THE SALVADORAN MILITARY: A MIXED PERFORMANCE

Created: 6/1/1984

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

The Salvadoranixed Performance]

Directorate of

The Salvadoranixed Performanc

An litUlllftBCt

T; ii paper wu pupa fed b;

Of Arr::brlM.ua A

coordinated with (he Directorate or Operation! Commcntf and qnfne^jtwjjcomj^ridrijybj'

The Saliadoranixtd Performance!

KeySalvador9 haa made significant progress in expanding.

rtoegaauzing.wPP>ng iu armed forces toounicriMurgeni

war. These force improve menu, achieved with iiuuance from the Unitedave enabled the miirtary to bead an incrcaiingly well-armed guerrilla force at bay while improving Us own field performance These achievements, however, have not ladverall galas oa the ground, as the guerrilla* sill) dominate at least at ranch Ot* the country as they did two years ago.

The experience wilh forceover the past few rearsto

as that Salvadoran military leaders will be capable of continued gradual progress and partial aaceens In molding ihc armed forcesore efTecUvc counierinsurgency force over tbe shon term. Other observers, most notably some In our Embaity In San Salvador and ai ihc US Southern Command, perceive the Salvadoran military to have made more substantial progress in the patl few months andelatively steadiei and more rapid improvement in the future. They point tovariety of factor* auchadical shift in attitude and Increased crcetivitr among Ihe Sahradoran military leadership, greater receptivity to US recommendj. lions, and more unni responding effectively to battlefield pressure.

Emergenceough, Independently capable modem military ia. in our view, anaay years away. Effort* lo push force cevelopmeot even more rapidly (haa presently planned could prove counterproductive, undermin-tag the traditional eoUitary lyatctn before new arxxoache* can become accepted and take root. By the asme token, nistaiaing at lent present arrets of US aopportcaaaatial toSalvador's hotting the iasargenis si hay until polilical. ceorxwnc. aad social change* can better coatribute to taming ibe tick

Force oeveJvpeneni to date has been sabuanoal Overall troop tireogth hai more than tripled9 toins inducesOO personnel In the three armed service* and0 is the public tecum)he Increased troop sirenglh generally enable* deployments agairul guerrilla ccmcenira lions wit bout leaving less conieiied areas of the countryA much expanded junior officer corps, the availability of mobile communiealroni gear and light iafanlry weapons, and Improved rcconnaUsance capability are encouraging adaptation to leider-inleniivc small-unit laciici.0 Satvadorant have received US training in areas ranging from ecu nleri at urgent operation* to equipment maintenance, although not all of iht US-trained troops remain on active duly.

i*1

Improved strategic planning has given iherameworkliniiied resources in key areas, imcgraiing civic actionmilitary efTon, and deveiopioi civil dclense

tecent advancement of officers wlih Heldtrcigthcri command authority, while intelligence coDection has increased dramaticallyesult of strong US support.

Government campaigns over the past two years have shifted but aot reduced the overall area under guerrilla domination, however. In fact. National Guard troops have been pulled back from numerous outposts, leaving mote villages nowegular government presence than iwo years ago. Nevertheless, during ihe recent election the military successfalry conducted operations aimed at preventiBg the guerrillas from disrupting the balloting.

While tbehowing an increasing ability to address some of Its shortcomings, we believe the combat effectiveness of the Salvadoran armed forces has been impededumber ol* factors:

Some of the force improvement programs are still under way or are being modified and bare not yet had their full battlefield impact. Limitations on the numbers and duties of US training personnel also temper combat expectations.

Funding shortfalla have weakened combat support and prevented the development of peripheral programs, such as incentive pay and support for civili needed lo mm in combat gains.

An institutional reluctance at times to proceed with US-sponsored programs has delayed conversion of the militaryounterinsurgency force.

Continued force improvements will allow the armed forces to malntaia military pressure on the insurgents and prevent tbe situation fromsharply in the year ahead, in our view, but they are not likely toIhe basisilitary breakthrough, ai long as catetaal support for the guerrillas continues. On the basis of performs net to date, we expect leadership attitudes lo continue loduring the coming year, though somewhat slowly and unevenly. We believe that erpsraion andwin continue to strain available officers and (raining programs, resulting in the fielding of some unlu poorly prepared for combat,ubstantial casually rate. There are likely to beiminishedof weapons and supplies to the eaemy.

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Military development will continue lo suiTer from budget constraints. Furthermore, with nosignificant military induilriet ot alternativethe government win probably have to continuearge proportion of US wo" on ammunition and other expewliNes si the expense of longer term investments In military hardware and (raining. We expect financial pressures to grow as the war intensifies, the payrolloans come due. and medical and death bencfiu burgeon.

reaklhrengb appears unlikely on (he battlefield over ihc shon term, political facial may hold the key lo the strategic balance. The actions of the new Christian Democratic government of Napoleon Duarte will influence both the level of US aid and tbc amount of attention theleadership gives to the war effort. Certainly, continued indications that the armed forces arc resignedew relationship with civil authority would permit military leaden to concentrate more fully on the war: on the other hand, if top leaders become preoccupied wilh political events in Ssn Salvador for an encoded period of time, they would be unable to orchestrate combat actions, aad potential tactical opportunities could be dissipated.

Washington's leverage In further accelerating the developeneni of the Salvadoran armed forces is constrained by Salvadoran culture andConsiderable Urides have been made in the technical modernization of the Salvadoran military, but. in our judgment, leadership attitudes and intlilutioaal procedure* still require significant additional change* to meet the guerrilla threat. These have shown the least improvement over the past few years, both because of the slow pace of institutional evolution and sensitivity over the US role. Recent reorganization and reasslgnments of military commanderr, combined with changes in civilian leadershipesult of4 elections, may result in some acceleration of the needed changes.

Wc believe US pressure lo promote force development can, if not carefully orchestrated, strain El Salvador's capacity to absorb new technology and force-management ideas andounterproductive dependence on the United States. Greatly expanded or more sophisticated assistance would probably rcooirc the Untied Slates lo increase Its advisory presence substantially to enable the Salvodorans lo make use of Ihe aid, ihus riiking leaving Salvadoran officer! feeling (hat they were not in control and weakeninE ihe resotre o! the Hifh Command

imnst

Salradara* Dtftntt

Army. Tkr Salroporan Army comfturt ' -tctnt of mem underanmt tiponded from about 1JXK treat* ima I'JOO in early IH'kren tauipptd nuliiaty fate. Thtrtal float rtleiloniMp with iht I'mied Slam hu rrplacrd hlitoni litt with tht Chilian mad. matt rrctmly. liraill mlhloritt. Tht hltntittt of Defense haii' tkostnfrom among lop Army ttSretri Through iii Chiefofthr Armtd Farceitaff, tht Army hai operational control over all take' tnlitan andparamilitar) components. The Army tl orgtmird lata ax mmry ta tl and itbd-

wiptd kotoeparimeiet rommaadlumber

of functional cammamdi li^hat botnt Ihr trunt tt the

toimlerlniurgtai nrvgrfr.

Air I Iht A" Foret haiepulatlon la rtrtnt years at US training and tauipminthftr role If luppon gferairont. Although Hill conn retard by mate-fieri for Inperationalroll Air Foret tilt hat Iripltd sienonnrl Ml apteattant tiage out of lloptmgo Air fait meat iht capital, although htltcopttri art lomtrtmet de-rocked to fir Id commander) foe timtpotary duty.

luBBortlht

Nary. Although Ii hai grown more lhan tl4otdht SOO-mon Saltdoran Navy rtmaint iht trtakett itrrlet branch. Operationally headtuarttrtd at ihe port of La Union in the Guff of Fonttea. and nith fewer than lObooii. ihr Nary Hill cannot adeeualtly patrol tht coat tlint or lupoort tie Army through electing action! or Interdiction]

Public StturityFartetlll.'OO' National Gated. The Sattadoran National Guard mat2 and modrltd afttr iht Sponiihuard; il ftcncilont mainlyural poller

force ikroaphoui ihe teatmry Tat Guard hat btft

rad<iiil. better paid, btiltr iralntd.ittptriinft thanIt It not

btneflUtti dltteily/rom US training and ntw fa*ip-mrnl which goti rxduUutly to tht regular fetcei. Thedmlniteerrd from Sam Salrodor andinn fit rtftonalaern-btrt prorlot ihtfirgt lite of dtftntt la many iwJ|Mr lor.ni andacitvtly parwi-atr in coumtrtniurgtm actiom technically tinder iht operational control of iht local Army commandtt!

