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Longerymptom of Soviet Problems in Using Western Technology
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
DircclOMlf of
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Longerymptom ofroblems in Using
Western Technology
Paper
This paperprepared by
Office of Soviei Analrsit. Commenu and queries are welcome and may be directed lo ihe Chief.
ymptom of So*lei
Problems in
Wesiern Technology
Keyuse of imported Western pUnt and oquipment has fallen fir shoti of
potcntiil for tmpioving (be USSR's overall economic pafc^rnance. in
part because the Soviet* lake so lorn to acquire and pot to use many
of Ihesc imports. Average lad timet are muchn (be USSR than in the Weal, almost invariably exceed ihe plan, and show no signs of diminishing
The picture is not uniform. Imports for project! in high-priority sectors -defense and energy, forget special handling and. as aare acquired and assimilated promptly. In most other sectors,ariety ofunique lo imported leehrtology and some affecting domestic asthe leadtimes:
DMdcd rtiponslbiliiy. The lackingle bodyoordinate all stages of the import acquisition and absorption process fosters redundancy, prolongs negotiations, and slows down the assimilation of new technology.
Administroiive barriers. Official reluctance to permit personal contacts with foreign suppliers isolates production managers from important Western sources of information about the equipment, often leading to improper installation and prolonging the period of adjustment.
/*ccouniiHf practices. Because the Soviei economic systemery small interest charge on capital assets (both domestic ando one feels obliged to get imported equipment into production quickly.
Incentives. By emphasizing quantitative output, the Soviet incentive system breeds resistance to technological change
Individual Soviet cod users probably can save time byroduct embodying new technology rather than wailing for its development in the USSR. However.widespread rueew technology throughout (hebe faster with indigenous development. Tnis is primarily because (he Soviets seldom begin (he research and development needed for embodying imported technology inequipment until the import has been operatedprototyperom initial expression of interest to factory operation generally takes two to seven years
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Nevertheless, a* tbe pinch on labor, capital, and natural resources tightens and tbc leading edge of Western technology conlinDca to advance, the Sovieu will continue lo import Western technology and equipment to alleviate bottlenecks and modernize domesticven though effective diffusion of technology might occur more quickly through indigenous development. Moscow swill continue to rely onause the USSRreater premium on satisfying current requirements for equipment and technology than on potential long-term uses
The USSR is trying to speed up tbe assimilation of new technology in nonprlority civilian protects through various rcorga nidations and special bonuses. Results continue to be disappointing, however, to judge by the chronic official complaints. We believe the prospect for improvements will remain dim,ajor overhaul of tbe system of incentives for modernization
Mure important, as long as the USSR relies on imported plant and equipment for its most advanced civilian technology, it will continue to lag in the generation of new technology. Fven though Soviet engineers who study unposted equipment may note well what tbe Western designers have done, they mayhaving gone through the designingbe ill prepared to carry the embodied technology further
Longerymptom of Sovicl Problems in Using Western Technology
Despite tis high degtee of self-sufficiency, the Soviet Union has traditionally imported Western technology to help ease bottlenecks, raise efficiency, andits economy. Imports of Western plant andexpanded rapidly in, as Moscow increased lis emphasis on these goals In response to increasingly severe malerial and expected manpower shortages
Such imports have significantly benefited specific sectors. They contributed much, for example, to the substantial enlargement of the natural gas pipeline network and the major advances of defense industries. But the Soviets hoped that Western technology also would stimulateonly in theplants where the imports were used but also generallv. through diffusion. This has not happened.
There is. in fact, direct evidence that Soviet handling of legally acquired Westcro technology for use in the civilian economy has been notablyrime example is tbe disproportionate length of time the Soviets take in assimilating and diffusing most imports of Western plant andhese excessive lead limesajor role in diluting the potential benefits of such imports
Our focus in this paper is on tbe overall pattern or handling foreign technology. Drawing on comparisons with Western experience, we identify factors lhat prolong the process of acquiring and using imports in the Soviet economy. We describe the performance of the Soviet system in each stage of ihe assimilation and diffusion of imports and compare ifcai lo ihe system's rvt'ertwaace with domestically generated technology.
Obviously there are exceptions, most notably priority projects in the defense and cneigy sectors. Their shorter Icadiimes usually reflect official actions lo override the obstacles built into the sysiem. These actions include (I) allowing the end user more direct participation in importromptlypayment in hard currency,lo guarantee on-schedule delivery.
