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The Changing Sino-Soviet Relationship
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
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THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
tl)l
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The foBowing intelligence organizotloni participated in the preparation oi the Estimate:
The Control Intelligence Agency. Iho Defenio InteSgence Agency, tho NotioW Security Agency, ond Ihe intelligence orgoniiation of lhe Deportment of Stole.
Also Participating:
Ihe Aisiilont Chief of Sfoff fo> Intelligence. Oepcrlroent ol theDirector of Novo! lr-telligeni.e, Department o* theAiiiitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of lhe AirDirector of Intelligence, rieodqoarteri, Marine
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CONTENTS
SCOPE
KEY
Tlic Wary
The Soviel
Tlic Chinese
The Major Isiues Precluding Sino-Soviet
The Augmenting of Soviet Military Power Adjacent to
The Central Role of the United States and
The American
The Japanese
Variables. Uncertainties, and Possible Alternative
Variables and
Alternative
ANNEX C: Sino-Soviet Chronology. 35
SCOPE NOTE
For almost two years the USSR and China have been actively probing the possibilities of improving their relations with oneat the very time that the Soviels have continued to develop and modernize their already formidable strategic and conventional military forces adjacent to China. These negotiating probes are not wholly new; ihey have occurred before. But this time there has been some forward movement, at least on secondary issues and polilical atmospherics. This raises several questions for us:
In what manner is the relationship between these two powers in process of change?
How do Soviet consultations with China fit into the USSR's bro^id strategic-military objectives in East Asia?
How far are present Sino-Soviet consultations going to carry Moscow and Beijing?
In addition to probable trends, what alternative outcomes are possible and what would be their likelihood?
And what will be the significance of the Sino-Soviet future for US
This Estimate addresses these questions, examining both theon and incentives for improvement in the Sino-SovietThe Estimate also explores the possible effect of certain variables, and proposes indicators by which to measure changes in theExcept where otherwise indicated, the period of thc Estimate is the next two to three years.
Because of the complexity of issues discussed in this Estimate, il is being published in iwo versions: for broad readership, thc complete text; for senior readers, the Key Judgmenis.
KEY JUDGMENTS
The present consultations between tlie USSR and China are unlikely to produce major concessions on the part of either, and the many issues that divide them will largelyhange in theiris nonetheless taking place. Wc believe this process will continue during thenext two to threeby this Eslimatc.
esult largely of Soviet initiative and of an increased Chinese responsiveness. Moscow and Beijing have reached numerous agreements over the past year or so on relatively minor economic and cultural questions. But the change taking place in their relationship does not so much involve their basic positions or any "moving closer" to one another, as itoderating of the intensity of conflict. These two powers will almost certainly remain suspicious, wary antagonists, continuing to arm against each other and to criticize each other's aimsess hostile climate.
Many issues will continue to divide China and thewill continue to prevent either from making major concessions to the other. The principal such forces:
On both sides, historical enmity, suspicions, ideologicaland racist attitudes toward each other.
The sensitivity of the Sino-Soviet issue in lhe inner politics of both Beijing andthe consequent need for their leaders not to become vulnerable to charges of betraying vital national Interests to the other power.
Chinese concerns about Soviet power over the coming decades; Soviet concerns about potential Chinese power over the coming century.
On the part of China, Beijing's continuing belief that the USSR retains expansionist ambitions, and that Moscow's long-term desire to expand Soviet presence and influence around China's periphery is aimed directly at isolating China and diminishing ils influence in Asia.
The desire of China that the USSR make concessions on three major issues: that is. ihat the USSR significant reduce its
military power (nuclear and nonnuclcar) in the eastern USSR and Mongolia, cease its support Cor Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, and withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan.
In the absence of any major Soviet concessions on these questions, Chinese reluctance to come to terms with Moscow on the Sino-Soviet border dispute.
Beijing's bitter experience with the high costs of close association with Moscow: remembrance of unacceptable past Soviet efforts to subvert the politics and armed forces of China and to subordinate China's national interests lo those of the Soviet Union.
The fact that China's boss, Deng Xiaoping, was himself one of the foremost anti-Soviet officials indentiftcd with the split of these two Communisteneration ago. into rival Third Romes.
On the part of theedrock, absolute refusal on the part of Soviet leaders to halt Moscow's continuing buildup of military power adjacent to China, or to give up or markedly lessen the great military superiority the USSR enjoys over China.
Moscow's reluctance to yield the geopolitical advantages it currently derives from its ties with Vietnam, especially the forward deployment of ships and aircraft, and the barrier these developments constitute to Chinese influence in Southeast"Asia.
The fact that the buildup of Soviet miliury power in Asia serves many strategic and political purposes beyond those relating directly to China, and isortion of the Soviet global strategic buildup.
Soviet unwillingness to make the major concessions demanded by Beijing unless China significantly reduces its relationships with the United States or moves to settle the border dispute.
At the same time, certain other forces will tend toeduction of the intensity of Sino-Soviet hostility. The principal such forces.
the numerous changes in time, situation, andthat have occurred since the Sino-Soviet splitenerationrender extreme hostility between Moscow and Beijing somewhat of an outmoded phenomenon, the product o! certain circumstances of thc time that now haw less relevance.
mere fact of reaching agreement on at least someissues in itself creates an environment for momentum and Ihe possibility of furlhcr agiccmenis
On the Sovtet side, as Moscow's leaders perceive increasing strategic challenge from more forceful US policies and future US weapon systems andtrong wish on their part lo lessen thc possibility that Sino-Soviet hostilities mighl greatly complicate the USSR's basic security interests or Its overall strategic objectives.
A basic desire to icduce fhe dangerwo-front war
A strong desire to prevent close cooperation between China and the United Stales (andnd to that end to lake advantage of known dissatisfactions on the part oi Beijing with itsconnection
A desire lo enhance the security of lhe USSR's eastern borders by means additional lo military power.
Concern about what the long-term polilical implications would be for China's economic modernization programs if outside assistance lo those programs were to come only from the United Slates and lhe West.
A sense in Moscow that the danger of Chinese adventurist actions against the Sovietof the original reasons for the beginnings of the Soviet military buildup, yean ago- on the Sino-Sovietgreally diminished
opportunity to lake advantage of the more businesslike attitudes and procedures that have come to mark Chinese politics and society since the dcalh of Mao Zedong, in the process lessening some of the emotional content lhat Mao and Nikita Khrushchev personally contributed to Sino-Soviet estrangement.
On the Chinese side. Deng Xiaoping and his associates have determined that (a) China's greatest problems are those it facesast, poor LDC. (b) the process of national development in China will be so difficult thai il willrolonged period of respite from oulside pressures, (c) to theseeordering of China's foreign policies is needed, one that reduces the level of tension with the USSR; and (d)eordering would noi seriously risk jeopardizing the continuance either of strong US-led opposition to Soviet expansion in the world, or of US and Western willingness to continueeralirig economically wiih China.
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Associated with those decisions, almost certainly lowon the part of Beijing's leaders that the United States would come to Beijing's aid in the eventoviet attack on China.
China's discovery during its invasion of Vietnam9 lhat itormidable military antagonist on its southern border, and Beijing's consequent desire to reduce the pressures on China resulting from its two-front confrontation with the USSR and Vietnam.
Views on the part of China's leadersodest improvement of relations with the USSR serves to increase Beijing's leverage on Washington.
A desire to diversify further the foreign sources of input into China's modernization, and to take advantage of certainthat would derive from expanded economic andties with the USSR.
A view on the part of Deng and his fellow pragmatists that less hostile relationships with the USSR will also signal that, in accepting some US economic and military assistance. Beijing does not intend lo embrace the United States too closely or completely refuse all assistance from the USSR.
It should be stressed tlujt present Sino-Soviet talks are taking place against the backgroundontinuing substantialof Soviet military strength adjacent tohasduring the Sino-Soviet consultations of thc past two years. Roughly one-fourth of all Soviel ground force personnel are now stationed opposite China, together with moreoviet aircraft,ir personnel, greatly enhanced navalapidly expandingorce, and considerable additional nuclear weapons carriers in the form of Backfire and Badger bombers, SLBMs^and ICBMs. The greal majority of the USSR's nuclear weapons targeted against East Asia will continue to be devoted to Chinese targets.rincipal net result of the buildup will be certain continuing marked asymmetries in Soviel and Chinese military forces* the Chinese seriously lagging, Qualitatively, in modern arms; Soviet ground and air forces generally positioned fairly close to China's borders. Chinese forces deployed deeply behind ihose borders.
Moscow's leaders see their miliiary augmentation as insurance against Chinese military provocations along the border, and against the prospectignificantly enhanced Chinese nuclear ihreat to lhe USSR
6
over the long lerm They almost certainly also consider that their lorces will continue lo serve meanwhileeterrent to China from invading Vietnam once again, or from otherwise effectively challenging Soviet interests in Indochina. And, these forces will strengthen Moscow's negotiating handis thc Chinese.
This ongoing Soviet augmentation will at the same time continue to stem from many causes beyond those directly relating to China and will continue to serve many broader Soviet interests. That is. the augmentation of forces in the East also reflects the USSR's plans to upgrade all of its forces, everywhere: its desire. to strengthen its capability towo-front war. in Europe and Asia; the felt need to compensate for dependenceery long, vulnerable railroad lo reinforce and rcsupply the isolated Soviel Far East; the traditional Soviet practice of overinsuring, of massing more military strength than outside observers might think necessary; thc Soviet effort to use the military buildup as an instrument for political intimidation and further expansion of influence in East Asia;esire to reinforce Sovietagainst thc perspective of much-enhanced Western military capabilities in the Pacific.
It should alto be stressed that the Sino-Soviet future is notilateral matter, but wilt develop within the dynamic of triangular relationships with the United States. This dynamic willrucially important factor affecting the behavior of Moscow and Beijing toward thc other. Each leadership will remain highly sensitive to its perceptions of the US relationship with lhe rival Communist power, and especially to any development that cither power might consider toajor discontinuity in US orientation or strategic priorities.
What developments appear most likely in thc Sino-Sovietover the next two years ot so?
Chances favor continuance of the process of markedlytrade relations and reaching agreements on other secondary issues of economic and technological ties, cultural interchanges, and thc like, amidst continuing reflectionsoreless intensely hostile overall atmosphere. This may proceed to thc point of including agreement on certain confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as mutual notification of troop exercises.
The two sides will upgrade the level of negotiatingThe Soviets will continue lo press for broader ties with Beijing, in lhe belief that agreement on enough small steps willath for progress on major issues. The Soviets will also seek
lo institutionalize tlic negotiating process. Tlie Chinese will probably continue to draw the line well short of the most far-reaching Soviet proposals in the absence of major Soviel military concessions
While continuing to emphasize its maximum demands for large-scale Soviet force reductions in the Soviet Far East. Beijing would welcome even small concessions from the Soviets in their force deployments against China. The Chinese wouldwelcome Soviet troop withdrawals from Mongolia.
For their part, the Soviets will continue their forcein the East. And, the Soviets will probably not make more than token gestures to China over the next two to three years.
Moscow will almost certainly coniinue to withhold major concessions regarding its forces along China's border and in Mongolia until Beijing has made more fundamental concessions than it has yet been willing to consider. There isodest chance that the Soviets willoken pullback ofivision or so from Mongolia during the next two to ihree years. This would no!aterial change of much consequence, but couldymbolic concession of some magnitude that might induce the Chinese to reciprocate in somethus perhaps encourage Moscow to make further concessions.