AWhmI Police. The Haitomal Poller urpj formed la ItdS at ihr urban ctnnmtrpari to ihe Noriemol Guardrrioanel tabr anion againit itrrermi. tut Still tftnd molt Of their lime on routine poke*

matteri Reform In rtetm itorr hare Imitated

poller prtfeititmolum but lack of offietri hatedaction to eadrtkrrt command retiresart iht

Titulary Pallet. The smallf Ihe HOO-mtn Trtaiury Pallet, trhich wai orfanittdtlitt Ut reputation at the mum aggrrilive of iht public ttcunti lorett and iht rrorn abuter eg kuman rtghit. Dtiprried tmofire operational tones. Trtancy per-

lOnarl ro,'Ieci late ill genet from local itformmntl and

participate on ocieiion tn military aettont under Army dlricilonT

n fixed rather thai mobile eemmuBiCt-toot networks. Under ihe peacetime isles iynem.boughtnd fuel ihroegh Vocalchannels but depended entirely on depots in the eap-iai fee(irons and tfnmuniiion supplies anJ cosleeneni maintenance^

begancipand the lire of ihe irmed force*,too* military school sufls into combatccelCTBlccI the graduation of off-eer* from ihtImiiioiid rtlatsm *lthng countriesy at sun it* now ef arme MtHfcMi aad loaowC US aid Tie rneeintaiioat of rxtsimc reaourcci aanwed gevennat force*ouatrywide guerrilla campaign la Januarykfl the Array oa Ihey i" endhei resource*ncrcuingly appa re v'

BitthfWUe

O.U'.y. kil ^rivoi

The mediocre pcrformine cf government force*1 plusdevelopments la earlyaf such of the Air Forceanuary raid aad iba kaarry security tanuiraaaiana for Ike March CoattitMAt Asse-nb')ta urgeoi rojaciis far iiereavd Uutied Slate* utntiia To tmpiwt baniefieldthe Um'td Statu iht:py wcecavd military aid fcr programs to di> grade the me. training, ccu^prnenl. luppon i. .1 lad combai planning of tie Salvadoraa faeces.'

Font Dtniofmmiumber of arcai El Salvidor has made progrutt toward retooling in armed forcesounwriaturgnt war:

strength hai mora than tripledV lo. wHh fn* in mediate-reaction (IR) banalkM creased so nnml aad rwiatorec when local forces engage the aaaany Thane emits, a* well a* the nirtorue haiukcavrutecic

lhata* ewabiad lha go-crnancni to faeui dcjloiirwtj againu latrrllla conceal ratioutkautog has caaaaosad arena oa* ihc cinatry uapreneeatd Local fafcas haw. been eaawnded aad arerceeaaalaad--in aa effort tostreagihea the ocfeiwe of ianaertana Inaiallaiiosts.xincfmu, mating iworv troops available for agg-es-*ive pamHing and offcpe ration*.

0 Salvador ana hare received some US military training, although only about SO perctnt are still an active duly. MoraS (raining

icema have roiaied to El Salvador to providein command and control, tmall-unitcombat medical care, logistics, naval aad nil skills, com manlcai ions, and equipment maiotc-nance. Salvadoran unii* have trained al Fort Bras* and ai the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras, while Individual soldiers have beta tentUS facilities In Panama to acquire spcctalUcd skill*.

Tbe addition cfS-trained juniorbo* plugged critical gaps In lower leveland is en*Wint the Army gradually to move toward leader-intensive smalt-unit (actio. The gov-crnmeni also hasew com bat-prove* mid-level officers to key command positions u> take advantage of iheir experience.

< Recent personnel thills al the lop have loitered better commun>catices beiaeen the General Staff and field anils. The outstanding reputation of Ihe new leadershipoot com bit commanders is bringing iomt improvement in command xuibority. Proceduralavehour staffing of the nationalcenter, formal Jn-vestigt-(ion of combat losses: the increased incorporation of air force, artillery, and naval personnel into the planning process; and more regular liaison with US advisers.

Thr iimukirteoui realignment of military rone* lo eoirtcsde with enemy fronts reduced the guerrillas'lipping itrovgh corridor* between operationalt also ha* encouraged the brigade!unction as links between battalions and (he High Coronand.

Modern infantry weapon! and commanicaiions gear of US manufacture have begun io be standardised throughout regular units New equipment could be Introduced rapidly because weapons have not been technically complex and training package* have accompanied prccurement. The acquisition of new

for mdMunSw of IMaado*ufiunm wuhera>W. "DpielflfaaiomarMwiuacy Fafc

J

ne-nfi hasIht Alt Fort* not fully IMO ihe counter irtwiut struggle, ind the Navy has bejui'ri" iu pw trolling louttouiafc okib> reiupply t.

In ceorerai.ee wilh III* Untied Sulci.eltonsinblegit planning hat then ihclied resources In key areas, inlet rntini civic set ton with the military effort, and dcvrloninc civil definsa forces to cav haitce local security.

Improved uciieal ptaanini and theof local forces into light battalions Ia encouraging more aggressive sman-iinii opsvalkma. The rcorgnniinfion ii shaking the lethargy out of aoma prrison units and prcvndlng cc-ra mandateaueruially more frciiblc Structure lo anticipate or reipood toctksns.

Ttjcasatcal fMeltgsnea oolkctoni tkaHytaohahadorsa observer oa-crati ban .

proving "'rir ui

US nirerafi provideapt tsrpsssel. EMaained Mag raagt rrcon-ruiitUDoa pairatt have tndcnakea prod mot mis-iioru Ma enemy eeal retted lemiery Tht irtnad foreea' abtliy so ax intelligencetiia rtMli of ettunded tsaffiai hoih at ih> Highand at neltf amis ModlftcaiHsas la eD-auuror tactical eeeritfartit planning packages fromare improving Ihfir uKfulrtcas for Salvadorcomma nor r-

Co-iwr fceora. The coaiidarabk progreat ofarmed forces In aiialalng lULrand training |oala has not beeoIheir oveni afTcoilveneas on the baliWfkid.Duatnit iradwalin combatfor saampk. during iheelectioncampaignspasiyears hav* aol reduced ihc totalguerrilla dom.nat*n. alihnugh theyrelocationumber of ioaurgcaiGuard troopsbeen pulled backootpotla. leaving rnaeaun iwa years ago

furtbemnc. Ihcaner> proach io ccrcrulrsai had Int Itleil of cr-cm. neatilc tct.vil

Wide tactical swingi in the Salvadoran uar have tended to obscure ihe overall urateglc trend ise*bcnitiative has shifted back and forth with neither side abk toecisive brcalcthrough. Daring implementation or" Ihe National Plan in rummer IMS. fee example, aomnmenithen nine out of Utht guerrillas, So pull back and ir group.eries of ruccesiful guarrCa counieral-lachs during the fall, hemever. the iniurtents cupped off the year by overrunning, for ihe fin.rmy garriiou and destroying the remaningridic ewer the Lempa River. The nvJksry. however, has shown aa abuViy so address soma af asMost recently, aggressive offensrva tetwwa cm-iribuied to the gwernbs inn briny lOu'sniTlItlh" round of tbe tsreaeeuiial ekes.

