irst Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement
intcreitncr utdliiencc assessment memorandum to holder? of nilq021
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF1
IRST LOOK AT MECHANISMS OF CONTROL AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
iwtil in ill" mnijlnhfo MaironnJun
The New Jewel
Interwoikings With the People's Revolutionary
Relations With the
The Grenadian Revolutionary Armed
The Ministry of the
Havana's Influence in
Cuban Use of
The Point Salines
Growing Sovietoviet-Cuban Cooperation.
Dealings With Other
Anne* A: Original Key
Annex B: Interworkings of tbe New Jewel Movement
and the People's Revolutionary
ssistance and Type of
Onhe Intelligence Community issued an Interagency Intelligence Assessment.irst Loot atof Control and Foreign Invoicement. which reflected the results of llie initial exploitation of the documents recovered from Grenada after the Invasion ofudgments noted therein were based on an all-source assessment ofocuments lhat had been processed at that time. This Memorandum to Holders of the IIA draws on the analysis of anocuments to provide further insights into some of the subjects previously covered and information on several new subjects as well |
0 documents have been exploited toew more may be forthcoming, but we believe the vast majority already have been reviewed. With tbe exception of those documents that must be exempted by Freedom of Information Actless thannentire collection will be released to the public in the near future. [
As we pointed out in the original Assessment, the documents reveal Grcnadian perspectives; they do not contain Soviet or Cuban obieclives with respect to Grenada. The documents do provide an appreciation of tbe New Jewel Movement's (NJM) motivations, strategy, and objectives as tbev applied to tbe consolidation of the Bishop regime's rule, and thgf show how the NJM sought to nuke itself useful to Moscow andThe documents also illustrate in considerable detail the ambitious plans that Grenada's Marilst-Leninlsts had for subverting, with the support of Cuba and tbe USSR, not only Grenada but the Eastern Caribbean region as well.]
ew | j
The exploitation of0 documents captured in Grenada has reaffirmed the basic judgments of tbe original Assessment:
The New Jewel Movement (NJM) was dedicated toarxist-Leninist society in Grenada and consolidating its own
Cuba and the Soviet Union provided extensive political,and military support to the Bishop regime,ad made considerable progress inenter for further subversion in the region (see annexthe original Key
Tbe additional documents provide considerable detail on how the NJM sought to continue its growth by indoctrinating the populace and controlling events in Grenadaeries of mass organizations that covered every segment of Crenadian society The NJM was aided In the development of these institutions by the Communist Parties of Cuba and the Soviet Union, which provided specialized training and advice to the NJM cadre. Nevertheless, the documents indicate that after four years of continuous effort to build support for Marxism-Leninism in Crenadaariety of means, the Movement had failed in itsandwas forced to rely on the personal following of Maurice Bishop |_
The documents show that the NJM's abiding fear ofactivity reached fever pitch after the bombing attempt on Maurice Bishop's lifehe NJM reorganized and greatly expanded the counterintelligence section of the Ministry of Interior's Special Branch In order to try to preempt counterrevolutionary activity. Cuban advisers trained some agents on Grenada, others were sent to the Soviet Union or Cuba for more detailed studies. Graduate agents were primarily employed in gathering information on otherchurch, labor unions, andalsolose watch on foreign visitors including the medical school students, and operated with Cuban intelligence agents in support of the Bou terse regime in Suiiname and Tim Hector's leftist party in AntiguaJ
The leaders of the NJM were obsessed bv their belief that the United States wouldounterrevolution against them The Bishop regime based its military requirements on threat analyses thatUS-sponsored counterrevolutionary activity ranging from domestic
terrorism lo an invasion o( the island by Crenadian and Cuban exiles based in Venezuela. The NJM planned on expanding the Crenadian armed force, which inad an authorized strengthreservists andas many0 Grena-dians, aboutercent of the population!