Acquisition, AsrirnlUtion, and Diffusion of Imports
The process of legal acquisition and use of Western plant and equipment for the civilian economy can be divided Into six stages:
Discovery of Western plant or equipment (initiationerest).
Request for funds.
Negotiation of Soviet foreign trade organization (FTO) with Wesiern suppliers.
Delivery, installation, and first use.
of ihe import by the original endiffusion of tbe embodied technology to relevant
uses throughout ihe cconomi
To work well, the process must facilitate the flow of information, reward initiative and innovation, foster trade, and provide ihe know-how and resources for production wilh tbe new equipment or process. In no country, of course,ork perfectly. But in the USSR the process is seriously Hawed in almost alt singes by:
An tneiTidenl decisionmaking apparatus.
Lack of motivation to innovate
A xenophobic leadership.
The treatment of capital assets as virtually free goods.
Protracted construction limes
ilcrttg of new technologyat* andDifluiwa iuk* use of rt ihrouihoM Ihe toiomy. In iM>
paper (he panic .aiilmdMioarifen leaflet thefrom hhiW let Waalchnotsti' ic illdapilot
In ihe Soviet Union, responsibilities tot ekcisions thatinnovation and importn the civilian economy are tharedumber of organizations, including the State Planning Committeehe State Committee fot Science and Technology (GKNTk the Ministry of Foeeign Trade, the Ministry of Finance, and the veriears industrial ministries. Within these organiiations. the import decisions arc made primarilyew officiab in the central administrations. These cJTiciab are usuallyseparate from the end users they are supposed to represent and are not always well informed about all the technologies in which they have tradingthe Soviets* weH-organized system for collecting and disseminating informattoi
The olTieials responsible for innovation are further handicappedrequent Uek of common objeeti.es with ihe end user. An enterprise manager often resists innovation because it causes downtime snd other short-term disruptions of plant operations, and these jeopardiie his fumiltneni of immediate sales and productionprime success indicators. Such resistance, in turn, tends to discourage the import decision maker, who also fears being identifiedailed ^novation attempt. This conflict of objectives encourages temporizing and buekpnssing and makes the import process even slo-ei
The Soviet Unions high degree of self-sulTicieney further weakens the motivation to trade. Trade has never been crucial to its economic iwvivfj.nsion or trade in recentaccount foroercent of Soviei GNP. Xenoplsobia. deeply rooted in Russian history, has inhibited the Soviet ability lo make the most of Western technology, even when imports are expanding rapidly. For example, when deienlcand imports surged in the early and, ihe Soviets still severely limited Western participalion in economicthat wouldforeign contacts and possibly diminish Soviet operational control. Even though management studies showed long ago that technology is more efficiently transferred through personal interaction than through technical dccumeniation alone, the USSR has placed rignificant limitations on foreign travel foe its people and on visits by Western technical advisers. The
Soviets rely, lor the most part, on Westernto identify and learn bow to use Western import*
The Soviet economy treats capital asree good. This atlilude contributes to long leadilmes by reducing the motivation to put new plant andinto operation as promptly as possible. This particular problem is not peculiar to importedbuteneral managerial indifference toward having capital tied up. whether thai capital is imported or domestic and whether il embodies new or old technology
This indifference prolongs construction times, and building delays in turn delay ihe assimilation of Wesiern technology. Duringoviet sources estimated thai the building of an enterprise from the initial design to full-capactiy operation look five to seven year* on average; it takes only two io three years in ibeote recent Soviet) puts Ihe average leadtime for all projects at eight toears. Since newenerally made operational through new plant and equipment, the far longer construction times mean that allboth imported androught on siteamm0ee ilowly in the USSR than in tbc West
In ihe Soviei chemical industry, for example, the lime Ibai elapses betweeninii.at inquiries about import contiacts and operation ofpurchased plant and equipment) is roughly twothree limes as long as in the Westn the machine tool industry, the time between contract inquiry and first production is more than twice that requiredn two of the six stages ofcoess (negotiation and Insullation/firsloviei firms take three times as long a* Western firms