la our view, lactofgrialer gfuaerurneac aa"*tha UlikTidd ca> becaptained i* pun t-he enemy's trabal capabitity The latewigtnte Community betoes that the overall uu ol ihenovumeni has remained about tfceurmro.tr ihr put iwo yean but thai guerrilla oaethul luengih bat now0 because of the Homering of sruliuirouah irtniug. aaieri-ence and wardt

nation between guerrilla factions has aa* Improved somewhat. Funbetrnorc, iniuritat forest have show* increasing sotuustimtion In tactical plttnlng and ihe use of intelligence and can now uagc well-aaecuied convemsonalten ator even lirf.tr onilt

Ffcure2 riifclURrmns

(heSihadoran Conflict. JanuaryU

I Strain! nf rvwiraru

r*-* etelBESKSa

loKitMtllin

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of El Salvador's militarypro irarns areocrwiy. thus deiayir< in asseu-roetu of Iheirbititefidds already elm thai training and fuadint bottlenecks haw slowed effort* totoul forces ind restructure indrridunl units. Undcnundably, io me drtorttniiaiioo end lack of aa-dersUndint of new miiiiocit and lactic* have dogged Lkjovcnmcni effort durina the irirttifioaJ

itinetirdmtiot iiuo OTmin

;:eM bziuijom hat new been scrapped in favor of

lunit* with heavier weipom luppari

n my lerd

The new structure* will strain equipment and person nel resources over the short term, but may lead io rreater battlefield fteitbiliiy Ia time

TV funding thonfaiii during the early suites of the war also weakened cotbbai sappcriand prevented the devcic*Knefit of perinherat profrtmt needed to tustain combat tami. Lackajor program to uptrsde trtobalicy, we believe, las reduced potential ir*iM from Ihe improvetrienti in ihe lire, ortanixattan. and lacli* cal training of the ground forces. Tne icramWe for

resources hasiacc< ii rivarric* between ibt set-vicesime svhen cooper*lion ii ckemrd viul and corerlbuted lathe reluctance of Ihc logiitici conv msnd lodisiribsnc supplies to ihc Field. Lack of fund) has alto prevented commanders from cultivating local informants, ihus handicapping opcritrooi by poor laclical intelligence. Freer arm to electorate recntist-meet through incentive pay. to rewardo improve the military's image through eme action, and md-.flop civil defense units to maintain securitygrnernnscsi forces have retakenanguished because of ihe fiscal scjuecief

ResTceitng chronic budgei shorifalls despite US aid. the Salvadoran Government hat had losrge rreeortion of available defense funds on consunublcs to keep the day-te-day war going raiher than oa innatrrteats for long-term force irrtprovececnt. US ammunition detiverka are critical to keepingortn forces la ihe Field. Defense Minister Vide* actdged El Salvador's dependence ia this area

i Wuh no miliary indasirtts and no alternative foreign sources ofthe government has had lo use about JO percent of USmiliUry aid In recenl years foreep Ihe war going]

Even so. ammunition shortages affecting the level of combal have occurred from lime to I

>boruges

fetifficuliy I

-Cil.iJccli.nt-i. Ihe difficulty ofdvance and stockpiling under the irrcgalar appropriations timetable, and fluctuations inactical activity and fire discipline that have snack forccnsiing difficult. El Salvador required an emergency ahia-meat of SJ6-mm ammunition ai (he endor example, after Ibeummerad lha fall guerrilla resurgence depleted stocks more rapidly (ban expected. Even when stocks are on hand, worry about futureduring US Oo^reiiiontl deb*lex over aid

caused Salvadoran commanders to hoard lupplies

growing need for spare parti ai new equipment ages has also begun to increase the pres.su rc to use more aid funds for short-term expendibles

Insirtuttonal rigic-ty and leadership rum*net to chaege, in ourlso have couidcrebtyucaieocd ihc envisioned payoffs from programs set ia place. In each case, areas of gain have been undercut by areas of continuing weakness:

The government has expanded Ihe armed forces, but kot Ihc bciefii or much iraimrig and combat eiperi-ence through short enlistment tours and poor rem-lisimcni rates.

Training to countersuerrilia todies has been iustl-(uied. but offices have not always (rained with tbeir troops, anils have been pulled from training for operandraining programs have been slow to supplement US effort'.

The number of inexperienced junior officers has ballooned, but the High Ccenrnand has noimoved to increase critical middle ranks through merii promotions or endorsed Ihe dmlop-meni of an NCO corps

US cqulpmern and supplies have arrived, but meffi' eieni distribution and requisition iwceedurct often have prevented lions from getting to where (hey are most neededimely basis. Furrkermore, dcunet-ticnlly produced items have ofien been In critically ihort lupply.

' The government has undertaken to reorgaairr local force* into smaller bauabons without the aaits themselves embracing lha appropriate tactics io brosi cases.

- Army rones have been redrawn to match combat realities, but public security forces, which constitute more lban one-fourth of the Salvadoran defense etublithaseni andignificant combat rcte. haie not rcorgimted along parallel fanes.

Strategic plans have been formulated, bul weak command aulboriry has handicapped implementation.

m

Selvadoisa and US pfanners forecast continued force imprcwemenu

] phetimncnim ai

leasttroops, set up one more IR batialioB.ihe conic'lcjiirv of local foieeaot her large class Of junior officersto graduate. US inilnlni teams inand programs outside the country provideof combat prepsmion foe Salvadorangovernment iraininc e'foris are likelysomewhat niliring the lriininr. eenlcr in

lunnc- improve

toursMekdccT beyond Two yeifi4 as draftre revised following approval of ihe new Salvadoria ConailiaUoi. Much of the Curroniaid ippropriiiion is likely to be ipeni on aramu-nllion. according la mililary aisiltaneerders for communications gear, artillery, and tracks hate been processed. Plans lo upgradeMei'.igenec sad funhcjinprove medical care "eander rnmMcnil

Manpower tapaasion tnd Ibe eslabtiihmenl ofuniu win imprawe the eombti potential of the armed forces ti prevising additional troop! (o* offensive operations. btrcAd itiiic deflate reauiremeau. Wr be'itit. however. Ihai Ihe needs o' the at* iroopecontinue ionilibSr itaUtng programs. re*uh-log ia thef tauti ready prepared feeabstsailal earaalty ran aad fartheraaiaaa)he aaaaaf,onsiraiau. opcriiienal prhnrauea. ana as'tiviUea, Saa SaWadorJ

ide^ewl^wjBwe

mar also cw baca onAT fU IU|ienaTCenter in Honduras iahe Mil inflaa of junior offices will provide tapanded lower eehrlon leadership, eaeoursgini imal prralions. but persiiieni ofTiccr shoriagea al company and lUld grade loeli >eakcn nuuicmcni o'lM expanded foiee'

Furthermore, even if lorccarojected rates, the sire of ihr mihtaiy i> nee tipreiM io drama tinoulsirip iht vie of apposing lorcev Sothe SahvdeeaaipdnarrvHb Hias doneto bold as aaa ia ihe (Vsd conaleflag the *ery heavy mjnpcwrrthai are required coeaicnasugcai uraeelca la search cart aa ehtuve enemy Geaertwneai force, hat benefited somewhat from force awkipners -sue* as bettn mob>lily and firepower iaaame sac-ccaaes^cycfld .'at their aumbenwould pro-vi'

oar view, wcaknetsct la the Salvadoranwell as enemylikely to centime to reduce the potential Impact of forceoofer. On the basis of performance lo date,eel leadership attitudes io continue to evolveIhe coming year, but only slowly ind uiwenlj. The si rcog Inciting of iht cemmsod and controlsow under way is likely to contribute gradually lo more efficient resourcend iiisr officer morale.I

Atatirrunadramatic Chang* ia inurgeolts. iarterrnemtau ia mobiUtt and waapteiO> during ihe coming year will hiengine* Iheabdiiy to maunuia anatuary prttsure an the aMwr-

f cats. The aimed faces will b< able ic rrate imm-di-

ate use of ihr tract)rder aad caw Id bene/ii Tram someaal heaataatiri af irpet already ia aat However, say point a? oTei of Urge Bankers of helafoeecrs. eveny areype already in theniory. or af additional nans, suchJ* ceatiritd lo gnathic* or Chinookhelicopters, would face absorption prabkms. we judge The Mbuiniul leadumei for pikn. crew, and