Grenada received0 weapons and various military support equipment from Cuba and several Soviet Bloc countries in aof deliveries between9 andilitary equipment deliveries were handled with tight security at the highest levels of thedocuments indicate that Maurice Bishop personally coordinated offloading procedures with Colonel Torlolo. the senior Cuban military adviser in Grenada. The Cubans carefully monitored deliveries and brought the armored vehicles ashoreunder cover of darknessj-
We haveingle" unconfirmed report that an unknown quantity of arms was shipped from Grenada to St- Luciaut have found no trace ofhipment in the tborouxh records kept by the Crenadian custodians. However, between! andritish rifles were either combined with other weapons on the rolls or dropped from the listings.)
Our analysis of the factory markings on weapons recoveredhas revealed new information on Soviet weaponscaptured Soviet Bloc electronics, trucks, and armoredome recovered Chinese antitankwere delivered to Vietnam In the, weaponssame batch have turned up In El Salvador, Guatemala,
We believe that2 Havana and Moscow had accepted the NJMeliable ally and had begun to exploit their relationship with Grenada when the US-led invasion terminated their influence The documents show that Havana's relationship with the NJM was the more developed- Castro used tbe good offices of the Bishop regime to try to develop friendly leftist regimes In the Caribbean Basin and to helpegional voting block of members of the SocialistHavana alsoelationship between Nicaragua, the Salvadoran Insurgents, and the NJM for the mutual benefit of all parties.^
We believe that, following the establishmentoviet Embassy in Grenadahe Soviet Influence on Grenadian affairs began to approach that of the Cubans. The NJMigh priority on further enhancing its own stature with Moscow, but was hindered by Soviet bureaucracy and disinterest. Nevertheless, the documents confirm that
Ihe NJM was determined to prove itself worthy of Soviet support, and offered to establish Grenadaeans by which Soviet influence might reach the Eastern Caribbean, and considered Suriname and Belize as special targets for penetration. As reported in the original Assessment, the Bishop regime offered both Moscow and Havana military use of the Point Salines Airport, although neither was willing to provide the financial support necessary to complete the project.!
The documents show that the Soviets and the Cubans had worked closely to develop and support the Bishop regime, and shared common goals with respect to Grenada:
Soviet projects were often preceded by Cuban feasibility
Crenadlan officials passed through Havana en route toBloc capitals.
Soviet arms deliveries were made through Cuba, and Cuban personnel were used to offload major shipments in Grenada.
Nonmilitary goods shipped from the USSR and its alliespassed through Cuban portsj^
We are unable to judge from the available evidence whether Moscow and Havana bad become competitors for influence over events in Grenada, or, in the aftermath, were simply trying to avoid blame for the demise of the NJM. While tbe additional documents shed no new light on events leading directly to the death of Maurice Bishop,|
[and that competition for
leadership of the NJM was the primary cause of its dissolution. |
Nevertheless, blatant courting of Soviet favor by NJM officials may have led to some reduction in Cuban influence, although the continued pervasive presence of Cuban advisers in most People's Revolutionary Government (PRC) officesoncern of some senior Grena-
wrltten by MM otticlals during the Bishop-Coard dispute showreacted with surprise, alarm, and dismay to thebut there ts no indication of any response from Moscow. Weknow whether this Soviet silence indicated foreknowledge ofadoptionands-off attitude, or reliance on Havanathe situation, After the US-led invasion, Havana did notSoviet line that alleged US intelligence Involvement in thedispute, andthat Moscowto join inttempt to mediate between the NJM factions.
