CUBA CASTRO'S PROPAGANDA APPARATUS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Created: 11/1/1984

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CUBA

Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy

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Table of Contents

Page

Key

Historical Perspective: In the Sierra

Instinct for

Radio

Headline

meture for Media

Castro's Personal

-npoocnU of the Apparatus

International

Casa de las

Performing

Athletes and Sports

International Meetings. Conferences, and

Personal

Miscellaneous Propaganda

Training Foreign

Annex Methodology of Cuban Ideological

FIGURES

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Fig.orge Ricardo Masetti. Argentine journalist

Fig.ntonio Perez Heircro. Castro's chiei political offioer

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HATE:3 Orienlalinn Department

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Kie-astro al ihe Nonalianrd Movement Conference9

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Pig.uban-Mmnsorcil Third Latin American Seminar of

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Fig.astro with Cuban exile leaders

asiroress conference wilh US journalists

jniplr ol Cuban publication* mediums

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Branch Othces und Collaborators of Piensa

Cuba's Daily Broadcasting

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APPROVED POP RELEASE DATE: 3

PREFACE

This paper is an in-depth examination ol Castro's propaganda apparatus, but it is notumber nl (lie apparatus' lesser elements have been omitted for sake of brevity, and no mention has. been made of Havana's extensive use of foreign aid to enhance the Castro regime's image. The major branches of the propaganda mill, however, are discussed in sufficient detail to give (he reader an adequate appreciation of the size and sophistication of one ol Havana's most impoitant foreign policy took

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DATS: 3

Key Judgments

Cuban President Fidel Castro has long considered propaganda to be one of the most potent weapons in his foreign policy arsenal. His use of the few propaganda assets available tointerviews with journalists, radio broadcasts and special publicity-seekingduring his guerrilla war against Batista contributedajor way to his victory andreview of the methods he would use so successfully after coming to power.

Immediately after assuming power, Ik: sot about creating aempire that today is perhaps the most effective in theand has connections worldwide. The empire is directedlique made up of Castro and his old guerrilla comrades; thisermanent antipathy toward democratic nations that the Castroseeks to undermine.

This network consistslobal news agency, international broadcasting facilities, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, front groups, "friendship" Institutes, sports and cultural activities,ide variety of miscellaneous organizations.

Cuba's news service hasffices around the world, transmits stories in four languages, andariety of magazines and news periodicals that are disseminated to readers in numerous Western and Third World nations. Cuba's broadcast facilities include eighton theuptwo transmitters in the USSR. Shortwave broadcasting aloneours weekly in eight languages to Europe. Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The Cuban Institute for Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP) is designed to organize in foreign countries associations that are responsive to direction from Havana. Tlicrc areuch associations throughout the world.

The Castro regimeillion Palace of Conventions in Havana to host international gatherings designed to focus world opinion on sprscific issues or to promote Cuban prestige. In addition. Cuban cultural institutions such as the Casa de las Americas have effectively mobilized many Latin Americanof themsupport of the Cuban revolution. Cuba'shouses have turned out0 titles andillion copies of books andignificant amount being propaganda. Cuban books are now distributed in more thanountries.

Castro's propaganda successes are impressive. The two mostachievementsespite severe economic shortcomings in

his country, lie has been able to projectavorable image of Cuba AiT-iovsnlAte's:Third WorId ,eatleis see itodel for other developing date:espite relentless meddling abroad, he has been able to

convince many influential individuals that he is willing to abide by

correct standards of international behavior.

It is clear from Cuban Government statements that propaganda will continue toajor priority and will expand in certain key areas. Although economic constraints will hamper this effort, we are likely to see new investments made to:

Improve the availability of Cuban books and magazines abroad.

Open new bureaus of Cuba's international news agency and increase the number of subscribers for that news agency's services.

Help allies develop their own propaganda outlels for both domestic and international audiences.

Train foreign journalists to make the most of their skills and opportunities in non-Marxist countries.

Establish and promote ostensibly independent news-gathering and professional organizations of leftists to provide competitionreduce ihe influencenews agencies,and radio stations.

In our view, the bitterly pro-Marxist bias of Castro's propaganda apparatus will not change because it mirrors his own deep-seated antipathy towards democratic governments. Although he may. from time to time, have the apparatus temper its invective,uting so far has always proved lo be temporary' Basically he expects the propaganda machine to promote Soviet/Cuban policies and to counter anti-Communist (anti-Castro) trendsay-to-day basis. In addition, he intends to use it toroad, permanent body of literature that, through its scholarship, eloquence, and sheer volume, willcurrent and future generations of Latin Americans. Castroexpects this growing body of literature to cause problems for democratic nations long after he himself is out of the picture.

Castro's propaganda mills have sometimes made mistakes- Radio Havana's selective reporting on Peru's Maoist Scndero Luminosogroup, for example, has angered the Peruvian Government. Despite these occasional lapses, however, the Cuban propagandaenjoying close association with its Soviet counterpart, ample funding, and competent personnel, will remain an important negative factor working against democratic interests, worldwide.

" HI'llllll j

Historical Perspective: In the Sierra Maestro

Fidel Castro's instinct for the value of international propaganda served him spectacularly as early aswo months after his infiltration of eastern Cuba by sea. His group ofnsurgents had been reduced through combat and desertionsard core ofnd government control of the media left most Cubans with the impression tbat the insurgency had failed and that Castro was dead. To overcome the censorship barrier and embarrass the BatistaCastroessenger to Havana tooreign journalist to meet with him in the Sierra Maestra mountains of eastern Cuba. The journalist picked for the task was Hebert Matthews of the New York Times.

In three articles resulting from his brief encounter with Castro, Matthews gave an almost heroic impression of the Cuban revolutionary, describing him as "the flaming symbol of the opposition to the regime" and boldly predicted that "from the looks of things, General Batista cannot possibly hope to suppress the Castrojudgment madeime when the insurgent band consisted only ofoorly armed, half-starved men on the run.

A political bombshell, the Times articles, with their photographic evidence of the historic meeting, gave the lie to Batista's insistence that Castro was dead, overstated the strength of the insurgent band (thanks to Castro's deliberate efforts to deceivend gave the insurgents vital international exposure. Castro's comrade-in-arms, Che Guevara, recalled two years later: "At the time, the presenceoreign journalist, preferably an American, was more important to usilitaryonth of the Matthews interview the band ofad grown toor his support. Matthews was later decorated by Castro.

The intermediaries who had arranged the Matthews trip later setimilar propaganda exercise with the Columbia Broadcasting System. The resulting television documentary, which included ainterview with Castro atop the highest mountain peak in Cuba, further enhanced the rebels' romantic image.

Radio Rcbcldo

The second phase of Castro's propaganda war against Batistaear later on Cuba's independence dayebel radioin Che Guevara's headquarters in the Sierra Maestra began nightly broadcasts on shortwave. The use of shortwave, which meant it could not be heard in eastern Cuba itself, suggests it was intended as much for listeners abroad as for those on the island. Castro's first speech

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on Radio Rebelde suggests the same; he opened by appealing "to publicos wnioioa in Cuba and lo the free peoples of Latinemocratic governments, leaders, and parties of the region for

their tolerance of the Batista dictatorship."