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Stem

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Although US in Due net has increased, the application or leverageccelerate aimedit limited byol factor! inherent In Ibei' beoukk Diet. suchreeouip-pint ihe Salvador aa Army and uainiai elil* units lotrategic riaclioo forte, are alreadyacterrpluked Tha areaa thai still teayilrtniraeet the gucrruBs threat tack aatirade* and reatitatuniirc ibtnc iipeen thai haveUtile drvelofimeat until recently. Prof reel in lha fulure.ta likdy to be bolh tlov-er aad kai Quantifiable, withdifTicnliiei of evaluating and readjasllnt pre-tramiimely I

have fotmd il diffkuli to coordinate operations with nearby force) reluctant to move out ofgarrisons in kit than coRvpaay-uie trails even in daytime. If an Idea surfaced to turn Ihe IR battalions into advanced air auault units, for exurtsple.ove would noi reap maiimum benefit if elite unitsunable lo meth iheir anions uith local forces in the area of

meth iheirrcraiionlj

We bclkve thai US pressure to accelerate force dcvclopmeni can, if oot carefully orchesi rated, strain Elapacity lo absorb both technology and force-management ideas, endounicrptj-duetive dependence on tht Uniied States!

slow pal term of intiiiuitona! change arc complicated ai timet by rntlalance to US influence. The Salvadoran military Icadorthip bas tried Id hold the Uniied Stale* al armi langih dunks; the pit! several years, resisting, for exampk. for more than ill months US importuning io replace ad hoc military actionsomprehensive itralco for winning the war. Top leaders imtilarly avoidedublic Hand cat himia rights abate* watU Vice frntdtat Bosh'saaicrrihlr toibc auwe. Aionia

meat oa re^UMing Ihe eharacic* of Ike military

system rather lhan technical medcrnintion of tbc armedelieve Salvadoran nationalo bt inercatinfly irritaled.n our view, ihe end product inevitably wiHybrid approach lo ihc counter insurgentodification of ihe US tactical model, toward latter lomcwfcat less mobile unlli. lo ft) theiiixi.

Increasingly strong foreign pressures for change, when added lo Ihe roni.der idle domestic Icmkra from and political instability, run Ihe danger of funher shewiug the pallern of Salvador* ndmrlcpmett Over the pall saw rears, sectors of the military lysitm and saalnulual Itadcrs able tocaly so the toumrrininrgrai threat have pertorcacd thatnailcalty an ihchile those less abk io idic" hava kgged Tun auparity in rales of progress his (ended so undercut theany improvemrais made!

-tilingunpioy USWI lotaaT-lnlc aggressive patrols ai nit hi. for example.

[Useof secure

. iimiltrl;

ijiwmi hai similarly been shackled by Ihe lev level of technical expertise and lack of security consciouincM among Salvadoran irocps-preseni lnwiu o* US advisory presence.adge lhat theual have etwaackiabfcutty- ia makiaa wa* at* graaily eapaudedmore soph mx* led atsistaac* ihaa tberycettvea' in recent years Moreover, aij sign.fveaat increase iu LS advisory pretence could kev* otTicenetting ihey were nor as control of iheir oun rn.lna.ry tiluation and weaken ihe reserve of ihe armed forces High Command] "

These probkmi suggest thai Salvadoran military traders will be capable of only Incremental progress aad partial saccess In molding the arwied forcesore effective ecu mar insurgency force. Emergenceough, indcpeedeaily capable rnoekian our view, many yuan away EfTcvti la push force ckvcscrswcnl evtn more rasudly ihaa preseuOy plaaned could proveive, usvser mi*-eg the tradnsoaal ailrury tywtm baftwcanea-oacbes can become worsted aad take root. By ibe taane totcn. tjnain.ng at knit treamil) plaaned USis essential to El Salvador't hoasiug Iheat bay aniil pobtieat. economic, and social changes can belter contribute lo laming the ink.

O 3

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Appendix

UcTclopmrnIountcrinsurgeiiej Force

aaisifsftj..

Tbc mediocre performance oi governmeni fetees1 plbi new developments io earlyOc-Mtuction ol much otorce duringJanuary raid and ihe heavy aecurily reaurcrnenii for Ihe March CeniiiiDeni Assemblyto re-queni lor ikibiinniiilly increased US assistance. To improve beu!(field performance, prograini were uo-dcrtakcB to lubsianlially upgrade the itc. training, equipment, support systems, intelligence capab and combat planning ot the Salvadoran (orccsj

Farce Siie

J troops tho

l Solvador has more than tripled its armedIs. ihe miliary services and public. addlni suategk reservelo respond and reinforce when local forces engage ibe enemy-race table Ik New resources have gone into creatingsn ImmediateUnits: the AHacatl. fjettoso. Atonal, Arce. and Bra ca none Ba nations. Airborne. leuig-mngeand naval commando anils also haw been added.arge rsroporiion of the augmented force is still being used for sialic defense, wc judge lhat moreBOO additional uoocn should be available for offewtive operations

The gc-emmeniave had

tittle tremble finding recruits so meet manpower gewtt io date. Because El Salvador ia tbe moil densely populated couniry in Central America aad beet use the current economic downlarn hat swollen the ranks of ihesufficient youth* have usually registered vriih local garrisons to meet the thriee-yetrly induction quotas.hea miliiary tour is compulsory foroears old. In practice. I

Referrals forin iac lyrtcmbave spared seas of (he oueTdle(tastes from serving, contributing totUsconlcni about the tnen.iia bit harden of ihehave bees

and forced conscript ton. moss recently in (he'aorth-casl. but we do not believe such abates arc "iOe-sprcad^ [

h gf ihr iteanumum Hi CI bHUrraa

sieen nennnBilubia eoumyntk aaalfiU

r.iTt.li

El Salvador's manpower needs arc relatively high each year not only because of force opantion. but also because of moid turnover among enlisted pet ton-

TeTili til ibe government's pol-ileal

rcWlance to

declare national roobiltialion andfJlend an miliiary tours, ihe majorityMill leave ihe regular Army after onlyahhough some then join public securityprogram of salary incentives announced inhas encouraged some senior enlisted personnelIhc lands

have not stretched far enough to benefii most first timers, la ibe absencetrong national incentive program, reenlistmenleally depending oc unit leadership and morale. |

Ihe Bel lose Battalion was able lo sign up ta percent of iu troops for another lour, unite nearby units in San Vietute retainedandful ofigh casually rate aho tribute* io recruitment pressures (see table *l.

Eff'tii ofBuiliof, So far. mlliury force eipanslon bat notomrnensuraie effect on ihe conduct of the eoonieriaaurgeney. in pan because the number of armed guerrilla*o risen in recent years so that tbe government manpower advantage1nihe eipanded site of ihe force permits the government io conduct large operations in several areas sl-nulia-rseously. Ihe guerrillas' ability lo strike throughout the country on their own tsineiable often has kept ike armed forces off balance. Due to InsufFicseni mobility, strategic reserve units have not always been ablehort notice. Although definiteccurred in recent months. In our view, maximum use is still noi being made of local iroops. in large pan

*rmh ol L3 pressure,aauailim*

0 5

stem

r>bk i

El Sal radon Fore* Expansion

Scewh) Fonts

D'alliAx"!

lorn

Gua-d

-i

rOW

JOt

1

ihe 'eooeeunoo of Salvadoran miliury thinking from (marlialic defenseo mobile offeeslve warfare it uklng longer lhan efforts io miruciure lhc Army imo smaller combai anil*.