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Ibeestern rale*be less jnif -tint than whether Uicy themselves on assimilate on Ini. polled technology met quickly than oochome. Ai Ibe ublclhca not available dorneslicjilly. importing iits time. Ho-r. -a, if equipment embodying (he tcchrvdoiyalrcad< available in (he USSR, auimitauon is presumably speedier ihiouch iu use. raiher (ban through impo'ii Bui even In this case, Soviet enterprises sometime* prefer Woicni supplier* because (hey are supposede rnote reliable. Inoe offset by delivery delays after shipmenti have reached Soviet soil. Fuithermore, US-Govcramcni-imposed sanctions have on occaiion caused US luppli ers to suspend contractual obligations to Soviet buy
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Moreover, even if imporlini ipeedt up asumilation by one end user, it I* not deaf that il accelerates diffusion throughout the economy. Diffusionew technology be embodied in Soviet -producedtirtw-consuming process ihai often deraandticaeatcai andent. The USSR seldom begins such RAD work until auirnitation of imported plant and equipment is well under way or even complete. This i* ntually some twoeven years from lhc initiation of interest by the Soviet end user (Stage 1)
Additionally, there it evidence that the Soviets somein (hear attemptsccomplish diffusion (StageAccording twF
uccessful diffusion of an import within ihe civilian economy is rare Consequently, he Said, imported Wesiern technology bat not prtOueedj IK changes in the economy, and technological advances in Soviet indusiry continue to depend pn< manly on domtiiic inearth and development
At least three Wester* at rd.es have. su the Sen-let chemicaligh levelports,
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continuedone period of time, hai tended to peipetuate denendence taihci than end It.
howi thateed for specialiied equipment (which the chemical Industry has been importing (or the pasthe machine-building industry hai made only limited progress in itsThis prolonied dependenceontinued hi of Sovicl technology behind that of the West Both Wesiern and Soviet observers have noted ihst even if atechnology reachesn the Soviet Union, it often hat taken so loos that the diffused technology is obsolete '
Moreover, the Soviets evidently are nottatisticalon survey dau from Western businessmen collected in Philip Hanson's chemical induftry studyndicated that leadtime pertorinaoee has not improved over the last JO yean, despite Soviet industry'sfamiliarity with the same Western firmi.'
The Sovieli themselves seem dissatisfied -ith Iheir Iradtimc performance. Articles drawing attention to unlniialled or malfunctioning imports oftenhe Soviet press. One such article concluded that ihe actual lime from plant oommissioning to attainment of full capieily can be up to SO rxreeni longer than the planned timeT
Jfl large sharell foreign equipment ii almost uielrat becameelivered so late that it no longer fits ia with the cnierprtse'i plans These prookmin though the Sonets seem tohcr prmniy so tbe assimilation of Western equipenent than io that of dornetiic oauipmert (see irk:)
estern materials in scores of technology ateat and distribute! compilations (usually monthly) io RAD institutes and ministries throughout Ihe country. The VJNITI documents are supplemented by material from other Moscow-bawd clearinghouses, report! filed by Soviets who have iraveled abroad, and subscription! to Western journals.'
The distribution system fonaroos smoothly, butfulnrti itonsiderable degree offset by certain impediment! For eaampJe.
A thorough grasp ef the Western data often defend, on instruction Ibat can be prewsded only by direct personal contact withthe Soviets often (orbid or sharply limit.
The scope of technologies in which the Soviets have trading interests is too great for tbe relatively limited number or import decision makers toeiatp through their own efforts. (These drxUtonmakers are primarily officials in Groplan, GKNT. the Ministry of Foreign Trade, andor Leningrad -bated ministerial offices who are fat removed liom the day-loday activitiesherefore they muil icly on lliese enterprises to accomplish ibe bulk of the review of Wesiern lileraiurc and to submit pertinent in lor ma lion and recommendations io then These enterpnses. however, may distent tbe information they give to theeven withholdorder io escapeinnovate
IKurmin.nl. of Tendtimei in Each Slag, of Ibe
Import Process
Stag*. icon of Western Plant or Equipment The Sovieu haveassive and effective lyttcm for collecting and duseminaiing information on Wetlcrn technology. The key organisation in ihi*he large Moscow-bitted All-Union Institute lor Scientific and Technical Informationt
Centralonnes attempt to eouoterbalaace this reluctance to innovateombination of administrative dneclion and tmkering wiih incentives The former arc generally annual "innovation isrgeu" leviedinistry ind its coirsuiueni enterprise! The taller involves modifying economic or organirs-ii.in.il mechanisms lo provide incentives without changing the bosie command Structure of the lysiem.