A popular Venezuelan station began taping the rebel broadcasts and replaying them onaudible in eastern Cuba atwas, according to the insurgent radio'source of great satisfaction in the rebel camp. Another important Venezuelan broadcaster later did the same on both mediumwave and shortwave and eventually stations in Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, and even Argentina were involved in the retransmissions.

Byadio Rebelde's nightly broadcasts could be heard throughout the Caribbean Basin and were clearly audible inDC. Thus, Radio Rebelde, powered by lessatts,ajor factor in putting Batista on the defensive internationally and ineroic portrait of Castro.

Castro's Press Club

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RESTRICTED

Radio Rebelde was only part of Castro's campaign, journalistsumber of countries were invited to repeat the Matthews experience. One of Buenos Aires' most influential radio stations sent Jorge Ricardo Masetti to the Sierra Maestra inis "instant" book about his trip. Those Who Fight and Those Who Weep, introduced Castro to Argentinaasetti was so captivated that he later returned to Cuba to organize Castro's international press agency and,sing the alias Comandante Segundo, Masetti died trying touerrilla war in his homeland.

"Triii'iiuLt*-

Masetti was preceded into the Sierra Maestra by reporter Enrique wi-sovEr ^neseiw.*yhose reporting on this trip appeared in articles in Paris date: jul fHiHeh. The French magazine's greatest international competitor. Look magazine, had already published an interview with Castro in whichan eye for his USto holdruly honest election" and disclaimed any intention of nationalizing foreign investments.

During this same period inastro hosted an Uruguayan journalist and another New York Times' reporter. Foreign journalists were visiting with such frequencyign reading "Pressn English and Spanish, was placed on the rude hut where the foreign visitors were received at insurgenl headquarters, and Che Guevara jokingly referred to it as "the most exclusive press club in the world."

Headline Grabbers

In addition to entertaining international journalists duringhe insurgents carried out special paramilitary operationsboth to attract the press and to heap scorn on Batista's security forces. The insurgents' urban apparatus, for example, kidnapped world-famous Argentine race ear driver Juan Manuel Fangioavana hotel in broad daylight.Cuba for the Gran Prernioreleased unharmed after the race had started, but gained points for his captors by commenting favorably on the treatment he had received.

A second kidnapping, carried out in lateusload of aboutS sailors and marines, who were held until mid-July. The aims were to pressure Batista lo halt indiscriminate air bombings of villages in guerrilla territory, to prod the US into making demands on Batista lo rescue US personnel which Batista could not fulfill and thus would discredit him and to alert the US public to the savagery with which the Batista Forces were pursuing the civil war.

Through his broadcasts, his careful cultivation of foreignand his propaganda-oriented paramilitary operations, Castroin internationalizing the conflict. Besides arousing broadsympathy, his efforts yielded tangible benefits. His propaganda campaign almosl certainly played an important part in the US decision in8 to suspend arms shipments to the Batista government It also elicited important support in arms and money from abroad.

Structure for Media Management

Castro's Personal Control

Once in power, Castro began organizing what is today anmedia empire unmatched by other Latin America countries. As in other Communist countries, this empire is tightly controlled by ihe

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Cuban Communist Party's Political Bureau, the regime's highest policy-- - making body This network consists of such organizations as radio date:3 ews agency with offices around the globe, newspapers.

magazines, publishing houses, front groups, "friendship" institutes, professional associations, as well as ad hoc devices, includingmeetings, sham tribunals, cultural displays, speaking tours, and literaryof which are dedicated to promoting the Cuban line and denigrating the non-Communist world in general andcountries when it is in Cuban interest to do so. Some operate overtly as acknowledged organs of the Cuban Government while others are fronts ostensibly free of Cuban influence. The efforts of this vast party-controlled apparatus are carefully synchronized with and supplemented by the personal efforts of Castro and other top Cuban officials, who use their perogatives of office and their considerable powers of persuasion to sway foreign figures of influence and exploit the non-Cuban media.

Topping this media monolith is Castro himself. His concern for propaganda nuances is so great that he sometimes visits the editorial offices of the party's daily newspaper Granma late at night to review the next day's edition or direct the exact placementtory. Castro also sometimes drops into the headquarters of Cuba's international news agency, Prensa Latina, totatement that he wants disseminated abroadesponse to quick-breaking events. On subjects of extremedealing with the Uniteddoes not hesitate to write unattributed editorials. Over the years he has consistentlyeen personal interest in how news is presented, always trying to gain the maximum political benefit from it.

Castro's chief political officer, Antonio Perezolitical Bureau alternate member who functions as party secretary for ideology, oversees day-to-day operations of the media empire ensuring that it accurately reflects Castro's thinkinguerrilla veteran, he

rose quickly in Raiil Castro's Armed Forces Ministry after theice minister and chief political officer for the entire date: jul inHftary establishment.

Revolutionary Orientation Department

Perez Herrero exerts control over the media empire through the Revolutionary Orientation Department, an office of the party's Central Committee charged with establishing ideological guidelines andthat they are followed. The Department Chief. Orlando Fundora Lopez, has served in this position since7 and is directly subordinate to Perez Herreroccording to press reports, it is not unusual for either or both to accompany Castro on trips abroad to ensure that his tight control of the media is not loosened by distance.

Fundora's department includes Cranmo, which in addition to Its daily schedule for domestic consumption, publishes three weeklySpanish, English, anddistribution abroad. The department's radio, television and documentary film section controls domestic broadcasting as well as Radio Havana shortwave and La Voz de Cuba mediumwave for external audiences. Its press sectionthe international news agency. Prensa Latina, and its domestic counterpart, Agenda Informativa Nacional. It also has history,and publicity sections as well as several others.

Components of the Apparatus Prensa Latina

Perhaps the most effective Cultan propaganda weapon is Prensa Latina, which not onlyaily stream of propaganda

hostile to democratic nations, but also servesover for intelligencefoband operations; on occasion itiplomatic function bv3 using branch offices as de facto embassies-According to tlie authorsuban history of the agency, the idea for Prensa Lalina was born at the time of Operation Truthhen Castro, complainingonspiracy against him and his revolution by tbe international news agencies, gathered moreoreign journalists and news photographers, mostly from Latin America, in Havana to try to overcome the bad press that resultedave of executions immediately following his victory over Batista. The high point of Operation Truth occurred onanuary when Castro met with the assembled army of newspersons.

In condemning the Western wire services, he lamented that "we don't have (our own) international wire services. You Latin American journalists have no other choice but to accept what the (US and European) wire services tell you. The Latin American press, ought to have lite means that would permit it to know the truth and nol beof Ihee urged the journalists to become involved. "Do you journalists want to help the oppressed? Well, youormidable weapon in your hand: continental public opinion Use it and you will see how you can help to liberate people and save many lives."

On hand for Castro's spectacular press conference were Carlos Maria Gutierrez and Jorge Ricardo Masetti, two pro-Castro journalists whose radical bona fides had been established during their visit to Che Guevaras "press club" in the Sierra Maestra8 Respondingersonal invitation from Che, they had returned to Cuba from Buenos Aires in early9 and had helped Castro prepare for Operation Truth. Following Castro's plea, they prepared forfor what six months later was to becometina

Inexican industrialist Cuillermo Castro Ulloa arrived in Havana to conclude the preparations for the agency, later becoming its first president.une, it was formally inaugurated andasetti as its directorLatino began its first transmission to subscribers abroad.