Even if thereoken Soviet military pullbackV-from Mongolia, however, we doubt that the Chinese would make major concessions on the issues of greatest concern toparticularly the borderSoviet force withdrawals had gone well beyond the token stage.
Nor is the USSR likely to give up its control over the regime in Afghanistan, to abandon support for Vietnam's war effort in Kampuchea, or to surrender its military privileges at Cam Ranh Bay insince3 the Soviets have deployed Badger bombers.
Conringcnf deoelopments that could upset the above-estimated course of Sino-Soviet relations:
escalation ol Vietnamese war efforts in Kampuchea or along Thailand's borders.
North Korean reversion to incendiary policies.
Major Soviet efforts lo destabilize Pakistan.
B
Vietnamese clashes with China, either along the border or in the South China Sea.
adoption of major new policies on the part of post-Deng or post-Cher nenko leaderships.
Japanese move toward major rearmament. Possible alternative outcomes:
is an off chance that during the period of this Estimate the Sino-Soviet relationship could takeuch more hostile character than the Estimate holds probable:
This could occur because so many variables are present, many of them not fully within the control of the present leaderships in cither Moscow or Beijing: the advent of new policies on the part of post-Deng or post-Chcrnenko leadership, initiatives taken by other governments (in Korea or Vietnam, for cxam-pleX and so on.
It does not follow that US interests would necessarily benefit from thc cominguch more frigid Sino-SovietThe effect on US interests would depend on the nature and intensity of thc estrangement between Moscow and Beijing: upoint. US interests would clearly benefit from probable increases in Chinese cooperation against Sovietin the world, in Chinese receptiveness to US advice and counsel,willingness to permit expanded levels of Western economic and technological presence within China. But, if Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point of actual or threatened large-scale hostilities, US diplomatic and security policymaking could be greatly complicated.
there is also an outsideless likely than thethe Sino-Soviet relationship coulduch closer one during the period of this Estimate than we now judge likely:
might come to pass if no great disruptive contingencies should occur; if the Chinese should back away inthough not incertain of their keyif agreements reachedumber of secondary issues should begin toomewhat greater momentum toward Sino-Soviet rapprochement; or if for some reason Beijing's leaders should come to depreciate the value of China's relationships with the United Slates.
- The coming of significantly closer relations between tbe USSR and China could seriously harm US interests; thc warmer the Sino-Soviet relationship, the more damaging to US geopolitical concerns, defense policies, targeting, and alliance systems, to the role of Japan, and to numerous other key US interests
Although (he possibility cannot be excluded that alternative outcomes such as thc above could occur in the Sino-Soviet relationship, we stress that the most likely outcome, by far, is that which this NIE has postulated: namely, that the level of hostility between Moscow and Belling will decrease, that some additional agreements on secondary matters or possibly CBMs will be reached, that at most the USSR mayoken withdrawal ofivision or so from Mongolia, and that continuing basic differences between Moscow and Beijing will not permit any significantly greater degree of rapprochement between them to develop over thc next two to three years.
fr
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DISCUSSION
I
Sino-Soviet
The Wary Thow
5
industrial plants built by the Chinese with Soviet help innd two seta of semiannual consul "alions at theevel have beento maintain channeb of coniact on both contentious and noncontentious issues It Is noteworthy that the scope of many of these developments lias tended to broaden over time, Ira plying that the process of charge has some momentum
t the same time, an Intense conflkl of interest in Asia persists between these two Communist powers. This conflict has many sources, including racialhistorical grievances, territorial aspirations, the difference La military potential, the heritage of past border hostilities, lhe great contrast in population derrsity. Chinese irsernories of put Soviet heavyhand-edness. ideological pretensions, and the rivalry for political advantage in states around tbe periphery of China and, more generally, in the Third World. Fundi mentally, the Soviet Union seeks lo constrain the growth of China's geopolitical weight in Asia, and continues to regard Chinese ambitions as incompatible
Since ibe Intelligence Community last addressed Ihe lubtcci of Stno-Sovielhe USSn and China have begun lo moderate lhe level of hotlllity between them Evidence indicates lhat them is stillostile and distrustful relationship, and lhat thc most important of tlie factors that have preserved this animosity for more Ihan Iwo decades will probably remain substantially urschanged over the next Iwo to three years- Incremental improvements have occurred in secondary aspects of the relationship, and these will probably continue and grow inover time. These improvements will probably continue to haveodest effect on the central issues that divide lhe twocertain developments discussed below.
Over the last three years, and particularly since the fallmportant changes have occurred in the atmosphere of bilateral Si in-Soviet dealings.have been significantly reduced, particularly on the Soviet side Eaclunges of technical, sports, andelegations have increased Student eichanges have also been leinstituted for tlie first time in many yean, althoughery smallin no way even faintly approaching China's present studentwith theino-Soviet dealings on river navigation matters have become more cooperative. Mutual trade was doubledoa target figure ofillion, the highest level since theseend4 trade protocol calls for total Irade lo increase to2lso, local trade crossing points have been opened In Ibe northeastern andtors of lhe Sino-Soviet botder. for lhe first lime since the. The Soviets have proposed and the Chinese have in
accepted Soviet assistance In (heion over Ihc ned few years of two lo four of the
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Aims oixi Tactics In the Sine-Soviet Contultotioni
" jileaden hope lhal these ctxuolti lions will help emote the tee unity ol (he USStVi easternndermine. SI no US and SI no-Japanese rewith reaped to any strategic discussions, and modes ale Chinese hostility.
i'eaden hope lhal the corouliatiorn will help China to mania* the Soviet threat, toioloncrd period oi reduced tensions can facilitatercetteu toward raodernixation
1 led ore barrier tenuora end the lick of armed riaihea
Cain levorace In iti raperti-rc deal;net with the United Stalot
IrKieaae Hade; resume teetWal an.oan.-v
Increase cultural,ornnd other eichamrej
Without having to mile tain
leverage (or ultimate tulntinliil tains al the other's eipeme
The Some'o,
small Reps toward Improved relations.
the rnore difficult ittalegk issues.
The SooJrift thexejote iconl to.*
Imprcrvements In relationsoinl statement of principles
Negotiate lone-term trade agreement, agreements onchanges, etc-
Achieve undeistinding on some bilateral security
party-to-party relations If posstUe.
The CAineieo:
a calculated distance from the USSH. ven while bencfitinst from various Improvements
in relations.
Focus from the outset on maior strategic concerns, even if there Is no hope of agreement in the foreseeable future.
Identity aieas of Soviet policy that can symbolize Ihe Soviet strategic threatay that will gain support for China In the Third World, among Asian countries, and In the West.
The Cninere there/oreo.
Co stew on formal agreements, but withoutprogress on practical issues.
Continue to focus attention on the 'three obstacles" lo full normalization: the Soviet military presence in Mongolia and on the Sino-Soviet border: the Soviet occupationhanistan; utd Soviet aid to the Vietnamese occupation of KBrnpecbea.
its own security and coals. The Chinese, for their part, view their present dealings with Moscow against the backgroundong-term buildup of forces in the Soviet Far East since tbe start of the Brezhnev regime, and of an ongoing Soviet effort to consolidate geopolil-ical advances in Afghanistan and Indochina. Thc Chinese interpret the Soviet buildup as intended to intimidate China and Japan, to facilitate tbc Soviet struggle to advance Soviet presence and influence around Chinas periphery, to assist in thc Soviet worldwide aeopolitical contest with the United Stales, and to offset the growth of US military strength in the western Pacific and the improvement of USiiim^with Japan. Thus, over the last few years China has taken the position that Soviet forcealong China's borders, Soviet moves inand Soviet actions In Afghanistan arc three key issues where there must be some movement on Mos-
cow's part before substantial Sino-Sovietcan take*
n the last year, as bilateral contacts haveeach side has received confirmation that it should not anticipate early progress toward major txmcessions. Beijing has found tliat the prospect of Increased trade and contacts has not caused the Soviet Union to reduce its threat to Chinese security or to alter those policies that undermine China's interests around its periphery. Moscow has found that, in the absence of what it considers radical and unpalatable Soviet concessions to China, Beijing will not abandon lhe use of important tics with the United State* to contest Soviet policy and to reinforce China's security. Although both sides apparently regard thcregistered thus far as useful, almost certainly neither stale is recoriciled to failure to move! thc other
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thus fai on the issues ol greater conocin. Each may retain residual hopes lhal (he further develop"will ol lhe process ol" amelioration will eventually bring ll the cocjeessions it seels, without surrendering the oo rices siom the ctoponent demands
Thc Soviet Perspective
he attitude of Soviet leaders toward China is one of nm's-lcngth encouragement.learly gratified at the recent improvemerrts In the bilateral atmosphere and the trend toward eipanslon of Sino Soviet intercourse. Thc Soviets initiated this current process ineries of publicacting partly in response to perceptionew opening created by the emergence of heightened Sino-US frictions well as in response to setbacks Soviet fortunes had experiencedis thethe derailing of tbc SALTgreement,ecision on intermediate-range nuclear forcesnd sharply advene world reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As in previousol Sino-Soviet diplomatic explorations, dating backhe Soviets have conjistenlly sought to broaden the scope of bilateral dealings as far as the Chinese will permit, seeling both lo create the prereq-uisites for the restoration of some Soviet influence in China and to encourage Beijing to distance itself further from the United Stales. Evidence Indicates lhat Soviet leaders thus hope lo erode (he Slno-US relationship or at leastore balanced Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship, and to render more remote tbe contingency of Soviet involvementoot war.
fmc indication lhat there have been differing views within the Soviet foreign policyin recent years, however, over tlieof initiating thc kind of overtures Moscow began making to Beijing init is not clear hownt any such differences have been. Because all thc USSR's recent proposib lo China are long-estlished themes of Soviet policy lhal evade Beijing's request* for major military concessions, however, they probably are not oblccts of major controversy in Moscow. But. should the Soviet leadership ever come lo weigh seriously the advisability of some recessions lo China on Soviet troop dispositions, the degree of controversy would probably rise sharply.
e*ine4'uent, we belie re tnat there Isconsiderable satisfaction In Moscow that thcmovement seen so firseful Sovietregistered at little cost, the first frull of more
thanears of sporadic efforts to secure Chinese consent to some improvement in the relationship without major Soviet concessions in advance- Soviet leaders doubtless regard Chinese modification ofattitudes asnilateral tacit Chinese concession.
