch effort to eiplore lhe lechnical fcasibdiiveutral particle beam weapon in space, in approach cun cut ly under investigation in the

United States In this effort, Ihc Soviets have developed some tecfinicalty advaricedbut have notomplete last system. The technical requirements forystem, including precise pointing and tracking, are severe, and it ii unlikely thai the Soviets couldrototype space-based PBW to destroy hard targets like missile RVs before the end of the century and no earlier5 for an ASAT weapon Lower power systems Intended toelectronics systems could possibly beand deployed several yean earlier,f)

elieve the basic technologyrequency (HP) weapon already is available,

oderate likelihood that0 The USSR wiltround-Used RF weapon potentially capable of physicallysatelliles

E. Operations of Soviet Strategic Forcesonflict

Preparations ond Training of Nuclear Forces lor Con (lid



We believeundamental Soviet objective in acquiring and operating itrategic force* is toigh probability of prevailinguclear conflict, even if many Important aspects ol Ihe conflict turn out worse than expected. To this end, training of Soviet forteslobal nuclear conflict is increasingly broad tn scope and complea in the operational factors taken into account. In their military writings, Ihe Soviets note that wars usually do not proceed accord' ing to prior expectations and planning They almost certainly anticipate wide variations in circumstances and events. Thev rccognire lhat numerousand degradations would affect plannedparticularly in lhe unprecedentedly difficult nuclear environment^

The inhcrenl uncertainties of warfare cannot be elimf^ nated through such practice, but the Soviets believe that their ability to continue to operate effectively in adverse conflicl situations would be

ith respect to the first sentence of theparagraph, there is an alternative view that Soviet force acquisitions and operations are guided by the countciforcc and damage limitation precepts ofdoctrine, and are constrained by technological, bureaucratic, and budgetary influences The Soviets recognire lhat the concept of prevailing in nuclear war is far loo imprecise to guide force acquisitions and operations, and are fully aware of lhc greatand catastrophic tosses thai would be incurred by all partiesuclear war **

oviet perceptions of the growing compleiity of warfare have led to greater efforts to plan forces and operationsackdrop of more variedand to achieve greater realism In combat training. The Soviets' principal alms have been lo enhance their operational flexibility and force sustatn-abdity and to Increase tbe probability of maintaining continuity of eontioluclear conflict In line with this approach, they have:

Adlusted (heir force employment strategies to respond to more varied contingencies

Made changes lo enhance the survivability and endurance of some ol Iheir stralegic forces, such as the creation of bastions where SSBNs can be more effectively controlled and can be protected by ASW forces, the operation of SSBNs in the Arctic near or under the polar icecap, and the deployment of the highly mobileorce.

-Gradually increased the stress placed on their personnel in combat training,[


Consistently worked lo increase the survivability and redundancy of their command, control, and communications system and. thus, to increase their assurance of retaining control during the complex circumstances of extended operationsuclear environ men


SO Soviet employment strategies also are being modified lo Increase tho options availableolitical lenders for using and controlling their intercontinental forces Soviet military planners have sought to develop force responses applicable lo various stages of theater or global conllict. Theseaunch-on-taclical-warning (LOTW) capabilily for Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) weapons as well as increasedfoe extended operations

Scenario Ic Operation of Soviel Strategic Forcesonllict

e haveomposite tcenario.briefly below.

Thr hotari ot (Anhc IXrrtiot, Burnt, of tot/IUgc-tce unrf Rritatch. Depaittntnt of Stair.


- Joc-SgCTot-

Soviet militaiy views on llie operation of Soviet strategic lorces and on (hc natureajor US-Soviel confrontation that proceeili through largc-scalr nuclear conflict

Thc flow of eventi in an actual conflict would be likely to vaty considerably from lhat presented here Out presentation, therefore, should not be re lardedoviet prescription for nuclear conflict live presentation does not preclude efforts by the Soviets to achieve political solutions at any slasje. or to vary then military actions in response to circum nances On the contrary, the Soviets evidently intend to prepare thc military establishment to meet the contingenciesong global conflict, to increase the options available to the political leadership at any point inonflict, and thus lo increase then chances ol controlling events and securing favorable conflict outcomes.

Crisis Fcriod. Thc Soviets see little likeliliood that the United States wouldurprise attackormal peacetime posture; we believenlikely thai, ihe Soviets would mount such an aitack themselves

"^they eipect lo have sufficient warningS attack lo carry oul the deployment and dispersal of their forces. Thevbelieve that,eneral war occurred, it would most likely result from the eipanrionajor theatei conflict, precededolitical crisis period that could lasl several weeks or longer During thi. crisis period thc Soviets would:

Heighten iheir surveillance of enemy activity, to acquire detailed inhumationide range ol US strategic force capabilities and readiness

Shifteacetimeartime posture, while avoiding implementing readiness measures lhat thev thought were unduly provueativc.

As the crisis intensified, seek to confuse Western

intelligence and deny il information on the status of Soviet forces and preparations The Soviets would Increase the use ofenion, and disinformation for military, diplomat ic. and propaganda purposes in attempting to achieve their objectives.

onvcnliunol Phatc. The Soviets apparently believeajor nuclear conllicl, if it occurred,

would be likely to arise outonventional conflict and could involve several theaters. The Sovietsthe conventional phase of a NATO-Warsaw

Pact conflict as lastingew days lo as long as several weeks Key objectives would be to weaken lhe enemy's theater based and sea-based nuclear capa bill -tv. while protecting their own nuclear force:

At the outset of hostilities, the Soviets would try lohealerwide air offensive in which hundreds of Pact aircraft, employingweapons, would be massed, with the obicctivo ol achieving air superiority andNATO's nuclear assets, command and control facilities, and other high-value military targets.

We believe that most, if not all. of the mobileRBM force would be deployed lo Ihe field by this lime

All available Soviet SSBNs would be ordered to deploy from bases. Soviet general purpose naval forces would protect those SSBNs In areas near the USSR. In addition lo the protection of their ownoviet naval forces would attempt to destroy enemy sea-based nuclear strike forces, principally SSBNs and aircraft carriers.

Wc believe (hat thereigh likelihood that, during litis convenlional phase, lhe Soviets would altempt to Interfere with selected US space systems that provide important wartime support, using both destructive and nondestructive means. The decision to launch ASAT interceptors against such systems during the early part of aphase ofonflict would be affected by Soviet uncertainties with tegard to USIncluding Ihe likelihood of attacks on Soviet space launcluites

We believe Ihe Soviets currently have tbccapability, using active electronic warWX to attempt to interfere with enemy space systems, f

JWf believe, however, that lhe Soviets intend lo use active EW to attempt to Interfere with such space systems. Potential Soviet active EW platforms include many liied. transportable, and mobile transmitters.^

^An alternative viewthai therensufficient evidence at tliij time to support the judgment of Soviet intent to use active EW against satellites.^

/ Moreover, the holder of this view concludes that,oviet active EW capability againsi satellites does exist, brute force jamming would be the most likely EW techntqucL

Nuclear Photc. Wc believe thetrial it would bo lo their advantage torapid conventional campaign io accomplishobtcctives in NATO ln thb campaignemploy noo.iuclear means, including someof slralegic aviation to attempt lonuclear forces, with Soviet theater andnuclear forces standing ready lo preemptIn our judgment, are unlikely loconflictimited scale, withhe immedbte combat zone, becauseprobably sec il as being to theirto keep lhe conflict al lhe eonvcnllonalMoreover, they would see the use ofon any scale as substantially increasingof escalation to strategic nuclear war. Wethat the likelihood of Soviet initiationstrikes would increase If Sovielwere facedajor defeat or ainto Eastern Europe.

onventional to nuclear war in EuropeSoviel forces attempt lo preempt what thevto In un imminent NATO massed nuclearlaunching their own initial massed nuclear strike.