V. Cah.mMi IKnil, iS<-u mi r- IWtvt
The high priority assigned to assimilation of Western equipmentvtaenetdecree issuediiasic bonusercent at the total value of construction and installation troth fee on-lime project completion andi-peecenl increase to this bonus /or projects using large amounts of imported equipment. Ineparate resolution was Issued orderingto ensure that imported equipment is put Into service and brought up lo capacity operation within the warrant' period
Soviet cdTtcieli have recrntly criticized the foreign trade organisations for foot-d'afgtng in their negitia-tions with Western suppliers This suggestsottenllfi- lO the problem of import leadtimei
liven ttcminriy sensible centrally directed measures olten to awry, however, in ihe prevailinc sellers'here chronic shortage* force buyen lo take whit they can tel. For tiampte. guaranteeinghigher priceew product stemming Ironoften kadiinanufacturer re pretend aa new orroduct that hai in fact hadosmetic change. The combination of centrally controlledof resources and the weak bargaining positM" of buyers enables such activity lo spread widely
Even though disincentives fat outweigh inccnirvci for innovation, noi all innovation targets ate met through deception. There arc somenot many for enterprise managersursue real
Genuine innovation probably helps ministerial and cntetprise officials gain attention from higherand Ihus enhances their cared prospects.ew cases, managers may be forced ti introduce real change in rei[Onse to centrally oerted pressures. These pressures are applied at the enterprise level through an Enterprise Technical Council, whichthe enterprise's technical achicrcmcPU andto the minbby. The enterprise alsound for Innovation, and management has an Incentive in make ll appear that thii fund is being used well
Whether inspired by (lie carrot or ihe stick, huweter. innovation tends to be conservative, even whenenuine Since many production manager* view'Westcrn companies (especially Weal lUiropcan andas more reliable than Sovietihey often choose importingay lo meet innovation targets. Ministries, for Ihe most part, try lo inaugurate new technologies in newecause innovations in an cabling plant often require production adjust meals that threaten its ability lo satbfy ill ciisiing pcrfceev ance indicators Furthermore, new facilities increase Ihe sire sod prestige of the ministry
equest la* Funds
Aficr enterprise or ministry offieith have identifieduseful import, they begin the processapproval to enter into irade negotiationsusually complex and protracted, except forby central authoritiesave highapplica-
tion to purchase machinery mutt demonstrate that Ihe imparl is needed, that the USSR hat no suitable substitute, and lhat money would be saved by the purchase. The application mini include itatcmems from relevant Soviet minittrics thai they cannotIhe equipment in Ihe tequired quantity, quality, and lime
The actus] purchase justification ii submitted firstreview and then (if tentatively approved)central authorities '
reports thatocument may contain up toyped pages
urchasemecoi.ii.rr.-cog procedure, generally requi'ing the following .tcps:
Consultations within an enterprise! design bureau or between ii and other interested organizations tofirst cut" technical specification.
Submission of technical ipeoonsiniiliy technical review committee with an explanation of the purpose of the inii.ni. for preliminary approval
Resubrnitiiori (after preliminary approval)erailed funding request and the documents showing that the technology is not available from domestic sources.
The ministry's technical review committee evaluates (lie justification request end eiiher denies it or sends it forward for funding. If approved by centralthe fundi are usually included in lhcnnual plan. Since plant arc formulated three to six. month* before they go inioignificant amount of lime can be lost in the budgetingormer Sovieiu estimated that as long asnonths may elapse between ministry approval and ibe beginning of negotiations with the foreign supplier. (Simitar delays can be cipeeled for projects involving domestic resources, since they must usually go through this same application process.l
Inertia seems toajor determinant ofimport*.
report! that industrial ministries
routinely win renewal of yeiiij allotments for importsearly constant level. However, Ihe central authorities lend to place requests for increased or new funds at the bottom of their priority list, and if the funds are approved ihe lag before import negotiations begin is generally longer than for renewal requests. In many instances, addiction to routine, coupled with tightening hard currency constraints, apparently lakes precedence over the need for new technology from abroad
egotiation With Western Suppliers
3 bas reportedarge Soviet foreign trade orgaruutton like Mashinoimport is responsible for conducting0 trade negotiationsmore than its staff can handle raped itroblem i* rccognired by Soviet
lust bis FTtf'carinot always give expe-
dient attention to smaller equipmentnce negotiation* do begin, they typically lake three* in theseveral reasons, including tlie need for approval from multiple sources. An imtvsi imay need as many asignature*.
