Created: 8/1/1984

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Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters3


Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters3

SoiirlAcfitilv Outside Nome w

SutisiKa) analysis ind'cmes lhal Soviei naval .tupsigh of0 ship-days oultidc home waieri inperceni more thanhe lime speni oui of urea by general purpose submarines nnd am-phibsou* warfarencreased, while lhal of surface comboianisThe Soviet presence increased in everycpl lhc Indian Ocean and lhc waters off West Africa Overall, however, lhc average daily oui-of-arca presence ofhips andmore than half of which were auxiliaries and researchlesserceni of lhc Soviei Navy

Several changes in deploymenl pailerns and composilioo occurred:

In Ihe Indian Ocean, ibef Soviet shirt-days continued the sicady decline that began1 The Soviets continued their efforts lo secure naval privileges in Sxychellt-s. Mauritius, and other liitoral stales Other aciiVitics included opera Horn by ihe Novrxossiysk .ertieal ukeoff and landing IVTOL) aircraft carrier.

In the Pacific, ihe overall Soviet presence increased almostereem. This was largely due io iheowih of the Soviei naval force in ihe Souih China Ser-ue rivaling lhal of lhc Indian Ocean Squadron.

In ihe Mediierrancan, (he Soviei presence increased somewhat.oderate remfoicemcnl of the squadron during lhc Lebanon crisis. The Soviets coniinued io develop nnvul lies wilh Libya and io seek coniracts for the repair of naval auxiliaries in Gicck shipyards.

In lhche Soviet presence increasederceni. Intelligence ship and submarine opcraiions were conducied close to ihe Allamie coasi. as well as the Pacific cmm. of ihe United Slates.

In Ihe Caiibbean. no Soviet task group anived in Cuba4 It conducied caiensive ASW training activitiesuban naval forces.

Wesi Africa, the number of Soviet ship days remained liable Thereumber of show-1he-flag vmis.

oir.i< v

Soviet Naval Aviition (SNA) continued to makeubstantial pan of ihe overall Soviei presencelthough total aircraft deployment dayi changed little, there were significant changes in lite types of aircraft deployed in several regions. Tbe initial deployment of nine Badger aircraftietnam may foreshadow eipansioo to atoircraft '

Wc believe that the pattern and scope of Soviet naval deployments observed3 will continueistant deployments provide Moscow high visibility abroad but involve (he commitment ofmall portion of iota! Soviet navaloscow jj not likely to undercut the readiness of the Navy to perform high priority wartime tasks in waters close to home by increasing tbe number of units operating in foreign waters Newer and more capable platforms will, however, be depk>yerj. We capeci the Soviets will continue to respond to fluctuations in tbe sue of the Western naval pretence in distant (egtons and to pursue ihe operationalief new or expanded naval privileges in Third World nations.


Scop* Note

paper is oneeries thai annually summar ires Soviei naval andair activity outside home waters It includes trends in the level of Soviet naval presence in distant waters, and il seeks to highlight Ihe more important or unusual activities of the Soviet Navy in those waters. Changes in Soviet access to or use of foreign naval and naval air facilities are alto noted. This paper touches on Soviet naval diplomacy in the Third World as it relatesoviet naval operations, but tt does not include analysis oforeign policy in ihe Third World, ti alio does not cover naval activities in waters contiguous io the USSR or the wartime missions or capabilities of the Soviet Navy

Soitct Naval Aciiviiy Outside Home Waters3 (U)

This paper eaaminet lhc Soviet naval presence in seven region*he level of naval deploy -menls is compared wilh lhal ol recent yea's, and imponam naval aciivilica In each region areTbc paper also looks aheadikely develop-mems4 and beyond

Tbe US Naval Operational Intelligencesupplied the dan on Soviet navalhome waters. We ine lhc yearly tabulapresence ol one ship away fromfar onecompare ocplcyyrneuthose of preceding yean aad to idcaiif)deplovmcni patter nsa lysis of Semct navaland use of facilities is derived