^assertuccessful preemptive strike could provide one sideecisive advantage and therefore stress the importanceimely Pada preemptive one or one at least nearly simultaneous with the bunch of NATO's massed strike

" The Itoldri of ihuhe Dtitctoi. Nuibnulen err.

he available evidence implies thai, concurrent with the initial massed strike by nuclear forces in Ihean initial strategic strike would lakepresumably including intercontinental forces Soviet doctrine up lo thcenerally held that use of nuclear weapons on any scale constituted the Initiation of nuclear war, with escalation lo large-scale or "massed" nuclear strikes Inevitable. Soviet writings thus declared thai any NATO use of nuclear weapons would be metassive response, drawing on the USSR's full arsenal of strategic weaponsf"

"Jil it became

apparent NATO was aboul to use nuclear weapons, lhe Pact should preemptassed strike oven If it were not apparent that the NATO strike wouldrge oneF

^ater Soviet doctrinalasserts that the circumstances under which nuclear weapons first would be employed cannot be predicted with certainty, and lhal preparations must be made lo cover conlinEencies.r

^he need toider array of nuclear options, including capabilities for using only those nuclear weapons deployed with tactical forces. Nevertheless Q

^rejected the

feasibility of limiting escalation once nuclear weapons have been used.


"^he Soviets continue to empbasfie the use of massive strikes to accomplish their strategicSince the earlv

ew cases, the Initial use of nuclearconfined lo thc battlefield. Development of thisii described in their doctrine as "limited" or "selective"that the Soviets believe that there may be smut ions where at least small-scale use of nuclear weapons could be confined to the battlefield C

Soviels remain highly skeptical ol lhe ch.iiKci for controlling escalation.

f they perceived that NATO intended to use nuclear weapons onlyimited scale that would not resultamr defeat lor lhe Pact,ossible tln-Sovietl might decide againstarge-scale

preemptive strike We should note, however, that wc

do noi know how rhe SovieU would he able to determine and be convinced lhat an imminenl NATO Strike will be limited, rather than large-scale, warningATO nuclear strike is likely toassive Soviet preemptive strike. While thc Soviets' overriding goal is combat success, not control of escalation, we cannot predict how the Soviets would react when actually faced with thc prospectlobal nuclearotivation for restraint wouldesire on their part to avoid unnecessary escalation to theater-wide or even global nuclear war. Ttscir decision would be based on several factors,esire to avoid damage to thc USSR, and their assessment of the likelihood they could still achieve their objectives.

s lhe likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict increased. Soviet leaders would face thc difficult decision of whether to seize the initiative and strike, as would be consistent with iheir general militaryor to be more cauiious in thc hope of averting massive nuclear strikes on thc Soviet homeland. There are no easy prescriptions for what Ihe Soviets would actually doarticular set of circumstances, despite live apparent doctrinal imperative to mount massive preemptive nuclear attacks-

The Soviets would be attempting, as in earlier stages, to acquire stralegic warning of strikes from enemy forward-based nuclear lorces againsi ihe Soviet homeland, as well as from intercontinental nuclear forces. We are unable to judge what information would be sufficiently convincing to cause Soviet leaders toassive prccmplive attack. Should the Soviets acquire warning of US missile launches, they would await confirmation from ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars before deciding whether toesponsive strike

They would bo more likely lo seize the initiative by launching intercontinental nuclear strikes if the war had already reached lhe level ofattlefield nuclear use. than if it was still at Uie conventional level. Bv taking llie initiative, tliey would expect lo reduce the capability of US stnlc forces and to disrupt to some Client the coo'dinaiionS response. Evidencethai they would not expect lo be able lo

' 'mi l r% :u.

probably consider il likely lhat the United Slates would attempt to launch its forces on inctical warn ing

believe they- would launchoordinated theater and inteiconlincntal strike if there hadarge-scale theater nuclear strike against Ihc western USSR Should the Soviets choose toassive preemptive theater strike against NATO forces in Europe, we believe they would alsoreemptive strike against thc United States at the same lime, as available evidence suggests II is possible, however, lliey could choose Io delay (lie intercontinental strike. In the possible hope thai tlir United Slates would not retaliate against the Soviet homeland. An alternalivc viewong-term Sovietavailable evidence suggests that il Is highly unlikely that the intcrconlinenial strike would be delayed "

ihey acquired convincing evidenceS Intercontinental strike was imminenl. they would try to preempt Wc believe that they would be more likely to act on lhe basis of ambiguous indications and inconclusive evidence of US strike inlentionsattlefield nuclear conflict were way thanrisis or aconflict.

reasons such as lack of convincing evidence from their strategic warning systems or fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly initiating intcrcoriii-nenial nuclear war, the Soviets might notreemptive strike. Their LOTW capabilily wouldarger and moreiiii(crattack than retaliation, while reducing lhe risk oi escalation based on insufficient or faulty information.

believe the Soviets recognize the possibility that limy might fail to get reliable tacticalof an enemy Interconlincntal nuclear strike Thev prepare for the possibilily that they would be unable to act quickly enough to successfullyarge number of missiles on tacticalji cine, -ind could retaliate only after I arnple tin ii tactical wan m,

", a} il.ii t, ,ieeiaar


-lop SfKftrt-

might have been damaged oi destroyed in the prior phases of conflict. They would attempt to maintain control of thc force and launch large-scale strikes with surviving forces

We believe live Soviets place considerableon assessing their strategic offensiveunder conditions in which the United States were lo launch the initial major strike. These include scenarios where they are able to launch varying portions of their forces on lactical warning, as well as live most stressfulwhere they fail to launchctarning and mustell-coordinated US counlerforce aitack. Thc Soviets strongly believe warfaregoes as planned and that being prepared for adversity and unplanned occurrences is ofimportance. For the Soviets theseare the most critical in an evaluation of their capabilities.

of Soviet strategic forces wouldhave suffered some losses during theof the conflict. Thc Soviets expect theylost some SSBNs in their forward patrol areas,and In the protected havens. Some SRFhave been damaged or destroyed!