The burceuuauc and geographic separation of llie PTOning team from lhc Soviet end use: nlso stretches oui lhc process. The FTO i* qualified to pursue commercial negotiations, but usually not ihe necessaryii discussions Sine end users are
not often part of ihe formal negotiating team. Special arrangements must be made for (heir participation. This requirement prolongs kadtimes by making" the commercial and technical aspects of the negotiations relatively distinct and sequential, instead of overlap-piog. Still, cases exist where the end user docs not participate in the negotiations at all (see inset)
legitimes are further lengthened iny the incentive system for FTO negotiating teams. This usually emphasizesn foreign exchange, obtaining favorable fsaandrtB, and extracting price concessions. Negotiations to achieve these objectives are often time consuming, even though the inieretts of both individual end users and (he economyhole might be better served by speedier import of the technology bang sought
Lcadtimes arc also prolonged by the exclusion of foreign advisers from moil projects. Westernfind it difficult to supply all relevant instructions and documentation because of the Soviet icluctanoe to supply information on how and where the import will interface with existing systems and plants. For example, the Soviets significantly limited Western suppliers" visits to the Kama River Truck Plant and withheld drawings of the buildings in which the imported equipment was to be insullec1
To get at much as possible oul of this one-way flowfor trillion, the Soviets often demand vastdocumentation.rex
xof approiimatcly J6
ypical proposal prepared^ Soviei spedfVcaliortsubic feet. Further more, an FTO normally sends inquiriesairly large number of competingfirm* fin (be case cited, seven} and must usually study all thdr proposal! before it selects the firms with which it will negotiate further
Great detail is later required in the coniraci itself and in ibe operating instructions. For example,
ites operating instructions in whichwording'was "Openhis wasat Soviei request, to read "Openands, three turnsheoeckagc was tout limes the sue normal
Brcauit of Information iranunllial problem* result-ingfrom bureaucratic and teorrophic separation. FTOs may oropr rouipmeni Ihai the end KM cannot
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rehai expensive "ouiomaiedJurnacr"purchased for ihe Iron foundry ml ihe Kama River Truth Plant hai never been Itsialled.it was not requeued byfuund'p MMWH and II inappropriate to iheir nrrJi In another case, o Jj
J eealli thai the Ministry of Foreign Trade lailea ia include rrpreiemativei of hisin the negotiating team tent lo purchasethough the Ministry was nol familiar with hts enterpriie'i special requirementsesult, the eomputerited banking system that the Miliary purchased from France proved lo beolossal failure, because ii wot detunedapital-ill system and could not be adapted to Soviei needs."
checkpoints, 'ii'ii undodifferent jurisdiction, lie tote final delivery This multiplies ihe opportunities for bureacralic delay
Once ihe import arrives, the Soviet end user face*newbstacles. If the plain is new. thewith installation is particularly lengthybecause of problem* in theAccording to
the purchasing
ofnecra who select impom roe new pttnt* and arrange for their delivery mutt do so during the planning stage* of Ihebefore the plant will be ready for mtiallation of equipment. However.ercent of all construction projects are completed behind schedule (even though the schedule is anything butesult, the Western producer often dcltveis equipment long before the construction of the plant is at the stage where it can be installed
Two other Soviet tendencies can cause delay at ihe negotiation *iage.o word an initial inquiry so vaguely Ihai many Western firms do not realize they have been asked loroposal, and the other is to interrupt negotiations for substantial periodswarning or explanation
1.