We have examined recent statements by former PRC officialsthat Bishop's downfall was the result of his intent toInstitutions at the sugaestion of Fidel Castro and againstof Moscow. We consider them to be self-serving attemptson Bishop's continued popularity to restructure the* remnantsNJMegitimate political
All evidence gathered to date Indicates that the leaden of the NJM were not associated with drug dealings They linked narcotics use and trafficking with counterrevolutionary activity in Grenada, andtheir opposition to any dealings in drugs bylose surveillance over the few known users and dealers on the island- (
New Jewel Movement The Coord Coup
1.have (nurd no documentary evidence lhat sheds new light on events leading directly to ihe death of Maurice Buhop. There are. however, convincing repom thai Bernard Coard had set inlot to overthrow Bishop when Coard resigned from die Central Committee and Politburo of the New levicl Movement (NJM) In2 to "devote him-arlf to his work as Minuter ofoard ipent little time In Ihe ministry of fleet; Instead, hemoat of Mi time to the behind-1he-scene* political necessary to undermine caitiou Coard'i icheme was disturbed by Bithop's successful trip* to the United States and Eastern Europe in the tptlng and lummereport from the Crertadian Embassy In Moscow found among the documents indicates that even this most pro-Soviet sector of the NJM hailed Btihop's meeting with the US National Security Adviser and Stateiplomatic triumph bevortd all eipec-latioos. Fearing thai Bishop's popularity within the Coard faction mtiht spoil his plans, Coard hadodule* who controlled the Central Committee teln-state him in the Movement andoint Biiliop-Coard leadenhip on isevelop-meni
thai led directly to the demise of| |
1 Since the original Assessment wai published, we haveumber of reports thatthe advice of Fide)about to hold free elections, encouraae the development of privateand attempt closer relations with the United Statu We consoler these reports, which cite recers! remarks made by former NJM officiah nowto reconstruct the Movementegitimate political party In Gienada, to be self-serving alletnpn to trade ooonr.nued popularity The Grerta-dlan decumenu show that the primary purpose forp's visit to the Untied State* wa* publicput the Reagan administration on the defen-uve by appealing lo be reasonable and making the United State* appear toujly Other documcMt indicate that the Bishop (Viard struggle fccuied on
Bishops popularity with thei* failure to retain control of key partynd his lack of attention to day-to-day party affairs.
lrrterwo.Wnos With the People'* BevoMkinory Government
The NJM and theR^ktioiur.(PRC) were Inseparable as evidencedarce number of recovered documents including ihe minute* of2 NJM Centralmeeting that identified overercent of the PRC and Cabinet combined as tuQ member* of the party. Maurice Bishop often made referencehe "NJM/PRC"ingle entity in hi* handwr.tten notes.urtherhe intciaclioos of Ihe party and government by showing the overlap of NfM and PRC poilUons held by (be top Crcnadlan official*9 and
he document* <how that the NJMtgh priority on Indoctrinating it* member* and theinought The Soviet and Cuban Communist Parties provided the NJM with their expertise In formingot gamut ions, conducting political indoctrination, and recruiting new members. Grenadlann Moscow and Havana studied ideology, politics, and ecunomics in preparationarty work among youth, women, fanners, teachers, andaimer Bdhop'* special re-Quesl ao Soviet Dvfenae Minister UsOaov ledhrre-nwxiih pohhea) training course in Moscow for Crenadian Deputy Defense Minister Chru Stroude in preparation forondnrttng pwork In tbe arraedA high-level NJM delegation loin2 sought wayi to apply the Cuban model foe party *ork among lite masses io building internal ide"logical support for tlie party in Cieruuij
he documents (ho* that mass organizations were, the NJM's most frequently used form ofinfluence Gtcnada's leaders established Parish Coordinatingational Women's Ortoniia-tion,ational Youth Organization in their
attempts to convert the mum to the Kate ideology. In iiructurp. tactics, aod mission, xht.fr thiee organ:appeal lo have been closely patterned on thai counterpart mas organisations In Cuba. The Parish Coordinating Bodies, the highest rrgsona! pohaca! otaaaasataooa, were comprisederies of aooal committees, each charged with monitoring 'he ootiri-cal mood ic la bur area,overnment programs at the local level mobilizing ikr masses,arning out the decision! of thehe Women's nnd Youth OrtaniuUom were responsible lor accomplishing similar tasks In their respective portions ol society, and withactulung prospective party and militia members,|
he NJM Organizing Committee carefullyind coordinated the use of all forms ofto carry the party's message io tlte people ol Grenada; Radio Free Grenada broadcast news and propaganda provided bv Soviet and Cuban wirethe local newspapen were censored by the NJM. NJM tutors taught political classes to groups of party members and to mass organintoos, and party Labor ;epre*entatives conducted on-siteart ol the normal workday Educating the youth received special attention in order that the future of the revolution might be assured Notn taken by members of the National Youth Organization who visited Moscow and Havana indicate lhat the NJM was interested in methods to indoctrinate the very young.