^ Naval bases and command, control, and communications facilities in the USSR could have been damaged, and losses ol strategic bombers in conventional operations probably would have been considerable.

offensive objectives in carrying outnuclearof which sidethcbe to neutralize US andoperations and capabilities. Instrikes the Soviets would seek lo destroyforces and to disrupt and destroy theinfrastructure and conlrol systems for thesewell as thc National Command Authority.attempt to isolate the United States fromcampaign by attacking its powerThey probably would also attemptUS military power in the long term bvothei nonnuclear forces, USand governmental control facilities,extent of the aitack on these targets in thecould vary, depending on thethe initial strikes only to command, control.

and communications targets, or onlyortion of US strategic forces such as ICBM silos, is not consistent with thc available evidence.

In large-scale massed theater nuclear strikes, which thev would be likely to coordinate withnuclear strikes, the Soviets probably would employ hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons as wellarge share of those stralegic Forces that have missions against theater targets. Adjustments Inallocations would have to be made for weapons destroyed in thc conventional phase. Strategic systems would be used to support front operations and to strike targets beyond the area of front nuclear targeting responsibility. The Soviet Navy would continue strikes, using both nuclear and convenlional weapons, against Western naval strike forces. Soviet stralegic aviation would conduct nuclear ond convenlional strikes against high-value military targets.

Soviel brge-scale intercontinental nuclearwould involve primarily ICBMs and SLBMs. Massive slrikes probably would be delivered against worldwide US and Allied military targets, as wellore comprehensive set of political and industrial-economic facilities. We believe that tlie Soviets would conduct continuing attacks in an attempt to destroy, degrade, and disrupt thc US capability to employ nuclear forces, and the reconstitution capabilities of US nuclear lorces and their command and control: (s)

The Soviets have considerable flexibility in iheir employmenl of ICBMs for inlerconllnentalWe believe they would not launch ihcir ICBMsingle massive strike-^

ll is less clear how the Soviets intend to use their SSBNs during intercontinental nuclear conflict. Some SSBNs in protected areas near the Soviet homeland probably would be employed in an initial attack against targets in the United Stales and Eurasia, while others probably would lie withheld for potentially protracted nuclearWe have no direct evidence of Soviet



lo launch forward-deploycdLBIvur against critical US command, control,eds and bomber baseslaunch of such SLUM, wiih ICBMs,would mean SLBM impactoinutes ahead of ICBMs. and wouldhe reaction lime available to the US National Command Authority and bomber bases We have reevaluated the use of forward-based SLBMs Wc believe It it highly unlikely thai the Sovicls would make Ihe execution of their overall Intercontinental strike plan dependent on lhe success-of forward-based SLBM strikes. Thecould not bo confident of the survivability of these SSBNs. Ihere are operational difficulties, they have not Improvedlass SSBNs in many years, and they are withdrawing some of them from the forward patrol areas. Although the Soviets would use their ICBM and probably long-range SLBM, force to strike criticalcontrol, and communications facilities and bomber bases, il Is abo possible they would targe! forward basedLBMs against thesebecause such an attack, if successful, could offer the possibility of substantiallyS retaliatory aitack.

Some strategic bomben would probablyole in initial intercontinental nuclear Strikewithin hours after the Initial missile strike- We believe it is likely that other bombers would be used later, for postaltackami strikes against surviving targets in lhc continental United States Deployment of the newndombers, both capable of carrying ALCMs. will increase the Soviets' flexibility in conducting bomber strikes at inteieontinenial ranges as well as against lhe tier targets, and the intercontinental attackof (he bomber force will expand as these bumboi armed with ALCMs. become available in substantial numbers in the.

oviet strategic defensive operations in thenuclear phaseonflict would include:

Ballistic missile defense operalions to protect key targets in tlse Moscow area, by engaging enemy missiles until key elesnenii in the ABM system were destroyed or all available inlcitcptors had been expended

Air defense In depth, lo impose successiveto enemy penetration The Soviets probably would have re-located some sue face-to-air missiles to thwart dclense suppression and avoidance tactics They evideistly plan to use nuclear aimedgainst penetratorsL

^Jthe rapidol damaged SAM sites, airfields, andcontrol, and communications facilities.

operalions to attempt lo destroy enemy SSBNs and SSNl.

implementation of civil defense plans.earlier Most of the Soviet leaders at both thc national and regional levels would be In protective facilities from which ihey wouldrmcfgency rescue and recovery operalions by civilian units and civil defense military troop units.ew days for preparations, essential workers either would be in shelters at their place of work or, if off duty, would bo dispersed to rones outside the cities. The Soviets have shelters for aboutillion people in urban areas- Their plans for protection of the general urbanare based on mass evacuation ofillion people and require adequate warning time

oter Phate*uclear Conflict.plan for later exploitation phasesinteruclear strikes- Thiswould be conducted primarily hypurpose forces, but our knowledge ofconcerning these phases is sketchy Thelo reconstitute some surviving generalstrategic foices andjo secure their theateroccupation of substantial

areas ol Western Europe- The implication*

lucini to be lhat the strategic nuclear forces of both sides are largely expended or neutralized, butwithheld and reconstituted Soviet strategicforcesmall, but important, role in achieving Soviet objectives during the later phases.

he Soviets are working to improve theof (he assets required lo reconstitute strategic foicei. although we are highly uncertain about Soviet reconslitution capabilities. Overall we believe the Soviets could maintain the combat effectiveness of

lop Saejoi

of llie surviving withheld weapons and would be able lo reconstitute strategic forces at least lo some Client with surviving reserve weapons and materiel, allhough damage to the logistic system andfor decontamination would stretch out the time required for reconstitution. Combat effectiveness would be contingent on many factors, including lhe restoration of command and conirol communications

he Soviets prepare for combat operations that could extend weeks beyond the initial nuclear phasc. They would clearly prefer to accomplish theirquickly, but recognize that lhe laler phases could be protracted, given thc difficulty and complexity of conducting operations following massive nuclear strikes. The duration would depend on such factors as the capabilities of remaining theater forces, thc status of surviving political leaders, Ihe viability of command and control, and thc conditions In the US and Sovietey objective for the Soviets in this period would be to prevent the United States from reconstituting its command and control system. In addition:

believe tlie SovietsthhoidQ

their initial ICBM force,mall portion of thc peripheral attack forces, foroperations They plan to reload and refire from some of their ICBM silos andsing reserve missiles and equipment. Wc believe these forces would be used againstenemy conventional and nuclear forces and command and control, and perhaps keyelements of the economy supporting militaryAccording to an alternative view.

Jnot the Inclusion of retire in

have few details of Soviet planning for SSBN operationsrotracted conflict. Someprobably would be withheld, under naval force protection,eserve foice role. The Soviets also probably plan to reload some SSBNs. We Judge that their capability is limited,and that any reload operation could include

" Tht holdti of ihu rrtcui It iht Dirt/tor, Bureau of InrrKtfence ami lleieo'th. Deportment ol Stole.

ew SSBNs. According to an alternative view, the assertion lhat the Soviets probably plan to reload SSBNsuclear war is not supported by the minimal available evidence or by any meaningful Soviet capability: Any SLBM reload operation wouldost of difficulties, and the contribution to Soviet striking power of any reloading that could reasonably be achieved would be so small as to make it unlikely that SLBM reload figures in Soviet war plans


We have little evidence on how the Soviets would employ their slrategic bomber forcethis period. Evidence suggests they do not expect most aircraft to survive the earlier phases of nuclear conflict. We believe lhat anybombers would conduct reconnaissance and strike operations against key surviving targets.