A recent ;
Soviets insisted that production
unitsaspian Sea project be deliveredven though drilling was not scheduled lo bebeforehe equipment will thus "sit idle for alear and develop rust lubrication, and/or dry rot problem* *'
elirrry, Installation, and Flrtt Us* Lead timet inte long; ihe overall lead time from initial contact lo firti use of theften three lo four times the normal leadtimes in the West, according pj Wcatcrn studies of the chemical and machine tooloviet literature it repleir with eaamplti of poorly formulated tappinginadequate port faeilitiea. and tbortaga ofof whacb tend an 'iicteh out delivery of importi lo the end use*
Another cause of delay i* the fragmentation ofDornetiic ihipr-ag eharsnels are so airaaged ihai .mp.il. muttlcaiedumber of
't/. amtn
gQU'lliHI t* Mahdm Hill anil ftiiiioSlal tva firwann laiiatwu.i-xi' a/ Wiui'H TnlwaVxy, Soa'aia ftiMiitli iiMiiinr Mini. lt.IV
A plant presumably canomestic delivery schedule more eauly lhan it can tcvise an intcination-al contract Thus, tbe laci of coordinationeqjipnwni delivcites aad plantreater when the equipeeentimporter*
Even if the ptani i* built and already producing, tbe lag in installing imported equipment can still be significant; it often bas been the subject of criticism in the Soviet picas The chemical industry's handling of imports mm deridedrovda cartoon ofIUnl buried ursdet crarea of machine loot* Tbe accoatpaaving narrative Mated that the
* Mia* xaaww tarWtaai tt annmana ianii^Ti IiaJi lad aainotn ifcai- aa- crrnrxOK nan anaikia|
1
No.opototik Production Assoeinlioq "PolimCf"iot made any use of imported equipment valuedublei and thai9 Ihe Usolikiy "Khlm-piom" Association had received imported equipment worthubles that had never been Installed and had. in fact, deteriorated beyond repair while in Storage9 Soviet authorities checkedxtro-ehcmical eompteiea and foundt which equipment awaiting inilallation was lying unprotected. Such negligence remit*cut ofof which affect Ihe handling of domestic atat imported '
' Itnie ftnualIrrt ntwia
niaaa Ir Ike
aad paw rakci molniiio*.
Still another impurlant factor can prolong leadtimes in Stageeported Soviet procedure of lometimes requiring lhatercent of total cquipmenLbc delivered before installation begins Because deliveries forplants (or for major renovation projects in old ptanu) arc often spread cert over many months orquipment lhat could have been insiallcd may instead lie deteriorating pending arrival of additional shipments *
Slag*Initiation
Sovicl sources indicate lhat the intervali between first use of imported equipment and in use at rated capacities arc frequently SO percent longer thanplanners consider normal There are two main reasons for ihn
m finding reliable suppliers for theand equipment necessary to milall and service ihc new technology. This reflects, in pari, the
cha racier is tic tautoess in Soviet plans.
coordination among central planners with lopoosibrlily for differed phases of the same protect
A current eiampte of poor ptaasuogupplier plant and an end-use plant being built at the same time (eachesternilcene-lers (km) apart. This distance greatly Increase* the probability of delivery problems. US engineers have noted lhat if the two plants were constructed in the West, iheyW be no more than IS km apart
Because supply uncertainly is more the rule than thefcr USSR. Soviet enterprises tend lo produce in house the items Ihey really need. This inefficient practice can cause downtime andmalfunctions that, among other negative conse-ouences. can delay the achievement of rated capacity.