Growth of ibe armed toicei has also proceeded faster lhaa the develevamcni of lnpporlinf services. The feetrBtnesl has found ii more difficult to come up wilh housing, food. pay. and personal to.airmeni for Iheig force than io sign up rccrtiils-Such sirppon collilaced an enormous burden on already strained po-ernmeni resources. US rtsili-ury advisers, for example, rtpcel thai Die Selradneenncountered serious eUffrc-lliea oaeeuo. lis im) miliury payrolL Hore-jn ecc-wmlc aid has reacted rem of EJ Salvador, fiscal pressures andan provide hardware and Irainins. but ihe Uniied Stales it lcgal|vjrcvcnlcd fiom cJfertnj; direel badges succor11

Troop Quality

OS Fre/aiHg Fiet'tm. The Saleadoran Army. Air Force, and Navy have received substantial Irainins assistance, mainly from lhc United Suits, in recent yean. Ai the Nisei, lhc United Sutes faced the diuntinf. task ca" convening Pj Sahadori sundirg conientional ineiy, wilh liiile field experleece, intoine eownicrmiurgency force. Force upansioo,luraorcr In personnel, and tbe fielding of sew equipment tysiems >ub*co.ucaily added to treining

reouiremecu. Despite Umttcd funds ind rigidQuotas.US iraincrs had Uughi critical skillsffsetrs and irotos bv4 (see tables 1

[

in specific arras, enhanced training hasramatic iatprovemem in the canabihiic* of Ihearmed forces. Tbe IR batulloa* and the reconnaissance learns trained in Pi ni rnehavejarrsed cnniidrniWc ittpcci from lhcpgrading of ire Air roreemil sendee fully into ihe eounterineffort. Oa tbe other hand. Ihe perfcemaroe of some of Ihe light baiuiiani. evea those irained byUaa'ted Sutes, has been disappsniing, oftenesult of weak leadership and ihe lo. level of skills acquired during iriining.'j

The overill impact of US iraioiisg ft llmlird. hs.lng reached only aboulercent of lhc lUnding force0 US-irained personnel, we esiiaautoul Army.

InanctTonncarrctt iHn* mUnM uainni lot iM le"

hanillow is lam and Irani frn aa citM wcti ian

I

fl r, 6

Table I

US Trainingl Salted or

Tick 3

Number afSnlv.doran* Trained by ibr United Sniri

m. II<11

ir.

ft int

acui

c

in,

WtWWaM. IIS *

Conbal

-

Initial

tad Air Farce strength olHill or. activelthough tomebare imn! publk aecuil-ly unils afiir rale tie In addition, individuals who receive technical naming often ban rejoined units crsabteiaclincd io Ukt mlnnur* a*sti tbat irtae Segvthcr aenstdr-el> short period uadcr US lapcrvitaoa. am

enough trine lo |uarantcc raxulu Furthermore, ihe public aeeariiy forces, which constitute more than

. rswjveaoa

rnve-founb of Ihe Ralvnckeiri aofrr re eetaWiehmeait

andignificant com tut rate, iwcelvc ao oit

a nee aecaaae of US aid rcsirlalcjnsl

accepting trainini from US nencammissionedtn addition. some courses have been iborlcncd because of training backlogs and operational needs. The Arte IR battalion, for example, received only sii weeks of training ihcontrail to the Bclloso'a scheduled IV weeks iaorder to have it return from hondura* In lime foripectod fall <

I eir. Salvadoran leadart nave

noi ahvayt been fully supportive of US training

profiasnt. The High Coasinaad has patted warn outcombatia uaenthusiastKMin'r,"

because of iheir hifh price and inoonve-nicncn.deipile the advaniagci ot uninterruptedUS miners alto report only slow program ia getting leaders lo train ekngudt their trooeu. i" some cases officer reluctance has reflected tcsmtrvity ever

"iiivoarr Sue aa ivaut alBilliV) wum ranoawl in lUllihil SO arrtfa> LS-lnlaol innoa i'ii" |

Salvadoranini efforlt. moreover, have rot <om-plemeotcd US programs. The tovernmeai hai drag|od lit feat, la our view.oa ibc tteps needed toontusebensWe aaiioaal imalng system "lafltr ihe teigsssal iraiaang stiuciure *aa dlaanaaaJad to prmrwl* adduioaal CBcabal rxrsoovoel Suave mausiry Khooas, staeh aa Ihe Ccaanaod and Cewaral Suff School and she Aw*lien School, have

prtmarily dutjnUS imjehjiasgr

^ bask liainaag aargai> iiinamt

rleccnttalirrJ ot ther ir.n| on the approach of the local commander, recruits

i)

8 O

I batic weaponio novieeaj

sometimes receive only aweeki of on-the-job traUiag bcfoic being tent into combat US tcimi expectingeiicnccdften end up providing baticfam Hit rotation and drill in* urueiion I

Arwua Fortei Casualties

promises toitrons! mililarycenter are only no* yielding rewltl rVt ihe endhe Minister of Defense began lo Stafftraining centerneiliiy used by US adulters In la Union. It has Initially focused on refresher courses for umls as well a* some basic training for reeiuits. but ii will be some time before the center i* operallna; fully. Sahadoran trainers work alongsiie most US teams, and Ihe military has shown some initiative In fielding two of Iu own mobile mining teams to help with ihe cMversion of local units to light batubons. but ihe overall Salvadoran naming-mall and poorly organWcdj^

UytliT and Morale. OveraU armed forces loyaltyot seriously in question and the governmentlo be able to pot soldiers in tbe field Few troop* have gone over to ihe enemy and some -nils have shown outstanding professionalism and bravery.liter,eiccnt in the second Quarter

hich is riot cons dc reddtr

combat

Nonet some Hoops

Although losses from ordinary onus arc probably greater lhan from IR battalions.desertion doc* ml appear toeal problem. So far,ocal issue, we judge, rather than one of national dimension!

nS'Lesng in

cut tbe road bat aid remedying cases of

disorder.hanging to civilian clothes io escape deteciion. eiag-aerating ihe site of opposing forcesed follow-on operaiiont. and refuting io go imo bailie until lions-Including leadership

or tie suaeta* laree t.

.Aiihrwhwraderilse

hr -niaouawutlo OarHftap-rtf0 m

otnisiently high casushy rate among

i morale in Mime the

IvaiaBIUIyorreisttcemenllTiaVniiiSmlrrd ihekstsei foree-'ide. The governmeni hticasualties each year, uriih aboutthete losses occurring in the regular forces and thein public securii) units (see table

GmeramcBi lossos remain striking, despite the ctceh'n-in. proportion or forces affected. Caiualtiesuch larger proporiion of troop* each yearukJ be eoritidered acceptable by Western miliury stra'cgitis. Such high losses result from the large number of raw recruits in eombai and Ihe dismal riate of medical care. AccordingS medical team's evaluation. one-third of iH wounded soldiers eientuallycomparison to one inor the United Sutes innf poor field aiientlon and irutJoquaie medical trauportation. US lucceti In training several hundred medics was nor accompanied by increased helicopter and ambulance medoac support untilurthermore, many Sahadoran officers continue to consider medics as lirah ihe medical supplies.