Soviet air defense units plan to restore airfields for defensive operations. Fighters and SAM units would operate from alternate sites if necessary. Civil defense unils would coniinue rescue and recovery operations and aid with the distribution of reserve supplies to the civilian population. Thc Soviets evidently expect that some economic restoration would beafter absoib-ing multiple nuclear strikes.

hc evidence that we hava:

Jjn tbe later stages ofgeneral nuclearwith the conductuccessful militaryforces reconstituting after heavylossesoccupying much of continental

Soviets would seek touclear war on theirneutralizing the ability of USand theater nuclear forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to prevailonflict in Eurasia.

e have no specific evidence on whether the Soviets would attempt to endar byor on initiatives thev mighl undertake if Ihey

" The hotdtii of ihu iBtu' ait iht Di'titoi. Sailaaal Stewiiv Agentv. aad lhe litiaciot. Dmeau ol tnttlkgtatt ead Rtuateh. Drparimeni of State.


perceived they could not achieve their military


Impact ol Future Systems on Soviei Operations

c believe the structure and operations o( Soviet strategic lorces will be maikedly different by, as new weapons and military support systems are deployed and future systems become operational, Expansion of thc offensive forces weapons inventory to include mobile ICBMs. cruise missiles, and new bombers will require that the Soviets make major changes in their offensive operationswell as in readiness and command and controlaccommodate these new weapon system capabilities:

mixed force of mobile and silo-based systems will enable the Soviet planner ofo continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initial strikes, while withholding most or all of the mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes. Mobile ICBMsighly suivivable force element. Wc believe the Soviets will applycamouflage, concealment, and deception measures to make the probability of accounting for or detecting their mobile ICBM unitsimely basis more difficult.

deployment of mobile ICBMs will also lead to improved capabilities for ICBM ICBMs would have many of the logistic and operational problems associated with silo refire, they would have major advantages over silo-bascd systems for reconstitution and refire. The use of solid propellants would case handling procedures and shorten reaction time. Mobility would improve ICBM survivability, thereby increasing the Soviets' capability toa larger fraction of their ICBM force. Reloading could be concealed and carried out in remote locations Mobile launchers dispersedentral support base could avoid the damage and contamination lhat might be present for reload of fixed-point silos. Inobile system piobably would be less vulnerable to enemy follow-on strikes. Thesgoing to be deployedanner similar

fo that for thend we expect its reload practices lo be similar to those for thcn alternative view holds that, while mobile ICBMs theoretically offer advantages for reload,considerations suggest that'iequircments for additional deliverable warheads can bewiih greater assurance by deployment of missiles on launclwrs Thc holder of this view notes that unwieldy and vulnerable logistics, as well as damage and contamination from US nuclear strikes, could make refire as problematic as for silo-based

Soviets almost certainly will apply their experience with the mobileRBM incommand and conirol readinessfor these units Wc believe they will greatly expand their preseni mobile command and control system of fixed-wing and lielicopler airborne command posts and field-mobilecontrol, and communications van units at all echelons

hc Soviets" new(ELF) communications system will potentially increase thc survivability of iheir SSBN force by allowing SSBNs to operate deeper or under polar ice and still lie able to monitor communications. Also, an ELF system is capable of operating in anwarfare environment, and ils signal is relatively unaffected by nuclear bursts anddisruptions, hut its transmitters areIn direct atlack.

introduction of long-range cruise missiles into thc strategic bomber force probably will not alter the fundamental relationship between bombers and ballistic missiles in Soviet planning The employment of bombers in intercontinental strikes would be likely to follow massive strikes bv Und- and sea-based Soviel missile systems Deployment of theCM will give thc Soviets the long-range standoff strike capability

" Tht hotdti ofhe Dlittiot. Ninmu of IWtligw ami Ptuaich. DetMiimeai ol Stole


currently tack; aircraft will be able to hunchrom Canadian airspace or from poinis several hundred kilometers ofl etlhei US coast and still strike most target arras In the continental United States.

The Blackiack bomber probably will be operatedixed load of ALCMs and bombs; some may carry only ALCMs We believe tbss bomber will be employed fot both theater and Irilerconti-nenlal missions, with emphasis on the latter The Soviets will also probably use some of their new Candid tankcis to refuel bombers for bothand intercontinental missions.

The SovieU" new SLCMs will enhance Iheir offensive Although we estimate lhat thes probably intended for theater meets ia Europe and Asia, we believe the Soviets mayewquippednear the Uniied Slates4 Suchwould bo consistent withresponse" to US INF deployments. Deployment ofnwouldradeoff in mission capability since they could then carry fewer ASW and antiship weapons. The SS-NX-Mp

I munching submarines would be subiect to d

l be deploycdon dedicated SSCNs Wo have no direct evidence, bul wc believe the mission of theill probably Include coverage of both US andtargeb{

tion bv ASW systems

o improve iheit capabdity to defend against attacks by low-altitude bombers and cruise missiles, we believe tbc Soviets will alter air defense command operations procedures and Introduce improvedequipment and data systems in order to beltci integrate the operations of their new air defense fighters. Mainstay AWACS aircraft, and SAM systems:

They probably will concentrate their available AWACS aircraft in lhe most critical approaches Irom which they perceive attacks by low-allitude

penetrating bombers and cruise missiles would be likely to eorne.

The inlrodoctlom of lhe new Candid tanker forces could enhance their uh defense capabilities by providing greater On-nation lime for thc Mainstay AWACS and interceptor alrciaft. This couldtlie Soviets to eiiend their air defensefarther from tneir borders in an effort to engage US crvite-flussue-car lying aircraft before they could launch their ALCMs Therojected tankers by theeemhowever, to fully support Ihe needs for both strategic air defense missions and strategic bomber missions, and we are uncertain how the SovieU will allocate tankers among these missions.

If Ihe SovieU are to masimiae the potential of an integrated air defense system against low-altitude targets, they would have lo change their present procedures to enable air defense pllou lo use more Initiative in engaging targets within their area and to be more Independent of centralized control It Is possible, however, that lhe SovieU wiU not be willing to give up centralized control to lake advantage of the increasedully integrated air defense system veould pro vide

F. Irends In Soviet Capabilities To Perform Slrategic Millions

uring the neatears the primary wartime missions of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces will coniinue to be lo

Destroy enemy nuclear delivery means.

Neutralize enemy command, control, andwarning capabilities, and othersystems.

Destroy other military and non military targets

Assure lhe survivability of sufficient offensive fotces ami command and eontiol capabilities to perform the missions envisioned by Soviet strategy.