S Because no significant Soviet concessions ire yet involved, roritinualion of the strategy now beingtoward China lo attempt to change Chinese policy is generally approved in the Soviet leadership. There appears to be solid support in thc Sovicl elite for further efforts to eipand trade and contacts along present lines, along with renewed attempts to persuade the Chinese to accept bilateral improvements In areas where ihey remain recalcitrant, particularly their consent to top-level meetings. The Soviets wilt surely continue lo press them hard for further substantive and jymbolic movement, across Ihe spectrum ofrelit ions, in order to bring Ihe level of Sino-Soviet dealings closer to that existing between the United Stales and China. Moscow and Beijing have agreed lo double the level of their trade, and evidence indicates that Moscow would like lo be able to raise the turnover still further. Acutely conscious of the acceleration ofAmerican mutual ministerial visits3 and the schedulingew Presidential visit to China inhe Soviets chile at lhe restrictions Beijing continues to Impose on their own reciprocalexchanges with China, and seek to upgrade, the level of coniact. The Soviets would probably like toestoration of bilateral party to-party contacts severed by Beijing Insince thev constitute an aspect of tbe relationship that the United States of riccessity could not match.
addition,lelv to be wide supportdecisionmaking circles for concrete effortslo Chinese concerns tf.it seetr,to run counterpohcy. One lead inga*jtjiiitvevival of JapaneseThe Soviets have already made efforts lo use(unuicccssfully lo date)ehicle with whichSirao-Soviet polilical cooperation againstStales, and Ihey will almostrts in the future.
the same lime, however, availableI bat Soviet leaden regard (lieIn Sino-Soviet talks to date as superficial.the Soviets welcome Chinese critkisms ofStales and China's abandonment of calls forunited front" against lhe Soviet Union,Soviet spokesmen have made it clear that, they
-lop Wei.,
Cnitsese policy as still fimdainenully hostile to Soviet coals, and as aliened with thc United States against the USSR in most important respects
'lsiitheiinotc, the question of how to deal withensitive issue In Mcncow. The available evidence suggests that two currents ofon thb matter exist In tbe Soviet foreignbllshrnenL One, which appears to be much the weaker of tbe two, seems to favor more active Soviet steps to conciliate China, pcrssibly Including some concessions regarding troop dispositions on the border. {Seend the appendedhose who lean to thb position evidently argue that only through such concessions can the Soviet Union extract major dividends from favorable tendencies in Beijing Certain of the USSR's academic specialists on China takeosition. These figures have drawnfrom the Increased Chinese civility indealings, from the disappearance of Chinesecharges against the Soviet Union, from tbe similarities between the Chinese and Soviet social systems and state structures, and from the resentment shown by some Chinese leaders over what they regard as (he subversive effect of Western influence. Such trends, these figures argue, bode well lor future trends in Chinese foreign policy.
uch thought, however, appears lo be considers-bly outweighed by dominant forces in the Soviel Figure Z
Sonet Peacetime Force Manning Opposite
4
f uoops
KtCure 3
Active Ground Forces Divisions Opposite
Tout
Iradership that are ttrrsogly suspicious of Beijing's intention, particularly while Deng Xiaoping terrains China's boa These views seem particularly strong in the Central Committee apparatus and among thc Soviet military. These harder-line figures rxobablv believe that recent Chinese concilia lory behaviorthe USSR has been driven in large partesire to exert pressure on the Uniled States for bilateral concessions within an overall framework of coratinued reposition to Sraviet policy by both powav Those Soviet officials are apparently vividly aware of the extent to which tlie USSR's Interests and ambitions clash with China's in Asia, and of the fact that the United States and China continue to work la parallel to contest Soviet policies in Indochina andThey have remarked that recent Chineseto the US Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and thc President to visit China are furtber coofirmation of these attitssrJes. These Soviet skeptics apparently interpret these Chinese Invitations asof the strength of Beijing's long-term interest In acquisition of American industrial technoloscv relevant to China's defense against the Soviet Union. Tbey almost lertainly doubt that the Chinese can be in-duccd to abandon thb relationship with the United States merelyesult of improvements in China's trade and contacts with the USSR, akhough they apparently see no haim in attempting to'do so
Although thesettitudes do not eaclude ill Soviet concessions to China dvinoe the peiiod of thii Kstimate, they suggest thai any Rich concessions are likely to be hugely token ot almosphetic in nature, in the absence of major changes In tbe Chinese positionenerational luinover in the Soviet leadership that mightiffeient set of altitudes to theepresentatives of ill tendencies in Moscow, however, doulrfless hope thatctors in China or the United Statesultiplication of Si no American frictions that will in turn produce major changes in China's posture toward both sorter powers. And there clearly appears to be general agieement in the Sovietthat thc USSRested interest in limiting Si no-US cooperation and. If possible. Ineterioration of Washingtoo-Beijin* reUlions
or the moment, the passing of Andropov and the advent of Chernenko do provide Moscow wiih an opportunity lo make another effort to advance tbe Sino-Soviet dialogue. There have alreadyew such signs from tlie Sovieteiamplc. hintsore forthcoming stand on the question of China'sature But CherncnVo has bluntlyMoscow's refusal to budge on the basic issues in dispute; Afghanistan. Indochina, Soviel force strength adjacent to China The early emphasis of the new Soviet leadership has been on eontinuit, in policy, and Iheie has been no sign that Chernenko has made improved relations withop priority. Fuither-rnore. the continued prominence of Foreign Minister Cromvko and Defense Minister Ustinov suggests that Moscow will make few, if any. major departures on foreign policy issues at the outset under Chcrneisko His leadership is likely to Stick with tbe present course of "small Jjaformalization of relations with China.
The Chinese
IS. Although tlie initiative for the recent bilateral improvements has come from thc Soviet Union, the important shifts In policy leajuircd to allow anyto begin have come from China As already noted, most of those measures that have now been put into effect had for many years beenproposed by Moscow and rejected by Beijing.ontinuing central Issue for tlie future is that many important proposals long on the Sovietsuch as requests for summit meetings and restoration of partyhave not been accepted by China,
'Tho*iseased Inetail In ihc aectloo besjir.nl ns at
he degree of movement Ihat has occurred In Sino-Soviet bilateral relations has resulted in part from gradual chances in the thinking of Chinese leadeis about how much improvement in these dealings Is compatible with China's defense of its geopolitical interests against the Soviet Union. This evolution In Chinese attitudes beganas halted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but has resumed againe believe that thb pattern of sporadic stalling and stopping in Chinese policy towardwith the Soviet Uruoo has been influenced not only by security and foreign policy considc rat ions, but also by Ihe Interplay of differing opinions within thc Cliinesc leadership Such differences from time to time seem to have affected Chinese tactics toward both the Srtviet Union and tbe United States.
The most recent modifications in Chinese calcu lit ions about the Soviet Union have emerged as partroader pattern of changes In the Chinese postuie toward the world, carried out Incrementally over the last Ihree years, aimed atoteimage on the international scene. Whileonsiderable decree of cooperation with Washington against Moscow. Beijing has thus sought to blur the impression created in thehina almost totally identified with the United Stales in polar Opposition to lhe Soviet Union. To this end. China hat lepudiated the notiontrategic alliance with tlie United States, has abaridoned earlier callsworld united front" against the Soviel Union, and hascontracted the scope of its criticism of Ibe USSR.
The Chinese have evidently decided to make these changes in their general postureixture of reasons. Certain of these shifts were reflected in China's ciploralory talks with Moscoweijing was later Influenced lo Increase somewhat Its distance from America12 because the rise of bilateral difficulties tended lo strengthen longstanding skepticism in Beijing about the wiUingncss of the US government and public to take rbks for China in the eventhinese crisis with tbe Soviet Union Beijing's leaders were apparently also iiilerested in using thc process ofovirjt amelioration as an instrument of leverage oo the United States,in the two most Important areas offriction: the US teUtiotuhlp with Taiwan, and US policy regarding the transfer of advanced industiial lechnology to China. Simultaneously, the Chinese apparently hoped that the resulting shifts In relations with the United States wouldorebackdrop for Chinese efforts t0 elicit Soviet concessions
vidence indicates that Beijing's leaders found China's partial disassociatioo from the United States convenient in other respects. It enabled China to separate itself from identification with those USin theJThird World that Beijing disapproves. It also maoc It somewhat easier for Belling to court political actors hostile to the United States butfor Chinese Interests; and to strive to avoid isolation from important sections of Western public opinion opposed to certain specific American policies.
At the same time, however. China has been reminded by Soviet Intransigence that, whatever the uncertainties in the Sino-US relationship, thisprovideselcome margin of security. Because Besting has continued tooviet threat to Chinese security and undiminished Soviet opposition lo Chinese interests in Asia. It has also had an ongoing reason toay to compromise differences with Washington China has therefore sought not to eliminate ils strategic cooperation with the United States against the USSR, but rather to redefine lhat cooperation in terms that preservedvantages for China while giving Beijing greater flexibility and leverage In dealing with both powers.
In92 China opened talks with the USSBajor step in relations with lhe United States had assured It that ties with Washington hadhe visit of then Vice President Mondale. and2 the conclusion of theugust communique on arms sales to Taiwan. It is likely that the Chinese leaders felt that these actions, which stabilised relations with Ihe United Slates, were important prerequisites for the talks lhal were opened with thc USSR shortly thereafter.
QjfsTJfic tlie improvement that has taken place In the atmosphere of Sino-US relations over the past year, we believe that China will continue to disavow any intention lo join Washingtonormal strategic relatlunship. Also, the Chinese wiih continueoft-pedal attacki on Soviet policies in some areas of the world, and will continue lo criticize US policies on occasion. And, additional new areas of Chinesewith the United Slates could emerge. But
Belting's leaders will also continue lo hold on to thc relationship with the United Stales as Important to China's security and economic development, and as the essential underpinning for Iheir exploratorywith Moscow.
Chineseumber of associatedforiessening the level of tensions with the USSB:
A desire to reduce tensions and relieve thc pressure on China resulting from its two-front confrontation with the USSB and Vietnam.
A desire to put pressure on Vietnam. Beijing Is well aware of Hanoi's discomfiture over Sino-Soviet contacts and ncRotistions. and ofobvious anxiety at the possibility of Soviet betrayal of Vietnam's interests to apr>ease China. However remote China's leaders consider the likelihood ofurn in Soviet policy, they welcome the difficulties the issue has created for Vietnam, and they doubtless hope for aexacerbation of Soviet-Vietnimese
The desire toalmer strategicthat willargin of safety for Chinese economic rsiiorities, for despite China's military weaknesses Its leaden arc determined toeasured pace of militaryand to avoid hasty diversion of badly needed resources from the civilian economy to lhe military sector.
A desire to further diversify the foreign sources of input into Chinas modernization Beijing is not likely to cease relying primarily upon the capitalist industrialized world for such inputs, despite Soviet hopes to change this priority. But Deng and his associates have apparently come lo believe that expanded importsimited use of expertise from ihe Soviet Union and Eastern Europe canseful supplementary rote In modernization. This view hajapparcnlly been reinforced by the difficulties' China hasexperienced lo assimilating advanced Western or Japanese technology. Evidencethe Chinese have come to believe that some less advanced but easier to assimilate Soviet riilddlc-level technology should be given alarger role in modernization, andIn reeqtripping some of the industrial plants built with Soviet help in. Evidence also Indicates thai Beijing's leaden remember past Soviet efforts to exploit Chinese economic dependence for political punooses; thev areunlikely to allow therruelvcs to be pul Inosition of dependence again. We believe that with thb considcratton in mind they will place sharp limits on the number and activities of Soviel technical experts used In China to help in plant modernization.
A belief on the part of Beijing's leaders that China can make good use of expanded raw material imports from lhc Soviet Union, and that thc USSBonvenient outlet forand other Chinese light industrial products that are surplus to Chinese exporte-
lo
whereeaden also apparently find cort-venicnl Ihe (art that barter trade with the Soviet Union conserves hard currency.
A Chinese desire toolitical pre*European states and lo eipand useful economic relations withrooesa that will be furtheredontext oi Chinese improvements with Moscow.