Leadership

Slu Diintkutlm of Officer Carre. Theoffieei corpscaughtnset of hnvtllliiei bm hai grown rapidly in itieffon ioipamion and meet (he teackrihip demanda of tmsll-unn oounierinsurgeney wiffare. Beeauie ot* ihe urgency nf ihe war. EI Salvador graduatedelatively larce military academy esatl ofadeliAugust IMI. enrolled anclataadets In Oclobtr IHI. and rasmaustiencd ihenwjf chats iwoalf yean earlyIHJ. Two groupsoati (netour raceithsori Ber.=mg. in springank of cadet, below Ural.1 .PC- conation. Owingiamt. mort junior ofsetri eeiered the armed ft.ee. from IMO lo the end of IM) lhan had pravlouOy graduaiedii lourdinc in

tome growing palm. Incladinf Initial reluc-lance of senior officers io entrust raw cadets wilh combat rcponiibill ileaigh Wtrilion rai* among newS miliury observers consider ihai (he triiical ahcetaget ai lhc junior ranks havo now been eased r"

Ihe infiiuoa of junior otTseerv however, was nol uteeipuie. by irsereases In eipeisenctd efkert at she (Via and ccaapaaj grade Inel llrfeeawai tie-attaat in the junta faced the rciraweaa

bated on combat performance, despite ihe Mlnliter of Offense's ackaowlcdgmem of the need fee crsang* and lhc availability of several outstanding candidaics The rtcenl attentionsombat-tea toned maiorctiag commend of ihe Atlacatl Baiuhaacmm coloneiull brigade/toot eommarid. aowrver. luggest thai some evelutiao may bt occur-ring aa the lysiarn. alihoaigh oother has been fwcenet-raath ail new command

The aaUiuo aho ia rrJuctait toistrinaaid imo ka derihip poaliicars.treag cultural bias. The tuning acnsceanawMuoaed otTtotrs' town* has been upgraded io sncMt sis weeks of US wining in Panama, but will turns out onlyCOsear. Even though iht United Slates putNCOs in charge of the nen, highly trained, long.range rcconnaiiunce pa* trees, this practice wai not adopted elsewhere in lha SaNidoean forceiarge group ol itrgtanu received lieutenant's ban. butlUsiocisoon to tell how efficiently ihey will be usedT"^^ I

mi

iis* i

kaa hill

0 9

ngom-oa daty ai aH limes. >i

hUalintit- ProWcnu of absentee leadership arid Isi prosecution of ihc war have aol afflicted iac boire all toocbtrscietistieof Ibe many units whose leaders have not >ei received US training or have not uken ihe teachings lo hean. Acknowledging ihe poor state of rcaeBncia. Defense Minister Vide* Issued new siaisdingc-rders

pereent of each unit be kept on alert, operations be conducted around ibe clock wilh emphasis en night-lane cuurolltng. and eetailed arson tnl) reports beso sho* ecnashaacc. Despite ihc efToris of lopsBStjaihjssote regal* -

reassif rmer t

ii*t" commanders whose units were eaughi unaware bj Ibe eneeay itsome previous lacki*e| incentive ta Improve readiness, but Punishments for ofTeert icmain

he Salvadoranommand is pa vine greater attentionhe aar effort ihan iwo rears ago. The1 mutiny of Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa in Cabanas Depariment broughtditsatttftetrm with Ih* management of ihe waread andforced ihc resignation ofMinister (Tartla lit replacement. General Vides.ore eclive personal role ia Ihe conduct of the arar.amis Ht Ihc field, tried lo promote aggressive unall-uttt mciio. and began toa ansa "awtJonalor defeating Ihe gwrrriTbs^ |

The Defense Miniascr aimed moreakmg critically needed personnel changes, however. Amicus io avoid political faDOut that might yeopar-dirc his own positori. lactloaaliie the miliiary, or endanger continued US aid. Videt followed tradition andommission in October lo thresh out military problems ly November, ball le fie Id reversal ikroughout (ht coaatry, ineraatlngh in Ike miliiary. and sirong pressure from ihc United Stales finally propelled him Into announcing major leadership c

The shakeupramatic opportunity to strengthen thr irncMionally unresponsive General Suff. Defense Miaester Videt brought la the First Brigade commander Colonel Blundon ns Chief of

Siaff and Lieutenant Colonel Mender from theBattalion at Chief of Opera!ions andof staff

rem la lionit

mceg cot hi'z- il

crease in ihc eemmsrd and eetatroly the Catteral Slatf Fnrty ckaagetroare-tV-clccS tUlTiatg. seruaal tarvestigatroa ofcorneal leases Iba adcnies of Aw Forcerepresent* Irvu lo gdtaaiag aeasiona.cordial bison with US advisersin tradition ally independent localsetting prior hie*support on a

cousirywide basis will not be accomplished Quickly.

Videt't movea were also designed, we believe.evitalise batUrfletd performance. II' changedof at leastajor combat anihreeof the four US-trsiaed Ikicffwdeadwood. relieving several battk-wuary com-rnaaders.up offerer at charge of the octcagacitd easier at an depanawnti. andew group of tfTmrs so ami teniar posts Although tbehncas represented tbe first command shsfitaag time see menu of the uaatt. tbe enanges .ei baca. opcitlons Ifhon limeihe new officers settled iaollowup move at Ihe endhe corrapt commander of Ihe Navy was finally i

Fvew an. thentv tlow

progress in improving It* dismal public image,houh human rights abuaca appear kg be deciin-ng.

JS imesl-gaiors found villagers that govern -meat solders bad murde-ed aaaul two doaea yosih* in Uanhniaa al Ihc end of Nmaatattaa eaTtccr respmieae for an earlier suastaevu ia Soeoonatererroed tut art brought t* trial Few coBsminerrs bate chosen so follow tht cat mate en* Lieutenant Cokrnei Ockea. whouccessfultj rtlaliears pcogram in Cabanasefense leaden have endorsed socioeconomic reforms,ctidci of tenduct. Hied so keep Air Force bORbing away Irom civilian areas, promoted Civic

fi i 0

action projects, and provwitd ptogo-crimeni media espesure. Lack of full ervdcssemeni of shew measures by tome local commanders, however,ened Iheir impaci. The transferew ed* lb* more noteviows rightwlnghe cad of November from national naffctive field units may have rtaac-ed ihe individuals from Ike limehght but did noi remove them from petitions of responsibility. Onlj Ihrec acre exiled al Ibai time. President Dearie, however, las recently designated three additional officers to leave for overseas posts!

Military EujuiptHnf

fil Salvador has revamped iu equipment inventories over the past few years, taking advantage of US military aid lo beginandardice weapons through-oat ibc regular forces and purchase new items geared for the eounicrinsurgenc* threat {see lableefense leaders matntala contact! with other militarysuch Israel. Taiwan. Chile, and Argentina, but ne couniry besides the United States has come forth with substantial aid or long-term credit arrangements.

Table*

DbtrtWioa of US Miliar) Assistance lo EI Salvador

it* a

aU

i*a

o

i

Tauluuswatr Distntwitea of aid b>

. i vrrran

Tasul

IntUr*

SvrawemOKMIing

ml wrw ani

Canmoie silent at at

Aircraft sad etnrafs

!1

hrau aal naval ntfl.ii CrruMawMU)utnwi

il 1 '-

tvn

IS!

Id 3

11

ea)

IIV)

ij It itst are

m ia

i

i

io

j

lixtiOat meei.rirvJetnlvngl

BcoiKrim-Sirm- >Ot teuwv n

units have lost sabsiantial numbers of weapons to enemy actions Coma la tire hates since? could have equipped more ihaa three additionalIRhe Intelligence Community esiimaiesignificant proportion of the enemy's weapons and ammunition needs are met through Ihe capture of government sapplii

W> IrIon i

Airtrafi aad Air Fotrt Srf/lin. Deliveryiwo dozen US pUnes ind ncllcoptcnan ar.:nj fleet

non nave

planesreplace leases from imfe liid in Januarytroog new dimensionht government'i wit effort. Tbe Air Force wai abk to fly com bat run* ihorily after the piaocx armed and bit lest only one yet fighter and three helicopters during operation since. All Sough w* do noi have

statin les on bombingFiatse upm

feiponie

dte locem.-nanfiirid control

ciuicei concern ailbm the fMLN Cocnhniregularly call for ai) support, rclysag on small Cessna Ob for largel tckniaVaiKai at Knrr of air or artillery airikca- All una tot bombing ar urafuar.et-cetatn unsh long knur line Ic* niaraimg anstiguu ftrt. a*t keheiipetrs fcr iraertmg rrconatiaianc* team, prorsding light fire support-'apralkl at lb* field, andg.1

activity tol increased somewhat in recen: months, however, since the replacement of ihe naval

Maaliloat aad EipfadoUei. US ammunition deliver* let are eriiical lo keeping Sahadoran forces in ihe field. Defense Minister Vides acknowledged El Sal* dor* dependence in this ares whenl

irgn irtrte momnis

munitions luppori. Wlib no mililary industries and no aliernailvc foreign sources of supply, the gpitrnmeni has had io use aboutercent of US miliury aid in recent years for ordnance to keep ihe war going)