By the end of the year. Prensa Lalina had, in addition to its service in Spanish for Latinransmission in English for Egypt's Middle East News Agency and Yugoslavia's Tanyug News Agency. Its Spanish transmissions were also directed to Czechoslovakia for CTK and to Poland forear after its creation. Prensa Lalina had branch offices in Washington, New York. London. Paris. Geneva and Prague, as well as in all countries of Latin America except Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. Bv the endt boasted of two national andnternational radio circuits and an average daily transmission

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totalews dispatches.tuechua Indiano-lapguaReaiews service for Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

DATE: 3

Today, Prensa Latina transmits in fourEnglish andshortwave to all parts of thenews in Spanish is on the airours aprovides additional transmissions in undetermined languages on satellite facilities. It hasranch offices in major cities of the world from Tokyo and Luanda to Moscow and Buenos Aires. Itpecial services department thatariety of journalistic support materials, including:packages of events or personalities; compilations of basic data for background presentations; recorded interviews with leading political, cultural, and sports figures; political or economic commentariesingle country or an entire region by experienced observers; and feature articles on virtually any subjectewspaper or magazine would be interested in publishing. These made-to-order services can be provided in Spanish, French, or English.

Prensa Latina also publishes its own magazines and newsItspagc Prisma Latinoamericatw,ormat designed to compete with Time,panish edition sold in Spain and nine countries of Latin American,ortuguese edition for Portugal. Brazil and five African countries. Prisma's news items and illustrations invariably have an anti-Free World slant intended to condition its readers to view non-Communist economic and political institutions as the source of all the world's ills. Its half- and full-pagefor products of major Spanish and Portugueselend il respectability. Begun in5 (Portuguese edition, Prisma is staffed by some of Prensa Latinamost professional and effective propagandists. An English-language version of Prisma first appeared inrinted in Prague through agreement with CTK, it is avowedly aiming for distribution in the US, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. Ethiopia. Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria. South Yemen, Tanzania, Nigeria. Libya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

A companion to Prisma is Cubapage monthly in Spanish that relies on illustrations and feature articles, many of which arc devoted to presenting an optimistic picture of life in Cuba or lauding the exploits of Cuban aid missions abroad and Cuban sports teams in international competition. Like Prisma, il is consistently pro-Communist, pro-Cuba. Cuba Internacional is distributed in Spain. Portugal, Angola, and nine countries of Latin America. It also has aedition for the USSR.

In addition. Prensa Latina publishes Pel, or Panorama Econdmicopage, fortnightly publication in Spanish that provides articles on the "the principal international economic problems

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ith special attention to themes related to Asia, Africa, and Latina api'Soved forhe Prensa Latina office in Prague, Czechoslovakia,Latin American Roundup (Slntesiswice-weekly wrap-up of events in Latin American in both an Englishpanish edition. Also in English and Spanish editions is Direct frompagc Prensa Latina product that aims "to place at the reach of progressive publications all over the globe the most important, permanent, and current information from our network of correspondents in Cuba, Latin America, and other parts of tlietina and tbe Soviet Novosti news agency office in Havana jointly publish IntegracUm Econdmicapage collection of articles on the economic activities of the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistancet isublic relations vehicle for CEMA.

Prensa Latina facilities are not used exclusively for journalistic purposes- When Havana closed ils embassy in Caracas0 and withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Venezuela, for example, ihe Prensa Latina office there assumed diplomatic functions. The same occurred in Bogota1 when Colombia suspended relations with Cuba"

Inter rational Broadcasts

Before Castro came to power. Cuba had no international shortwave broadcasting service. Today, the Castro regime has Radio Havana, an official government entity lhat, according to regular observations, broadcastsours per week on shortwave in eight languageshe countries of Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Americas.ingle low-powered transmitter inauguratedadio Havana has grown into one of the leaders of tbe Third World in the held of international broadcasting. It now has at least eight transmilters in Cuba ranging upilowatts in power, and also used two transmitters in the USSR. (The use of Radio Moscow's transmitters to twain Cuban broadcasts to Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa complements Soviet use of two Cuban shortwave transmitters for Radio Moscow transmissions to Latino other government in Latin Americaomparable international broadcasting service.

Radio Havana's service on shortwave Is supplemented by La Voz de Cuba, on mediumwave, which broadcasts approximatelyours per week for Spanish-speaking listeners in the IS and in the countries bordering thearallel service inVoice ofretransmission of Radio Moscow's English service for North

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America were broadcast by some of Cuba's strongestincluding at least oneilowatts, until latewere taken off the air; their removal presumably was

intended to deny Washington the opportunity to use retaliation as grounds for justifying the initiation of US broadcasts to Cuba on mediumwave over the proposed Radio Marti.

The Castro regimeong history of involvement in subversive broadcasting efforts. Castro's victory over Batista was lessonth old before Cuban commercial broadcasting stations began beaming programs abroad calling openly for revolution in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. As Castro's sponsorship of guerrilla warfare in other countries grew. clandestine insurgent radio stations proliferated. Their links to Cuba were virtually impossible to prove, but circumstantial evidence frequently indicated Cuban involvement. For example, one short-lived clandestine shortwaveRebelde delittle else bul slanted news provided by Prensa Latina.

On other occasions, Cuban complicity was obvious- In one such incident, for example, one of Radio Havana's shortwave transmitters was temporarily taken out of service, and on its frequency thereclandestine" radio lhat displayed technical characteristics that were unique to the Radio Havana transmitter. The station's pretense that it was broadcasting from the Dominican Republic was belied by its inability to provide timely news of fast-breaking events taking place there. When the radio ceased its transmissions, Radio Havana resumed its broadcasts on the same frequency.

More recently, Cuba has been linked to broadcasters in Costa Rica and, until recently, Grenada, as well as to clandestine radios associated with Salvadoran insurgents. Radio Noticias delhortwave radio that broadcasts openly from San Jose until closed by the Costa Ri-can Government inegularly attacked the Governments of Argentina, Chile. Uruguay. Guatemala, and Elthe time, all standard targets of Cuban propaganda. On the air forear. Radio Noticias was eventually found to be propaganda outlet of the Montoneros, an Argentine terrorist group that, for years has had close ties to Havana. Radio Noticias' closureilter attack from Radio Havana, which suggests that the Castro regime hadigh valuewas secretly involvedoperation.

While Havana's links to Radio Noticias were covert, the Cuban association with Radio Free Crenada was open. Cuban communications technicians arrived in Grenada innly two months after Maurice Bishop seized power, and, according to press reports, in0 the two countries arranged for Cuban assistance In the repair and upgrading of Radio Free Grenada. Cuba5 kilowatt

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medmmwaveercent more powerful than theo^-BtnWcial mediumwave broadcasting station in the US-and Cuban technicians installed it alongoot transmitting tower and ancillary equipment. Havana provided scholarships for trainingstudents who were to maintain and operate the new equipment which was inaugurated onhe third anniversary ol Bishop's takeover

Presumably to support Radio Free Crenada's newscasts Havana inaugurated Prensa Latina press transmissions in English to the eastern Caribbean. Accordingress release from the Cuban Embassy in Georgetown, the Cuban Radio-Television Institute also prov.ded Radio Free Crenada with programming in the fields of culture, sports, the sciences, and music The extent of Cuban support for Radio Free Grenadaigh degree of confidence iu Havana lhat the station would functionuban propaganda surrogate in the eastern Caribbean.