A Chinesenot thelseijing may eventually obtain major concessions from Moscow thai would reduce Sovietpressure atound China's periphery.
vailable evidence Indicates that, afler two years of consultations with Moscow. China retains little expectation of receiving meaningful concessions regarding Indochina or Af ehanimn for the foreseeable future. On tbe other hand, Chinese behavior suggests lhal some elements in Beijings leadership may mil retain hopes that concessions can eventually beretarding Ihc Soviet force posture to China's north. Such Chinese views have apparently been encouraged by hints advanced by the Soviet Union implying the possibility of eventual unspecifiedregarding military deployments. Thc Chinese may also harbor hopes of orjtairung such gains because they perceive the Soviet Union as heavily burdened by ilv economic difficulties, hi military commitment! In Afghanistan and Europe, and heightened Sovielwith the United States. Finally. lhe Chinese may have been led to hope that the tougher US posture toward Moscow In recent yean would enhanceeverage over the USSR, and thereforeSoviet
espctaaT their reasons to expand bilateral dealings with the USSR, however, the Chinese have powerful reasons to maintain broils on their dealings with ihe.USSR:
Perhaps most important, the need to avoidlive impression In the USSR that the Chinese leadership is permanently reconciled to the statusn East Asia, and is willing to accept tlie Soviel presence in Soutlseait Asia and aSoviet force buildup in East Asia aswith good relations
--Chinese care not lo go so farroving relations with Moscow that thb mighl jeopardiie the gainsChina receives from its existingwith tho Uniied States and other non-Communist states. China's leaders wish lo be able to imply loa prod for concessionsisincentive to more forceful policies
toward China- -that ihey retain the option lo greatly strengthen security cooperation with thc United States; and they also Strongly desire to maintain US acquiescence in the flow ofteclusology lo China from lhe United States. Japan, and Western Europe, and to enlarge lhat flow into more sophisticated and sensitive areas EvTdencc indites lhat Chinese leaders also wish to preserve the option to purchase some ad-varsced weapons production technology from the West, and particularly from the United States, believing that the creation of expectations of far-reaching changes In Sino-Soviet relations could alarm the United States sufficiently to endanger all these benefits
wish net lo be perceived by Third World leaden as moving closer to tbc USSR Beijing has found lhat Chinese actions viewed In Asia as seeking to rxopiiiale Moscow can evoke negative reactions from certain states, notably Japan and Thailand.
or all these reasons, we judge that, in the absence of major Soviet concessions. Beiiirg over lhe next two to three yean will probably continue lo resist Soviet pressure for bilateral improvementsype thai would be likely to raise serious warning flags elsewhere- Chinese response lo Soviet overtures will therefore continue to be diffexeoliaied: in some areas Beijing will probably allow further rarogrest, while in othenikely to continue to reject Soviet requests:
tn the first area, Beijing will probably consent to some reciprocal visits by important government figures (without adusowiedgiog their party sta tusi as well as to continued exMrtswn of dealings on those fronts where improvernerrls havebegun in the lastyean: notably, student exchanges, and multipbeation of eco-nomie, sports, and cultural contact* and tradewliere agreement may be reachedive-year trade pact
In lhe second area are those Soviet desires whose satisfaction Beijing will probably regard as not Justified by Soviet conduct and as likely to be overly provocative to the Urated States. For example. In lhe absence of major Soviet conoes sions (which are themselveseijing will probably not agree lo the Soviet request, pressed by Moscowormal umbrella document to establish the underpinningew Sino-Soviet reUtlonship.o bto agree during the period ofrriite to reciprocal vlsiu by top party leaden, and Ihe
chances are .ess than even that the Chinese will consentestoration of party relations.we do not believe that Beijing wfD consent to any overtures from Moscow for concrete Sino-SOviffpoUtlcal cooperation against the United States.
The Major Issues Precluding Sino-Soviet Improvement
three primary proconclitions thatposedajor improvement in theare that the USSR significantly reducepower (nuclear and nonnuclcar) adjacentcease Its support for Vietnam's occupationand withdraw its combat troopsThese issues have different degreesto Moscow and Beijing; and It shouldthat, if past Chinese negotiating patterns"preconditions" often remain in abut ultimately give way somewhat in factare the three primary issues, in orderimportance to tbe Sino-Soviet relationship.
Afghanistan
Evidence Indicates that tbc Chinese regard live issue of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as the least important of thc threehe Chinese interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in9 as alarming new evidence ofwillingness to use force to attain its goals, andignificant advance of the Soviet military presence in Asia,ew potential for eventual further advaiiccjjF^oviet influence, lo particular. China's tcaden-trfc almost certainly concerned that success for the USSR's "southward strategy" in Afghanistan could endanger China's close ally Pakistan and thc oil routes of thc Persian Culf so important to the West Beijing also sees the Soviet assertion of hegemony In Afghani-stan os. among other things, an extension cf other Soviet efforts to encircle China geopolltically, and asof an unending struggle lo counteract China's influence in Asia.
At the same tone, however, the Chinese have not seen the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, remote from China because of geography and terrain, as adding significantly to the Soviet iTtilitary threat to China^lso. because of Afghanistan's remoteness. Bel-lings seme of its vested interest in tbe political orientation of this country has always been much weaker than its view of ils stake in Indochina. Finally. Bcjing has come to regard the extended punitive war Moscow is waging in Afghanistanrotracted
source of Sovietpoint of politicala drain on Soviet resources,ossible constraint oo Soviet ability to take military initiatives elsewhere. Beijing's leaders therefore see the present situation as offering important oompetuatioa forfailure to withdraw, and do not seem lo be greatly concerned at the prospect of continued stalemate
fudge that the Soviets are unlikely toefforts to consolidate control overSoviel leaders are unlikely to modify their viewimportance ofriendly regimethere that also servesridgeSoviet power and influencein Southwest Asia. Thb view hasreinforced by the Soviet commitment thereSoviet local domination. In any case,leaden almost certainly regard China'ssecondary concerning Afghanistan. If morenegative consequences of thb policy arclo modify Soviet behavior there, the Sovietsnot do so to appease China.
Indochino
Beijing's leadersar graver view of Soviet actions in Indochina, which they regard aswith China's security.he Soviet Union has provided economic, political, and military backing for Vietnam's efforts toits domination over the Irsdochinesc peninsula and to exclude Chinese influence from the region. The Soviet Union has also servedizable deterrentajor Chinese intervention to halt Vietnam's conquest ofChina has been compelled lo rely instead onampuchean irisurgency that for five years has denied final victory to Hanoi and Moscow. Thb insurgency has been nourished in part by Chinese weapons and supplies funncled through Thailand; as well as by the diplomatic support oi* China, the ASEAN countries, and the United States; and,by US security backing for Thailand against the threat of Vietnamese reprisal. In return for thc USSR's commitments lo Hanoi, Soviet influence has followed In thc wake of Vietnam into Kampuchea and Laos, and the Soviet Union has obtained use of Cam Banh Bay to support growing air, naval, and intelligence capabilities on China's southeastern flaruV
Available evidence suggests that, whileleaden do not regard the present Soviet position in Indochina as com parable with Afglianistan inthey surely regard It as an importantgain registered at the expense of both the United States and China. They are well aware of Chinese
concetti overo-front military confrontation Beijing hai been forced to acceptnd they doubtless consider thai the Soviet deterrent factoi lias humiliated Beijing by demonstrating Cninese inability effectively to coerceao area ofCKinc^sSetensions lo dominant influence They also probably regard their allance with Vietnamource of augmented Soviet pressure oo China which has already paid dividends in the new Chinese willing ness to accept Soviet proposals for modest bilateral Improvements Over and above these considerations. Soviet leaders almost certainly see their growingpresence at Cum Hanliajor advance thai enhances Soviet capabilities to conduct and support naval and air operations in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The Soviet relationship with Hanoi that yields this Soviet nailitaryot wtuSout frictions and problems for both sides. Evidence clearlythat the Soviets are sensitive u< the costs of supporting Vietnam: and that the Vietnamese resent Moscow's attempis to establbh Its own independent ties with Hanoi's satellites. Laos and Kampuchea, and fear that the USSR might someday betray the interests of Vietnam in favor of its huge neighbor. China The demonstrated behavior of the USSR and Vietnam males it clear, however, that both parties ccxmoVr their relationship on balance loost beneficial one.
Hence, we believe it unlikely that thewill change their course in Kampuchea in any major way, or that significant change will take place In tlie Moscow-Hanoi relationship over the neat two to three years, or indeed perhapsuchtiod.leaders are well acquainted with the intransigence of the Viensaanese leadership, and almost certainly believe that only drastic Soviet peesoo Hanoi might conceivably bring sufficient Vietnamese concessions to utlsfy Beijing, but that the atlrmpted use of such picssures would gravelythe Soviet relationship with Vietnam, tlie Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh. and indeed Soviel objectives in Southeast Asia To run political risks of thb magnitude concerning Vietnam, the Soviets would want commensurate gains in advance from Beijing
The Soviets are unwilling lo risk losing the bird in thepresent advantages in Indochina for the uncertainties ol hypcthetical Chinese gratl-lode.have cortsbtently refused to bargain with Beijing on the subject of Indochina during their bilateral talks with the Chinese. Thev have on occasion gone so far as to attempt to intimi-
date ASEAN states, on Vietnam's behalf, intoopposition to the fait accompli In Kampuchea. They have maintained intact their deployments along China's northern borders, wliich constitutethreats against lhe possibilityew Chinese mihlary reaction to Vietnam's operatirans to China's south In sum. the inertia created by eibting Soviet geopoliticalkety to continue lo dorm-oate Soviet policy in Indochina, god lo perpetuate Chinese resent merit.
rxmfideticc In this conclusion hasstrengthened byjhe Soviet deploymentof ninead-
some five configured as bomben or air-to-surface missileCam Ranh. The lisdficrs apparently will remain under Soviet control and probably willontuiuous pcrsencr there, routing pcricdicalry back to the USSR and being replaced by ethers. If thc Badgers remain at Cam Ranh. the Chinese may surmise that the Soviet Union has extorted from Vietnam permission for thb deployment as partial compensation for thc Sov<et refusal to betray Hanoi to conciliate rjcqing Chinese leaden almost certainly interpret the advent of the Badger bombers as fresh evidence that the Sovietkdy io remain intraiaojen: on the Indochina Issue
The Augmenting of Soviet Military Power Adjacent lo China
In view of the poor prospects for Sino-Sovie! accommodation regarding Afgiuivistan ot Indochina, the thirdQuestion of whether the Soviet leaden will make major concessions regarding fotce deptoyrjsent policy Inlikely toreat influence on the evolution of tbe Sino-Sovietover the next few yean We review io turn, below, the evidence of existing trends In Soviel and Chinese deployments, tlie ixastbiDttes andof Soviel concessions, and the role of Use Slno-Soviet border dbpulo In Soviet uunklng on theseen..