Even to. ammunition shortages affecting ihe levelave occurred from time to time I

hive oeeuiretr beciute ol aid ceiliitgi, In* difficulty of ordering in advance

Entiled nighttime and poor weather flying cm- y. and competing

ll

and stockpiling under th* irregular arvrnorte-atiom timetable, and fluctuations in Salvador an tactical activity and fire discipline thai have msdc forecasting difficult El Salvador required an emergency shrp> mentmmunition at ihe andor eijmpie, after ihe governments summer off en lire and ihe fall guerrilla rcsTecncr dcpleKd mocks more rapidly iban eipectedj-

Even when aiockt are on hand, worry aboutduring US Congressionalover aidcaused Salvadorto hoard supplies and reducehigh proportion of

aaj Tonus gumg see munitions, nai reduced El Salsa-dor's abilityake sonicr term Investments in military hardwareain May Tha growing need for spare pari)quipment tees has also begua 10

iacrcasc ihe pressure so us* more aid fuads forbits'

T'tMipenailoi. Cuesrllla atiaeks agstral El Salt-dor's transport ftclllllei coalinua lo hinder govern-mem effortiove supplies overland. Tha insist-genu have hit FJ Salvador's bridges mora than CO limes, blowing up lha two major spans over ihcver and destroying or ilamagiag name reusighways and rail lines ase vulnerableGierdiciion Only eight locomotives are stillut ofO because of attacks and derailments, th* gwarnCa*been able ta nhuahingconvoys, heading up and doiroysnt civilian buses and tr-ucks. and taiiag local raaateau to daaweuattrait posrtrcaf strsmarth Alaaoal al ssapprna arctnssttd oa Ibc around. aad Iht go tiaetr.nl aas been forcedVrcrl considerille iiaoarcaa ta repair routes, iuui bailey bodies, and tighten security for tearswya- ba addition, the military has imeuvjwcd aeeurily at nou major bridge* tndctct irwurgcat attacks]

Tbe government does not fug) use Ms air transEl Salvador has aboutant portof which can land on ibon. unimprovedaircraft are

underuiiliird because af sstiol shortages, slowance, and poor scbtduling. The gotornmcat has not tapped the almotiommtrclal pllott who are

availablery pun-lime aod could relieve (heAir Force pilots of some of IheirSo far. air delivery has remainedalthough Ihe miningunny al Sanearly IW may pi tunc an iiscrcaK in this kindr

1 CI Salvador's sapplyts only tkruly adjustingartime needs.report progress in famillariiingofficers uiih comptci procurementid now ledge Utile headway in making ihcsupply-driven sysiem responsive to localThe tagtsiic staff often has withheldfiom the field to hedgeearedUS aid. accordingS miliiary observers.deliveries are made in equal sharesllboth to avoid offending politicallylocal commanders andompensate forof rationalnd requisitionreluctance Id sel priorities anda 1has led so severe frustration on Ihe pancommanders in Ihc most contested areas.

improvement* are gradually occurring!-

^jjjjujh ii

Tight centra' control of supplies elastics withoperational planning Tbc logistic staff is reluctantose leverage over local commanders by stockpiling supplies in forward areas and requires thai each rcoueoi for logutac turoort be processed through Ihc national bureaucracy. The sysiem bat encouraged mitrcporting of needs in order for commanders to hoard supplies for planned operations. Even with such informal stockpiling, combat campaign* have been cut then when supplies ran out. The improved ability of some units to lustaiail summerstayed in the field longer than athe resourcefulness of Individual local commanders irnie lharlcnj

So far. the govemnvenr* war effort has failedtimulate the development of domestic militaryor encourage (be private sectordjust for the

If

Althoughn short supply, the coauntriai ibwia of anirnuatiioa plantsibrssentabt* production weakness In addition, de-tfavtr Iht nerd lorprepackaged COnv bal itimiwilh private Salvador an firmrepeatedly looedered. Crxnbni commind ert Dilio purrhaic large qtaeniltiei of food through commercialeonsprorrusing ctwrilionitdeliver bulky itrrni lo Ihe field despiter.rpci. Furthermore, lick ofand other neatweapon Kenw. Ihai are loo eipea-jv*mport hai bmeed iM numbercru in laeal coirffiardiTiduci ind hai reined inorale

hequipment malnt*naocc eyitem. iradtiionaiy characteriitd by nd hoc repairs and (aiiniive canalbnlitntSon. hat improved in then* lectori receiving US ai instance. Standardisation of weapons and equipment in general hai facilitated ihef aiechi of spar* pans ai central depotsbelieve, although rrtany

and boat

ir vn pJannet

improvedbni ranted the operational readinessLM III heliecpeers fromabuulbetter lhanricenlihe avail*

Pit of IP frustrates coenb*;

ol

nr Ih-iiilia; lic cf tht

number of military rones toiia by Ml (ice figuren practice however, control connnurdcn wilh the I* department eoiinanden. who pie'crtd direct Inks wilh (br Min.ni- of Defense. The need in eoord-nat* matin rut opersilcea against ancapableled to ope;xocatatio*the theater consnsandn bt* IHI. Ahhough orcaiioRill) aouad. tcmpctary oatnmaafls continued to founderlaff shortage* and local jrilnuiiri ewer ihe control of force* In ihe Ncwrmbci I'Da leap, ih* High Command moved iignifi-cantly cloaar to aligning ihe formal Army iirueture with on* miiii-ji aeaiitiea by ihlfilng tn* boundarici of militarv aonoi to coincide roughly with tntmy fronts.

The government has also incrcaaingly ceaaotniraicC feeees in iht aaoai contested areas. Initially, this was accomplished by borrowing units from th* less active atpanmanta. Colonelhen Commander of the Third BrigaaV. aspressed typical frustration wuh this ipproaeh. henyevar. when be ccenc*aia*cl

1 ihai he could not tees* around San Hataxl arhil* hb troop* "tee off pa'JoOIng in Usulatan. guarding

the I alia* Bridge, iclicing Ibe loan Ot* CtwiulO in

Mora ran. and regamiag controlighway in Sue Vicente. Th*trategic itstrx forces in

yura has enabled ibe goveinanrni grnei-

te>ilareaso' i

allyoeui ihploymenti againii guerrilla concenira-tions wiihoui having lest coniestofl ajeaj-pf lhc country unpnnnoted far* finite II

armed force* have made less piogrett in vehicle mahttrnane* and small arras repair. Having aubtiitui-ed ntw US weapons for older European model; In lb* regular forces, lb* countryarge number of arm* (hat couldefease i

Aid Ifjt*ala6a> lasiil USon nr thb aetmiy. however, and the SaKsdoraa Covern-encni hit shown liiltr lemati-e. Asr*siili.mal pcrccntag* of civilh* tint lire of dtltnse In outlying villages -are armed wilh anything more lhan marl

ight Bttittlimi. In March tvSiihr Defense Mlaiurr announced plant for Ibe eoantnlon of local garrison anttt to light battalions.nitriMlur* for fan her fere*paniion. and faeHiUi*ries-bv* araall-aru operation, the pian (avnaged Ihe creation ofan tatulnsns coanlrywtde by ibe end of thb year, mainly by eombovrr raasting infan-iry ccanpnnia and addingnd Combat supporl aaiti. The lit' baiuhons wereio alternate sialic defense rosponiibililies with aggreisne patrol-

CengraakfeEl Salvador haireshapedliaiy structure in recent yean to face the guerrilla threat. The government doubled th*

In Ibe wakcofaterscs of guerrillait fall,several light battalions were mauled bysenior commanders in ihean battalion concept be scrappedof baltalioeritrength olThey

ihai ihe lighter batlarsoniwere nrjritrwvi inuu: rtrained cnoofh to engage la opcrationiJ