Cuba's interest in clandestine broadcasting stations is currently evident in its collaboration with the Salvadoran insurgents According to an analysis by an agency that regularly monitors Havana and the insurgent radios, "Havana regularlyorum for the rebels three regularly clandestine radios stations by replaying the rad.os political commentaries, mililary communiques, and news bulietms. Cuban foreknowledge of these radios' operations over the past two years has been proved on three occasions, the Cuban media gave advance publicity for the guerrillas- Radio Venceremos before it beganinor Radio Farabundo Marti before "came on Ihe air onnd for Radio Guaxapa before it started broadcasts onast February. Radio Havanaopenly thai Radio Venceremosepresentative in Havana.

In light of the high value the Castro regime 1ms always placed on Insurgent broadcasting and considering the material support it has provided the Salvadoran rebels for years, it seems safe lo assume that Cuba's guerrilla warfare training scliools have been used to teach Salvadorans to operate and maintain clandestine radios and that Cuban party schools have provided instruction on the techniques ot propagarrda.

ICAP

The Cuban Institute for Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP)-was established on0 in the midstajor Cuban campaign to mobilize popular sentiment in Latin America and Europe against the anticipated counter revolutionary invaswn from Ihe United States The new organization, according to the law creating it. was

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founded "to stimulate and facilitate the visit to Cuba of theof Ihe popular and progressive sectors of all the countries of thehow in,erest in 'earning firsthand the economic and social changes and the works carried out by the Cuban revolution" and totheas ihe US-based Fair Play for Cubathat had been formed in other countries to publicly demonstrate support for the Castro regime.

One of ICAP's first tasks was to organize foreigners in Cuba intobased on country of origin, such as the Union of Peruvians in Cuba, the Cuban-Spanish Friendship Society, the Cuban-Venezuelan Institute of Revolutionary Solidarity, the Cuban-Brazilian Friendship Committee, and the Association of Guatemalans Residing in Cuba. This provided Cuban intelligence servicesegistry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands, and servetructure for mobilizing foreign nationals in demonstrations against ihe policies of their own governments. Every Latin American diplomatic mission in Havana knew it would face an ICAP-sponsored parade of its own nationals marching and shouting outside the embassy walls if frictions developed with Cuba'sgovernment.

Subsequently, ICAP. establishing contacts with intellectuals abroad, arranged for them to form local "friendship" associations responsive to directives from Havana. Colombian author Leon de Creif, for example, organized the Colombian-Cuban Friendship Association in Bogota and was its first president, while Culture Ministry official Robin Ravalesouted as the "national poet ofeads the Suriname-Cuba Friendship Association in Paramaribo.

There areuch associations throughout the world,to ICAP president Rene Rodriguez Cruz.tatement last year, he described them as being made up of writers, artists, journalists, civil rights workers, student and labor leaders, politicians of variousstripes, men and women in the religious life, and others. They "are those who are charged with refuting in their respective countries the distorted version that North American imperialism presents of our social work and our internationalist assistance to other peoples."

Rodriguez Cruz boasted that through these associations "we are related to the broadest social, political, cultural, and mass sectors in every part of theCAP's goal, he said, is "toechanism of communications between the various social strataivenechanism that is quick and flexible, withoutorCAP, then, is highly opportunistic, eagerly welcoming propaganda support from all sources, even those that might beincompatible.

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In his interview. Rodriguez. Cruz admitted openly thatftred friendship associations carry out their propaganda activities according to prearranged work plans coordinated with Havana and depend on Havana for material support. He stressed the "fluid and systematic interchange" that Cuttan officials had with the leadership of these associations. He also confirmed Havana's linksroleWest European peace movement by saying that:. we have directed the (friendship) associations abroadstablish broad links with the whole movement that is prompting actions in defense of peace. And we can say. without fear of error, that many of them are carrying out precisely thosee bragged thatreat peace movement began in West Germany, the first banner that waved, carried by the demonstrators, had the initials of ICAP printed onuba thus acknowledges that in effectriendship associations abroad are directed from Havana and act on its instructions

In addition to aligning themselves with broadly based political organizations such as the peace and antinucloar weapons movements, the friendship associations distribute Cuban-supplied propaganda,their own pro-Cuban literature, serve as unofficial spokesmen for the government in Havana, defend Cuban policy in the local press, and carry out marches and other demonstrations to focus local attention on issues that Havana wants to exploit. Even when these activities involve very few people and have no measurable impact locally, they are duly reported throughout the hemisphere by Radio Havana,tina. and Cuban newspapers and magazines, and thus promote animpression of substantial popular sentiment in favor of Cuban policy and against US interests.

Bringing foreign groups to Cuba for propaganda exploitation is another part of ICAP's job. The Nordic Brigade made up mostly of young Scandinavians, the Venceremos Brigade from the US, the Antonio Macro Brigade of young Cuban exiles most of whom live in the US, and the Jose Marti Brigade of West Europeans all make regularto Cuba to engage in "constructivesymbolic cane cutting or manual labor in the field oftouided tour of the island. The groups from the US are usually portrayed by the Cuban media as typical of the idealistic youth who have rejected the anti-Castro political Judgments of Washington; in reality, according to accounts by some of these young visitors. Cuban authorities are wary of the drug problem these people sometimes bring with them to Cuba and considerable effort is made to isolate the members of the brigades to keep them from "contaminating" the Cuban population.

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Casa do las Americos

Induing from (heir own writings and statements, Latin America'sncluding many who had been persecuted by dictatorial regime in their ownvicarious satisfaction from Batista's downfall andontinent-wide supply of literary and artistic talent waiting to be tapped on revolution's behalf. To help harness the considerable propaganda potential of this influential segment of Latin American society, Castro founded tbe Casa de Us Americas iness than four months after be assumed power. The Casa quickly established itself as an influential literary institutionor its firstears, it sponsored annual Latin American theater festivals and5 beganheatrical journal called Con^tinfo. Int organized the "Festivaluba" for

Latin American writers and used the occasion to publish five hooks.fttt same month, it established its own Jose Antonio Ecbeverria Library, which specializes in Latin American studies, anderies of conferences on live "American Policy of the Revolution" attended by prominent cultural and political figures.

he Casa organized what we believe has become one of its most important political vehicles, the annual literary contest that awards monetary prizes to Latin American poets, writers, andin various categories of literature. The "testimony" category for autobiographical writings, for example, has been particularly useful for calling public attention to memoirs of those in the region willing to relate the experiences of urban or rural guerrilla fighters.0 prize, for example, went to Argentine journalist Maria Esther Cilio for her book The Tupnmaro Guerrillas. Prize-winning works are often published by the Casa, giving added prestige ond exposure to the author. In the, when the Castro regime began paying greater heed to the former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Casa added to the annualpecial category for authors from the English-speaking Caribbean territories and still laterrench-language category for authors from Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana.