irtually every individual, oriantiation, and business that associated withere required to submit "workplaru" ol the author's annual objectives and methods for approval by higher parly authorities Although these plans were intended toystem of personal accountability, they becameless specific, and stated goals were rarely met at any level of the party Q
8 Tbe doewmrao confine thai the vast majority of the members of the NJM were themselves newcomers to Man lit-Leninist thought andreat deal of time In educating each other, as well al the general public, in the Intricacies ol Communis! dogmaa parly endeavor failed to reach its goal,crash coursci" were instituted In the belle!roper Interpretation ol doctrine and raiting ibe con-ciouHiesi_n( those responsible would lead lo eventual
ew Jewel indoctrination ef forts culminatedlurry of activity from July to3 as the party attempted to reverse Its declining popularity and rectify Its internal leadership schism As recorded in lhe documents, the final crisis was in pail lhe muttrowing awareness among party leaden lhat lhe Movement had not capitalized on the potential of lhe mati organizations il had created. Not only had lhe indoctrination programs tailed to popularize the Movement androad base of support (or its programs, but the downward drill of the NJM'i fortunes was most viable in the popuUtwo's laciras-insdv apaiheoc approach lo attendance alvfcxtn nation meions For eumple, even though the National Youth Organization maintained the besl record of attendance among thef Itsouth groups did not meet in March orear later, onlyercent of
ita membership attended those meetings lhal were
Retalions With Hie Church
ecovered minutes of NJM meetings indicate that theeaden believed lhe church to be its most formidable domestic foe Overercent of the population bad been educated in churcfl-operaied private school* and remained active churchgoers. The church competed wiih lhe NIM'i argaiurtng and ufSoctrinatisind preachrd against Marxist -Ler.it:octrine Church leaden were considered to be active cniMmevoIut lotteries who mod their pulpits to complain about NJM human nghti violations,ol church newsletters, and recruitment of children inlo lhe militia. The MM directed theBranch' of the Ministry of the Interior lor all sermons, maintain mrveillance over chuich leaders and those with whom Ihey regulaily dealt, and lap the telephones of the lending ohurchei. Intelligence re-ports ptepaied by Major Keith Roberts, head of lhe Special Branch, during the0 time frame indicate lhat lhe four principal churches in Grenada the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Seventh Day Advenlisl Church, and thehreat to the revolution" and lheain churches against whom our work isut urged caution be-ca'ase ". churches thrive on
IL Inuban delegation headed by Aurebo Alonro Tesada of the America Department of the CubanParty vsskrd Grenada lor the purpose of evaluating lhe conflict between the NJM and the chuichecovered dociirneri written in Spanish, the delegation concluded lhat. although the NJM perceived chuich bodies at adopting aggressive
poutUmj. ihe situation had not reached (he critical poinl of open confrontation. The delegation made several recommendations lo the NJM thai included:
comrade to be responsible for religionmailer*
Training the comrade in Cuba
Inviting Crenadian laity and clergymen to vbit Cuba.
Promoting cotuacn among GrcnadUns,ans. and other Latin American laUy and
Passing mformaiKn among the MM. tbe Cuban Communist Party, and the FSLN of Nicaragua
We have no evidence that any of these Cuban recorn-nyrndatiorti were OCT presented to the NJM or im pie-mem ed in Grenada-f"
It When the Bishop regime came to power, live of the eight trade unions In Grenada were already under the influence of ihe NJM. These were
The Bank and General Workers Union
The Commercial and Industrial Workers Union
The Technical and Allied Workers Union.
The Agricultural aod General Workers Union.