*2as arc ocscnpiions of. ai ma/or facilities. We also use NOIC's month-ly summary of port calls lo help assess Soviet intercil in individual countries or regions. Judgments about Soviei use of naval forces fat political purposes me alt-source evaluations

General Paltrrn of So-letymenls The Soviei naval presence outside home *aiers6 percemoa record high oferceni store tbe prerl on peak set0 Alihough ihis number refkcii an overall rise in our of area drploymcnis. ibeieeeneer eases in ihe aura her. as well ashe type, of ships deployed to individual regions (sec. Soviet snip-days in ihe Pacific increasedue mainly to the continuing growth of the naval presence in Use Soulh China Sea and the continuing decline in ship-days in the Indian Ocean sincea decrease of aboutercent last year. Soviet deployays in Ihe Caribbean increased 9West African ship-days, which increased aboutercent. declined slightlyhe

' RifWaal rw.utiini1 1I( drii-rvwetilte NivjlOpfraiaMil laiillifiactof shipt lo ih* Atlantic increased aboutoceril last year, andn iheSea lose nearly as much

Overall changes io deployment patterns included in-crcases ia lac oul-ol-arca ship-days forar-pose and ballistic motileauiiUarica, mine warfare ships,ise of over TO percent foe amphioioui warfare ships. Only the deployment days Tor surface combatants and research and space event iuppoil ships fStSSs) declined

From Moscow's pcispeciivc, the acquisition of naval privileges aisociaied with distant drploymenli serves both operational and political purposes.lhc Soviets' use of foreign facilities contributes lo iheir ability lo sustain worldwide deploy menu in keeping withayor letoaatsorul power li provides an opportunity lor peacetimeof Western naval forces lhal could eilend into ihe early nagca of hostilities. Mosi foreign facilitieshich lhc Soviets have access, however, are not currently suitable for extensive wartimesupport or loron ing supplies. They serve largely as secure, sheltered SKboragca, and most would be highly vulnerable in wartime. Politically, the Soviets appear to believe thai naval forces abroad can reinforceesponse to regional crises, under -score ils commit meat to specific, policies or local regimes, and support its cfloru totic* to individual gervcramenis Such benefits are intangible, however, and hiitrjrically iransien

Measuring Soviet Naval Presence Using ship-dayseasure of Soviei naval presence outside home waled can be misleading without latins several considerations into account'

Soviet Navy must commit ships to maintenance before, alter, and sometimes during overseasto maintain mil of-aica force levels. Thus the hip-day count does noi reflect the lotal limein supporting distant naval operations

Soviet Out ol area dcptoyraearii attractyet. ihey lie up welt underercent of aily avengeaily average ofurfaceand aboul It general purposeeiccni of the combaianiercent of the general


Ships in transit for tea trials or interfleet iransfci are counted, although ihey may perform onlyoperational functions or none al all.


Indian Ocean. Soviei ship-days in the Indian Ocean continued the downward trend thai beganie resolution of ihe Iranian hostage crisis1 and ihe subsequent reduction in ihe US naval presence in the region. The Soviet presence dtopped by app'Oti-matclyercentJ |scc figureuring the same year. Ibe Soviet Indian Ocean Squadronof an averagerom about0nd2 the Squadron usually included one general purpose submarine, two or ihree surfaceine warfare ship, one


mphibious ihips. aboulauaitiariea. and threefoul rocaick ship* or SESSveomposition) fartherin operational capability.'

ip-da yi. which fellerceni in Ml.or herccfni) eon-

i, ihe pattern begun

days foiurpose submarines dropped byercentevel last seen wlessourth of0 figure. No submarines were present in the Indian Ocean for more than three months from early May to early August. (

ship-dlyihile amphibious ship-days remained fairly siable

The only rotable increase3 was in mine warfare slug-days, twi these ships servetnoniior-ing . .tv> and do little to enhance the combat potential of the Squadion.

