The Afghan Resistance: Struggling for "Unity
approved for RELEASe
The Afghan Resistance: Struggling for UnitylH
The Afghan Resilience: Struggling far UnltvU"jJj|
Keyof unity continues to hamper the Afghan refinance. We believe
it ti rice efforts to Influence International opinion, to have
voice 'n negotiations on an Afghan lenlcment. toensore diplomatic
support and the flow of money and weapons, and to coordinate
Initiatives for unity have come from the eaile community in Europe, thecommunity in Peshawar, and local insurgent commanders ia Afghanistan. In Rome, former Afghan King Zahir Shah is attempting lo join all elements of the resistance tne] develop international supportnited Front of Afghanistan. The Front probably will attempt toxllc.
Zahir probably will fail to develop support from the USSR and Pakistan. The Soviets wan! to maintain control over Afghanistan, and thewant control over negotiations and fear that resistance unily couldowerful force ID domestic politics.
Deep divisions among fundamentalist resistance leaders and insurgent commanders will prevent the United Front from achieving legitimacy.
Many Afghans feel nostalgia for Zahir but probably nol loyalty.
A weak.nly supported Afghan gcvcrnmem-in.csilc could pose diplomatic recogrtilion problems for Western rations and increase tensions within the resistance.
We believe the Peshawar resistance groups will not develop more than temporary, loose alliances formed for financial advantage end because of outside pressure.
In our view, ihe guerrilla commanders inside Afghanistan will gradually improve eooperatioa in military operations and maintaining supply lines. Major Soviet operations in4 prompted several suchThe insurgents, however, are unlikely to develop regularcooperation because of ethnic and language barriers, political and religious differences, and communication problems.
Over tbe long term, the resilience probably will draw only slightly closer than it Is now.
Tbe Afgiin Rttistarjcet^ Sduggliri'vVj^B
Afghan resistance oniinucle hampered by lack of overall unity, durst* initiatives lo achieve lhat oejeetive. The absence cf an orsraniialion able to speak for (hehole limits iu efforts id influence International (pnion, to havevoice la ncgailaiioni on an Afghin settlement, to ensurediptoetauc and material support, and to coordi-naie milimy effot
a our view, he never, the common elements are Itsufficient to overcome rival-lie" and grudges, social and ethnic differences, and conflicting religious vitvs. Seme commacders inhave begun effects toward unification.the insuigenu laic shown gradualIn militaiy cceptmhui, the Mil of eniiy thai would permit significtni inteneMftil militaryhas
Tbe most publiciied ami ambitious of the initiatives for unity, that of former Afghan King Zahir Shah, envisions joining allmenb02aiiw the Kabulackers have neavilyd Western government* to ssippoti tbe fonset Afghan King siaovei towardovtrnment-la-ulle. We believe thishas mainly (town est of fear that the Afghan resistance may be left out of any political settlement on Afghanistan. Zahir's backers also fear loss of influence to rival resUurcc crgar.iiaticis unless tbe former King leads the
Inltiaiives In the rcsliuncc community in Peshawar primarily seek stable pslitieai coalitions to emurc the flow of funds and weapon. Initiatives amcoa the insurgent commanders in Afghanistan hive military cooperation as the mainc believe ttsi pres-pcvtsn fc: allmiiv-i
The Afghanivided into hundreds of different (roups. Sigt/csri distgrcemesns existboulit mean* i*ttam ind lo free AigUnoan frora Ihe Sanru Most Uadi ororably arc poorly anojaaiwid ata lha goals of iht fu tseajacsv ultRs or ike eioderata la aortaeaaotra Haureajai. for cumptc. several koMi reuuneiykgar-cc from ene Peitu-ar-bvo! groap to anjthei1"