Defend Ihe Soviet homeland against attacks by ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles

Protect lhe Soviet leadership, economy, and pop illation Ihiough civil defense



Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery Means

Soviet military doctrine cmphasires the critical importance of destroying enemy nuclear capabilities earlytrategic nuclear warinimum, tlie Initial stralegic nuclear strikes by the USSR would be targeted against the enemy's nuclear forces and bases, associated suppori systems and command and control, stralegic defense capabilities, and national command authorities

During the nextean the Soviets willboth the capabilities of their nuclear systems In achieve higher damage probabilities and the total number of weapons available for such missions The modernization of the nuclear forces of lhe United Slates and other countries, however, could increase Soviet strategic weapon requirements nnd complicate Soviet targeting plans

ffn ii lemonhe Soviets have enough hard-Urget-capable ICBM RVs today to attack all US missile silos and launch control centersell-executed fim strike. In our projections of thc growth and moderniration of Soviet ICBM forces, the USSR will have substantially larger numben of hatd-target-capable RVi in the future (as shown in figureThe projected improvements In Soviet ICBM accuracy. In coniunction with the expected warhead yields and improvements in weapon system reliabilities, willa substantial increase in thc destructive potential of futuie Soviet ICBMs.

igureepicts our estimates of Ihe capability of tbe Soviets' most accurate ICBMs to inflict severe damageinutemanone-on-one and two-ooone targetingcfl-eiecuied strike As illustrated in the figure, uncertainties in our estimates of the accuracy, reliability, and yield of Soviet strategic offensive systems, when statistically combined, produce substantial uncertainties in the probabilityinuteman silo would be destroyed

his year alternative estimates of the accuracies and vicldsof thendsee insd) leadenng views of Soviet capabilities for attacking US Minuteman stlos:

- According lo one view, the Soviets currenlly would plan to launch two (possibly three) SS-18




arheads al cacti US Minuteman silo. This view holds lhat the accuracies and yields are suchwo-on-one aitack would resultest estimate damage expectancy, as shown inf aboutoercent with today's systems, with tbe uncertainties as shown "

Accordingecond view, continuing rearialy-sis of accuracies and yields of Ihenduggests thai the Soviets' capability to achieve their desired damage expectancy is somewhat lower than previously estimated "

During lhe neit year, we will be carrying outneeded analysis on this key issue, including, in particular, further analysis of the accuracies and yields of these Soviet ICBMs.

igurehows that the protected uncertainties In our estimates of future weapon systemhave much less significance for damage rxpectan-cv as the Soviets further Improve accuracy. The (rend of growing countersilo capability for Soviet ICBMs is apparent. By thehe Soviel ICBM force is projected to have hard-target ICBM RVs in sufficient numbers and with enoughto achieve Soviet targeting goalsamageol overercent; byingle RV io each target We do not know Ihe number of additional weapons the Soviets would allocate lo compensate for detectable launch and in-flight failures or losses to enemy counteraction Although the Soviets' hard-target capabilities will increase substantially, welhal Ihey will still be concerned thai atortion ul the US ICBM force would be launched while under attack Wcthat Soviet capabilitiesinuteman silo In thcrc somewhat less than was shown in last year's Estimate Wheicas in last year's Estimate weore capable follow-on to both lhend SSn this period, we now project only anithbeginning7 rather" Moreover, thclthough still projected to be deployed

" The MrfVfi ol ihu tfeur ore lhe Director. De/enit Intelligence Agency, and ihe AiiUlanr ChufolStaff. Inlelligence. Otporimem

ol Iht Air tone

" The holder ol ifcu i, ihe Depuiv IHtettoe lo* ImctHgerxct.

Cenl'el ImtlUg/nci Agency

"For on ollematii* mewoboot futureytlcou. ree pott graph 3

beglnnhiK5s proiected to lie less capable lhan previously projected, because the RV and yield are assessed to be smaller lhan wc had ei peeled.


tralegic Aircraft. The SovieU almost certainly would try lo attack US strategic aircraft on ihe ground Those aircraft not on aleil and unable lo become airborneatter of minutes would lie highly vulnerable For alert aircraft thc critical Issue is their abilily to lake off and escape safely in the few minutes before enemy missiles arrive. Our aiulysis of the problems ihe Soviets would face in structuring and carrying out such an attack leads us to

T-lhal it isoviet atiack would be able to destroy most of Ihc US alerl strategic aircraft We do noi believe thc Sovieis will be able to develop the capability during the neatears lo taigel and destroy, with tttategic offensive weapons, US aircraft in flighi

SIISs. The Sovieis do not now have thclo detect US SSBNs operating in open ocean areas eicept by chance, or to maintain contact with or trail ihemhance detection occurs. Even though overt tii by modern Soviet SSNs using active sonai is feasible fnr short periods ofombination of factors (see volume II. chapter III) males active acoustic trail of more thanfew SSBNs operationally impractical today. Projected Improvements In Soviet passive acoustic sensors, plus deployment ol more ASW platforms, probably will enhance the Soviets' capabilities to detect and destroy US submarinesin coriiiricd areas or close to the USSR but will not give them an effective broad-ocean detection capability or improve significantly their capability to trail US SSBNs We eipect Soviet ASW capablliiy to increase over the neatears We judge, however, thataiof advance in oonacoustk ASW which we believe is unlikely (see paragraphs) Ihe Soviets' ability to systematically detect and track US SSBNs In the open ocean wilt continue to be poor through

uclear Forcei in Eiiratia. We believeand proiected Soviet strategic offensive forces would be more than adequate in numbers and capabil-ilies lo ailacL nuclear lorces in Euiopc and Asia in hardened and soft fixed facilities To counter mobile missiles the Soviets plan lo make extensive use of all

available rrconniisiarxcincluding signals(SIGINTX aircraft and satellite photography, and human coiloctori- to locale and Irack ihe mobile systems,ombination ol conventional andweapons, to destroy them. Soviet special purpose forcesave specifically been tasked lo iserform behind lhc-hnes reconnaissance tu localenuclear capable missile systems, for the purpose of inilial strike targeting They are also tasked with carrying; out sabotage and commando opera (tons against NATO nuclear forces. Missiles deployed in West Cermany. Belgium, and the Netherlands would be within ranee of tactical reconnaissance CLCMs deployed in the United Kingdom andie in Italy would be beyond thc range of Soviet taoticaland would become the rcsponsiblhtv of Soviet strategic reconnaissance. Whether tlie Soviets could successfully locale mobile missile units, and then target and destiov ihem during conventional otwar. would depend heavdy on tbe conflict dreum-stances, such as tbe length of the conventional phase, thc eitcnt lo which missile units could remain hidden or move frequently, and thc ability of Soviet staffs to obtain, correlate, ami distribute reconnaissance dataimely fashion

Neutralizing Enemy Ccmrnond. Conirol. ond Comrnonkolions, Warning Capabilities, ond Other Support Systems

Throughout the nestears the Soviets will have weapons of sulficien! numbers and capabilities lo give them high confidence in their ability lo destroy most fucd, land-based nuclear support facilities in the United States, Euiope. and elsewhere, such as depots, nuclear storage sites, maintenance bases, airfields, and pons While attacks against ihese support facilities -ould degrade lhe endurance andl ion of US and Allied nucleai forces, their destruction would not necessarily affect initial slrategic force operations.