Inhe Casa began publishing its literary Journal, Casa de las Americas, which servesehicle for sliorter works by the region's poets and writers. Published sixear, it alsoook review section that publicizes books with the appropriate political slant, and conversely,latform for challenging those nolengthy news column alerts the reader to coming cultural events andthose that have already taken place; as with the magazine in general, politicalsupports the Cubantoajor criterion for selection of material appearing in the column.

In addition to publishing the works of some of the winners of the annual competition. Casa publishes book-length material by authors whose literary efforts are deemed worthy of broad exposure. Perhaps the most famous example was Regis Debray's Revolution within theublished7 just in time for the failure of the guerrilla operation it was meant toBolivian disaster. Other Casa books, such us Gerard Pierre Charles' Haiti: The Uninterrupted Crisis, are designed to establish theebellion tliat destroys all political, economic, and social institutionsountry and replaces them with "socialist" institutions.

Until her suicidehe president of the Casa was Haydeeelf-effacing heroine of the Cuban revolution who always maintained that site herself was not an Intellectual. If herna fides were wanting, her credentialsevolutionary were impeccable

Slieember of Castro's rebel force thai attacked the Moncada Army barracks onulyfutile assault that left both her OTbtfrer:anrJ her fiance dead of torture and herself alater worked in tbe underground in support of Castro's guerrilla war. Her daring revolutionary' experiences ami her tragic personal losses madearticularly appealing, dramatic figure for the region'smany of whom could relate to her sufferings.

During her tenure as its president, the Casa served the Castro regime effectively by marshaling supportive cultural activity and helping create acceptance of Cuban revolutionary ideology. Itajor contribution to the formationizable body of literature that helped to reshape popular conceptions of armed struggle, dramatize it, and try to make it respectable Revolution became synonymous with idealism, and intellectuals, caught up emotionally, left their norma! pursuits to take up guns.

Author-journalist Jorge Ricardo Masetti. for example, left Cuba to die in Argentina3 at the headuerrilla band; Peruvian poet Javier Heraudroup of young Peruvian intellectuals, according to Havana's own admission, left Cuba to die in their homeland3 while trying to rendezvousuerrilla group; Guatemalan poet Otto Rene Castillo, according lo an account published by the Casa. died7 while servingroiwganda officer for the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces guerrilla group; noted Salvadoran poet-author Roquc Dal ton, whoong and warm association with the Casa. died5 in internecine fighting within bis rebel movement; Nicaraguan priest-poet Ernesto Cardenal, another friend of the Casa, became an active member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front and wasabinet posthe oustei of Somoza: and many others over the years who had links to the Casa contributed in some form to theof the Cuban armed struggle doctrine Many more have willingly aided Cuba in less dramatic bul perhaps more useful pursuits, the staffs of the Casa. Prensa Lalina. and Radio Havana, in particular, have profited in this fashion.

Never Quite confident of her roleultural personality, Haydee Santamaria, according lo accounts by knowledgeable observers, left much of the Casa's day-to-day business to others whose personal prestige helped il develop into one of the most influential cultural organizations in Latin America. Noted Cuban leftist intellectuals who staffed it or linked iheir reputations to it were joined by foreign intellectuals such as Argentine Marxist philosopher Ezckial Martinez Estrada and Guatemala's Manuel Galich Theeader of the Guatemalan Communist Parly who was Foreign Minister during the Arbcnz government, was appointed Assistant Director of tbe Casa and also headed the Casa's Theater Department Noted Uruguayan leftist author Mario Benedetti became director of the Casa's Center for

Literary Hesearch when it was created7 and later gaveemporarily to Colombian writer Oscar Collazos.

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One observer, who7ympathetic study ot the Casa and interviewed several of its top figures, noted that the Casa's history "is the chronicle of the efforts by Cuban and Latin American vanguard intellectuals to ally, unite, and integrate intellectual support for Cuba and the Latin Americannd credited the Casa's magazine with servingorum for Latin American writers and as acenter for the region's more militant intellectuals. This description of the Casa's mission remains true today.

Performing Arts

It appears that any element of the performing arts in Cuba is considered an appropriate vehicle for disseminatingostensibly innocent messenger that, through its polished performances,avorable impression about the Cuban social system. The Cuban National Ballet, captained by prima ballerina Alicia Alonso. is the flagship of this segment of the propaganda machinery, and has performed in many parts of the world from Hanoi and Moscow to the Kennedy Center in Washington.

Alonso, who is aboulears old, is the ballet's director and principal choreographer. She earned international acclaim innd she has shaped the National Balletespected representative of the Castro regime. Her statements and actions over the pastears indicate clearly that she is deeply committed to Castro's revolution and she continues to lend her personal prestige to it.

Other performing groups that are sent abroad to enhance Cuban prestige include the National Folkloric Ensemble, the NationalOrchestra, and. more frequently, smaller teams of actors, singers, and musicians such as the Cubana de Acero theater group; tbe Moncada musical group; the Camaguey Ballet Company, the Aragon Orchestra; the Irakere jazz rock band; the Papines popular music quartet; the Nueva Trova musical group; and others. Their mission is to help erase the image of the Castro regimeromoter of subversion and revolution, and convince their audiences that Cuba merits closer bilateral ties.

Athletes and Sports Teams

Cuban sports teams and athletes are also sent abroad as good-will emissaries and as evidence of the alleged superiority to the Cuban system. Because of the stress Havana places on the politics ofcompetition, there is great pressure on Cuban participants to win, especially when matched against USossS amateur baseball team, for example,ource of great embarrassment. The

Castro regime invests heavily in its athletic programs and its huge representations at the Central American and Caribbeanfeg]iow"6bmpetition held every four years, dwarf the delegation from neighboring countries. The acquisition of masses of medals is given high priority because the Cubans realize that the country that dominates such athletic extravaganzas usually gets the broadest press coverage.

Because international-class athletes such as boxer Teofilo Stevenson and runner Alberto luantorena can capture headlines in thepress by defeating world-class competitors, they are looked upon as important national assets by the Castro regime. Like their counterparts in the performing arts, they establish links with the "outsidearn international respect for Cuba, pave the way for increased contacts, and help to overcome the Castro regime's isolation.

Losers, on the other hand, are politically untenable. Even though Cuban athletesold,ilver, andronze medals during the Central American and Caribbean Games in Cuba inhere was high-level disappointment in Havana because the baseball team won none.esult, the regime canceled plans to send the team to the world amateur baseball championship competition in South Korea the following month. Fielding no team at all was considered better lhan fielding one that would likely lose and thus stain Cuba's reputation.

Cinema

While athletes and performing artists help toeneral impression lhat Cuba's system promotes artistic expression and athletic excellence, the cinema industry is much more directly propagandist. Cuban films pointedly address political themes and film festivalsatter of course base the awarding of prizes on politicalhird-rate film that endorses violent revolulion or disparages the US and other anti-Communist nations is certain to find favorirst-rate production that is apolitical.