oviet carrier task group deployed inio the Indian Ocean ll made port calls inre the official reception wasand Madias, India. One combatant also broke off and visited Seychelles during transit Forces deployed io the Indian Ocean paniopaicdorldwide Soviet naval (see Global Eaer-cisc)

Sciei hydrographte research ihipa were busy in theroup of three to (cur research ships operated eatensively in ihe northern Arabian Sea. Olher hydrogiaphie ships were present in theChannel,attern of researchbegun1 Wc do not cipeci a? capanded So-iei naval peesence in the channel in the near term, bui wc recognize the potential military applicability of ihe program Similar research was carried out ofT Vietnam. West and Cuba before regular Sonei deploywteau so those areas The research in the Arabian Sea may serve both miluaiy and economic purposes

The Soviets made noaining foriher naval access lo Mauritius las) year Onlynaval-subordinaied research shiport call at fort

Luuiseveral civilian rcseaich vessels did call, however,) and the fiew quartern late ^clearance request was submitted to the mauruian Govcmmeni lor the projected4 visit of two destroyer* and an auxiliary oil tanker

) the Sovietsecord number of poil calls to Seychelles. These included calls icQucsicd by Presidenthe hat done in thesupport res regime during his absence from Use com-try or dunng limes of perceived danger io bisOne call, for example, was madeoviet Kopucha-class amphibious landing ship ihai stayed in harbor foe aevceal days, during which lime small, lightly controlled groups of ship's crew and naval infantrymen took shore leave C

3 however, the Sovietsin otner locatev -de not command the respect of the local populace because of their arrogant attitude and lack of spending money. Tnia Ropucha is referred lo by tome Seychcllols as "Rene's babysitecause it hat appeared on uveral occasions dunng his absence from the country Other calb were made byand both naval and civilian research shipr

Tbe Soviets reportedly made additional efforts to increase iheir access io Seychelles by attempting to gain limited access io dilapidated fuel storageon Sainie Anne Island They huve failed, how-ever, io oblain access to any naval supper!pite of miluaiy aid and their longstanding offer of arotcctaaa for Rene

Ship viiiu by US, Brit iih. and Trench ships also Dccuircd in) and4 The US Navy reported that its port calluceess. and US naval personnell eo tried by the Seychelles

The Soviets continued to support the Indian Ocean Squadion wiih auxiliary ships and yirderatt stationed at Ethiopia') Dehalak' Desei (Dahlak Island) and at Aden. South Yemenumber of irporti lhat


lb* Sovieli were push "ifincreased naval access in both nations. little change was nosedptre 4

Stivles Ship-Days In the PaddcW


Lanka continued to contract lor the icpaiiew Soviet ausiliary shipsingapore's shipyards remained closed to Soviet naval vessels, as they have since the invasion of Afghanistan.coniinued. however,ake port calls iooften for replenishmeni, during transits between ihe Indian and Pacific Oceans.

ibe Se-ieis renewed

tneii pciKiur. n. ship isns io Madi-gaiennd proposed an cn>.aneed naval assistance program thai would i'clude patrol boats, training assistance,oint exercise. Thus tar. Piesidcni Raitiraka has apparenily icstsied ihese Sennet overtures

Peei/iehineThe Soviet presence in ihe Pacific Ocean, especially in Ihe South China Sea. increased almosi II percentew record for Pacifrfjship-days (sec figurehe presence of eveiy category of ship eicepf research veiselslhc level of surface combatant days remained stable

Deployments in the South China Sea accounted lor nearlyercent of Pacific ship days (see figure il continuing lhc trend thai began ingrowth In Pacifichc South China Sea and lhc contraction of the Indian Ocean Squadron '

An average of nunc ihinhips and submarines weie deployed oui ca* atea in ihe Pacificypical day)hat number, about four general puipose submarines, iwoor thtec surfacecombatinii.

t iheii-rw aaila

Saw* Chaaa aaaar paow thewhai af im Ocxia far ihr-,

lit IO.'