The Grenada Union of Teacben
Tbe remainingSeamen* and Waterfront Workers Union, the Public Workers Union, and the Tail Owners and Driver*corrud-ered to be Twurgeoisnd were targeted for prnrtretson, supervision, and controlirective from the NJM leadership lo tiatOisjaiiiiingrecovered from Grenada
he NJM believed that the most effective nnd ideologically correct way to further Ihe revolution wai through complete unionization of the labor force under NJM leadership. To accomplish this, the NJM Organizing Committee established and carefullya Workers Committee which was charged with ptotTogatlng Marxist-Leninist thought among the workers, building party organizations at all work centers, and completing the process of unionization at the various enterprises and work centers By June IfAl. the Worker* Committee hadunctioning worker education classes Tutors reported that rarely did more thanercent ol ihe workers al each lite come to elan, and that participation washe workers stilltrong antitevoiution side to them (sic).'* The anli-NIMIn the recalcitrant unions was never ellertlvnlv controlled and seemed to grow stronger as disputes over -ages and benefits were eiacerbated by aIncreasing number of complaints against worker education classes Even the leaders of the unions loyal to the Movement became dissatisfied with NIMpolicies tha! failed to Improve employment opportunities for their mesnberdsspj^
The Csranocfcan Revolutionary Armedcsraxot>or.
he Crenadian armed forces were organized into aand four geographic command* based on electoral parishes
RegionCeorge's and St. Dave's Parishes
t Mark's, and St Patrick's Parishes.
RegionIslands of Carriacou and Petite Martinique.
Theae organizationskeleton tegular army itaff that was intended to provide leadership tot reservists and militia jpon rational mohilizatton q
he documents sbo* that, from tht beginning, the leaders of the NJM were obsessed by the bebef lhat the United Sates wouldounlerrevolu-tionarv movement to overthrow their regime Almost from the day he took power, Maurice Biihoperies of appeals to several sources for the "means" lo defend Grenada and continued to press for greater numbers of weapons to be delivered on steadily advancing schedules throughout the reign of the NJM. Kairv on Bishop'* coiscerns included appropriatespace for the military equipment he hodOne sought Bulgarian aid for the construction ofoully armed and prepared Crenadian armyeport prepared bv Deputy Prune Minister Bernard Coard and several member* of the Ministry of Defense dated3 reiterated the NJM bchct
(Jut ittfl United States remained the primary threat In the retime, but posited that the moat likely loira of US intervention would be to facilitate domestic terrorism or to back Cuban and Crenadian exiles who might conduct an invasion from Venezuela. Similar threat analyses appareoliy were used to fuatify the steadily increasing planned strength of the Crersadun arrrsed setvscesJ^
eputy Minister of Defense Ewart Layn* petitioned Maurice Bishop for equipment toorcenlisted menfficers, most of which was delivered in2 The Ministry ol Defense calculated its strength Int one permanent infantry battalion and five reserve batuJions plus supportingwith an authorised strength of roughlythe Cresudsan aimed forces could musterffectives lo meet the invasion force onctober Plans ailed for the loraatfcxoar Urges force by adding two regular and four reserve bailallons by the endne regular and two reserve battaUonsnd three reserve bamboosntal of foot regular andeserve units.arranged the details of ihe transfer with ColoneJ Tortolo. the senior Cuban military adviser to Grenada. Bishop directed the harbor matter at St. Ceorges to dose the harbor to shipping for the entire period required for the transfer. Ctenadian ksrigshoremen broughteapons roBfaiocn ashore onh, but from rnsdnigbi0 onh. only Cubans were allowed Into the area while the arrrsored vehicles and trucks vnsre offloaded Among thegiven lo Grenada in this shipment2oviet assaultoviet pistols.rmored vehicles,rti of individual equipment p
has quoted him as planning toercent of the
Cienadlan military records show that Grenada received0 small arms from its Communist patronsifles-apparently IncludingiflesSfrom Cuba inrom the Soviet Unionndifles and pistols were parthipment received In1 The Crenadians kept very thorough accounts of the weapons ia their control, butifles were elther combined with another rategory or dropped from ihe rolls between1 and January
The best example of Soviet-Cuban delivery tactics occurred2 Mauricehandwritten notes indicate that he personally
weaorsMouldent to omer countries that were havingnd that some weapons had been sent lo St Ltsoa9 We have no ialormatton ofcovement. nor do Crertadian logsecrease in holdings at that time.