; bands censtdcrir atknaC groups aad prefer ninimal1 from Kabul. Other groups, such ai Miosis and nxtal democrau, have little powervikcly to influence Ihe resistance muc
Another factor thai Vaospers iniatgroap tat la that the leadershipn flui in Afghanistan and among Ihe refugee) ahs ptoodt the guerrillas' mar.-power poet.esternour*
with autornailc waponi bava rttUotd viUagt ciders as tbc bixhesi av.hotay In areas lard hit by the war. Only traditional Ittdert who ire oombalinu retain their influent* I* ibe refugee tames, rival (Tsvps bavatsuib-Biioo of food and arcs ood the issue of rcbgiao. Al tbey have for centuries,l andu aetirut to dn<d* as well as aalicafaaua. refugee ecTkia! (old West-era joamaliais thaimpossible, for example, to put Ghiliai trltasmtn Into acamp, since
meat flghi.ng among themselves. alw havehereii In ciJ ofommon program, bovtvet. lewrfeeu prone* :bc medio primarily wniieggenied cUiFti of mcccucitieef tie Santa ond ite Katu
Ziiir Sbah'i lollljl.'f
ncithci title -ouW icocpi meniliuilion.it* aihiMally Puihtua. Similar dtvisiossAfghanistan Including amongrtfoge in.'flood and
vci, can acmuulmei came H'WI aad ethnic im to loosen.l
Zahir'i effort to unify the rumaacc it ambitious iru! utcniive. Backed by the Peshiaar moderate alliance. Zahir publicly opened his eampaigoummerHit principalonited Front of Afghanistan that can participate inoviei -iihdiawal In3 an aideZahir laid that (italic*overnment-in-cjUe would doptnd on tbe willotional assembly, which Zahir* supponcis hope to convene when tuffi-cunt backing haa de-etpped.esirecricnage around whom the Afghancan cotlesor. Zahir In press conferences has portrayed himseJfonciliator rathereader, diss -owing personal ambctioni or any siiernpt lo restore the moaarchy (see boa and appendix O. Tbe for met King aad tis sappcciers apparentlyHut icte:rational support wJI makes boag ifct na/ae resnuecr leaden to Laome observers believe that aavVioji advisers wit pvsb Zahir Uaofirtaaagdacuit* I
The Soviet I
We believe Zahir is not likely to get Seme! support, though he raaliui Ihe need for itreas iatervicw inahir indicated that be considers friendly rilaOoes between Afghasliun and the USSRneeeaalty. though he bershly condemns ihe Sovietsthe Kabul rtgin
The Soviet! have notublic position on Zahir Shah's Initiative. In4 limited attacks on Zablr by Afghan Governmcctarc controlled by theto Soviei concern about Zahir'i unity effort. Tbt Soviets probably fear
ni urgent effaiii io influenceontto be hindered by an Inability to dceidioinnon program. The Peifcav-ir grou-n. who ao tbe
Sovicia dii> alio ulll hope that Zahir will ultimately heJp tbc Afg ban CoanrauolsU consolidate Iheir oonirol of Afghanistan. Members of bit (Btou-rageW US academic eiperu (here have been periodic contact! between ibc Sovieuissarics of ibe former King, although be denial it. Moscow's preference coual be for Zahireturn to Afgbani-Hanigarebcad Ilka Souvanna Phooma In Lao, after tbe Comraacdit takeover there. We doubt1 cow would ever permit ihe King real powerfH
Zahir'a bickers claim lo have Ihe lupport of Piciidcnt Zia, but tbat i, ret likely. In our view. Pakistan would hava acveral reasons for opposing the former Afghan King. Airaiitancc would diminiih Pittltn'i authority in ntiottaltontolitical actllctnccu of ihc Afghaniiun iUoe. In lateH
rcitiiance by citabliih. Ing direct lie*niurgentijn the field and circum*