Trends in Soviet Deployments andTbe improvements poled in the SrXHSovtet lelstionshrp have taken place in the face of aVlengthening of the Soviet military position in the eastern USSR and the Pacific. The pace ofbuildup has tapered off from that of thend; Moscow now seems intent onlongstanding force modernization plans In thc area, upgrading tlie capabilities of deployed units* and increasing logistic support Nonet Mess, one-fourth of
all Soviel Croundow stationed opposite China. Ground units in Ihe eastern USSR and Mongolia devoted lo the anti-China mission includective divisions and an IndcneuiitV-army corps. These units are supported by wellircraft andirDuring lhe past year, while Sino-Soviethave been in progress, Ihe Soviets Itave added Iwo motorized rifle divisions to their active forces,otorized rifle divisionankandighter-bomber regiment facing the aiinese. In addition, al least one air assault unit and an additional artillery brigade are now being formed along the bordec with China. Meanwhile, thc Soviets over the last year have also made costly Investments in miliury logistic capabilities in Ihe Far East, and have begun construction thereew garrison, probably intended lo house part of another new division. We think it likely the Soviets will also continue over Ihe next few years an ongoing construction program to eipand fortified zones in certain sectors of lhc Sino-Soviet border.
The Soviets have also continued slowly lo strengthen their military position in Mongolia, despite China's known sensitivity on this subject and repeated Chinese demands for reduction of ihese deployments. There lhe Soviets have constructed newir defense regimental complexes and radar stations,older tanks with2 models, andsome of their artillery and armored personnel carrier holdings. In result, the Soviet army inwhich ii in position lo threaten the North China plain and routes to Beijing, is the most combat-ready force facing China andelatively high priontfin the USSR's gradual modernization of Far East equipment.
In addition, the weight of tbe Soviet strategic nuclear threat directed against China is continuing to grow even while the small-scale improvements lo Sino-Soviet relations proceed. The Soviets currentlyaunchers deployed atases in Siberia-plusdditionalaunchers In the central USSR that could hit targets in westernarc constructing facilities at two more basesunchcrr. It should be noted that the presentorce threatens China with morethan were on lhe older single-reentry-vehlcle missllea^ihat were directed againsi targets in China before deployment of the
the Chinese face not only the presentand Soviet ICBMs.onsiderable arraySoviet nuclear weapon systems as well:
Backfire and Badger bombers, shorter range ballistic missiles, tactical aircraft, and twolass ballistic missile submarines In the Sea of Japanf"*
3
we judge that the great majority of all riet strategic targets in Asia are probably in China, although the Soviet nuclear systems arc flexible and could be shifted to other targets. For their part, however, Beiifng's leaders are convinced that China remains the primary target of these variousdespite considerable Soviet efforts in dealing with Asian stales to obfuscate the purpose of the USSR's heavyeployment In Asia.
total number of aircraft assigned toIn Ibe Farxpected lo declinethe next few years. Nonetheless,in aircraft, avionics, and weaponwill allow the Soviets to upgrade their abilitytheir assigned missions while deployingto each regiment. In strategic aviation,deployment of the new Blackjack bomberill highlight developments. Thewith increased numbers of Bear Ha formidable standolf air-launched cruisecapability east of lhehirdwill further Increase strategic strikethc tactical airey aevelopmcnl will beol lookdown/shootdown fighters: theFlanker, and Fulcrum. These aircraft willand more maneuvcrablc, and will carryfor both dogfighting and engagementsrange engagements. Cround attack aircraftto be equipped with new longer'afr-to-surfaoe missiles. This improvedcapabilily .will be complemented by tbeof Frogfoot and additional helicopterslo supporting Soviet ground forces alongborder.
Soviet Pacific Fleet has significantlyits size and capabilily over the part decademore modern submarines, surfaceamphibious ships, and aircraft* During the next
9 major improvemrrXi to Pa<lnc Fled Forces have included frontline EMUU (nuclear)ass (norma-cfea.Jatlaek tubnuruvss.umber' ol KrctU and Kara cruisers (CCr) and Krwak frigate*vxri Roxot amptarbtoul(LPOxL Bearlona-onre intimtnbuine' (ASW) tuoralt, Hebi ASW helicopters, and two rcarimeob et Oaclrllre strike bornbenvighter-be oibrr resiment has been termed In the Pacific Fleet. Not least, the Soviel Pacific Fleet Hu acquired lhe atnw^dbcixawd naval and air (acUttks at Cam Bahn. Vietnam
e
yean ibe new Kirov-clan cruiser (CGNl Sovre-rnennvv- and Udaloy-dass destroyersass attack submarines (SSNi) are expected to be introduced into the Soviet Pacific Fleet. These unils willificanlly improved weapons and sen-son for anfrsurface attack, air defease, and aiatbzatxna-rine warfare. We believe the Soviet Pacific Fleet will continue to be structured primarily to oppose US naval forces altliough it will also devote attentionto counter other potential threats such as those from some Japanese or Chinese navalhile the overall force level of the Soviet Pacific Fleet will remain about the same, its capability will increase with the introduction of new classes of submarines, principal surface combatants, amphibious ships, and shipboard aircraft.
verall, given these trends in Soviet force strength, the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship over the neat few yean will be stronglyy the decisions (he Soviet regime adopts regarding force modernization and deployment policy In Asia. On both the nuclear and the conventional rides, however, the momentum of clisting SovietImpetus for further irscrernental growth rather than either stagnation orunlikely to be overcome.
omparttrioe Chinese Militaryhe Soviets confront (a) Chinese ground forces that are much larger than Soviet Far East ground forces in manpower, but much weaker In firepower, maneuver capability, and air support; and (b) Chinese strategic nuclear forces that are still fairly small in size and rdy upon concealment and mobility rather than numbers for their deterrent effect. In the four Chinese military regions bordering on the USSR and Mongolia, the Chinesefile ploy someain-force combat divisions, which arc largelyundred miles and more back from the border, defensivelyto trade space for time in the eventoviet attack and to guard against the raosribility ofSoviet assaults to overrun Beijing or to cut off Northeast China In the last four yean, the Chinese haw*Increased their tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti aircraft in the border regions by someercent, and they have formed new units and strengthened their fortificalionj along probable invasion routes.
n recent years tbe Chinese "C"
n
-kiTor.veter-raner IC! '
supplemented by the motyjily
MPBMias well as
the availability ofDtermedialc- range bombers, all of which can deliver nuclear weapons to parts of Sovietn addition, thc Chinese In recent yean have launched their first ooclexr-poweredmissile submarine, intended to carry theLBM (which ii Hill undergoing flight tests).of this weapon system as an additional element in the Chinese deterrent against the USSR Is eapected4inally, the Chinese have also shown consider able sensitivity about their potential vulnerability lo Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons, and have conducted and publicized exercises that reckon with this contingency. The Chinese have no deployed weapons comparable to Soviet tacticalweapons in flexibility and accuracy, and they probably bebevc that the Soviets are more readily inclined to use such weapons in the Far East than In Europe Overall, although the Chinese are making important improvements In their deterrent and war-fighting capabilities; they are not closing the gap in relation to the growing and improving Soviet forces that face them, oo the contrary. Ihey are continuing to fall further bchind-
The Future of SS-ZQi in Asie and in Europe. We believe the Soviets will fill out the existing fourivisions in Siberiaotal of sii bases each by tlie, Because eachaniesr-three reentry vehicles, the advent of this IRBM capaoilrty in East Asia has already significantly expanded nodes'against China. With (our divisions of sixeach, the Soviets wouldissilesarheads lor an initial strike against Asian targets In addition, by the end of the decade the Soviets may begin loew 1BBM to replace thend may also deploy ground-launched cruise missiles In the region
eployments reflect long-range Soviet strategic plans These are Importantly in flues *ced by the visible trends in Chinese weaponsnd deploymenl policy, and by the prospects of increased US military strength in the Far East In. In both regards, the Soviets will almost certainly lake action in advance to guarantee undiminished force advantages against worst-case eventualities
he Andropov regime showed lhat, givenstrategic political gains concerning Europe, it might be willing lo contemplate curtailment of its amuch greateruildup; this will
o* be deployed. ThedcterreiU effect of these weapons, which can reach Moscow, is
probably* characterise ihr Chernenko regime'ias well. During die INI" negotiations, the Sovieu offered not lo transfer SS-ZOt to Asia if an agreement acceptableUSSR malerialiied They lubse-quently offered, if such an agieemenl were adopted, to halt neweployment in East Asia through new constructkm so long as deployments in that region aimed al Soviet territory did not subsequently inhese proposal* reflect the great irnportance to the Soviet Union of an advantageous INFand implied willingness at the time to trade off planned enlargement of their existing nuclearin East Asia in order to prevent American deployments in Europe Secondarily, those Sovietwere also intended as gestures to Japan and China, calculated to place thc onus for any father Sovietuildup in Siberia on US depioymeot policy in East Asia.
he future of therogram in Asia and the ultimate site of the total Soviet nuclear threat againsi China have thus been made partly dependent upon the prospects for INF agreement in Europe, In (he wake of tbe beginning ol Western intermediate-range nuclear deployments innd the Sovietleast for the timeINF negctUliorrs. tbe Soviets are very unlikely soon to halteployment in Siberia. In the continued absence of an INF agreement, we believe that within the neat two to three yean the Soviets will probably not stop furthereployments in Asia merely to conciliate Beiiiiig and Tokyo.
Wejieljeve there Is even less chance tlian this that MceeSV over this period will actually reduce itseployments as the Chinese have deananded. either unilaterally or as the result of Sino-Soviet bariaming. The Soviet leaders are likely to beIhat an acceptable nuclear arms agreesnent can be negotiated with Beijing In view of the enormous asvmmetries in tlie bilateral balance of forces.
The luue of the Ground Force Foifnreto China. In principle, the Chinese demand tlie simple elimination ol the Soviet capabilities that threaten them: ihateduction of tbe Soviet force structure in East Asia, back down lo the level existing almost two decades ago inay. The Chinese-Jus* privately indicated that they would be
Aa mm ltw casetheir moralorwo onn Furcoc the SovieUalmuM otrttlaly InlrnxO iSetr coodiiKxi al otter to hallromise lo Mp ihem oH al Iht level created by eompletioo ol all eonati.rolian tgtfa in piifteQ.
satisfied with much less lo start with, and some leaders In Beijing may hopenilateral Soviet local pullback of some forces may eventually be procured that wouldrocess of Soviet reductions that might later beeneral Soviet pullback to coistiiiale Beijing appears highlyreasons
Because of geography, Soviel forces In thesector of the border, which must defend large vulnerable cities and the Trans-Siberian Railroad near the frontier, have no dcfenso-ln-depth option and thus are necessarily deployed much closer to the border than Chinese maln-lorce units Consequently, any ostensibly mutual pullback of Soviet and Chinese forces from the border must in fact benilateral Soviet withdrawal unless it is hmited toborder guard forces at tbe frontier Itself. This is likely to remain politically unacceptable to any set of Soviet leaders.
In the narrow Far East Military District salient Irom Khabarovsk lo Vladivostok, tbe mostpart of the Soviel Far East and the most heavily defended area of its size In thc Soviet Union. Soviet forces have little room toor spaceullback.
There are some points on the bprderullback could be construed as compromising Soviet border claims
Furthermore, we believe that Moscow will not agree even lo selected fullbacks of selected units In certain localities. The Soviets are highly reluctant to agree to unilateral constraints oo their troopand more broadly perceive their overall relationship with China as Impelling them to continue strengthening their force dispositions opposite China. In recent years, the Soviets haveattern of activating at least one new division each year In the Far East from existing mobilization bases that hold tlie pre-positioned equipment for such divisions Wc have idenlified additional mobilization bases in the Far East that we believe thc Soviets intend to convertinto active divisions over tbe next few years, with the additions entering active status at about thc same measured pace we have seen in the past We see little reason to believe that the SovieU have yet decided to alter this long-term pattern of behavior.