At the Fourth International Festival of the New Latin American Film, held in Havana inolitics and ideology played the dominant role as usual. First prizeocumentary film, according to the Cuban media, was awarded to Cartas de Morazan {Letters fromar movie prepared by the Radio Vencere-mos propagandists of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front, the Salvadoran insurgentimilar award in the animated cartoon category was given to Crdnicas del Caribe {Chronicles of thea film jointly produced in Mexico and Puerto Rico that allegedly exposed the economic penetration of "Yankee imperialism" in theS-produced film, Americas in Transition, alsoirst prize for "analyzing US meddling" in Latin American in the twentieth

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century. First prize (or fiction went to Tiempo de Revancha (Time /orilm that attacked big mining consortiums In Argentina as exploiters of the working class.

This annual festival, first held inroduction of the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry (ICAIC) of the Ministry of Culture. Its pro-Communist mission is clear; ICAIC had stated publicly that the festival's purpose is. in its own verbose description "to promote the regular meeting of Latin American film stars who with their work enrich the artistic culture of our countries, contributing to the redemption and affirmation of our identity and the defense of national values and common characteristics of our peoples in the lace of imperialist cultural domination and deforming

Films produced in Cuba provide much the same diet of politically slanted material designed to justify armed struggle, glorify violent revolution, provide ideological indoctrination, bolster Cuba sstanding, and undermine the democratic process. The film entitled No, for example,ocumentary denouncing alleged US plans to manufacture the neutron bomb; And the Nightainbow by top Cuban filmmaker Santiago Alverez, covered the visit of Fidel Castro to Ethiopiaifty-five Brothersull-length film about the return to Cuba from the USroup of young Cuban exiles; Pablo, portrays in heroic terms the exploits of one of Cuba's first Communists in; The Survivors describes how the bourgeoisie theoretically disappearslass in the revolutionary society.

The public distribution of Cuban films is limited, although they are shown in European and some US theaters, as well as in Latin America, and some have even received awards at such noted forums as the Cannes Film Festival. In addition, Cuban films on occasion are shown privately by various Cuban diplomatic missions or Friendship Institutes for selected audiences. Nevertheless, they do not have toass audience tooteworthy return on Havana's investment. The Castro regime is probably satisfied, however, that the films receive significant exposure among foreign intellectuals, many of whom can influence public opinion either through the media or through their own writings or other cultural activities.

International Meetings, Conferences, and Symposia

Havana often hosts international gatherings of various kinds to focus world opinion on specific issues or to promote Cuban prestige. To accommodate such events, the Castro regime in thealace of Conventionsavana suburbost of overillion pesos, according to the Cuban media.

These meetings, manipulated to generate propaganda and ereate a

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f&^L: oI Cuba>rom sma" affairs-forats: jul modest regional conference of professionalsarrowa major conclaves such as the sixth Nonaligned Movement summithe eleventh World Festival of Youth and Studentshe Havana Cultural Congressnd Tricontinental Conference6ome, like the Tricontential and the subsequent conference of the Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization, which were held to set the stage for Che Guevara's guerrilla war in the Bolivian Andesave very specific goals; other, such as those

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Havana cosponsors with ihe United Nations, the Nonaligned Move-UPROVni POP RLL>JA?ment, or other international agencies, have the more general aim of bolstering Cuban prestige, presenting Cubaodel for development, and developing common propaganda themes lhat range from the vituperative to the subliminal.

hi meetings where Cuba does not control the invitations, such as those of international organizations, Havana adapts by abusing its position as host to neutralize potentially uncooperative delegations One troublesome delegation to the Nonaligned Summitor example, was assigned housing so remote from ihe palace as to hamper seriously its liaison with other delegations.

Recausc to (he Cubans these meetings have political rationale, cost apparentlyecondary consideration.or example. Cuba sent one of its passenger-cargo ships, the XX Aniversario. to St. Vincent. St Kills-Nevis, St. Lucia, Montscrral. Grenada, and Guyana tortists, performers, and intellectuals to Cuba for the ThirdFestival of the Creative Arts. The Cuban national airline also made charter flights to Venezuela, The Bahamas, Belize. Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico on similar missions. In all,ountries and island political entities, by Havana's count, participated innduarterillion people attendederformances in Havana alone. The Cuban press claims it hadournalists, photographers, and technicians covering the festivities.

Until Ihe Cubans sponsored the event, CARIFESTA had been an apolitical cultural affair, sponsored every three years by various Caribbean governments. Havana, however, used it toSymposium on Caribbean Cultural Identity" andeclaration denouncing various facets of imperialism. Althoughrtists, performers, and intellectuals took part innlyfour Cubansarticipated in the symposium and all appear to have been carefully picked to ensure ihe proper pro-Communist, pro-Cuban bias of the declaration.

Another meeting to enlist ihe support of intellectuals on behalf of Cuban policy was the "Meeting of Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of the Peoples of 'Our America,'" held in Havana1 under the sponsorship of the Casa dc las Americas According to Havana's own description of the event,elegates from Latin America, the Caribbean, the US. and Europe "denounced the deforming culturalwhich the great American fatherland is athe imperialist government of the United States, which is ihe creator, manipulator, and financier of various sophisticated means of interference lhat reduce and aim to destroy the sovereignty of the majority of our"

Havana used the meeting to organize the "Standing Committee of Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of the Peoples of "Ourront group that was founded to perpetuate the impression that the region's leading thinkers are solidly united with Cuba. The group is chaired by the president of Cuba's Casa del las Americas and meetsto issue what have become standard denunciations of the policies on hemispheric governments not aligned wilh Cuba.

Personal Visits

Officials of the Castro regime make effective use of the personal attention they grant lo visiting individuals and small, specialized groups oflegislators, media luminaries, religious leaders, academicians, government or partyranks or position makes them useful to Cuban interests. This special attention is often designed to complement propaganda campaigns and generate favorable press coverage.

Castro, for example, has on many occasions met with US and other foreign personages to explain Cuban policies with apparent sincerity and reasonableness that he expects will influence his visitors* viewseonsummate actor who. especially when dealing with visitors on an individual basis, can putemarkably convincing display of candor and idealism that rarely fails toeep impression on his guests. Wilh favored visitors who may be particularly useful to him, he engages in special activities such as hunting or spearfishing intended toense of familiarity lhat he hopes will pay dividends. On several occasions, Castro has done specialspecific prisoners from Cuban jails, forestablish goodwill with influential people.

Such visits with Caslro and other high-ranking Cuban officials frequently yield good press coverage Several of theosta Rican legislators whoeek in Cuba in rnid-January invisit highlighted by an interview withcomments favorable to Cuba upon their return home, and thereby gave Radio Havana ammunition for Its broadcasts promoting tlie Cuban position on Central America and on the resumption of normal relations between Havana and San lose. Tbe visit and the favorable media attention it precipitated put the Monge administration on the defense and cast Castro in the roleesponsible chief of state reluctant to offend hispanish news agency, for example, reported that, in discussing frictions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua with the legislators, Castro "asked to be excused from interceding wilh the Sandinista government" on Costa Rica's behalf because "he cannot interfere in tbe domestic affairs of other countries."