- Oil)


I. (Ml


i'ifNl'f 5

So.'ieln ihe Soulh China Sea Compared lo Ihe Remainder o( the3


oneine warfare ships, one amphibious ship. I* or IS luailiarsca. and one research ship were normally in ihe Soaih China Sea- -corrspartfl with

> three surface eombaianti. eight aaiilUriea.

and three general purpose submarines1n ihr Pacific, five nuclear-powered ballistic

missile submarines (SSBNs) Ihree general purpose

submarines, one surface combatant, four auxiliaries.

and three research or SESS ships were generally

deployed oui of area

The rose of Cam Rards Bay. Vieinam. as ihe sappon center fere expanded Soviei naval operalioni in the South China Sea continues lo grow



HI Vim* vwr.rc

Surffct tnnihjunl*

e .soviet* remain depenuem tor these servicesivcisc group of auailiary ships andnumbers nearly doubtedhe Snviei hospital ihip Ob also makei jieriodie deploymcnls io Camto provideor other personnel support

OO-ion floating drydoek delivered lo Ho On Mmhontinues lo service Soviet mgr. chant and some autiltary ships, as well as VieinartvcscOO'ton noating drydoek airivcd in Vietnam laic last year fiom the Black Sea. ll ie-maincd moored and inactive ai an old logistic lupiiott depot lull unriver from Ho Chi Minh City, until it was lowed It) IVuc-fuvlovsk in AprilA miall irantporlcr dock that remains al Cam Rari. may hsvc been turned over lo ihe Vietnamese Navy

Mediinraatan Sen. The Soviei naval presence in (he Mediterranean Sea increasederceni inihe highest level sinceremained well below lhai of ihesee} the Mediierranean Squadronincludedhips: nine aurfaccnine cenetal purposeine war-Care ship, one or two amphibious warfare ships.uxiliaries, and three or four research ships. '

There were several notable changes ia the composition of the squadron:

The presence of general purpose submarines rose aboulercent, to the hithesi levelnding the steady dedinc in the Mediierranean submarine presence since that year. The submarines not onlyeightened Soviet response to regional tensions; they alio participated in regular exercises of the Mediterranean Squadron.

The presence of amphibiousone Alligator landing ship or two small Polnoenythan tripled from the year before These ships usuajty icmaincd at anchor in the eastern Mediterranean, probably ready to respond to an escalation of ihe crisis in Lebanon that mighi require ihe evacuation of Soviets. Amphibious ships also took ran in some of the numerous eiciciscs throughout ihe year

The presence ol all other categories of ships in ihe region increased slightlyremained about the same

As in recent years, most Soviet naval activity occurred in the eastern Mediierranean in connection with the Lebanon crisis and the subsequent augmentation of US and West European forces in the region. In addition to monitoring Western naval and naval air forces. Soviet unitsarge number of port visits to Syria, both for minor upkeep and replenishment from auxiliary ships and io show the flat in support of Damascus C

Figure 6

Soviet Ship-Days In the Mediierranean


Sovirti alsourface gunnery caercisc of!

Lebanon fot ibc llrM (imc inin responseS actions in lhc legion. Soviet naval aviation (SNA! reconnaissance aircrafi de-ployed once io Syriaiatus

Soviet naval relations with Libya reflected the caution exercised by both sides in recent years. Soviei naval port calls io Tobruk and Tripoli coniinuedwith the moil frcqucnl calls during Ihe spring and summer The simultaneous visit of an Oskol-cUss repair ship'-class aniithip cruise missileiSSGl io Tobruk in2 was repealed in July and3