Midlers All those who were not wounded have been demoted, reprimanded, or otherwise punished at an cumple io futureolonel Pedro Tortolo Comas, the Cuban commander In Grenada, and many of the others reportedly have been reduced in grade and sentngola as enlisted soldier*.]
he documents indicate thai Havana began to eipknl Us reiahonship with Grenada2 when it sought to create wider lupport in the Socialistfor Soviet and Cuban viewpoints bvegional voting bloc* within the membership Al first. Cuba encouraged Grenada to eipreas its support for "progressive HrugsW' In southern Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America,ecret regional caucus of leftist governments was organixed by Cuba and hosted by Nicaragua to coordinate positions and votes on issues before the body Grenada also lobbied within the Socialist International foe thef ether emerging Caribbean partieser_lbai region al influence might be further expanded
aurice Biihop'i personal notes indicate that Cuban officials kept the NJM informed on events In El Salvador and Nicaragua. Other document* show lhal the NJM complieduban request thatRamon Coidona be permitted to establish on office In St George* In orderconduct work in the Caribbean on behalf of theetter Iron Major Keith Roberts to Loon ComraB. Greoa-cian Ambas-dor to Cuba, indicate* that Havana bad granted permission for three high-level NJM officials to visit Nicaragua so that they might observe" how the war was being directed and controlled."!
avana was Interested in securing NJM asiis-lance in gaining influence over and gatheringon the political parties In the Easternin Dominica. St Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad andigh-level Crenadian delegation to Havana2 agreed to provide ihe Cuban Communist Partyist of needs for Crenadaep*rate one for the Caribbean left politicalhe NJMParty Building Seminar' foraribbean leftistInollowedeeting of leftist youth groups sponsored by tlse World Federalion of Democratic Youth, the Continental Organization for Latin American Youth, and the International Union ofCommunist frontSeptember
Cuban* freaoently sought tbeamasciin who served as theGeneral and whom they considered anon Caribbean politics, and requested hitpenetrating the Organisation ol EaslernHavana also cultivated the specialMaurice Bishop and Tim Hector, aIn Antigua. Hector cwsied Aotlguanto Crenadian agents probably forlo Cuba, arranged for security trainingfor same of the members of his party,two of his people who were wanted byauthorities through Granada en routeIn Cuba.j
Ihe Point Sofine* Airport
Crenadian documenis contain manyto the major construction protect on thePoint Salines Airport This protect was tbeof the Bishoplant to greatlyisland's twins: trdmtrv. and was irutialJyand accepted bv Havana shortly alter tbeto power Tlie runway oneinallv waseterseet)shorthandle large let aircraftrcnadian delegation to Cuba suggestedrunway be lengthenedccommodate the wandard air carriers; theto the extension after conducting anstudy [ [
inute* of NJM meetliaa show that the airport was the source of many ol the prchletn* faced by the PRC Senior Crenadian officialsreat deal of Iheir time attempting to secure aid to complete the protect, but had little success. The NJM offered both Mnu-ow and Havana military tne of the airport, although neither was willing lo provide financial aid for the protect./
ctesmoed in the Assessment, most ot aid came from Middle Eostern nationssupportrices declined.
Unison Whiteman immediately began activelythe Soviets In order to lustily continued Soviet aid to Grenada. During the following year, members ol the diplomatic community in Grenada noticed that the Soviets seemed to be gradually replacing the Cubans as the primary source of advice to the PRC. although the documentsontinuing closer relationship with Havana and Ambassador Torres Rizo. The NIM/PRC obviously believed in keeping both patrons satisfied to the oitcnt thatpossible, and offered political support lor both in thearena. q
any recovered documents indicate that the NJM was most Interested in proving its worth to Moscow byoute for Soviet influence through Crenada to 'he Caribbean left, even though the Soviets seemed content to use their Cuban proxies for such access. During the summert. Ceorges was developing plans tocar meetings with the progressive and revolutionaryin thelterember of the NJM Central Committee would report to Moscow in order that Grenada might become. point of access to the USSR for all of thesehe NJM singled out Surlname and Belize as special targets through which they might enhance their importance to the Soviets. The US-led invasion prevented the NJM fromthese plam|
NJM was hindered in its attempts toit) stature with Moscow by Sovietdisinterest- The documents contain the reportBourne, Grenada's Minister-Counselor toUnion, that the Soviet's foreign relationsnot organized to dealriendlygovernment In theemisphere,was handled by Nichols! Mostevets, thea minor section lumped In with the UnitedCanada- Bourne stated that theexperience In dealing with part let ofwhich are Innd thattold him. the Caribbean wasfrom the Soviet Union and not oneichard Jacobs, the Crenadianto Moscow, wrote to Maurice Bishop lothatesult of these factors. we would figureery minutethe USSR's globalhey arevery careful, and for us sometimesin making up their minds about who to support
Crenadian documentseatevidence indicating that Soviet and Cubanand development of the Bishop regime was closely coordinated They Indicate that:
Soviet-sponsored economic assistance prefects were often preceded by Cuban feasibility studies
Crenadian official visits to Moscow or other Communist Bloc capitals typically began and concludedoordinating stopover in Havana.