P'kiiat;Ccrmnrmat wenicd to sponsor icrmaiaoQ of in Afghan oil* poblicalcabawar that could negoiiate, under Pakistaniariib the Soviet) loeace settlenteoi. in2 Pakistani officials eipteued atroog rciervaiionaxnaoii ng Afghan reaUtiact uni-ly. claiming that tbe rerituncc hid tufftcitnl cohrr-ence lo sustain military operation, in Afghanistan. The Pakistani, feared tbat rcniunce unity couldowerful force In domettic politic, ahculd the refe.-gcea' hope of returningree Afghanlitin fade Finally, tbc PakauBli aallked Zahir when he was inf hi, association with the Puahtioit-
We believe, however, lest Pakiitaa will not obsuuet Zahir Shah'scetrBCuon could invite lataina-tional criticism and jocrju-diie relations with Muslim nates Inat support tbe tuiitano
.formulated any policy in regard to Zahir
overnment cn goad terms withRecently. Pakistanto Zahir's backers^
the Pakistani Ooveroanai provided faciiitle* and le-ctisity fcr Table's rcpeatatalivea in! when they tried to develop lutport for the feemer King among refugee in the North-West Frontier Province and adjoin trig tribal aren^l
3 9 8-
We bel.eve the oc?OKtka af ibe tWamoataMt icaiiunc* groups win leevoni Zahir ana hn backers [ram achieving any kg ibmicy tbai tte pUnaodFront may oral mil; Balm.ti' reactionahir'i piottimranaed fron to ouirigbt bHUlll;undamentalists supportaiiBn: aaamtlt planned by Zahirate-cv Pro| lira approval by inch an assemblybei without pirucipation by meal funcUmcn-lalial kaden,ty influence ihe roost effec-tivc Iniuricnt group* i
ai Zahir and I
'.Sla beusviorally bankrupt and hai ignored Ibe insvaency whik tmcj in comfort(itk. Soma findaaKMiLiu alto saspact ihe rood-
eratei arc manlptlnni Zitir and findVi>:i
The Jemlet. Jaraiat Irader Rabbani apparently eon-lidersunited resistance do liable foe dealing with tbo Soviea and Kabul regime, but be wouW probably
beUeves the termer Kir.gl flan toraled front ti uatrcaUstk.ecera peeaiRabbani said tba front vcaid have toiS em Islamic rmcuplcs. I'm to fcceigi domlmtioc. Ht fees Zahir si having com ties with the Weal and not (be Afghan people. The fact, said Rabbani, "may tc< bo led by persons whose relitioas with the people ore weak andn aotaterview with apublication Inabbani labeledoru as laiptoet-eahic
mt other laoiiat
"cii. bum eeyfw ihr itfcro of Zahir. They btatae his poLcto* for leading tie Sonets to Invade end believe be vouht bepotesman foe Ibt resistance bocaaie he licii influence mvong the porni-laee inside AfghiniitanT"
Wc beline tbe Kabul regime ha) carefully limitedon ihe Kiaj, fearing lhc publicityZahir'i caw itg.rr.e
Zahir ShahEnglish-language preii but net the vernacularommentaryotiilcd "Mad Fantasies of Zahir Shah" played op charges that tbt King is backed by Ihe United Stoici, that he Li living Init bis feudal tenure caused starvation and poverty, and that he ruled by tiploiting conflicts among tribes and ethnic groups. Inabul television Implied criticism of Zahir by brieflyhctc-graph of hlra that was proceed against weaponi allegedly captured from iniiiigcntsl
Afghan Popular Views
The Afghan people, la our judgment, have little moreostalgic af (eel ion for Zahir. That good will, however, could develop into active support should tht
Western reports oTZahlr's pros interviews aroused warm memories in Kabul's baraari of Ihe days before the Soviet Imasioa and prompted bope that Ihe Soviets would sooa leave Afghanistan and the King would rettire, Westersnote, however, that the public showed little dismay when the King was overthrown and regarded toj^ofthe King's advlarn with eonstdeiible bcaUt^Hj K
Other Initiatives for Unity
Tbe Pcseawar Resistance Croups
In our view, the Peshawar resistance groups are capable of only temporary, kote-knithe alliances, we believe, have uiually developed foradvantage rather than from common goals and have earned more on caper lhan In reality.