The .Soviets have the capabilily to destroy or interfere with rnosl major elements ol the US tactical warning and attack assessment system, shortly before orarge-scale nuclear strike Allhough the Soviets probably could substantially degrade USwarning systems, we do not bel,eve they would be confident that such imerferesxe alone would prevent the bunch of substantial numbers of US weapons

he effectivenessoviet attack on the US command, control, andnreal ions system,lo debv or prevent issuance, receipt, and vcrilicalion of IfS launch orders, would depend in part on lhc US alert poslure. We cannot assess the effects ol such an attack. The Soviets" military doctrine, their emphasis on radioclcctronlc combat, and their theater warfare exercise scenarios and targeting strategy, as well as Iheir preoccupation wiih the survivability of tbeir own command, control, and communications systems, lead us to believe lhal they would devote substantbl dforts to

and destroying the US National Command Authority, operating alternates, and critical Intermediate nuclear force control points in the United States and Europe, through direct nuclear strikes by multiple means Tired from the forward edge of their normal patrol areas.LBMs deployedlass SSBNs would lake aboutinutes lo reach US coastal instal-bisons (See)ired from liases in lhe western USSR could strike targets in Western Europe In aboutinutes. The flight times of Soviet cruise missiles would be much longer, but they ate much mote difficult to detect.

or preventing transmission of launch orders by disrupting Ihe various communications paths with direct attacks, ia mining, andinterference andell-coordinated, minimum warning attack on many control points and communications facilities.

They might also attempt to disable electronics equip ment unhardened to the effects of electromagneticl* by detonationmall number of nuclear weapons at high altitude over the ccestinental Uniied Stale, at the starttrategic tiuclear attack Moreover. Ihe Soviets probably would aeek to prevent rcconullutlon of residual command, control, and com municatiom capabilities through continuing attacks

hereumber of fadors which suggest the Soviets would not be confident of iheir chances of severely degrading critical US command and eontiol of nuclear forces:

Soviets might not have confidence in their ability lo use forwaid deployed SLBMs to strike US command, control, and communications or sucecishilh coordinale Ihe timing uf ICBM and


SLBM strikes.iscussion on such timing see

Prioroviel nuclear strike, moat elements of US strategic command and conlrol wouldbe on alerl and mobile assets would probably be dispersed, and llieieby less vulnerable to aitack.

We believe the Soviets will not develop the capability over the period of thb Estimate to use ballistic missiles to destroy US airborneposts and other supporting aircraft in


Improvements to US command, control, and communicationsas greaterandcomplicate Soviet attack plans.

We believe the Soviets have major uncertainties regarding llie effects of EMP on Ihe wide variety of electronic equipment associated with UScontrol, and com municalions.

The Soviets may not have identified all tlse important fixed or mobile command, control, and coinmunicatiom facilities for US nuclear forces

Copobtftvci lor Comprehensive Strategic AI locks

o believe that Ihe primary obtectlveoviet nuclear atiack would be to destroy enemy strategic nuclear capabilities, but lhat an attackwould take place as partarger comprerWisive strategic attack. Soviet strategic missions are planned in thc context of integrated oi<erations within designat-ed Theaters of Military Operations

he number and priority ol targets associated with various theaters worldwide would varydepending on the circumstances, the threats they pose to the Soviet homeland, their importance to enemy military operations, and their postwar military value. The Soviets would be especially concerned aboul destroying those installations that could suppori US power protection, thus preventing lhc United States from reinforcing its miliiary operations woild-wide

ur preliminary analysis of potential targets in the North American Theater of Military Operalions suggests the Soviets might identifyied

military, government, and economic Installations In addition to those targets associated with US nuclear forces About one-half of these Installations support US or NATO nonnuclear military forces (hathreal or potential threal to Soviet operations in Eurasia and ai sea. including potentialon facilities Thc remainder includescritical for supporting US federal civilianoperations and economic facilities related lo the production and supply of military capabilities. In addition, llie Soviets probably plan to attack the energy production plant network thai support* the North American miliiary and civilian economy

n initial comprehensive Soviet strike against all targels In North America piobably would currently includeoviet ICBM and SLBMThc Soviets ihcn would havelher online Intercontinental bomber and missile warheads, plus any reserve weapon systems that could beto fulfill other strategic requirement*

ver the next decade, tbe Soviets will introduce more modern and accurate missile systems that we project will reduce the number of warheads required lo strike current North American targets to achieve Soviel damage goals Thb could be offset to some extent bv the addition of newexample, more redundant stralegic couimand. control, andfacilities oc. inobile US ICBMby US defensive efforts such as deployment of an ABM systemardeninglor military installations. In Ihe absence of such new targeting requirements, however, thc Soviets3 could have, in addition to thearheads needed (or an Initial comprehensive strike against North America, additional online warheads lo fulfill other sJrategic rcquiremeoti

nline warheads, if their forces generally remain withinnd SALT II numerical constraints0 (Force 1)

00 online warheads, if their forces are expanded beyond arms control limita-liosund 31

nline warheads, if constrained by the Soviet START proposal

In addition, tlie Sovicls would have reload weapons for some of theii sysiems


Preliminary analysis olrtels intheaters ol* military operalions suggest! lhe Sovietsould target up to several thousand fixed military, government, and economic 'retaliations in addition to ihose targets associated with NATO nuclear forces- Thc most important of these arenstallations related lo NATOmilitary capabilities.omprehensiveattack against NATO, the Soviets might abo Urget several hundred civilian government facilities topolitical control and up to several thousand mihtary-ecorsomic facilities that produce or storeend-pioducts, energy and petroleum. The extent ofoviet attack would depend on the course the conventional war had taken Some fixed targets,within the area of front responsibility would be attacked by tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets piobably would also use strategic weapons to attack detected mobile targets beyond the area of front responsibility

etaliatory attack the situation is much more complex. The command and control over forces would be degraded, with great unknowns for thc Soviets in degree of control remaining initially, and In the ability lo reestablish conlrol, where il has been lost, and lo maintain control over time Thus, numbers of surviving weapons and tbe capability to employ themoordinated fashion are both critical.

ith the vulneiability of Soviel ICBM stlos increasing during lhe period of this Estimate, at more accuiate US weapons are deployed, the Soviets will be faced with more difficult problems in assuringretaliatory capabilities In the event they are struck first. We believe the Soviets" efforts to expand the eapabililies of iheir command and conlrol network and SLBM lorce. and to develop mobile ICBMs. reflect their concern that, even after being attacked, Ihey must maintain sulficient stralegic nuclear forces to accomplish llieir missions

SurvivoUliiy oi Soviet Strolegie Offensive Forces

CBM, We expect thai silo-based ICBMs will continue to be the largest clement of Soviet Mrategic offensive forces through at least the nextcari.i

IT andilos have nearly the tame hardness as thai for the SS-IS. theilo it considerably softer

Our analysis Indicates that Soviet silol for the latest ICBMs. and their associated bunch control facilities, wouldigh probability ol syrvtving an atiack by current US ICBMs and SLBMsQ