The Castro regime has been using this intimate type of person to-prrson propaganda freely in its efforts to generate pressure onregarding Central America. Al the same limeuban campaign for negotiations on El Salvador was getting underway. Vice President Carlos Rafaelember of the party's ruling Political Bureau and Castro's chief foreign policy adviser,earn of foreign policy officials who played hostroup of US academicians and journalists in2 to create an impression that Cuba was willing io contribute lo and abideegotiated politicalin Central America Havana had no intention of abandoning the insurgents in El Salvador, but recognized the need to mobilize world opinion and channel it inay loerceived drift of the

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US toward intervention not only in El Salvador bul in Nicaragua, and perhaps, Cuba as well. Subsequently, articles by the visiting journalists Ai'i'soviiiia number of US newspapers reflecting the Cubans' date: jul -propaganda line. One such article, by Iwo respected academicians, argued strongly foruban callavana-Washington dialogue. This is exactly what the Cubans expected their hospitality to produce

More recently. Havana has been trying to improve formal relations with Colombia. Castro invited former President Alfonso Lopez Michel-sen, head of Colombia's Liberal Party, to Cuba to spend several dayswith him in mid-January. In giving the ex-President his personal attention, judging from subsequent Colombian press accounts, Castro assured himself of access lo influential figures in Colombian politics.

Castro's desire to maintain excellent relations with the government of Socialist Prime Minister Olof Palme in Sweden, accordingestern press report from Havana, is one of the reasons why the Cuban President has developedarm personal relationship with ihe Swedish Ambassador in Havana, Anders Sandstrom. Not long afler they Grst melastro's yachl "accidentally" came upon Sandstrom as he was scuba-diving in waters south of Cuba and the Swedish envoy was invited aboard. Castro and Sandstrom went diving together andspentours togetherariety of subjects. They subsequently went scuba-diving and spearflshing on several occasions; Sandstrom is one of ihe few ambassadors who has direct access to Castro and has had the unique privilege ofix-page article published in Cuba's most important news magazine.

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Tbr Castro regimeariety of other propaganda agencies and vehicles. One is the Executive Secretariat of the African. Asian, and Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organizationounded at the Tricontinental Conference inlthough it purports to be an independent international organization, its staffing and activities over the years leave do doubt that the Secretariat is actually an agency of the Cuban Government used as an outlet for propaganda aimed at strengthening Cuba's links to revolutionary movements abroad and perpetuating the Che Guevara guerrilla cult

Every other month, AALAPSO publishes for worldwidea book-lengtheditions in English, French, andarticles by representatives of the PalestineOrganization, the South West Africa Peoples Organization, the African National Congress, the Frente Polisario. and other revolutionary organizations and Communist parties. The AALAPSO is headquartered in Havana, and is headed by Cuban Communist Pary Centralmember Belbaeroine of the Cuban revolution In addition to the magazine, the AALAPSO sponsors "solidarity" meetings in Cuban factories and ministries, issues statements to the press, sends representatives to international meetings to push the Cuban line, and entertains foreign radicals when they visit Havana. It also prints and distributes colorlul posters lhat glorify armed struggle and attack the

us.

A similar propaganda agency is the Continental Organization of Latin American StudentsCLAE operates out of Havana andonthly magazine with articles supporting revolution and discrediting the US. Much of OCLAE'5 propaganda focuses on promoting independence for Puerto Rico. Like AALAPSO, OCLAE had its origin in the Cuban effort in theo organize international support for the Guevara operation in Bolivia With the death of Guevara and the failure of his expeditionowever, both agencies Inst their international character and became little more than Cuban propaganda mills, which is their current status

Onithin three months of assuming power Castro established the Imprcnta Nacional deublishing house created to spearhead the new government's propaganda efforts in the field of literature The organization, according to the Cuban media, has since grownajor industry consistingumber of large publishing houses that have turned out0 titles andillion copies of various kinds of books and pamphlets over the pastears. The giants of the industry are the Juan Marinello Polvgraphic Combine in Guantanamu. which opened with equipment from East Germanyimilar plant in Palma Soriano, which began operations in

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he formerapacity to produceillion books per year while the latterapacity forillion. These expanded

mpcdiilities now so exceed Cuban needs that Havana is soliciting

date: jul Anting business from abroad.

While much of the output of these plants consists of textbooks, technical manuals, and other materials for domesticignificant amount is propaganda, much of it intended for consumption abroad; by Havana's own claim. Cuban books are now distributed in more thanountries. Some are the traditional works by Marx, Lenin, and other ideologues, and some are by such typically pro-Cuban Latin American writers are Argentina's Gregorio Selser. Uruguay's Eduardo Galeano, and Guatemala's Cuillermo Toricllo and Manuel Calich.

Cuban books are distributed through direct sales from the Cuban Book Institute in Havana; cultural agreements with other governments, universities, or cultural institutions; printing arrangements with foreign publishers; and in various oilier ways. In2 andor example, the ICAP arranged for ils Venezuelan-Cuban Friendship Institute to hold Cuban book exhibitions in Caracas, Maracaibo, and San Cristobal.itles were available and, according to the Cuban press, the exhibits were attended by wellisitors.

The Castro regime also uses other organizations and publications to carry ils propaganda message. Some are ostensibly independent but, judging from Iheir activities and political bias, are under Havana's strong influence if not outright covert control. The Lalin America Federation of Journalistsor example, was formedesult of vigorous Cuban lobbying with leftist journalists of the region to counter the influence of the independent Interamerican PressFELAP, which has close links to such Soviet front groups as the Prague-based International Organization of Journalists and the World Peace Council, is used by Havana lo focus international attention on abuses of freedom of the press by rightist governments of theas well as to attack the US.

Another front group is the Managua-based Anti-Imperialistof our Americaounded on1 as the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Central America and the Caribbeanhe organization did not have overt links to Cuba untilocal chapter was established in Havana. Havana's influence, however, is clear.resident is Guatemalan Guil-lermo Toriello. who has had close ties to the Castro regime for more than two decades, and its executive secretary in Venezuelan Freddy Balzan, who for years worked in Cuba's Prensa Latina office in Caracas. TANA publishes the monthly magazine Soberanta devoted toimperialism and its crime" and "identifying the agents of the CIA" in the region. The magazine's editorial board includes Phillip

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S citizen noted for his efforts to expose CIA employees, as well as several Cubanslaque of leftist writers and cultural figures.

Havana has close ties to the Mexico City-based monthly Cuadernos del Tercettridently pro-Cuban magazine that never deviates from the Cuban policy line. Its English-language edition was short-lived but it continues to publish in Spanish (printed in Mexico City and Lima) and Portuguese (printed in Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro) with distribution in Europe. Africa, and Latin America-Havana has long had close contact with leftist Mexican journalist Mario Menendez Rodriguez. Menendez' magazine For Eslo claims to be an independent weekly, but its links to Havana are readily apparent from its generous Cuban advertising and its list of Cuban-associated staff personnel and "collaborators."

Training Foreign Journalists

he head of Cuba's professional organization for newsmen, Ernesto Vera, announced the founding by the Cuban Journalists Union (UPEC)ournalists, "improvement school" that would accept newsmen from all of Latin America.andidates from Africa were also being accepted and inroup ofngolans who had beenear-long course graduated and returned home. Their course, accordinguanda newspaper, "emphasized political training and journalistiche problems entailed in the realm of the ideological struggle between decadent capitalism and ascending socialism in this important field were also examined."