I a 9 9
(the Afghan Inturgestt ive never been intern led inthe formationo mm on front (seehe principal leaden have long resistedearing curbs on their powers
According lo fin reporlt. ihe raven major fundi mentoUil reutlancaand Ia Petbawarooie coalition1 and dttidid ic merer la3 lo Improve flnancrl. RetltlOaci toureri laid ihe tartlet continued ta function ttpe-raiily. however, and that blcktrlnt in tht leadtflhlp earned the alliance io tote influenceNan. Inunui Khalii publicly charted alliance leader Sayyof wtlhdi and pulled hit pntit qui of the alliance.estern obttrvtr. the fundamental! itIn little other than name Before Yunuieparture
Milan**dBTiremti lametimat have led io oictodshed. AceordinteUble.ttachedorctl in Wardak Prortnte. and GuJtmddtm claimed the enetkIn reiponir to Sayyof> tmerference In Hibi affair,^
Aceordint to fiitera observewide divisions exit: between tht Jamiat and mail other fundamtmaUiit.peculated lhat Kbit's and ftabbant may ignore ihe other fundamentalist and teek toeweliable sourte repam that In iprlng IHd Sayyof was uting alliance fundi la buy ihe perianal loyalties af gw'i'-la leedirs and nor dlmlbuitng money lo othermimbr'i Tht lemeiource rrporti thai covtrv-allve mltslonartei tupportid by Sayyof have prompted armed tlathti within the ritlilance In three provinces}
and cniiciam of theirand dr^iont,'spring lalitU and moderate* made an unprecedented call for unity and for atiiitance to ihe Panjiher Valleywho.beca.Tic the targeturac-icale Soviei of fe cii ^lim among iniurieni iroups in ihe Panjiber Valley iru has improved, but inlerrsocine^fiahiini ha* contuiutc in several Afghan province*.]
lliincc came from mcmben of the Muslim Brotherhood In several Pctiian Gulf slate* *nd from the Pihiitan Jemaal Islamihe outaidata urged in and iodlibanding individual partita, (lection of officeis. and tighter financial control. The laducament war as muchillion In aid lo the alliance out not to an individual.]
We believe diffm-xu between thejr^adcfticiaad
Rah-baa. ha* mM tllT^flaei^t
luiiticc* hud. Si and ibc Jinvai win fellow eo ether leadership Ribcani added lhat. ever, if Zahir succeeded inational assemblytep toward found-njUnited Fraal, Ihere would alillplit bet-men Ibi modcritc* and fundtmen-mEwl Should Zahir b* itactad leader, Rabbanlmoil of tha moderate* would come over to the Jamiii. Rabbent Indicated that he would In any cue continue to try lo uaii* rkmcnia of theimneo witbin Afghaniitaa underJ
The rnoderaie* have been more successful iraiithe fuBdimentaliiu in maintaining ceo pern tion.*H mm.
no likelihood exists of thet'.iee moilerale partiesonsolidated front.
Hftbc tbrec-porly*lli*nee holds tcgeiher because of atrong"element* Inrrninubly tbecommunity. We believe that tbcbacking and dealings with Zahir Shahrecent ilia tion between them and theever,
ihe moderates'ibly common goal of settingShah a* reaeitancc iroknrnarLlu'and
Nabi may have reservations about the initiative, hich they sec primarilyailani move.
iiiUII> iBflttittV btud
Units1 ,': iniitii
(NatlOHl bknJ< Fnui)
sed Co men namf(ttaullU^
Facionry. Sever a! iniorgent eeov ciandcn ir. Alghiriiiiar. have pioo>oicd guerrillacai^^MJ^jp^JBI ooi eortrmuoicai-tneuij;:SrncrTSnrffieaLico. Eiheic. euhural, rraUiictl.Ugiovi difference* deterat do avjunUtnoui terrain, peat distances, and bcatile troops between dinner oraatnaQderi and ibeir varioua buderuarten!