ByGen-

eral Sufi had approved the rtxvganiaaiidn of the light battalions intocoutcrlmurgency battalions ofersonnel aogmcated In many iastanccsanppen oompany. In the cast, vrhere ihe fighting has been heaviest, ihe Army Commander I

local commardcrs. Soierarchical chain of command reporiedly baa taken firmest root in those areas such as the 3rd Military Zone in Ihe call where tat brigadeider has been able locxcriby Ibe sheer force of hit personality andrepuiationj-

Irterurrtuome continuedintdcpeisdeace of the Air Force, Navy, and Public Security forces also handicaps ihc war effort. Because of the nature of the counter insurgency struggle the Salvadoran Army has received the lion's share of us inee, increasing the disparity between thaiand other fighting elements. Air Forceto tbc war have increased_ sigh-level planning coordination is still unevenj |

for combat sup-

in the past tended to come strut hi to ihe Air Force from field comma aden. of tea over commercial telephone lines. With little direction from tbe General SulT. Air Force duty officers made (heir ownon mission priorities. Changes in General Staff procedures are improving coordination. The Navy's apabi lilies remain so poor ihsi even when iisvoKed in

opiralicnalis during the Ivivi'r-

oc<rations in Septemberhas been unable io cose off the enemy's sea rouses of e

The integration of the AK Force aed Navy into the pfenning process Improved hi) with Ike inclusion of service representatives at meetings of the General Staff. Neither lha powerful chief of the Air Force.sul.o.igh-level naval officer is pan of Ihe strengthened staff orgs n'uation. however, and improvement in cay-today coordination has been slow. Despite heavy involvemcnl in Ihc arban and rural ground war. the Public Security forces remain outside regular planning channels Shunted aside from the US assistance program, the National Guard. National Police, aad Treasury Police keve neither consolidated iheir forces stor realigned their organiutional boundaries with Army thealers to rr in force tbe national war effort,1

new pattern, kowtver, cannot yet be considered an mstiiational svorm. The efaie IR batialions, for raamplc. continu* to resist opcraiional control by

<fm

Strategy and Tncttrs

alternative

Sirairglt a. El Salvador hisTkulU Hi adopting and stickinga comprehensive lulicnal Mraicty for deft*ling ihe insurgents. Hariag neverounieiiMurreney. ihe government had to csiabliihed doctrineuide ill initial response.ma nd.n; individual clYictrs demonstrated energy and resourcefulitesorted lo sirengllen-ing local defensive position* and engaging in occailoO' al unsuccessful sweep opt rations, according lo our analysis. This piecemeal approach icsullcd la bule ore rail progress on Ihe be airfield, and defense leaden begin io ciplore alternative siratcgies *ilh US adm-crs by

The Nulonal Plan ihai emerged called for lhcof resources io icerc decisive gains In one areaime, the use of aggressive small-unit lacilct io keep the enemy off balance, the integration of civic action and economic restorationthe military effort, and Ihe expansion of trail defense forces to consolidate combai gains. Implcmenled first in SaneUpopolated department in the center of lhc country where guerrillas had successfullyagricultural production, the National Plan begaa

pooh quauty pAGE

with (real acclaim In3 and accelerated in July at pliant)ailer operations wens initialed throughout the couniiy. Destnta mach planning and material support from theUnitedowever, mornentum tagged by (all The eaperirnent. In our view, proved too ambitions for the well-meaning but StillSalvadoran High Command The campaign finally moved on to Usuhstan inut largely without its economic ictonnrueiion and civil defense components

Tatiieal CawdinariOB. In the absence of an overall nraitgy. day-to-day operations are determinedonstantly shifting mis of national directives and localThe High Command controls the purse strings, logistic sspport. and the flow of intdligencc-ll also reviews battlefield plans and performance and issue* recommendations, but less often orders. Inor example, defense leadersthe procedures for use of dose air support in copulated areas following civilian deaths in Tenan-cingo.ovember directive reviewed the steps for avoiding ambtabes O: the other hand, local commanders dcurmiae the aiic. timing, targets, and tactics forrationt.ypical operation, for example. Colonel Florethree-battalion attack against guerrilla bases near Jucaaran InUsulutan In3 with no help from the

General Staff in either planningirxu

The split in declskeimahics authority has hindered combatby encouraging local initiatives while denying commanders the means of(heirensions runn both sides. The High Command charger that Field officers fall to notify then of pending operalions and then comptahV whenogistic, and air and navy luppon ar* not availableimely bails Combat uoov mandcrs blame ihe Comma nd for security (cats that compromise operational plans, and tiegligence inresources to rescue anils under sitae) or to sustain field net It

Ceurareraaturgerir laciin Over (imo (he armed forces have become more aggressive and more willing to adopt small-unit tactic* and occasional night opera-lions Neveribcleis, at ibe tactical It-el. many officer! remain reluctant to fully employ tucholonel

BuitirSo. the Air force commander and one of the country's moat dedicated leaden, hat bcntcd fellowor not undemanding that the urgency of ibe national itrugjlr demand* field4ay. sevenort Although up toercent of

in the Heid du-irsr. the

rammer of

dnclinedurge1Ba -as once again operatjag consuntly an Ibe springo>ocr. to keep thaf balance daring it*|

cenmanden havahai ibcrtages cf officcn and iraop* and inadequate radios and hebcop ten hare madenlnetani io move out oftha* company-tne units ewnt hough

I io us that

In many cases offiten hen used themrutchtraditional defensive philosophy.and trainingii sincegrrsiljh* offensive potentialerased forces, we bcline la our view, lackdirect no* from Command euihorJie*.aa Ih* tU* and crTcdmaKaa or* the iraand in* ingrauxd reluctance ofio risk eipcrtmaatatsonnewmilitary per fee mane*

.niOeOjcaie mobioly hit alto reduced tome of ihe laetical choice* Open ta Field comma ode n. Even (h* immedini* rraciiun ballallont cannot respond on ihoilot only* numberucks jnadeguaic in ihe rieid. but ihe high rok of ambush diicouiage* grounditon altogether Allhough ruer rifletactics have become well known. Salvadoran iruopscontinue to ignore accssrHy pnreaiiiioR* la Astral lata, aa Id-ana* nasi from the die Bellow eetiaaoe. on its way as reinforce atrader attack, trailedend with no teouti or flank guard, fellrap, aad Ion almost ibt antire unn. In November, aa Army anil mad*utile atlenpis io tend reinforcement] toain road withoutircling around gucrrillai ai known ambulh point

a

i

Wilh only aboutelicopters operationalone time, commanders have noi been able lo airlift large numbers of tround ireopt onregular bout. Colonel Dust iliaS Conetcstionel dcUcaiion Iul September that priority mission* tuch aa comtai retupplyew helicopters available fot troop tranipori. Bectutc afihts, farces have on many occasions leal ihc eteeneoi of tactical surprise, failedot off retreating insurgeni anils, and had to pull iiwoi back from ihreaicRed forward positions be-Cause ihey could not be reinforced in lime. Tbe Arte Battalion took at hours to get troops into position fee an operation in Moraua inor esa topic, giving enemy forces time to ilip away, la December, after ihc leadership reshuffle, sve began so sec troop trastsport receiveI helicopters lifted Ireopt Into action nearthe small number of helicopters amiable still precludes regular airlift operation!.

A long-range fcconnassstnccintoix-manreceived irsterait* US training in Panama aad has undertaken dangerous butmiss'oris into cnemy-eoni rolled territory,targets forround force strikesT"

ntttiaoec units discovered and destroyed an insurgent camp at ihc mouth of the Lcrapa River inalvadoran observer aircraft have increased ll

Army's vitutl i

The arnved forces' ability lo use intelligence hats noi kepi pace wilh col lection, however. Poor cotnmunica-lions between ike General SlalTand rreld commands haveayor liability in the dissemination of strategic and tactical information. Detpiie theof undermining ihe General Staff. US personnel have on occasion felt compelled to deliver datalo field commanders when stiff bottlenecks have prevented operational intelligence from gelling to the

Original document.

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