) ihe Sov.eis continued routine servicingin Syria and ovcihaul of submarinesin Yugoslavia and auxiliariesoviets

ew one-year at/cement tor coniinued useTunisian shipyard ai Menrel Bourguibahe press reported inoviei-Tunisian protocol on maritimehad been signed. The protocol containedaccordingbul did

covci lhc establishf some lypc of training assistance fir Tunisian shipyard workers

Ja stMN submarine and lepair ship visit took place in* at well,lass SS and an Amur class repair ship called in Tobruk. Such visits supplement ihe support given Mediterranean-deployed submarines in the crowded poet of Tarlus, Syiin. and njay include support of Libyan submarinesuid pro quo Soviei naval aircraft also deployed periodically to Libya during ihe year While the Soviets certainly will continue to take advantage of limned access to Libyan naval facilities, wc believe ihey will reject aay attempt by Qadhafi to embroil themotential US-Libyan maritime conflict

Soviet accesshe region drdsubttaatullv) According to theScmei unsimed auiihariet

continued io be repaired trrali numbcis al the stale ownedhipyard on Sytcn IslanC cm

J iapparent attemptave an aunliaiy repined'liaievs shipyardajor Hellenic Nav, base, svas lurned down.likely because of lite protests of(en* Navy

The Sovietsalso icsling

it) tec hown nutlt then lhcpo't iceeuprett renom also indicate

thai uric visit of two Soviet waiships io I'lraievs. in Octoberncluded (he innim.indtrihe Hlaei Sea rice-

atlantic otmn Soviet ship-days in ihe Atlantic Ocean increased aboutercenihe ship* and submarines deployed usually included nine SSBNs.eneral purpose submarines, two surface combatants, one or two mine warfare ships, nine orutiliariet. and eight or nine research or SESS ships (see figure> All categories of ship presence increased except for turfaee combatants, which declined.'

The Atlantic statistics) reflect normal Sovietin Warsaw Pact training in the Nonh Sea. Norlhern Fleel eierciscs ouisidc home waters, and routine Soviei activities such as stationing an oceangoing tugboat north of the Shetland Islandsontingency patrol for submarine rescue

class SSNs were initially deployed off the US cast COast for reconnaissance and surveillance piltol3 In earlyollided with Ihe io-ed acousiic turvcillance arrayS frigate icvcial hundred miles west of Bermuda. One of lhc two signals .nielligence collection ships (AGII Ihat routinely operate off liie US east COasialvage ship deployed to Cuba responded io ihe disabledeSN was lowed io

er ol UmiiiBe AllanliesrcorvSs ii inediterranean, ihe Ailiniie itiio-flar untili 'encieni iheVmrl nl nieritionil nival incwnei thatfluijeere an on-ilaiiondicn msk.esiheiht ihio-din ShipsliortliAllies, and eehtr rcftcnilim icvearAtlantic ihip-ijiv eoumi. is "ill maniim.'rx msidea elenlnvrnenii. and sea trill-


893 Crncrjl purple

B ssoh>

toi emergency repair and was eventually ableio the Soviei Union under iu ownatrol

coast,s had previously openied off the east ooast against USSSBN facilities and operations, including wint AGI/SSN activities.'

CanMeait Sen. No Soviet task group visited Cubalthough the one which arrived in late Novembercombatants and an attacknot depari Caribbean waters until the end ofoviet presence for theof the year consistedew auxiliaries and researca ships (see-