When neworusedew enterprise, managers may attempt lo mini-miie the risk of failure by altering ihe criteria used to monitor their performance. They can do this, for esample, by deliberately Operating at less tiur.rates, out of fear that higher rates may convince superiors to sei more demanding norms
*
difficulty the Sovieu have capcricnccd in mesh-in* imparled anddameiiie machinery it another marie cauvc of delay ia Slice* tome imported ammonia planu. for ctsmptc. incompatibility of do-meisk and foreign machinery tut earned equipment nuifarKtmu resulting in tigiuficaat prodnciionOther industries have been affeeied a* well. The failure of domestic and foreign equipment lo dovetail haiajoi problem0 at the Nairii Production Association- This Incompatibility delayed the opening and impeded the subsequent smooth functioningynthetic rubber production line there. Furthermore,2 itollution
ihi; prwir.ptcd local M<: H
order production ttonped until the accessary repairs were made, thm tatk was scheduled to be completed by the end of Ihr current fire-yesr plan
Mllfunctiont in imported ptsnt and equipment often item from tbe processing of low quality or oihciwiae unsuitable materials and from inadequate preventive maintenance Liamples include the breakdown of imported machinery when it -Jl used to make parts from slot)ioaensile strength or pans thai eiceoSed pcrrtuisiMc dimcniiofii and'u'r.age production lineciet ou' of commisiion because of the uie of inferior Sonet bronir
Another important constraint on puttinghe Soviet reliance onfor karninc bow to ute equipmentttirnple it the ctpcneocc ihe Soviets hsietryingthe IBM InformationThat was ix-ported4
hai never
-arked well mainly because ihc Soviets have used only the written instructions Theie aie incompl'te bccauic HIM ItptCU to tend its awn people to lirln end users ler rejected by ihe Soviet1
Whatever the Caul* of equipment malfunctions flack of mlorrualvM. poor mamlcnanee. trtiprorwf raw ma-icrit'i. orWsni) (hear effect depends on how quickly int Sonet) cane equipment wwksni again Here ihen record Ii poor Even when tbeydo alto- Wejtetn technicians io teivice importedrlnc meddling often deleyi the work
hit reported thai in order to make
one hour of repairs st an acetic acid plant inhe tpcnl two weeks in thrTTlSSB
Also,indicate thaii is usual
uy lew ur no replacement parts to avoid spending foreign cichangc.reakdown of ihe simplest pari can caute an ei tended delay as replacements are ordered from the West c* fabricated locally. Thisap*ice ofoccurs more frequently ai cquiprnent ages Rcccouy one half of the SO Western made (wlldoien used by (he LentoJolO Production AtsoCiation gold-irimng facility lay idle becautr ick of iparc parti
According lo aiIk nam
shorUgc hai kept man) ol irvr imported USio ihc USSR's petroleumof service for ciicndrd periodsalso plagues Oil drilling
C T ndicate thai il is gctune worse and thai spare parti portions of recent import contractt for the petroleum drilling indutlrv hive, in many cases been cut by over SO percenT
Slag* i: Diffusion
Successful diffusion uiuilly require! becoming inde pendent uf imporls by producing ihe equivalent plant and equipment domeiticaHy Ibu arduous technical talk it becoming increanngly ilillwult because of ihc growing oarnpleaiiy ol Ihe imnorti In nsanr caaea Ihe SovseU lack ihc ik><It and rrvaitriahjjed for series prraducsioa of similar Ke.as ACd^nV.llly. Soviet re tearcben do nr* alwajt have acceia IO ihc lypca of equipment and resourcesia the West and lhu> chieving the neeeuary Quality iland ards
Forlhat in
thehe ictearcb il.lt at the Meeba. I'roieei Imtilulr for Oilaier Lquipiilent in Moscow iprnl irrrnl years ii yinr. toub mcniblc pump for use in Oil1 be staff look tiempied lo copyhem with minor modifKaliritti llie major Humbling block was tbc icfusal ol Soviet industrial officials to
supplyeiiats on whicl. .he quality andof imported pomps depended. Staff enf inecti were amazed that US companies could easily obtain nicltel and other metals foe then pumpi. since Sovietmetals atepilmaiily for direct defense application'
Soviet failures in diffusing imported technology result not only from or gamrjnagement and inferior technological capability, but also from .he practice of keeping cutting facilities and equipment in use far longer than in the West. Demand is so great that old and inefficient plaali can still sell their output and continueperate. Thus, inertignificant variation in physical configuration,and performance standards between plants producing the same goods. These variations doom to failure most attempts to force-fit to one plant the complex imported equipment thai works tn another.
fiven when the Soviets have successfully diffused imports, their Icadiimet. compared to those in the West, have been extremely song. Long lags inre not unique to imports, however many of the same influences also impede ibe diffusion of domestic tech-rtology. s-
The successful adaptation of irnpotts for nse at Soviet-made products must begin with RAD concepts that arc workable, but Ihe geographic andseparation oftganitation* from end user plants deprives tbe RAD employees of full knowledge of the environments wnbin which then concepts must work. The RAD incentive system in the USSR, which usually allows bonus payment before an idea is translated inlo production, does not encourage the RAD employee to seek such knowledge This partially explains the significant aao between research and application in the USSR
The Soviets have attempted to close this gap aad speed up tbe innovation process through tbe use of scientific production assoelaiiooi (NPOs) that bring research, devekiprrscoi. and production responsibilities together under one roof. They claim that the NPOs. which currently number more thanave reduced kadttmes byo ii percent. They probably are referring, however, to the lime between
phase and firsthe NPO plant, not between RAD and eroescmy-wide use Additionally. NPOs are often assigned normal production quotas hyiheit industrial ministry bosses, in addition IO their operi-rocntal wears; toward speeding upthey have even been ordered to cease eaperi-motal work altogether in order to make up for losses of production elsewhere in Ibe ministry
The efficiency of Soviet had institutions ioworkable concepts is also impaired by the(and sometimes virtual absence) ofandoviet surveyin different branches of industrygS percent of them coined designs andby hand.