This Soviet pattern of thinking has been most clearly shown in the Soviet Union's refusal. Ih Its talks ihus far with Beijing, lo discuss changes In Soviet
military deployment* in Mongolia/ In principle,he sector in which noticeable Soviet concessions could be made to China without major impact upon the Soviet Union's ability to defend itself against China. In Mongolia ahuiewhe Sovietsarge buffer against China and CouH if necessary trade space for time. Thc token withdrawal ofoviet division or so from Mongolia northward to tlie Soviet-Mongolian border would not endanger any Soviet city, and would not expose any Soviet territory to Chinese attack. Additionally, over thc past year and more, thc Soviets have significantly upgraded the equipment andilities of Mongolia's own aimed forces.03 the Soviets provided the Mongolians with enough additional equipment to upgrade their two editing brigades to motorized rifle divisions and form two additional MRDs, although all four are at low strength.
t seems likely that the Soviet leaders intend to withhold concessions regarding their forces Inuntil Beijing has made rnore fundamentalthan it has yet been willing to consider. We donoderate chance, however, that within the not two to three years the Soviet leaders will be willing to offer China some token concession regarding their force posture in Mongolia, in the hope ofa process of mutual concessions thatreakthrough to major Sovietocal pullback of perhaps one or so of the USSft's five divisions now in Mongolia triight betep. If the Soviets did makeithdrawal, this woulda symbolic concession of some significance. It would not be too meaningful In military terms,since such_ units could be reintroduced Into Mongolia slAy/itime. If tbe Soviets didivision or more, we judge that the Chinese would welcome tbe move and would wish to respondashion likely to encourage more such Soviet gestures Beijing's response, at least initially, would alsoikely to be largely symbolic in nature.
n tlie meantime, in the absence of the kind of large-scale withdrawals the Chinese are requesting at the moment (for the total bordert is probable
Sovieu stale lhal ihey wtU not ducraa their troops in Mongolia because thisailerthirdhe Chin car almost certainly regard thisypocritical evasion of the iarue. TV Soviet Vernon effectively cootroh the Moegolua icximc. and any MonjoUaD reservations about possible Soviet troopwouldelatively minor eewauoeratieei (or Moscow tt the SoVieu feh some withdrawal* to be tehee*lie deniable. We abo believe ihat the Soviel Union don raot need five efiviiinea in Moncolia either to enforce lhe WaJty of the Ttedenbal readme or to uleeuird Mongolia against Chinese attack.
that the Soviet Union will continue to proposesubstitutes. Since thc, the Soviets have unsuccessfully offered the Chinese proposalsonaggression pact and for an agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union in thc last year has evidentlyumber of additional suggestions for corificlencc-building measuresllhough the Chinese will probably continue to regard most such Soviet proposals as essentially evasions of China's central concerns, they may no longer reject all such suggestions out of hand It Is possible that China will come to see agreexnent with the Soviet Union on one or more selected CBMs, such as mutualof troop exercises, asarginal usefulness in helping to reduce tensions. Should any CBMs In (act be agreed upon during the next two to three years, it would probably not have an early impact upon the hard issues separating China and tbe USSR regarding the status of the border or the question of overall Soviel force duposiuoos. Agreement even on such superficial CBM measures, however, would give some Impetus to the process of improving Siho-SovJet dealings.
Ihe Central Role of the United States and Japan Ihe American Factor
The Sino-Soviet future will notilateral affair, but will develop as part of the broajer dynamic of Slno-Soviet-US triangular relations. And theof the future reUttauhips of the Soviet Union and China with tbe United States, whether improvements or setbacks, will continue to be one of tlie most important factors affecting the behavior of Moscow and Beijing toward each other. US polvci's toward the USSR and China will of course not determine the conduct of the two Corxununist powers toward each other, but will ccrisuruy help condition that behavior, and on the margin could conceivably be decisive.
Both Moscow and Beijing remain highlyto their perception of the US relaUonshlp with the other. Thc Chinese have tradiUooallyhile the Soviet leadership lias foran been deeply concerned at the prospect of Sino-US security collaboration at Soviet expense. Since the first stages of Sino-Arncrkan rapprochement In the, Soviet Politburo members have warned US leaders against anU-Soviet cooperation with China, end have occasionally sought to entice the United States Into commitments incompatible with goodith Beijing. At the same lime, the Soviets have for yean vainly sought to better their positxOyf in the triangle by im proving relations with Beijing, and
his end hive repeatedly sought lo reestablish personal contacts with Chinese leaders.
available evidence dearly indicatesMsfeojw and Betjiiiai remain concerned atof sudden changes that would heightenof US collusion with lhe other. Be ulna,by tbe depth of Soviet-US differences,retained residual concerns about theof sudden deab between the twoat summit meetings, that mightimplications for Chinese interests. Suchconcerns remain especially strong regardingTlie dominant current of Soviet opinion, onhand, has never ceased lo believe Ihatdifferences, the basic character of thebetween Beijing and Washington remainscooperation against Soviet policy. This view has
y many of the events3 and
hatarming of Slno-US relations, particularly the visits of the US Secretaries of Defense and Slate and Premier Zhao Ziyang. and the scheduled visils of President Reagan and Defense Minister Zhang Aiplng.
policyilemma on thesethe one hand. BeijingeedtiongreUtiooship with thc United Slates insupport Chinese cecesomic and militaryand to assist China In resisting ongoingpressure In Asia. On the other hand,may sense that this association withSlates, even If formally disavowed, remainsIhat renders major Soviet corseessiotis lonot
present strained reUtiooship betweenand Washington also poses another dilemma of sorts for Beijing- In general, lt welcomes US toughness toward Moscow, both because it desires that United States inhibit Soviet expansionist impulses, andit hopes that China will derive additionalover both Moscow and Washingtonesult ofmarked Soviet-US tensions. At the same time, the Chinese have indicated that their own position could be gteatly endangered If these tensions were totoevere Soviet-US crisis. We Judge that the Chinese leadership has no desire to become ern-broilcd inrisis if ll arose over issues remote from direct Chinese security concerns, and thai under thosrsssjlljaeult circumstances Beijing would endeavor to maintain Chinas neutrality. Nevertheless, China's leaders probably abo recognize that ifrisb arose In an area more directly relevant to China's securityas the Indochina area orwould face more difficult risks and choices
in their posture toward the Soviet Union. Morethe Chinese recognize that theyested interest in lhe continued ability of the United States and Western Europe to olfset Soviet power, and that Chinese vulnerabilityis the Soviet Union would be enonnously increased If that offset were greatly weakened
ver time, the Sino-Soviet relationship may become more responsive lo adverse changes in the US relationship with either of the other (wo powers. Over the last three yean, bilateral difficulties vrith the United Slates have already, to one degree or another, influenced both Moscow and Beijing to wfah to be able to improve relations with each other. Inonth before hb death, Brezhnev gave public expression to thb motive In an address lo military commandeis, warning Soviet marshals that theof Soviet relations with the United States had given added Importance to the possibility ofwith China. Meanwhile, the Chinese desire lo lest Soviet willingness lo make concessaoos bad been given Impetus2 by new frictions with lhe United States over the question of the US relationship with Taiwan
desire for moderating Sino-Sovietnot synonymous with the willingness of eithertwo Communist powers to make thelor far-reaching improvements In theirIhe basic conflicts of interest areto make It improbable that improvement InrcUtkmshlp will reach the point of awith harmful implications for USNevertheless, the readiness of the Sovietleaden to contemplate keyactornfluenced by the staterelationship with the United States. Bothand China will probably endeavor toImprove the negotiating process and to dealoa which agreement can be reached Altime tbey will seek to use theirto gain leverage In their dealings withSlates.adical growth Inbetween the United States and eltlser tlieChina might provoke one of them tomajor concessions
The Joponese Factor
second very Important external influencedirection ihat Sino-Soviet relations will take Intwo lo three yean will be that of Japan.set of relationships with Washington,Moscow exerts leverage on China. reiMoecingihat pull Beijing toward She Uniled
State* and that impose limits on Sino-Sovietajor chance in thr Chinese aUitudc towardunlikely- -could have serious elfccti on the Sino-Soviet-US triangle
The USSR's relations with Japan have worsened overecade and are not likely to be reversed during the period of this Fat Una te. The Soviets are increasingly exercised at what ihey see lo be growing US-Japanese security cooperation, primarily because ol the expectation (hat this cooperation will augment US capabilities againsi (he Soviel Union in Northeast Alia. The Soviets also appear to be concerned about lhe long-term implications o( Ihe gradual bul steady buildup In Japanese conventional military forces Moreover, despite the fact that lhe Sno-US-Japanese military cooperation the Soviet Union feared tn lheas failed to materialize in, Soviet military plannersorst-case view of ihisand consider Japan as an enemy allied with lhc United Stales and China.
umber of yean lhe USSR's tough, obtuse effortsntimidate the Japanese haw- greatly stre.Tgtrscrsed anti-Soviet altitudes In Japan Tbe Soviet leaden have not altered their adamant resection of Tokyo's claim lo Use small islands that constitute lhe Northern Territories, and they have continued the militarisation of these islands beguna and tlie modernization of the weapons deployed there.propensity lo continue Strengthening its large existing miliury advantages In lhe vicinity of Japan has probably been given further impetusome Quence of the3 overflight and downing of Ihe Korean Air Lines plane. Meanwhile, lhe growth of Sovieleployments In AsU has significantly height cned^rsanesc anxiety. As noted earlier,3 JarxirsSe protests about these deployments were echoed for the first time by ChiniP
^Moscow's leaden probably draw some encoui -
agement from the recent Japanese national elections.
hoping that the tesulls will undermine Premier Naka-
sone's efforts to strengthen Japan's military programs.
This will almost certainly serve to erscourage Soviet
leaden lo continue generally their previous policies
toward Japan, in thc belief that political intimidation
combined with economic Incentives will pay off foi
Moscow over the long run In "softening up" attitudes
In Japan.for successful use of economic
inducements are not good: reduced Japanese demand
for natural resources combined with thc cutoff In
official credits after the Afghanistan invasion suggest
that, with Ihe possible exception of Sakhalin gas, large-scale Siberian resource development iwojcctx will not be initiated any lime soon.