The neat Soviet task group, comprised of the Moskva-class helicopter carrierdaloy-class destroyer,lass diesel-aitack submarine,aval tanker, arrived in Cuba in latehe Leningrad is the first helicopter carrier sent to Cuba by the Sovieu, and the task groups arrival maiked the first visit to the Caribbean by an Udaloy-cJbss ship. The task group conducted joint eieccises with Ihe Cuban Navy andoint cruise into the Gulf of *

utrt.3 the Soviet navalin the waters ol West Africa dippedercent Irompercent upturn2 (seehe composition of the Wesi African pairol changed only marginally Irom thatJ and consisted of an average or one surface combatant, one amphibienjs warfare ship, three or four auxiliaries, and one or two research ships. The general purpose submarinewas reduced, however,lasseployed for about two months, in eontrast to the presence oflass during most2 An Alligator class landing ship -as deployed io thefor most. however, winch more than doubled the amphibiout deployment of the previous year

lulMM IS.w,<v

Mi hough Sovietor the Angolan Govcrnmcni increasedhe level and nu It re of Soviet ojvj| operations in the region did not change markedly. A*he Soviet Nsv> nude noil calls in Ihe region to chow Ibe flag. The mosi viable .a. lhaiask group visitnda led by the Kicv-clats curiierin) *

following the early Apiil coup In Conakry. Guinea, ihe Soviets made contingency plans for Ihe possible naval evacuation of Soviei citizens from lhat countiy. >

ihe li'it ma> have included anll,exercise by njvjl infantry and landing craft from (he Ivan Ru-ov-claw large landing ship wiih (he (ask group. Unlifcc ihe two preceding years, no Soviet naval vImis were made to Namibe iMocamcdcsl. The Soviet* cauiiously stayed away during ihe increased hoslitliic* in ihe region.

Nil evacuation became ueixuary. out wefuiurc Sovicl-Guincan naval relations andimited naval accctt remain areas of Soviet concern

The destroyer stationed at Luanda subsequentlyort call tofirst visit to thai nation since3 Ghana also began to allow some Soviet access foe air transports. Relations wiih Ghana may become increasingly important forif aeccss to Guinea is curtailed or denied

Soviet Naval Air Deployments

Deployment or SovietAviation (SNA1 airerati to distant areas continue* to provide Moscow aasset for lecannaiuancc or Western naval forces Increasingly, however. SNA is becoming moieas an operational lool in reaction to regional evenu andotential asset in (he event of hostilities,

fhc level or SNA presence abroads mess-ured in aircraft days in country. dropped lessercent from ihai2 tVc figure II') This trend

docs noi iclVil. hours cr.s ujniliuinlhe ruttemi ol deplwymenti itui occurred

In ike Indian (Xun. theufa> jniaubmannc airfareaircraft (elloot la percenti. bmrra SNA pretence nrataatj Airfield. Soulh Yemen, and Julia nac* IVir Atmera Cibnaraa.reduced IWpbji'rneni Io South Yemen normals about isvice ihai lob> abuut In ncictnl lo 'JS dais, while dcplo>incnihmpn increased nearly

percent,leiit the reduction ol" the depiocnenioulh fromans ofS Mniresent in the preceding ventsingle pair. The pattern ufingle pair ofs not disrupted at, when, beeuuie of lhc liritrean rebel ihicai. SNA aircraftould not useIV Airfield for several rnonthi

The mosi in.poriam SNA development in IvBJthe dcplos meni of nineadger aircraft io Cam Ranh lias in November lhc force,omposite squadron consists rsf foe strike.lanker. one photoreconnaiisaac* .and one cleorstnie counter measures lECMl aircraft Oilier than the presence of Badger bombers in Egim ia thetcniually turned over io theorslj prevsousf Badgers occurredingle rictcise related reconnaissance dcnloymtn' of snort duration in1




lirst flight* by

iheai Lam Kant ne. tot areaL.'l.i- <crunnniistancc flights everChina Sea. and ainna* refuelmi practiceApril.