estimated that the Soviet Union has
0mall fraction of thee:estern country of equivalent site and development would have. Thisymptomore generalroblem, as described as "insufficient Laboratory equipment and very poor manufacturing capability to produce new types of industrial-stair equipment.'
Misallocaiion of RAD labor resource; alsotimes. This problem has two parts. Fi.it,scientists, for prestige and otherpursue theoretical work in researchare not the prime morn in ippt.fc" RADSecond, the successful performance ofdeveloped io manufacture prototypesskilled blue cotlai woi kcrs However. {_ reports
thai ihe demanding workilot plant receives about the same pay as the less using workroduction plant and that the pilot plant workers have smaller "bonus pools" than those in prodvsclion.esult, the innovating sector cannot attract tbeworkers ft needs significantlyperformance and prolonging lead timet
After workable RAD concepts are formoUted and pilot tested, there it still no assurance they wil ever be introduced into serial production. The RAD esxabusb-ment. fee ibe most part, lacks the authority (evenit has tbe desire) io force imtiementatioo of itsover ibe objections of plant
'"'i tins from the Use of Western
Equlpaeil
Theould never have accomplished theiryear program atmodernization and expansion in the motor vehicle Industry without Western help. The Flat-equipped VAZ plant, foe example, produced onef all Soviet passenger ears when it came fully otiirramnd the Kama River Truck Manl. which Is beted almost exclusively on Western equipment and technology, not supplies nearlyercent of Soviet output of heavy trucks.
large computer tystemi and minicomputers qf Western origin hove been imported in largesystems sincethey (a/ here capabilitiet that the Sa-rlett eannoi match and lb) use complex software that the Soviets have not developed.
Cear-cultint machtnet of US origin have been usedroduce military trucks, wheeled armoredand components foe missile transporters, and US technology acquired for the Cheboksary tractor plant was used toew ll-cylindc tank engine.
well Howprotracted delays in acquiring and installing the equipment have reduced the effec-ttveneu of its use." "
As the pinch on tbc USSR's labor, capital, and natural resources ti^menr and the leading edge of Western technology continues to advance, the Soviets will continue to import Wesiern technology and equipment to alleviate bottlenecks and modernize domestic industries. Even though effective diffusion of technology might occur more quickly throughdevelopment, Moscow will continue lo relv on imports because the USSRreater premium on satisfying current requirements for equipment and technology than on potential long-term uses
As in the past, some of these Jmpotts will rabc the technological level of specific industries and/or in-crease the quantity and quality of iheir output, and some may find application in Sovicl weapons(tee inset)
Nevertheless, Moscow will find it increasinglyto catch up with the general level of technology in advanced Western countries by relying on imports of Western plant and equipment. This is partly because some imports embody technology that it not state of the art and are bought simply to improve the average quality of the USSR's own plant and equipment. Even
if the Soviets choose the most up-to-date technology..
however, imports stand little chance of eliminating the Soviet Lag behind the West, because;
Widespread application ol such imports probably will be rare.
If effective application ever occuit. it is likely tomany years.
Soviet engineers, having not gone through theexperience lhat underlies the imported equipment, will be ill prepared lo carry thetechnologytill more advanced level
-In HIS (hi Sovieu CMietcted firmS) lo
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tatticM. Simitar CQuipmo"'.Hi ai
boi Sai bora delayed
bluitMKit covU have previetfd um<OOOOO turuli per difefoB wrrrl beiwl thaiai^ from Ihoc fetal. Sam of the delay, however, ihe vtikSc" of opportunity for lit man irluinetevcnenl mir hive been aHbaed. txcatiK the vilir cvtflSe .mounth ihr eiQalvo ii now hiSu Ihin umlaut lor eitr.ctlon h, in UK 1
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Original document.
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