The Cuban Communist Party's Rico Lopez National Cadre School alsoariety of courses including two entitled "Political Training for Journalists" and "Political Training forhe1 graduating class, according to the Cuban press, includedoreign graduates fromountries of Africa and Latin America. Press reports also indicate that one of the measures Havana look to gain influence in Grenada and Suriname after tlie two countries' respective "revolutions" was to bring teams of local journalists to Cuba for training. The courses were offered either at the UPEC school or theNico LOpez school.

Conclusions

Fidel Castro's skillful use of the few propaganda assets available to him during his guerrilla war against Batista, in our opinion, contributedajor way to his victory and was an augury of the methods he would use so successfully after coming to power.

It is clear from the statements of Antonio Perez Herrero and other top spokesmen for the Castro regimeajor effort will continue to

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be made lo expand the propaganda apparatus in certain key areaslthough economic reality will hamper this effort, important iiiveitincFits are likely to be made to;

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Improve the availability o( Cuban books and magazines abroad.

Open newtina bureaus and increase the number of subscribers to Prensa Latina services.

Help allies develop their own propaganda outlets for both domestic and international audiences.

Train foreign journalists so as to utilize their skills andon behalf of Cuba in non-Marxist countries.

Establish and promote ostensibly independent news gathering and professional organizations of leftists to provide competition

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Castro depends on Prensa Latina, Radio Havana, ICAP, and tin-various newspapers and news magazines of his propaganda machine topfoftttSe^Ouban policy objectivesay-to-day basis. It isowever, that he is also intent on using other elements of thethe Casa de las Americas and his other publishing houses, fortoroad, permanent body of literature that, through its scholarship, eloquence, and sheer volume, will influence current and future generations of Latin Americans and peoples of tbe Caribbean. The aim of this long-term propaganda effort is to establish arecord of an irremediably flawed non-Communist bloc, Castro probably expects this growing body of literature to cause problems for non-Communist countries long after he himself is out of the political picture.

Castro's propaganda empire, however, does make mistakes. Radio Havana's slanted coverage of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group, for example, has created frictions between Cuba and Peru. Influential visitors attending international meetings into press reports, some chiefs-of-state at the Nonaligned Movement's summit inbeen alienated by the Castro regime's heavy-handed efforts to use them as windowdressing for Cuba's pro-Soviet foreign policy activities.

The huge investment Castro has made in his empire of radio stations, news agencies, publishing houses, and other publicity vehicles attests to the high regard he has for propagandaolitical weapon. We believe it also explains his great concern over the prospects for US broadcasts to Cuba. He understands clearly that propagandawo-edged sword.

The Cuban propaganda machine, enjoying close association with its Soviet counterpart ample funding, and competent personnel, will remain an important negative factor working for Cuban and Soviet interests throughout the world.

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Methodology of Cuban Ideological Penetration

Ideological penetration is an important adjunct of Cuba's self-assigned mission of promoting Marxist revolution. Ideologicalembraces all forms of human and institutional interaction and transcends all segmentsarget nation's population and dynamics In practice it takes advantage of natural and widely diversified access, outwardly benign purposes, and tlie means for concealmentinely structured central direction. Conclusions as to Cuba's methods of ideological penetration can be drawnomposite of information acquiredariety of sources such as, interviews of Cuban emigres and foreign elements knowledgeable of the Cuban Government's interworkings, study of Cuba's mass communications media,of Cuba's wide-ranging cultural and other exchange programs in action, and juxtaposition of Cuba's penetration tactics with those practiced by the USSR and other Communist countries. Cuba'showever, is notable for its efficacy and intensity by virtue of its capacity for bridging classic Communist thinking into the latino milieu of which Cubaart.

Fidel Castro, alone or in consultation with one or more of his closest advisers,articular country or regionarget and calls for an ideological penetration plan.

A meeting of top foreign policy officials is then held. Fidel Castro. Raul Castro. Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,on the geographical location of tbe.American Department Chief Manuel Pineiro or Generalof Foreign Relations Chief Jesus Montane are the usual principals. Either Pineiro or Montane usually is designated as the overall coordinator of the planning, and is tasked with collecting all pertinent information available on the target.

The planning coordinator then meets with other key officials.

namely:

Interior Minister Itamiro Valdcs, who gels an area analysis of the target from his chief of intelligenceist of the large! country's nationals living in Cuba from hischief.

Foreign Minister Ididoro Malmierca, who tasks the Cuban Embassy in the targetountry analysis (if there is noCuban diplomatic mission, the tasking is levied on the

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Ministry's resources at home andhe country analysis focuses on the target's intellectual community,key people according to politlal leanings;tudy of all cultural areas, especially music and theater;eparate study on the universities; lists the best actors, musicians, and other performers and analyzes local cultural tastes to identify which Cuban cultural figures would be well received.

Culture Minister Armando Hart, whoist of Cuban cultural figures who couldole in the penetration plan.

Orlandoez. chief of the party's Revolutionary Orientation Department, who provides information obtained through Prensa Latina and other organizations andunder his department's control.

Uikiii receiving the contributions from these key individuals, the coordinator collates the reportingeneral ideological penetration plan which he submits to the Political Bureau forember of the Political Bureau is then named to supervise all subsequent activity; this frequently is Armando Hart because cultural activity playsajor role.

The designated Political Bureau member and the coordinator then oversee the draftingpecific penetrationtask that can take as much as sixincludes specific names, dates, itineraries, and costs. Various party andoffices are directly involved:

The Culture Ministryepresentative to the target country to identify contacts there and find out what cultural events have been scheduled in which Cuban performers or intellectuals can take part The ministry also begins inviting intellectuals and performers from the target country to participate in various activities in Cuba.

The party's America Department pursues Its own direct contacts with the target country's intellectuals.

The Foreign Ministry focuses on identifying political contacts in the target country that Havana can use to gain supportreduce oppositioncultural initiatives Theconjunction with the State Committee fordevelops specific plans for offering economic assistance to the country.

The Revolutionary Orientation Department begins preparing articles on the target country's culture for publication in Cuba outlets and develops media contacts who can arrange for the

placement of articles on Cuban performers andho will be visiting tbe country.

Virtually any Cuban entity can be tasked. The Cuban Journalists Union may be called upon to identify foreign newsmen who would be willing to cooperate. The Cuban Women's Federation may drawist of prominent women or women's organizations in the target country that could be exploited. Tbe Cuban National Assemblyoster of the target's legislators who are favorably disposed toward Cuba. The Cuban Public Health Ministry may identify physicians or medical associations in the target country that seem susceptible to Cuban cultivation. The Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions may pinpoint labor leaders and unions that could help Tin-f any organization that has contacts or information on potential contacts in the targetNational Association of Cuban Economists, the National Association of Smallthe Cuban Academy of Scientists, the National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists, the Movement for Peace and Solidarity Among Peoples, the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry, andbe drawn into the process.

In the finaludget is prepared and. after approval or modification by Fidel Castro, funds are dispersed to the various offices charged with implementing the plan. The Politicalregularly reviews the plan and its accomplishments

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