Badgeri frna, nana patiscipaicot Soviet-Vietnameseeiere-se near Hai-phOtigC

Ocnloyrnenis to Cam Ranh byavalandSW aircraft ha*ea Stable basisair ol each typeIn July3

pailerninglend singlelying operaiional missionseam Wc believe lhc Soviets may seeomblnj'iooore efficient uie ofun ihr previous practice of tying pans ol Bear Ds Of Bear fs

After the arrival of ihr Badgers the Bear aircraft opanOcd "mi no*mil are* of operaixmi. taking greater advantage of then long 'ange by Hyingo*er ihe Last China and Philippine Seas, io'.-o- Slrail.- H Gull of Thailand lhc Badgers have supplemenied the Bear Ds aad Beat Fseconnaissancehe South China Sea

SNA Bear atrcrad based ia the Seme: Lr-jn also fl)

i^saonal inicllifcncc eolSrclron minors* into Ibcer a. ccaiial. and easiera Pacific Ocean

Pairs of IL-ll May ASW airerafi deployed io Libya three) -here Ihey participatedrase in SepIk- rccounjisiince missions against US naval 'nice* in liteair of Mays also tinged io Syria lor uie dutini the

ovrcitc The)one additional mi ele mission aftCf the evercise in rcipoiuc to ihe heightenedof iht Lebanon etna

The Soviet* continue periodically iaair ofuba. Sinceoncvcr.pair of 8cir ft hoi accompanied ihctc aircraft Although the Bear t* ind Dt do no> yet fly in miacd icants asdoom o< Cam Ranhear F> and oneidmion together inheircraft opcatc mainly between ihe United Slates and Bevmada. -they may aitempracate UStram-imgand from iheir bases- The Bear Ds fl> intelligence corleciiotioften against US naval banka wide area off ibe East Court

SNAcploymcni io Angola dropped byhird lasi year Wc believe ihe Soviets continue occasional SNA deployments io Luanda mainly loexcrciic ihair rt|hi of access there, although missions flown from Luanda usually lack substantial miliiaiy value because they air too distant from ilie Ailanile transit.lanes uied by ihe US Navy

Global Ear rrit*

The) worldwide Soviet naval exercise Involved "ui of arm operationsumber of


Acunty in ihe Mediterranean Sea included jntiiur-face warfare operation) involving lb* new Slava guided mimIe cruatcr and participation by IL-J* May ASW aircraft siagcd io Libya and Syria

Dear anerafi from Cam Ha oh Bay took part, and Sonet sabrruriraei ia ihe region may have been actKe ia the Souih China Sea

Units of the Sewiet Indian Ocean Squadron andeplored io Ethiopia and South Yemen con-ducted antnurlacc warlarc operations

Bear aircraft were deployed to Cuba and Angola, bui the eateni of their involvement in the excrcue is noi

The eiiensivc mc ol Soviei naval aircraft acres* during this exercise highlights ill value to Moscow both during peacetime and in the caily siagcs of actual hostility


Wc cipcci ihe evolution observed in ihe type of Soviet deployments lo foreign waters)d and beyond:

presenceeneral purpose submarinesoul of area willradual upward trend. These units arc increasingly being used for reconnaissance near US SSON bases on both coasts. In addition, mode miration of the Soviet general purpose submarine force will continue to make moreier submarine available for out-of-area opera lions.

While ibe number of surface combatantogged in distant waters may continue to deeline or stabilize near current levels.expeci the Soviets to deploy newer and more capable surface ships ooi of area

- The presence of amphibious warfare ships in foreign waters will probably continue to increase as the Soviets become increasingly aware of their utility fur regime support and contingency responserises abroad.

Moscow's quest for naval access abroad continues to meei wiih miicd results, the presence of large numbcis of auxiliary ships will continue to be essential io support the Soviet Navy's nut-of-area Operations As in ihe past, the Soviets are unlikely io allow their desire for naval and/or naval airtoycoparditc Iheir political relations wiih. host siaics

The overall level of distant Soviei naval deploymcnts will probably remain relatively stable Regional naval presence, however, will fluctuate because of crises and/or the augmentation of deployed Western naval forces The Soviet naval presence In Ihe Indian Ocean should stabilircowero new regional crisis- as ihe presence In ihe South China Sea stabilise!igher level



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