Meat octmTiaridtn alto lack local and regionalties. Even u* tbe Pesbawsr exile groups unified, tbe cITeet on thefgbaniitaii would be
be nustber ot* iruurgent basdi having oeeoinal (Ha vrttt exile cfga.ni-
xatloruocrtastd lo tbe past three yean. Tbe exiles, however, do not appear to have any neater control over the figbtini, and most exile loaders have only llmiitd influence even with the binds tbit ae> knowlcdge their autborit>^|
We believe that many cerasnarvdera lack political skills and care sboct little but their owe small areas of
ebjates nit unccnticd why foreign govern-menu do not rocoialiebe chief* ot* state of an independent nation. He also believes the SovlcU do not launch operations Into hit area became (bey are deterred by insurgent il truth, rather'ban by (he Hautebjiti Mrateaic eaicipKiin
scone insurgent leaden are toot) li|hters or skilled maDBtcn of people, but tail few have both ikills and even fewer attempt to central civilians Iu their areas of lafluesoc.^
rd Unity. Ia cur view, of all tbeinPasjiherbuild
bishe local populace and with insurgent comma adm outside tbeease-fire arrangement with ikeboJ. Inaiood hcM a
conferencerain ccouDandcri froen eight prov.
ern1 noudccmmaniicri from etheriicirginlroilcrier.PJ||JPJPaJP^^MuccC topedin allies witaoui alienatingerit approach involves being unemotional and caalanced, rinding capable aidet. and bavini lufllekni military supplies to cHi-(ribute to new groupierose support ii neededI
Maacod bad cipanded On tie*oibiai coenfnanden, utaUiihing bnls writgroups in Belkb, Hen. and ibe Hiiii'.j.lio acetirag etotc knka withVSM fad Hiabi (Kbataa) ooeafeader ta PakUa Pro.:
urther paBtxal movaaa aeii.tt up atld
1eaut otolnei at well at Matood'a diitrua of litehec.-i'aaood for bit wilkngneasegetiaieT
Jagian la trying to Improve cooperation withet
example. Jagian sent leftirticmiisartcsonservative Jamiat (roup in Faryab Province. The time source reports that Jagian wants self-rule in tbe Hazarchjat and has Utile interest in who governs in Kabul so long as the Huarehjat retains iu autonomy.
Over tbe long term, tie resistance probably will not draw much closer together thanow because of political and religion differences. Outside pressure is unlikely to bring tbe [distance politically closerVenous Saudi groups provided tbe impetus for the fundamental ill alliance, but it has nevermore than noraeslry ond now seemse disintegrating. More funds from Saudi sources will not keep the alliance from breaking up. Afghan exiles in Europe have pciiuided tbe moderates to maintainloose atUaDCc but can do little more. Iran's Influent it limited to the extreme fundamentalists. Pakistan, because of its own central for control, ha* little desire toruly unified reifttance. No other aat Ions bare sulTlcUot Influence with major resistance elementse able to ilfect moves toward unity.
We believe an even chattel exLllS that Zahlf Shah and
fin backerse>eggerated claimsational numbly ind Ml upagovcra-
Uck loltd lupoori from Ihe iniurgeits ind unouietbecame political, litigious,ethnic dtfleitncei an likely lo remain ruteak, unevenly supported gutrrnmtni-fli-cmIc would bethan noniillould increase tensions among reustincc factions We kc In: hopo. moreover, that th* Sonets willhat wovM reault in ii Afghan_ reginvt acceptable to all major partita (tee'
We believe the Peshawar parties will conttneeeuar-relinj and that their control over insurgent eernmart^-ers will remain Quite limited. Inside Afghanistan, the commanders will probably continue to increasegradually, with Jamlat farces inrowing more cohesive. We believe, however, thai unity will elude both the political and military ek-menu of the Afghan:
Inw. iKimit govrrnntmr could function only If Itarge oteawe ofrAe tribal and ethnic 'Client of Afghanistan*
recognition peeekrry fcr Westeia nations thatembassies Is. Kabul. Were the United States ot other Western government* lo rccosniee tbe govern-ment-in-exile, little justlficaiion would exist forembassies in Kabul. Were Ihe embassies to etete. an intct rational window on tbe war would close Western ties lo aformed by Zahir and the moderates would generate greater anti-Western reeling among the fundamentalist insurgentt. Sovkt counter measures could include militaryon Pakistan or aid to opposition elements in anyas host fcr the governments'n-cxilc.