Soviet arms deliveries come from or were traps-shipped thiough Cuba, and Cuban personnel were used to offload maior shipments in Crenada
Nonmilitary goods shipped Irom the USSR and its allies frequently passed through Cuban ports
evertheless, some circumstantial evidence of rivalry between Grenada's two patrons may befrom NJM members' notes taken during tbe Bishop-Coard dispute. These notes show that Havana reacted with surprise, alarm, and dismay to the anti-Bishop actions, but there is no indication that Moscow made any comment on the situation although the USSR was officially Informed of events lo Grenada by the NJM Central Committee- We do not knowthis silence indicated Soviet foreknowledge of events, adoptionands-olf attitude, or reliance on Havana to control the situation]
munttv to have placed more reliance on SovietCuban adviceermanent Sovietmission was establishedeports ofofficials' courting of Soviet favor arethe accounts and recommendations recordedrecovered documents, but whethercal Soviet-Cuban rivalry, or thethe ambassadors wasersonal nature
Deolingi Wiih Other Notions
he PRC signed aid aadmmber of countries, most of which wet* io tbe Soviet Blocbowi (he lull scope ol the NIM'i international activity ai revealed in (he document!
ocuments examined after the Asseiiment hi published have provided additional insights intobetween Grenada and Ihe Socialist Republic of Vietnam Cuba facilitated meetings between lhe MM and Vietnarneie official' and al) preliminary cutnmu-oicatiorts between the two patties were conducted thiouah the Grersadian Fmbaasy in Cuba The NJM wantedipiut Vietnamese eiperienre inan ti American military actions and to usemethods of monitoring andisit to Hanoiroup hmrlgcj bv Hudson Austin was briefed on CIA Intelligence and counterintelligence methods, as well as antiaircraft operations. The group then visitedliere Vietnamese reeducation techniques of dally work regimens and routine poiilicalwere demonstrated. The Austin delegationthat (be Ham-Na camp was coniductrd innd at tbe tuneeir vrat bonedornser South Vletrsaciese officials andj
eputy Minister olrt Lay tieelegation lo HanoiVietnamese assistance in military trainingLayne's meetings withtrtanvseproduced an agreement for training someIn Vietnam, bul (here wereavailable to transport (he students to Hanoi.appealed to Moscow for help, bul theno evidence thai they were successfulnever look place, nor did Vietnamesevolt Grenada
is no documentary evidence ofinvolvement in internal ior.al drug tra! do kingcontrary, many documents Indicate thai theleadership was stronaiy opposed to drug usefor both ideological and plasmaticThe NJM came to Identify drugs andwllh counterrevolutionary elements InNJM members psaced great importance onpore model of socialism, withorganization and loyalty to the partynarcotics (raflicking was seen as adcs(abillie the population, diffuse the attentionmasses, and provide fundi for aori-NIMcoiinlerintelligeiice maintained aover indivsdoah and groups associatedto an attempt to eliminate the me ofthe .land
riginal key judgments
an ail-source assessment of availableon Grenada and an analysis of that past ol the documents recovered from Grenada beforee have come to the following conclusions:
The primary focus of almost all actors on the Crenadianforeign andwas on consolidating the power of the New Jewel Movement and strengthening its Man 1st-Leninist orientation. To achieve thiseb ofamong Grenada. Cuba, and the Soviet Union evolved, charactcrizod bv:
- Discreet associations that became more overt as tbe New Jewel Movement increased its internal control.