_j-4rend of growing Soviet ICBM tilo vulnerability. US ICBMs and SLBMs in development wouldonsiderably greater threat, due mainly lo accuracy improvements. US bombers and land-attack cruise missiles could cause similar damage to Soviel silos, depending on the extent to which ihey could penetrata Soviet air defenses. The figure slsould noi be taken to iBpraaeig the potential effectivenessorcewide attack by US weapons on Soviet ICBM silos, however, because not all technical and operational uncertainties that would be associated wiih such an attack -ere considered (i)

e expect the Soviets may further modify thoir latest silos and launch control centers and further harden the missile systems, on the basis of experience they have gained in tests lhat simulate nuclear weapon effects, attempting lo gain slight Increases in hardness We have seen no evidence the Soviets will significantly haiden ICBM silos in the futurc.Q

e expect thai Somad-mobile ICBMs would have many basic operational features in common with theRBM Any road-mobile ICBM probably would be housed in unhardened. sliding roof buildings at support basesmall portion of thc force in the field for operations Once dispersed into field sites, lhe launchers would become more turvtvable because thev would be difficult to locale The areas lo which ihese missiles could be deployed is quite large Without target localixation the mobile missiles would he potentially vulnerable onlyarrage missile aitack designed lo saturate likely deployment or operating arr^asJ"


ombn land SSBN: TTvsstrategic bombers and SSBNi iiependent on Soviet preparations dmiiiKcmli oi thealer war, nnd upon receiving wamines ol possible enemy attacks

All Soviet SSBNs lhal disperse to sea would not be vulnerable to an enemy nuclear attack,they would be subject to attrition Irom enemy ASW attacks SSBNs with .inge SLBMs can remain in range of targets in the United Stales while operating In waters close to thc USSB, exploiting Ice cover and shallow ocean depths, and avoiding Western sound surveillance system (SOSUS) arrays The Soviets havea siguilicant porlion ot" their general purpose naval forces lo protect their SSBNs in waters contiguous lo tbe USSR These practices Increase Ihe chances that Soviet SSBNs woulderiod of conventional conflict.

We cannot evaluate the survivability and opera-bililv of lhe USSR's strategic bomber force dur-Ing the nuclear phasesonflict. Important factors Include the eslent of bomber losses during the preceding phases of conflict, capabilities to disperse and maintain aircraft at unlargeled locations, and capabilities to reconstitute the bomber lorce Soviet strategic bombers on alert at dispersal bases, ot In flight during an enem> attack, however, would have increased likelihood of survival

Protecting the USSR Wilh Strategic Defense

The Soviels would employ their ballistic missile and air defense forces to destroy enemy nuclear weapons and bombers before ihey reached IheirCivil defense efforts would be employed to protect leadership elements, economic activity, olid the population Although we provide an assessment of these elements individually, we have not assessed the dcgiee of overall protection, now or in the fuiure. that would be afforded by the combination of active and passive defenses

Boffiidr Mimic De/enie. The currentABM system providesimited, single-layerIs, it could intercept HVs before they reenter the atmosphere These defenses probably couldmall atlack not accompanied by

ponclratioti aids such as ehnff and decoys. Attempting toarger number of attacking RVs. however, would rapidly exhaust the available interceptors When completed, the ongoing upgrade of the defenses al Moscow will provide the Sovietsuch mote reliable, two-layer capabilily to defend critical targets at Moscow against an atlack bv some lens of current types of US RVs and against increasingly sophisticated third-country missiles.arge-scale attack, thenterceptors would quickly bebut they might be dlectrve in preferentially defending selected targets in lhe Moscow area, such as national command and control facilities

he upgrade lo Ihc defenses at Moscow is expected to provide the Sovietsoundation for expanding their defenses Withnlcrceplois lhe Soviets could rrakc hardened targets aroundespecially command bunkers, less vulnerableubstantial US force of attacking RVs The leakage likely to result fiom such an attack would cause severe damage to most of the ahoveground, unhardened facilities and to some of lhe hardened target facilities as wellmaller scale attack,efense would allow Ihe Soviets to spread their interceptor coveragearger number of targetsarger area The effectiveness ofefense against attack by thud countries, such al China, would be

If the Soviets were to deploy an ABM defense involving as manyaunchers, as in Ihe expansion options addressed In volume II. and assuming the deployed systems were reasonably ellec-tive. lhe potential effect on the US strategic missile force would beS preemptive Strike in the face ofeavy defense would be degraded, perhapsignificantS mt alia lory strike could be degraded even more, because lhe lower number and rate of RV arrivals in inost areas may resull in lower leakage rates lot the defense

The actual effectiveness ofefense would depend, not only on lhe performance oi the deployed ABM systems, bul abo on the vulnerabilities ol key elements ol the nelwotk and Ihe potential of an attacking lorce to exploit them. Wc have notassessed, and are uncertain about, lhe potential abilityidespread ABM system lo reduce overall damage and to protect key military functiom. Il would probably be more effective against SLBMs than

-Seti at.

againstf adequate coverage of SLBM ap preaches were provided by bailie management sup-port radars. US countermeasures sued as decoys, cliaff ^jnd rnaiieuverbuj RVs could reduce its effectiveness;

higher probablitv of intercepting fcw-aJuiud* aircraft in areas where radar coverage is dense and Ihcreigh concentration pf ground-based terminal defenses unless the attacker used standoff missiles or effective countenrieasures and

an* case, widesprcod Sovietof an ABM lystem. even if US evaluations indicated it could be overcome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planning and create major unceitalntles for US planners about theeffectivenessS strike. It Is premature to judge the capabilitiesew advanced surface-to-air missile system, llieowever, if ourabout certain features of this syslem are correct, its potential contribution to ballistic missile defense: would be of growing concern as it became widely deployed in the USSR and Eastern Europe In tbe. Additionally, according to one view, any evaluation of the elf ecuidespread ABM defense to reduce damage should consider thc potential ABM capabilities of thcndystems, which could further complicate US aitack planning."


101 Stralegic Air Defente. Our conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the Soviet air defense system are based on our assessments of Soviet potential to perform the essential air defensewarning, detection and tracking, control of intercepts, and target destruction They are noi based onsimulations of ihe air battle to calculate the attrition thc Sovicls could inflict on an attacking force. Wc conclude that thc present Soviet air defense system, undegradedarge-scale ballistic missile aitack or effective electronic countermeasuresrobably would perform wdl against current aircraft ataboveeters, although it does not have the capability to conduct intercepts much be yond the Soviet bordeis Irom bases within the USSR. We have not assessed the eatenl to which its per-forrnance would be degraded bv defense suppression, such os ballistic missile strikes likely to precede bomli-er and cruise missile penetration. The current Soviet air defense system wuuld be lelatively ineffectiveow-attitude attack. It could, however, have a

Tli* koU,


ol ihu H.Ktor.nulUgence



There is an alternative view that this Estimate substantially umieistalrt the capability of tlte Soviet an defense system to defend key la reel arras against low-altitudc perietrator* According to this view,effectiveness in these areas could be high today against bombers. The holder of this view believes that bv litfij the effectiveness in such areas would beigherombined attack of penetrating bombeis. SRAMs, and cruise missiles than the Estimate suggests"