InpilrarloBS for tbe United State*
A weak, unevenly supported Afghanwould present several problems for the United States sod Its silica. Its establishmentthe host cuuntry and give rise to Soviet ccuntet' measures and pressure. Il would also psie dljfcmaiic
A 9 9
The Influence of Sufiim
"II,ion, like tribal Uu divides as well it unites Afgt ins. Apeeoiuratdrercent of Afgtios an smmt Mesa-aaa aadrc Slua Wtthia each Ol* ih* iwo coramanriics. leecrdlns io Wcateraa wide range rfopirtati teparaies numerous ficijons In our view. Mitel cannlV.eniUi caoofb so airu tbc roatuaec. tiough eeaa panicalar. may be workag to do so.ascetic,orm of Islam ;fat his both Sunni and Shia adherents in Af-ftcohe-iHsn in carta ia areas. Weutri obsarvcii indicate that Sufisbegin attempts to icread their beliefs among Afghan refugeei in Pakistan. In aomc places Sofiim Iteligious andpolitical force, aarving to band loge'in ilre-enis ftom different ethnic iroapa aad btSBjvii cgani Aobserver repotted ieJufi miar-lent organitatMa. theoran, lao uaite tbe virions Afgist mstance orianitat-ons The arroopt leader etaaaa a*C (ccaSen dispersed tbgughoatnsurgent orgaaraationa in Afghanistan9 civilian member a.
A Wcaicrn observer ineaai-taol:ii-eal-rc'igojs force Is racatiafiaential in aorth-etterr. Afghanistan, where spjritaal guides arhilraubetween inauigent iraups mulling from (thnle frillr partisan rivalry, la Firpabne Safi Leader has beta verysacoctifia con-joauej interncelnc feuding. Wler* ihaarrong. Soil rellgloua kadrrs car, detennine whoeaiatanoc organiiaiion te-xincc chief. Herat It thefghanistac Inem crganiiat-ons baaed irc-.td Herat Ctty. mea; local commanders and Iheir followers arcingle Sufi organ!ratJm. In cation Afghanistan. Sufi political leader) sue!as Gsllani seldom ipend iitc oa religiousi. drretlng tirirucS-cs iruictd to resisiar.c* poiart |
Mirajan SoJiteeji. trade* of the Ma Jrati. ctalms that bis rnembers have lefarnud mayor resinante orgari-taiiona and arebko senior pcsr-Joei Ties believe they willight lha Sovjcta fee years and are preparing far tic struggle by providing pcurticet and relicioui attaeijinaiioc iansurgents aad cr-nlao* Tba srtdcrs arecprCHniatlve farm of government far Afghanistan tbat would bear no mrnolaac* to (he authoritarian goverameni in Iran Tbe organiialionbiisbcd ire Dari several books aria fee io tr.ir.bec-ihip. Some ire doctrja. end_pe'it leaL amd orJers arc military iniaiag mtmli
The United Front of Afghanistan
The noil Important of Zahir's supporters sre Ihe three moderate resittance leaders, lince they are the only ones who retain any influence among thecommanders within Afghanistan. Thewho approved the pkm for the United From of in Rome In
Fareian Mlr-arj. offloial.
at ui H
imil liuioc FlOU.
but at d< Afgtui
rncad of Aadil Well
far farming the front Involve following the treniiioral Afghan pattern ofational assembly toharier for the United Front. Sources close lo the former King have told the prati that the front will aa aa an officiil voice of the cttinsncs. nolovement to restore
moderate ralitanee greapa. lie lalamic Unity, will perform the functions of Ihe United Front until it caa be csiib'iib.Original document.