THE COMING CRUNCH FOR PAKISTAN-ANOTHER VIEW

Created: 7/20/1984

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Tbt Coming Crunch forVievtl

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.)Man In ibe ncil year face* potentially acrioui threats lo ita re-cunty froo tbe Soviets in Afghanistan and from India, Islamabad's auiyrsori for ibe Afgfun resistance has incidied (he ratougher Soviei policy towardlimited cross-borderMoscow concludes thai President Zia'a oorrsestic sap-port baa weakened, ibere arc new itraiaa ia US-Pakiii*ci ressuoas. or tbc United Slates ia Ii Iensifyist its efforts through Pakistaneed tbe Soviets in Afgbanistaa. Rei.u'--wiib Indii are tense and could degenerateesult of mutual

acx-ussticns cf inurferertce taser's afisiM[_

Ukelibood of major esaordimterj Soviel-lr>dian dTorts to desursilizcj|

In our view, however. Paktstaa's raosi scrioas cballcngcs will be domestic rather tbaa forago. Soviet aad Indian regional policies are more likely to be afTected by development! in Pibitaa than the other way around. Both Moacow end New Delhi could try to take ad-actage of Islamabad's domestic difficulties to weaken and dealsbtkre PaijtirBJ

The Sortet Threat

A sigiuficant Increase in insurgent effectiveness In Afghanistan could leadsugfacr Soviet policy toward Patostao pcaiibiy ladudina crrat-border attacSn-

Moacow regards President Zia'a commitment to the Afghan reautjusceajor reason for its failure to control Afghanistan, and Ibc Soviets' growing frustration in rattaaiaiairigt the insurgency increase* tbe usoeotivc to intimidate aad destabilize Pakiitan.

So far. however, Moscow has been unwilling to exert greater pressure on PaJdstao. and tbe Soviet leadership probably will ecoiinue to avoid poiscsc* tbat could create ooof teats tion with ibe United Sute*

A ajgnificanl increase in casualties and equipmentled Moscow to believe tbe United States was flmneiing more and better arms to the insurgent; would increase theof greater Soviet miliUry pressure on pal

Tbat the Sovieu have not exerted serious pressure on Pakistan probably reflects tbevrre>aatsoaougher policy in present corsdilioets would be lea* likdy to alter Zia't policies or lead to bis overthrow Ulan to strengthen his regime and result In cliner US-Pikiataai ties, inclodiag is regional security matters:

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has strengthened Zla's hand by fjroviding bitn considerable latitude in dealing with domestic peoblerns and the political exposition and by allowing him to restore seccriiy lies with the United Sute*.

Pakistanis judge Soviet capabilities to exert pressure oa Pare brjuted by ihe Afghan insurgency, the relatively small force tbe Soviets hare In Afghanistan, and the still poorly developed military infrastructure in AfghanistaD.

The Zia regirne would not bey tba potential of Smiledorder raids by Soviet or Afghan forces so long is it bail US support

The SovkU probably could not unilaterallyil.re Pakasian. but they could takef dorneatic unrealry to rseairalise Pakistan. Moacow presumably might believe that, if besieged docneatkally, Islamabad would be vtilrterable lo cataid* pressure to allct its foreign policies. The Sovieu. however, would have lo take care to avoid ortrt threats to Pakistan's security which might allow

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Zia io redefine the crisisopular referendum on his rule lo toe issue of Pakistan's survival as an independent

Even if Zia's regimeuccessor government would cot necessarily be more accotTirrxxbtiof to Moscow:

Another military regime would probably continue the broad oudinca of Zia's policies regarding Afghanistan, closer relations with the IJr,ttedommitment to Middle East security.

A civilianone led by the "leftist" Pakistan Peoplesbe const rained fromadical policy reversal by the national consensus on supporting the Afghan insurgent* and the attitodes of important foreign

Hies. ii^udinciChlna. Saudi Arabia, and tbe United States.BK

The Indian Threat

Most Pakistan's view Indiahreat to their country's survival, and Zia has exploited this consensus to buttress bis regime in times of domesticvividly, last fall during the Sind crisis:

India long has been prone to meddle in Pakistani affairs but faces most of the same constraints in trying to instigate unreal as tbe Soviets.

The Indians, however, probably would be better able than the Soviets to take advantage of dotnestic cites in Paldsian because of their closer ties to the political

India and the Soviet Union share the common goal of reducing Paldstan's role in the region, but they have different perspectives:

VVhile the principal Soviet concern it Afghanistan, the Indians are wonted that US-Paltislanf cooperation undermines New Delhi's regional dominance and threatens their security interests the Indian Ocean.

India sees the US-Pakistani relationship as havingynamic of its own which no longer dependsommon cause in Afghanistan.

It Is from this perspective (bat India regards tbe US links to Pakistan particularly the sale of moderndcsUbiliring regional sccurityi^1^

The prospects for Soviet-Indian collaboration to

subvert tbo Zia regime or tooordinated

attack on Pakistan arc slight:

India is suspicious of Soviet motives in the region and would resist significant Soviet influence in an opposition movement or civilian government in Pakistan.

India wouldoviet-dominated Pakistan or Soviet-dominated ministatesismembered Pakistanerious threat to its i

ajor long-term coordinated Soviet-Indian effort to destabilire Pakistan is highly unlikely.

The likelihooddo-Pakistan war io tbe next year is slight, but the chances increase as tension grows amid mutual charges of meddling:

Pakistan has been careful In Ibe current Indian internal crisis in Punjab State to avoid provocative actions that could lead to an unwanted rrulitary cxMfronUtioci, despite its apprehension about India's extensive military moverocnts on its side of the rwdee,

India mayiversionary conflict on the border with Pakistan if Gawihi's domestic support beg'as to crumble because of the

> io Punjab, althoughnlikely

caioeo! Ziaooi rem* loins ia power Tor Ibcew year because his political opposition it fragmented and lacks crciiibiniy. Hu handling of tbe Siad crisis last fall strengthened his support ia the Army. Nonetheless, there are political, cconomK, and regional factors that could qnkkly uadermine Zia'swhich could be eaptoitod by tba Soviets and India:

Mismanagement of the transition to civilianii to been with elections promised by Marchprecluding freaier poUUcal activity and suppressing opposition parties could resultacklash against Zia within his mod important in Punjab and la tbeecline ia the economyapid drop in foreign remi iiatwei would lead to oppoaition by important interest group* and the public generally.

particularly if domestic competition for rsacuraea increased.

Failure to address political and ecoocenic grievances in Sind and Baluchistan Provinces could lead to serious ethnic violence with nationwide impticaiions, including the pratped of militant regional leporatiam

The growing number of Afghan refugee* in Pakiitan could aggravate all of these factors as tbeyolitical crjmtituency in their own right, especially to tbe extent they conclude tbey could never returniberated Afghanistan.^^

1 Indentions fat US Policy

1st view of Pakistan's uncertain situation Inoming years, tbe United Sute* will face pcactitiaUy difficult policy cttoicea:

A US policy aimed at closer military cuopcration with Pakistan in regional security matters could he counterproductive and harm Zia's political standing because of the broad support in Pakiitan for nonalignmenLolicy would further barm US relations with India and worsen Indo-Pakhtai tensions.

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