M Defense. We believe that, with asew hours"arge percentage of Soviet civiliangovernment, andwould probablyarge scale US nuclear strike. Although the Soviets could not prevent massiveto iheir economy from such an attack, timely implementation of sheltering, dispersal, and relocatxc. plans would provide effective protectionarge percentage of thcesscnlial work force. Sovietcasualties would vary greatly, depending on ihe extent to which civil defense measures had been implemented. Improvements in Soviet civil defense preparations during the neatears would increase the likelihoodarge percentage of the leadership and csiential work force would be able toarge-scale altack, but casualties among the general population would remain high.

uring lhe past few years, we haveetter undemanding of Soviet wartime rnanageinent concepts and have identified more relocation facilities for the higher levels of Soviet wartime managementnational, military district, and key regional organiza tions(

igh probability of severe structural damage to almost all types of Soviel hardened underground enf. leadership facilities we have located would require multiple high-yield, accurate weapons. Deep underground facilities like those at Sharapovo and Chekhov near Moscow fot the Nalional Command Authority wouldifficuli targoting problem

d& olhr Ainrisni Chiel of Stall for Initlligente. Prrwiiw" ol the A'mu.

A recent reassessment of ihese sites indicates that they arc harder, deeper, and much less vulnerable than previously estimated. For moreecade the Sovicis have been expanding and improving these sites, bul have concealed the extent of tneir activities.


^The Soviels may believe lhat deep underground structures such as those near Moscow will assure the survivability of the toppriority objective of thor wartimeplans We have not yet assessed theoferception by Soviet leadersthoir confidence ln live effectiveness of Iheir overalle management structure is almosttempered by the belief that civilian as well as miliiary leadership facilities would be high on the list of US targeting prioritiesuclear conflict.

he Soviets have talcn additional measures that wc believe would contribute significantly lo the continued functioning of the wartime management system. They include providing redundant and liard-ened communications for the leadership and making provisions for poststrike restoration of communications service. These measures would improve theand dependability ol the systems lhat are critical to continuity of command and control.

e believe the Soviet command and control system for nuclear forces, even if directly attacked, can ensure transmission of launch instructions,retaliatory strikes could be delayed and not fully coordinated. Although US attacks could destroy mam-known fixed command, control, and communicalions facilities, many elements ol the political leadership and military commands probably would survive, and redundancy in Soviet stralegic communicalionsprevent loss of any one channel from disabling thc overall lyitcm

he Soviets could experience difficulty,in maintaining the endurance and effectiveness of strategic command, conirol. and communicalions for weeks of continuing operations, particularly if nibreded lo US strikes They would be relying onposts The impact of residual nuclear effects could

_ .lop-Serrei-

endanger coin<iiaml personnel and degradesystemsbo uncleareffectively lhe Soviets could tclargcl and employ suiviving oi recori-stituled weapons We believe the Soviets might espeet to lose most satellite reconnaissance and would thus rely primarily on long-range reconnaiuance alrciall and signal intctcepl capabilities

he Soviets perceive the Pershing H'srange, and short fright time (and possibly in.LBMs) as providing the capability lo threaten elements of their command, control,and warninghreat they do not now face lo the same degree from less accurate SLBMs. In making pessimistic threat assessments, tlie Soviets probably assume that scene key targets in thc Moscow area wiil be threatened by Ihe Penhing II. because they apparently believe its range is closerilometers than tom range ciled by (lie United States Pershing II weapons, not detectable by the current Soviet launch detectionoms, will have the capabilily lo destroy hardened Soviet facilities, and improved capabilities to destroy' "soft" Soviet Installations, only five loinutes aftei Soviet radars detect thereemptive atlack by Pershing II weapons could disrupt and delay Soviet warning and missile launch procedures, and Ihe Sovt ets may believe, in their pessimistic threat assessments, lhat their LOTW capabilities could be affected

Concluding Observations

. We do not know how the Soviets would assess their prospects lor pievaihntlobal nuclear conllict. Sizable forces on both sides would survive massive nuclear strikes

Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably target and destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in flight, nr land-mobile missiles,hose beyond lhe range of tacticalsystems We believe that,risis or conflict, the Soviets would credit unde-graded US warning and control systems with the ability to launch ICBMs on tactical warning.

Soviet mobile missiles. SSBNs patrolling in waters near the USSR,aifie part of the sllo-based ICBM force would survive US nuclear attack We believe lire Soviets can launch ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning and conirol systems arc iindegraded

Moreover, the Sovicis aie well awaie of thoir inability to prevent inassive damage to the USSR with their slrategic defenses even with the improvements taking place In these forces They also lecognire thai US Stralegic defenses cannot prevent massive damage

e believe that lhe Soviets' confidence in their capabilities for global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and controland on their prospects for disrupting andthe ability of ihe Uniied Stales and ils Allies to command and to operate iheir forces. The Soviets continue lo make eitensivc elforts lo improve all aspects of iheir command, control, andcapabilities We believe they would launchattack* on US and Allied strategic command, control, and communications to prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet stralegic defenses and impairing US and Allied abilities to marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute forces We believe lhat planned US and NATO improvements in command, control, and commuzucsticcts will Increase the Soviets' iincerlainllc* aboul iheir capabilily lo disrupt enemy force operations

be evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to prepare their militaiy forces for the possibility of having touclear war and are Iraining lo be able lo maintain control overcomplex conllict situations They have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting milt tary operationsuclear war. thereby improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies ofonflict, and raising the probability of outcomes favorable io the USSR. There is an alternative view thai wishes lo rmphsiire thai the Soviets have not resolved many of lhc critical problems bearing on tlie conduct of nuclear war. such as the nature of tlie initiation of conflict, escalation within lhe theater, and protracted nuclear operations According to this view, lhe Soviets lecogmte lhal nuclear war is so destruclive, and Its course so uncertain, that they could not espeet an outcome that wasn any meaningful sense."

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omprehensive survey of Soviel siui'-KJe forces and capabilities. Judgments have been drawn frotu other National Intelligence Esllinatcs and from Interagency InteUigence Assessments and Memo-rand urns thai contain more in-depth discussions on specific' suhicct areas. These include;

oviel Ballistic Missile Defense.escribes Soviel capabilities for ballistic missile defense.

NIEbe Soviet Space Program.3 describes current Soviet space capabilities, identifies dements ol the space program in development and estimates how these will affect future Soviet capabilities.

nWrse Capabllitta for Nuclear Conflict.3 Describes China'sfor strategic and lactical nuclear conflict at piesent and during the nextears

ossible: Soviet Responses totrategic Defense Initiative. IS Sep-

iamlnes general principles and constraints in the areas of politics, militaryand research and development practices that will influence the Soviets' responseS ballistic missile defense.

NIE. Prospects for Sootct Military Technology and Research and Development,dentifies technologies that are key to future Soviet military capabilities and assesses lhe likely impact of those technologies on Soviet military systems of

Nl IIMX. Soviet WartimeThe Rote of Civil Defense tn Leadership Continuity.ssesses thc Soviet civil defense infrastructure and measures for leadership protecllon and relocation as anpartroader national command and control system.

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