For Its part. China's economic ties wiih Japan are by far the most Important il has with any country in the eaptulist iodustrialuwd world, and also dwarf China's trade with the Soviel Union 'This leading Japanese role in assisting China's mcderruzataoo is therefore lhe second most important bulwark of Bci ling's reutlorulslp with the West, after Its broader connections with the United State* Because of lhe strength of Japanese-American lies, lhe Sirso-Japanese relationship reinforces other Chinese incentives lo maintain China's US ccnusections
ost aspects of the Sino-Japanese relationship remain fairly healthy, lo some areas the relationship hu somewhat cooled over lhe past two yean: China has become less ouUpoken In support of the Japanese-American security relationship, and more reserved about most issues relating to Japanese defense efforts against the Soviet Union; and Beijing has made sporadic strident atlacks on what the Chinese sorne-timex profess lo seeising danger of Japanese militarism. China still supports Japanese claims against the Soviel Union concerning the Northern Territories, ihough less voclferoudy, and. after years ofalmost exclusively oo cultivation of the ruling Japanese conservatives, Beijing has reopened lies to lhe Socialist oppoution. as wed as lo local antinuclear weapons movements
The Chinese leaders are well aware of Japan's military weakness, and probably do notrave or imminent danger of Japanese militarism. And their latent concerns on thb matter, while real, are" at present far outweighed by tbdr tense of the enormous economic contribution China receives from its ccla-ttonship with Japan. The Soviet Union ardently seeks to reverse thb Chinese sense of priorities, to alarm China aboul Japan and the Japanese alliance with the United States, and to use this alarmehicle for Sino-Soviet political cooperation against tlie United States. The USSR has little Iwpc of success in this effort unless fairly radical changes occur oo the Japanese scene. |
Jwe do not anticipate significant changersresenlrole Japan plays with raped lo
i1
Uncertainties, ond Possible Alternative Outcomes
ral judgments of thu Estimatebasedon thc belief that the broad structuieaffairs will more or less continue- We believethat most aspects of this structure willgeneral, though tlsere is sufficient iincertaintyflagging thethecertain developments
Variables and Uncertainties
o/ Chinese and AmericanAs noted earlier, tbe Soviets appear tofuture changes in Chinese or US leadershipsBeijing to inclineuch moreSino-Soviet rapprochement than now seemsSoviet leaders are likely to hope thatwithin the Chinese elite willsufficiently important to bring aboutand foreign policies in Beijing. Theybase this hope not on evidence that thb Is likelybul primarily on the long record ofleadership instability. Soviel leadershopes that sentiment more favorable toand more hostile to Ihe United Slatesin leadership ranks of the ChinesePeople's Uberation Army (PLAlappear to Judge that some of theof DengArnericanissued from some old guard PLA circles, andto appeal to thb audienceQ
3
Dissent In Beijing Rc--'t-
Available evidence is thin on the question ofwithin China's leadership concerning optimum policies toward thc USSR and the United States. It has long been clear that there is no coherent, recognizable faction that Isas such. Certain Soviet oveitures and propaganda over the yean haveplayed lo such presumed sympathetic Chinese kadcrJfcAnd. In tlie last two yean or so. some of these leaders apparently have been sharply critical of what they consider an unrewarding and isinecexsarily pro-US policy on the part of rSciilnginimum the Soviets have been playing to such Humes.
Such hopes as exbt among Soviet leadenhanged political scene in Beijing might leadess cordial Chinese relationship with the United States arc doubtless buttressed by lhe fact of Deng Xiaoping's advancingwill beears old thbof the advent of leaders who, unlike Deng, have not been personally associated in'the-past with strongly anti-Soviet attitudes. Even now within China there are signs of resistance to Deng's initiatives, and indication thatome hesrUnce to accepting partyHu Yaobang as Deng's putative successor Hence there may be some expectation in Moscoweriod of uncertainty and the absencetrong successor to Deng, at least initially, might strengthen existing resistance within China's leadership to any significant strategic or economic modern! rationwith Ihe United Stales. Thatuccession situation would necessarily redound lo Moscow'sb by no means certain, however, whatever the Soviet expectation, inasmuch as new Chinese leaden will seek to avoid having their political ambitions damaged by becoming vulnerable to partisan domestic charges that they are "soft" on China') enemy, thc USSR. Nevertlieless. as they did when Mao died, the Soviets can be expected to use such an occasion to advance proposals for movement in thc rcUtionshtp.
Continuity of Present Chinete Policy in the Border Dispute. The border Issue has beento date because the adamant negotiating position of China has been Interwoven with its much broader political sliuggle against the Soviet Union, and because Beijing's leaden have maintained thb position as an instrument of political warfare against Moscow. It is unlikely that fJeuing will give up thb position during tlie ncxl two to three years. Nevertbdess. we believe that, if China did yield on tbb question and began to moveorder settlement more acceptable to the Soviets, the chance of reciprocal major Soviet concessions over thc long run would be enhanced. Sino-Soviet relations would theneriod of much greater fluidity, and the rsosribuitics for further mutual concessions would grow.
Continuationamvuchean ResUtance to Vietnam. Collapse of military resistance toin Kampuchea would alter many of the terms of thc present political equation in East Asia. Under these circmristances, thc chances would grow that tbeASEAN consensus regarding policy towardwould dissipate, and that the United States-would come under considerable pressure from some ASEAN states to join them Inormula with which to come to terms with Vietnamese domination of Indochina. Any such situation would conflict with'
Background
byda?dowri by both itdes: alliance in lhe
Seen by lhe Chinoefocal point of wrong* perpetrated by the Riintan Empire and (he Soviel Union againit China. No* iited by Chinese ai instrument of political warfare against Soviel Union, lo demonstrate the USSK'i 'great-power hegernonis" letvScucies an] tu refusal to admit pait niMiiifei
Kegarded by SovieUuniuncntal lineal to the security of then eaitein border and the most Important tingle bilateral issue In contention with the Chinese. The inriwdaaU peccipiUnt of the Soviel military buildup opposite China. Seen by SovieU aaabe Issue and poterrrlally only lhe firstChinese Intend to present for return of territorym ui red ateine.
Petals at Issue
Dispute centersh-cent uiyimprecisely foe some seel on. and tobfert to dJIn-eotwriieJi Russia accrtiirrdillion square kilometers of territory In Central Alia and the Amor River Basis.
Chinese have stated willingnessccept the boundary bid down by the old iieaues as long as Moscow concedes they areut demand icturn ot* certain Soviet occupied lesrttcsries they claim were not even granted by these treaties. The aieas in dispute include tu.OOO square kilometers of land in tlie Pamirs, some islands In the Amur and UssurtJIijers In the Far East, and several small tncgswtsscted differently on each country's maps.
Tactics
- Both sides tabled some eocsceisioiis at iotial lound of border talksnd Soviets eventuallye- more coiastssaiont al second rrstsnd, which becan in October 1W9 atsd continued Intermittently over the rseit nine yean.
demanded that Soviets admitear are Inecognise inequity of oU treaties, agree to an vncoisdaiotsal return of"occupied territory, and withdraw their foices from all disputed areas pending arttlerneni of China'a dairm
refuse to admit old treaties are 'unequal" or to withdraw (heir force) from 'disputed areas' (almost all of winch are now in their luusdsi but haveillingness toew lurrcy of the boundary lines, and COatiniae loeramption of border talks.
Current Prospects
numption'ot header talks urdikdr al present, but the two tides maintain regular contact on matters related to duuulc at Deputy Foreign Minister tails and,esserhrough the Sro-Soviet Border River Navigation
Commission.
along border remains evict at the moment, with both sides ferrorn* aggressive petrolling wheren dispute. Neither tide, jsowever. shows namil'-ngness to yield oo keynotably, ownership of HeliiarJ bland at the confluence of tbe Amur and Ussuri Rivers, adasuaiog the Soviet city of Khabarovskram Siberian Railroad.
of lhe Impeitaol props of the present Slno-Aroerican tetationsliip, and could create tbe possbilsty of further changes in the Chinese posture toward the Unitasd-Stales and the Soviet Union.nlikely that Hanoi'will in fact find it possibleably complete end to Kampucliean resistance In the next two to three years But It is clear that the stability of both tbe Si no-US reUtiooship and the firmness of the Chinese positionls the USSR will to some degree continue to be contingent upon theof the present military stalemate in Indochina and the preservftoirof Sine-US cooperation against Soviet policy in Indochina.
tability of Politic* and Policies in the USSR. Tlie initial statements and actions of the Chernenko
regimeesire to protect orderliness In the succession and continuity in the USSR's dealings with China.nd not in the Isest ofsuddenly depart from the scene, leaving hb collcagisesew succession problem on their hands. There Is no Irdiealioo at thb time that any of the likelythe younger ones such as Romanov orout of step with the USSR'sChina policy. If. however, in tlie course of leadershipignificant segmentie leadership came to question the general thrust of current policy, different ideas about Soviet foreign relations might ultimatolv eiisuo. Relations with China could be one of tbc major foreign policy issues under review during thb peiiod. particulstrly if
ilew set of leaders who had no role in Ihe bluer exchanges of. It islhat the situation could produceuch morepproachignificant toughening of the USSR's policy toward China. Sino-Sovietcould, in fact, become very fluid if the Soviet leadership turnover should coincide withew leadership In China.
Preservation of Stability in the KoreanBoiling's interest lo maintaining good relations with lhe United States conflicts to some degree with its interest inlose relationship with P'yong-vang. Because of its geographic position. North Korea has always been of great importance to China, and over the last two years lseijing has lakeo vigorous initiatives to strengthen this relationship and tothe edge that Chinese influence has in P'yong-yang over that of the USSR. In anticipation of the coming political succession to Kim fl-song, the Chinese have in fact reluctantly acknowledged thc special status of Kim's designated heir, his son Kim Chong-il.
Beijing, aware lhat its lelalionship withcould become hostage of North Korea'slo dominate the south, has indicated to both Washington snd Seoul its desire to maintain stability In the Korean Peninsula. Since China cannot control P'yongyang's actions, however, itilemma. Thc North Korean regime, apparently concerned that time Is workinc to strengthen the relative economic and international position of the Republic of Korea, has taken an increasingly militant line over the past year, one lhat includes major terrorist initiatives against South. Korea's leaders and stability. Slmulta-rseoudyrfsowever, P'yongyang has initiated an opening to the Unitedboldtalksormal peace treaty, removal of US troops, and confederation of the two Koreas; Beijing's leaders support such talks but do not wish Chinaecome directly Involved. China's support for this proposal reflects its desire lo reduce instability along its borders, and to remain the prime ally/supporter of North Korea. These contradictory policies on the part of P'yongyang are not atypical of North Korea's behavior. Thus, white progresseaceful solution is not expected soon, we mayamoderation In P'vongyang's pattern of violence Should North Korea revert to an incendiary policy eav tbc peninsula, this would complicaterelatloiishlps with lhe United States and possibly work to Moscow's advantage by heightening Soviet opportunities to compete with China for Influence In P'yongyang Al the same time, however. Moscow might perceive North Korean radicalism as risking a
possible confrontation between Sovicl and US military forces in thc Korean area.
is likely that no war will break out inthe period of this Estimate, and lhat bothand China will continue to insulate theirwith Washington from P'yongyang's policy
lOward the SOUth. Nevertheless, the possibilities for
accident and miscalculation in the peninsula areand could grow, particularly in the event of an upsurge in internal instability la South Korea.
of New Sino Sonet Conflictand Southeast Asia. Any Sino-Sovietgreater rapprochement could be upsetpossible crises to China's south:
Thc emergence of new Chinese hostilities with Vietnamorious scale,esult of either major Vietnamese military conflict withor of Vietnamese clashes wllh Ihe Chinese In the South China Sea. Thc latter rjossibflity is highlighted by the conflicting claims lo oilrights in Ihe Culf of Tonkin, by recent actions bv the Chinese to strengthen theirposition in lhe Paraceis, and by lhe growing boldness and scope of Chinese naval and air deplovments In the area Both the overall Soviet reUtionship with Vietnam anJ, thc enhanced Soviet military presence at CamRanh create the possibility lhatino-Vietnamese crash could spread lo involve lhe Soviets.