Close party-to-party relations countries.
implementation of man agreements through Cuba
New Jewel Movementery small but highly influential part of thepopulace, dedicated toanrbt-Leninlst society but divided bv personaland conflicting views on how quickly to proceed with this task. Byhad:
A self-described Marxist-Leninist politicalwith Central Committee.Bureau, andthe revolutionary elite.
An army and militia that in size and armament far outstripped those of Hs neighbors or of previous Crenadian governments; bothhelped move Ctenada in tbe directionilltmlied society and provided important vehicles for indoctrinating youth.
An Internal security apparatus that dealtwith overt regime opponents and waspervasive to intimidate potentialto the New Jewel Movement.
iahly developed propaganda machine that relied on the government-monopolized media and partv-controlicd entities throughout the government bureaucracy to disseminate the leaderships political message.
captured documents underscore that the Bishop regime viewed Cuba as its principal foreign ally. Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop hadlose personal relationship'
- While Castro almost certainly knew of thebetween Bishop and Bernard Coard,was unaware of the degree tohad lost support within the leadershipthe Coard faction's growing drive forThe killing of Bisbup was clearlyIn Havana.
The Cuban role In defending Grenada is still being eiamlned. Thus far, we have not been able to confirm that armed Cubans defended other than their own positions or were involved inefense with Crenadian forces Most of the Cuban resistance came fromodd military advisers and on unknown number of construction workers who were trainedin the Cuban military It appears, however, that the majority of the construction workers had insufficient arms and ammunition and offered little
The Soviet Union valued the New Jewel regime in Grenadaymbol of decliniiig US power and expanding Marxist Influence in Latinhioscow initially kepi the Crenadiansat arm's length, effectively masking themibtary relationship. The captured documents show that direct Soviet Influence was brought to bear on party organization, ideological training, and management of the fading Grena-dian economy.|
Both the documents and open sources show that Crenadian contact* with the USSR were handled primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Coard, who wa* the most Ideologically committed and the most pro-Soviet member of the leadership. There if controversy within the Intelligenceregarding the extent of Soviet control over
events In Grenada. The documents give nolhat in3 Coord discussedSoviet officials (he leadership conflict) in ihe New Jewel Movement. There is generalwithin the Iwefligene* Comxoarot* that such discussions might have taken place, the Defense Intelligence Agency and some analysts in CIA beheve that when Coard went to Moscow he Informed the Soviets of hit plant to challenge Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advke and support. DIA further believes that Coard was tntlructed by Moscow to take action to assume leadership. However no documentary evidence of any kind of collaboration as described above has been found as yet |
Although the document* provide no evidenceoviet or Cuban request io use alt and naval facilities on Grenada, we believe that the Cuban role in budding the Point Salines Airportan erpectaiion of using it for Cuban purposes, and the USSR probably also planned use of. some facilities The documents indicale lhatofficials envisaged the possibility of luch
The captured documents and other sources show that Grenadians had been'
- Receiving training to Cuba and the USSR for both domestic and foreign intelligence work.
-Conductingan Ira ia lagolitical doctrination of small groups of easternleftift*.
Broadcasting Cuban- and Soviet-furnishedover Radio Free Grenada
Disseminating newsletters to Caribbean Jour-oalUU and media workers]
Although few references in the capturedsupport the judgment, other evidence Indicate* lhat both Havana and Moscow viewed Grenadacxiogboard for
Penetrating other countries in the aiea.
Distribution of propaganda and money iotn the region.
Military training of lubversiv* group* (
Captured document* reveal lhal Grenada had secret military agreements with Cuba, the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, andWhile the Crenadians may havethese weapon* were for their armede beheve that the Soviets and their proiies probably intended to draw on the stores ol weapons on Grenada to supply friendlyin the region as opportunities or need might arise. r"
- The overall tfcture presented by Use evidence is that by3 the USSR and Cuba had mace real progress toward turning Crcnada into awmter for further subversion of the region. [JJOriginal document.