Substantial escalation of Vietnam's miliiaryin Kampuchea and along the borders of Thailand. The many coiutralnts on Hanoi'sresources, concern over possible US andreactions, and Soviet lack ofmake such actions by Vietnam Improbablethe period of this Fatimate. There Issome possibilityuch greatermilitary Involvement In Kampuchea could arise from escalating border clashes with Thailand. Should ihese occur, lhe resulting crisis rnight well arrest or reverse any movementgreater Sino-Soviet raporochernent
A rruoor new effort by the USSR lo advance its geopolitical position In Sooth or Southwest Asia, particularly if done at thc eipense of Pakistan. The Chinese would of course be greatlyat any overt Soviet military threat to Pakistan arising out ol that country's role in opposing Soviet el forts to subdue Afghanistan. Belling would be equally concerned, however.
should the Soviet Union make significantin its efforts to destabilize Pakistan and/oi succeed in persuading India to join in thc effort. The Soviets have worked hard lo block any improvement in India's relations with eitherarnabad. Although iheir efforts lo get Ihe Indians to work jointly to undermine Pakistan have not been particularly successful, this might change If Pakistanuclear device or Prime Minister Gandhi becamethatforeign threat" is the only way to ensure her continued political preeminence
A Soviet effort to change the status quo In Pakistan and toealignment of that country away from its present orientation loward China and the United States. Any such effort, however indirect, would be regarded in Bellingerious new attack on Chinese mteiests. We consider that (here is sufficient fragility lo the present internal situation in Pakistan to make
,ovietair possibility during the period of this Estimate, and lhat over the longer term this possibility may grow. Hence the Soviets may wellhoice between exploiting new opportunities in Pakistan, ororecourse oul of regard for their relationship with China. Should the Soviets optuch more forward course toward Pakistan, thethaw in Moscow's relations with Beijing would be an eariy and definite casualty.
oviet Involvement in Major Neu> Crises Elsewhere. Additional Soviet Invasions or inwjlve-ment in major hostilities in thc Middle East orAsia wjulgV almost certainly reverse anytowaM significant Improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Such developments would cause Beijing to back away to dissociate itself from tbe Sovieland reassess Chinese policy In the light of subsequent developments concerning the crisis or crises. Soviet moves, and US moves. Chinese reactions wouldba somewhat similar, al least initially, in the event Soviet policy began moving toward some new version of armed intervention In Eastern Europe, some repeat of sorts of Budapest or Prague. Similar Chinesewould also probably occur in the event the Soviets got into open hostilities with Western forces, whether in Europe orsuch case Use Chinese would doubtless seek to stand dear of involvement.oC*inx's benefit in thc troubled waters. Moscow would be lughly unlikely to try to solve its other major problems, foreign or domestic, by going to war against China; any Sovietor
almost certainly fear (hat although their military forces could do China grievous harm, resort to such action might well divert Soviet attention from Moscow's principal antagonist, (he United Stales, while possibly bogging the USSR down in war with China.
Aftcrnolivc Outcomes
here is an off chance lhal during the period of this Estimate the Sino-Soviet reutioriship could takeuch more hostile character ihan thb Estimate holds probable:
This could occur because so many variables are present, many of them not fully within the control of (he present leaderships in eitheror Beijing: the advent of new policies on the part of post-Deng or post-Che rneriko leaderships, initiatives taken by other governments (forin Korea or VietnamX and so oo.
It does not follow thai US interests wouldbenefit from the cominguch more frigid Sino-Soviet relationship The effect on US interests would depend on the nature andof the estrangement between Moscow and Beijing: upoint. US interests would clearly benefit from probable increases In Chineseagainst Soviet policies in Ihc world, in Chinese receptiveness to US adviorf and counsel,willingness to permitlevels of Western economic and technological presence within China. But, if Sino-Sovietdeteriorated to the point of actual orlarge-scale hostilities. US diplomatic and security policymaking could be greatly
onversely, ihere Is also an outsidethough less likely than thethe Sino-Soviet relationship coulduch closer one during lhe period of this Estimate than we now judge likely:
Thb might come to pass if no great dbruptive contingencies should occur, if the Chinese should back away innot incertain of their keyf agreements reachedumber of secondary issues should begin toomewhat greater momentum toward the Sino-Sovietor If for some reason Beijing's leaders should come to depreciate the value of China's reUtiooships with tbe United States
Tlie coming of sigiiificantly closer relations,the USSR and China could seriously harm
US interests, the wimn thc Sino-Sovietthe more damaging to US geopoliticaldefensesyv
trmiaJhg.rolc of Japan, and nuiticnsus other key USiriftreti
lthough live possibility cannot be excluded thai alternative outcomes such as the above could occur in the Sino-Soviet reUtksrrship. we stress that the most likely outcome, by far. is that which this NIE has
postulated; namely, that the level of hostility between Moscow and "selling will decrease, that someagreements on secondary matters or possibly CBMs will be reached, that at most the USSR mayoken withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mocigolia. and that continuing basic diffcrertcea between Moscow and Beijing will not permit any significantly gieater degree of rapprochement between them to develop over the neat two lo three years.
INO-SOVIET
Chinesera me establbhed 'in liciiing,
02
3*
6
Ai..il6
Sovieti negotiate Treaty ol* Friendship. Alliance, and Mutual Assistance and other agreements with the new regime In one agreement. USSR promises to sui render control of Chinese Eastern Railway and evacuate Dairen (now Luda) and Port Arthurice-free nival ports on the Yellowthe end
Start of Korean War.
Deadline for Soviet evacuation of Dairen and Port Arthur suspended because of thc Korean War.
agrees
evacuate
Stalin dies.
Post-Stalin Soviet leadership Dairen and Port Arthur.
Khrushchev,h Soviet Party (CPSU) Congress, delivers his "secret speech- critichrinc Stalin, setting in motion East European attempts to reduce Soviet cotstroL
Chinese article in April implicitly corrects Sovietappraisal of Stalin. Chinese applaud Soviet promise to correct "errors" in Intra-Bloc relations but seek to define Limits of tolerable diversity within the Bloc.
Secret aarcemeiat on "assistance to defensehas USSR promising to help China
Mao. at Bloc conference in Moscow, publiclySoviets as Bloc leaders, but privately presses Soviet for harder line on foreign policy.
Sovietsong-range submarine radio in Chinaoint fleet to be dominated by USSR and lo use Chinese ports. Chinese refuse
Chinese communes are formally unveiled, andimplies it has found"Croatfull Communism.
8
Chinese, during Taiwan Strait crisis, find Soviet support to be too little and loo late.
Khrushchev,t CPSU Congress, indirectly aitacVa principles ol Chinese commune system. CPSU deelarej thai war can be diminaled while capitalism leraainv
Soviets Muse to five "sample atomic bomb" lo Chineae. "tearing up"7 military aid agreement
Chineae Defense Minister Peng Dehuai returns from vint lo Moscow, challenges Mao's economic and military policies with alleged Sovietandispuiged.
Khrushchev visits United States, and Soviettakes moderate line toward US. Chinese begin indued criticism of Soviet detente line.
Chinese launch massive press atiack on Soviet line, and Soviets organize unsuccessful counterattackloc gathering at Bucharest.
Soviets withdraw economic and technical advisers from China, indudinst (hose concerned with de-lense effort.
Soviets, at World Communist Conference infail in all-out effort to force Chinese to acinowlcdge CPSU's authority.
Enlai walks outd CPSU Congress and goes home earlv after public and private arguments with Khrushchev
2
33
in Xiniiang Province among minorityallegedly encouraged by Soviets, leads to mass flight Into USSR. Central Asian borders leinforced OB both sides. Soviet consulates there closed by Chinese.
Soviet backdown over Cuban missile crisis brings violent Chinese attacks on Sovietoviets organize counterattacks at East European party congresses
Beijing publicly challenges Soviet right to Farterritories once belonging to China.
Chinese announce their "general line" for the international Communist movement to replace"general line" Sino-Soviet party talks infail Polemics hit all-time high
*4
4
sci les ol Sino-Soviet border rsegof Ullons.
Khrushchev ousted from Soviet leadership. First Chineae atomic ciplosion
Zhou Enlai in Moscow lor talks with Soviet leaders.
So
55
6
6
9
99
2
46
7
88
8
bet in lorce buildup opposite China, Koiycin in Bcumt holds tali) with Mao. Brcahnev-DeraE Xiaoping talk) in Bucharest.
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, andAssistance with Mongolia.".
Chinese refuse invitationd CPSU Congress in Moscow.
Cultural Revolution at its height io China.
Border clashes at several spots along Sino-Soviet border, but especially on the Ussuri River In the Far East
Soviet war of nerves against China, with "threats" that USSR might bunch nuclear strikes against China's nascent advanced weapons program
Kosygin Thou meeting at the airport in Beijing.
First round of new border talks (sessions held Intermittently through.
Soviets and Chinese feel each other out oo
Slno-US "Ping-pongr. Kissinger vis-Its China.
US summit meetings in Beijing and MoscowSino US Shanghai Communique and USwiih the USSR.
US-Soviet summit in Vladivostok; Chinese propose Smo-Soviet nonaggjession pact-
post-Mao leadershli
US-Soviet summit in Vladivostok.
Mao dies. Soviet overture rejected
Sino-Soviet agreement on navigation around Xei<-iari Island, opposite Khabarovsk on Ussuri River, facilitates border river navigation talks, stalemated
Soviets propose joint statement on relations,by Chinese in March.
Brezhnev and Ustinov visit forces in Far East. (New stage in Soviet Far East buildup beginseading to new Far East theater command by end of the year )
Communal coup in Afghanittan.
88
9
99
99
00
111
22
333
treaty with "antihegemoiiv" dausc.
SovieU turn treaty with Vietnam, following further rapid deterioration in Siiao-Vietnamese relations.
Vietnam attacks and overruns Kampuchea, US and Cltlna complete noi null ration of diplomaticDeng visits US
China invades Vietnam toeason"occupation of Kampuchea unaffected.deploy two additional divuions into Mongolia and begin to expand their military presence in Vietnam.
Chinese announce intent to abrogate Sino-Soviet treaty, bat propose political talks.
Soviet-US summit in Vienna.
Sino-Soviet political talks in Moscow.
Soviet Invasion of Afghariistan.
Chinese postpone political talksino-Soviet treaty espire*
Breihnev.h CI'SU Congress, protases confb dence-building measures (CBMs) for the Far East.
Soviets propose resumption of border talks,
USSR and China begin gradual expansion of coo*academic and sports eichanges. etc
Brezhnev speech in Tashkent espressos desire for Improved relations with China.
First round of Smo-Soviet consultations held in Beijing
Brerhncv dies; Foreign Ministers Cromyko and Huang meet at funeral in Moscow; Andropov be-Ceneral Secretaiy
Second round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in Moscow.
Deputy Fceeign Minister Kapitsa in Iseuing.econd channel lor talks on "international Issues."
Third round of Sino-Soviet consultations held in
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Thii rkcumonl ntoy bo retained, or OeOioved by burning in rxcorchmc* won opcAcoblajt'.ii. or (Horned to (he Dtroclorato of
When ihoiuontincrted overseen, the ovoieai recipient! may retain iteriod not In oxcen of one year. Al the end of ihll period, the documente destroyed or returned to tho lorworcfcng opeocy. or paniuiw should be requested of the locwaaWvj agency ton ckcotoWo
t. The line of thi* dceument who* vied tepore4dy from ihcndcn.vf.ed.
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